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Biological Conservation
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Department of Economics, School of Oriental and African Studies, Russell Square, London WC1H 0XG, United Kingdom
Department of Geography and Environment, London School of Economics and Political Science, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE, United Kingdom
a r t i c l e
i n f o
Article history:
Available online 28 April 2012
Keywords:
Constraints
Livelihoods
PES
Poverty
REDD+
a b s t r a c t
Focusing on incentive schemes that induce participation in land-use activities to supply environmental
services, this paper examines the potential impacts of REDD+ on livelihoods, in particular with respect
to incomes and poverty alleviation. Two case studies, each at a different scale, are presented. First, the
Nhambita Community Carbon Project in Mozambique, a REDD+ project, promoted agro-forestry and
reforestation activities along with alternative livelihoods. Second, the Sloping Lands Conversion Programme (SLCP) in China is a national-level reforestation scheme to supply watershed services. Impacts
on the poor are addressed through the lens of a rural household allocating its labour supply to different
income sources. Four aspects of REDD+ policy are discussed: the incentives necessary for ensuring the
cost-effective, long-run sustainability of both carbon sinks and incomes; the implications for forest conservation, in particular biodiversity; the need for scaling up carbon sequestration activities in order to
minimise carbon leakage; and, the possibilities to maximise the participation of the poor and alleviate
poverty. Finally, the paper highlights the importance of using appropriate methodologies for correct evaluation of policy impacts on incomes.
2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
With tropical deforestation accounting for up to a fth of global,
anthropogenic carbon dioxide emissions, the storage of this gas is
probably the most valuable non-market benet associated with
tropical forest conservation. Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation REDD+ is dened as a set of policies
and activities implemented to prevent or slow deforestation and
degradation, and increase forest carbon stocks. Such policies and
activities, including both those inside and outside the UNFCCC1
process, target the climate benets of forests that are located in
some of the worlds poorest countries. Up to 800 million people
worldwide are dependent on forests for their livelihoods (Chomitz
et al., 2006; World Resources Institute, 2005). Stakeholders, ranging
from governments to NGOs, have called for poverty reduction to be
incorporated as a co-benet of REDD+ policy (see Brown et al.,
2009).
Corresponding author. Tel.: +44 (0)20 7107 5093; fax: +44 (0)20 7955 7412.
E-mail addresses: bg3@soas.ac.uk (B. Groom), c.palmer1@lse.ac.uk (C. Palmer).
1
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. At the Conference to
the Parties held in Cancun in 2010, an agreement was reached to include REDD+ in
the international architecture of the UNFCCC, covering REDD, conservation and
enhancement of carbon stocks and sustainable management of forest (Conference of
the Parties, 2011). In addition both the World Bank and the UN have established
programmes to move countries toward REDD+ readiness in the form of the Forest
Carbon Partnership Facility and UN-REDD, respectively.
0006-3207/$ - see front matter 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.biocon.2012.03.002
2
Cost-effectiveness has been used as a strong argument for including REDD+ as a
mitigation strategy for reducing greenhouse gas emissions in a global climate
agreement (Eliasch, 2008; Palmer and Engel, 2009; Stern, 2008).
3
PES is perhaps the most widely discussed policy tool in the REDD+ literature (see
Angelsen, 2010; Palmer, 2011). We dene PES as a voluntary transaction between at
least one buyer and at least one seller in which payments are provided conditional on
the supply of a well-dened environmental service or a land use likely to secure that
service (Wunder, 2005). See Engel et al. (2008), Pattanayak et al. (2010), and Wunder
et al. (2008) for useful recent reviews.
43
44
On-farm 1
On-farm 2
Off-farm
pected to voluntarily allocate their labour to activities or livelihoods that make them better off compared to the status quo (see
Fig. 1).
In both case studies, labour is allocated to one or more sources
of income. First, and in both studies, labour was allocated to agricultural production (on-farm 1). This is the baseline source of livelihoods, i.e. prior to the PES intervention. Thus, the majority of
participants were farmers with evidence of subsistence livelihoods
and very low incomes, often less than US$2 per day. With the intervention, another source of income was introduced on-farm (onfarm 2), which necessitated not only a reallocation of land that
may formerly have been used in agriculture but also a reallocation
of household labour. In Chinas SLCP, this involved reforestation
activities while Mozambiques project principally enabled agroforestry activities.
