Chinese Interrogation vs. Congressional Oversight: The Uighurs at Guantanamo

CHINESE INTERROGATION VS.
CONGRESSIONAL
OVERSIGHT: THE UIGHURS AT GUANTANAMO
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND OVERSIGHT
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
JULY 16, 2009
Serial No. 111–53
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOWARD L. BERMAN, California, Chairman
GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida
ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
Samoa DAN BURTON, Indiana
DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey ELTON GALLEGLY, California
BRAD SHERMAN, California DANA ROHRABACHER, California
ROBERT WEXLER, Florida DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York EDWARD R. ROYCE, California
BILL DELAHUNT, Massachusetts RON PAUL, Texas
GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York JEFF FLAKE, Arizona
DIANE E. WATSON, California MIKE PENCE, Indiana
RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri JOE WILSON, South Carolina
ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas
GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina
MICHAEL E. MCMAHON, New York CONNIE MACK, Florida
JOHN S. TANNER, Tennessee JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska
GENE GREEN, Texas MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas
LYNN WOOLSEY, California TED POE, Texas
SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas BOB INGLIS, South Carolina
BARBARA LEE, California GUS BILIRAKIS, Florida
SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada
JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York
MIKE ROSS, Arkansas
BRAD MILLER, North Carolina
DAVID SCOTT, Georgia
JIM COSTA, California
KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota
GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona
RON KLEIN, Florida
RICHARD J. KESSLER, Staff Director
YLEEM POBLETE, Republican Staff Director
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS,

HUMAN RIGHTS AND OVERSIGHT
BILL DELAHUNT, Massachusetts, Chairman
RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri DANA ROHRABACHER, California
KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota RON PAUL, Texas
DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey TED POE, Texas
ROBERT WEXLER, Florida
CLIFF STAMMERMAN, Subcommittee Staff Director
PAUL BERKOWITZ, Republican Professional Staff Member
BRIAN FORNI, Staff Associate
(II)
CONTENTS
Page
WITNESSES
Mr. Alan Liotta, Principal Director, Detainee Affairs, Department of Defense . 15
Bruce Fein, Esq., Principal, The Litchfield Group ................................................ 42
Jason Pinney, Esq., Counsel to Uighur Detainees, Bingham McCutchen, LLP . 50
Mr. Tom Parker, Policy Director, Counter-Terrorism and Human Rights, Am-
nesty International USA ..................................................................................... 63
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING

The Honorable Bill Delahunt, a Representative in Congress from the Com-
monwealth of Massachusetts, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Inter-
national Organizations, Human Rights and Oversight:
Written testimony of former Uighur detainees ................................................. 2
Article by David Keene, ‘‘The Uighur dilemma,’’ The Hill, dated July 13,
2009 ................................................................................................................... 76
Mr. Alan Liotta: Prepared statement ..................................................................... 19
Bruce Fein, Esq.: Prepared statement ................................................................... 46
Jason Pinney, Esq.: Prepared statement ............................................................... 57
Mr. Tom Parker: Prepared statement .................................................................... 68
APPENDIX
Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 80
Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 81
(III)
CHINESE INTERROGATION VS.
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT:
THE UIGHURS AT GUANTANAMO
THURSDAY, JULY 16, 2009
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS,
HUMAN RIGHTS AND OVERSIGHT,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:13 a.m. in room
2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. William Delahunt
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. DELAHUNT. This hearing will come to order. First let me wel-
come the vice chair of the Subcommittee on Oversight, Mr.
Carnahan, sitting to my right.
And we are joined by two colleagues, Congressman Jim Moran
from Virginia, who serves on the Appropriations Committee and
has an interest in this particular issue and is a senior member of
that committee. We are also joined by our colleague from the
Armed Services Committee who chairs the relevant subcommittee
of that particular body, Mr. Abercrombie of Hawaii. Welcome to
both of you gentlemen.
And of course I am joined by my good friend from California, the
ranking member of this committee, Mr. Rohrabacher. We also want
to welcome his new aide, Mr. Manyon, who is pinch hitting for Paul
Berkowitz, who will return sometime in August I understand.
This is the third hearing that this committee has held on the
plight of the Uighurs both in China and those 22 Uighurs formerly
and currently detained at Guantanamo Bay. For those who are un-
familiar, the Uighurs are a Muslim minority that live in north-
western China. For years they have been persecuted and oppressed
by the Communist Chinese regime.
It came to the committee’s attention that in September 2002,
Communist Chinese agents were welcomed to Guantanamo Bay for
a period of between 7 and 10 days for the purpose of interrogating
the group of 22 Uighurs.
It is important to note that in anticipation of the arrival of the
Chinese delegation, the Inspector General of the Department of
Justice here in Washington reported that American forces softened
up the Uighurs detainees by routinely waking them up at 15
minute intervals the night before.
It is the committee’s intention to provide a venue, whether here
in Washington or elsewhere, for these men who have fled Com-
(1)
2
munist Chinese persecution to come forward and testify so that our

colleagues and the American people can have an opportunity to
hear them firsthand without filter and make their own judgments.
Until that happens, the committee has been provided with state-
ments through their counsel from three former Uighur detainees
who are now currently residing in Albania and Bermuda.
I have reviewed these statements and find them profoundly dis-
turbing, and I believe that the American people will share those
sentiments. I ask unanimous consent to enter their testimony into
the records of the committee.
[No response.]
Mr. DELAHUNT. Hearing no objection, it is so ordered.
[The information referred to follows:]
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Mr. DELAHUNT. The Chinese delegation interrogated each of the

