PARAGAS vs.

HEIRS OF DOMINADOR BALACANO

FACTS:
Gregorio Balacano, married to Lorenza Sumigcay, was the registered owner of Lot 1175-E and
Lot 1175-F of the Subd. Plan Psd-38042. Gregorio and Lorenza had three children, namely: Domingo,
Catalino and Alfredo, all surnamed Balacano. Lorenza died on December 11, 1991. Gregorio, on the other
hand, died on July 28, 1996. Prior to his death, Gregorio was admitted on June 28, 1996, transferred
hospital in the afternoon of July 19, 1996 until his death.
Gregorio purportedly sold on July 22, 1996, or barely a week prior to his death, a portion of Lot
1175-E (15,925 square meters out of total area of 22,341 square meters) and the whole Lot 1175-F to
Spouses Paragas for the total consideration of P500,000.00. This sale appeared in a deed of absolute
sale and was notarized by Atty. De Guzman. Gregorios certificates of title were consequently cancelled
and new certificates of title were issued in favor of the Spouses Paragas.
The Spouses Paragas then sold on October 17, 1996 a portion of Lot 1175-E consisting of 6,416
square meters to Catalino for the total consideration of P60,000.00.
Domingos children filed on October 22, 1996 a complaint for annulment of sale and partition
against Catalino and the Spouses Paragas. They essentially alleged in asking for the nullification of the
deed of sale that:
(1) their grandfather Gregorio could not have appeared before the notary public on July 22, 1996 at
Santiago City because he was then confined at the Veterans Memorial Hospital in Quezon City;
(2) at the time of the alleged execution of the deed of sale, Gregorio was seriously ill, in fact dying at that
time,
which
vitiated
his
consent
to
the
disposal
of
the
property;
and
(3) Catalino manipulated the execution of the deed and prevailed upon the dying Gregorio to sign his
name on a paper the contents of which he never understood because of his serious condition.
Alternatively, they alleged that assuming Gregorio was of sound and disposing mind, he could
only transfer a half portion of Lots 1175-E and 1175-F as the other half belongs to their grandmother
Lorenza who predeceased Gregorio they claimed that Lots 1175-E and 1175-F form part of the conjugal
partnership properties of Gregorio and Lorenza. Finally, they alleged that the sale to the Spouses
Paragas covers only a 5-hectare portion of Lots 1175-E and 1175-F leaving a portion of 6,416 square
meters that Catalino is threatening to dispose. They asked for the nullification of the deed of sale
executed by Gregorio and the partition of Lots 1175-E and 1175-F. They likewise asked for damages.
Plaintiff-appellant Nanette Balacano testified to prove the material allegations of their complaint.
On Gregorios medical condition, she declared that:
(1) Gregorio, who was then 81 years old, weak and sick, was brought to the hospital in Bayombong,
Nueva Vizcaya on June 28, 1996 and stayed there until the afternoon on July 19, 1996;
(2) thereafter, Gregorio, who by then was weak and could no longer talk and whose condition had
worsened, was transferred in the afternoon of July 19, 1996 to the Veterans Memorial Hospital in Quezon
City where Gregorio died.