Labour was also supplied off-farm. For example in China,
households supplied labour to Town and Village Enterprises (TVEs)
and to the countrys rapidly-growing cities. Note that these sources
of labour demand did not necessarily arise through the SLCP intervention. In Mozambique, on the other hand, new sources of offfarm labour demand were created through the project itself, for
example, through microenterprises and support for project activities. In Pagiola et al. (2005), off-farm labour opportunities were
only discussed in the context of these providing a potential source
of capital to PES activities. As we show, this ignores the dynamics
of how households allocate their labour as a result of a PES intervention, with important implications for REDD+ policy design.
In general, policy interventions affect and therefore change how
households decide to allocate their labour in different ways
depending on the nature of the intervention. Incentives for supplying carbon services could be delivered through PES, although they
may alternatively be supplied more indirectly. Capital and labour
could be redirected away from activities that underlie deforestation such as certain types of agriculture, or commercial activities
that supply environmental services could be encouraged via joint
production (Ferraro and Kiss, 2002; Bulte and Engel, 2007).7 Examples of the former include agricultural intensication and the development of off-farm labour opportunities; the latter include
sustainable forestry (see Fisher et al., this issue), some non-timber
forest products, and eco-tourism.
Policy interventions in countries such as Mozambique and China typically operate in imperfect market and institutional settings,
and not in the simple setting illustrated in Fig. 1. For example, constraints may exist that prevent farmers from moving off-farm even
if they desired to do so. Other constraints such as credit rationing
and insecure tenure can also affect household decision making
over the allocation of labour and land, and tend to be widespread
in many developing countries (e.g. Ellis, 1998; de Janvry and Sadoulet, 2005). The poor tend to be most vulnerable to such con-
7
Such indirect incentives do not address the problem of missing markets for
services such as carbon in the manner of PES (see Bulte and Engel, 2007). Beyond
incentives, other REDD+ policy instruments range from command-and-control
policies, such as new protected areas or land zoning, through to other market-based
interventions, such as taxes (e.g. on forest products) (see Angelsen, 2009). Trade
instruments could also be used, e.g. timber export bans (Bulte and Engel, 2007).
(15%) and fruit orchards (14%). By 2008, about 1200 contracts were
in place covering 1000 ha.
Alongside carbon offsets produced from agro-forestry, we note
that offsets are also produced through community-level REDD
activities from miombo woodlands around Gorongosa (see Jindal,
2010). These woodlands were under threat from the expansion of
agriculture and charcoal production. Activities nanced by the sale
of offsets include re patrols. Remaining offset revenues were
deposited in a community trust fund, which has been used to construct schools and nance local healthcare provision. Additionally,
Jindal (2010) describes how the project promoted alternative livelihoods and incomes such as microenterprises including bee keeping, plant nurseries and a community sawmill. Local people have
also been hired directly by the project, e.g. as agro-forestry technicians and administrative staff. Since around 170 people have found
employment through the project, any assessment of project activities on the incomes of the poor rst needs to differentiate among
different sources of income created through the project, both onand off-farm.
3.1.1. Impacts of the Nhambita Community Carbon Project
All households within the community were eligible to participate in project activities, including the agro-forestry systems and
off-farm labour opportunities. As noted a clear majority of the
community did participate in the project in one form or another.
Regarding the former, households were selected on a rst-comerst-served basis. They were offered the choice of system(s) in
which to participate. Seedlings and training (e.g. on tree planting
and management) were provided for free by the project. People
were hired by the project or employed in microenterprises on
the basis of their skills and experience, and were mostly drawn
from the local community.