22 Uighurs. All 22 told consistent stories of intimidation and
threats by these Communist agents. They also reported that their
files, which included their real names and that of their families
back in China, were turned over to the Chinese by American per-
sonnel.
Imagine the fear of these men for their families as the Com-
munist Chinese Government routinely targets not only dissidents,
but also their family members. We have heard before from Ms.
Kadeer, who was nominated three times for a Nobel Peace Prize,
who was the target of the Chinese Communist Government, who
after she left, her two sons were incarcerated and still are.
To meet our oversight responsibilities, the ranking member and
myself requested permission from the Bush Administration to fly
to Guantanamo to meet with those very same Uighur men that the
Chinese had full, unfettered access to. Our request was denied, and
we never received a satisfactory explanation for why our visit was
refused.
The Department of Defense, however, provided a statement to
Fox News, which I will now read into the record and you can see
on the Floor to my right. This was the statement as reported by
Fox News:
‘‘We have permitted many countries from which these de-
tainees are from to visit 1] to see that they are being treated
humanely and 2] to help us understand who they are and to
provide us with insight and information about the detainees.
Foreign nationals are permitted to come in. They help us un-
derstand who these people are and what they are involved in,
and that includes official delegations from their country of ori-
gin.
‘‘But Congressmen, the general public, media are not per-
mitted to question detainees. It can only be done in an official
capacity, and no Congressman can interrogate or question de-
tainees because it is not part of their oversight responsibility.’’
That was the statement that was secured by Fox News.
Well, let me first address the issue of oversight responsibility. I
want to be very clear. There was no congressional oversight during
the Bush-Cheney Administration. It simply didn’t exist. As former
Senator Chuck Hagel stated, the Bush-Cheney Administration
treated Congress as a constitutional nuisance. Well, that is not
going to happen any longer.
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I reject any suggestion that the Executive can define what con-
stitutes congressional oversight. It is not the prerogative of the Ex-
ecutive to determine the role of the first branch of government. I
am confident that this position is shared by most, if not all, of my
colleagues in the House.
Things have changed. This is the new Congress, and we have a
new President. And I want to acknowledge that the Department of
Defense representative is present. I could speculate that if this was
prior to January 20 of this year our invitation to testify would have
been simply ignored as it was in the past, so we are glad you are
here, Mr. Liotta.
This committee intends to vigorously exercise the oversight re-
sponsibility explicitly tasked to it by the House of Representatives
not for purposes of confrontation or with intention to embarrass,
but to ensure that we do not make the mistakes or repeat them
that have been made in the past on any issue and to ensure that
a thorough policy review can be made available to our colleagues.
So as I said, I am pleased to welcome Mr. Liotta here today so
we can explore the policy of the Department of Defense to permit
governments like Communist China to interrogate detainees in
United States custody.
I would point out that this issue is particularly prescient in light
of the recent events in the Uighur Autonomous Region over the
course of the past several weeks. The atrocities now taking place
in China are only further evidence of the oppression and persecu-
tion of the Uighur people.
As the 2008 Human Rights Report published by our own State
Department confirms, the recent events in the Uighur Autonomous
Region are not new or novel to the Uighur people. Human rights
violations against the Uighurs have been meticulously documented
by our own State Department and the Commission on Inter-
national Religious Freedom, yet the Department of Defense, led by
then Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, welcomed a Com-
munist Chinese delegation to Guantanamo in September 2002 and
gave them full access to a minority which they have relentlessly
persecuted.
It is our purpose to determine why the Pentagon made this
choice because in light of what we know about the Communist Chi-
nese relationship with the Uighurs, their stated explanation makes
no sense to me. Can we really believe that the Communist Chinese
regime cared if the Uighurs were being treated humanely? I realize
this incident occurred in 2002. The question now is, is this policy
still in effect? Has it been changed? Is it being reassessed by the
Obama Administration?
Let us remember the words of our first President, George Wash-
ington, who once wrote that he hoped that America, and these are
his words, ‘‘might become a safe and agreeable asylum to the vir-
tuous and persecuted part of mankind, to whatever nation they
might belong.’’ Well, by allowing the Chinese Communists into our
detention facility we became other than something than a safe and
agreeable asylum.
Last June, Mr. Rohrabacher and myself sent a letter to the Bush
Administration requesting that the Uighurs then at Guantanamo
be promptly paroled into the United States. In the near future, I,
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and I am sure he will join me, will be sending a similar letter that
I hope many of our colleagues will join in to President Obama call-
ing on him and his Administration to parole and resettle at least
some of the Uighurs at Guantanamo into the United States.
As was stated at our first hearing by former Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs who was inti-
mately involved during the Bush Administration with the issues
attendant to Guantanamo, and this was Secretary Shriver and
these were his words: The situation of the Uighurs can be de-
scribed as nothing short of tragic, and these men were wrongly im-
prisoned.
It is now time, I would suggest, to seize this opportunity to fulfill
Washington’s dream and once again become a safe and agreeable
asylum for the virtuous and persecuted part of mankind.
Now let me turn to my friend and ranking member, Mr. Rohr-
abacher, for any statements he may care to make. Dana?
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Before
we get into this hearing, I think it is important for me personally
to note that I am not now, nor have I ever been, opposed to Guan-
tanamo as a holding spot for terrorist suspects during the war with
Radical Islam.
I think that it was and is a logical location, and I disagree with
the idea that terrorist prisoners especially in a wartime situation,
which we face now with Radical Islam having declared war on the
United States, having slaughtered thousands of our people, that I
find I also disagree with the idea that everyone picked up in that
situation deserves the same rights as American citizens do here at
home during criminal investigations. So right off the bat let me
note that.
Let me also go even further that unlike many, most of my col-
leagues, I do not even oppose enhanced interrogation of prisoners
taken during this war with Radical Islam. If indeed physical force
is used against a prisoner that we are certain and it ends up sav-
ing the lives of thousands of Americans, I would expect that our
protectors use enhanced interrogation, physical force, to save the
lives of my family and American families throughout our country.
I know there are others who disagree with this, and I remember
we had a hearing and there was a back and forth on this very issue
and I suggested to those people who were screaming at me from
the audience that I would hope that their families are the ones that
would bear the burden of the consequences if that policy is adopted.
I would suggest that each and every one of us has to examine
our hearts and say okay, will we really let our mothers and fathers
and our children be slaughtered because we will not use physical
force on someone like Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, who was the
mastermind of 9/11.
So with that preface so that people know that I am not a bleed-
ing heart liberal or anything like that——
Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Mr. Chairman?
Mr. DELAHUNT. Like you have never been accused of that.
Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Mr. Chairman?
Mr. DELAHUNT. Yes, Mr. Abercrombie?
Mr. ABERCROMBIE. I don’t think there is any danger of that.
11
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, with that said, let me then get into the
subject of today’s hearing.
If indeed you hold the positions that I hold, I think it is incum-
bent upon those of us who believe that those are the standards that
we need to operate on during a wartime situation where again
thousands of our own private citizens have been slaughtered and
we have an enemy that is willing to slaughter even more if they
had a chance.
We realize that we have that standard of behavior and relation-
ship to that threat. If you believe in that standard of behavior, it
behooves those of us who advocate it to be committed to truth and
committed to honesty and to understand when you have a standard
like that that you must be so careful about your analyzing what
the truth of any situation is that you are willing to admit mistakes
and correct them.
In this case what we have is a mistake that our Government
made during this war with Radical Islam. We offered what? We of-
fered $5,000 a head for people in Afghanistan to turn in people
that were suspicious and then immediately took these Uighurs who
were turned in for $5,000 a head who were not captured on the
battlefield but instead were living in a village away from the bat-
tlefield, people that never participated in combat against the
United States, and we took them to Guantanamo.
It was a mistake to begin with to do that and perhaps even a
worse mistake that once the interrogations happened and from
what we have gleaned from information already is that once inter-
rogations happened even the interrogators realized these were not
hard core Radical Islamicists who hate America. We should have
admitted the mistake at that moment and corrected it. Somebody
was covering up their mistake and their mistake in judgment.
So if we are to succeed, I think we have to have a tough stand-
ard, and if we are to be honest and if we are to be a country of
integrity we must make sure that we are brutally honest about
mistakes that are made within those standards.
So first of all, I would like to express my personal and deep sad-
ness and regret and apologies to the Uighurs who were treated
inhumanely and thoughtlessly by our Government in being turned
over to Chinese interrogators working for a dictatorship that op-
presses their people.
I believe, and I am sure that my chairman believes this as well,
that it should be the highest priority of this subcommittee to find
out exactly who were the American officials that agreed to this in-
terrogation, and we need perhaps to have an understanding why
after the initial interrogations before the Chinese got there that we
proceeded to do something like this.
We need to know who the American officials who made these de-
cisions were, and again if we are going to have a high standard
that we have or a tough standard while we are fighting this war
with Radical Islam we need to make sure that those making the
decisions are held accountable for those decisions and insist on a
high standard of honesty and truth.
That is why I was one of the few Republicans that voted in favor
of having interrogations of prisoners, of all prisoners, to be
12
videotaped because you then have proof of exactly—you have hon-

