History of Geophysics: Volume 3The History of Hydrology

Some Early Attempts at Theory Formation in Fluid Mechanics

SIMON INCE

Department of Hydrology and Water Resources, University of Arizona, Tucson, Arizona

Despite similarities in the axiomatic structure of theories in m~t~ematics and natural sciences, their
objectives are different. Mathematics is devoid of factual or. empIrIcal content a.nd need not, and does
not, assert anything about the physical universe. The theo~les In the na!ural SCIences, n~ matter how
well packaged in complex and sophisticated mathematIcs '. ar~ subject. to observa!lonal and~or
experimental verification. Some attempts ~t theory formatIon In the hls~ory. of fluId mechanIcs
illustrate the axiomatic structure of the theorIes and show the reasons fo.r theIr fatlure o~ succes~. T~e
basic theoretical structure of physical hydrology, resting on the foundatIons ~f Ne~tonlan physIcs, IS
deterministic. Mathematical random-process theory is a very powerful technIque In the management
of many hydrological issues.

INTRODUCTION

The goal of any branch of knowledge is to obtain a theory

within the framework of which the body of knowledge can be
interpreted, explained, forecast, and events predicted quantitatively with a high degree of probability. The fact that
mathematics is often referred to as the queen of sciences is
due to the absolute certainty of its results.
For a long time the idea was prevalent in wide circles that
if mathematics could be used as the language of natural
science, or empirical knowledge formulated in mathematical
terms and patterned according to the methodology of mathematics, the certainty of the results of empirical science could
also be guaranteed. Western man's confidence in mathematics was so great that, in the nineteenth century, it was
believed that the universe could be described by an infinite
system of self-solving differential equations.
Then, in the twentieth century, Bertrand Russell shook
the foundations of the entire system of sciences by calling
mathematics "the only science where one never knows what
one is talking about, nor whether what is said is true." The
shock treatment liberated the patient from his delusions,
which meant that, philosophically, the provisional nature of
empirical science was recognized and differentiated from
mathematics. It was realized that no proposition in empirical
science-no matter how well-packaged in sophisticated
mathematics-can attain the certainty of mathematics.
What is the nature of this mathematical certainty, and
what is its significance in relation to the structure of physical
theory?
Mathematical theory consists in the logical deduction of a
proposition from other propositions previously established.
This procedure presupposes an arbitrary origin where some
propositions are accepted without proof; they are the axioms
or postulates. Once the postulates for a theory have been
laid down, each further proposition of the theory must be
proven exclusively by logical deduction from the postulates;
in this process no appeal is allowed to self-evidence, to the
characteristics of the physical universe, or to our experiences concerning the behavior of rigid bodies in physical
space, etc. The purely deductive character of mathematical
proof forms the basis of mathematical certainly. In matheCopyright 1987 by the American Geophysical Union.

matics, no assertion is made that the axioms have physical or

factual content. For this reason a mathematical derivation or
deduction is absolutely certain because it is devoid of factual
or empirical content.
Historically speaking, however, Euclidean geometry, for
example, had its origin in the generalization and systematization of empirical discoveries in connection with the measurement of areas and volumes, the practice of surveying and the
development of astronomy. Thus understood, geometry has
factual content and may be called physical geometry.
The physical interpretation transforms a given pure geometrical theory into a physical theory of the structure of
physical space. Whether this theory is correct in interpreting
nature, is not the concern of mathematics but of empirical
science. It can only be proven by suitable experimentation
and observation. It might seem that an easy way to test the
validity of a theory is to test the axioms or postulates.
However, in all theories of natural sciences, it is neither
necessary nor in general possible, to submit the basic axioms
to direct experimental tests. The testing of any scientific
theory has to proceed indirectly by testing the deduced
theorems. If enough relevant experimental evidence is found
supporting the theorems and therefore the theory, it acquires
a certain degree of reliability and may be accepted "until
further notice." But, however great the degree of confirmation, the possibility always exists that new disconfirming
evidence will be found. Herein lies the provisional character
of all theories in empirical science. The great importance of
mathematics for the empirical sciences lies in the fact that
while it does not assert anything about empirical fact, it
provides an indispensable and efficient machinery for deducing, from abstract concepts, such as the laws of Newtonian
mechanics, concrete consequences which can be tested.
It has become customary to call the sciences which have a
high degree of confirmation "exact sciences or hard sciences"; other sciences with lower degrees of confirmation
"soft sciences." In fact we should only distinguish natural
sciences and social sciences, both empirical, and mathematics. Only mathematics affords us abstract certainty, while all
sciences-no matter how much sophisticated mathematics
they contain in their theoretical structure-are subject to
.experimental verification.
Now, what happens if repeated experimental evidence
disconfirms the theory? Do we have to reject the theory?
35

