ID 330414

On constructs of reality in Chinese philosophy. (1)

Preface.

I believe that we can call both the Confucian and Mohist Schools of thought products of human
intelligence. By intelligence I mean, as Wikipedia says, an ability to perceive and/or retain
knowledge or information and apply it to itself or other instances of knowledge or information
creating referable understanding models of any size, density, or complexity, due to any conscious
or subconscious imposed will or instruction to do so. Author of this work quite agrees with this
definition. Intelligence allows us to make the world intelligible, presented for our understanding.
Intelligence can be isolated and observed in the medium between reality and the mans view of
it, in language. Language of a local discourse, therefore, frames the reality in human mind. The
manner in which a human constructs a descriptive language depends, first, upon the problems
advanced at him by reality, totality of which at a given place is unique at every given moment of
the time and, second, upon the accumulated data. Naturally, as an intellectual system, every
discourse is affected by the force of deconstruction, which exists to provide for flexibility of
perception. Rejection of a given discourse is a process by which articulation gets adapted to
extant practices. Intelligence then can be seen as executing the task of invigorating our
perception of reality. We call this power of men to create narratives.

A specific development of postmodernism is the death of meta-narratives, these that prescribe as

possible the acquisition of better reality. Narrative force in the west of the last half a millennium
was the reactionary left. As it was well expressed in Hegel, the force was supported by a belief
that human reason eliminates its flaws over the course of time. At first it got rid of the near past,

then got to classical era, then to archaic Biblical narrative. All of the intelligent models have
been accused for being not only imprecise, but also products of imagination, confused with the
meanings of the words. It is if though that we are so despaired by the nature of our knowledge
that we can find it no better application than in science. Our pessimism does not let us ahead
critical theory, since it always relied on the criticism of the past and construction of discourse in
opposite. Now, that the whole of history has been appropriated, we do not see in us a capacity to
invigorate the discourse intelligently. It is expressed in the rooting of liberal discourse of
humanism coupled with naturalism. When a local discourse is prevented from withering away,
reality becomes hyperreality. Moral progress is replaced by scientific.

Now that I have argued that reality is only accessible in a form of human construct which has as
innate tendency to transfigure throughout the time depending on the condition of reality and
accumulated data, I can proceed to a discussion of Chinese philosophy, and treat it like an
intellectual system rather than a fossilised exhibit of dialectal materialism. I assume that
intelligence is not a variable dependent upon a race or any other factor, but is universal and
uniform, that always gives the most adequate explanans to reality in the set of possible ones.
Accumulation of knowledge, as I have tried to argue in the paragraph above, does not enhance
the effectiveness of intelligence. Therefore, I do not consider relevant qualitative comparison of
discourses. However, innate universality of intelligence allows us to establish relative
interdependencies between languages as wholes.

I.
Reality is a myth. In confucianism, rvn is an organising principle of the constructed reality, a
gravitational centre of discourse. What lacks in it is traditional to Western philosophy
development of the sources of the good, notion that is accentuated by Charles Taylor in the
analytical work Sources of the Self. Confucianism does not explore why is it that a given belief

came into existence, and is, therefore, not concerned with construction of beliefs out of the
reflection. Adoption of rvn does not follow argumentation, but is rather an act of committing
loyalty to ones way.

Socratic in a sense of claiming to search what is good, confucianism, instead of being rooted in
opposition to the flaws of reason, is signified in opposition to what is perceived as bad and evil.
It is, in other words, concerned not with categories of truth and false, but rather right and wrong.
True statement is that which represents things as they are in reality, while right statement is such
that is in service of good. Thereby, confucianism does not view reason as necessary in ordering
our interaction with phenomenological world. It is astonishingly distant to assigning meaning to
a surrounding reality (An 12:2). Instead of ordering the world, confucianism demands from one
to set the order within (An 4:5). It therefore constructs reality not in opposition to what exists,
but calls for embracing the principles of right conduct innate in the observable world. In a naive
and strikingly progressive manner, confucianism works within the contextually adopted premises
and sets itself a goal of solution of real problems. How does it wish to accomplish it?

