Wills and Succession 4th Batch

1. ABANGAN v ABANGAN
46 Phil 476
Topic: WILLS- FORMS OF WILLS
FACTS:
On September 19, 1917, CFI of Cebu admitted to probate Ana Abangan's will executed July, 1916. From
this decision the opponents appealed. The will consists of 2 sheets. The first contains all the disposition of
the testatrix, duly signed at the bottom by Martin Montalban and by three witnesses. The following sheet
contains only the attestation clause duly signed at the bottom by the three instrumental witnesses. Neither
of these sheets is signed on the left margin by the testatrix and the three witnesses, nor numbered by
letters. These omissions, according to appellants' contention, are defects whereby the probate of the will
should have been denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the will was duly admitted to probate.
HELD:
YES. In requiring that each and every sheet of the will be signed on the left margin by the testator and
three witnesses in the presence of each other, Act No. 2645 evidently has for its object the avoidance of
substitution of any of said sheets which may change the disposition of the testatrix. In a will consisting of
two sheets the first of which contains all the testamentary dispositions and is signed at the bottom by the
testator and three witnesses and the second contains only the attestation clause and is signed also at the
bottom by the three witnesses, it is not necessary that both sheets be further signed on their margins by
the testator and the witnesses, or be paged. The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of
wills is to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to
guaranty their truth and authenticity. Therefore the laws on this subject should be interpreted in such a
way as to attain these primordial ends. But, on the other hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact that
it is not the object of the law to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a will. So when an
interpretation already given assures such ends, any other interpretation whatsoever, that adds nothing but
demands more requisites entirely unnecessary, useless and frustration of the testator's last will, must be
disregarded.
2. ACAIN vs IAC
G.R. No. 72706,
October 27, 1987
Topic/Doctrine: Preterition
FACTS:
In 1960, Nemesio Acain wrote a will giving all his properties to his brother Segundo, or, in case Segundo
predeceases Nemesio, to Segundo's children. Segundo died before Nemesio. Petitioner Constantino is one
of Segundo's children. In 1984, after the death of Nemesio, Constantino petitioned the court to have the
will probated. This was opposed by Rosa Diongson, Nemesio's wife, and Virginia Fernandez, a legally
adopted child of Nemesio and Rosa. The opposition was denied by the trial court, hence Diongson and
Fernandez went to the SC, which transferred the case to the CA. The CA ordered the trial court to dismiss
the probate petition since Diongson and Fernandez were preterited. Constantino went to the SC on
certiorari, contending that the CA could not rule on the intrinsic validity of the will before it is admitted for
probate. Diongson and Fernandez opposed, contending that certiorari is not a proper remedy.
Issues:
1. Whether or not certiorari is a proper remedy.
2. Whether or not probate courts (the CA in this case) could rule on the intrinsic validity of a will
before the will is probated.
3. Whether or not Diongson was preterited.
4. Whether or not Fernandez was preterited.
Rulings:
1. Yes, certiorari is a proper remedy. The existence of the remedy of appeal does not preclude
certiorari, if appeal would not afford speedy and adequate relief.
2. Yes. For practical considerations [???], the CA should be allowed to rule on the intrinsic validity of a
will before the will was probated. If the probate of the will is allowed when on its face the will
appears to be intrinsically void would have been an exercise in futility. It would have meant a waste
of time, effort, expense, plus added futility.
3. No. Insofar as the widow is concerned, Article 854 of the Civil Code may not apply as she does not
ascend or descend from the testator, although she is a compulsory heir. Stated otherwise, even if
the surviving spouse is a compulsory heir, there is no preterition even if she is omitted from the
inheritance, for she is not in the direct line.

4. Yes. Her legal adoption by the Nemesio has not been questioned by Constantino. Under Article 39 of
P.D. No. 603, known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, adoption gives to the adopted person the
same rights and duties as if he were a legitimate child of the adopter and makes the adopted
person a legal heir of the adopter. It cannot be denied that she has totally omitted and preterited in
the will of the testator and that both adopted child and the widow were deprived of at least their
legitime. Neither can it be denied that they were not expressly disinherited. Hence, this is a clear
case of preterition of the legally adopted child.
3. In the Matter of the summary settlement of the Estate of the deceased
ANACLETA ABELLANA. LUCIO BALONAN, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
EUSEBIA ABELLANA, et al., oppositors-appellants.
G.R. No. L-15153 August 31, 1960 ;
FACTS:
1) It appears on record that the last Will and Testament (Exhibit "A"),which is sought to be probated, is
written in the Spanish language and consists of two (2) typewritten pages double space.
2) The first page is signed by Juan Bello and under his name appears typewritten "Por la testadora
Anacleta Abellana, residence Certificate A-1167629, Enero 20, 1951, Ciudad de Zamboanga', and on the
second page appears the signature of three (3) instrumental witnesses Blas Sebastian, Faustino Macaso
and Rafael Ignacio, at the bottom of which appears the signature of T. de los Santos and below his
signature is his official designation as the notary public who notarized the said
testament.
a. On the first page on the left margin of the said instrument also appear the signatures of the
instrumental witnesses.
b. On the second page, which is the last page of said last Will and Testament, also appears the
signature of the three (3) instrumental witnesses and on that second page on the left margin
appears the signature of Juan Bello under whose name appears handwritten the following phrase,
"Por la Testadora Anacleta Abellana'. The will is duly acknowledged before Notary Public Attorney
Timoteo de los Santos.
ISSUE: Does the signature of Dr. Juan A. Abello above the typewritten statement "Por la Testadora
Anacleta Abellana . . ., Ciudad de Zamboanga," comply with the requirements of law prescribing the
manner in which a will shall be executed?
HELD: the said will of the deceased Anacleta Abellana may not be admitted to probate.
Article 805 of the Civil Code, in part provides as follows:
Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator
himself or by the testator's name written by some other person in his presence, and by his express
direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witness in the presence of the
testator and of one another.
the important thing is that it clearly appears that the name of the testatrix was signed at her
express direction; it is unimportant whether the person who writes the name of the testatrix signs
his own or not.
In the case at bar the name of the testatrix, Anacleta Abellana, does not appear written under the
will by said Abellana herself, or by Dr. Juan Abello.
There is, therefore, a failure to comply with the express requirement in the law that the testator
must himself sign the will, or that his name be affixed thereto by some other person in his presence
and by his express direction.
4. Barut v. Cabacungan
21:461 | Casuela
FACTS:
Barut applied for the probate of the will of deceased, Maria Salomon. The testatrix stated in the will
that being unable to read or write, the will was read to her by Ciriaco Concepcion and Timotea Inoselda
and that she had instructed Severo Agayan to sign her name to it as testatrix. The probate was contested
by a
number of the relatives of the deceased on various grounds.
The probate court found that the will was not entitled to probate because the handwriting of the
person who it is alleged signed the name of the testatrix to the will for and on her behalf looked more like
the handwriting of one of the other witnesses to the will than to the person whose handwriting it was
alleged to be (i.e. The probate court denied probate because the signature seemed to not have been by
Severo Agayan but by another witness).
ISSUE:
Was the dissimilarity in handwriting sufficient to deny probate of the will?
HELD:
No. The SC found that the mere dissimilarity in writing is sufficient to overcome the uncontradicted
testimony of all the witnesses that the signature of the testatrix was written by Severo Agayan. It is also

immaterial who writes the name of the testatrix provided it is written at her request and in her presence
and in the presence of all the witnesses to the execution of the will.
Based on Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it is clear that with respect to the validity of
the will, it is unimportant whether the person who writes the name of the testatrix signs his own or not.
The important thing is that it clearly appears that the name of the testatrix was signed at her express
direction in the presence of 3 witnesses and that they attested and subscribed it in her presence and in the
presence of each other. It may be wise that the one who signs the testators name signs also his own; but
that is not essential to the validity of the will.
The court also held that the 3 cases cited by the lower court was not applicable. In those cases, the
person who signed the will for the testator wrote his own name instead of the testators, so that the
testators name nowhere appeared in the will, and were thus wills not duly executed.

5. BONILLA vs BARCENA
71 SCRA 491 | Angliongto
FACTS:
On March 31, 1975 Fortunata Barcena, mother of minors Rosalio Bonilla and Salvacion Bonilla and wife of
Ponciano Bonilla, instituted a civil action in the CFI of Abra, to quiet title over certain parcels of land
located in Abra. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that Fortunata
Barcena is dead and, therefore, has no legal capacity to sue. In the hearing for the motion to dismiss,
counsel for the plaintiff confirmed the death of Fortunata Barcena, and asked for substitution by her minor
children and her husband; but the court after the hearing immediately dismissed the case on the ground
that a dead person cannot be a real party in interest and has no legal personality to sue.
ISSUE:
W/N the CFI erred in dismissing the complaint.
HELD:
While it is true that a person who is dead cannot sue in court, yet he can be substituted by his heirs
in pursuing the case
up to its completion. The records of this case show that the death of Fortunata Barcena took place on July
9, 1975 while the complaint was filed on March 31, 1975. This means that when the complaint was filed on
March 31, 1975, Fortunata Barcena was still alive, and therefore, the court had acquired jurisdiction over
her person.
Under Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court "whenever a party to a pending case dies ... it shall be the
duty of his attorney to inform the court promptly of such death ... and to give the name and residence of
his executor, administrator, guardian or other legal representatives." This duty was complied with by the
counsel for the deceased plaintiff when he manifested before the respondent Court that Fortunata Barcena
died on July 9, 1975 and asked for the proper substitution of parties in the case. The respondent Court,
however, instead of allowing the substitution, dismissed the complaint on the ground that a dead person
has no legal personality to sue. This is a grave error. Article 777 of the Civil Code provides "that the rights
to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent." From the moment of the
death of the decedent, the heirs become the absolute owners of his property, subject to the rights and
obligations of the decedent, and they cannot be deprived of their rights thereto except by the methods
provided for by law. The moment of death is the determining factor when the heirs acquire a definite right
to the inheritance whether such right be pure or contingent. The right of the heirs to the property of the
deceased vests in them even before judicial declaration of their being heirs in the testate or intestate
proceedings. When Fortunata Barcena, therefore, died, her claim or right to the parcels of land in litigation
in Civil Case No. 856, was not extinguished by her death but was transmitted to her heirs upon her death.
Her heirs have thus acquired interest in the properties in litigation and became parties in interest in the
case. There is, therefore, no reason for the respondent Court not to allow their substitution as parties in
interest for the deceased plaintiff.
The claim of the deceased plaintiff which is an action to quiet title over the parcels of land in
litigation affects primarily and principally property and property rights and therefore is one that survives
even after her death. It is, therefore, the duty of the respondent Court to order the legal representative of
the deceased plaintiff to appear and to be substituted for her. But what the respondent Court did, upon
being informed by the counsel for the deceased plaintiff that the latter was dead, was to dismiss the
complaint. This should not have been done for under Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, it is even the
duty of the court, if the legal representative fails to appear, to order the opposing party to procure the
appointment of a legal representative of the deceased. Unquestionably, the respondent Court has gravely
abused its discretion in not complying with the clear provision of the Rules of Court in dismissing the
complaint of the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 856 and refusing the substitution of parties in the case.
6. Borja v. Borja
46 SCRA 577 | Ang
FACTS:
Francisco de Borja filed a petition for probate of the will of his wife who died, Josefa Tangco, with the CFI of
Rizal. He was appointed executor and administrator, until he died; his son Jose became the sole