esty. You have truth verified.
I don’t think we have any apologies of, as I say, using enhanced
interrogation and having it videotaped if you have someone who is
involved with a conspiracy to murder our people, but we have a lot
to apologize about if we are just acting basically like an unruly mob
rather than an organized effort of government to protect our citi-
zens.
We have a right to understand because we are not an unruly
mob. There are people who make decisions in positions of author-
ity. We need to know who those people were in terms of making
this decision that the Uighurs would be interrogated by Communist
Chinese intelligence agents.
I can only imagine how the Uighurs felt when American soldiers,
people who they had actually looked to with great hope. Their only
hope of the Uighurs were that America would stand true to its
principles of liberty, we believe that human rights, that people are
granted rights, all people are granted rights.
You can only imagine the Uighurs understood this. They know
that is what America believes, and then you have American sol-
diers tasked with the job of holding them down while the Chinese
are interrogating them and holding them in place so the Chinese
can take pictures of them and extract information about their fami-
lies.
I want to know who was to blame for that decision, who takes
credit for that decision. We do know that the soldiers themselves
were following orders, and I would suggest to the Uighur commu-
nity they should not lose faith in the average American and the
Americans who are in uniform who reflect our values as a people.
They were following their orders, but those orders originated
from officials in Washington, and I believe those officials should not
be holding the job that they hold. They should be held accountable
for this important decision.
So that is number one. Let us remember that the decisions of our
public officials in regard to the Uighurs has some relationship to
the decisions that our Government has been taking about China for
the last 30 and 40 years, especially the last 20 years.
China has been since Tiananmen Square a country that has not
been evolving into democracy, but has instead been a country that
is run by a gang of murderous thugs who have been holding power
with actually a more contracting grip on their people and the free-
doms of their people for 20 years.
Before Tiananmen Square, opening up relations and trying to
have more trade and more interaction with a country like this was
all right because they were going in the right direction. They were
opening up.
Well, the same officials that made the decision about the Uighurs
and permitting Chinese agents, intelligence agents, in to question
them are the same type of officials who have been guiding Amer-
ican policy with this vicious dictatorship for the last 20 years, and
that policy is coming back now to hurt the American people dra-
matically both economically, but also throughout the world we see
the Chinese Government allying itself with again the other thugs
in the world who control their people and do not permit their peo-
13
ple the freedoms that we believe are inherently rights of all human
beings.
So we need to know right now who are responsible for these poli-
cies, and we are going to focus specifically on the Uighurs, but I
want to make sure everybody knows that does relate to an overall
policy with China.
With that said, I look forward to this hearing. I want to thank
my chairman for his diligence on this issue, and I am very, very
proud to serve as his ranking member.
Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you, Dana.
I am going to call on Mr. Moran if he cares to make a statement.
Mr. MORAN. Thanks very much, Mr. Chairman. You in your
opening remarks mentioned the fact that I am on Defense Appro-
priations, and in that role the chair of the Defense Appropriations
Committee assigned me several years ago actually to take on the
issue of Guantanamo, to go down, visit the facility, talk to per-
sonnel, come up with a policy recommendation for the committee
that is required to fund Guantanamo and to explain to the full
committee why it is that we would be providing the money for what
purpose.
I did so. On each of the occasions I went to Guantanamo with
Pentagon personnel we were denied any access to the prisoners.
Basically we were treated to a dog and pony show, although the
second time it became far less comfortable for the Guantanamo
personnel than the first time as I knew what to expect.
But this revelation that Chinese Communist intelligence agents
were granted access to the prisoners after the prisoners had been
told by our people that all their personal information would be held
confidential is a direct violation of the policy that I was told we
would be pursuing, that we would be complying with, but it is also
immoral to have done that, knowing the way that the Chinese
Communist Government treats dissidents.
When we get into questions I am going to want to know the dis-
position of the families of these Uighur detainees since we put
them in direct jeopardy by releasing personal information of those
families.
We know that in the last month about 200 Uighurs have been
executed by the Chinese Communist Government, and it seems to
me since we were directly involved in putting them into that posi-
tion of vulnerability that we need to know what the exact status
of those families is.
The analogy with Afghanistan is striking to me. In one case, be-
cause it was in our interest to help people who were in many cases
deeply religious and thus deeply opposed to the Soviet Communist
Government, we armed them, gave them training and all the sup-
port we could. And here in this case we have been on the other
side, the side of Communist dictatorship in assisting them in re-
pressing people who were primarily looking for religious freedom
within their country of origin, so I think there are some inconsist-
encies in policy.
Mr. Chairman, it is entirely appropriate that you have this hear-
ing, and I trust that it is going to lead to a dramatic trans-
formation in the policy that you have exposed, so I thank you, Mr.
Chairman, for having the hearing.
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Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you, Mr. Moran.

Congressman Ted Poe of Texas?
Mr. POE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate you holding
this hearing.
I too have been to Guantanamo Bay prison. Being a former judge
I have seen a lot of prisons and have sent people to prison on fre-
quent occasions. I, like the other members, wanted to interact more
with the people that were there, and of course that was forbidden.
You could not do that. And then lo and behold, some foreign coun-
try, China, who has a horrible record of the way it treats its own
people, has access to prisoners that are held in an American prison
facility.
Now, that strikes me as very odd why we would let some foreign
country come in and interrogate basically our prisoners and give
them access to them and let them interrogate them for their own
intelligence reasons and not allow even Members of Congress to get
close to those prisoners and certainly not ask them any questions.
Like the ranking member, I don’t trust the Chinese. I know they
are our economic partners and we can’t talk bad about them be-
cause they own so much of American debt and may even end up
controlling our economy, but they treat their people in a very rough
manner, and American policy should not allow foreign governments
to come into our prisons and interrogate anybody. It is none of
their business. After all, they are our prisoners.
I will yield back.
Mr. DELAHUNT. Yes. I thank the gentleman. I want to point out
and I would commend to him reviewing the statements that were
made by those three former detainees. I think it is important to
read that.
You weren’t here, Congressman Poe, when I indicated that it is
the intention of the committee to provide a venue, whether here in
Washington or elsewhere, maybe via video link—I am not sure—
where we, Members of Congress, can hear directly without a filter,
without commentary these men so that we can make judgments
and that the American people can make judgments because much
has been said about the Uighurs by those I daresay who are ill in-
formed and who have done a disservice not just to the Uighurs, but
to what America stands for.
As I said, it is my belief, and I believe it is shared by Mr. Rohr-
abacher. These men fled Communist persecution. I daresay if they
were Tibetans they would be sitting here in this audience in front
of us today. While I disagree with so much with my ranking mem-
ber, I applaud his courage and his absolute perseverance to ascer-
tain what the truth is because that is what America is about.
It is the responsibility of this committee and other oversight com-
mittees in Congress to do what we can working with the respective
departments and agencies in the executive branch so that we can
ascertain what policies exist and, more importantly, how they are
being implemented. I hope that we are turning the page.
With that, let me see if the gentleman from Hawaii wishes to
make a statement. He doesn’t.
Well, then let us proceed with our first panel, who is by himself,
but he is here, which is a step forward. Mr. Alan Liotta is the prin-
cipal director of detainee affairs for the Department of Defense.
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Mr. Liotta, welcome. I am happy that you are here, and please
proceed with your testimony.
STATEMENT OF MR. ALAN LIOTTA, PRINCIPAL DIRECTOR,
DETAINEE AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Mr. LIOTTA. Thank you, and good morning, Mr. Chairman, mem-
bers of the subcommittee. I appreciate the opportunity to discuss
the Department of Defense’s detention operations at Guantanamo
Bay.
To address the subcommittee’s concerns, I would like to speak
briefly about the Department’s policy of access to detainees at
Guantanamo, as well as the issue and challenges of such visits. At
the outset, I would like to note that we currently hold fewer than
230 detainees at Guantanamo, less than a third of the total num-
ber ever detained there.
With regard to our detention operations at Guantanamo, it is un-
doubtedly the most transparent military detention center anywhere
in the world. Within the Department, we have worked diligently to
establish a state-of-the-art facility that provides safe, humane,
transparent and legal custody for each detainee.
We have allowed numerous media outlets and human rights
groups access to the facilities to observe proceedings and to partici-
pate in camp tours. We have also brought senior foreign officials
to Guantanamo to better understand detention operations.
These visits continue, and we facilitate as much access as
logistically possible to the media and these other groups to ensure
transparency and accountability in our operations. Over the past 7
years we have brought 52 U.S. Senators, 168 Representatives and
300 staff members to Guantanamo on official congressional delega-
tions.
Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Liotta, let me, and I respectfully want to—
I don’t mean to interrupt you, but I want to ask you if those 52
Senators, those Members of the House and those staffers ever were
allowed to interview any of the detainees at the facility?
Mr. LIOTTA. They were not, Mr. Chairman, for reasons which I
will explain.
Mr. DELAHUNT. Okay. Thank you. Thank you.
Mr. LIOTTA. I have personally escorted more than a dozen of
these trips. Through these visits, as well as through congressional
testimony and briefings, we have provided our respective oversight
committees, as well as other dedicated and interested Congressmen
and Senators, a look into our operations.
In every case, the visitors have expressed their appreciation for
the tremendous and outstanding work our young men and women
in uniform are doing in the most arduous of circumstances. It is ex-
tremely stressful duty, yet these young soldiers, sailors, airmen,
marines and coast guardsmen do it with pride and excellence every
single day.
To ensure the safe and humane operations of all Department of
Defense detention facilities and to comply with our obligations
under international law, it is the policy of the Department of De-
fense to limit access to detainees under our legal control. This is
not simply for detainees in Guantanamo, but for those we also hold
in Iraq and Afghanistan as well.
16
We do this for three principal reasons: First and foremost, to en-