History of Geophysics: Volume 3The History of Hydrology

36

THEORY FORMATION IN FLUID MECHANICS

Not necessarily. We can introduce an additional postulate or

a corrolary which brings the theory in line with the experimental data. This process can be continued until the theory
is so loaded with additional hypotheses that it becomes very
cumbersome. In that case, a search is warranted for a theory
with a new set of axioms, which is more compact, and
therefore more elegant.
What happens to the old theories? Should they be relegated to the junkheap of history? Certainly not. Beside forming
an integral part of mankind's intellectual heritage and therefore worthy of conservation and study, many of the superseded theories maintain their validity and usefulness within
well defined albeit narrower boundaries, and within these
limitations, can indeed be utilized very efficiently. Newtonian mechanics is a good example. The theory of mechanics of
fluids, which is ultimately based on the laws of Newtonian
mechanics, provides an interesting example of the checkered
history of theory formation in this field.
SOME THEORIES OF FLUID MECHANICS

Aristotle's (384-322 B.C.) concept of "horror vacuii" or

"nature's abhorrence of a vacuum" could be considered as
one of the earliest theories of fluid motion. On the basis of
this postulate, we are able to explain why liquid will not flow
out of an- inverted can with a single small hole punched into
it; for if the liquid discharged from the hole, a vacuum would
be created at the upper end of the can, which would be
contrary to the postulate that nature will not tolerate a
vacuum. On the basis of this theory we can predict that the
same thing will occur during future experiments; we can also
predict that if a second small hole is punched into the can,
liquid will pour out of it, since now air can rush in and
prevent the formation of a vacuum. This is a perfectly
respectable and adequate theory for the phenomenon at
hand. The short-coming of the theory is that it is qualitatively and quantitatively very limited and incapable of explaining
and/or predicting many of the other observed phenomena of
fluid flow.
Another early attempt to formulate a theory of hydrostatics was by Archimedes (287-212 B.C.). [For this and all
other references, unless specifically mentioned, see Rouse
and Ince, 1957]. Judging by the deductive method employed
and the validity of the results achieved, Archimedean hydrostatics is an "amazing monument in the history of fluid
mechanics. He based his theory upon two postulates:
Postulate 1: We pose in principle that the nature offluids is such
that its parts being uniformly placed and continuous, that which
is less pressed is displaced by the one which is pressed the
more, and that each part is always pressed by the whole weight
of the column perpendicularly above it, unless this fluid is
enclosed some place or is compressed by something else.
Postulate 2: Let it be granted that bodies which are forced
upwards in a fluid are forced upwards along a perpendicular
which passes through their center of gravity.

Based on these two postulates, Archimedes derived, by

purely mathematical deduction, many of the propositions of
hydrostatics and equilibrium offloating bodies. Some twenty
centuries later Lagrange commented on this: "This work is
one of the most splendid monuments attesting to the genius
of Archimedes, for it contains a theory of stability of floating
bodies to which the moderns have added very little."
Despite the limited scope of Archimedes' hydrostatic the-

ory, the results obtained are impressive. Even more noteworthy, however, is the method employed by Archimedes.
It is a perfect example of the method of theory formation
discussed in the introduction. There is nothing self-evident
or obvious about the axioms, especially when viewed in the
general philosophical and scientific atmosphere of the third
century B.C. The theorems deduced by purely geometrical
considerations, however, can be verified-even though
there is no evidence that Archimedes did so himself-and
bear out the validity of the postulates.
The next major contribution to hydrostatic theory was by
Stevin (1548-1620). Stevin followed the method of Archimedes by setting down postulates and deriving propositions or
theorems by logical deduction. His exposition is a good
example of the axiomatic method, based on two postulates.
Postulate VI: That the upper surface of the water (what is
ordinarily called the fleur d'eau) be plane and level, that is to
say, parallel with the horizon.

The other postulate, given In terms of a theorem and

proposition, reads:
Any designated body of water maintains whatever position is
desired in water, (because if it were not so) . . . . . this water
would be in perpetual motion, which is absurd.

