Failures - Rana Plaza Building Collapse

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RanaPlazaBuildingCollapse
Savar,BangladeshApril24,2013
GarrettSchwier,ArchitecturalEngineering,BAE/MAE
Introduction
TableofContents
OnApril24,2013,thestructureoftheRanaPlazabuildingcatastrophically
Introduction
collapsed, bringing down the entire 8story reinforced concrete structure.
Building
ThePlazawasoriginallydesignedasafourstorybuildingprimarilyforretail
Description
storeuse,butwasinsteadoccupiedbygarmentfactories.Withadeathtoll
Summaryof
of 1,129 people, it is the deadliest accidental building collapse in history.
Events
(Dietz)Multiplefactorsledtotheinadequacyofthedesignofthebuilding's
Investigation&
structure, including illegal construction, poor regulation of codes and
CauseofFailure
inspections, and dangerous ignorance by the managerial staff. The Plaza
RescueEfforts
wasownedbySohelRana,whousedhisaggressivetenacityandpolitical
connections to acquire illegal permits and bribe government officials to
Aftermath
approve construction. On the day prior to the collapse, warning signs of
Conclusion
numerous cracks throughout structure and caution expressed by local
PhotoCredits
engineers were ignored by the garment factory owner and managers,
Bibliography
leadingtounsafeoccupationofthebuildingandthetragicdeathsofovera
thousand workers. In the aftermath of the collapse, changes are being
made in the Bangladesh building codes, inspection procedures, and safety standards of factories.
Pressured by the Bangladeshi public's outrage and encouraged by foreign governments, world
organizations, and retail companies, three major initiatives have been enacted to improve factory
conditions and enforcement of regulations. The initiatives are all designed to encourage safer
construction practices and working conditions, to empower industry inspectors, and to require
increased involvement from the corporations who contract work to the factories. With these
imperatives in place and through continued emphasis from the public and the world, the systems in
placeinBangladeshcanbeimprovedandmadebothsaferandmoreefficient.
BuildingDescription
https://failures.wikispaces.com/Rana+Plaza+Building+Collapse
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Figure1:CrossSectionoftheRanaPlazaStructure(PhotocourtesyofJeanaRippleand
BarbaraPorada.PendingApproval.)
Rana Plaza was an eightstory reinforced concrete structure, with a ninth story under construction at
the time of the collapse. The building was rectangular in shape with a glass facade entrance at the
front end. Two stair towers near the rear of the building were the main escape routes in times of
emergency.Thislayoutwasnotadequateforsafeevacuationduringtimesofemergency,aclearcode
violation, which was one of many. The first and second floors of the Plaza were rented by offices,
shops, and a bank, and the third through eighth floors of the building were rented by garment
manufacturers. The structure of the building was castinplace concrete with steel reinforcement. The
designwassimpleinnaturewithflatslabssupportedbytypicalbeamsandcolumns.Theinteriorofthe
building was dimly lit and does not have dedicated air conditioning technologies. Fans were
occasionally used to induce air flow and to disperse the heat that gathered in the building. Working
conditions were not pleasant, a staple of the garment industry. Four diesel generators located on the
roofofthebuildingwereinstalledasameansofemergencypowerduringfrequentpoweroutagesthat
the city experiences. They were known to activate over a dozen times per day in order to restore
electricityandclothingproduction.(Motlagh2014)
Rana Plaza was opened in August 2009 and by 2011, the third through eighth floors were fully
occupied by garment factories. Each floor was rented by a different company, each with their own
materials, supplies, equipment, and personnel. Combined across all renters, the building brought in
about1.5millioneurosannually,about1.85millionUSdollars.(Motlagh2014)
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SummaryofEvents
On April 23, 2013, visible cracks could be seen throughout the structure of the Rana Plaza, primarily
ontheseventhfloor.Someofthesecrackswereasmuchastwoinchesdeepanddeeplyalarmedthe
workersinsidethebuilding.BecauseofthesecracksthePlazawasimmediatelyevacuatedandalocal
engineerbroughtintoassessthesituation.Afterhisreview,theengineerrecommendedthatitremain
closeduntilitcouldbeinspectedbyprofessionalengineersandtechnicians.Aroundthistime,alocal
news station arrived to report the story, spreading awareness of the situation for hundreds of miles.
Ignoringtheengineer,SohelRanahadhisowninspectorsandengineersexaminethebuilding.Through
bribesandotherinfluence,hewasabletoconvincethemtoopenRanaPlazaforoperation.(Whearty
et al. 2014) Sohel ignored the warnings from other engineers and the dangers of the building, and
thought only of continuing production at any cost. He was fueled by both insatiable greed and the
pressure from major corporate clients to deliver merchandise orders on schedule. Delays could be
catastrophic to client relations because corporate clients demanded quick turn around on contracts.