sure the safety of the detainees and U.S. personnel; Second, to
shield detainees from public curiosity to remain consistent with the
Geneva Conventions; and, third, to avoid complications with ongo-
ing litigation in U.S. courts.
Without question, the single greatest reason to limit access to de-
tainees is to provide for their personal safety, as well as that of the
guards and the military personnel who interact with them on a
daily basis.
It is not unique to Guantanamo that every interaction a detainee
has with an individual from outside the camp affects not only that
detainee, but all those who live in the same camp with him. The
arrival of individuals from outside the camp changes the mood, the
demeanor and the overall temperament of a camp, in turn affecting
the security dynamics within that camp.
Second, our international law principles warrant that we limit
access to detainees in our custody and control. The Third and
Fourth Geneva Conventions contemplate that nation states shield
detainees from the public eye and protect them from public curi-
osity. The facilities at Guantanamo provide safe and secure living
conditions, and the Department of Defense has determined that we
simply will not permit a deliberate departure from the principles
of the Geneva Conventions.
Finally, as the subcommittee is well aware, almost every de-
tainee at Guantanamo is involved in some sort of litigation. Allow-
ing broad access to detainees would potentially complicate and pro-
long these litigation proceedings by raising questions about the
presence of detainee counsel at interviews and the possibility of
calling members of congressional delegations as witnesses in the
litigation.
I do not wish to leave the subcommittee the impression, however,
that detainees are left alone and without contact. To the contrary,
the Department of Defense recognizes the unique and primary role
of the International Committee of the Red Cross to have unfettered
access to detainees under our control and custody at Guantanamo,
as well as in our theater detention facilities in Iraq and Afghani-
stan.
Under the Geneva Conventions, nation states are required to
give officials from the ICRC access to detainees. Accordingly, the
United States grants the ICRC full access to all detainees interned
at Department of Defense theater detention facilities.
The ICRC conducts regular interviews with detainees to ensure
proper treatment and to facilitate communication with their fami-
lies. Our relationship with the ICRC is a productive one and we
greatly value their observations, insights and recommendations.
Senior Department officials meet regularly with the ICRC to discus
our detention operations and policies and to address their concerns
in a constructive and confidential dialogue at all levels of the chain
of command.
Our commitment to the ICRC to keep our dialogue with them
confidential requires that we handle all communication between
our Government and the ICRC as classified, but to ensure effective
congressional oversight, as well as access to ICRC observations and
17
recommendations, the Department provides regular briefings to

Congress on at least a quarterly basis.
During these briefings, the Department shares the entire collec-
tion of correspondence exchanged between our Government and
their organization to provide insight into the full breadth and scope
of the Department’s relationship and communications with the
ICRC. In this way we are able to ensure that we meet our inter-
national obligation to maintain the ICRC’s relationship with those
in our custody, while also providing Congress access to the same
information so they can exercise effective oversight.
Depending on the circumstances, there are some occasions when
we will allow a foreign government access to a detainee if that
country is considering accepting the transfer of the detainee for re-
settlement in their country. This is an exception to policy and is
approved on a case-by-case basis.
Similarly, some of the detainees at Guantanamo have committed
crimes in their homelands or other countries, or they can be crucial
witnesses in the trials of other terrorists. In such instances, foreign
governments have made and continue to make requests to inter-
view a specific detainee to assist in law enforcement actions. If a
foreign government requests a law enforcement visit with a de-
tainee, the Department evaluates each request on a case-by-case
basis to determine whether to grant such access.
Finally, the United States Government has in the past requested
a foreign government’s assistance in helping to determine the iden-
tity of an individual we have captured or for intelligence informa-
tion they have about his terrorist links and activity. Such foreign
requests for access on these grounds are extremely infrequent.
In addition, some foreign governments may request access to a
detainee to assist them in their own efforts to gain intelligence to
assist them in identifying and aborting potential terrorist plots in
their countries. When we receive such requests, however, they are
assessed on their individual merits and in consultation with other
appropriate U.S. Government departments and agencies to deter-
mine whether such access should be granted.
I would like to stress to the subcommittee that in each of the set
of circumstances I have described above when a decision to grant
access to foreign law enforcement and/or intelligence officials is
made it has been and currently remains longstanding Department
policy that visiting foreign officials must agree that they will abide
by all DoD policies, rules and regulations.
This is codified in Department of Defense Directive 3115.09 and
remains our policy in all of our military detention facilities world-
wide. Additionally, in all of the above-noted cases, the foreign gov-
ernments who are allowed access are members of their nation’s ex-
ecutive branch.
Finally, I would be remiss if I did not stress that the Department
also allows legal counsel access to their clients at Guantanamo.
The Department goes to extraordinary lengths to facilitate attorney
visits with their clients in detention facilities and to hold produc-
tive and privileged meetings with their clients in an environment
that ensures the safety of the detainee, the counsel and govern-
ment and military personnel. In 2008, JTF-Guantanamo facilitated
more than 1,800 legal visits and phone calls.
18
To conclude, Mr. Chairman, our detention policies ensure that

detainees under the control of the Department of Defense any-
where in the world are cared for humanely and in complete compli-
ance with our obligations under the laws of armed conflict, applica-
ble U.S. law and binding international treaties.
I am proud of our outstanding service members who serve at
Guantanamo, in Afghanistan and in Iraq who are committed to en-
suring that our detention mission is carried out in a safe, humane,
legal and transparent manner while balancing the needs of oper-
ational security. They deserve our gratitude.
This concludes my statement, Mr. Chairman. I would like to
thank you and the subcommittee for the subcommittee’s time and
attention to this important topic. As the subcommittee’s time per-
mits, I am prepared to respond to members’ questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Liotta follows:]
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23
Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you very much, Mr. Liotta.

I know he has a number of commitments, and I am going to go
first to the chairman of the Subcommittee on Land and Air Forces
of the House Armed Services Committee, Mr. Abercrombie, for
questions that he might want to post.
Mr. Abercrombie?
Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I thank
the other members for their indulgence.
Mr. Liotta, aloha to you. Mr. Liotta, by way of full disclosure to
you for the questions, I am a former probation officer, several
years, including work at San Quentin Prison. I am also familiar
with prisons. I have handled everything from traffic tickets to mur-
der as an officer of the court, both making recommendations and
supervising recommendations about probation and sentencing and
supervision of felons.
That is where I find the testimony a bit strange. Please forgive
me. It is nothing personal, but could you just give me very briefly
your background in law enforcement, if there is any?
Mr. LIOTTA. I am a current government official, Congressman. I
have no background in law enforcement.
Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Okay. That doesn’t mean that you are not ca-
pable in this respect of giving definitive testimony.
In other words, do you direct this at Guantanamo—that is what
I am trying to get at actually—or are you the chief administrative
individual? It says principal director, Office of Detainee Policy. Is
that located here in Washington with the Department of Defense?
Mr. LIOTTA. Yes, sir. It is at the Pentagon. I work for the Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy, Ms. Michelle Flournoy, in the Of-
fice of Detainee Policy.
Mr. ABERCROMBIE. And when did you start your position?
Mr. LIOTTA. I assumed the position in July 2004 when the office
was created.
Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Okay. Very good. So then you have the back-
ground. I mean the history. You embodied the history then in your
testimony.
Mr. LIOTTA. Not of the entire history of its existence, but since
that point.
Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Since that point.
Mr. LIOTTA. Since that point. Yes, sir.
Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Yes. Thank you very much. In that context
then I am a little concerned, the context I just outlined from my
own background. Separate and apart from the question of the Ge-
neva Conventions, which I was under the impression we said did
not necessarily apply at Guantanamo—perhaps that can be ex-
plored a little bit later. I don’t want to abuse my time.
But what did strike me here is on page 2 of your testimony, your
third point with regard to the reasons that you set forth for the
policies. Third, to avoid complications with ongoing litigation in
U.S. courts.
Again going to my own personal experience, I don’t understand
how it is possible then to allow access of foreign governments to
these prisoners before they have been tried by us. I understand
completely the idea that you have enunciated very clearly about
the possibility of other governments having an interest in terrorism
24
within their borders, possible crimes of one kind or another under