She claimed that Gregorio could not have signed a deed of sale on July 19, 1996 because she
stayed at the hospital the whole of that day and saw no visitors. She likewise testified on their agreement
for attorneys fees with their counsel and the litigation expenses they incurred.
Defendants posit that Gregorios consent to the sale should be determined, not at the time
Gregorio signed the deed of sale on July 18, 1996, but at the time when he agreed to sell the property in
June 1996 or a month prior to the deeds signing; and in June 1996, Gregorio was of sound and disposing
mind and his consent to the sale was in no wise vitiated at that time. They presented as witnesses Notary
Public de Guzman and instrumental witness Antonio to prove Gregorios execution of the sale and the
circumstances under the deed was executed. They uniformly declared that:
(1) on July 18, 1996, they went to the hospital in Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya where Gregorio was
confined with Rudy;
(2) Atty. De Guzman read and explained the contents of the deed to Gregorio;
(3) Gregorio signed the deed after receiving the money from Rudy;
(4) Julia and Antonio signed the deed as witnesses.
Additionally, Atty. De Guzman explained that the execution of the deed was merely a confirmation
of a previous agreement between the Spouses Paragas and Gregorio that was concluded at least a
month prior to Gregorios death; that, in fact, Gregorio had previously asked him to prepare a deed that
Gregorio eventually signed on July 18, 1996. He also explained that the deed, which appeared to have
been executed on July 22, 1996, was actually executed on July 18, 1996; he notarized the deed and
entered it in his register only on July 22, 1996. He claimed that he did not find it necessary to state the
precise date and place of execution (Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, instead of Santiago City) of the deed of
sale because the deed is merely a confirmation of a previously agreed contract between Gregorio and the
Spouses Paragas. He likewise stated that of the stated P500,000.00 consideration in the deed, Rudy paid
Gregorio P450,000.00 in the hospital because Rudy had previously paid Gregorio P50,000.00. For his
part, Antonio added that he was asked by Rudy to take pictures of Gregorio signing the deed. He also
claimed that there was no entry on the date when he signed; nor did he remember reading Santiago City
as the place of execution of the deed. He described Gregorio as still strong but sickly, who got up from the
bed with Julias help.
The lower court, after trial, rendered the decision declaring null and void the deed of sale
purportedly executed by Gregorio Balacano in favor of the spouses Paragas, noting that at the time
Gregorio executed the deed, Gregorio was ill. Because of the seriousness of his illness, it is not
expected that Gregorio Balacano would be negotiating a contract of sale. The lower court also ruled
that Lots 1175-E and 1175-F were Gregorios and Lorenzas conjugal partnership properties.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision of the trial court, with the modification that Lots 1175E and 1175-F were adjudged as belonging to the estate of Gregorio Balacano.
ISSUE:
(1) WON Gregorio gave an intelligent consent to the sale of Lots 1175-E and 1175-F when he signed
the deed of sale?

(2) WON Deed of Sale purportedly executed between petitioners and the late Gregorio Balacano
was null and void
HELD:
It is not disputed that when Gregorio signed the deed of sale, Gregorio was seriously ill, as he in
fact died a week after the deeds signing. Gregorio died of complications caused by cirrhosis of the liver.
Gregorios death was neither sudden nor immediate; he fought at least a month-long battle against the
disease until he succumbed to death on July 22, 1996. Given that Gregorio purportedly executed a
deed during the last stages of his battle against his disease, the Court seriously doubt whether
Gregorio could have read, or fully understood, the contents of the documents he signed or of the
consequences of his act. There was no conclusive evidence that the contents of the deed were
sufficiently explained to Gregorio before he affixed his signature. The evidence the defendantsappellants offered to prove Gregorios consent to the sale consists of the testimonies of Atty. de Guzman
and Antonio which the Court did not find credible.
Additionally, the irregular and invalid notarization of the deed is a falsity that raises doubts on the
regularity of the transaction itself. While the deed was indeed signed on July 18, 1996 at Bayombong,
Nueva Vizcaya, the deed states otherwise, as it shows that the deed was executed on July 22, 1996 at
Santiago City.
Article 24 of the Civil Code tells us that in all contractual, property or other relations, when one of
the parties is at a disadvantage on account of his moral dependence, ignorance, indigence, mental
weakness, tender age or other handicap, the courts must be vigilant for his protection.
Gregorios consent to the sale of the lots was absent, making the contract null and void.
Consequently, the spouses Paragas could not have made a subsequent transfer of the property to
Catalino Balacano.
In the case at bar, the Deed of Sale was allegedly signed by Gregorio on his death bed in the
hospital. Gregorio was an octogenarian at the time of the alleged execution of the contract and suffering
from liver cirrhosis at that circumstances which raise grave doubts on his physical and mental capacity to
freely consent to the contract. Adding to the dubiety of the purported sale and further bolstering
respondents claim that their uncle Catalino, one of the children of the decedent, had a hand in the
execution of the deed is the fact that on 17 October 1996, petitioners sold a portion of Lot 1175-E
consisting of 6,416 square meters to Catalino for P60,000.00. One need not stretch his imagination to
surmise that Catalino was in cahoots with petitioners in maneuvering the alleged sale.
FRANCISCO VS HERRERA
FACTS:
Eligio Herrera, Sr., the father of respondent, was the owner of two parcels of land, one consisting
of 500 sq. m. and another consisting of 451 sq. m. On January 3, 1991, petitioner bought from said
landowner the first parcel, for the price of P1,000,000, paid in installments from November 30, 1990 to
August 10, 1991.On March 12, 1991, petitioner bought the second parcel, for P750,000.
Contending that the contract price for the two parcels of land was grossly inadequate, the children
of Eligio, Sr., namely, Josefina Cavestany, Eligio Herrera, Jr., and respondent Pastor Herrera, tried to

