Case under the topic of Capacity to Act and Restrictions Thereon

= Presumption of Capacity- Capacity to act is presumed until the contrary is proven,

and that it be the reason for the specific act attributed. Proof of restriction: habituality,
presence at the time, no other cause.
19, PHIL, 363 No. 5921, July 25, 1911
The Standard Oil Company of New York, plaintiff
Vs.
Juan Codina Arenas and others, defendants
FACTS:
December 15, 1908 Juan Codina Arenas and Francisco Lara del Pino, as principals,
and Alipio Locso, Vicente Sixto Villanueva and the Chinaman, Siy Ho, as sureties sign a
bond in favor of plaintiff for the obliged to pay the amount of P 3,305.76 at three months
from date, with interest at P 1.00 per month.
April 5, 1909 The plaintiff sued the debtors regarding the bond sign and was
summoned, the record showing that summons was served on Villanueva;
May 12, 1909 - Villanueva did not appear, and was declared in default.
On process:
-

Wife of Villanueva appeared when judgment was about to be executed and

asked that he be relieved from the bond and the judgment because he was
insane (declared July 24, 1909) with his wife as his guardian.
Case was reopened and tried and the evidence showed that Villanueva executed
the bond with full understanding of the nature and consequences of the act
performed by him although he was suffering from monomania of great wealth.
He was, therefore, held liable on the bond. Hence appealed to the Supreme
Court.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not monomania of wealth necessarily warrants that the person does
not have capacity to act.
2. Whether or not Villanueva was actually incapable of entering into contract at the
time the bond was executed.

RULING:
SC affirmed the judgment of the CA. it would have been necessary to show that:
1. Such monomania was habitual and constituted a veritable mental perturbation in
the patient;
2. That the bond executed was the result of such monomania, and not the effect of
any other cause, that is, that there were not, or could there have been any other
cause for the contract than the ostentation of wealth and this was purely an effect
of such monomania of wealth.
3. That the monomania existed on the date the bond in question was executed.
Monomania of wealth does not necessarily imply that the person is incapable of
executing a bond such as that in question.
4. Capacity to act must be supposed to attach to a person who has not previously
been declared incapable, and such capacity is presumed to continue for so long
as the contrary is not proved, that is, at the moment of his acting he was
incapable, crazy, insane, or out of his mind; which, in the opinion of the court has
not been proved in this case.