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CASE DIGEST: CHAPTER IV

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT & ELECTION LAW

Power of Adjudication

1) SANTIAGO JR. vs. BAUTISTA


32 SCRA 188, GR No. L-25024, March 30, 1970
2) ASSISTANT EXECUTIVE SECRETARY vs. CA
169 SCRA 27, G.R. No. 76761, January 9, 1989
3) BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS & MORTGAGE BANK vs.
MONETARY BOARD
204 SCRA 767, G.R. No. 70054 December 11, 1991
4) CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION vs. LUCAS
301 SCRA 560, Gr. No. 127838, January 21, 1999
5) DESIERTO vs. SILVESTRE
Gr. No. 145389, July 31, 2001
6) MABUHAY TEXTILE MILLS CORP. vs. ONGPIN
141 SCRA 437, G.R. No. L-67784 February 28, 1986
7) REALTY EXCHANGE VENTURE CORP. vs. SENDINO
233 SCRA 665, G.R. No. 109703 July 5, 1994
8) REPUBLIC vs MIGRINO
189 SCRA 289, G.R. No. 89483, August 30, 1990

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SANTIAGO JR. vs. BAUTISTA


32 SCRA 188, GR No. L-25024, March 30, 1970
Facts:
Teodoro Santiago, a grade 6 pupil, was adjudged 3rd
honor. 2 days before his graduation, Ted and his parents sought the
invalidation of the ranking of the honor students. They filed a
Certiorari case against the principal and teachers who composed the
committee on rating honors.. Respondents filed a MTD claiming that
the action was improper, and even assuming it was proper, the
question has become academic (bc the graduation already
proceeded. They also argue that there was no GADALEJ on the part
of the teachers since the Committee on Ratings is not a tribunal, nor
board, exercising judicial functions, under Rule 65, certiorari is a
remedy against judicial function
Issue:
Whether or not the a committees act of determining who
among the batch of graduating pupils should be ranked first, second
and third honors involves the exercise of a quasi-judicial power.
Or Whether or not the committees decision is subject to
judicial review by petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court.
Held:
No. The court ruled that there could be no doubt that he
miserably failed to comply with the requirement of Rule 65. The
stubborn fact remains, however, that appellant had known of such
decision of the said committee of teachers much earlier, as shown
by the circumstance that according to him, even before the filing of
his petition with the lower court on the 19th of May, 1965, he had
personally appealed the said committee's decision with various
higher authorities of the above-named school, who merely passed
the buck to each other. Moreover, appellant mentions in his petition
various other documents or papers as the Service Manual for
Teachers allegedly violated by appellees in the constitution of their
committee; altered grading sheets; and erasures in his Grade I
certificate which appellant never bothered to attach to his
petition.
A judicial function is an act performed by virtue of judicial
powers. The exercise of judicial function is the doing of something in
the nature of the action of the court. In order for an action for
certiorari to exist,
Test to determine whether a tribunal or board exercises
judicial functions: 1) there must be specific controversy involving
rights of persons brought before a tribunal for hearing and
determination. 2) that the tribunal must have the power and
authority to pronounce judgment and render a decision. 3) the
tribunal must pertain to that branch of the sovereign which belongs
to the judiciary (or at least the not the legislative nor the executive)
It may be said that the exercise of judicial function is to
determine what the law is, and what the legal rights of parties are,
with respect to a matter in controversy.
Judicial power is defined: as authority to determine the
rights of persons or property; authority vested in some court, officer
or persons to hear and determine when the rights of persons or