negotiate with petitioner to increase the purchase price. When petitioner refused, herein respondent then
filed a complaint for annulment of sale. In his complaint, respondent claimed ownership over the second
parcel, allegedly by virtue of a sale in his favor since 1973. He likewise claimed that the first parcel was
subject to the co-ownership of the surviving heirs of Francisca A. Herrera, the wife of Eligio, Sr.,
considering that she died intestate on April 2, 1990, before the alleged sale to petitioner.
Finally, respondent also alleged that the sale of the two lots was null and void on the ground that
at the time of sale, Eligio, Sr. was already incapacitated to give consent to a contract because he was
already afflicted with senile dementia, characterized by deteriorating mental and physical condition
including loss of memory.
The Regional Trial Court declared the deed of sale null and void. CA affirmed trial courts
decision.
ISSUE: WON the assailed contracts of sale void or merely voidable and hence capable of being ratified
HELD:
It was established that the vendor Eligio, Sr. entered into an agreement with petitioner, but that
the formers capacity to consent was vitiated by senile dementia. Hence, the Court must rule that the
assailed contracts are not void or inexistent per se; rather, these are contracts that are valid and
binding unless annulled through a proper action filed in court seasonably.
A void or inexistent contract is one which has no force and effect from the very beginning. Hence,
it is as if it has never been entered into and cannot be validated either by the passage of time or by
ratification. There are two types of void contracts:
(1) those where one of the essential requisites of a valid contract as provided for by Article 1318 1[10] of
the Civil Code is totally wanting; and
(2)
those declared to be so under Article 14092[11] of the Civil Code. By contrast, a voidable or annullable
contract is one in which the essential requisites for validity under Article 1318 are present, but vitiated by
want of capacity, error, violence, intimidation, undue influence, or deceit.
Article 1318 of the Civil Code states that no contract exists unless there is a concurrence of
consent of the parties, object certain as subject matter, and cause of the obligation established. Article
1327 provides that insane or demented persons cannot give consent to a contract. But, if an insane or
demented person does enter into a contract, the legal effect is that the contract is voidable or annullable
as specifically provided in Article 1390.
An annullable contract may be rendered perfectly valid by ratification, which can be express or
implied. Implied ratification may take the form of accepting and retaining the benefits of a contract. This is
what happened in this case. Respondents contention that he merely received payments on behalf of his
father merely to avoid their misuse and that he did not intend to concur with the contracts is unconvincing.
If he was not agreeable with the contracts, he could have prevented petitioner from delivering the
payments, or if this was impossible, he could have immediately instituted the action for reconveyance and
have the payments consigned with the court. None of these happened. As found by the trial court and the
Court of Appeals, upon learning of the sale, respondent negotiated for the increase of the purchase price
while receiving the installment payments. It was only when respondent failed to convince petitioner to

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increase the price that the former instituted the complaint for reconveyance of the properties. Clearly,
respondent was agreeable to the contracts, only he wanted to get more. Further, there is no showing that
respondent returned the payments or made an offer to do so. This bolsters the view that indeed there was
ratification. One cannot negotiate for an increase in the price in one breath and in the same breath
contend that the contract of sale is void.

