ELECTORAL

GEOGRAPHY

Redrawing
Europes Map

SWISHPHOTOS

JOSSE DE VOOGD

IJMEGEN, NetherlandsAutumn falls in the leafy eastern

neighborhoods of the Dutch
city of Nijmegen. The vines winding up
the sides of the late 19th century brick
homes are turning yellow and brown.
Inside, large book shelves line the walls.
Stickers saying No to advertising mail
adorn letter boxes, but quality newspapers

are welcome. People go to their work at

the university or in nonprofit organizations. Children with names like Fleur and
Sanne are brought to school in cargo bikes.
When they grow older, they will study a
semester in a foreign country. Freelance
hipsters are working on their notebooks in
coffee bars. Nearby is a refugee center. A
raft of volunteers, many jobless but with

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college degrees, are willing to help visitors

find their way around town.
Foreigners can enrich a society is often
heard. Locals even go as far as to apologize
for the whiteness of their area. Fortunately
the neighborhood has
several Turkish bakera new right- ies. At times, theres
wing populism disdain for Dutch
culture, while
is emerging folk
traditions from elsefrom a where are embraced
remarkable as exotic. Though
there are few councombination tries where progresof anti- sive values are more
than in the
government embraced
Netherlands, nationsentiment and alism is with equal
nostalgia for frequency a non-starter here. Neighbors
a time when embrace art markets,
government car-free Sundays, and
festicared more multicultural
vals. As the electoral
about its map shows, eastern
citizens. Nijmegen is one
of the most important strongholds for
GroenLinks, the Dutch Green Left party
and D66, the progressive liberal party.
A few miles to the west, vines have
given way to paved gardens. Row houses
built in the 1980s are covered with shutters on windows that reveal pairs of shiny
vases standing symmetrically. Large dogs
are walked on spacious but monotonous
green lawns. Cars are pimped out with
spoilers. A pink colored plaque next to

front the door reveals that the childrens

names are Kevin and Shirley. Income levels are not that much lower than in the
eastern part of town, but education levels
are. Dad works in construction and faces
competition from cheaper East European
workers, while mom is a housekeeper for
the elderly, a sector also under constant
strain. When they go to a restaurant or
on a holiday trip, they prefer a simple
package tour, and they watch commercial entertainment shows. Social cohesion
in the neighborhood is not as strong as a
few decades ago. But if the Dutch soccer
team plays, people color their streets with
orange flags. Folks can argue about parking tariffs and speed bumps, while taking
their cars to the shopping mallwhere
they often find groups of young Moroccans
lounging aimlessly.
The Netherlands multicultural society is also visible at the soccer club. The
teams are growing more ethnically diverse,
but few immigrant parents are willing to
volunteer to keep the club running. Many
complaints about foreigners are becoming more vocal, preceded by an I am not
a racist, but... Immigrants are believed
to profit disproportionately from the welfare state, seem overwhelmingly present in
crime statistics, and urgently need to adapt
to Dutch cultural norms. The Netherlands
should be The Netherlands again is another increasingly frequent refrain. People
are angry about European integration and
dont want to cut our pensions to help
out those lazy Greeks. Strong politicians
who talk straight and say what we think
are becoming increasingly popular. Voters

Josse de Voogd, an independent researcher specializing in electoral geography and

based in the Netherlands, has a multidisciplinary background in anthropology, development studies, geography, and international relations.

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ELECTORAL

feel betrayed by a cosmopolitan elite that

is weak on crime and immigration, proEuropean, and wants to help the whole
world while our own poor and elderly are
left to their own devices. The populist,
right-wing Party for Freedom (PVV), and
to a lesser extent, its leftist populist competitor, the Socialist Party (SP), are topping
the polls in this neighborhood.
A few decades ago, the differences between these two halves of town were narrower, with the traditional parties, the Social Democrats and Christian Democrats,
both doing well. But today its increasingly
clear that voters in both neighborhoods
hold a very different view of the world, of
society and politics. As a result of globalization, migration, the rise in crime, and
the growing importance of education and
lifestyle, different groups in society have
grown markedly apart.
EUROPES ELECTORAL MAP

