Facts:

1. ENGINEERING AND MACHINERY CORP. VS. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 52267 January 24, 1996

Almeda and Engineering signed a contract, wherein Engineering undertook to

fabricate, furnish and install the air-conditioning system in the latters building along
Buendia Avenue, Makati in consideration of P210,000.00. Petitioner was to furnish the
materials, labor, tools and all services required in order to so fabricate and install said
system. The system was completed in 1963 and accepted by private respondent, who paid
in full the contract price.
Almeda learned from the employees of NIDC of the defects of the air-conditioning
system of the building. Almeda spent for the repair of the air-conditioning system. He now
sues Engineering for the refund of the repair. Engineering contends that the contract was of
sale and the claim is barred by prescription since the responsibility of a vendor for any
hidden faults or defects in the thing sold runs only for 6 months (Arts 1566, 1567, 1571).
Almeda contends that since it was a contract for a piece of work, hence the prescription
period was ten years (Hence Art 1144 should apply on written contracts).
RTC found that Engineering failed to install certain parts and accessories called for by
the contract, and deviated from the plans of the system, thus reducing its operational
effectiveness to achieve a fairly desirable room temperature.
Issue:
1) Whether the contract for the fabrication and installation of a central air-conditioning
system in a building, one of sale or for a piece of work?
CONTRACT
FOR
PIECE
OF
WORK.
2) Corrollarily whether the claim for refund was extinguished by prescription? NO.
Held:
1) A contract for a piece of work, labor and materials may be distinguished from a contract
of sale by the inquiry as to whether the thing transferred is one not in existence and which
would never have existed but for the order, of the person desiring it. In such case, the
contract is one for a piece of work, not a sale. On the other hand, if the thing subject of the
contract would have existed and been the subject of a sale to some other person even if the
order had not been given, then the contract is one of sale.
A contract for the delivery at a certain price of an article which the vendor in the
ordinary course of his business manufactures or procures for the general market, whether
the same is on hand at the time or not is a contract of sale, but if the goods are to be
manufactured specially for the customer and upon his special order, and not for the general
market, it is a contract for a piece of work .
The contract in question is one for a piece of work. It is not petitioners line of
business to manufacture air-conditioning systems to be sold off-the-shelf. Its business and
particular field of expertise is the fabrication and installation of such systems as ordered by
customers and in accordance with the particular plans and specifications provided by the
customers. Naturally, the price or compensation for the system manufactured and installed
will depend greatly on the particular plans and specifications agreed upon with the
customers.
2) The original complaint is one for damages arising from breach of a written contract and
not a suit to enforce warranties against hidden defects we here with declare that the
governing law is Article 1715 (supra). However, inasmuch as this provision does not contain
a specific prescriptive period, the general law on prescription, which is Article 1144 of the
Civil Code, will apply. Said provision states, inter alia, that actions upon a written contract
prescribe in ten (10) years. Since the governing contract was executed on September 10,
1962 and the complaint was filed on May 8, 1971, it is clear that the action has not
prescribed.
2. Calalas v. CA
Facts:

Private respondent Eliza Jujeurche G. Sunga is a college freshman at the Siliman

University, took a passenger jeepney owned and operated by petitioner Vicente Calalas. As
the jeepney was already full, Calalas gave Sunga an stool at the back of the door at the rear
end of the vehicle. Along the way, the jeepney stopped to let a passenger off. Sunga