property or the propriety of doing an act is the subject matter of


adjudication.
The power exercised by courts in hearing and determining
cases before them. The construction of laws and the adjudication of
legal rights.
The so-called Committee for Rating Honor Students are
neither judicial nor quasi-judicial bodies in the performance of its
assigned task. It is necessary that there be a LAW that gives rise to
some specific rights of persons or property under which adverse
claims to such rights are made, and the controversy ensuring there
from is brought in turn, to the tribunal or board clothed with
power and authority to determine.
As pointed out by appellees, however, there is nothing on
record about any rule of law that provides that when teachers sit
down to assess the individual merits of their pupils for purposes of
rating them for honors, such function involves the determination of
what the law is and that they are therefore automatically vested
with judicial or quasi judicial functions.
WHAT ARE JUDICIAL OR QUASI JUDICIAL ACTS. It is
difficult, if not impossible, precisely to define what are judicial or
quasi judicial acts, and there is considerable conflict in the decisions
in regard thereto, in connection with the law as to the right to the
writ of certiorari. It is clear, however, that it is the nature of the act
to be performed, rather than of the office, board, or body which
performs it, that determines whether or not it is the discharge of a
judicial or quasi-judicial function. It is not essential that the
proceedings should be strictly and technically judicial, in the sense in
which that word is used when applied to the courts of justice, but it
is sufficient if they are quasi judicial. It is enough if the officers act
judicially in making their decision, whatever may be their public
character. ...' "In State ex rel. Board of Commrs. vs. Dunn (86 Minn.
301, 304), the following statements were made:
'The precise line of demarkation between what are judicial
and what are administrative or ministerial functions is often difficult
to determine. The exercise of judicial functions may involve the
performance of legislative or administrative duties, and the
performance of administrative or ministerial duties, may, in a
measure, involve the exercise of judicial functions. It may be said
generally that the exercise of judicial functions is to determine what
the law is, and what the legal rights of parties are, with respect to a
matter in controversy; and whenever an officer is clothed with that
authority, and undertakes to determine those questions, he acts
judicially.

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ASSISTANT EXECUTIVE SECRETARY vs. CA


169 SCRA 27, G.R. No. 76761, January 9, 1989
Facts:
Larrabaster applied with the National Land Settlement
Administration (NLSA) for a home lot at the Marbel Settlement
District, Cotabato and was granted. He leased the lot to private
respondent, Basilio MENDOZA, and tolerated Jorge Geller to squat
on the portion thereof. Land Settlement and Development
Corporation (LASEDECO) took over the functions of the NLSA.
Larrabaster and his wife assigned their rights and interests over the
Disputed Property to Jose B. PEA. Notwithstanding the transfer,
PEA allowed Mendoza and Geller to stay on the lot.
Republic Act No. 1160 transferred the custody and
administration of the Marbel Townsite to the National Resettlement
and Rehabilitation Administration (NARRA). PEA requested NARRA
to approve the transfer of rights but the latter did not act thereon in
view of Proclamation No. 336, series of 1956, returning to the
Bureau of Lands the disposition of the lots which remained
unallocated by the LASEDECO at the time of its abolition.
The Bureau of Lands did not act on PEA's request either,
prompting him to bring up the matter to the Board of Liquidators
(BOL).The BOL denied the request. PEA moved for reconsideration
but the BOL again denied the same under its Resolution No. 439,
series of 1967. PEA appealed to the Office of the President.
Upon PEA's motion for reconsideration, it was granted
and BOL approved his request.
Private respondent MENDOZA addressed a letter-protest
to the BOL and responded by advising MENDOZA to direct its protest
to the Office of the President. He did and while his protest with the
Office of the President was still pending, MENDOZA resorted to Civil
Case for certiorari before the then Court of First Instance of
Cotabato against the petitioners-public officials and PEA.
MENDOZA followed up with a Supplemental Petition to annul the
administrative Decision denying his protest. TC dismissed his
petition. CA reversed.

absence of notice and opportunity to be present in the


administrative proceedings prior to the rendition of the 10 February
1969 and 13 May 1969 Decisions by the Office of the President, such
procedural defect was cured when MENDOZA elevated his letter
protest to the Office of the President, which subjected the
controversy to appellate review but eventually denied
reconsideration.
Having thus been given a chance to be heard with respect
to his protest there is sufficient compliance with the requirements of
due process.
Substantial factual evidence support the questioned
administrative rulings. The Office of the President relied on the factfinding report of the BOL made sometime in 1969 with respect to
the Disputed Property to the effect that although the area of Lot No.
355 awarded to Larrabaster was 1,500 sq. ms., it was found situated
along a creek and that "it had increased in area to 3,616.93 square
meters by accretion."
Finally, invariable is the rule that in reviewing
administrative decisions of the Executive Branch of the government,
"the findings of fact made therein must be respected, as long as they
are supported by substantial evidence, even if not overwhelming or
preponderant (Ang Tibay vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 69 Phil.
635 [1940]); that it is not for the reviewing court to weigh the
conflicting evidence, determine the credibility of the witnesses, or
otherwise substitute its own judgment for that of the administrative
agency on the sufficiency of the evidence (Lao Tang Bun, et al. vs.
Fabre, 81 Phil. 682 [1948]); that the administrative decision in
matters within the executive jurisdiction can only be set aside on
proof of gross abuse of discretion, fraud, or error of law (Lovina vs.
Moreno L-17821, November 29, 1963, 9 SCRA 557; Timbancaya vs.
Vicente, L-19100, December 27, 1963, 9 SCRA 852), which we find
absent herein.