Quantitative household data were collected by Jindal (2010), in
2004 and 2008, to assess the impacts of the project on local livelihoods. In the 2008 survey, the local population was divided into
three strata, followed by random sampling (about 20%) of respondents within each stratum: (1) households participating in one or
more agro-forestry contracts and with at least one member employed in a microenterprise (n = 53); (2) households participating
in agro-forestry contracts only (n = 105); and (3) non-participating
households that neither participated in agro-forestry contracts nor
were employed in a microenterprise (n = 47). Note that Jindal
(2010) did not differentiate among households according to the seven land-use systems.
Jindal (2010) thus focused on two possible sources of household
income: annual carbon payments from participating in agro-forestry and monthly wages from participating in microenterprises.
Since many of the cash crop, timber and other non-timber benets
had yet to materialise these were not included in the income estimates of households participating in agro-forestry. One-way analysis of variance was performed by Jindal (2010) for cash incomes in
20072008 with the sample of households participating in agroforestry contracts and the sample of those with both contracts
and employment in microenterprises; each was compared to the
incomes of the non-participating sample.
The average annual cash income for households with both contracts and employment was signicantly higher (MZN 14,646) than
both non-participating households (MZN 1200) and those that
negotiated agro-forestry contracts alone (MZN 1435). Annual carbon payments in the agro-forestry contracts were equivalent to
about two months of wage labour. Thus, carbon payments appeared to play a relatively weak role in improving household incomes. Participants able to access wage labour created through
the project were much better off than those receiving even the
largest carbon payments. The impact of off-farm labour provision
reveals the possible existence of an off-farm labour constraint in
45
the study area. Jindal (2010) found that all employees of microenterprises sampled had agro-forestry contracts as well, which implies that the agro-forestry intervention may have helped people
move off-farm. Overall, he suggests that the project may have reduced local demand for wage labour, through the negative effect
of households reallocating land from food production to agro-forestry (thus reducing demand for seasonal wage labour) outweighing the positive effect of new jobs created through labour-intensive
agro-forestry. Reduced access to wage labour has been compensated, to some extent, by the carbon payments and the new offfarm labour opportunities created in the project.
Jindal (2010) observes that the increase in incomes may have
enabled more investment in agricultural inputs for the expansion
of non-project crops. Although the proportion of households growing such crops was much higher in 2008 than in 2004, the proportion among participating households was not noticeably higher
than among non-participants. Both participants and non-participants purchased food more often and were more likely to own livestock in 2008 compared with 2004. The number of income sources
remained unchanged between 2004 and 2008. Yet again for all
these indicators there is little difference between the participant
and non-participant groups. This could imply that the changes observed between 2004 and 2008 were unlikely to have been caused
by the project intervention.
However, without income data for 2004, it is neither possible to
gauge the precise impact of the project on changes in levels of
household income nor is it possible to analyse the shifts in income
according to income source between 2004 and 2008. But even at
the cross-sectional level, the participant sample, i.e. the treatment
group, and non-participant sample (untreated) are not directly
comparable due to sample selection: the treated and the untreated
differ in unobservable characteristics, which determine their outcomes. Using the same dataset as before Jindal (2010) found that
participant households were signicantly more likely to be larger,
have a female household head, have larger land endowments, and
have been resident in the area for longer compared with non-participants. He concluded that poorer, i.e. the female-headed households, and richer households, i.e. those with larger land
endowments, were equally likely to participate in the project.
Palmer and Silber (2012) assessed the role of both the carbon
payments and the potential returns from the production of cash
crops and timber in farmers incomes over the 100-year duration
of the project. They used secondary survey data collected during
project implementation, which were provided by the ECCM. These
consisted of technical specications of the different land-use systems, and included tree species and number, the quantities of
sequestered carbon,12 and the expected harvest of each land-use option as well as investment costs. Data for potential future harvests
and prices of cash crops were obtained from a variety of other secondary sources (see Palmer and Silber, 2012). The Net Present Value
(NPV) per hectare of each system was estimated by adding up the
benets (e.g. carbon payments), and subtracting the costs (e.g. establishment costs) before being discounted into a present value.
Uncertainty in future prices and harvests was addressed by Palmer and Silber (2012) using Monte Carlo simulations. They varied
ten input variables including the yields and prices for the cash
crops and timber but not the carbon price since this was xed
for the duration of the contract. All variables were varied according
to historical data trends and over 100,000 simulations, using latinhypercube sampling.