As a corollary to the second postulate, Stevin stated that

"a solid body parigrave to water holds itself in such position
and place as is desired." Broadly interpreted, this implies
that if any part of the water is replaced by a rigid body uf ~;1~
same density, the forces exerted on it by the rest of the water
will remain unchanged.
On the basis of the two postulates, Stevin demonstrated,
for example, that: "The bottom of a mass of water, parallel
to the horizon, supports a weight, equal to the weight of a
column of water of which the base is the aforesaid bottom
and the height a line perpendicular to the horizon, between
the bottom and the surface."
Thus, the so-called hydrostatic paradox was shown not be
be a paradox at all, but a lawful proposition in a new theory
of hydrostatics. In evaluating this theory of hydrostatics,
one must st~ll agree with Dijksterhuis that a very essential
concept was missing from his reasoning: "Stevin does not
know the idea of hydrostatic pressure acting at a point of the
liquid equally in all directions; the consequence is that
Stevin does not succeed in deducing the various subjects
treated by him (Archimedes' principle, hydrostatic paradox,
pressure upon an inclined wall) from a single point of view to
be brought into relation with static conditions." It would be
interesting, however, to perform a thought experiment to
demonstrate how close Stevin came to this concept of
pressure [Conant, 1951].
Consider the postulate of the impossibility of perpetual
motion. In Figure 1 is shown a vessel containing a liquid,
with a tube running through the sides of the vessel as
indicated. If the pressure at A in one direction were greater
than in the other, then the liquid would flow around the tube;
but this would be perpetual motion, which is impossible by
postulation. Hence the pressure in both directions must be
the same. It is this concept of pressure which eluded Stevin.
Pascal (1623-1662) reformulated many of Stevin's arguments and demonstrated the principle of the instantaneous
transmissibility of pressure. In the case of the hydraulic
press, which he called "a machine for multiplying forces,"

History of Geophysics: Volume 3The History of Hydrology

THEORY FORMATION IN FLUID MECHANICS

Fig. 1. Demonstration of the concept of pressure based on the

impossibility of perpetual motion [Conant, 1951]

he introduced the notion of pressure as force per unit area,

but there still was no clear statement about the concept of
pressure acting equally in all directions. It remained for
Euler (1707-1783) to formulate this concept in a clear form
and thus to lay the foundations of a more ample and useful
theory of hydrostatics. How fruitful a concept this is can
perhaps best be judged from the fact that Euler used it also
as one of the axioms for a theory of hydrodynamics. In a
series of three papers, published in the Memoires de L'Academie des Sciences de Berlin, 1755, Euler formulated a new
theory of fluid mechanics.
The historical importance of these papers is not only that
they created a new theory of hydrostatics and hydrodynamics, but in doing so introduced a new principle in mechanics,
the continuum concept of matter. In many cases, the history
of scientific thought is too intertwined to allow setting
definite dates for scientific breakthroughs, except by tradition or for convenience. Euler was influenced, as he himself
has admitt~d, by the ideas of pressure and continuum put
forward by John Bernoulli (1667-1748), who first suggested
the method of calculating the force acting on an infinitesimal
element. "A true and genuine method," Euler called it.
Around the same time, d'Alembert was tangling with ideas
of internal pressure but was unable to free himself from the
atomistic view of matter.
By 1749, Euler I had reached the conclusion that further
advances in mechanics were only possible by giving up the
atomistic view of matter. Instead, he put forward the concept of a continuous medium, defined a particle to mean a
point in that continuum, and postulated an internal pressure
at a point with equal intensity in all directions. On this one
postulate of pressure Euler erected, by logical deduction, a
completely new, extremely broad and very simple theory of
hydrostatics.
Now the question arises whether this theory is any better
than its predecessors and if so, why? Furthermore, is this
theory the final formulation of fluid statics? The answer to
the first question is easy; it is better because it is simpler,
more general, and it works. Up to now we have found no