Issue:
Whether or not the CAgravely erred in holding that private
respondent basilio mendoza has been denied due process of law.
Held:
No. In ruling that the Decisions of the Office of the
President were vitiated by failure to accord due process of law to
MENDOZA, respondent Appellate Court relied on its observations
that MENDOZA was: (1) not made a party to the administrative case;
(2) not served with a copy of the 10 February 1969 Decision; and (3)
not notified of proceedings before the 13 May 1969 Decision nor
served a copy thereof.
The foregoing observations do not justify the conclusion
arrived at. After the Office of the President had rendered its
Decision dated 13 May 1969, MENDOZA filed a letter-protest on 1
August 1969 with the BOL. The latter office directed him to file his
protest with the Office of the President, which he did. On 28
September 1971, MENDOZA's request for reconsideration was
denied by said Office. So that, even assuming that there was

BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS & MORTGAGE BANK vs. MONETARY


BOARD
204 SCRA 767, G.R. No. 70054 December 11, 1991
Facts:
On different occasions, Top Man agement
Program Corporatio n, Pilar Development Corpor atio n, El
Grande Development Corporation obtained a loan from Banco
Filipino and Savings and Mortgage Bank secured by Real Estate
Mortgages.
When the bank suffered serious financial
pro blems, the Monetary Board issued resolution finding
the bank insolvent and placed it under receivership.-Banco Filipino filed a
complaint to set aside the said action of MB.-Subsequently, MB issued another
resolution placing the bank under liquidation and designating a liquidator.
Banco Filipino filed another petition questioning the validity of the said
resolution. A temporary restrainin g order was issued,
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however, acts pertainin g to normal operations of a bank


are not enjoined.
A resolution was also issued ordering the conduct of hearings. In the
meantime, Top Management Program Corporation, Pilar Development Corporation,
El Grande Development Corporation failed to pay their obligations. The liquidator
extra judicially foreclosed the Real Estate Mortgages.
Each filed separately a petition for injunction and prohibition seeking to
enjoin the sheriff from proceeding with the foreclosure sale.
Petitions were dismissed. Hence, petitions were filed by Top
Management Program Corporation, Pilar Development Corporation, El Grande
Development Corporation alleging that the liquidator has no
authority to proceed with the foreclosure sale pending the resolution of the
issue on the validity of the closure and liquidation of Banco Filipino.
The petitioner also filed with the SC the instant petition for certiorari and
mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to annul the resolution of the
Board as made without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, to
order respondents to furnish petitioner with the reports of examination which led to
its closure and to afford petitioner BF a hearing prior to any resolution that may be
used under Section 29 of RA 265 (Central Bank Act).

subject to judicial scrutiny as provided for under the same law (Rural
Bank of Bato v. IAC, G.R. No. 65642, October 15, 1984, Rural Bank v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. 61689, June 20, 1988,162 SCRA 288).
Notwithstanding the foregoing, administrative due process
does not mean that the other important principles may be
dispensed with, namely: the decision of the administrative body
must have something to support itself and the evidence must be
substantial. Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It
means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion (Ang Tibay vs. CIR, supra). Hence,
where the decision is merely based upon pieces of documentary
evidence that are not sufficiently substantial and probative for the
purpose and conclusion they are presented, the standard of fairness
mandated in the due process clause is not met. In the case at bar,
the conclusion arrived at by the respondent Board that the
petitioner bank is in an illiquid financial position on January 23,
1985, as to justify its closure on January 25, 1985 cannot be given
weight and finality as the report itself admits the inadequacy of its
basis to support its conclusion.