12
Data on carbon storage in biomass and products were derived from on a model
called CO2Fix-V3.1, which was originally developed by the Modelling Carbon
Sequestration in Forested Landscapes (CASFOR) project (see Schelhaas et al., 2004).
Parameters in the model include wood-carbon content, timber production, product
allocation for thinnings and expected lifetime of products.
46
Table 1
Key parameters of the seven land-use options: costs for establishment, total carbon payments, total revenues from the sale of cash crops, timber revenues, and NPV over
100 years: median values of Monte Carlo simulations with 95% condence intervals. Source: Palmer and Silber (2012).
Total costs for
establishment
(US$/ha)
Total carbon
payments
(US$/ha)
Total revenues
from sale of
cash crops over
100 years
(US$/ha)
Total
revenues
from
timber
over
100 years
(US$/ha)
Boundary planting
Homestead planting
Fruit orchard (cashew)
Fruit orchard (mango)
Woodlot
Dispersed interplanting (gliricidia)
Dispersed interplanting (faidherbia)
260
1280
1280
1320
2820
395
395
270
880
783
653
1047
209
668
0
51,541
31,728
97,125
0
0
0
1142
175
232
198
1035
653
218
2 ( 100 to 113)
2004 (305 to 7640)
903 ( 224 to 4441)
4065 (714 to 16,150)
1678 ( 2691 to 776)
130 ( 251 to 2)
217 (78 to 385)
0.982
2.570
1.717
4.166
0.346
0.567
1.683
5000
boundary planting
homestead planting
fruit orchard (cashew)
fruit orchard (mango)
woodlot
dispersed interplanting (glir.)
dispersed interplanting (fai.)
-5000
NPV [US$/ha]
15000
10
20
30
40
50
Table 1 shows the data for the key parameters of the seven
land-use systems. Fig. 2 contrasts the mean quantity of carbon
sequestered per ha for each land-use system over a 100-year planning horizon and the median NPV per ha.
From Table 1 and Fig. 2, the fruit orchard options along with
homestead planting had the highest median NPV. Moreover, only
three land-use options had positive, lower-bound condence intervals. Reforestation (woodlot) had the lowest NPV despite comprising the largest carbon payment of all systems. This was due to high
costs of establishment and no additional income from cash-crop
production. Reforestation and dispersed interplanting (gliricidia)
both had negative, higher-bound condence intervals. As noted
boundary planting comprised 56% of all contracts in the project,
although it has a slightly negative NPV. Similar to homestead
planting, this system requires relatively little commitment on the
part of farmers due to the utilisation of land not previously used
for agriculture. Farming on other land can thus continue as before,
although there may have been a shift in the households labour
supply from agriculture to agro-forestry. Boundary planting also
potentially provides higher timber benets compared with most
of the other options (see Table 1).
Participation in the other land-use options was relatively low,
which may have been due to the need to adopt new land-use practices, e.g. for interplanting. Fruit orchards require constant crop
maintenance, investments in skills and other inputs, and a supporting infrastructure for getting products to market. Yet further
research is necessary to clarify the determinants of adoption of
the different land uses.
47
Table 2
The impact of the SLCP on household incomes. Source: Groom (2012).
Income
sources
Total
Total SLCP
Crop
Crop + SLCP
**
Income
sources
Off-farm
Livestock
Forest
336.48** (70.67)
10.65 (37.42)
16.84 (21.26)
ability of PES schemes. NPV measures should be treated with caution where a lack of data limits any attempt to correct for the use of
market prices.
3.2. Sloping Lands Conversion Programme, China
In 1998, severe oods wreaked havoc in the Yangtze River basin. In the previous year, severe droughts occurred in the Yellow
River basin. In each case the social cost of these environmental
disasters was enormous, including loss of life, lost agricultural output, and damage to sheries.13 Both disasters were at least partly
caused by deforestation in the upper reaches of the respective river
basins. In response, the Chinese government implemented the Sloping Lands Conversion Programme (SLCP). Beginning in 1999, it had
two main objectives. First, and primarily, to restore river basin/watershed-related ecosystem services by afforesting or reforesting currently cultivated highly-sloped land in the upper reaches of the
Yellow and Yangtze river basins. Second, the SLCP aimed to alleviate
rural poverty.