stepped down to give way when an Isuzu truck owned by Francisco Salva and driven by
Iglecerio Verena bumped the jeepney. As a result, Sunga was injured. Sunga filed a
complaint against Calalas for violation of contract of carriage. Calalas filed a third party
complaint against Salva. The trial court held Salva liable and absolved Calalas, taking
cognisance of another civil case for quasi-delict wherein Salva and Verena were held liable to
Calalas. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision and found Calalas liable to Sunga for
violation of contract of carriage.
Issues:
(1) Whether the decision in the case for quasi delict between Calalas on one hand and Salva
and Verena on the other hand, is res judicata to the issue in this case
(2) Whether Calalas exercised the extraordinary diligence required in the contract of carriage
(3) Whether moral damages should be awarded
Held:
(1) The argument that Sunga is bound by the ruling in Civil Case No. 3490 finding the driver
and the owner of the truck liable for quasi-delict ignores the fact that she was never a party
to that case and, therefore, the principle of res judicata does not apply. Nor are the issues in
Civil Case No. 3490 and in the present case the same. The issue in Civil Case No. 3490 was
whether Salva and his driver Verena were liable for quasi-delict for the damage caused to
petitioner's jeepney. On the other hand, the issue in this case is whether petitioner is liable
on his contract of carriage. The first, quasi-delict, also known as culpa aquiliana or culpa
extra contractual, has as its source the negligence of the tortfeasor. The second, breach of
contract or culpa contractual, is premised upon the negligence in the performance of a
contractual obligation. Consequently, in quasi-delict, the negligence or fault should be
clearly established because it is the basis of the action, whereas in breach of contract, the
action can be prosecuted merely by proving the existence of the contract and the fact that
the obligor, in this case the common carrier, failed to transport his passenger safely to his
destination. In case of death or injuries to passengers, Art. 1756 of the Civil Code provides
that common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently
unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as defined in Arts. 1733 and
1755 of the Code. This provision necessarily shifts to the common carrier the burden of
proof. It is immaterial that the proximate cause of the collision between the jeepney and the
truck was the negligence of the truck driver. The doctrine of proximate cause is applicable
only in actions for quasi-delict, not in actions involving breach of contract. The doctrine is a
device for imputing liability to a person where there is no relation between him and another
party. In such a case, the obligation is created by law itself. But, where there is a pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, it is the parties themselves who create the
obligation, and the function of the law is merely to regulate the relation thus created.
(2) We do not think so. First, the jeepney was not properly parked, its rear portion being
exposed about two meters from the broad shoulders of the highway, and facing the middle
of the highway in a diagonal angle. Second, it is undisputed that petitioner's driver took in
more passengers than the allowed seating capacity of the jeepney. The fact that Sunga was
seated in an "extension seat" placed her in a peril greater than that to which the other
passengers were exposed. Therefore, not only was petitioner unable to overcome the
presumption of negligence imposed on him for the injury sustained by Sunga, but also, the
evidence shows he was actually negligent in transporting passengers. We find it hard to give
serious thought to petitioner's contention that Sunga's taking an "extension seat" amounted
to an implied assumption of risk. It is akin to arguing that the injuries to the many victims of
the tragedies in our seas should not be compensated merely because those passengers
assumed a greater risk of drowning by boarding an overloaded ferry. This is also true of
petitioner's contention that the jeepney being bumped while it was improperly parked
constitutes caso fortuito. A caso fortuito is an event which could not be foreseen, or which,
though foreseen, was inevitable. This requires that the following requirements be present:
(a) the cause of the breach is independent of the debtor's will; (b) the event is unforeseeable
or unavoidable; (c) the event is such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his
obligation in a normal manner, and (d) the debtor did not take part in causing the injury to
the creditor. Petitioner should have foreseen the danger of parking his jeepney with its body
protruding two meters into the highway.
(3) As a general rule, moral damages are not recoverable in actions for damages predicated
on a breach of contract for it is not one of the items enumerated under Art. 2219 of the Civil
Code. As an exception, such damages are recoverable: (1) in cases in which the mishap
results in the death of a passenger, as provided in Art. 1764, in relation to Art. 2206(3) of the
Civil Code; and (2) in the cases in which the carrier is guilty of fraud or bad faith, as provided
in Art. 2220. In this case, there is no legal basis for awarding moral damages since there was
no factual finding by the appellate court that petitioner acted in bad faith in the performance
of the contract of carriage.