Issue:
Whether or not the closure and receivership of petitioner bank which
was ordered by respondent MB is valid.
Held:
No. It is null and void. The Central bank is vested with the authority to take
charge and administer the monetary and banking systems of the country and this
authority includes the power to examine and determine the financial condition of
banks for the purpose of closure ion the ground of insolvency.
Even if the bank is questioning the validity of its closure,
during the pendency of the case, the liquidator can continue prosecution
suits for collection and foreclosure of mortgages, as they are acts done In the usual
course of administration of the banks.
While the high tribunal recognized the actual closure of
Banco Filipino and the consequent legal effects thereof on its
operations, We cannot uphold the legality of its closure and thus
ruled that the closure and receivership of petitioner bank, which was
ordered by respondent Monetary Board on January 25, 1985, is null
and void.
Despite the existence of the partial list of findings in the
examination of the bank, there were still highly significant items to
be weighed and determined such as the matter of valuation
reserves, before these can be considered in the financial condition
of the bank. It would be a drastic move to conclude prematurely
that a bank is insolvent if the basis for such conclusion is lacking and
insufficient, especially if doubt exists as to whether such bases or
findings faithfully represent the real financial status of the bank.
The actuation of the Monetary Board in closing petitioner
bank on January 25, 1985 barely four days after a conference with
the latter on the examiners' partial findings on its financial position
is also violative of what was provided in the CB Manual of
Examination Procedures.
The basic standards of substantial due process were not
observed. However, as to the requirement of notice and hearing,
Sec. 29 of RA 265 does not require a previous hearing before the
Monetary Board implements the closure of a bank, since its action is

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION vs. LUCAS


301 SCRA 560, Gr. No. 127838, January 21, 1999
Facts:
Raquel P. Linatok, an assistant information officer at the
Agricultural Information Division, Department of Agriculture (DA for
brevity), filed with the office of the Secretary, DA, an affidavitcomplaint against respondent Jose J. Lucas, a photographer of the
same agency, for misconduct, consisting of touching her thigh with
lascivious thought. Respondent denied the charges, he alleged that
he did not touch the thigh of complainant Linatok, that what
transpired was that he accidentally brushed Linatok's leg when he
reached for his shoes and that the same was merely accidental and
he did not intend nor was there malice when his hand got in contact
with Linatok's leg.
After a formal investigation by the Board of Personnel
Inquiry-BOPI, DA, the board issued a resolution finding respondent
guilty of simple misconduct and recommending a penalty of
suspension for one (1) month and one (1) day. The Secretary of
Agriculture approved the recommendation.
Respondent appealed the decision to the Civil Service
Commission (CSC). CSC issued a resolution finding respondent guilty
of grave misconduct and imposing on him the penalty of dismissal
from the service. Respondent moved for reconsideration but the CSC
denied the motion.
Then, respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals. Court
of Appeals promulgated its decision setting aside the resolution of
the CSC and reinstating the resolution of the BOPI, DA.
The Court of Appeals further ruled that "a basic
requirement of due process on the other hand is that a person must
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be duly informed of the charges against him (Felicito Sajonas vs.


National Labor Relations Commission, 183 SCRA 182). In the instant
case however, Lucas came to know of the modification of the charge
against him only when he received notice of the resolution
dismissing him from the service.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent Lucas was denied due process
when the CSC found him guilty of grave misconduct on a charge of
simple misconduct.
Held:
No. Petitioner anchors its position on the view that "the
formal charge against a respondent in an administrative case need
not be drafted with the precision of an information in a criminal
prosecution. It is sufficient that he is apprised of the substance of
the charge against him; what is controlling is the allegation of the
acts complained of, and not the designation of the offense. The
court denied the petition.
As well stated by the Court of Appeals, there is an existing
guideline of the CSC distinguishing simple and grave misconduct. In
the case of Landrito vs. Civil Service Commission, we held that "in
grave misconduct as distinguished from simple misconduct, the
elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant
disregard of established rule, must be manifest, which is obviously
lacking in respondent's case. Respondent maintains that as he was
charged with simple misconduct, the CSC deprived him of his right to
due process by convicting him of grave misconduct.
The court sustained the ruling of the Court of Appeals
that: (a) a basic requirement of due process is that a person must be
duly informed of the charges against him and that (b) a person can
not be convicted of a crime with which he was not charged.
Administrative proceedings are not exempt from basic and
fundamental procedural principles, such as the right to due process
in investigations and hearings. The right to substantive and
procedural due process is applicable in administrative proceedings.