administrator. Francisco had taken a 2nd wife Tasiana before he died; she instituted testate proceedings
with the CFI of Nueva Ecija upon his death and was appointed special administatrix. Jose and Tasiana
entered upon a compromise agreement, but Tasiana opposed the approval of the compromise agreement.
She argues that it was no valid, because the heirs cannot enter into such kind of agreement without first
probating the will of Francisco, and at the time the agreement was made, the will was still being probated
with the CFI of Nueva Ecija.
ISSUE:
W/N the compromise agreement is valid, even if the will of Francisco has not yet been probated.
HELD:
YES, the compromise agreement is valid. The agreement stipulated that Tasiana will receive
P800,000 as full payment for her hereditary share in the estate of Francisco and Josefa.
There was here no attempt to settle or distribute the estate of Francisco de Borja among the heirs
thereto before the probate of his will. The clear object of the contract was merely the conveyance by
Tasiana Ongsingco of any and all her individual share and interest, actual or eventual, in the estate of
Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco. There is no stipulation as to any other claimant,creditor or legatee.
And as a hereditary share in a decedent's estate is transmitted or vested immediately from the
moment of the death of such causante or predecessor in interest (Civil Code of the Philippines, Art. 777)
there is no legal bar to a successor (with requisite contracting capacity) disposing of her or his hereditary
share immediately after such death, even if the actual extent of such share is not determined until the
subsequent liquidation of theestate.

7. Cagro v. Cagro
92:1032 | Dina
FACTS:
Vicente Cagro died on Feb. 14, 1949 in Samar. Since the decedent allegedly made a will prior to his death,
the will was
probated before the CFI of Samar. However, the oppositorsappellant objected the probate proceeding
alleging that the will is fatally defective because its attestation clause is not signed by the attesting
witnesses. It is undisputed that the signatures of the three witnesses to the will do not appear at the
bottom of the attestation clause, although the page containing the same is signed by the witnesses on the
left-hand margin.
ISSUE:
W/N the will may be probated even if the signatures of the witnesses do not appear at the bottom of the
attestation clause, and instead, they were placed on the left-hand margin of the page containing the same.
HELD:

No. The position taken by the oppositor-appellant is correct. The attestation clause is 'a
memorandum of the facts attending the execution of the will' required by law to be made by the attesting
witnesses, and it must necessarily bear their signatures. An unsigned attestation clause cannot be
considered as an act of the witnesses, since the omission of their signatures at the bottom thereof
negatives their participation.
The petitioner-appellee contends that signatures of the three witnesses on the left-hand margin
conform substantially to the law and may be deemed as their signatures to the attestation clause. This is
untenable, because said signatures are in compliance with the legal mandate that the will be signed on the
left-hand margin of all its pages. If an attestation clause not signed by the three witnesses at the bottom
thereof, be admitted as sufficient, it would be easy to add such clause to a will on a subsequent occasion
and in the absence of the testator and any or all of the witnesses.
8. Cruz v. Villasor
54 SCRA 752 | Dizon
FACTS:
The CFI of Cebu allowed the probate of Valente Z. Cruzs last will and testament. His surviving spouse,
Agapita Cruz, opposed the allowance of the will alleging it was executed through fraud, deceit,
misrepresentation and undue influence; that the said instrument was execute without the testator having
been fully informed of the content thereof, particularly as to what properties he was disposing and that the
supposed last will and testament was not executed in accordance with law. Agapita appealed the
allowance of the will by certiorari.
ISSUE:
W/N the will was executed in accordance with law (particularly Articles 805 and 806 of the NCC, the first
requiring at least three credible witnesses to attest and subscribe to the will, and the second requiring the
testator and the witnesses to acknowledge the will before a notary public.).
HELD:
NO. Of the three instrumental witnesses to the will, one of them (Atty. Teves) is at the same time
the Notary Public before

whom the will was supposed to have been acknowledged. The notary public before whom the will was
acknowledged cannot be considered as the third instrumental witness since he cannot acknowledge before
himself his having signed the will. To acknowledge before means to avow (Javellana v. Ledesma; Castro v.
Castro); to own as genuine, to assent, to admit; and "before" means in front or preceding in space or
ahead of. Consequently, if the third witness were the notary public himself, he would have to mavow
assent, or admit his having signed the will in front of himself. This cannot be done because he cannot split
his personality into two so that one will appear before the other to acknowledge his participation in the
making of the will. To permit such a situation to obtain would be sanctioning a sheer absurdity.
Furthermore, the function of a notary public is, among others, to guard against any illegal or immoral
arrangement (Balinon v. De Leon). That function would defeated if the notary public were one of the
attesting instrumental witnesses. It would place him in inconsistent position and the very purpose of
acknowledgment, which is to minimize fraud, would be thwarted.
Admittedly, there are American precedents holding that notary public may, in addition, act as a
witness to the executive of the document he has notarized. There are others holding that his signing
merely as notary in a will nonetheless makes him a witness thereon. But these authorities do not serve the
purpose of the law in this jurisdiction or are not decisive of the issue herein because the notaries public
and witnesses referred to in these cases merely acted as instrumental, subscribing attesting witnesses,
and not as acknowledging witnesses. Here, the notary public acted not only as attesting witness but also
acknowledging witness, a situation not envisaged by Article 805-06. Probate of will set aside.
9. Dela Cerna v. Potot
12 SCRA 576 |
FACTS:
Spouses Bernabe de la Serna and Gervasia Rebaca, executed a joint last will ad testament where
they willed that their 2 parcels of land be given to Manuela Rebaca, their niece and that while each of them
are living, he/she will continue to enjoy the fruits of the lands mentioned.
Bernabe died. Gervasia submitted the will for probated. By order of Oct. 31, 1939, the Court
admitted for probate the said will but only for the part of Bernabe.
When Gervasia died, another petition for probate was instituted by Manuela, but because she and
her attorney failed to appear in court, the petition was dismissed. When the same was heard, the CFI
declared the will void for being executed contrary to the prohibition on joint wills. On appeal, the order was
reversed.
ISSUE:
W/N the will may be probated.
HELD:
Admittedly the probate of the will in 1939 was erroneous, however, because it was probated by a
court of competent jurisdiction it has conclusive effect and a final judgment rendered on a petition for the
probate of a will is binding upon the whole world. However, this is only with respect to the estate of the
husband but cannot affect the estate of the wife; considering that a joint will is a separate will of each
testator.
The joint will being prohibited by law, its validity, in so far as the estate of the wife is concerned,
must be reexamine and adjudicated de novo.
The undivided interest of the wife should pass upon her death to her intestate heirs and not to the
testamentary heir. Thus as to the disposition of the wife, the will cannot be given effect. A decree of
probate decree is conclusive on the due execution and the formal validity of the will subject to such
probate.
10. Diaz v. De Leon
G.R. No. 17714
May 31, 1922
Topic/Doctrine: Revocation of a will
FACTS:
Jesus de Leon executed 2 wills, the second will was not deemed in conformance to the requirements under
the law. After executing his first will, he asked it to be immediately returned to him. As it was returned, he
instructed his servant to tear it. This was done in the testator's presence and his nurse. After sometime, he
was asked by his physician about the incident wherein he replied that the will has already been destroyed.
ISSUE:
WON there was a valid revocation of the will?
HELD:
Yes. His intention to revoke is manifest from the facts that he was anxious to withdraw or change the
provisions he made in the first will. This fact was shown from his own statements to the witnesses and the
mother superior of the hospital where he was subsequently confined. The original will which was presented
for probate is deemed destroyed hence, it cannot be probated as the last will and testament of testator.
11. In RE Tampoy: Diosdada Alberastine, petitioner
GR L-14322, 25 February 1960 (107 Phil 100)En Banc, Bautista Angelo (p): 10 concurring

Facts:
On 19 November 1939, Petronila Tampoy, a widow and without children, requested with Bonifacio Minoza
to read a testament and explain its contents to her in her house in San Miguel street, municipality of
Argao, province of Cebu in 19 November 1939, which he did in the presence of three instrumental
witnesses, Rosario K. Chan, Mauricio de la Pena, and Simeona Omboy. After confirming the contents of the
testament, she requested Bonifacio Minoza to write her name at the foot of the testament in the second
page, which he did, and after which she stamped her thumbmark between her name and surname in the
presence of all three instrumental witnesses. Bonifacio Minoza also signed at the foot of the testament, in
the second page, in the presence of the testator and all three above named witnesses. However, the
testator, just like Bonifacio Minoza, did not sign on the left margin or any part of the first page of the
testament, composed of two pages. All the three instrumental witnesses signed at the foot of the
acknowledgment written in the second page of the testament, and the left margin of the first and second
page, in the presence of the testator, BonifacioMinoza, Atty. Kintanar, and the others. The testament was
executed freely and spontaneously, without having been threatened, forced and intimidated, and not
having exercised on her (the testator) undue influence, being the same in full use of her mental faculties
and enjoying good health. On 22 February1957, the testator died in here house in Argao.
On 7 March 1957, or two weeks after, the heir found in the testament, Carman Aberastine died, leaving her
mother, the petitioner Diosdada Alberastine. After trial on the probate o a document purportedly to be the
last and testament of Petronila Rampoy, the trial court denied the petition on the ground that the left hand
margin of the first page of the will does not bear the thumbmark of the testatrix. Petitioner appealed from
this ruling. The Court of Appeals certified the case to the Supreme Court because it involves purely a
question of law.
Issue:
Whether the absence of the testators thumbmark in the first page is fatal to render the will void
Held:
Statutes prescribing the formalities to be observed in the execution of wills are very strictly construed. A
will must be executed in accordance with the statutory requirements; otherwise it is entirely void. In the
present case, the contention that the petition for probate is unopposed, and that the three testimonial
witnesses testified and manifested to the court that the document expresses the true and voluntary will of
the deceased, cannot be sustained as it runs counter to the express provision of the law. Since the will
suffers the fatal defect, as it does not bear the thumbmark of the testatrix on its first page even if it bears
the signature of the three instrumental witnesses, the same fails to comply with the law and therefore
cannot be admitted to probate.
The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed order, without pronouncement as to costs
12. Gabucan vs. Manta
[G.R. No. L-51546; January 28, 1980]
TOPIC: Effect of failure to attach stamp to taxable document, instrument or paper.
DOCTRINE:
A taxable instrument, document or paper which does not bear the stamp shall not be recorded, nor shall it
or any copy thereof or any record of transfer of the same be admitted or used in evidence in any court.
The non-admissibility of the document, which does not bear the requisite documentary stamp, subsists
only "until the requisite stamp or stamps shall have been affixed thereto and cancelled." (Sec. 201 NIRC)
FACTS:
The CFI dismissed the probate proceedings for the will of the late Rogaciano Gabucan. The proceeding was
dismissed because the requisite documentary stamp was not affixed to the notarial acknowledgment in the
will and, hence, according to the CFI, it was not admissible in evidence, citing section 238 of the Tax Code,
now section 201 NIRC 1997.
FACTS:
This case is about the dismissal of a petition for the probate of the notarial will of the late Rogaciano
Gabucan on the ground that it does not bear a thirty-centavo documentary stamp. The probate court
refused to reconsider the dismissal in spite of petitioners manifestation that he had already attached the
documentary stamp to the original of the will.
ISSUE: Whether or not the proceeding should be dismissed because the will was not duly stamped.
HELD:
No. The CFI dismissed the case and even the motion for reconsideration wherein petitioner was already
manifesting that he had already attached the stamp to the original of the will. The CFI erred in declaring
that, because no documentary stamp was affixed to the will, there was "no will and testament to probate"
and, consequently, the alleged "action must of necessity be dismissed". Instead, the court should have
allowed the petitioner to tender the stamp in order to correct the deficiency. The non-admissibility of the
document, which does not bear the requisite documentary stamp, subsists only "until the requisite stamp
or stamps shall have been affixed thereto and cancelled."
13. Gago vs. Mamuyac