3. FILINVEST vs. CA
G.R. No. 115902. 27 Sept 1995.
Petition for certiorari to review the decision of the CA
Davide, Jr., J.:
Facts:
On Aug 26, 1978 FILINVEST awarde to the defendant PACIFIC the development of the
residential subdivision consisting of two lands located in Payatas, QC.
PACIFIC issued two surety bonds issued by PHILAMGEN. PACIFIC failed to finish the
contracted work, FILINVEST intends to take over the project and hold defendant liable for
damages.
On October 26, plaintiff submitted its claim against PHILAMGEN under its
performance and guarantee bond but PHILAMGEN refused to acknowledge its liability for the
single reason that its principal, defendant pacific, refused to acknowledge liability therefore.
Defendant said that the failure to finish the contracted work was due to the weather, and
the grant of extension of the work is a waiver to claim any damages. PHILAMGEN contends
that the various amendments made on the principal contract and the deviation in the
implementation thereof which were resorted to by plaintiff and PACIFIC w/o its consent have
automatically released the latter from any liability. The tc dismissed the complaint, basing on
the
commissioner
report.
CA
affirmed.
Issue:
Won the liquidated damages agrees upon by the parties should be reduced.
Held:
Decision

of

CA

AFFIRMED.

Ratio: Art. 1226 in obligations with a penal clause, the penalty of shall substitute the
indemnity for damages and the payment of interests in case of non-compliance, if there is
no stipulation to the contrary. Nevertheless, damages shall be paid if the obligor refuses to
pay the penalty or is guilty of fraud in the fulfillment of the obligation.
As a general rule, courts are not at liberty to ignore the freedom of the parties to
agree on such terms and conditions as they see fit, as long as they are not contrary to law.
But the courts may equitably reduce the penalty in two instances, first, if the principal
obligation has been irregularly complied with and second, when it is iniquitous or
unconscionable
4. De Leon vs. Benita T. OngGR No. 170405, Feb. 2, 2010A
Absolute and Conditional Sales
Facts:

On March 10, 1993, Raymundo S. De Leon (petitioner) sold 3 parcels of land to Benita
T. Ong(respondent). The said properties were mortgaged to a financial institution; Real
Savings & Loan Association Inc. (RSLAI). The parties then executed a notarized deed of
absolute sale with assumption of mortgage. As indicated in the deed of mortgage, the
parties stipulated that the petitioner (de leon) shall execute a deed of assumption of
mortgage in favor of Ong (respondent) after full payment of the P415,000. They also agreed
that the respondent (Ong) shall assume the mortgage. The respondent then subsequently
gave petitioner P415,000 as partial payment. On the other hand, de leon handed the keys to
Ong and de leon wrote a letter to inform RSLAI that the mortgage will be assumed by Ong.
Thereafter, the respondent took repairs and made improvements in the properties.
Subsequently, respondent learned that the same properties were sold to a certain Viloria
after March 10, 1993 and changed the locks, rendering the keys given to her useless.
Respondent proceeded to RSLAI but she was informed that the mortgage has been fully paid
and that the titles have been given to the said person. Respondent then filed a complaint for
specific performance and declaration of nullity of the second sale and damages. The
petitioner contended that respondent does not have a cause of action against him because
the sale was subject to a condition which requires the approval of RSLAI of the mortgage.
Petitioner reiterated that they only entered into a contract to sell. The RTC dismissed the
case. On appeal, the CA upheld the sale to respondent and nullified the sale to Viloria.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration to the SC.
Issue:

Whether the parties entered into a contract of sale or a contract to sell?

Held:
In a contract of sale, the seller conveys ownership of the property to the buyer upon
the perfection of the contract. The non-payment of the price is a negative resolutory
condition. Contract to sell is subject to a positive suspensive condition. The buyer does not
acquire ownership of the property until he fully pays the purchase price.
In the present case, the deed executed by the parties did not show that the owner
intends to reserve ownership of the properties. The terms and conditions affected only the
manner of payment and not the immediate transfer of ownership. It was clear that the
owner intended a sale because he unqualifiedly delivered and transferred ownership of the
properties to the respondent.
5. DIGNOS YS. COURT OF APPEALS158 SCRA 378
FACTS:
The spouses Silvestre and Isabel Dignos were owners of a parcel of land in Opon,
Lapu-Lapu City. On June 7, 1965, appellants, herein petitioners Dignos spouses sold the said
parcel of land to respondent Atilano J. Jabil for the sum of P28,000.00, payable in two
installments, with an assumption of indebtedness with the First Insular Bank of Cebu in the
sum of PI 2,000.00, which was paid and acknowledged by the vendors in the deed of sale
executed in favor of plaintiff-appellant, and the next installment in the sum of P4,000.00 to
be paid on or before September 15, 1965.On November 25, 1965, the Dignos spouses sold
the same land in favor of defendants spouses, Luciano Cabigas and Jovita L. De Cabigas,
who were then U.S. citizens, for the price of P35,000.00. A deed of absolute sale was
executed by the Dignos spouses in favor of the Cabigas spouses, and which was registered
in the Office of the Register of Deeds pursuant to the provisions of Act No. 3344.As the
Dignos spouses refused to accept from plaintiff-appellant the balance of the purchase price
of theland, and as plaintiff- appellant discovered the second sale made by defendantsappellants to the Cabigas spouses, plaintiff-appellant brought the present suit.
ISSUE:

Whether or not there was an absolute contract of sale.2. Whether or not the contract
of sale was already rescinded when the Digros spouses sold the land to Cabigas
HELD:
Yes. That a deed of sale is absolute in nature although denominated as a "Deed of
Conditional Sale "where nowhere in the contract in question is a proviso or stipulation to the
effect that title to the property sold is reserved in the vendor until full payment of the
purchase price, nor is there a stipulation giving the vendor the right to unilaterally rescind
the contract the moment the vendee fails to pay within a fixed period. A careful examination
of the contract shows that there is no such stipulation reserving the title of the property on
the vendors nor does it give them the right to unilaterally rescind the contract upon nonpayment of the balance thereof within a fixed period. On the contrary, all the elements of a
valid contract of sale under Article 1458 of the Civil Code, are present, such as: (1) consent
or meeting of the minds; (2) determinate subject matter; and (3)price certain in money or its
equivalent. In addition, Article 1477 of the same Code provides that" The ownership of the
thing sold shall be transferred to the vendee upon actual or constructive delivery thereof."
While it may be conceded that there was no constructive delivery of the land sold in the
case at bar, as subject Deed of Sale is a private instrument, it is beyond question that there
was actual delivery thereof. As found by the trial court, the Dignos spouses delivered the
possession of the land in question to Jabil as early as March 27,1965 so that the latter
constructed thereon Sally's Beach Resort also known as Jabil's Beach Resort in March, 1965;
Mactan White Beach Resort on January 15, J 966 and Bevirlyn's Beach Resort on September
1, 1965. Such facts were admitted by petitioner spouses.2. No. The contract of sale
being absolute in nature is governed by Article 1592 of the Civil Code. It is undisputed that
petitioners never notified private respondents Jabil by notarial act that they were rescinding
the contract, and neither did they file a suit in court to rescind the sale. There is no showing
that Amistad was properly authorized by Jabil to make such extra-judicial rescission for the
latter who, on the contrary, vigorously denied having sent Amistad to tell petitioners that he
was already waiving his rights to the land in question. Under Article 1358 of the Civil Code, it
is required that acts and contracts which have for their object extinguishment of real rights
over immovable property must appear in a public document. Petitioners laid considerable
emphasis on the fact that private respondent Jabil had no money on the stipulated date of
payment on September 15, 1965 and was able to raise the necessary amount only by midOctober 1965. It has been ruled, however, that where time is not of the essence of the
agreement, a slight delay on the part of one party in the performance of his obligation is not