The environmental aims of the SLCP could only be achieved by
ensuring that extensive reforestation occurred. Initially, the proposed scope of the SLCP was to reforest 15 million hectares of
sloped land (Xu and Cao, 2002). By 2003, approximately 15 million
farmers had been enrolled in over 27,000 villages spread out over
20 provinces (ibid). In the rst two years of the SLCP, almost 1.2
million hectares of cultivated land was converted to forestland or
pasture while an additional one million hectares of barren land
was afforested. By 2005 over nine million hectares of cropland
had been retired (Bennett, 2008). Despite various problems in
implementation, the SLCP has been considered relatively successful in increasing forest cover and associated environmental services (Xu and Cao, 2002).
For participants of the SLCP, poverty was to be reduced via relatively generous compensation packages to households in exchange for reforestation of their cultivated land.14 Compensation
came in the form of cash, in-kind grain and occasionally tree-seedlings and technical assistance (Xu et al., 2004). By 2005 the total cost
of the SLCP was RMB50 billion (US$7.5bn). The compensation
scheme was initially planned to be temporary, lasting between ve
and eight years for participants.
3.2.1. The impacts of the Sloping Lands Conversion Programme
In order to alleviate poverty, participation in the SLCP would, at
the minimum, have to target the poor as participants to the programme. These participants would then have to be lifted out of
poverty as a consequence of their participation, i.e. from the compensation and assistance received for reforestation activities. Early
research concerning the implementation and targeting of the SLCP
13
In the Yangtze River, costs in the order of RMB7.8bn billion had already been
incurred in order to mitigate problems associated with ooding (CCICED, 2002).
14
In Purchasing Parity Power (PPP) terms the compensation offered to farmers was
more generous than that offered to participants of the Conservation Reserve
Programme (CRP) in the United States (Xu et al., 2004).
48
Table 3
Quantile treatment effects (QTE) of the SLCP. Source: Groom (2012).
Quantiles (s)
25th
50th
75th
607.75
1115.69
2133.89
330.96 (131.19)
472.85 (145.19)
286.26 (334.61)
.05
-.05
-.1
Reduction
in poverty
-.15
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
18
Fig. 2 also shows is that if the impact on poverty was estimated at the less
extreme US$2 per day (i.e. at RMB1800) the conclusion would be that the SLCP would
have had no impact on poverty since it appears to have had a negligible effect on the
number of people at or below this level of income.
inclined to shift labour off-farm to alleviate poverty even in the absence of participation in the SLCP.
First, labour markets in rural China, as in many developing
areas, are imperfect. Migration from one district or province to another is regulated by the Hukou system of household registration,
under which individuals who wish to change their place of residence must gain approval from government authorities in order
to access public services in their destination. Second, land tenure
is frequently insecure in many rural areas with land allocations
made by local government. This inhibits the free movement of labour off-farm since households fear losing their land if they migrate. Third, prior to 2004, agricultural taxes had to be paid in
grain. With incomplete labour markets, payment of taxes required
household labour to remain on farm, again inhibiting the free
movement of labour.
These constraints have been found to be crucial determinants of
the household off-farm labour decision in Chinas SLCP. Thus, they
determined the household response to the SLCP and help explain
its success in achieving its poverty alleviation goals. Constrained
and unconstrained households were found to have responded to
the SLCP intervention in different ways.
First, the design of the SLCP, particularly the nature of the compensation, enabled constrained households to relax constraints on
off-farm labour, who either moved labour off-farm for the rst
time or supplied additional labour to existing off-farm labour
activities. In particular, the provision of compensation in grain enabled taxes to be paid and subsistence requirements to be met
without the need for labour to remain on farm. Yet, the need for
households to supply labour for reforestation activities may have
inhibited the migration of labour outside of the village.