G.R. No. L-26317

January 29, 1927
Topic/Doctrine: Revocation of a will
FACTS:
Previously, Francisco Gago filed a petition for the probate of a will of Miguel Mamuyac executed on July 27,
1918. The oppositors alleged that the said will was already annulled and revoked. It appeared that on April
16, 1919, the deceased executed another will. The lower court denied the probate of the first will on the
ground of the existence of the second will. Another petition was filed to seek the probate of the second
will. The oppositors alleged that the second will presented was merely a copy. According to the witnesses,
the said will was allegedly revoked as per the testimony of Jose Tenoy, one of the witnesses who typed the
document. Another witness testified that on December 1920 the original will was actually cancelled by the
testator. The lower court denied the probate and held that the same has been annulled and revoked.
ISSUE:
WON there was a valid revocation of the will
HELD:
Yes. The will was already cancelled in 1920. This was inferred when after due search, the original will
cannot be found. When the will which cannot be found in shown to be in the possession of the testator
when last seen, the presumption is that in the absence of other competent evidence, the same was
deemed cancelled or destroyed. The same presumption applies when it is shown that the testator has
ready access to the will and it can no longer be found after his death.
14. ARTICLE 811
Gan v. Yap
104:509 | Lugtu
FACTS:
Felicidad Yap died of a heart failure, leaving properties in Pulilan, Bulacan, and in Manila. Fausto E.
Gan, her nephew, initiated the proceedings in the Manila CFI with a petition for the probate of a
holographic will
allegedly executed by the deceased.
The will was not presented because Felicidads husband, Ildefonso, supposedly took it. What was
presented were witness accounts of relatives who knew of her intention to make a will and allegedly saw it
as well. According to the witnesses, Felicidad did not want her husband to know about it, but she had made
known to her other relatives that she made a will.
Opposing the petition, her surviving husband Ildefonso Yap asserted that the deceased had not left
any will, nor executed any testament during her lifetime.
After hearing the parties and considering their evidence, the Judge refused to probate the alleged
will on account of the discrepancies arising from the facts. For one thing, it is strange that Felicidad made
her will known to so many of her relatives when she wanted to keep it a secret and she would not have
carried it in her purse in the hospital, knowing that her husband may have access to it. There was also no
evidence presented that her niece was her confidant.
In the face of these improbabilities, the trial judge had to accept the oppositors evidence that Felicidad did
not and could not have executed such holographic will.
ISSUE:
1. May a holographic will be probated upon the testimony of witnesses who have allegedly seen it and who
declare that it was in the handwriting of the testator?
2. W/N Felicidad could have executed the holographic will.
HELD:
1. No. The will must be presented.
The New Civil Code effective in 1950 revived holographic wills in its arts. 810-814. "A person may execute
a holographic
will which must be entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no
other form and
may be made in or out of the Philippines, and need not be witnessed."
This is a radical departure from the form and solemnities provided for wills under Act 190, which for fifty
years (from 1901 to 1950) required wills to be subscribed by the testator and three credible witnesses in
each and every page; such witnesses to attest to the number of sheets used and to the fact that the
testator signed in their presence and that they signed in the presence of the testator and of each other.
Authenticity and due execution is the dominant requirements to be fulfilled when such will is submitted to
the courts for allowance. For that purpose the testimony of one of the subscribing witnesses would be
sufficient if there is no opposition (Sec. 5, Rule 77). If there is, the three must testify, if available. From the
testimony of such witnesses (and of other additional witnesses) the court may form its opinion as to the
genuineness and authenticity of the testament, and the circumstances its due execution.
With regard to holographic wills, no such guaranties of truth and veracity are demanded, since as stated,
they need no witnesses; provided however, that they are "entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand
of the testator himself." In the probate of a holographic will" says the New Civil Code, "it shall be
necessary that at least one witness who knows the handwriting and signature of the testator explicitly
declare that the will and the signature are in the handwriting of the testator. If the will is contested, at least

three such witnesses shall be required. In the absence of any such witnesses, (familiar with decedent's
handwriting) and if the court deem it necessary, expert testimony may be resorted to."
The witnesses need not have seen the execution of the holographic will, but they must be familiar with the
decedent handwriting. Obviously, when the will itself is not submitted, these means of opposition, and of
assessing the evidence are not available. And then the only guaranty of authenticity the testator's
handwriting has disappeared. The Rules of Court, (Rule 77) approved in 1940 allow proof (and probate)
of a lost or destroyed will by secondary evidence the testimony of witnesses, in lieu of the original
document. Yet such Rules could not have contemplated holographic wills which could not then be validly
made here. Could Rule 77 be extended, by analogy, to holographic wills? (NO) Spanish commentators
agree that one of the greatest objections to the holographic will is that it may be lost or stolen an
implied admission that such loss or theft renders it useless. As it is universally admitted that the
holographic will is usually done by the testator and by himself alone, to prevent others from knowing either
its execution or its contents, the above article 692 could not have the idea of simply permitting such
relatives to state whether they know of the will, but whether in the face of the document itself they think
the testator wrote it. Obviously, this they can't do unless the will
itself is presented to the Court and to them. This holding aligns with the ideas on holographic wills in the
Fuero Juzgo, admittedly the basis of the Spanish Civil Code provisions on the matter.(According to the
Fuero, the will itself must be compared with specimens of the testators handwriting.)
All of which can only mean: the courts will not distribute the property of the deceased in accordance with
his holographic
will, unless they are shown his handwriting and signature. Taking all the above circumstances together, we
reach the
conclusion that the execution and the contents of a lost or destroyed holographic will may not be proved
by the bare testimony of witnesses who have seen and/or read such will. At this point, before proceeding
further, it might be convenient to explain why, unlike holographic wills, ordinary wills may be proved by
testimonial evidence when lost or destroyed. The difference lies in the nature of the wills. In the first, the
only guarantee of authenticity is the handwriting itself; in the second, the testimony of the subscribing or
instrumental witnesses (and of the notary, now). The loss of the holographic will entails the loss of the only
medium of proof; if the ordinary will is lost, the subscribing witnesses are available to authenticate. In the
case of ordinary wills, it is quite hard to convince three witnesses (four with the notary) deliberately to lie.
And then their lies could be checked and exposed, their whereabouts and acts on the particular day, the
likelihood that they would be called by the testator, their intimacy with the testator, etc. And if they were
intimates or trusted friends of the testator they are not likely to end themselves to any fraudulent scheme
to distort his wishes. Last but not least, they can not receive anything on account of the will.
Whereas in the case of holographic wills, if oral testimony were admissible only one man could engineer
the fraud this way: after making a clever or passable imitation of the handwriting and signature of the
deceased, he may contrive to let three honest and credible witnesses see and read the forgery; and the
latter, having no interest, could easily fall for it, and in court they would in all good faith affirm its
genuineness and authenticity. The will having been lost the forger may
have purposely destroyed it in an "accident" the oppositors have no way to expose the trick and the
error, because the document itself is not at hand. And considering that the holographic will may consist of
two or three pages, and only
one of them need be signed, the substitution of the unsigned pages, which may be the most important
ones, may go undetected. If testimonial evidence of holographic wills be permitted, one more
objectionable feature feasibility of forgery would be added to the several objections to this kind of
wills listed by Castan, Sanchez Roman and Valverde and other well-known Spanish Commentators and
teachers of Civil Law. One more fundamental difference: in the case of a lost will, the three subscribing
witnesses would be testifying to a fact which they saw, namely the act of the testator of
subscribing the will; whereas in the case of a lost holographic will, the witnesses would testify as to their
opinion of the
handwriting which they allegedly saw, an opinion which can not be tested in court, nor directly
contradicted by the oppositors, because the handwriting itself is not at hand.
In fine, even if oral testimony were admissible to establish and probate a lost holographic will, we think the
evidence
submitted by herein petitioner is so tainted with improbabilities and inconsistencies that it fails to measure
up to that "clear and distinct" proof required by Rule 77, sec. 6.
2. No. Even if oral testimony were admissible to establish and probate a lost holographic will, we think the
evidence submitted by herein petitioner is so tainted with improbabilities and inconsistencies that it fails to
measure up to that "clear and distinct" proof required by Rule 77, sec. 6
15. Gonzales v. CA
90 SCRA 183 | Reyes
FACTS:
Isabel Gabriel died on June 7, 1961 without issue. Lutgarda
Santiago (respondent), niece of Isabel, filed a petition for probate of Isabel's will designating her as the
principal beneficiary and executrix. The will was typewritten in Tagalog and was executed 2 months prior to
death of Isabel.