a sufficient ground for the rescission of the agreement. Considering that private respondent
has only a balance of P4,OOO.00 and was delayed in payment only for one month, equity
and justice mandate as in the aforecited case that Jabil be given an additional period within
which to complete payment of the purchase price.
6. Peoples Homesite vs. CA
Facts:
In February 1960, herein petitioner Peoples Homesite & Housing Corporation (PHHC)
passed a resolution, subject to the approval of the Court Court Council of the PHHCs
consolidation subdivision plan, awarding Lot 4 with an area of 4,182.2 square meters located
at Diliman, Court City to respondents Rizalino and Adelaida Mendoza (spouses Mendoza) at a
price of twenty-one pesos (P21.00) per square meter. The Court Court Council disapproved
the consolidation subdivision plan in August 1960 but approved in February 1964 its revised
version where Lot 4 was reduced to an area of 2,608.7 square meters. Then in October 1965,
the PHHC withdrew the tentative award of Lot 4 to the spouses Mendoza for the latters
failure neither to pay its price nor to make a 20% initial deposit, and re-awarded said lot
jointly and in equal shares to Miguela Sto. Domingo, Enrique Esteban, Virgilio Pinzon,
Leonardo Redublo and Jose Fernandez, all of whom made the initial deposit. The subdivision
of Lot 4 into five lots was later approved by the Court council and the Bureau of Lands.
The spouses Mendoza asked for reconsideration and for the withdrawal of the said
2nd award to Sto. Domingo and four others, and at the same time filed an action for specific
performance plus damages. The trial court sustained the award but the Court of Appeals
reversed the said decision, declared void the re-award to Sto. Domingo and four others, and
ordered the PHHC to sell Lot 4 with an area of 2,608.7 square meters at P21.00 per square
meter to spouses Mendoza.
ISSUE:
Was there a perfected sale of Lot 4, with its reduced area, between the parties?
COURT RULING:
The Supreme Court found that there was no perfected sale of Lot 4 because the said
lot was conditionally or contingently awarded to the Mendozas subject to the approval by
the Court council of the proposed consolidation subdivision plan and the approval of the
award by the valuation committee and higher authorities.
When the plan with the area of Lot 4 reduced to 2,608.7 square meters was approved
in 1964, the spouses Court should have manifested in writing their acceptance of the award
for the purchase of Lot 4 just to show that they were still interested in its purchase although
the area was reduced. Article 1475 of the Civil Court says [t]he contract of sale is perfected
at the moment there is a meeting of minds upon the thing which is the object of the contract
and upon the price. From that moment, the parties may reciprocally demand performance,
subject to the law governing the form of contracts. Indeed, there was a no meeting of the
minds between the parties on the purchase of Lot 4 with an area of 2,608.7 square meters
at P21 a square meter and the PHHC board of directors acted within its rights in withdrawing
the tentative award.

7. Heirs of Juan San Andres vs. Rodriguez

FACTS:
Juan San Andres sold a portion of his property to Rodriguez as evidenced by a Deed of Sale.
Upon his death Ramon San Andres was appointed as administrator of the property. He hired
a land surveyor and found that Rodriguez enlarged the property he bought from late Juan.
Ramon demanded form the Rodriguez to vacate the portion allegedly occupied but the latter
refused
hence
the
present
action.
Rodriguez said that the excess portion was also sold to him by late Juan the following day
after the first sale. He argued that the full payment of the whole sold lot would be effected
within five years from the execution of the formal deed of sale after a survey of the property
is conducted, as evidenced by a receipt of sale. The balance of the purchase price was
consigned.
RTC ruled in favor of petitioner while CA reversed the ruling. In SC petitioner argued that
there is no certain object of the contract of sale as the lot was not described with sufficiency
that
there
should
be
another
contract
to
finally
ascertain
the
identity.