DESIERTO vs. SILVESTRE


Gr. No. 145389, July 31, 2001
Facts:
On January 26, 2000, elements of Task Force "Aduana"
headed by petitioner Doctor conducted an entrapment operation in
a case of bribery involving Atty. Redempto C. Somera, Hearing
Officer, Law Division, Bureau of Customs, Manila, and Indian
nationals who had pending cases of seizure with the former.
After the pay-off materialized, petitioner Doctor
announced the entrapment and then arrested Atty. Somera and two
(2) Indian nationals, namely, Murli Tejoomal Mohrani and Kumar
Rupchand Khiatani, for violation of Article 210 of the Revised Penal

Code. As a consequence, the Task Force filed with the Regional Trial
Court, Manila, charges of bribery, violation of R. A. No. 3019, and
corruption of public officials against them.
Likewise, the Task Force filed with the Ombudsman
administrative charges for grave misconduct, dishonesty and
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service against
respondent Ronnie C. Silvestre and Atty. Somera.
Issue:
Whether or not the Ombudsman has authority to suspend
from office respondent Ronnie C. Silvestre indefinitely on the basis
of the administrative complaint filed with his office showing that
evidence of guilt is strong.
Held:
We need not resolve the issue presented. We dismiss the
petition. It has become moot.
On February 14, 2001, the Ombudsman dismissed the
administrative charges against respondent. In dismissing the
charges, the Ombudsman categorically ruled as follows: "It is
another story, however, as regards respondent SILVESTRE. In
implicating respondent SILVESTRE in the instant case, Atty. DOCTOR
stated in his AFFIDAVIT OF ARREST AND COMPLAINT, the following:
'6. That after the hearing of the case (S.I. No. 00-005) on
January 20, 2000, ATTY. SOMERA approached me and invited me to
the room of ATTY. RONNIE SILVESTRE (herein petitioner), Head of
the Law Department of the Port of Manila wherein the duo
convinced me to cooperate with them in the withdrawal of the
complaint and its eventual dismissal;
'7. That I did not commit myself to their proposition to
drop the case but I just continued talking with them with the plan in
mind to report the same to LT. GEN. JOSE T. CALIMLIM, Task Force
Commander of Presidential Anti-Smuggling Task Force ADUANA;'
"Except this bare allegation of the complainant, however,
practically no other evidence was ever presented to substantiate the
charge against respondent SILVESTRE. At this point, it may be noted
that well settled is the rule that within the field of administrative
law, while strict rules of evidence are not applicable to quasi-judicial
proceedings, nevertheless, in adducing evidence constitutive of
substantial evidence, the basic rule that mere allegation is not
evidence cannot be disregarded.
"We are, therefore inclined to believe the defense of
respondent SILVESTRE, that what was discussed between him,
respondent SOMERA and Atty. DOCTOR on January 20, 2000, was
the legal issue on the continued detention of some kitchen wares
which were not covered by the Warrant of Seizure and Detention
(WSD). This, in light of subsequent Order of the District Collector of
the Port of Manila dated March 2, 2000, releasing the said kitchen
wares which were indeed, not covered by the Warrant of Seizure
and Detention (WSD) x x x
"Worthy of note also is the DECISION of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No. 58958 dated August 14, 2000 entitled
RONNIE C. SILVESTRE vs. OMBUDSMAN ANIANO A. DESIERTO,
(pages 253 to 254, Records) where in granting the petition for
certiorari and prohibition involving the preventive suspension order
on respondent SILVESTRE, the said appellate court stated, thus:
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"xxx xxx xxx


"While the above DECISION may not necessarily be
controlling in the resolution of the merits of the instant case insofar
as it pertains to respondent SILVESTRE, we cannot help but note its
relevancy inasmuch as practically no other evidence was presented
by the complainant, other than his AFFIDAVIT OF ARREST AND
COMPLAINT to support the charge against respondent SILVESTRE.
Needless to state, this is also the very same and only evidence
presented before the Court of Appeals which rendered the
aforequoted DECISION." WHEREFORE, the Court hereby DISMISSED
the petition for mootness.

petitioner was denied due process by the Board when it cancelled


the export quota allocations.
However, the appellate court ordered the Board to give
the petitioner and its officers due hearing to determine whether or
not any of its rules and regulations had been violated as to warrant
the imposition of any penalty against them. Until such hearings were
held, the petitioner's export quota allocations were to remain
cancelled and its officers suspended. This modification is now the
subject of this petition.
The petitioner contended that the appellate court
committed grave abuse of discretion when it ordered a new hearing
to be conducted unnecessarily since even without controverting
evidence, the evidence on record relied upon by the Board failed
miserably to measure up to the requisite of "substantial evidence."
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners contention is correct.