the laws of those nations that may have an interest in these indi-
viduals.
But you yourself indicate in your testimony that the possibility
if Members of Congress had been able to interview any of these
people, for example, that they could be called as witnesses in litiga-
tion. Couldn’t members of a foreign nation’s intelligence operations
or law enforcement operations then be called as witnesses if we
then prosecuted someone in our courts?
Mr. LIOTTA. Yes, Mr. Congressman. First I would like to empha-
size that the detainees that we hold at Guantanamo are being held
under the law of armed conflict, which is different than criminal
and the criminal proceedings associated with that.
But I would have to say that in terms of the litigation questions
and the——
Mr. ABERCROMBIE. I understand that, Mr. Liotta. Honestly, I do.
I am just referring to your testimony. You are saying one of the
reasons Members of Congress could not interview or have a con-
versation with prisoners there is because they could be possibly
called as witnesses in litigation.
If that is the case, if you allow prior to prosecution of these de-
tainees members of a foreign government’s intelligence operation or
law enforcement operation to interview them and interrogate them,
couldn’t they be then called by legal counsel as witnesses in a pros-
ecution engaged in by the United States?
Mr. LIOTTA. That would be under the purview of the Department
of Justice, and I would not be qualified to respond to that specifi-
cally, sir. I am not an attorney, and those cases in litigation and
the requirements are all handled by——
Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Again, I don’t want to be argumentative with
you, but this is your testimony. It is not mine. You are saying that
Members of Congress——
Well, did the Department of Justice say Members of Congress
couldn’t do this interview? I am not quite sure. How is it possible
for Members of Congress to be involved in litigation if they had
been involved with an interrogation or an interview with a de-
tainee?
Why wouldn’t the same principle apply then to those who have
done that from a foreign government?
Mr. LIOTTA. I would defer to the Department of Justice on that.
Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Okay.
Mr. LIOTTA. I would simply note that as I said at the outset of
my testimony, I wanted to identify some of the challenges.
Mr. ABERCROMBIE. You see where I think the difficulties here
are?
Mr. LIOTTA. I am sorry?
Mr. ABERCROMBIE. I am very familiar with chain of custody, with
chain of custody in terms of evidence. I am very familiar with it.
If you allow a third party to come in, I can’t imagine—I can’t
imagine—in any other prosecution, and you are talking about
armed conflict here, so even more important because you are talk-
ing about possible war crimes and so on.
I can’t imagine in an American court system you would allow a
third party to come in and interrogate somebody absent attorneys,
25
by the way, and not have that destroy the capacity for having a
trial that wouldn’t be subject to a request for dismissal. I just won-
der. What is the rationale behind it?
Mr. LIOTTA. Congressman, I understand the question, but again
I would have to defer to the Department of Justice, which is
the——
Mr. ABERCROMBIE. So do you have a memo or something from
the Department of Justice indicating that this procedure, these set
of procedures, is agreed to by the Attorney General?
Mr. LIOTTA. The Department of Justice is familiar with the pol-
icy. Yes, sir.
Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Well, that is not what I asked. Do you have
something in writing from the Department of Justice that says al-
lowing access to foreign governments by their intelligence officials
or law enforcement officials is warranted or agreed to or will not
in any way damage the capacity of the United States to prosecute
detainees?
Mr. LIOTTA. I would defer to the Department of Justice on that
language, sir.
Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Okay. You say here law enforcement visits
are done on a case-by-case basis. Has any government been turned
down?
Mr. LIOTTA. Yes, sir.
Mr. ABERCROMBIE. For what reason?
Mr. LIOTTA. I cannot get into that in an open hearing, but I have
offered to the subcommittee a classified briefing that can provide
the details of the countries that have asked for visits, those that
have been accepted, those that have been denied.
Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Okay. You say that they are assessed on their
individual merits in consultation with appropriate U.S. Govern-
ment departments and agencies. Do you consult with the Depart-
ment of Justice?
Mr. LIOTTA. We do, sir.
Mr. ABERCROMBIE. And what other agencies?
Mr. LIOTTA. A wide variety of agencies, sir. The Department of
State might be consulted. The intelligence community members
might be consulted. It would depend on the nature of the request,
sir.
Mr. ABERCROMBIE. And who does this determination in these
agencies? Is there your equivalent somewhere in these agencies?
Mr. LIOTTA. There is, sir. Most of the agencies have an equiva-
lent. Yes, sir. Someone is responsible for detainees at Guantanamo.
Mr. ABERCROMBIE. And none of them have indicated that they
are fearful that if you allow this kind of thing that it could inter-
fere with the capacity to have a successful prosecution should you
feel one is warranted?
Mr. LIOTTA. I believe the other agencies would also defer to the
Department of Justice on that point, sir.
Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Okay. Just a couple more questions. You say
that foreign law enforcement and intelligence officials will abide by
all DoD policies, rules and procedures.
What process do you engage in to make sure that these people
are familiar with DoD Directive 3115.09, and what do you do to de-
termine that they will follow up?
26
Mr. LIOTTA. There are briefings ahead of time. Sessions are mon-
itored, and they would be interrupted if there was a violation.
Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Interrupted by who?
Mr. LIOTTA. By the United States side.
Mr. ABERCROMBIE. And who is the United States side?
Mr. LIOTTA. It would depend on the defense. If it was at Guanta-
namo, it would be the guard force that was involved.
Mr. ABERCROMBIE. The guard force?
Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Are you talking about troops?
Mr. LIOTTA. Or the SJA, the legal counsel down there. It would
depend.
Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Okay. The legal counsel for the DoD?
Mr. LIOTTA. Yes, sir. For the Joint Task Force.
Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Yes. Now, in these interrogations that take
place is legal counsel provided to the detainee?
Mr. LIOTTA. Again, sir, I have offered a classified briefing, and
I would be happy to discuss the parameters and how these meet-
ings are conducted in a classified session.
Mr. ABERCROMBIE. I don’t want to be argumentative, but I am
not quite sure. I don’t think my question is a classified question.
Do you mean whether or not the detainees have legal counsel
during an interrogation by a foreign national, that is classified?
Mr. LIOTTA. I would prefer to provide that information in a clas-
sified briefing, sir, as part of the comprehensive briefing program.
Yes, sir.
Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Excuse me, Mr. Liotta. I know what you
would prefer to do, but that is not the question I asked.
I have some difficulty. Is it a classified element as to whether or
not—let me rephrase it. How is it possible to be classified in na-
ture, the answer to the question of whether or not the detainee has
his or her legal counsel available during the interrogation by a for-
eign national?
The reason I ask that question, again not to be provocative, is
that you have raised in your testimony the possibility that a Mem-
ber of Congress even talking to someone, that that could obviate
the capacity to pursue a successful prosecution and so legal counsel
would be available. As I understand it, legal counsel was available
at Nuremberg.
The fact that they are detainees under the armed combat provi-
sions doesn’t obviate the necessity of having legal counsel available
if a third party was making interrogation.
Mr. LIOTTA. If I could, I would like to clarify. I don’t believe that
I said that it would complicate the prosecutions.
I said it would complicate litigation proceedings, which there are
a wide variety of that—habeas counsel proceedings, lots of other
kinds of proceedings—outside of straight prosecutions.
Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Yes.
Mr. LIOTTA. It is the concern that it would complicate those types
of proceedings. That it could potentially complicate those pro-
ceedings is one of the three concerns that I listed.
Mr. ABERCROMBIE. That is what I want to know. Was legal coun-
sel available to the detainees if they were going to be subject to
third party interrogation?
27
Mr. LIOTTA. Again, sir, I would defer that to a classified briefing.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Okay. I don’t think it is classified informa-
tion, but if you don’t want to do it, we will get it. I will leave that
up to the chairman.
I just want to quote to you on page 3, ‘‘Finally, I would be remiss
if I did not stress that DoD also allows legal counsel access to their
clients at Guantanamo.’’
I will ask you once again. Did these detainees who were inter-
viewed, whether it was by the Chinese or anybody else, have legal
counsel at Guantanamo during these interrogations? I am raising
the question because I am reading your testimony, not because I
am trying to look to put you in a difficult position.
I am trying to understand whether I have a clear understanding
of what I believe to be the clear implications of your testimony.
Mr. LIOTTA. Yes, sir. I understand. And I apologize if my answer
is not clear, and I would clarify this for you.
In the testimony that you just read, my reference to legal counsel
is in reference to their cases involving habeas litigation, those that
are being prosecuted through military commissions, and other ex-
amples where there would be legal counsel involved along those
grounds. That is what I was referring to in that statement.
That statement and reference to legal counsel there had nothing
to do with the other part of access and whether or not counsel were
involved with that, which again I would ask to defer.
Mr. ABERCROMBIE. So you separate that kind of litigation, say a
habeas corpus hearing? You separate that and perhaps the neces-
sity or the desirability of having legal counsel present from the in-
terrogation situation of a foreign national?
Mr. LIOTTA. In that comment that you read I was referring strict-
ly to the habeas litigation and the court proceedings that would be
involved that way. Yes, sir.
Mr. ABERCROMBIE. All right. Finally then, from my perspective
if that is the case do you have something from the Department of
Justice and/or some other authority to make such a separation?
Mr. LIOTTA. I don’t believe it is a separation, sir. It is strictly
that the testimony was referring to one aspect of legal counsel’s
participation and their work with the detainees at Guantanamo.
Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Well, I am sorry. I am not sure I understood
what you just said. Could you repeat it to me?
Mr. LIOTTA. You phrased your question, if I understood it cor-
rectly, in terms of a separation, and I am simply saying that I was
not referring to a separation in my testimony.
I was only referring to the aspect of the counsels’ ability to have
access to their clients for the legal proceedings for which their cli-
ents are involved in, such as habeas corpus proceedings, litigation
or if there are other cases they have brought suit against the De-
fense Department or the U.S. Government.
Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Then maybe my question wasn’t clear. Do you
have something in writing from competent authority that tells you
that in the circumstances of a foreign national interrogating one of
the detainees that the admonition that you just cited to have legal
counsel available for habeas corpus proceedings or some other pro-
ceeding need not be observed?
28
Mr. LIOTTA. I am sorry, sir. Could you repeat the last part of
that?
Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Yes. In other words, do you have something
in writing that says where you are required to have legal counsel
for a litigation proceeding like a habeas corpus proceeding you
don’t have to have counsel for the detainee if it is a circumstance
involving an intelligence agent or a law enforcement agent from a
foreign power coming to make the interview?
Mr. LIOTTA. There is nothing that I am aware of on that, sir, but
I would again defer to the Department of Justice as to whether
there is such a distinction that has been made.
Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Well, then I guess it forces me into another
question though before I conclude. Does the Department of Justice
have observers there or something?
If you have to refer to the Department of Justice over and over
again and you have supervisors there at one level or another, ei-
ther troops or officers stationed at Guantanamo, do they have ac-
cess to and are there Justice Department personnel there to advise
them as to what they can do and not do?
Mr. LIOTTA. During their habeas visits?
Mr. ABERCROMBIE. At Guantanamo.
Mr. LIOTTA. Yes, sir. But, Mr. Congressman, there are many dif-
ferent types of activities that occur there. In terms of legal counsel,
there are not Department of Justice officials there when lawyers
meet with their clients. Those are privileged meetings between the
clients and——
Mr. ABERCROMBIE. No, no. I am talking to give you advice or
those over whom you have authority.
You say you defer to the Department of Justice in answer to my
questions again and again and again. Is the Department of Justice
actively involved then in the day-to-day supervision of what can
take place and not take place in this context of third party foreign
nationals interviewing prisoners?
Mr. LIOTTA. The Department of Justice is not day-to-day involved
in our operational activities. They do provide advice and counsel to
us in their role.
With regards to the advice and counsel they provided in terms
of access by foreign officials for intelligence briefings, again, sir, I
would defer to a classified presentation for that.
Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, thank you for your
indulgence. My observation——
Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you, Mr. Abercrombie. As I listened to
your questions and I reflect for a moment, I am going to ask you
to consult with the chair of the full committee about a series of
hearings at the subcommittee level that are joint in nature.
And I would ask Mr. Moran and I see in the audience and I wel-
come to the dais our dear friend from California, Ms. Eshoo, who
is a senior member of the Intelligence Committee.
Now, I know the Executive always prefers to have classified
briefings. You know, I think the American people have a right
without compromising national security to understand what hap-
pened at Guantanamo, particularly in the case of the Uighurs. Let
us keep it focused, exclusively focused on the information that has
29
emerged since their release and the information that we have been
able to secure.
With all due respect, we are always being invited to classify
briefings. Let me tell you, there is a sense among Members on both
sides of the aisle that if the Executive or a particular department
is able to secure the consent of Members of Congress to a classified
briefing wow. We know that that information cannot be dissemi-
nated publicly.
There is a balance here that has to be achieved because we need
to have an informed American public to understand our policies
and how they are implemented. One of our great strengths as a re-
public in our constitutional system is to, as the ranking member
has said, acknowledge our errors and where we ran afoul so that
we can make the necessary changes.
I daresay that is the best message that the United States can
send to the rest of the world. We are not afraid, and we have a sys-
tem of checks and balances that will always allow the truth to
emerge.
Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Mr. Chairman? Mr. Chairman?
Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Abercrombie?
Mr. ABERCROMBIE. If you would just indulge me a follow up as
a result?
Mr. DELAHUNT. Please.
Mr. ABERCROMBIE. And I appreciate again the other members.
The reason is I have, Mr. Liotta, if you will trust me on this, and
we will make a copy available to you. I have a copy of an official
response from the Office of the Attorney General, the U.S. Depart-
ment of Justice, dated July 7, 2009, addressed to John Conyers, the
chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary, with a copy to Lamar
Smith, who is their ranking member, as Mr. Rohrabacher is here,
on the Judiciary, in response to questions.
On page 14 of the document from Ronald Wyche, the Assistant
Attorney General, on questions submitted by Mr. Delahunt there
is a reference by Mr. Delahunt—do you have that in front of you
now?
Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Page 14. Could you look at page 14? A ques-
tion is asked by Mr. Delahunt with regard to agents from China
allowed to visit the Uighur detainees. The response by the Assist-
ant Attorney General on behalf of the Department of Justice is,
‘‘The Inspector General’s Office stands by the accuracy of its re-
port,’’ the report which is referred to in the question.
The relevant part for me here in the context of the question I
asked you is, ‘‘The Department of Justice does not control visitor
access to Guantanamo Naval Base or access for interrogation pur-
poses to detainees in the Department of Defense custody. Such ac-
cess is controlled by the Department of Defense.’’
The second question then again is answered in explanation of
why Chinese agents are granted more access than congressional
delegation. ‘‘The Department of Justice does not control visitor ac-
cess to Guantanamo Bay Naval Base. Such access is controlled by
the Department of Defense.’’
So if your answer to me is you defer to the Department of Jus-
tice, the Department of Justice has said in writing that it does not
30
either control access to Guantanamo Bay detainees, and for interro-