Spirits have rule over man and act upon him in accordance with his deeds. This is an assumption
borrowed by Chinese philosophers from the practices of spiritualism. It is, therefore, the
substance of mans actions that affects material reality he lives in. Little mans impartiality is
viewed as responsible for actions that bring about harm unto others in opposition to the will of
heaven. Junzi, then, is conditioned by his origin to serve the ruler and the country well if he
wishes to excel in courts. To know right from wrong one has to learn to be rvn. Rvn is a
principle, adherence to which allows a man to choose in a set of possible actions a right one, and
therefore please spirits. But since the welfare of junzi seems to be absolutely dependent upon his
conduct, the purpose to which introduction of the emphasis upon rituals serves for is not totally
clear.

Ritual, which plays an especially important part in confucianism around the lifetime of Mozi,
serves as a medium between our world and the world of the spirits. I assume that the reasoning
standing behind is that Confucians saw rituals of generations before them, especially that of
Zhou dynasty, to which Confucius belonged, as containing the list of actions allowing for
communion with some sacral truth of which people at their time were no longer conscious. But
why does Confucius, who, is concerned with the substance of mans actions, puts such a big
emphasis on simulation of some signified procedure, substantial good of which to us is
unrevealed? In Confucius, rvn is a path of man staying blindly loyal to the will of spiritual world.
I assume that demanding an equally blind execution of ritual Confucians wanted to simulate
partaking in the constructed reality, affirming the existence of rvn. It is then not a mere number
of assertoric imperatives employed by a statesman in achievement of personal goals (An 4:1),
but an extant and self-subsisting part of the reality (An 6:11). It is reinforced in An 2:18, where
the Master says that profit comes not from working towards obtaining it, but from working on
ones overall way of conduct. Confucius, we can say, leaves space for the work of providence.

Mozi opposes Confucius exactly in this matter. For him, all the actions should be judged on the
basis of substantial good and be dismissed if not producing such (Against Music, p.113). What
is real, for him, requires ordering to be set right (what is habitual in opposition to what is proper).
He, therefore, erases limits of human understanding and argues against execution of rituals if the
ends are contrary to the mode of adopted reasoning (Moderation in Funerals, p. 79). In Mozi,
doctrine of universal love is advanced in opposition to wrong ones, and it is affirmed on the
basis of fact that it was once duly practiced. Mozi is of a new generation of Chinese. He sees
ethics of Confucius as ineffective in controlling the ambitions of statesmen and wishes to put an
end to impartiality masked behind inscrutability and ambiguity rvn. New definition of
benevolence takes up a human face and makes its meaning accessible for manipulation by

human intellect. Mohist reality is in essence deprived of any spiritual influence. In a manner of
Locke, Mozi emphasises what is good to us, and calls to be concerned only with accumulation of
it. Humans act right and achieve well-being (the wealth, order, and increase in number). Spirits
are seen as prescribing these rules, but their participation in enforcing these rules and rewarding
obedience on earth is transparent and impalpable.

II.
Rituals have always existed in human societies. As acts of speech, they are meant to convey a
mode of communication in addition to a given. In a manner in which acts of speech make body
claims, rituals make intellectual. In linguistic terms, rituals can be viewed as forms of expression
in a figurative language, where an action serves a role of underlying strings. The surface string,
then, prescribes meaning to an action lying outside of the realm of efficiency. It is what Aristotle
called final cause. Ritual, therefore, is such an action, performance of which serves to
communicate intellectual sensation.

I believe that an attempt to estimate a possible view of Confucius on any of existing rituals is
impossible. Confucianism escapes prescription of any added values to phenomenal world. He
entrusts men no power whatsoever to discover the reason for existence of things. Mohism,
however, exercises intellect to evaluate existing practices and claim some of them as wrong and
promote others as right. He therefore establishes narrative of intelligence serving the benefit of
men. In confucianism, one cannot willfully produce good except by partaking in rvn, whereas
Mohism sees every man as innately informed about what is good, but failing to promote it on his
own part (Universal Love, p. 44). For this reason I think that Mozi would disapprove of the
most of our rituals, since they do not directly produce good which they nevertheless advocate.