GUIANG VS CA
FACTS:
Plaintiff Gilda Corpuz and defendant Judie Corpuz are legally married spouses. The couple have
three children, namely: Junie 18 years old, Harriet 17 years of age, and Jodie or Joji, the youngest, who
was 15 years of age at the time their mother testified in court.
Over the objection of private respondent and while she was in Manila seeking employment, her
husband sold to the petitioners-spouses one half of their conjugal property, consisting of their residence
and the lot on which it stood.
Sometime on February 14, 1983, the couple Gilda and Judie Corpuz, with plaintiff-wife Gilda
Corpuz as vendee, bought a 421 sq. meter lot from Manuel Callejo who signed as vendor through a
conditional deed of sale for a total consideration of P14,735.00. The consideration was payable in
installment, with right of cancellation in favor of vendor should vendee fail to pay three successive
installments. Sometime on April 22, 1988, the couple Gilda and Judie Corpuz sold one-half portion of
their Lot No. 9, Block 8, to the defendants spouses Guiang. The latter have since then occupied the
one-half portion and built their house thereon .They are thus adjoining neighbors of the Corpuzes.
Plaintiff Gilda Corpuz left for Manila sometime in June 1989. She was trying to look for work abroad,
in the Middle East. Unfortunately, she became a victim of an unscrupulous illegal recruiter. She was not
able to go abroad. She stayed for sometime in Manila. After his wifes departure for Manila, defendant
Judie Corpuz seldom went home to the conjugal dwelling. Sometime in January 1990, Harriet Corpuz
learned that her father intended to sell the remaining one-half portion including their house, of their
homelot to defendants Guiangs. She wrote a letter to her mother informing her. Gilda replied that she was
objecting to the sale. Harriet, however, did not inform her father about this; but instead gave the letter to
Mrs. Luzviminda Guiang so that she Guiang would advise her father.
However, in the absence of his wife Gilda Corpuz, defendant Judie Corpuz pushed through the
sale of the remaining one-half portion of Lot 9, Block 8. On March 1, 1990, he sold to defendant
Luzviminda Guiang thru a document known as Deed of Transfer of Rights the remaining one-half
portion of their lot and the house standing thereon for a total consideration of P30,000.00 of which
P5,000.00 was to be paid in June , 1990.
Sometime on March 11, 1990, plaintiff returned home. She found her children staying with other
households. Only Junie was staying in their house. Harriet and Joji were with Mr. Panes. Gilda

gathered her children together and stayed at their house. Her husband was nowhere to be found. She
was informed by her children that their father had a wife already.
For staying in their house sold by her husband, plaintiff was complained against by Guiang spouses
before the Barangay authorities for trespassing .On March 16, 1990, the parties thereat signed a
document known as amicable settlement. Believing that she had received the shorter end of the bargain,
plaintiff went to the Barangay Captain for the annulment of the settlement. Defendant-spouses Guiang
followed thru the amicable settlement with a motion for the execution of the amicable settlement, filing the
same with the Municipal Trial Court.
The judgment wasrendered for the plaintiff and against the defendants. CA affirmed the trial
courts decision.
ISSUE:
(1) WON the contract of sale (Deed of Transfer of Rights) was merely voidable, and
(2) WON such contract was ratified by private respondent when she entered into an amicable
settlement with them
HELD:
(1) The Contract of Sale was not merely voidable but void.
The error in petitioners contention is evident. Article 1390, par. 2, refers to contracts visited by vices
of consent, i.e., contracts which were entered into by a person whose consent was obtained and vitiated
through mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence or fraud. In this instance, private respondents
consent to the contract of sale of their conjugal property was totally inexistent or absent. Gilda Corpuz, on
direct examination, testified thus:
ART. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to
both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husbands decision shall prevail, subject to
recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years
from the date of the contract implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the
administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which
must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of
such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the
transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the
third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other
spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.
The legal provision is clear. The disposition or encumbrance is void. It becomes still clearer if we
compare the same with the equivalent provision of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Under Article 166
of the Civil Code, the husband cannot generally alienate or encumber any real property of the
conjugal partnership without the wifes consent. The alienation or encumbrance if so made however is
not null and void. It is merely voidable. The offended wife may bring an action to annul the said
alienation or encumbrance. Thus, the provision of Article 173 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, to
wit:
Art. 173. The wife may, during the marriage and within ten years from the transaction
questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of any contract of the husband entered
into without her consent, when such consent is required, or any act or contract of the
husband which tends to defraud her or impair her interest in the conjugal partnership