The social and electoral map of Nijmegen

has changed, and so has the map of the
Netherlands and Europe. A similar set of
observations could be made in many cities across the continent. New patterns of
voting behavior have emerged, reflecting
new polarities in changing societies. These
polarities are set in the context of centuries-old rivalries that still persist. One of
the most striking recent developments is
the rise of Euroskeptic right-wing populist parties. The June 2014 elections for
the European Parliament turned them into
major parties in several countries, particularly the United Kingdom, Denmark, and
France. Left-wing populists got their share
as well, especially in southern Europe.
With these new political movements
taking center stage, electoral maps are being redrawn. A new right-wing populism is
emerging from a remarkable combination

GEOGRAPHY

of anti-government sentiment and nostalgia for a time when government cared more
about its citizens. And it thrives both in
traditionally rightist areas populated with
small entrepreneurs and in the remote
fringes of the cities, as well as declining
industrial regions and working class neighborhoods that had long been bastions of the
left. The rise of populism and its geographic translation also reflect how left and right
are becoming increasingly blurred, with
both populist streams often deriving their
support from the same areas.
In addition to this widespread Euroskeptic and populist trend, numerous regionalist movements seem to have gained
momentum. Scotland organized its referendum on whether to seek independence from
Britain. Catalonia is anxious to do so as well,
despite the failure of the independence vote
in Scotland. Meanwhile, an outright civil
war has broken out in eastern Ukraine.
While the field of electoral geography
has confined itself primarily to the national
level, it is precisely the international comparisons that are so intriguing. Indeed,
merging all of Europes electoral maps creates the opportunity to see just how the
potency of intra-European sentiments are
that effectively transcend what remains of
the continents national borders. An electoral map of Europe has begun to emerge,
showing quite an intricate patchwork of
subcultures, class antagonisms, lifestyles,
and ancient sentiments.
CITY AND COUNTRYSIDE

One of the main factors shaping Europes

electoral geography is the division between cities and the countryside. In the
United Kingdom, Germany, the Netherlands, Denmark, Switzerland, and Austria,
urban regions are clearly recognizable on
the map as left-wing isles in right-wing

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ACTION STEPS
Different segments of society should try to better understand each others needs and
worldviews. This holds especially for the cosmopolitan elites that should try to empathize
with the lower classes. This is definitely not the same as giving equal play to their fears.
Politicians, media, and individuals should take note of electoral geography to know where
discontent derives and why it does so. Notions about populist voters are often too superficial
and subjective, preventing a profound debate.
P
 oliticians should be aware of the fragility of Europe, the complexities and arbitrariness of its
borders. Many in the West, as they consider current borders as fixed, were upset about Russia
annexing Crimea. But borders have always changed and will change, as shown by the recent
case of the independence of Kosovo, supported by the West and anathema to Moscow.
Politicians and media should take into account the electoral geographies of countries when
they react or report on events. A massive protest in one city, for example Kiev in Ukraine,
may not in any sense accurately reflect the situation in other parts of the same country.
Josse de Voogd

surroundings. These cities are traditionally populated by industrial workers, intellectuals, and immigrants, while socialized
housing often occupies a significant part
of the urban landscape. At the same time,
broad swaths of the middle class have left
for a house with a garden in the suburbs
or in the countryside, creating a rightist
commuter-belt around these cities. Where
social democrats and socialists dominate
the more industrialized areas, cities with
a highly educated population also show a
strong preference for progressive parties
like social-liberals and greens, so called
post-materialist parties that place an emphasis on individualism, cosmopolitanism,
and multiculturalism. It is remarkable how
support for these kinds of parties is concentrated in comparable areas across the continentgentrified neighborhoods built in
the 19th century just outside the city center. These areas, among them Nrrebro in
Copenhagen, De Pijp in Amsterdam, Prenzlauerberg in Berlin, and Neubau in Vien-