SC: Petition has no merit. The contract of sale has the following elements: 1. consent or
meeting of the minds, 2. determinate subject matter, 3. price certain in money.
There is no dispute that Rodriguez purchased a potion of Lot 1914-B consisting of 345 square
meters. The said portion is located at the middle of the lot. Since the lot subsequently sold is
said to adjoined the previously paid lot, the subject is capable of being determined without
the
need
of
another
contract.
However, there is a need to clarify what CA said is a conditional sale. CA considered as a
condition the stipulation of the parties that the full consideration, based on a survey of the
lot, would be due and payable within 5 years from the execution of the formal deed of sale.
It is evident in the stipulation in the receipt that the vendor late Juan sold the lot to
Rodriguez and undertook the transfer of ownership without any qualification, reservation or
condition.
In can be gainsaid from the facts that the contract of sale is absolute, and not conditional.
There is no reservation of ownership nor stipulation providing for a unilateral rescission by
either party. In fact the sale was consummated upon the delivery of the lot to Rodriguez.
Art.1477 provides that the ownership of the thing sold shall be transferred to the vendee
upon
the
actual
or
constructive
deliver
thereof.
The stipulation that the payment of the full consideration based on a survey shall be due
and payable in 5 years from the execution of the formal deed of sale is not a condition which
affects
the
efficacy
of
contract.
CA decision is AFFIIRMED.
8. Case of Luis Pichel vs. Prudencio Alonzo
G.R.No. L- 36902 30January1982
FACTS OF THE CASE:
That Prudencio Alonzo (VENDOR) executed a deed of sale for the coconut fruits of his
land in Balactasan Plantation in Lamitan, Basilan, in favor of Luis Pichel (VENDEE). The land
from which the subject coconut fruits are derived from was subjected to a cancellation of the
award in 1965, due to the reason of violation of the law that disallows alienation of land (the
vendors rights to the land were reinstated in 1972)
The vendor and his wife sold to the vendee the fruits of the coconut trees from 1968
to 1976 for consideration of 4,200. Even during the date of sale, the land was still leased to
one Ramon Sua, and it was part of the agreement of the sale that the sum of 3,650.00 was
to be paid by the vendor to Ramon Sua as to release the land.
The RTC decided in favor of the vendor, due to the fact that the deed of sale that was
executed was invalid, due to its supposed violation of RA No. 477, in which they equated the
deed of sale executed by the parties as a contract of lease.
ISSUES OF THE CASE:
Was the Deed of Sale valid?
- Yes, The RTC erred in constructing the deed of sale as a contract of lease.
- There was no need on the part of the RTC to interpret the contract, since there was
no ambiguity, it merely contracts the sale of the fruits of the land, not the land itself.
- The S.C. relied upon ART 1370 of the Civil Code, regarding the rule on interpreting
contracts.
- Its interpretation in express form is the preferred. Construction shall be employed
when such literal interpretation is impossible.
- The possession of the coconut fruits for 7 years is different from possession of the
land, since the coconut fruits are mere accessories and the land is the principal- a transfer of
accessories does not necessarily mean a transfer of principal, it is the other way around.

- The vendor after having received the consideration for the sale of his coconut fruits
cannot be allowed to impugn the validity of the contracts he entered into, to the prejudice of
petitioner who contracted in good faith and consideration
HELD:
The Judgment of the lower court has been set aside, and another one entered in its
place, dismissing the complaint.
Obligations and Contracts Terms:
Difference between a contract of sale and a lease of things: that the delivery of the thing
sold transfers ownership, while in a lease no such transfer of ownership results as the rights
of the lessee are limited to the use and enjoyment of the thing leased.
Contract of Lease- defined as giving or the concession of the enjoyment or use of a thing
for a specified time and fixed price.
9. Melliza v. Iloilo City [G.R. No. L-24732. April 30, 1968.]
Facts:
Juliana Melliza during her lifetime owned, among other properties, 3 parcels of residential
land in Iloilo City (OCT 3462). Said parcels of land were known as Lots Nos. 2, 5 and 1214.
The total area of Lot 1214 was 29,073 sq. m. On 27 November 1931 she donated to the then
Municipality of Iloilo, 9,000 sq. m. of Lot 1214, to serve as site for the municipal hall. The
donation was however revoked by the parties for the reason that the area donated was
found inadequate to meet the requirements of the development plan of the municipality, the
so- called Arellano Plan. Subsequently, Lot 1214 was divided by Certeza Surveying Co., Inc.
into Lots 1214-A and 1214-B. And still later, Lot 1214-B was further divided into Lots 1214-B1, Lot 1214-B-2 and Lot 1214-B-3. As approved by the Bureau of Lands, Lot 1214-B-1, with
4,562 sq. m., became known as Lot 1214-B; Lot 1214-B-2, with 6,653 sq. m., was designated
as Lot 1214-C; and Lot 1214-B-3, with 4,135 sq. m., became Lot 1214-D. On 15 November
1932, Juliana Melliza executed an instrument without any caption providing for the absolute
sale involving all of lot 5, 7669 sq. m. of Lot 2 (sublots 2-B and 2-C), and a portion of 10,788
sq. m. of Lot 1214 (sublots 1214-B2 and 1214-B3) in favor of the Municipal Government of
Iloilo for the sum of P6,422; these lots and portions being the ones needed by the municipal
government for the construction of avenues, parks and City hall site according the Arellano
plan. On 14 January 1938, Melliza sold her remaining interest in Lot 1214 to Remedios Sian
Villanueva (thereafter TCT 18178). Remedios in turn on 4 November 1946 transferred her
rights to said portion of land to Pio Sian Melliza (thereafter TCT 2492). Annotated at the back
of Pio Sian Mellizas title certificate was the following that a portion of 10,788 sq. m. of Lot
1214 now designated as Lots 1412-B-2 and 1214-B-3 of the subdivision plan belongs to the
Municipality of Iloilo as per instrument dated 15 November 1932. On 24 August 1949 the
City of Iloilo, which succeeded to the Municipality of Iloilo, donated the city hall site together
with the building thereon, to the University of the Philippines (Iloilo branch). The site
donated consisted of Lots 1214-B, 1214-C and 1214-D, with a total area of 15,350 sq. m.,
more or less. Sometime in 1952, the University of the Philippines enclosed the site donated
with a wire fence. Pio Sian Melliza thereupon made representations, thru his lawyer, with the
city authorities for payment of the value of the lot (Lot 1214-B). No recovery was obtained,
because as alleged by Pio Sian Melliza, the City did not have funds. The University of the
Philippines, meanwhile, obtained Transfer Certificate of Title No. 7152 covering the three
lots, Nos. 1214-B, 1214-C and 1214-D.
On 10 December 1955 Pio Sian Melizza filed an action in the CFI Iloilo against Iloilo
City and the University of the Philippines for recovery of Lot 1214-B or of its value. After
stipulation of facts and trial, the CFI rendered its decision on 15 August 1957, dismissing the
complaint. Said court ruled that the instrument executed by Juliana Melliza in favor of Iloilo
municipality included in the conveyance Lot 1214-B, and thus it held that Iloilo City had the
right to donate Lot 1214-B to UP. Pio Sian Melliza appealed to the Court of Appeals. On 19
May 1965, the CA affirmed the interpretation of the CFI that the portion of Lot 1214 sold by
Juliana Melliza was not limited to the 10,788 square meters specifically mentioned but
included whatever was needed for the construction of avenues, parks and the city hall site.
Nonetheless, it ordered the remand of the case for reception of evidence to determine the
area actually taken by Iloilo City for the construction of avenues, parks and for city hall site.
Hence, the appeal by Pio San Melliza to the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision appealed from insofar as it affirms that of
the CFI, and dismissed the complaint; without costs.