Thenextday,April24,alargecrowdofseveralhundredhadgatheredoutsideofRanaPlaza,manyof
whomwereirateandconfusedworkers.Theyhadassumedthatthebuildingwouldremainclosebased
uponthewarningfromtheengineer,buttheyhadreceivednoticetoshowforwork.Regardless,many
of the crowd were extremely hesitant to enter the dangerously unstable complex and return to work.
Sohel, recognizing their hesitation, went to factory managers and supervisors and told them to force
people inside. They threatened to retain overtime pay or to fire workers if they did not enter the
building.(Motlagh2014)
Faced with no other option the workers entered Rana Plaza and returned to work at approximately
8:45am. At 9:00am, the power cutout, a very common occurrence in Bangladesh. The generators on
the roof activated, restoring power and sending vibrations through the building, as typical. This
vibration was noticeably stronger than typical and caused the building to shake violently. Panicked,
workersbegantorunforexits,butbeforetheycouldcouldescapethestructure,therewasaloudclap
andthebuildingbegantoprogressivelyfailfromthetopdown,eachfloorcollapsingontopoftheother
inapancakefashion.Inunderaminutetheentirebuildinghadcollapsed,asseeninFigure2below.It
is believed that the collapse propagated on the 7th floor at a southwest corner column, most likely a
column underneath one or more of the electrical generators. As this floor collapsed, it overloaded the
floor below leading to further collapse, trapping several thousand people inside a network of concrete
andsteel.(Motlagh2014)
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Figure2:RanaPlazashortlyaftercollapse.(PhotoCourtesyofWikimediaCommons.)
Investigation&CauseofFailure
Shortlyafterthecollapse,theBangladeshigovernmentorganizedanddirectedahighlevelcommittee
to investigate the disaster site and determine the causes of the failure. Through their investigation,
they discovered several contributing causes, many developing from the beginning moments of its
construction.Thesecauseswere:
Unsuitablelandformultistoryconstruction.
Useofpoorqualityconstructionmaterials.
Loadsplacedonthebuildingthatwerenotwithindesigncriteria.
Poorregulationandenforcementofbuildingcodes.
Highdemandwithinthegarmentmarket.
The land underneath the Rana Plaza was unsuitable for construction. In their report, the
committee stated that "the ground the Rana Plaza was built on was unfit for a multistory building".
(Whearty et al. 2014) Before construction, a marshy swamp land with a small pond could be seen at
the site of the Plaza. The soil composition of the land was unstable and had inadequate strength to
supporttheweightofthebuilding.(Dietz)However,insteadofremovingtheunstablesoilandreplacing
itwithbetter,strongersoilwiththestrengthneededtosupportthebuilding,rubbishandtrashwasused
to fill in the swamp. Sohel was able to bribe officials to grant him the permits necessary for
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construction, despite the poor soil strength. Also, he bribed several engineers and the local mayor to
signoffontheprojectandallowconstructiontoproceed.Thesepoorgroundconditionswerenotable
tosupporttheloadsofthebuildinganditisbelievedtheyleadtodifferentialsettlement,weakeningthe
structure.(Wheartyetal.2014)
The committee found that construction "used extremely poor quality iron rods and cement". It
wascommonforcheapermaterialstobeusedinconstructioninBangladesh.Someofthiscamefrom
an effort to cut costs on the project, and some of it came from inexperience of the builders. For the
Plaza,cementusedtomaketheconcreteincludedtoomuchsand,makingitmorebrittleandweak.In
addition,thesubfloorswerecasttoothinanddidnothavethenecessarydepthandstrengthneeded
todisperseandsupporttheloadsofthebuilding.Thereinforcingsteelusedintheconcretealsohadits
share of issues. Due to unavailability and high cost, it was a difficult material to obtain. In order to
decreasethebudget,lesssteelwasembeddedintheconcretethanwascalledforinthedesign.This
drastically decreased the overall strength of the concrete and made it much more susceptible to
tension loads. The committee postulated that had the proper amount of steel been used within the
concrete, the collapse may have been localized rather than progressive. Furthermore, smooth bars
wereusedasreinforcing,ratherthanthetypicaltexturedbarsusedtoday.(Dietz)Smoothbarsdonot
form as strong of a bond with concrete because the smooth surface does not facilitate a strong
connection with the aggregate. Textured bars provide an undulating surface that gives the aggregate
something to "grip" onto, providing more tensile support within the concrete. With both an inadequate
amountofsteelandauseofsmoothbarsovertexturedbars,thestructurewasweakerthandesigned
andwassusceptibletotensionloads.(Wheartyet.al2014)
Loadswereaddedtothebuildingthatwerenotintheoriginaldesign.ThePlazawasplannedto
be a fourstory building that would house primarily retail and office space. However, four additional
floors were illegally added to the structure, with a ninth under construction.at the time of collapse.