24

na, are dominated by hipster cafs, organic

supermarkets, galleries, and yoga studios.
Urban-rural patterns are somewhat different in Europes periphery. In the Nordic
countries, industries are primarily based in
small rural towns, while the broad countryside is far out of reach for affluent commuters. These rural zones are traditionally
strongholds of the left and centrist Scandinavian agrarian parties. Most urban regions
vote from right to the center, although
post-materialist leftist parties have begun
to win some substantial support as well, especially on Stockholms Sdermalm Island,
stronghold of greens and feminists.
In southern Europe, urban-rural distinctions are not as clearly marked. An exception is southern Spain, where cities are,
at least relatively, rightist strongholds in
quite leftist agricultural provinces. Mediterranean cities display a different structure from their northern European counterparts, with the rich traditionally living
in expensive apartments in and around the

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city center. Neither the home nor garden,

but the paseo, the collective evening walk,
is the central point of reference. The working classes live at the periphery, in cheap
flats or low-rise areas that sometimes have
started as squats, creating red belts
around cities. As with many cultural cases,
France stays somewhere in between the
northwestern European and Mediterranean pattern. Until recently, central Paris
was a rightist stronghold, surrounded by
a communist high-rise banlieu, until even
there the leftist yuppies advanced.
REGIONS AND REGIONALISTS

While voting patterns in urban regions

are mainly consequences of segmentation in terms of social status and lifestyle
preferences, more factors are at play at the

Leftist

Rightist

Regionalist

This map of Europe, as it emerged from recent national

and European-wide elections, shows which areas are
dominated by leftist, rightist, and regionalist forces.

GEOGRAPHY

regional level. Old traditions, loyalties, religious affinities, and rivalries continue to
prevail, overruling local class distinctions.
Across the Netherlands, ignoring the physical landscape, income level, or degree of
urbanization, runs the Bible Belt. This area
follows relentlessly a 500-year-old border
with a territory formerly occupied by Catholic Spain and now dominated by the most
orthodox Calvinists. Spains electoral geography still strongly resembles the positions
during the civil war in the 1930s. The
south, the Asturian mining region, Basque
country, and Catalonia remain leftist or
separatist, while northwestern Galicia and
Castile-Len are still on the conservative
right. Madrid and the Mediterranean coast
switched to the right more recently. This
is where most of the economic and housing boom took place, until the bubble collapsed a few years ago.
Patterns in Portugal are consistent
with neighboring Spain, the north being
characterized by conservative and religious
small farmers and the south by large estates, strong unions, and leftist sentiments.
As socialist as southern Iberia has become,
southern Italy, consisting of the former
Kingdoms of Naples and Sicily, has turned
conservative. Religion and the mafia are
somewhat omnipresent in this heartland of
supporters of former Prime Minister Silvio
Berlusconi. This controversial rightist leader was also backed in the far richer north,
leaving the central regions like Emilia-Romagna and Tuscany to the left, a division
that goes back centuries.
The East European countries show the
most volatile party landscapes, a product of
young democracies that suddenly and with
no preparation succeeded rule for decades by
the communist leaders of the Soviet Union.
Identities are more complex, as boundaries
were drawn quite arbitrarily during the last

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century. Countries like Poland and Romania are electorally split along former international borders. So the eastern old Poland is deeply conservative on social issues
and statist on economic ones, while the reverse is true in the western part, which was
removed from Germany after World War II.
Further east is Ukraine. The areas that
were once part of Poland-Lithuania massively support the pro-Western parties,
while the East and South vote strongly
pro-Russian. In Germany, more than two
decades after unification of communist
East with capitalist West, electoral differences between the two sectors seem stronger than ever, with a clear preference for
Die Linke (The Left) in the East. This party grew out of the former communist regime and thrives on nostalgic sentiments
toward the communist past. These striking electoral gaps show the importance of
phantom bordersfrontiers that officially
do not exist anymore except in the minds
of the voters, and yet are ubiquitous in todays political culture.
As various countries have been pulled
apart and merged and many populations
have been displaced, any number of minorities have found themselves on the wrong side
of todays borders. Hungary is just a small
remnant of a great past, and Hungarians
whove found themselves mired in neighboring countries like Slovakia, Romania, Serbia, and Ukraine massively back their own
political parties. After the bloody Balkan
Wars, the former Yugoslavia disintegrated
into six different states, but even these are far
from mono-cultural. The three main ethnic
groups in Bosnia are voting by and large for
their own ethnic parties, a pattern that was
even reinforced at the very recent October
elections. Ethnic Albanians got their microstate of Kosovo at the expense of Serbia,
while Kosovo now includes Serbian enclaves.