Held:
Requirement, that sale must have a determinate thing as object, is fulfilled if object
of sale is capable of being made determinate at the time of the contract
The requirement of the law that a sale must have for its object a determinate thing, is
fulfilled as long as, at the time the contract is entered into, the object of the sale is capable
of being made determinate without the necessity of a new or further agreement between
the parties (Art. 1273, old Civil Code; Art. 1460, New Civil Code). The specific mention of
some of the lots plus the statement that the lots object of the sale are the ones needed for
city hall site; avenues and parks, according to the Arellano plan, sufficiently provides a basis,
as of the time of the execution of the contract, for rendering determinate said lots without
the need of a new and further agreement of the parties.
10. RONGAVILLA V. CA G.R. NO. 83974
Facts:
The Dela Cruz sisters were the aunts of Dolores Rongavilla. They borrowed P2,000
from the Rongavillas to have their rooftop repaired. Later, petitioners went back to their
aunts to have them sign a contract. Taking advantage of their lack of education, the sisters
were made to believe that such document, typewritten in English, was just for the
acknowledgment of their debt. After four years, petitioners asked their aunts to vacate the
land subject to litigation claiming that she and her husband were the new owners. After
verifying with the Registry of Deeds, the aunts were surprised that what they have signed
was actually a deed of sale. Their land title was cancelled and the ownership was transferred
to their nephews. The land was mortgaged with the Cavite Development Bank.
Issue: Was the deed of sale void?
Held:

Yes. While petitioners claimed they were regularly paying taxes on the land in
question, they had no second thoughts stating at the trial and on appeal that they had
resorted to doctoring the price stated in the disputed Deed of Sale, allegedly to save on
taxes. While it is true that public documents are presumed genuine and regular under the
Rules of Court, this presumption is a rebuttable presumption which may be overcome by
clear, strong and convincing evidence.