property. Should the wife fail to exercise this right, she or her heirs after the dissolution
of the marriage, may demand the value of property fraudulently alienated by the
husband.(n)
This particular provision giving the wife ten (10) years during the marriage to annul
the alienation or encumbrance was not carried over to the Family Code. It is thus clear that
any alienation or encumbrance made after August 3, 1988 when the Family Code took effect by
the husband of the conjugal partnership property without the consent of the wife is null and
void.
In sum, the nullity of the contract of sale is premised on the absence of private respondents
consent. To constitute a valid contract, the Civil Code requires the concurrence of the following elements:
(1) cause, (2) object, and (3) consent, the last element being indubitably absent in the case at bar.
(2) The amicable settlement did not ratify the contract. Both the Deed of Transfer of Rights and
the amicable settlement are null and void.
Art. 1422. A contract which is the direct result of a previous illegal contract, is also void and
inexistent. (Civil Code of the Philippines).
The sale of a conjugal property requires the consent of both the husband and the wife. The absence
of the consent of one renders the sale null and void, while the vitiation thereof makes it merely voidable.
Only in the latter case can ratification cure the defect.
HEIRS OF REYES vs MIJARES
FACTS:
The controversy stemmed from a dispute over Lot No. 4349-B-2, approximately 396 square
meters and registered in the name of Spouses Vicente Reyes and Ignacia Aguilar-Reyes. Said lot and the
apartments built thereon were part of the spouses conjugal properties having been purchased using
conjugal funds from their garments business.
Vicente and Ignacia were married in 1960, but had been separated de facto since 1974.
Sometime in 1984, Ignacia learned that on March 1, 1983, Vicente sold Lot No. 4349-B-2 to respondent
Spouses Mijares for P40,000.00. She likewise found out that Vicente filed a petition for administration and
appointment of guardian.Vicente misrepresented therein that his wife, Ignacia, died on March 22, 1982,
and that he and their 5 minor children were her only heirs. On September 29, 1983, the court appointed
Vicente as the guardian of their minor children. Subsequently, in its Order dated October 14, 1983, the
court authorized Vicente to sell the estate of Ignacia.
On August 9, 1984, Ignacia, through her counsel, sent a letter to respondent spouses demanding
the return of her share in the lot. Failing to settle the matter amicably, Ignacia filed on June 4, 1996 a
complaint for annulment of sale against respondent spouses. The complaint was thereafter amended to
include Vicente Reyes as one of the defendants.
The court rendered a decision declaring the sale of Lot No. 4349-B-2 void with respect to the
share of Ignacia. It held that the purchase price of the lot was P110,000.00 and ordered Vicente to return
thereof or P55,000.00 to respondent spouses.

Ignacia filed a motion for modification of the decision praying that the sale be declared void in its
entirety and that the respondents be ordered to reimburse to her the rentals they collected on the
apartments built on Lot No. 4349-B-2 computed from March 1, 1983.
On May 31, 1990, the trial court modified its decision by declaring the sale void in its entirety and
ordering Vicente Reyes to reimburse respondent spouses the purchase price of P110,000.
Pending the appeal, Ignacia died and she was substituted by her compulsory heirs. Petitioners
contended that they are entitled to reimbursement of the rentals collected on the apartment built on Lot
No. 4349-B-2, while respondent spouses claimed that they are buyers in good faith.
Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of the trial court. It ruled that
notwithstanding the absence of Ignacias consent to the sale, the same must be held valid in favor of
respondents because they were innocent purchasers for value.
ISSUE:
(1) What is the status of the sale of Lot No. 4349-B-2 to respondent spouses?
(2)
Assuming that the sale is annullable, should it be annulled in its entirety or only with respect to the share
of Ignacia?
(3) Are respondent spouses purchasers in good faith?
HELD:
(1) The sale was voidable.
Under the regime of the Civil Code, the alienation or encumbrance of a conjugal real property
requires the consent of the wife. The absence of such consent renders the entire transaction merely
voidable and not void. The wife may, during the marriage and within ten years from the transaction
questioned, bring an action for the annulment of the contract entered into by her husband without her
consent.
Articles 166 and 173 of the Civil Code, the governing laws at the time the assailed sale was
contracted, provide:
Art.166. Unless the wife has been declared a non compos mentis or a spendthrift, or is under civil
interdiction or is confined in a leprosarium, the husband cannot alienate or encumber any real
property of the conjugal partnership without the wifes consent. If she refuses unreasonably to
give her consent, the court may compel her to grant the same
Art. 173. The wife may, during the marriage and within ten years from the transaction questioned,
ask the courts for the annulment of any contract of the husband entered into without her consent,
when such consent is required, or any act or contract of the husband which tends to defraud her
or impair her interest in the conjugal partnership property. Should the wife fail to exercise this
right, she or her heirs after the dissolution of the marriage, may demand the value of property
fraudulently alienated by the husband.