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Even in countries with more stable

borders, outspoken regionalist or separatist
parties take a share of the electorate, like in
Scotland, Wales, and Catalonia. In Belgium,
Flemish parties that want to reform or even
dismantle the state dominate politics. They
feel stuck with poorer and inefficient Frenchspeaking Wallonia. And Italy has its separatist Northern League that profits from a
northern sentiment of being squeezed by the
poor south for subsidies it can ill-afford.
THE RISE OF POPULISM

The already long simmering north-south

split in Italy has proven a precursor for the
current crisis in Europe. Large money transfers were sent southwards, provoking opposition in the north but also in the south,
which suffered under the burdens that accompanied such largesse. There have been
large cutbacks in public services, and unemployment has skyrocketed.
Since the economic crisis broke out six
years ago, Euroskepticism has also advanced.
Feelings of discontent are further strengthened by longstanding issues such as immigration and ongoing cuts to the welfare state.
In several countries, this has led to the rise of
rightist, in other cases leftist, populist parties. This is accompanied by a blurring of
positions of both right and left. Traditionally, the left promotes an extended welfare
state and is progressive on social-cultural
issues like immigration and crime, while
the reverse is true for the right. But many
voters, primarily the less-educated, combine
pro-welfare opinions with quite conservative
positions on cultural themes. In their opinion, public services should be improved. Elder care is often mentioned, but immigrants
should be excluded and criminals should be
given harsher punishments. Several rightwing populist parties were successful after
adding specific leftist political views, par-

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ticularly regarding health care and pensions,

to their nationalist and repressive discourses.
The so-called horseshoe-model of left and
right has been closed at the bottom. In addition to distinctions between rich and poor,
or religious and secular, a gap has emerged
between the highly-educated, embracing individualistic and cosmopolitan values, and
profiting from open borders on the one hand,
and on the other hand, the less educated,
more nationalist, community-oriented, and
nostalgic, who all feel threatened by globalization and immigration.
The nature of right-wing populist movements differs by country, and it is dangerous
to lump them together. Parties do have their
own controversial hobbyhorses, and when
confronted with their differences, right-wing
populist leaders frequently feel an urge to
distance themselves from colleagues in other
countries. Nevertheless, they all profit from
similar discontent in their societies, relating to immigration, globalization, European
integration, and economic stagnation. They
all attract a comparable electorate, and often
have a charismatic leader who claims to be in
touch with the common people.
There are still some points of contention between these rightist movements.
While the Dutch Freedom Party defends
hard-won gay-rights against bigoted Muslims, sexual diversity is strongly opposed
by similar parties in other countries. Israeli
actions in the Middle East are often backed
by rightist populist parties in northwestern
Europe, particularly in Norway, Britain,
and the Netherlands, while many other
rightist movements in eastern and southern Europe have an anti-Semitic past. The
further east and southeast we go in Europe,
the more rough and anti-democratic radical
right- wing parties seem to become, as they
are often attempting to mirror some of the
more authoritarian aspects of the commu-

GEOGRAPHY

nist era that substantial elements in their

electorates view nostalgically. Hungarys
Jobbik (Movement for a Better Hungary)
and Greeces Golden Dawn are outright
racist and are alied with goons who attack
Romas and immigrants.
Populism in the rich Alpine countries
is again something different. Where elsewhere its realistic to consider a right-wing
populism of those left behind socially and
economically, in this case the winners have
begun demonstrating an isolationist mountain mentality. The Swiss Peoples Party is
strongest in the most conservative cantons
where the nation was
born, hardly a zone of
the new rightdeprivation, while Italys Northern League
wing populism
also advocates the inclearly derives
terests of the rich
its strength
north. Equally, voters in Bavaria, Gerfrom outside
manys prosperous
the urban core.
southland, are casting their ballots for
the more conservative regional branch of
the Christian Democrats, which intends
to leave no gap to its right. In southern Europe, more left-wing or centrist populists
are catching fire. Spain has its Podemos
(We Can), and Greece its Syriza (Coalition
of the Radical Left), which became that nations largest party during the 2014 European election, while large stretches of Italy
have embraced the Five Star Movement of
the clownish populist Beppe Grillo. These
parties flourish on anger about austerity
measures and, somewhat contrary to their
rightist northern counterparts, attract a raft
of votes among young urban populations.
SUBURBS AND BORDERS