Throughbribesandextortion,SohelRanahadtheseextrafloorsbuiltwithoutgettingtheproperpermits
or approval from the local government. (Motlagh 2014) The illegal construction more than doubled the
height of the building and put tremendous stress on the structure. Furthermore, the building was
designed to handle the loads of office and retail space, but was instead used mostly in an industrial
capacity. The first and second floors were occupied by banks and retail space, but the third through
eighthfloorswereoccupiedbygarmentfactories.Thesefactoriesmeantmuchlargerloadscreatedby
heavy sewing equipment, hundreds of employees, and large stockpiles of garments and fabrics.
(Wheartyetal.2014)Thedesignloadsforoffice,retail,andmanufacturingoccupancytypesfromthe
BangladeshNationalBuildingCodearebrokendowninTable1below.
Table1:UniformDesignLoadsinBangladeshDesignandConstruction
(CourtesyoftheBangladeshNationalBuildingCode)
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AscanbeseeninTable1,theuniformloadsforofficeandretailoccupancytypesareverysimilarin
scale.Ontheotherhand,theuniformloadsformanufacturingoccupancytypewereconsiderablylarger
and could be up to twice as large. Depending on the actual weight created by the factories, which is
presumablyintherangeof125to250psf,theloadplacedonthebuildingcouldbenearlytwicewhatit
wasactuallydesignedfor.Evenwiththefactorsofsafetybuiltintocalculationsandintotheseuniform
loads,thisisanaddedweightthatcouldnotbesafelywithstoodbythestructure.Inaddition,fourlarge
diesel generators were installed on the roof of the Plaza in order to backup the electricity of the
building, which went out frequently. The roof was certainly not built to withstand the weight of these
generators, each weighing several metric tons. (Motlagh 2014) Furthermore, when activated, the
generatorscausednoticeableshakingofthestructure,jeopardizingitfurther.Itwasthisvibrationthat
ultimately unsettled the building and set off the progressive collapse. (Whearty et al. 2014) The
locationwherethesegeneratorswereplacedontheroofisnotexactlydocumented.However,itcanbe
theorizedthatoneormorewaslocatedoverthefailingsouthwestcolumn,sincethegeneratorswere
thecauseofthecollapsethatbeganinthatlocation.
RegulationsandbuildingcodesinBangladeshwererarelyfullyenforced.Corruptionandpolitics
playamajorrolethroughouttheconstructionindustryinBangladesh.Buildingownersareabletoexert
theirinfluenceinordertogetaroundthelawortoconvinceofficialstoallowwhattheywant.Thereare
numerousinstanceswhereconstructionoftheRanaPlazashouldhavebeenstoppedorcorrected,but
it wasn't. Sohel Rana was able to take advantage of the deficiencies in the system through his
connections to political allies and his wealth. Not only did he make sure that inspections were rarely
performed, but Sohel was able to bribe officials to build on a rejected plot of land, to add additional
floors to the building, and to convince workers to enter the building despite the cracks and warnings
fromengineers.(Motlagh2014)Heusedhispoliticalconnectionstoobtainpermitsandpermissionsto
build. Unfortunately, the Plaza isn't the only building where these immoral and illegal practices were
followed. According to the Bangladesh building code, all new construction must apply for and receive
anoccupancycertificatefromagovernmentorganization.However,onlysixhavebeenproperlyissued
since 2008, despite estimates of over 4,000 buildings built each year. (Whearty et al. 2014) This
statistic clearly shows that there is a significant level of corruption throughout the Bangladesh
constructionindustry,allowingbuildingownerstoeasilyabusethesystem.