MABUHAY TEXTILE MILLS CORP. vs. ONGPIN


141 SCRA 437, G.R. No. L-67784 February 28, 1986
Facts:
Petitioner Mabuhay Textile Mills Corporation (Mabuhay) is
a corporation engaged in the garments and textile import business
for the last twenty-seven years. Among the government
requirements for engaging in this type of business are the export
quota allocations issued by the respondent Garments and Textile
Export Board. The Board granted export quota allocations for 1983
to the petitioner.
The petitioner received a letter from the Board informing
it that its 1983 export quota allocations were revoked. Furthermore,
its major stockholders and officers were also distinguished from
engaging in business activities involving garment and textile exports.
The Bureau of Customs conducted an investigation
pursuant to the above initial findings. The petitioner moved to
reconsider the revocation of its export quota allocations and the
disqualification of its officers from the export business.
Commissioner of Customs responded through a lettercomment addressed to the Board.
Petitioner filed an action for prohibition and injunction
with preliminary injunction and restraining order against the Board.
The trial court issued a restraining order directing the
Board and its officials to desist and to stop from implementing the
decision revoking the petitioner's export quota allocations and from
disqualifying its principal stockholder and officers from engaging in
the textile and garment export business. The Board moved to
reconsider but the same was denied.
The lower court issued a writ of preliminary injunction.
The trial court rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner, and
among others directed the Board to issue to the petitioner within
two days from service of the writ.
The Board appealed the decision to the Intermediate
Appellate Court.
The appellate court modified the trial court's decision. It
affirmed all the findings of fact of the court and held that the

Held:
No. The court ruled that the contention has no merit.
Executive Order No. 823 provides, among others: The
GTEB shall have the following powers and functions: h. In case of
violations of its rules and regulations, cancel or suspend quota
allocations, export authorizations and licences for the operation of
bonded garment manufacturing warehouses. (Sec. 2[h] Exec. Order
No. 823 amended Sec. 3[h] of Exec. Order No. 537).
Likewise, under its Rules and Regulations, said Executive
Order provides: Rules and Regulations: Section III. Penalties.- Any act
or misrepresentation or violation of these Rules and Regulations
shall, after due hearing, constitute sufficient ground for the
imposition of a fine of not more than ten per cent (10%) of the gross
FOB value of the goods exported or for a total or partial forfeiture of
the offender's Export Quota, Export Authorization and Export
License and permit or temporary disqualification from enjoying the
privilege to export under all Agreements on textiles, without
prejudice to any liabilities under other applicable laws. (Sec. III, Part
111, Rules and Regulations).
It is clear from the above provisions that the respondent
Board is the body charged with the function of granting export
quota allocations, issuing licenses to operate bonded warehouses
and revoking or cancelling the same. Correspondingly, it is also
authorized to conduct hearings to determine whether or not
violations have been committed by the grantee .
The Board acted arbitrarily when, after acting solely upon
the initial findings of the Bureau of Customs, it issued the
questioned order but once the basis for its action proved nonexistent, it refused to lift its erroneous and unfounded order.
However, since the Board has reason to believe that the
petitioner might have violated its rules and regulations in
connection with the importation of materials for the petitioner's
garment industry then it has the discretion to conduct a proper
hearing to determine the petitioner's culpability or non-culpability. It
does not have to rely on the findings of other agencies to discharge
this function.

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In the case at bar, the petitioner was never given the


chance to present its side before its export quota allocations were
revoked and its officers suspended.
While it is true that such allocations as alleged by the
Board are mere privileges which it can revoke and cancel as it may
deem fit, these privileges have been accorded to petitioner for so
long that they have become impressed with property rights
especially since not only do these privileges determine the
continued existence of the petitioner with assets of over
P80,000,000.00 but also the livelihood of some 700 workers who are
employed by the petitioner and their families.