The petition was opposed by Rizalina Gonzales (petitioner), also a niece of Isabel, on the following
grounds: 1. the will is not genuine, 2. will was not executed and attested as required by law, 3. the
decedent at the time of the making of the will did not have testamentary capacity due to her age and
sickness, and 4. the will was procured through undue influence.
The trial court disallowed the probate of the will but the Court of Appeals Reversed the said decision
of the trial court. The petitioner filed a petition for review with SC claiming that the CA erred in holding that
the will of the decedent was executed and attested as required by law when there was absolutely no proof
that the 3 instrumental witnesses are credible.
ISSUE:
1. 1. Can a witness be considered competent under Art 820-821 and still not be considered credible as
required by Art. 805?
2. Is it required that there must be evidence on record that the witness to a will has good standing in
his/her community or that he/she is honest or upright?
HELD:
1. Yes. The petitioner submits that the term credible in Article 805 requires something more than just being
competent and,
therefore, a witness in addition to being competent under Articles 820-821 must also be credible under Art.
805. The competency of a person to be an instrumental witness to a will is determined by the statute (Art.
820 and 821), whereas his credibility depends on the appreciation of his testimony and arises from the
belief and conclusion of the Court that said witness is telling the truth. In the case of Vda. de Aroyo v. El
Beaterio del Santissimo Rosario de Molo, No. L-22005, May 3,1968, the Supreme Court held and ruled that:
"Competency as a witness is one thing, and it is another to be a credible witness, so credible that the Court
must accept what he says. Trial courts may allow a person to testify as a witness upon a given matter
because he is competent, but may thereafter decide whether to believe or not to believe his testimony."
2. No. There is no mandatory requirement that the witness testify initially or at any time during the trial as
to his good standing in the community, his reputation for trustworthiness and for being reliable, his
honesty and uprightness (such attributes are presumed of the witness unless the contrary is proved
otherwise by the opposing party) in order that his testimony may be believed and accepted by the trial
court. It is enough that the qualifications enumerated in Article 820 of the Civil Code are complied with,
such that the soundness of his mind can be shown by or deduced from his answers to the questions
propounded to him, that his age (18 years or more) is shown from his appearance, testimony , or
competently proved otherwise, as well as the fact that he is not blind, deaf or dumb and that he is able to
read and write to the satisfaction of the Court, and that he has none of the disqualifications under Article
821 of the Civil Code.
16. Icasiano v. Icasiano
11 SCRA 422 | Dela Cuesta
FACTS:
Celso Icasiano filed a petition for the allowance and admission to probate of the alleged will of
Josefa Villacorte, and for his appointment as executor thereof. Natividad and Enrique Icasiano, a daughter
and son of the testatrix, filed their opposition thereto. During the course of the trial, on 19 March 1959,
Celso, started to present his evidence. But later, on 1 June 1959, he then filed an amended and
supplemental petition, alleging that the decedent had left a will executed in duplicate and with all the legal
requirements, and that he was submitting the duplicate to the court, which he found only on 26 May 1959.
Natividad and Enrique filed their opposition, but the will and its duplicate was admitted to probate by the
trial court. Hence, this appeal by the oppositors.
Oppositors-appellants (Natividad and Enrique) in turn introduced expert testimony to the effect that
the signatures of the testatrix in the duplicate are not genuine, nor were they written or affixed on the
same occasion as the original, and further aver that granting that the documents were genuine, they were
executed through mistake and with undue influence and pressure because the testatrix was deceived into
adopting as her last will and testament the wishes of those who will stand to benefit from the provisions of
the will, as may be inferred from the facts and circumstances surrounding the execution of the will and the
provisions and dispositions thereof, whereby proponents- appellees stand to profit from properties held by
them as attorneys- in-fact of the deceased and not enumerated or mentioned therein, while oppositorsappellants are enjoined not to look for other properties not mentioned in the will, and not to oppose the
probate of it, on
penalty of forfeiting their share in the portion of free disposal.
ISSUE:
Was the trial court correct in admitting the will and its duplicate to probate given the allegations of forgery
of the testators signature, or that the will was executed under circumstances constituting fraud and undue
influence and pressure?
(Not raised by the appellants in the case but discussed by the Court and in Sirs book) Is the failure of one
of the witnesses to sign a page of the will fatal to its validity?
HELD:
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that both the will and its duplicate are valid in all
respects.
On the allegations of forgery, fraud and undue influence:

The Court is satisfied that all the requisites for the validity of a will have been complied with. The
opinion of a handwriting expert trying to prove forgery of the testatrix's signature failed to convince the
Court, not only because it is directly contradicted by another expert but principally because of the paucity
of the standards used by him (only three other signatures), considering the advanced age of the testatrix,
the evident variability of her signature, and the effect of writing fatigue.
Similarly, the alleged slight variance in blueness of the ink in the admitted and questioned
signatures does not appear reliable, considering that standard and challenged writings were affixed to
different kinds of paper, with different surfaces and reflecting power. On the whole, the testimony of the
oppositor's expert is insufficient to overcome that of the notary and the two instrumental witnesses as to
the wills execution, which were presented by Celso during the trial.
Nor is there adequate evidence of fraud or undue influence.
The fact that some heirs are more favored than others is proof of neither. Diversity of apportionment is the
usual reason for making a testament; otherwise, the decedent might as well die intestate. The
testamentary disposition that the heirs should not inquire into other property and that they should respect
the distribution made in the will, under penalty of forfeiture of their shares in the free part, do not suffice to
prove fraud or undue influence. They appear motivated by the desire to prevent prolonged litigation which,
as shown by ordinary experience, often results in a sizeable portion of the estate being diverted into the
hands of non- heirs and speculators. Whether these clauses are valid or not is a matter to be litigated on
another occasion. It is also well to note that fraud and undue influence are mutually repugnant and
exclude each other; their joining as grounds for opposing probate shows absence of definite evidence
against the validity of the will.
17. Javellana v. Ledesma
97:258 | Enriquez
FACTS:
The Court of First Instance of Iloilo admitted to probate the documents in the Visayan dialectas the
testament and codicil duly executed by the deceased Da. Apolinaria Ledesma Vda. De Javellana, on March
30, 1950, and May 29, 1952, respectively, with Ramon Tabiana, Gloria Montinola de Tabiana and Vicente
Yap as witnesses. The contestant, Matea Ledesma, sister and nearest surviving relative of said deceased,
appealed from the decision, insisting that the said exhibits were not executed in conformity with law.
Ledesma is questioning the validity of the codicil contending that the fact that the notary did not sign the
instrument in the presence of the testator and the witness made the codicil was not executed in
conformity with the law
ISSUE:
W/N the codicil was validly executed.
HELD:
The instrumental witnesses (who happen to be the same ones who attested the will of 1950)
asserted that after the codicilhad been signed by the testatrix and the witnesses at the San Pablo Hospital,
the same was signed and sealed by notary public Gimotea on the same occasion. On the other hand,
Gimotea affirmed that he did not do so, but brought the codicil to his office, and signed and sealed it there.
The variance does not necessarily imply conscious perversion of truth on the part of the witnesses, but
appears rather due to a well-established phenomenon, the tendency of the mind, in recalling past events,
to substitute the usual and habitual for what differs slightly from it.
Whether or not the notary signed the certification of acknowledgment in the presence of the
testatrix and the witnesses, does not affect the validity of the codicil. The new Civil Code does not require
that the signing of the testator, witnesses and notary should be accomplished in one single act. A
comparison of Articles
805 and 806 of the new Civil Code reveals that while testator and witnesses sign in the presence of each
other, all that is thereafter required is that "every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the
testator and the witnesses" (Art. 806); i.e., that thelatter should avow to the certifying officer the
authenticity of their signatures and the voluntariness of their actions in executing the testamentary
disposition. This was done in this case. The subsequent signing and sealing by the notary of his
certification that the testament was duly acknowledged by the participants therein is no part of the
acknowledgment itself nor of the testamentary act. Hence their separate execution out of the presence of
the testatrix and her witnesses cannot be said to violate the rule that testaments should be completed
without interruption. It is noteworthy that Article 806 of the new Civil Code does not contain words
requiring that the testator and the witnesses should acknowledge the testament on the same day or
occasion that it was executed.
18. G.R. No. L-46364

April 6, 1990

SULPICIA JIMENEZ and TORIBIO MATIAS, petitioners,

vs.
VICENTE FERNANDEZ alias HOSPICIO FERNANDEZ and TEODORA GRADO, respondents.
Antonio E. Bengzon III for petitioners.
Agustin U. Cruz for private respondents.
PARAS, J.:

Before Us is a petition for review on certiorari of the following Decision 1 and Resolution 2 of the Honorable
Court of Appeals: (1) Decision, dated March 1, 1977 in C.A.-G.R. No. 49178-R entitled "Sulpicia Jimenez, et
al., v. Vicente Fernandez, et al." affirming in toto the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan,
Third Judicial District in Civil Case No. 14802-I between the same parties and (2) Resolution dated June 3,
1977 denying plaintiffs-appellants' motion for reconsideration.
As gathered from the records, the factual background of this case is as follows:
The land in question is the Eastern portion with an area of Four Hundred Thirty Six (436) square meters of
that parcel of residential land situated in Barrio Dulig (now Magsaysay), Municipality of Labrador,
Pangasinan actually covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 82275 (Exhibit A) issued in the name of
Sulpicia Jimenez.
The entire parcel of land with an area of 2,932 square meters, formerly belonged to Fermin Jimenez.
Fermin Jimenez has two (2) sons named Fortunato and Carlos Jimenez. This Fortunato Jimenez who
predeceased his father has only one child, the petitioner Sulpicia Jimenez. After the death of Fermin
Jimenez, the entire parcel of land was registered under Act 496 in the name of Carlos Jimenez and Sulpicia
Jimenez (uncle and niece) in equal shares pro-indiviso. As a result of the registration case Original
Certificate of Title No. 50933 (Exhibit 8) was issued on February 28, 1933, in the names of Carlos Jimenez
and Sulpicia Jimenez, in equal shares pro-indiviso.
Carlos Jimenez died on July 9, 1936 and his illegitimate daughter, Melecia Cayabyab, also known as
Melecia Jimenez, took possession of the eastern portion of the property consisting of 436 square meters.
On January 20, 1944, Melecia Jimenez sold said 436 square meter-portion of the property to Edilberto
Cagampan and defendant Teodora Grado executed a contract entitled "Exchange of Real Properties"
whereby the former transferred said 436 square meter-portion to the latter, who has been in occupation
since.
On August 29, 1969, plaintiff Sulpicia Jimenez executed an affidavit adjudicating unto herself the other half
of the property appertaining to Carlos Jimenez, upon manifestation that she is the only heir of her
deceased uncle. Consequently Transfer Certificate of Title No. 82275 was issued on October 1, 1969 in
petitioner's name alone over the entire 2,932 square meter property.
On April 1, 1970, Sulpicia Jimenez, joined by her husband, instituted the present action for the recovery of
the eastern portion of the property consisting of 436 square meters occupied by defendant Teodora Grado
and her son.
After trial on the merits, the lower court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, decision is hereby rendered dismissing the complaint and holding the defendant, Teodora
Grado, the absolute owner of the land in question; ordering the plaintiffs to pay to the defendant the
amount of P500.00 as damages, as attorney's fees, and to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 20)
Petitioner appealed the above judgment to the respondent Court of Appeals and on March 1, 1977,
respondent Court of Appeals rendered a decision affirming the same in toto. Said decision was rendered by
a special division of five (5) justices, with the Hon. Lourdes San Diego, dissenting.
Petitioners within the reglementary period granted by the Honorable Court of Appeals, filed therewith a
motion for reconsideration. But said motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in its
resolution dated June 3, 1977.
In their appeal to the respondent Court of Appeals from the aforequoted decision of the trial court, herein
petitioner raised the following assignments of error to wit:
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT MELECIA CAYABYAB, ALSO KNOWN AS MELECIA
JIMENEZ, IS NOT THE DAUGHTER OF CARLOS JIMENEZ.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT MELECIA CAYABYAB, ALSO KNOWN AS MELECIA
JIMENEZ, HAS NO RIGHT TO SELL THE LAND IN QUESTION TO EDILBERTO CAGAMPAN.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT EDILBERTO CAGAMPAN DID NOT BECOME THE OWNER
OF THE LAND IN QUESTION BY VIRTUE OF THE DEED OF SALE (EXH. "1") EXECUTED BY MELECIA CAYABYAB,
ALIAS MELECIA JIMENEZ, IN HIS FAVOR.
IV