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Thereisaveryhighworldwidedemandforcheapgarments.Consumersthroughouttheworld
enjoypurchasingmassquantitiesofclothingandothermerchandiseatthelowestpossiblecost.They
demandtheabilitytobuycheapshirts,jeans,dresses,andotherclothing,withlittlethoughtofhowthe
productsaremade.Corporationsrespondtothisdemandbyplacingpressureontheirinternational
factoriestoproduceclothesquicklyandatlowcost.Theyrespondpoorlytodelaysorissuesinthe
process,oftenlayingdownharshpenaltiesinresponse.Thiscorporatepressurethenleadsfactory
ownersandmanagerstoworktheirlaborerstirelessly,requiringlonghoursoflaborforlittlepay.Itis
thishighlevelofdemandthatleadtothepoorworkingconditionsthatplaguegarmentfactories
throughouttheworld,particularlyinBangladesh.ThepressuresthatSohelfacedfromthisindustrylead
himtomakemanypoordecisions,thatsadlyleadtothedeathsofoverathousandworkers.(Motlagh
2014)
RescueEfforts
GetyourbrandnewWikispacesClassroomnow
(https://www.wikispaces.com/t/y/classroomswitch/banner/3/)anddo"backtoschool"in
Figure3:Localsandotherrescueworkersscanthedebrisforsurvivors.(Photocourtesyof
style.
WikimediaCommons.)
Immediatelyfollowingthecollapse,policeandfirebrigadeweredispatchedtoRanaPlaza,buttheydid
notarrivefor10to15minutes.Thefirstresponderstothescenewereseveralhundredlocalresidents
whohadheardthecollapseorheardofthecollapseandcametoassistthosetrappedinsidethe
rubble.Manypeoplevoluntarilyenteredthedebrisfield,riskingtheirownlives,inordertosaveas
manyofthevictimsaspossible,ascanbeseeninFigure3and4totheright.Theyalsobrought
suppliessuchaswater,medicine,andbandagestohelpanyoneinneed.Iftheywererunninglowon
anyvaluablematerials,theyutilizedsocialmediatocommunicatewitheachotherandaskfor
additionalsupplies.Asemergencypersonnelarrivedandrescueeffortsintensified,somesurvivorshad
tobephysicallycutfromtherubbletheyweretrappedunder.Inmanyunfortunateinstances,theyhad
tobeamputatedinthefieldinordertobesafelyfreed.FromthePlaza,allwoundedweretransported
toEnamMedicalCollege&Hospital,locatedlessthanamileaway.Thehospitalwasonlysetupto
treat750patientsandwasquicklyovercapacity.Makeshiftbedsweresetuptoholdmorepatients
andfirstyearmedicalstudentswerecalledintoassistthestaffofthehospital.Nearbymedical
facilitiessentsuppliestorestockthehospital'sreservesastheyweredepletedtotreatallofthe
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wounded.
Figure4:Rescuerspreparetoscanthewreckageforsurvivors.(PhotocourtesyofWikimedia
Commons)
Rescuersworkedquicklyagainsttheclock.Trappedvictimsfaceddeathfromdehydration.exposure
tohightemperatures,oxygendepletion,andtheirinjuries.OnMay13,after20days,rescueefforts
wereconcludedwithover2,500survivorspulledfromthedebris.Thegovernmenthadbeenillprepared
todealwiththescopeofthedisasteranditwasprimarilytheheroiceffortsofthelocalresidentswho
savedthelivesofsomanypeople.
Aftermath
Intheaftermathofthecollapse,changehasbeenusheredintoBangladesh'sgovernmentandit's
buildingindustry.Internationalorganizations,foreignallies,localinstitutions,andlargeretailershave
beenstrongpromotersofimprovingtheworkingsituationsforgarmentfactoryworkers.Inaddition,the
Bangladeshpublichasbeeninoutragesincethedisasterandhasprominentlyvoicedtheirdesirefor
changetotheindustryandtheirworkingconditions.Thecatalystofthismovementcomesfromthe
collapseofRanaPlaza.Intheweeksfollowingthetragedy,publicprotestsofthegarmentindustry
werecommonplace.OnMay1,oneofthelargestprotestsoccurredwithseveralthousandworkers
marchingthroughDhakatoprotestpoorworkingconditions.InJune2013,alargeprotestnearthesite
ofthePlazawasbrokenupbypoliceusingteargasandbatons.Theunrestcontinuedasworkers
demandedanincreaseinminimumwagefrom$37permonthto$104permonth.Facingpressurefrom
upsetworkersandthegovernment,inNovember2013,theBangladeshGarmentManufacturersand
ExportsAssociation(BGMEA)raisedtheminimumwageto$68permonth,ahugevictoryforthe
workers.
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AnothervictoryforthepeopleofBangladeshwasthefirstsuccessfultrialagainstamemberofthe
garmentfactoryindustryinDecember2013.DelwarHossain,hiswife,and11factorymanagerswere
chargedwithculpablehomicideafterTazreenFashionsburneddownkilling117people.Flammable
chemicalswereimproperlystoredinthefactoryandtheexitpathswerenotclearforescape.Thehigh
levelstateinvestigationaccusedthemof"unpardonablenegligence".Anumberofpeoplewerealso
arrestedduringthemonthsfollowingtheRanaPlazacollapse,includingengineers,managers,and
politicians.Oneofthechiefengineersoftheproject,themayorofSavar,andmostofthemanagersof
thebuildingfacechargesforthedeathsoftheworkers.Sohelisstillinprisonawaitingpolice
prosecution.