gation purposes access with regard to those custody it does not con-
trol it. It is controlled by the Department of Defense.
So again I must ask you. Have you explored in any way in writ-
ing from some competent authority whether or not you are actually
possibly jeopardizing successful prosecution of detainees by the
United States by allowing third party interrogations before that
prosecution has been successfully completed?
Mr. LIOTTA. Mr. Congressman, this is the first time that I have
seen this testimony just handed to me, so I don’t have the context.
Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Yes. I understand that.
Mr. LIOTTA. I take it at face value what was responded here.
Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Me too. I just saw it myself.
Mr. LIOTTA. Yes, sir. But as I read this as what has been pre-
sented to me, I mean, it is a statement of fact by the Department
of Justice that the Department of Defense controls access, which is
the point of my testimony to highlight for you the policy of that ac-
cess and how it is derived and the limitations on that policy that
is there.
So I don’t believe the statement of facts as presented by the De-
partment of Justice response to the subcommittee chairman’s ques-
tions are inaccurate. I think they are factual statements that are
accurate, which is the Department of Defense controls that access,
and I outlined that in my testimony.
Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Yes. I understand that. I am asking for the
policy behind it. Do you understand that you may be jeopardizing
the successful prosecution of terrorists?
Mr. LIOTTA. And again, sir, for questions of prosecution and what
would constitute a successful prosecution or what may jeopardize
that——
Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Okay.
Mr. LIOTTA [continuing]. I would defer to the attorneys at the
Department of Justice.
Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you, Mr. Abercrombie.
I am going to go to the ranking member, but if he would indulge
me just for 1 minute?
You indicated that requests by third countries on occasion have
been denied.
Mr. LIOTTA. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. DELAHUNT. It is clear that in the case of the Communist Chi-
nese Government that request was not denied. Is that an accurate
statement?
Mr. LIOTTA. As I indicated in my response, Mr. Chairman, I will
not be able to talk about any particular country’s request and
whether it was granted or denied in an unclassified forum, but I
am more than happy to provide detailed information on all the
countries to the subcommittee in a——
Mr. DELAHUNT. I am not going to press you on that today.
Mr. DELAHUNT. But I think it is safe to say, given all of the infor-
mation that has emerged, that the request of the Chinese Govern-
ment for access to the Uighur detainees was granted by the govern-
31
ment, by the Department of Defense or by somebody we don’t