The geographical redistribution of support for the populist right will be a prod-

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uct of globalization, deindustrialization,

economic crisis, and aging, often shrinking, populations. Young, educated populations in service-oriented urban regions
seem to be assuming leadership roles in
many countries. Inner cities are booming
and trending increasingly leftist and liberal. At the same time, industrial towns are
struggling, along with older suburbs that
are in decay, as the affluent opt for life in
the inner city or the more remote suburbs.
Exactly these kinds of areas are embracing the populist right. Recent elections
in Sweden confirmed these trends, with
the moderate right losing ground to the
left in the cities, and the populist right,
like Sverigedemokraterna (Swedish Democrats), making substantial inroads outside
the urban core.
Although earlier more radical rightist
parties were often embraced by deprived
areas within the large cities of France, Britain, and the Netherlands, the new rightwing populism clearly derives its strength
from outside the urban cores. The lower
middle class suburbs, exurbs, and the
countryside are the sources of many such
votes. On the rightist populist map, Londons eastern commuter belt, Amsterdams
satellite towns, and Copenhagens suburbs
stand out respectively as strongholds for
Britains United Kingdom Independence
Party (UKIP), the Dutch PVV, and the
Danish Peoples Party (DF). While Frances
National Front clearly curls around Paris,
its voters are almost absent inside the Priphriquethe ring road that defines the
outer limits of Paris proper.
Meanwhile, the protest-vote has been
suburbanized. Although problems related
to immigration have been spreading as
well, voting for the anti-immigrant policies seem to be primarily preventive votes.
The base of support is not just a geograph-

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Stronghold

Above (National) Average

This map of a part of Europe shows in which regions

right-wing populist parties do better than the
national average. The map is based on either the
most recent European-wide or national elections.

ic notion. Right-wing populism seems to

derive from a rejection of urban problems
and paradigms like multiculturalism, cosmopolitanism, and environmentalism. Todays populist right stands up against the
out-of-touch politically correct elites and
claims to represent the common sense of
the ordinary people.
Apart from this anti-urban notion,
it is remarkable how support for rightist
populism does show the re-emergence of
several old fault lines. When there is confusion about identities, when foreign powers have ruled, or when whole populations
have been displaced, there seems to be
fertile ground for the emergence of populist zealots. The south of the Netherlands,
once Spanish-controlled territory and later
economically deprived, is now a prime

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place for populism, even when nowadays

it is as prosperous as the rest of the country. Old sentiments are persistent. People
are still talking about the arrogant and
cold-blooded Hollanders from the western provinces to which the south was once
added and quickly being subordinated. It
is remarkable how the Dutch south is a
stronghold of both the leftist populist SP
as well as the rightist PVV. This Catholic area is now rapidly secularizing and
in search of new heroes and identities. In
short, the political spectrum is no longer
left-to-right but rather bends around on
itself in a Calder-like circle.
Notable cross-border patterns of support for right-wing populism also exist.
For instance, there is a visible protest-strip
from Dutch Western Brabant, through the
Belgian region of Flanders into Northern
France. According to Filip Dewinter, leader of the right-wing Vlaams Belang (Flemish Interest), this is the old Flanders, which
is now distributed across three countries.
However, the Dutch PVV is also strong on
the nations eastern border, while no discontent is apparent on the German side.
Germany has its own protest-strip along
its eastern fringes, an impoverished area
that was once home to World War II refugees from further east. Even in eastern
Germany it is obvious how support for
Die Linke goes along with high percentages for the Euroskeptic (Alternative for
Germany (AfD)) and the extreme-right
National Democratic Party (NDP). Given
their quite similar non-conformist appearances, young radical supporters of the extreme-right and left are sometimes hardly
distinguishable here.
In France, the National Front has always been strong in its eastern departments,
areas that had been occupied by Germany
for decades. The Mediterranean coast, home