REALTY EXCHANGE VENTURE CORP. vs. SENDINO


233 SCRA 665, G.R. No. 109703 July 5, 1994
Facts:
Private respondent Lucina C. Sendino entered into a
reservation agreement with Realty Exchange Venture, Inc. (REVI) for
a 120-square meter lot in Raymondville Subdivision in Sucat,
Paranaque. He paid the full downpayment on the purchase price.
However, she was advised by REVI to change her co-maker, which
she agreed, asking for an extension of one month to do so.
For alleged non-compliance with the requirement of submission of
the appropriate documents under the terms of the original
agreement, REVI, informed respondent of the cancellation of the
contract.
Private respondent filed a complaint for Specific Performance
against REVI with the office of Appeals, Adjudication and Legal
Affairs (OAALA) of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
(HLURB)
The HLURB rendered its judgment in favor of private respondent and
ordered petitioners to continue with the sale of the house and lot
and to pay private respondent P5,000 as moral damages, P5,000 as
exemplary damages and P6,000 as attorney's fees and costs of the
suit. An appeal from this decision was taken to the HLURB OAALA
Arbiter, which affirmed the Board's decision. The decision of the
OAALA Arbiter was appealed to the Office of the President (OP). The
OP rendered its decision dismissing the petitioners' appeal. The
Motion for reconsideration of the decision was likewise denied.

In general, the quantum of judicial or quasi-judicial


powers which an administrative agency may exercise is defined in
the agency's enabling act. In view of the Court's pronouncement
in United Housing Corporation vs. Hon. Dayrit, supra, recognizing the
HLURB as the successor agency of the HSRC's powers and functions,
it therefore follows that the transfer of such functions from the NHA
to the HRSC effected by Section 8 of E.O. 648, series of 1981,
thereby resulted in the acquisition by the HLURB of adjudicatory
powers which included the power to "(h)ear and decide cases of
unsound real estate business practices . . . and cases of specific
performance."
Obviously, in the exercise of its powers and functions, the
HLURB must interpret and apply contracts, determine the rights of
the parties under these contracts, and award damages whenever
appropriate.
Going to petitioners' contention that the decision of the
OAALA should have been rendered by the Board of Commissioners
sitting en banc, we find ample authority both in the statutes and
in jurisprudence-justifying the Board's act of dividing itself into
divisions of three. Under Section 5 of E.O. 648 which defines the
powers and duties of the Commission, the Board is specifically
mandated to "(a)dopt rules of procedure for the conduct of its
business" and perform such functions necessary for the effective
accomplishment of (its) above mentioned functions."
The practical necessity of establishing a procedure
whereby cases are decided by three (3) Commissioners furthermore
assumes greater significance when one notes that the HLURB, as
constituted, only has four (4) full time commissioners and five (5)
part time commissioners to deal with all the functions,
administrative, adjudicatory, or otherwise, entrusted to it.
It is settled that rules of procedure are as a matter of
course construed liberally in proceedings before administrative
bodies. In the instant case, the original suit for specific performance
and damages was filed by the private respondent with the HLURBOAALA, an administrative body not hamstrung by the strict
procedural technicalities of the Rules of Court. Under the
circumstances, it was certainly appropriate for the HLURB-OAALA to
have acted on the substantive questions relating to the validity of
petitioners' unilateral rescission of the contract without unduly
concerning itself with a mere procedural slip, the non-joinder of
private petitioner's husband in the original complaint before the
HLURB. Moreover, since petitioners participated in the
administrative proceedings without objecting to or raising the
procedural infirmity, they were certainly estopped from raising it on
appeal before the Office of the President and before this Court.

Issue:
Whether or not the HLURB has quasi-judicial functions.
Held:
Yes. The HLURB properly exercised its jurisdiction over the
case filed by the petitioners with its adjudicative body, the OAALA,
in ordering petitioners to comply with their obligations arising from
the Reservation Agreement.