know.
I guess what I am offering to you is after today to go back to
your superiors and inform them that we want an answer to that
question in a public setting such as this. I am not going to press
you today, but we want to know that answer.
I guess I will expand on that somewhat by saying that we want
to know if the request came from the Chinese or was it an offer
that was without a request that was provided by the United States
Government or one of its departments because I think to say that
the response to that answer should be in a classified setting is ab-
surd.
Again, I know you are here and I know you have to return to the
Department, but we are going to demand that answer, and I think
that I can secure the concurrence of——
Mr. MORAN. Absolutely, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. DELAHUNT. The concurrence of the House Armed Services
Committee, the Appropriations Committee, and I will inquire from
the lady from California, the Intelligence Committee.
To suggest that that has to be done in a classified briefing is un-
acceptable to those four committees and I daresay to the United
States Congress because that is laughable. Again, I don’t mean to
direct this at you personally, but we want answers. The American
people deserve answers.
One more question, and then I am going to defer if I can. We
talked about a policy. Is there anything written down about guid-
ance or a policy as it relates to letting the Chinese or anyone in
to interrogate detainees at Guantanamo?
Mr. LIOTTA. Mr. Chairman, first I will commit to you that I will
bring the committee’s request back with me to the Department——
Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you.
Mr. LIOTTA [continuing]. And the passion behind the request as
well.
And then in response to the second question on whether there is
anything written, again I would say, sir, that I can explain in more
detail and would be happy to go over rules, procedures, all those
things as of right now in a classified setting.
Mr. DELAHUNT. Okay. But I guess I can infer that there is some-
thing in writing?
Mr. LIOTTA. Affirmative. Yes, sir, there is.
Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you. I yield to the gentleman.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and congratula-
tions, Mr. Liotta, for your courage in coming here today and being
willing to be interrogated by a panel like this. I notice that you are
sitting there by yourself, and so I admire that.
Let me just note that your comments about——
Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Rohrabacher knows what
it is like to be by himself.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thanks for reminding me. Your comments
about the hard work and the diligence and the gratitude that we
owe our personnel who have served in Guantanamo and people like
yourself who have been given certain authority and responsibility
to handle a very hard part of this war against Radical Islam.
32
I mean, this is an extraordinarily difficult part of that overall op-

eration that protects the American people, and those soldiers that
have been at Guantanamo and those people who have conducted
interrogations and yourself and others who have been engaged in
this, I think that we owe a great debt of gratitude to you for being
able to take on a job, just like being able to come here today, so
thank you for that.
With that said, that doesn’t mean that those of us who have con-
cerns may totally disagree with the policy that you as soldiers and
you as employees of our Government have had to implement and
so today I would say that you have done your job as well as could
ever be expected in defending what I consider to be an indefensible
policy.
That doesn’t mean that you are wrong. That means the policy is
wrong, but maybe you have done a good job in defending the policy
because that is your job. So with that said, let me just ask a few
questions about policy here.
So it is our policy, it is our Government’s policy, that information
that is received from these interrogations that we are talking about
with the Uighurs and others is classified, is not available to the
American people and to their elected Representatives outside of a
secret criteria of which we can learn the knowledge? Is that right?
Mr. LIOTTA. Under the current policy, that is correct, sir.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. So doesn’t it sound a bit absurd that
people who are elected in a democratic government to represent the
people and the interests of the people and the people themselves
are unable to have access to information because it is classified and
secret information, but it is information that we have given to the
intelligence agents of a dictatorship that hates the United States
of America?
Do you get what I mean? Chinese Communists, government offi-
cials and their agents have information and we can’t? Would you
think that is a bit absurd?
Mr. LIOTTA. Sir, I understand the frustration with that. As I
said, I am limited. I cannot single out just the Chinese, but in all
aspects of this policy.
I would be happy to provide information about that in a classi-
fied setting, recognizing the frustrations that the committee has ex-
pressed with that.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay.
Mr. LIOTTA. But again, sir, I would add to that that we are and
we remain in a war, and the information flow when a foreign dele-
gation visits isn’t just one way. It is also the other way.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. So we can trust the Communist Chinese in-
telligence agents, but we can’t trust that information would be
available to the American people because those intelligence agents
must have the interest of the American people at heart as com-
pared to elected officials by the American people?
You get the absurdity of it. All right. Fine. It is your job to argue
your case, and you have argued your case well.
As I say, I think there are some things that are very disturbing
about the actual position. Not disturbing about you, not disturbing
about the men who conducted the interrogations, not disturbing
about our military personnel. Disturbing about the policy and those
33
who actually set that policy. I am assuming that you did not set
policy and that you are a person who is here and it is your job to
explain policy.
Mr. LIOTTA. The policy regarding access was established long be-
fore I came to this position, sir.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. Well, let me ask you this. So the Inter-
national Red Cross Committee has total access to prisoners.
By the way, in the International Committee of the Red Cross, the
ICRC, is there any person in that group that is an elected official?
Mr. LIOTTA. To be honest, sir, I am not sure of the makeup of
the ICRC and where their role is, but I don’t believe so.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Yes. It is made up of people who are ap-
pointed by someone else, a private organization or an international
body, but not made up of anyone who represents people.
You know, there is a fundamental difference between our country
and other governments and agencies. In our country the power
rests with the electorate, with the people of the country, but it
seems that now you are saying the rules of the game that are poli-
cies that we are talking about would say that those people who are
elected to represent the people of the United States have no rights
in this particular area as compared to a group of unelected for-
eigners.
Mr. LIOTTA. That was not the point I was making when I re-
ferred to the ICRC. I was simply referring to our obligations under
the international preferences as they are recognized.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Right. But as you see it——
Mr. LIOTTA. But I see your point. Yes, sir.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. As you see, the policy is a group of unelected
foreigners have more rights to oversee the implementation of
American military personnel, foreign policy, dealings with this con-
flict, than do the elected Representatives of the people of the
United States.
Mr. LIOTTA. Sir, respectfully I would have to disagree that they
have more rights. The Congress has been very prolific over time in
providing us——
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, you have told us that they have abso-
lute access and we have no access, so I would say that that is giv-
ing them more authority than we have, but we will leave that for
the record as well.
Again, this is not a reflection on you and it is not a reflection on
the people who are actually having to carry out the orders that are
based on the policies that we have asserted, that we have devel-
oped for our country.
Let me note that I do not believe that it is necessary to have
counsel available, legal counsel available, during interrogations of
terrorist prisoners who are picked up on a battlefield. I don’t think
that is necessary. I disagree with my colleagues on that. I don’t
think that in wartime situations you have to go by the criminal jus-
tice rules of American citizens. I just want to make sure that is in
the record.
Let me ask you about this policy and about the things that we
have said. Again, I echo my chairman’s concern about always try-
ing to get things into classified briefings, which then for the public
that doesn’t know knows that once we have a classified briefing
34
even if we know 98 percent of what has been told us, then there
are controls on what we can say and what the American public can
know or what our opinions are of certain aspects because at that
point we can be accused of releasing classified information that
maybe everybody else knows anyway.
Male VOICE. Like the Chinese ones are going.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Like the Chinese Communist intelligence
agents.
Mr. LIOTTA. Sir, I sympathize with that position.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Yes. And let me also again reiterate I actu-
ally did not know over all these years that those U.S. Senators and
Representatives that went to Guantanamo did not have access to
the prisoners themselves to even ask them a question. I did not
know that.
I would say that had I known that, I would have paid a lot more
attention to the complaints of my Democrat and liberal colleagues
about Guantanamo if I had known that we as a body, as the elect-
ed Representatives of the American people, did not have access to
those prisoners to hear something that they might want to tell us.
Had we had access, perhaps this incident today with the Uighurs
could have been corrected a long time ago.
Mr. DELAHUNT. Would my friend yield a moment?
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Yes.
Mr. DELAHUNT. I wanted to state as a matter of record that our
request was supported by all of the Uighur detainees. Their counsel
had consulted with them. Their legal counsel had consulted with
them. Legal counsel reported back to the committee that they were
able to secure whatever waiver was necessary because those men
that according to a Bush Administration official, Assistant Sec-
retary Shriver, had been wrongly imprisoned.
Again, I want to note for the record that I respect his testimony
before this committee for that admission and that acknowledge-
ment, but I daresay that those men, those Uighurs who were inter-
rogated, intimidated and threatened by Chinese Communist secu-
rity agents, did not give their consent and were not willing, but felt
coerced to be interviewed by the agents of that repressive regime.
With that I thank the gentleman for yielding.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Again, had we had access I can imagine that
if we had been down there and one of these Uighur prisoners would
have through an interpreter told us, a Member of Congress, by the
way, we love America and we just came over here to learn how to
fight the repression that our people suffer from the Communist
Chinese Government, that would have been enough to trigger.
At least if anybody would have told me that, that would have
triggered a situation where we could have corrected this wrong a
long time ago, but instead they have had to suffer years because
of a lack of ability to talk, to have communication with elected Rep-
resentatives.
It says here the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions con-
template that a nation state should shield detainees from the pub-
lic eye to protect them from public curiosity. You are using that as
the basis for a denial of access to the elected Representatives of
this government.
35
Is that what the Defense Department believes is what elected