Pursuant to the foregoing provisions, the husband could not alienate or encumber any conjugal
real property without the consent, express or implied, of the wife otherwise, the contract is voidable. This
is consistent with Article 173 of the Civil Code pursuant to which the wife could, during the marriage and
within 10 years from the questioned transaction, seek its annulment.
In the case at bar, there is no dispute that Lot No. 4349-B-2, is a conjugal property having been
purchased using the conjugal funds of the spouses during the subsistence of their marriage. It is beyond
cavil therefore that the sale of said lot to respondent spouses without the knowledge and consent of
Ignacia is voidable. Her action to annul the March 1, 1983 sale which was filed on June 4, 1986, before
her demise is perfectly within the 10 year prescriptive period under Article 173 of the Civil Code. Even if
we reckon the period from November 25, 1978 which was the date when Vicente and the respondent
spouses entered into a contract concerning Lot No. 4349-B-2, Ignacias action would still be within the
prescribed period.
(2) The trial court correctly annulled the voidable sale of Lot No. 4349-B-2 in its entirety.
The plain meaning attached to the plain language of the law is that the contract, in its entirety,
executed by the husband without the wife's consent, may be annulled by the wife. Had Congress
intended to limit such annulment in so far as the contract shall "prejudice" the wife, such limitation should
have been spelled out in the statute.
To be underscored here is that upon the provisions of Articles 161, 162 and 163 of the Civil Code,
the conjugal partnership is liable for many obligations while the conjugal partnership exists. Not only that.
The conjugal property is even subject to the payment of debts contracted by either spouse before the
marriage, as those for the payment of fines and indemnities imposed upon them after the responsibilities
in Article 161 have been covered (Article 163, par. 3), if it turns out that the spouse who is bound thereby,
"should have no exclusive property or if it should be insufficient." These are considerations that go beyond
the mere equitable share of the wife in the property.
(3) Spouses Mijares are not purchasers in good faith.
In the instant case, there existed circumstances that should have placed respondent spouses on
guard. The death certificate of Ignacia, shows that she died on March 22, 1982. The same death
certificate, however, reveals that (1) it was issued by the Office of the Civil Registrar of Lubao
Pampanga on March 10, 1982; (2) the alleged death of Ignacia was reported to the Office of the Civil
Registrar on March 4, 1982; and (3) her burial or cremation would be on March 8, 1982. These obvious
flaws in the death certificate should have prompted respondents to investigate further, especially so that
respondent Florentina Mijares admitted on cross examination that she asked for the death certificate of
Ignacia because she was suspicious that Ignacia was still alive.
Respondent spouses cannot deny knowledge that at the time of the sale in 1978, Vicente was
married to Ignacia and that the latter did not give her conformity to the sale. This is so because the 1978
"Agreement" described Vicente as "married" but the conformity of his wife to the sale did not appear in the
deed. Obviously, the execution of another deed of sale in 1983 over the same Lot No. 4349-B-2, after the
alleged death of Ignacia on March 22, 1982, as well as the institution of the special proceedings were,
intended to correct the absence of Ignacias consent to the sale. Even assuming that respondent spouses
believed in good faith that Ignacia really died on March 22, 1982, after they purchased the lot, the fact
remains that the sale of Lot No. 4349-B-2 prior to Ignacias alleged demise was without her consent and

therefore subject to annulment. The October 14, 1983 order authorizing the sale of the estate of Ignacia,
could not have validated the sale of Lot No. 4349-B-2 because said order was issued on the assumption
that Ignacia was already dead and that the sale dated March 1, 1983 was never categorically approved in
the said order.