meikimouse

CASE DIGEST: CHAPTER IV

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT & ELECTION LAW

REPUBLIC vs MIGRINO
189 SCRA 289, G.R. No. 89483, August 30, 1990
Facts:
Acting on information received by the New AFP Anti-Graft
Board, which indicated the acquisition of wealth beyond his lawful
income, private respondent Ret. Lt.Tecson was required by the
Board to submit his explanation/comment together with his
supporting evidence. Private respondent was unable to produce his
supporting evidence because they were allegedly in the custody of
his bookkeeper who had gone abroad. The Board proceeded with its
investigation and submitted its resolution, recommending that
private respondent be prosecuted and tried for violation of Rep. Act
No. 3019, as amended, and Rep. Act No. 1379, as amended.
The case was set for preliminary investigation by the
PCGG. Private respondent moved to dismiss the case on the
following grounds: (1) that the PCGG has no jurisdiction over his
person; (2) that the action against him under Rep. Act No. 1379 has
already prescribed; (3) that E.O. No. 14, insofar as it suspended the
provisions of Rep. Act No. 1379 on prescription of actions, was
inapplicable to his case; and (4) that having retired from the AFP, he
was now beyond the reach of Rep. Act No. 3019. The Board
opposed the motion to dismiss. The PCGG denied the motion to
dismiss for lack of merit. Private respondent moved for
reconsideration but was denied by the PCGG. Private respondent
was directed to submit his counter-affidavit and other controverting
evidence.
Private respondent filed a petition for prohibition with
preliminary injunction with the RTC. Petitioner filed a motion to
dismiss and opposed the application for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction on the principal ground that the RTC had no
jurisdiction over the Board, citing the case of PCGG v. Pena. Private
respondent opposed the motion to dismiss. Petitioner replied to the
opposition.
The court judge denied petitioners motion to dismiss. The
respondent judge granted the application for the issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction, enjoining petitioners from investigating or
prosecuting private respondent under Rep. Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379
upon the filing of a bond in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos.
Petitioner strongly argues that the private respondents case falls
within the jurisdiction of the PCGG. Hence, this petition.
Issues:
Whether or not Presidential Commission on Good
Government- PCGG has jurisdiction over the case of private
respondent
Held:
No. It will not do to cite the order of the PCGG Chairman,
creating the Board and authorizing it to investigate the unexplained
wealth and corrupt practices of AFP personnel, both retired and in
active service, to support the contention that PCGG has jurisdiction
over the case of private respondent
Applying the rule in statutory construction known as
ejusdem generis, the term subordinate as used in E.O. Nos. 1 and 2
would refer to one who enjoys a close association or relation with

former Pres. Marcos and/or his wife, similar to the immediate family
member, relative, and close associate in E.O. No. 1 and the close
relative, business associate, dummy, agent, or nominee in E.O. No.
2. Clearly, this alleged unlawful accumulation of wealth is not that
contemplated in E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.
It does not suffice, as in this case, that the respondent is or
was a government official or employee during the administration of
former Pres. Marcos. There must be a prima facie showing that the
respondent unlawfully accumulated wealth by virtue of his close
association or relation with former Pres. Marcos and/or his wife.
This is so because otherwise the respondents case will fall under
existing general laws and procedures on the matter. Rep. Act No.
3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, penalizes the corrupt
practices of any public officer.
Under Rep. Act No. 1379 (An Act Declaring Forfeited in
Favor of the State Any Property Found to Have Been Unlawfully
Acquired By Any Public Officer or Employee and Providing for the
Procedure Therefor), whenever any public officer or employee has
acquired during his incumbency an amount of property which is
manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or
employee and to his other lawful income and the income from
legitimately acquired property, said property shall be presumed
prima facie to have been unlawfully acquired [Sec. 2]. The Solicitor
General shall file the petition and prosecute the case in behalf of the
Republic, after preliminary investigation by the provincial or city
prosecutor.
The resolution alleges that private respondent unlawfully
accumulated wealth by taking advantage of his office as Finance
Officer of the Philippine Constabulary. No attempt is made in the
Boards resolution to link him or his accumulation of wealth to
former Pres. Marcos and/or his wife.
It will not do to cite the order of the PCGG Chairman,
dated May 13, 1986, creating the Board and authorizing it to
investigate the unexplained wealth and corrupt practices of AFP
personnel, both retired and in active service, to support the
contention that PCGG has jurisdiction over the case of
private Respondent. The PCGG cannot do more than what it was
empowered to do. Its powers are limited. Its task is limited to the
recovery of the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses, their relatives and
cronies. The PCGG cannot, through an order of its chairman, grant
itself additional powers powers not contemplated in its enabling
law.
But in view of the patent lack of authority of the PCGG to
investigate and cause the prosecution of private respondent for
violation of Rep. Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379, the PCGG must also be
enjoined from proceeding with the case, without prejudice to any
action that may be taken by the proper prosecutory agency. The rule
of law mandates that an agency of government be allowed to
exercise only the powers granted it.

meikimouse