GEOGRAPHY

to both rightist former colonists and poor

immigrants both from northern Africa, is
a winning ground as well. During recent
elections, the center of gravity of the Fronts
support has moved somewhat to the north.
This is partly a result of the so-called favorite son effect. Long thought a relatively ignored, deprived, and somewhat unattractive
flyover country, its new charismatic leader
Marine Le Pen won the election as a European Parliament candidate from what is commonly known as La France Profonde or
deep Francenot unlike Middle America.
FALLING APART?

The emergence of nationalist right-wing

parties together with regionalist movements comes down
to fundamental quesalthough in
tions about belonging and about how
most countries
far solidarity reachthe problem of
es. The construct of
conflict is not
a united Europe has
sought to challenge
as immediate
these issues and now
as in ukraine,
seems to suffer from
a certain degree of
most european
overstretch. Voters
societies appear
in the core nations
increasingly
that founded the
European Union are
fragmented.
turning against the
process of ever greater integration, just
as the notion of a continuously expanding Europe begins to run up against its
natural boundaries in the east. Its enlargement will be halted by complicated relations with Russia and Turkey, while being
slowed and restrained by its own populations. The question where the outer borders of Europe or the European Union lie
will be an ongoing issue, filled with conflict. This applies primarily to the eastern

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regions, given the more weakly defined

identities and loyalties in these countries,
but it is deeply relevant to the whole continent, as identification and solidarity decreases the further away from home these
centrifugal forces spin.
The ongoing integration and expansion of the European Union signifies a
continuing process of re-bordering. If
one border gets opened or raised, for example by joining the European Union or
the Schengen Treaty that erases internal
border controls, the next border becomes
more important and can turn out to be a
barrier for someone else. The open traffic
policies create an even sharper outer border thats the scene of painful attempts to
migrate and complex efforts of preventions. High fences surround Spanish exclaves in northern Africa, and accidents
involving boats overloaded with refugees
are ever more frequent. Former Yugoslavs
now need to hassle their way through new
borders between EU and non-EU, and between Schengen and non-Schengen, to see
their old neighbors. And should Ukraine
be further integrated into the West, its
eastern Russia-oriented areas will certainly become more peripheral. The enthusiastic acceptance by several Western
European politicians of Ukraines westward turn often neglects the complicated
divisions within this country, putting at
risk Ukraines unity and relations with
Russia. Electoral geography shows that
many more divisions are in play than just
international borders that are sometimes
arbitrary and even temporary.
A different consequence of further European integration and the diminishing
importance of some of its internal borders

30

could be the easing of tensions within some

nation states. Separatist Catalonians in Spain
or the Flemish in Belgium might feel less
claustrophobic under a European umbrella
with weak nation states and strong regions.
But at the same time, in an even larger unity
that lacks a common identity, people do feel
alienated and will more easily fall back on
old local identities, triggering a Balkanization of the whole continent.
Although in most countries the probability of conflict is not as immediate as in
Ukraine, most European societies appear
increasingly fragmented. Mutual understanding between groups decreases, and
common interests are harder to find. Given
the electoral consequences of this fragmentation, the formation of workable government coalitions will become a tougher sell,
and political paralysis could be a scenario in
many countries.
Easing tensions about European integration might be helped by an understanding of peoples views and fears. Many are
aware of the importance of international
policies. But they seem to believe politicians and cosmopolitan elites remain more
than a little out of touch with their cosmopolitan orientation. This does not mean
politicians should start blaming Europe for
all their problems, which is sometimes the
case. They should formulate the benefits of
European cooperation beginning with peoples worldviews.
Politicians have a very challenging
job nowadays. They should be profoundly
aware of Europes complexities and turbulent past, and need to balance on a thin,
high wire between the need to think and
act on a larger scale while holding societies
and nations together. l

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