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT TEODORA GRADO DID NOT BECOME THE OWNER OF
THE LAND IN QUESTION BY VIRTUE OF THE DEED OF EXCHANGE (EXH. "7") EXECUTED BY HER AND
EDILBERTO CAGAMPAN.
V
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE TITLE OF APPELLANT SULPICIA JIMENEZ OVER
THE LAND IN QUESTION CAN NOT BE DEFEATED BY THE ADVERSE OPEN AND NOTORIOUS POSSESSION OF
APPELLEE TEODORA GRADO.
VI
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE APPELLEE TEODORA GRADO IS THE ABSOLUTE OWNER
OF THE LAND IN QUESTION IN THE LIGHT OF THE DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT IN THE CASE OF
LOURDES ARCUINO, ET AL., V. RUFINA APARIS AND CASIANO PURAY, G.R. NO. L-23424, PROMULGATED
JANUARY 31, 1968, WHICH CASE IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR.
VII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT AND ORDERING THE APPELLANTS TO PAY THE
APPELLEES THE SUM OF P500.00 AS ATTORNEYS FEES PLUS THE COSTS.
From the foregoing, this petition for review was filed.
We find merit in the petition.
From the start the respondent court erred in not declaring that Melecia Jimenez Cayabyab also known as
Melecia Jimenez, is not the daughter of Carlos Jimenez and therefore, had no right over the property in
question. Respondents failed to present concrete evidence to prove that Melecia Cayabyab was really the
daughter of Carlos Jimenez. Nonetheless, assuming for the sake of argument that Melecia Cayabyab was
the illegitimate daughter of Carlos Jimenez there can be no question that Melecia Cayabyab had no right to
succeed to the estate of Carlos Jimenez and could not have validly acquired, nor legally transferred to
Edilberto Cagampan that portion of the property subject of this petition.
It is well-settled in this jurisdiction that the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of
the death of the decedent (Art. 777, Civil Code). Moreover, Art. 2263 of the Civil Code provides as follows:
Rights to the inheritance of a person who died with or without a will, before the effectivity of this Code,
shall be governed by the Civil Code of 1889, by other previous laws, and by the Rules of Court . . . (Rollo, p.
17)
Thus, since Carlos Jimenez, owner of one-half pro-indiviso portion of that parcel of land then covered by
Original Certificate of title No. 50933, died on July 9, 1936 (Exhibit "F") way before the effectivity of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, the successional rights pertaining to his estate must be determined in
accordance with the Civil Code of 1889.
Citing the case of Cid v. Burnaman (24 SCRA 434) wherein this Court categorically held that:
To be an heir under the rules of Civil Code of 1889 (which was the law in force when Carlos Jimenez died
and which should be the governing law in so far as the right to inherit from his estate was concerned), a
child must be either a child legitimate, legitimated, or adopted, or else an acknowledged natural child
for illegitimate not natural are disqualified to inherit. (Civil Code of 1889, Art. 807, 935)
Even assuming that Melecia Cayabyab was born out of the common-law-relationship between her mother
(Maria Cayabyab) and Carlos Jimenez, she could not even be considered an acknowledged natural child
because Carlos Jimenez was then legally married to Susana Abalos and therefore not qualified to marry
Maria Cayabyab and consequently Melecia Cayabyab was an illegitimate spurious child and not entitled to
any successional rights in so far as the estate of Carlos Jimenez was concerned.
Melecia Cayabyab in the absence of any voluntary conveyance to her by Carlos Jimenez or Sulpicia Jimenez
of the litigated portion of the land could not even legally transfer the parcel of land to Edilberto Cagampan
who accordingly, could not also legally transfer the same to herein private respondents.
Analyzing the case before Us in this manner, We can immediately discern another error in the decision of
the respondent court, which is that the said court sustained and made applicable to the case at bar the
ruling in the case of Arcuino, et al., v. Aparis and Puray, No. L-23424, January 31, 1968, 22 SCRA 407,
wherein We held that:
. . . it is true that the lands registered under the Torrens System may not be acquired by prescription but
plaintiffs herein are not the registered owners. They merely claim to have acquired by succession, their
alleged title or interest in lot No. 355. At any rate plaintiffs herein are guilty of laches.
The respondent court relying on the Arcuino case, concluded that respondents had acquired the property
under litigation by prescription. We cannot agree with such conclusion, because there is one very marked
and important difference between the case at bar and that of the Arcuino case, and that is, that since 1933
petitioner Sulpicia Jimenez was a title holder, the property then being registered in her and her uncle
Carlos Jimenez' name. In the Arcuino case, this Supreme Court held. "(I)t is true that lands registered under

the Torrens System may not be acquired by prescription but plaintiffs herein are not the registered
owners." (Rollo, p. 38) Even in the said cited case the principle of imprescriptibility of Torrens Titles was
respected.
Melecia Cayabyab's possession or of her predecessors-in-interest would be unavailing against the
petitioner Sulpicia Jimenez who was the holder pro-indiviso with Carlos Jimenez of the Torrens Certificate of
Title covering a tract of land which includes the portion now in question, from February 28, 1933, when the
Original Certificate of Title No. 50933 (Exhibit 8) was issued.
No possession by any person of any portion of the land covered by said original certificate of titles, could
defeat the title of the registered owner of the land covered by the certificate of title. (Benin v. Tuason, L26127, June 28, 1974, 57 SCRA 531)
Sulpicia's title over her one-half undivided property remained good and continued to be good when she
segregated it into a new title (T.C.T No. 82275, Exhibit "A") in 1969. Sulpicia's ownership over her one-half
of the land and which is the land in dispute was always covered by a Torrens title, and therefore, no
amount of possession thereof by the respondents, could ever defeat her proprietary rights thereon. It is
apparent, that the right of plaintiff (now petitioner) to institute this action to recover possession of the
portion of the land in question based on the Torrens Title of Sulpicia Jimenez, T.C.T. No. 82275 (Exhibit "A")
is imprescriptible and not barred under the doctrine of laches. (J.M. Tuason & Co. v. Macalindong, L-15398,
December 29, 1962, Francisco v. Cruz, et al., 43 O.G. 5105) Rollo, p. 39)
The respondent Court of Appeals declared the petitioner Sulpicia Jimenez guilty of laches and citing the
ruling in the case of Heirs of Lacamen v. Heirs of Laruan (65 SCRA 605), held that, since petitioner Sulpicia
Jimenez executed her Affidavit of Self-Adjudication only in 1969, she lost the right to recover possession of
the parcel of land subject of the litigation.
In this instance, again We rule for the petitioner. There is no absolute rule as to what constitutes laches or
staleness of demand; each case is to be determined according to its particular circumstances. The
question of laches is addressed to the sound discretion of the court and since laches is an equitable
doctrine, its application is controlled by equitable considerations. It cannot be worked to defeat justice or
to perpetrate fraud and injustice. It would be rank injustice and patently inequitous to deprive the lawful
heirs of their rightful inheritance.
Petitioner Sulpicia Jimenez is entitled to the relief prayed for, declaring her to be the sole and absolute
owner of the land in question with right to its possession and enjoyment. Since her uncle Carlos Jimenez
died in 1936, his pro-indiviso share in the properties then owned in co-ownership with his niece Sulpicia
descended by intestacy to Sulpicia Jimenez alone because Carlos died without any issue or other heirs.
After all, the professed objective of Act No. 496, otherwise known as the Land Registration Act or the law
which established the Torrens System of Land Registration in the Philippines is that the stability of the
landholding system in the Philippines depends on the confidence of the people in the titles covering the
properties. And to this end, this Court has invariably upheld the indefeasibility of the Torrens Title and in,
among others, J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. v. Macalindong (6 SCRA 938), held that "the right of the appellee to
file an action to recover possession based on its Torrens Title is imprescriptible and not barred under the
doctrine of laches.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review is hereby GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution dated March 1, 1977
and June 3, 1977 in CA G.R. No. L-49178-R are SET ASIDE.
19. Kalaw v. Relova
132 SCRA 237 | Posadas
FACTS:
On September 1, 1971,Gregorio Kalaw, claiming to be the sole heir of his deceased sister, Natividad
Kalaw, filed a petition for the probate of her holographic Will executed on December 24, 1968.
The holographic Will, as first written, named Rosa Kalaw, a sister of the testatrix as her sole heir.
She opposed probate alleging that the holographic Will contained alterations, corrections, and insertions
without the proper authentication by the full signature of the testatrix as required by Article 814 of the
Civil Code reading: Art. 814. In case of any insertion, cancellation, erasure or alteration in a holographic
will the testator must authenticate the same by his full signature.
ROSA's position was that the holographic Will, as first written, should be given effect and probated
so that she could be the sole heir thereunder.
Trial Court denied petition to probate the holographic will. Reconsideration denied.
ISSUE:
W/N the original unaltered text after subsequent alterations and insertions were voided by the Trial
Court for lack of authentication by the full signature of the testatrix, should be probated or not, with Rosa
as sole heir.
HELD:
Ordinarily, when a number of erasures, corrections, and interlineations made by the testator in a
holographic Will litem not been noted under his signature, ... the Will is not thereby invalidated as a whole,
but at most only as respects the particular words erased, corrected or interlined.

However, when as in this case, the holographic Will in dispute had only one substantial provision,
which was altered by substituting the original heir with another, but which alteration did not carry the
requisite of full authentication by the full signature of the testator, the effect must be that the entire Will is
voided or revoked for the simple reason that nothing remains in the Will after that which could remain
valid. To state that the Will as first written should be given efficacy is to disregard the seeming change of
mind of the testatrix. But that change of mind can neither be given effect because she failed to
authenticate it in the manner required by law by affixing her full signature,
The ruling in Velasco, supra, must be held confined to such insertions, cancellations, erasures or
alterations in a holographic Will, which affect only the efficacy of the altered words themselves but not the
essence and validity of the Will itself. As it is, with the erasures, cancellations and alterations made by the
testatrix herein, her real intention cannot be determined with certitude.
20. Labrador v. CA
184 SCRA 170 |
FACTS:
Melecio died leaving behind a parcel of land to his heirs. However, during probate proceedings,
Jesus and Gaudencio filed an opposition on the ground that the will has been extinguished by implication of
law alleging that before Melecios death, the land was sold to them evidenced by TCT No. 21178. Jesus
eventually sold it to Navat.
Trial court admitted the will to probate and declared the TCT null and void. However, the CA on
appeal denied probate on the ground that it was undated.
ISSUE:
W/N the alleged holographic will is dated, as provided for in Article 810 of CC.