Second, the supply of labour from constrained households was
more sensitive to credit constraints and insecure land tenure than
the labour supply from unconstrained households. Using the same
dataset as Groom (2012), Mullan et al. (2011) found that insecure
land tenure, for both agricultural and forested land, inhibited the
decision to supply labour off-farm and attenuated the impact of
participation in the SLCP. Credit-constrained households, on the
other hand, who participated in the SLCP saw their incomes significantly rise, at least partly due to the relaxation of liquidity constraints (Uchida et al., 2009). These constraints may have
formerly inhibited the decision of households to shift labour offfarm, including those already participating in off-farm activities
(Groom et al., 2010).
In sum, while the SLCP may have had a positive long-term impact on the income levels of constrained households it is unlikely
to have had a permanent effect on those of unconstrained households since their off-farm labour allocations did not change. The
reduction in poverty occurred solely as a result of the temporary
compensation. The important impact in terms of labour supply
was only observed in Ningxia. Weak land tenure and the absence
of land rental markets is likely to further reduce the sustainability
of the SLCP despite the initial impact on poverty (see Grosjean and
Kontoleon, 2010). Indeed many of the surveyed households reported that they planned to return land to former uses when the
SLCP ends.
49
19
The difference in differences estimator is used following Abadie (2005). The
results are comparable in this sense to Table 2.
Table 4
Impact of SLCP on income and off-farm labour for voluntary and involuntary
participants. Source: authors.
Impact
Implementation
Voluntary 1
(n = 121)
228.8 ( 1.37)
40.75 (2.07)
Voluntary 2
(n = 21)
Involuntary
(n = 143)
696.61 (3.04)
545.00 (3.22)
183.7 (4.54)
94.79 (1.33)
chose to make participation less voluntary where it had poor information about household incomes and/or land characteristics. In
such settings, a voluntary policy could lead to the unintended
enrolment of unsuitable land or people possibly leading to ineffective or inequitable policy outcomes. But if degree of voluntariness
is under the control of local governments then it could follow that
with access to good information, more voluntary participation
might lead to greater household benets and the enrolment of
more suitable land into the programme. For now, we leave this
for future research.
4. Discussion: implications for REDD+ policy
In this nal section, we discuss the REDD+ policy implications of
income impacts from the two interventions in Mozambique and
China. First, the Nhambita Community Carbon Project in Mozambique is an actual REDD+ scheme, which integrated a range of landuse systems incentivised by PES with an approach to create alternative livelihoods, i.e. new sources of off-farm income. Second,
Chinas SLCP is a huge national-level PES scheme focused on the
adoption of reforestation as a means of supplying watershed services. Yet it offers lessons for the design of national-level REDD+
PES frameworks. We begin with the implications for long-run sustainability, and follow with those for forest conservation, scaling
up, and pro-poor targeting.
4.1. Implications for long-run sustainability
The Nhambita project incorporated a wide range of carbon
sequestration activities including different agro-forestry land uses,
reforestation and forest conservation, in contrast to the SLCPs focus on reforestation. Reforestation typically has a high carbon
sequestration potential as demonstrated for Nhambita. It also
demonstrates a relatively low income potential as well as being
less cost-effective compared with the other systems (Palmer and
Silber, 2012). But since the NPV estimates of income potential
are based on market prices and zero transaction costs for project
participants these could be lower still while those for cost-effectiveness may be underestimated.
The Nhambita project developers assume that the land-use systems will continue for 100 years with livelihoods and incomes
dependent on continued production of cash crops and other commodities. There is, of course, no guarantee that farmers will continue the land uses in a sustainable manner with repercussions
for carbon sequestration. There is a 15% risk buffer in case of carbon reversal, although this may not be adequate to cover all potential risks to carbon sequestered over such a long time period. Both
Jindal (2010) and Palmer and Silber (2012) note the considerable
risks in providing, in the rst seven years of the project, the entire
value of payments for carbon expected to be sequestered over
100 years. The fact that carbon payments are withheld if farmers
breach their PES contracts also implies that the conditional nature
50
51
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