Sincethecollapse,threemajorinitiativeshavebeenenactedtoimproveconditionsinBangladesh:the
AccordonFireandBuildingSafety,theAllianceforBangladeshWorkerSafety,andajointstrategy
betweentheUnitedNationsandBangladesh.Allthreeinitiativesaredesignedtoencouragesafe
constructionandworkpractices,empowertheindustrytohavemoreregularinspectionsbyhiring
additionalinspectors,andincreasecorporationinvolvementbyrequiringthemtopayforupgradesto
theirfactorybuildingsinordertoreachappropriatesafetystandards.TheAccordisalegallybinding
documentlastingfiveyearsforthecompanieswhosignitandprimarilyinvolvescountriesfromthe
EuropeanUnion.Itrequirescorporationstohireathirdpartytoconductinspectionsoftheirfactories
andprotectsworkersbygivingthemthefreedomtovoicetheirconcernswithoutthefearofbeingfired
andguaranteesworkerssalaryeveniftheycannotworkduetofactoryrenovationsorstoppages.The
AllianceinvolvesmainlyUScompaniesandretailers,andaimstobringthemtogethertoinspect100%
oftheirfactorieswithin5yearsandsetthemtosafetystandards.Thebiggestdifferencebetweenthe
AllianceandtheAccordistheAlliancerelievescorporationsofmostoftheliabilitytheywouldfaceif
accidentsweretooccur.
Conclusion
ThereweremanydifferentfactorsthatleduptothecollapseoftheRanaPlazaonApril24,2013,
makingitdifficulttopinpointoneissueasthedecidingfault.Thebuildingitselfhadstructuralintegrity
issuesduetototheweaksoilfoundationbeneath,theuseofpoorqualitymaterialsduring
construction,increasedloadsduetoadditionalfloorsandachangeinoccupancytypefromthedesign,
andfourrooftopgeneratorsthatshookthebuildingduringoperation.Thesephysicalissuescombined
withainspectionandregulationsystemthatfailedtocheckthebuilding,noticetheapparentissues,
andceaseconstructionoroperationduetotheunsafenatureofthebuilding,createdaverydangerous
situationthatsadlyresultedinthecollapseofthePlazaandthedeathsandinjuriestothousandsof
workers.SohelRana,likemanybuildingownersinBangladesh,usedhispower,money,andpolitical
connectionstocheatthesystem,acquireillegalpermits,andignoreprofessionalopinion,leadingto
immoraldecisionsthatputthousandsinharmsway.
Ifthereisasilverliningtothishorrificevent,itisthattheterriblenatureofthetragedyhasshocked
theworldandtheBangladeshgovernmentandpeopleintoaction.ThroughtheinactionoftheAccord,
theAlliance,andtheUN/Bangladeshagreement,changewillbeseeninthegarmentindustryin
Bangladeshandthroughouttheworld.Overthenextseveralyears,workingconditionswillbemade
saferasunsafegarmentfactoriesareshutdownandthecorporationswhousethempaytohavethem
renovatedintosafeoperation.
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PhotoCredits
Figure1:ThisphotoiscopyrightedbyJeanaRippleandBarbaraPoradaandcanbeseeninThe
GhostsofRanaPlazabyJasonMotlaghoftheVirginiaQuarterlyReview.Useofthisphotoispurely
forthisreportandisnotmeanttosuggestthattheartistendorsesanyopinionsexpressedhere.
Cover&Figure2:ThisphotoiscopyrightedbyRijans007,whouploadeditthroughFlickrtoWikimedia
Commons.Useofthisphotoispurelyforthisreportandisnotmeanttosuggestthattheartist
endorsesanyopinionsexpressedhere.Thelicensecoveringthisphotocanbefoundhere .
Figure3:ThisphotoiscopyrightedbySharatChowdhury,whouploadedittoWikimediaCommons.
Useofthisphotoispurelyforthisreportandisnotmeanttosuggestthattheartistendorsesany
opinionsexpressedhere.Thelicensecoveringthisphotocanbefoundhere .
Figure4:ThisphotoiscopyrightedbySharatChowdhury,whouploadedittoWikimediaCommons.
Useofthisphotoispurelyforthisreportandisnotmeanttosuggestthattheartistendorsesany
opinionsexpressedhere.Thelicensecoveringthisphotocanbefoundhere .
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thesurvivorsofthedisaster.
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