HELD:
YES. The law does not specify a particular location where the date should be placed in the will. The
only requirements are that the date be in the will itself and executed in the hand of the testator.
The intention to show March 17 1968 as the date of the execution is plain from the tenor of the
succeeding words of the paragraph. It states that this being in the month of March 17 th day, in the year
1968, and this decision and or instruction of mine is the matter to be followed. And the one who made this
writing is no other than Melecio Labrador, their father. This clearly shows that this is a unilateral act of
Melecio who plainly knew that he was executing a will.
21. Maloto v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 76464 February 29, 1988
Sarmiento, J. (Ponente)
Facts:
1. Petitioners and respondents are the neices/nephews or Adriana Maloto who died in 1963. The four heirs
believed that the deceased did not leave a will, hesnce they filed an intestate proceeding. However, the
parties executed an extrajudicial settlement of the estate dividing it into four equal parts.
2. In 1967, Atty. Sulpicio Palma, ex-associate of the deceased's counsel allegedly discovered her last will
which was purportedly dated 1940, inside a cabinet. Hence the annulment of the proceedings and a
probate petition was filed by the devisees and legatees. The said will was allegedly burned by the
househelp under the instruction of the deceased
3. The lower court denied the probate on the ground that the animus revocandi in the burning of the will
was sufficiently proven.
Issue: Whether or not there was valid revocation of the will
RULING: No, there was no revocation. For a valid revocation to occur,the 'corpus' and 'animus' must
concur, one without the other will not produce a valid revocation. The physical act of destruction of a will
must come with an intention to revoke (animus revocandi). In this case, there's paucity of evidence to
comply with the said requirement. The paper burned was not established to be the will and the burning
though done under her express direction was not done in her presence.
Under Art. 830, the physical act of destruction, in this case the burning of the will, does not constitute an
effective revocation, unless it is coupled with animus revocandi on the part of the testator. Since animus is
a state of mind, it has to be accompanied by an overt physical act of burning, tearing, obliterating or
cancelling done by the testator himself or by another under his express direction and presence.
22. G.R. No. L-10907

June 29, 1957

AUREA MATIAS, petitioner,

vs.
HON. PRIMITIVO L. GONZALEZ, ETC., ET AL., respondents.

J. Gonzales Orense for petitioner.

Venancio H. Aquino for respondents.
CONCEPCION, J.:
Petitioner Aurea Matias seeks a writ of certiorari to annul certain orders of Hon. Primitivo L. Gonzales, as
Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cavite, in connection with Special Proceedings No. 5213 of said
court, entitled "Testate Estate of the Deceased Gabina Raquel."
On May 15, 1952, Aurea Matias initiated said special proceedings with a petition for the probate of a
document purporting to be the last will and testament of her aunt, Gabina Raquel, who died single on May
8, 1952, at the age of 92 years. The heir to the entire estate of the deceased except the properties
bequeathed to her other niece and nephews, namely, Victorina Salud, Santiago Salud, Policarpio Salud,
Santos Matias and Rafael Matias is, pursuant to said instrument, Aurea Matias, likewise, appointed
therein as executrix thereof, without bond. Basilia Salud, a first cousin of the deceased, opposed the
probate of her alleged will, and, after appropriate proceedings, the court, presided over by respondent
Judge, issued an order, dated February 8, 1956, sustaining said opposition and denying the petition for
probate. Subsequently, Aurea Matias brought the matter on appeal to this Court (G.R. No. L-10751), where
it is now pending decision.
Meanwhile, or on February 17, 1956, Basilia Salud moved for the dismissal of Horacio Rodriguez, as special
administrator of the estate of the deceased, and the appointment, in his stead of Ramon Plata. The motion
was set for hearing on February 23, 1956, on which date the court postponed the hearing to February 27,
1956. Although notified of this order, Rodriguez did not appear on the date last mentioned. Instead, he
filed an urgent motion praying for additional time within which to answer the charges preferred against
him by Basilia Salud and for another postponement of said hearing. This motion was not granted, and
Basilia Salud introduced evidence in support of said charges, whereupon respondent Judge by an order,
dated February 27, 1956, found Rodriguez guilty of abuse of authority and gross negligence, and,
accordingly, relieved him as special administrator of the estate of the deceased and appointed Basilia
Salud as special administratrix thereof, to "be assisted and advised by her niece, Miss Victorina Salud,"
who "shall always act as aide, interpreter and adviser of Basilia Salud." Said order, likewise, provided that
"Basilia Salud shall be helped by Mr. Ramon Plata . . . who is hereby appointed as co-administrator."
On March 8, 1956, Aurea Matins asked that said order of February 27, 1956, be set aside and that she be
appointed special co-administratrix, jointly with Horacio Rodriguez, upon the ground that Basilia Salud is
over eighty (80) years of age, totally blind and physically incapacitated to perform the duties of said office,
and that said movant is the universal heiress of the deceased and the person appointed by the latter as
executrix of her alleged will. This motion was denied in an order dated March 10, 1956, which maintained
"the appointment of the three above named persons" Basilia Salud, Ramon Plata and Victorina Salud
"for the management of the estate of the late Gabina Raquel pending final decision on the probate of the
alleged will of said decedent." However, on March 17, 1956, Basilia Salud tendered her resignation as
special administratrix by reason of physical disability, due to old age, and recommended the appointment,
in her place, of Victorina Salud. Before any action could be taken thereon, or on March 21, 1956, Aurea
Matias sought a reconsideration of said order of March 10, 1956. Moreover, on March 24, 1956, she
expressed her conformity to said resignation, but objected to the appointment, in lieu of Basilia Salud, of
Victorina Salud, on account of her antagonism to said Aurea Matias she (Victorina Salud) having been
the principal and most interested witness for the opposition to the probate of the alleged will of the
deceased and proposed that the administration of her estate be entrusted to the Philippine National
Bank, the Monte de Piedad, the Bank of the Philippine Islands, or any other similar institution authorized by
law therefor, should the court be reluctant to appoint the movant as special administratrix of said estate.
This motion for reconsideration was denied on March 26, 1956.
Shortly afterwards, or on June 18, 1956, respondents Ramon Plata and Victorina Salud requested authority
to collect the rents due, or which may be due, to the estate of the deceased and to collect all the produce
of her lands, which was granted on June 23, 1956. On June 27, 1956, said respondents filed another motion
praying for permission to sell the palay of the deceased then deposited in different rice mills in the
province of Cavite, which respondent judge granted on June 10, 1956. Later on, or on July 10, 1956,
petitioner instituted the present action against Judge Gonzales, and Victorina Salud and Ramon Plata, for
the purpose of annulling the above mentioned orders of respondent Judge, upon the ground that the same
had been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
In support of this pretense, it is argued that petitioner should have preference in the choice of special
administratrix of the estate of the decedent, she (petitioner) being the universal heiress to said estate and,
the executrix appointed in the alleged will of the deceased, that until its final disallowance which has
not, as yet, taken place she has a special interest in said estate, which must be protected by giving
representation thereto in the management of said estate; that, apart from denying her any such
representation, the management was given to persons partial to her main opponent, namely, Basilia Salud,
inasmuch as Victorina Salud is allied to her and Ramon Plata is a very close friend of one of her (Basilia
Salud's) attorneys; that Basilia Salud was made special administratrix despite her obvious unfitness for
said office, she being over eighty (80) years of age and blind; that said disability is borne out by the fact
that on March 17, 1956, Basilia Salud resigned as special administratrix upon such ground; that the Rules
of Court do not permit the appointment of more than one special administrator; that Horacio Rodriguez
was removed without giving petitioner a chance to be heard in connection therewith; and that Ramon Plata

and Victorina Salud were authorized to collect the rents due to the deceased and the produce of her lands,
as well to sell her palay, without previous notice to the petitioner herein.
Upon the other hand, respondents maintain that respondent Judge acted with the scope of his jurisdiction
and without any abuse of discretion; that petitioner can not validly claim any special interest in the estate
of the deceased, because the probate of the alleged will and testament of the latter upon which
petitioner relies has been denied; that Horacio Rodriguez was duly notified of the proceedings for his
removal; and that Victorina Salud and Ramon Plata have not done anything that would warrant their
removal.
Upon a review of the record, we find ourselves unable to sanction fully the acts of respondent Judge, for
the following reasons:
1. Although Horacio Rodriguez had notice of the hearing of the motion for his removal, dated February 17,
1956, the record shows that petitioner herein received copy of said motion of February 24, 1956, or the
date after that set for the hearing thereof. Again, notice of the order of respondent Judge, dated February
23, 1956, postponing said hearing to February 27, 1956, was not served on petitioner herein.
2. In her motion of February 17, 1956, Basilia Salud prayed for the dismissal of Horacio Rodriguez, and the
appointment of Ramon Plata, as special administrator of said estate. Petitioner had, therefore, no notice
that her main opponent, Basilia Salud, and the latter's principal witness, Victorina Salud, would be
considered for the management of said. As a consequence, said petitioner had no opportunity to object to
the appointment of Basilia Salud as special administratrix, and of Victorina Salud, as her assistant and
adviser, and the order of February 27, 1956, to this effect, denied due process to said petitioner.
3. Said order was issued with evident knowledge of the physical disability of Basilia Salud. Otherwise
respondent Judge would not have directed that she "be assisted and advised by her niece Victorina Salud,"
and that the latter "shall always act as aide, interpreter and adviser of Basilia Salud."
4. Thus, respondent Judge, in effect, appointed three (3) special administrators Basilia Salud, Victorina
Salud and Ramon Plata. Indeed, in the order of March 10, 1956, respondent Judge maintained "the
appointment of the three (3) above-named persons for the management of the estate of the late Gabina
Raquel."
5. Soon after the institution of said Special Proceedings No. 5213, an issue arose between Aurea Matias
and Basilia Salud regarding the person to be appointed special administrator of the estate of the deceased.
The former proposed Horacio Rodriguez, whereas the latter urged the appointment of Victorina Salud. By
an order dated August 11, 1952, the Court, then presided over by Hon. Jose Bernabe, Judge, decided the
matter in favor of Horacio Rodriguez and against Victorina Salud, upon the ground that, unlike the latter,
who, as a pharmacist and employee in the Santa Isabel Hospital, resides In the City of Manila, the former, a
practicing lawyer and a former public prosecutor, and later, mayor of the City of Cavite, is a resident
thereof. In other words, the order of resident thereof. In other words, the order of respondent Judge of
February 27, 1956, removing Rodriguez and appointing Victorina Salud to the management of the estate,
amounted to a reversal of the aforementioned order of Judge Bernabe of August 11, 1952.
6. Although the probate of the alleged will and testament of Gabina Raquel was denied by respondent
Judge, the order to this effect is not, as yet, final and executory. It is pending review on appeal taken by
Aurea Matias. The probate of said alleged will being still within realm of legal possibility, Aurea Matias has
as the universal heir and executrix designated in said instrument a special interest to protect during
the pendency of said appeal. Thus, in the case of Roxas vs. Pecson* (46 Off. Gaz., 2058), this Court held
that a widow, designated as executrix in the alleged will and testament of her deceased husband, the
probate of which had denied in an order pending appeal, "has . . . the same beneficial interest after the
decision of the court disapproving the will, which is now pending appeal, because the decision is not yet
final and may be reversed by the appellate court."
7. The record shows that there are, at least two (2) factions among the heirs of the deceased, namely, one,
represented by the petitioner, and another, to which Basilia Salud and Victorina Salud belong. Inasmuch as
the lower court had deemed it best to appoint more than one special administrator, justice and equity
demands that both factions be represented in the management of the estate of the deceased.
The rule, laid down in Roxas vs. Pecson (supra), to the effect that "only one special administrator may be
appointed to administrator temporarily" the estate of the deceased, must be considered in the light of the
facts obtaining in said case. The lower court appointed therein one special administrator for some
properties forming part of said estate, and a special administratrix for other properties thereof. Thus, there
were two (2) separate and independent special administrators. In the case at bar there is only one (1)
special administration, the powers of which shall be exercised jointly by two special co-administrators. In
short, the Roxas case is not squarely in point. Moreover, there are authorities in support of the power of
courts to appoint several special co-administrators (Lewis vs. Logdan, 87 A. 750; Harrison vs. Clark, 52 A.
514; In re Wilson's Estate, 61 N.Y.S. 2d., 49; Davenport vs. Davenport, 60 A. 379).
Wherefore, the orders complained of are hereby annulled and set aside. The lower court should re-hear the
matter of removal of Horacio Rodriguez and appointment of special administrators, after due notice to all
parties concerned, for action in conformity with the views expressed herein, with costs against
respondents Victorina Salud and Ramon Plata. It is so ordered.