37

observation or experiment which contradicts the theory, so

until further notice, we accept it as a useful theory.
There is nothing to indicate, however, that this is the
ultimate of all possible theories of hydrostatics. It is entirely
within the realm of possibility that some day a better theory
will be found.
It is customary to indicate the origin of theoretical fluid
dynamics with the publication, in 1738, of Daniel Bernoulli's
"Hydrodynamica." Leaving aside, for the time being, the
legitimacy of this assumption, it is certain that until the
beginning of the 18th century there was no broad theory of
fluid motion. Daniel Bernoulli's "Hydrodynamica" was a
landmark in the history of fluid mechanics, not only because
it coined an imaginative and descriptive new name, but also
because it attempted to build a wider theory based on the
postulate of the conservation of the total energy of a body of
fluid. The criticisms of the disciples of Euler are all valid:
The "Hydrodynamica" was obscure, complicated and limited in scope, treating mainly some of the problems of applied
hydraulics. Nevertheless, it was a theory as defined in the
introduction of this paper.
When the scientific climate in a given period in history is
fertile for the development of new conceptual schemes,
cross-fertilization of ideas does frequently lead to the successful formulation of new theories. The first half of the 18th
century was ripe for a theory of hydrodynamics. The efforts
of Daniel Bernoulli, d' Alembert, Clairaut, John Bernoulli
and others to establish a broader and better theory remained
by and large fruitless; but the sparks of insight emanating
from their work kindled Euler's imagination. In 1755, Euler's efforts culminated in the publication of a classical
hydrodynamics of ideal fluids, which, in form, content and
notation, remains essentially unchanged until today.
In Euler's hydrodynamics, the fundamental postulate was
again the equality of pressure in all directions at a point in a
continuum. In addition, he introduced Newton's momentum
principle which he had earlier adapted to apply to an
infinitesimal element in a rectangular coordinate system,
fixed in space. The third postulate in Euler's theory of fluid
motion was the principle of conservation of mass, known in
hydrodynamics as the continuity equation. The history of
this principle is more difficult to follow, but it is beyond
qyestion that the first quantitative statement of the continuity equation is to be found in the writings of Leonardo da
Vinci. It is written in simple language, about the flow in a
river, expressed in forms of proportions and applicable to
incompressible fluids: "A river in each part of its length in an
equal time gives passage to an equal quantity of water,
whatever the width, the depth, the slope, the roughness, the
tortuosity. "
In this form the continuity equation was used by the
hydraulicians for practical purposes; d' Alembert and John
Bernoulli recognized the principle of continuity as a fundamental notion in hydrodynamics, but credit for the clear and
elegant formulation of the principle of mass conservation in a
continuum must go to Euler. Euler treated the problem in its
full generality by extending his analysis to embrace compressible fluids.
Now, once again, it is pertinent to ask why this theory is
better than, say, Bernoulli's. It is better 'because it works
better; that is, it explains and predicts a larger range of
phenomena with a greater degree of reliability and with
greater economy of intellectual effort.

History of Geophysics: Volume 3The History of Hydrology

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THEORY FORMATION IN FLUID MECHANICS

Is this the final theory of hydrodynamics? Obviously not,

since already there have been occasions when disconfirming
evidence put into question the validity of the theory.
D'Alembert's paradox-that the net thrust on a sphere in a
flow field was calculated to be zero-was a severe blow to
the prestige of Eulerian hydrodynamics, which we now call
the theory of potential flow. To bring it in line with the
experimental results, additional hypotheses had to be introduced. One such postulate was the free streamline concept,
which, while still working with an ideal fluid, was successful
in overcoming some of the more blatant departures of the
theory from observation. Other important additional postulates were the concepts of viscosity and boundary layer, the
introduction of which enlarged considerably the scope and
the limits of validity of hydrodynamic theory. However,
Eulerian hydrodynamics is still very effectively used in the
theory of deep water waves and in the theory offlow through
porous media.
Euler's success was largely due to his ability to break
away from the conventional atomistic thinking of his contemporaries and to visualize a continuous medium. It would
be absurd to maintain that this is the only valid way to
hydromechanics. It is quite possible that an even better
theory can be formulated on atomistic concepts. But, until
then, and so long as it works, we provisionally believe in
what we have.
The conceptual framework of physical hydrology rests on
the foundations of Newtonian physics, and, as such, its
theoretical structure is deterministic. Yet we find it necessary to use the mathematics of probability and random
functions to overcome the uncertainties encountered in its
operation. Does this mean that something is wrong with the
conceptual framework, and that we should now try to move

away from Newtonian physics and seek a better understanding by adapting the tenets of modern physics? Would there
be a philosophical necessity and an operational advantage? I
think not; and I have the feeling that physicists wrestling
with the problems of the particle zoo would advise us against
such a move at this time. Even though the possibility is not
precluded that some day we might not find a better theoretical foundation, for the present and the near future the
deterministic structure is adequate; the imperfections and
uncertainties are not conceptual. For the practical and
practicing hydrologist, to whom all hydrological processes
such as rainfall, runoff, infiltration, etc. appear to be random, I recommend the point of view of Bras and RodriguezIturbe:
Randomness and the applicability of random-process theory
may be inherent in the structure of the process or may result
from the lack of knowledge or from the scale of observation.
Many arguments, mainly philosophical, exist to refute or justify
the above statement. The techniques and philosophy in this
book have proved their usefulness to us. The nonbeliever
hopefully will be impressed by the power of the various
techniques and therefore accept them. [Bras and Rodriguezlturbe, 1984]
REFERENCES

Conant, J. B., Science and Common Sense, 371 pp., Yale University Press, New Haven, CT, 1951.
Bras, R. L., and I. Rodriguez-Iturbe, Random Functions and
Hydrology, 559 pp., Addison-Wesley, Reading, MA, 1984.
Rouse, H., and S. Ince, History of Hydraulics, 264 pp., Iowa
Institute of Hydraulic Research, Iowa City, lA, 1957.
S. Ince, Department of Hydrology and Water Resources, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ 85721.