23. BEATRIZ NERA, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,

vs.
NARCISA RIMANDO, defendantappellant
G.R. No. L-5971; February 27, 1911; CARSON
FACTS:
The only question raised by the evidence in this case as to the due execution of the instrument
propounded as a will in the court below, is whether one of the subscribing witnesses was present in the
small room where it was executed at the time when the testator and the other subscribing witnesses
attached their signatures; or whether at that time he was outside, some eight or ten feet away, in a large
room connecting with the smaller room by a doorway, across which was hung a curtain which made it
impossible for one in the outside room to see the testator and the other subscribing witnesses in the act of
attaching their signatures to the instrument.
FACTS:
1. Facts are missing in this case.
2. Witness was outside, some eight or ten feet away, in a large room connecting with the smaller room by
a doorway, across which was hung a curtain which made it impossible for one in the outside room to see
the testator and the other subscribing witnesses in the act of attaching their signatures to the instrument.
ISSUE:
1. Whether one of the subscribing witnesses was present in the small room where it was executed at the
time when the testator and the other subscribing witnesses attached their signatures?
HELD:
1. Subscribing witness was in the small room with the testator and the other subscribing witnesses at the
time when they attached their signatures to the instrument
subscribing witness has been proven to have been in theouter room at the time when the testator
and the other subscribing witnesses attached their signatures to the instrument in the inner room,
it would have been invalid as a will, the attaching of those signatures under circumstances not
being done "in the presence" of the witness in the outer room.

line of vision from this witness to the testator and the other subscribing witnesses would
necessarily have been impeded by the curtain separating the inner from the outer one "at the
moment of inscription of each signature."
position of the parties with relation to each other at the moment of the subscription of each
signature must be such that they may see each other sign if they choose to do so
does not mean that the testator and the subscribing witnesses may be held to have
executed the instrument in the presence of each other if I appears that they would not have
been able to see each other sign at that moment, without changing their relative positions
or existing conditions.
at the moment when the witness Javellana signed the document he was actually and physically
present and in such position with relation to Jaboneta that he could see everything that took place
by merely casting his eyes in the proper direction and without any physical obstruction to prevent
his doing so."

Doctrine: whether the testator and the subscribing witnesses to an alleged will sign the instrument in the
presence of each other does not depend upon proof of thefact that their eyes were actually cast upon the
paper at the moment of its subscription by each of them, but that at that moment existing conditions and
their position with relation to each other were such that by merely casting the eyes in the proper direction
they could have seen each other sign.
o extend the doctrine further would open the door to the possibility of all manner of fraud,
substitution, and the like, and would
o defeat the purpose for which this particular condition is prescribed in the code as one of the
requisites in the execution of a will.
HELD:
Citing Jaboneta v. Gustilo, the court held that The true test of presence of the testator and the witnesses
in the execution of a will is not whether they actually saw each other sign, but whether they might have
been seen each other sign, had they chosen to do so, considering their mental and physical condition and
position with relation to each other at the moment of inscription of each signature.
But it is especially to be noted that the position of the parties with relation to each other at the moment of
the subscription of each signature, must be such that they may see each other sign if they choose to do
so.
The question is whether the testator and the subscribing witnesses to an alleged will signed the instrument
in the presence of each other does not depend upon proof of the fact that their eyes were actually cast
upon the paper at the moment of its subscription by each of them, but that at that moment existing
conditions and their position with relation to each other were such that by merely casting the eyes in the
proper direction they could have seen each other sign. To extend the doctrine further would open the door

to the possibility of all manner of fraud, substitution, and the like, and would defeat the purpose for which
this particular condition is prescribed in the code as one of the requisites in the
execution of a will.
24. Rodelas v. Aranza
119 SCRA 16 | Nieves
FACTS:
Rodelas filed a petition with the CFI of Rizal for the probate of the holographic will of Ricardo B. Bonilla and
the issuance of letters testamentary in her favor.
Aranza, et al. filed a MTD on the grounds of:
1. Rodelas was estopped from claiming that the deceased left a will by failing to produce the will within
twenty days of the death of the testator as required by Rule 75, section 2 of the Rules of Court;
2. the copy of the alleged holographic will did not contain a disposition of property after death and was not
intended to take effect after death, and therefore it was not a will, it was merely an instruction as to the
management and improvement of the schools and colleges founded by the decedent;
3. the hollographic will itself, and not an alleged copy thereof, must be produced, otherwise it would
produce no effect because lost or destroyed holographic wills cannot be proved by secondary evidence
unlike ordinary wills
4. the deceased did not leave any will, holographic or otherwise, executed and attested as required by law.
MTD was denied. Aranza et al. filed an MR, Rodelas filed an opposition.
The CFI set aside its order and dismissed the petition for the probate of the will stating that in the
case of Gam vs. Yap, 104 Phil. 509, 522, the Supreme Court held that 'in the matter of holographic wills the
law, it is reasonable to suppose, regards the document itself as the material proof of authenticity of said
wills.
And that the alleged holographic will was executed on January 25, 1962 while Ricardo B. Bonilla
died on May 13, 1976. The lapse of more than 14 years from the time of the execution of the will to the
death of the decedent and the fact that the original of the will could not be located shows to that the
decedent had discarded the alleged holographic will before his death.
Rodelas filed an MR which was denied. Rodelas appealed to the CA. Aranza et al. moved to forward
the case to the SC as it involves a question of law not of fact.
ISSUE:
W/N a holographic will which was lost or cannot be found can be proved by means of a photostatic copy.
HELD:
If the holographic will has been lost or destroyed and no other copy is available, the will cannot be
probated because the best and only evidence is the handwriting of the testator in said will. It is necessary
that there be a comparison between sample handwritten statements of the testator and the handwritten
will. But, a photostatic copy or xerox copy of the holographic will may be allowed because comparison can
be made by the probate court with the standard writings of the testator. The probate court would be able
to determine the authenticity of the handwriting of the testator.
In the case of Gam vs. Yap, 104 PHIL. 509, the Court ruled that "the execution and the contents of a
lost or destroyed holographic will may not be proved by the bare testimony of witnesses who have seen
and/or read such will. The will itself must be presented; otherwise, it shall produce no effect. The law
regards the document itself as material proof of authenticity." But, in Footnote 8 of said decision, it says
that "Perhaps it may be proved by a photographic or photostatic copy. Even a mimeographed or carbon
copy; or by other similar means, if any, whereby the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased may
be exhibited and tested before the probate court,"
25. ARTICLE 810
Roxas v. De Jesus
134 SCRA 245 | Lantion
FACTS:
Bibiane Roxas died. Her brother, Simeon Roxas, filed a spec. pro. for partition of the estate of the deceased
and also delivered the holographic will of the deceased. Simeon stated that he found a notebook belonging
to deceased, which contained a letter-will entirely written and signed in deceaseds handwriting. The will
is dated "FEB./61 " and states: "This is my will which I want to be respected although it is not written by a
lawyer. Roxas relatives corroborated the fact that the same is a holographic will of deceased, identifying
her handwriting and signature. Respondent opposed probate on the ground that it such does not comply
with Article 810 of the CC because the date contained in a holographic will must signify the year, month,
and day.
ISSUE:
W/N the date "FEB./61 " appearing on the holographic Will of the deceased Bibiana Roxas de Jesus is a
valid compliance with the Article 810 of the Civil Code.
HELD:
Valid date.
This will not be the first time that this Court departs from a strict and literal application of the
statutory requirements regarding the due execution of Wills. The underlying and fundamental objectives

permeating the provisions of the law wills consists in the liberalization of the manner of their execution
with the end in view of giving the testator more freedom in expressing his last wishes, but with sufficient
safeguards and restrictions to prevent the commission of fraud and the exercise of undue and improper
pressure and influence upon the testator. If a Will has been executed in substantial compliance with the
formalities of the law, and the possibility of bad faith and fraud in the exercise thereof is obviated, said Will
should be admitted to probate (Rey v. Cartagena 56 Phil. 282).
If the testator, in executing his Will, attempts to comply with all the requisites, although compliance
is not literal, it is sufficient if the objective or purpose sought to be accomplished by such requisite is
actually attained by the form followed by the testator. In Abangan v. Abanga 40 Phil. 476, we ruled that:
The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith and
fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth and authenticity. ...
In particular, a complete date is required to provide against such contingencies as that of two
competing Wills executed on the same day, or of a testator becoming insane on the day on which a Will
was executed (Velasco v. Lopez, 1 Phil. 720). There is no such contingency in this case.
We have carefully reviewed the records of this case and found no evidence of bad faith and fraud in
its execution nor was there any substitution of Wins and Testaments. There is no question that the
holographic Will of the deceased Bibiana Roxas de Jesus was entirely written, dated, and signed by the
testatrix herself and in a language known to her. There is also no question as to its genuineness and due
execution. All the children of the testatrix agree on the genuineness of the holographic Will of their mother
and that she had the testamentary capacity at the time of the execution of said Will. The objection
interposed by the oppositor-respondent Luz Henson is that the holographic Will is
fatally defective because the date "FEB./61 " appearing on the holographic Will is not sufficient compliance
with Article 810 of the Civil Code. This objection is too technical to be entertained. MAs a general rule, the
"date" in a holographic Will should include the day, month, and year of its execution. However, when as in
the case at bar, there is no appearance of fraud, bad faith, undue influence and pressure and the
authenticity of the Will is established and the only issue is whether or not the date "FEB./61" appearing on
the holographic Will is a valid compliance with Article 810 of the Civil Code, probate of the holographic Will
should be allowed under the principle of substantial compliance.
26. IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE PROBATE OF THE WILL OF DOROTEA PEREZ,
(deceased): APOLONIO TABOADA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. AVELINO S. ROSAL, as Judge of Court of First Instance of Southern Leyte,
(Branch III, Maasin),respondent.
G.R. No. L-36033 November 5, 1982
Facts:
1. In the petition for probate filed with the respondent court, the petitioner attached the alleged last will
and testament of the late Dorotea Perez.
Written in the Cebuano-Visayan dialect, the will consists of two pages.
The first page contains the entire testamentary dispositions and is signed at the end or bottom of
the page by the testatrix alone and at the left hand margin by the three (3) instrumental witnesses.
The second page which contains the attestation clause and the acknowledgment is signed at the
end of the attestation clause by the three (3) attesting witnesses and at the left hand margin by the
testatrix.
2. TC: denying the probate of the will of Dorotea Perez for want of a formality in its execution.
The petitioner was also required to submit the names of the intestate heirs with their corresponding
addresses so that they could be properly notified and could intervene in the summary settlement of
the estate.
Instead of complying with the order of the trial court, the petitioner filed a manifestation and/or
motion, ex parte
He also asked that the ten-day period required by the court to submit the names of intestate heirs
with their addresses be held in abeyance.
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the order denying the probate of the will.
3. The new Judge denied the motion for reconsideration as well as the manifestation and/or motion filed ex
parte.
In the same order of denial, the motion for the appointment of special administrator was likewise
denied because of the petitioner's failure to comply with the order requiring him to submit the
names of' the intestate heirs and their addresses.
Issue: WON it is required that the testatrix and all the three instrumental and attesting witnesses sign at
the end of the will and in the presence of the testatrix and of one another.
Held: No. The signatures of the instrumental witnesses on the left margin of the first page of the will
attested not only to the genuineness of the signature of the testatrix but also the due execution of the will
as embodied in the attestation clause.
1. Under Article 805 of the Civil Code, the will must be subscribed or signed at its end by the testator
himself or by the testator's name written by another person in his presence, and by his express direction,
and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one
another.

It must be noted that the law uses the terms attested and subscribed Attestation consists in
witnessing the testator's execution of the will in order to see and take note mentally that those
things are, done which the statute requires for the execution of a will and that the signature of the
testator exists as a fact. On the other hand, subscription is the signing of the witnesses' names
upon the same paper for the purpose of Identification of such paper as the will which was executed
by the testator. (Ragsdale v. Hill, 269 SW 2d 911).
Insofar as the requirement of subscription is concerned, it is our considered view that the will in this
case was subscribed in a manner which fully satisfies the purpose of Identification.

2. The signatures of the instrumental witnesses on the left margin of the first page of the will attested not
only to the genuineness of the signature of the testatrix but also the due execution of the will as embodied
in the attestation clause.
While perfection in the drafting of a will may be desirable, unsubstantial departure from the usual
forms should be ignored, especially where the authenticity of the will is not assailed. (Gonzales v.
Gonzales, 90 Phil. 444, 449).
3. The objects of attestation and of subscription were fully met and satisfied in the present case when the
instrumental witnesses signed at the left margin of the sole page which contains all the testamentary
dispositions, especially so when the will was properly Identified by subscribing witness Vicente Timkang to
be the same will executed by the testatrix.
There was no question of fraud or substitution behind the questioned order.
4. We have examined the will in question and noticed that the attestation clause failed to state the number
of pages used in writing the will.
This would have been a fatal defect were it not for the fact that, in this case, it is discernible from
the entire wig that it is really and actually composed of only two pages duly signed by the testatrix
and her instrumental witnesses.
As earlier stated, the first page which contains the entirety of the testamentary dispositions is
signed by the testatrix at the end or at the bottom while the instrumental witnesses signed at the
left margin.
The other page which is marked as "Pagina dos" comprises the attestation clause and the
acknowledgment.
The acknowledgment itself states that "This Last Will and Testament consists of two pages including
this page".
27. In the matter of the estate of Tomas Rodriguez, deceased. MANUEL TORRES, special
administrator, and LUZ LOPEZ DE BUENO, heir, appellee,
vs.
MARGARITA LOPEZ, opponent-appellant.
G.R. No. L-25966
November 1, 1926
FACTS:
This appeal involves a controversy over one-half of the estate of Tomas Rodriguez, decedent. The
appellant, Margarita Lopez, claims said half by the intestate succession as next of kin and nearest heir;
while the appellee, Luz Lopez de Bueno, claims the same by accredition and in the character of universal
heir the will of the decedent. The trial court decided the point of controversy in favor of Luz Lopez de
Bueno, and Margariat Lopez appealed.
Tomas Rodriguez executed a will and he declared Vicente F. Lopez and his daughter Luz Lopez de Bueno as
his universal heir.
Vicente F. Lopez died before the testator, at the time the will was made Vicente F. Lopez had not presented
his final accounts as guardian, and no such accounts had been presented by him at the time of his death.
Margariat Lopez was a cousin and nearest relative of the decedent.
ISSUE:
Whether or not intestate succession will govern in the transfer of estate of decedent since the instituted
heir was disqualified to succeed?
HELD:
The SC held that the kind of succession took place in this case was Accretion, which was defined by
Article 982 of the Civil Code. It further reiterated that the conflict bewtween the two provisions of the law
which are Art. 982 and Article 912. A
rt. 982 says, that accretion take place in a testamentary succession, first when the two or more persons
are called to the same inheritance or the same portion thereof without special designation of shares; and
secondly, when one of the persons so called dies before the testator or renounces the inheritance or is
disqualifying to receive it.
Article 912 wherein it is declared, among other things, that legal succession takes place if the heir dies
before the testator and also when the heir instituted is disqualified to succeed.
As between articles 912 and 983, it is obvious that the former is the more general of the two, dealing, as it
does, with the general topic of intestate succession while the latter is more specific, defining the particular

conditions under which accretion takes place. In case of conflict, therefore, the provisions of the former
article must be considered limited by the latter. Indeed, in subsection 3 of article 912 the provision with
respect to intestate succession is expressly subordinated to article 983 by the expression "and (if) there is
no right of accretion." It is true that the same express qualification is not found in subsection 4 of article
912, yet it must be so understood, in view of the rule of interpretation above referred to, by which the
more specific is held to control the general. Besides, this interpretation supplies the only possible means of
harmonizing the two provisions. In addition to this, article 986 of the Civil Code affords independent proof
that intestate succession to a vacant portion can only occur when accretion is impossible.
The judgment appealed from will be affirmed, and it is so ordered, with costs against the appellant.SO
ORDERED.
28. Uson v. Del Rosario
92:530| Andres
FACTS:
This is an action for recovery of the ownership and possession of five (5) parcels of land in Pangasinan,
filed by Maria Uson against Maria del Rosario and her four illegit children. Maria Uson was the lawful wife of
Faustino Nebreda who upon his death in 1945 left the lands involved in this litigation. Faustino Nebreda left
no other heir except his widow Maria Uson. However, plaintiff claims that when Faustino Nebreda died in
1945, his common-law wife Maria del Rosario took possession illegally of said lands thus depriving her of
their possession and enjoyment. Defendants in their answer set up as special defense that Uson and her
husband, executed a public document whereby they agreed to separate as husband and wife and, in
consideration of which Uson was given a parcel of land and in return she renounced her right to inherit any
other property that may be left by her husband upon his death. CFI found for Uson. Defendants appealed.
ISSUE:
1. W/N Uson has a right over the lands from the moment of death of her husband.
2. W/N the illegit children of deceased and his common-law wife have successional rights.
HELD:
1. Yes. There is no dispute that Maria Uson, is the lawful wife of Faustino Nebreda, former owner of the five
parcels of lands litigated in the present case. There is likewise no dispute that Maria del Rosario, was
merely a common-law wife with whom she had four illegitimate children with the deceased. It likewise
appears that Faustino Nebreda died in 1945 much prior to the effectivity of the new Civil Code. With this
background, it is evident that when Faustino Nebreda died in 1945 the five parcels of land he was seized of
at the time passed from the moment of his death to his only heir, his widow Maria Uson (Art 777 NCC).As
this Court aptly said, "The property belongs to the heirs at the moment of the death of the ancestor as
completely as if the ancestor had executed and delivered to them a deed for the same before his death".
From that moment, therefore, the rights of inheritance of Maria Uson over the lands in question became
vested. The claim of the defendants that Maria Uson had relinquished her right over the lands in question
because she expressly renounced to inherit any future property that her husband may acquire and leave
upon his death in the deed of separation, cannot be entertained for the simple reason that future
inheritance cannot be the subject of a contract nor can it be renounced.
2. No. The provisions of the NCC shall be given retroactive effect even though the event which gave rise to
them may have occurred under the prior legislation only if no vested rights are impaired. Hence, since the
right of ownership of Maria Uson over the lands in question became vested in 1945 upon the death of her
late husband, the new right recognized by the new Civil Code in favor of the illegitimate children of the
deceased cannot, therefore, be asserted to the impairment of the vested right of Maria Uson over the lands
in dispute.
29. De Molo vs. Molo
G.R. No. L-2538 September 21, 1951
Bautista Angelo, J. (Ponente)
Doctrine of Dependent Relative Revocation
Facts:
1. Marcos Molo executed 2 wills, one in August 1918 and another in June 1939. The latter will contained
a revocation clause which expressly revoked the will in 1918. He died without any forced heirs but he was
survived by his wife, herein petitioner Juana. The oppositors to the probate were his nephews and nieces.
2. Only a carbon copy of the second will was found. The widow filed a petition for the probate of the 1939
will. It was admitted to probate but subsequently set aside on ground that the petitioner failed to prove its
due execution.
3. As a result, the petitioner filed another petition for the probate of the 1918 will this time. Again the
oppositors alleged that said will had already been revoked under the 1939 will. They contended that
despite the disallowance of the 1939 will, the revocation clause is valid and thus effectively nullified the
1918 will.
Issue: Whether or not the 1918 will can still be valid despite the revocation in the subsequent disallowed
1939 will

RULING: Yes.The court applied the doctrine laid down in Samson v. Naval that a subsequent
will,containing a clause revoking a previous will, having been disallowed for the reason that it was not
executed in accordance with law cannot produce the effect of annulling the previous will, inasmuch as the
said revocatory clause is void.
There was no valid revocation in this case. No evidence was shown that the testator deliberately destroyed
the original 1918 will because of his knowledge of the revocatory clause contained in the will executed in
1939.The earlier will can still be probated under the principle of dependent relative
revocation.The doctrine applies when a testator cancels or destroys a will or executes an
instrument intended to revoke a will with the intention to make a new testamentary
disposition as substitute for the old, and the new disposition fails of effect for some reason.