government is all about, public curiosity?
Mr. LIOTTA. No, sir.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. I didn’t think so. I would suggest that
is not a very good argument, but I understand you had to make
every argument that you could.
Now let us go to the policy. What I would suggest is if you cannot
answer these questions I would suggest that you answer them in
writing to us if you can. I wouldn’t expect that you would be able
to right off the top of your head be able to come up with all these
answers.
But who were the Chinese interrogators? Were they intelligence
people, or were they members of the Consul General’s Office or
something here or embassy staff in Washington?
Mr. LIOTTA. Again, Congressman, with regard to whether they
were Chinese interrogators or anyone else, I cannot talk in an un-
classified hearing about the specific instances.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. So the Chinese Communist intel-
ligence agents can know, but the American people can’t know.
I think it is the American people’s right to know things like that.
We have to keep secrets from our enemies. I understand that to-
tally, but why do we have to keep secrets from the American people
that our enemies obviously know about? So we will see.
We will go into how far we will allow the Intelligence Committee
briefing to be classified rather than try to get the people——
Mr. DELAHUNT. Again if my friend would yield? I do want to con-
sult with Ms. Eshoo and Mr. Moran and Mr. Abercrombie and
members of those because these questions are the same questions
I think we all have.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Right.
Mr. DELAHUNT. But I want to persist in being very clear that I
cannot understand why the answers to these questions should be
in a classified brief.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Right. Considering the——
Mr. DELAHUNT. I concur, and I think my colleagues do——
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Yes.
Mr. DELAHUNT [continuing]. That these answers, and, Mr. Liotta,
it shouldn’t be you that provides those answers. Clearly when this
policy was affected it was Secretary Rumsfeld.
You know, we should extend him an invitation to come before
this committee to explain that policy, and I think we have to ex-
tend an invitation to whether it is Secretary Gates or whomever
from the Obama Administration.
Are they changing this policy? Are they going to continue this
policy or are they in the process of reassessing this policy, because
I don’t think it has the support of the United States House of Rep-
resentatives.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Reclaiming my time, you say that it was
monitored. Were these Chinese personnel ever alone with the
Uighurs without American supervision? You say it was monitored.
Was it always monitored, or was there a time when they were
alone?
Mr. LIOTTA. I regret that I would not be able to answer that spe-
cific question in an unclassified setting, sir.
36
Mr. ROHRABACHER. All right. All right. And I guess all of these
other questions that I have—I will submit a list of questions. Rath-
er than taking up time now, I will submit a list of questions to you
about this, and they will be specific questions. Just rather than
take up the time of the hearing, we will just do this.
Let me just end this, my segment of this, by saying that I think
that again we are in a war with Radical Islam, and I do acknowl-
edge that we owe such a debt of gratitude for people down there.
I don’t want this ever to be thinking this in some way besmirches
the people who are down there guarding the gates so to speak and
involving themselves in the interrogation of prisoners, which is a
very incredible responsibility at a time like this when we know
that prisoners could be deeply involved in conspiracies.
You know, we found out from Ramzi Yousef. I remember that
when we captured his laptop in the Philippines that there was a
list of targets. One of the lists was Disneyland. They were going
to have poison gas and kill thousands of families at Disneyland.
Now, that is the kind of enemy we are up against. I understand
that. I take it extraordinarily seriously.
Obviously mistakes will be made in trying to prosecute such a
war. We have to admit it when those mistakes are made and be
brutally honest with ourselves and our people. We shouldn’t be
keeping secrets from our people that our enemies know because our
people need to support the policies of this conflict.
I have one last note, and that is Ramzi Yousef. I have had a re-
quest from the last Administration to see him in Federal prison. I
was denied. Mr. Chairman, I am being denied and all of us are
being denied the same access that was denied during the last Ad-
ministration and George Bush. What a horrible man, a horrible
President.
Those very same restrictions are now on us and are now being
reaffirmed in today’s testimony by this Administration. I was
against it then, and I am against it now. This is a bipartisan de-
mand that the rights of the legislative branch of government be re-
spected.
Thank you.
Mr. DELAHUNT. I thank my friend. I am going to——
Mr. LIOTTA. Mr. Chairman, may I interrupt for 1 second?
Mr. DELAHUNT. I am sorry.
Mr. LIOTTA. I just wanted to respond to the ranking member that
had to leave.
Mr. DELAHUNT. Sure.
Mr. LIOTTA. I just wanted to say, sir, thank you for your com-
ments in support of the men and women there.
I had the privilege to escort Mr. Berkowitz on a trip down to
Guantanamo, and he made the point of your support for them
when he was there. It was greatly appreciated. Thank you, sir.
Mr. DELAHUNT. I thank you, Mr. Liotta.
I am going to go to Congressman Moran since he has been wait-
ing here patiently. I will not inquire. We have 13 minutes left, and
I would like to be able to conclude with Mr. Liotta.
Our second illustrious panel is going to have to wait for approxi-
mately an hour. You could go down to the fine dining at the Ray-
burn basement, but we are eager to hear from you.
37
Mr. Moran?
Mr. MORAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. In reference
to my good friend from California’s remarks though with regard to
Ramzi Yousef, I know he would agree it is somewhat irrelevant to
the situation of the Uighurs since both the Bush and Obama Ad-
ministrations have stated for the record that they do not constitute
any threat to United States citizens, and that is what we are talk-
ing about today.
Now, Mr. Chairman, is there not an obligation on the part of wit-
nesses to respond to questions as accurately and as fully as pos-
sible? We used to have their hand and say that. We don’t do that
anymore, but certainly witnesses understand that to be the case.
Mr. DELAHUNT. Of course they do.
Mr. MORAN. Now, if a witness is deliberately evasive, chooses not
to answer a question or obviously answers a question untruthfully,
can they not be held in contempt of Congress?
Mr. DELAHUNT. That is my understanding.
Mr. MORAN. All right. Now, Mr. Liotta, let me ask you because
in listening to the chairman, Mr. Abercrombie and Mr. Rohr-
abacher my frustration continues to mount.
We all know—maybe not everybody in this room, but certainly on
this part of the dais—and you know very well because you are em-
ploying this tactic that in order not to answer a question you can
suggest it be provided in classified form.
That is not acceptable. There is no classification of that answer.
This is a manipulative, evasive tactic that you are employing. We
have no requirement to accept that.
Now, you have been asked directly were the Uighur detainees af-
forded legal representation during the interrogation by Chinese
Communist agents. Yes or no?
Mr. LIOTTA. Sir, I regret that I cannot respond in——
Mr. MORAN. Yes or no, Mr. Liotta? We are responsible to rep-
resent the interests of the American people. You are responsible to
respond accurately and fully. I am not going to accept that.
You know there is no classification of that answer. You know you
don’t want to answer it and so you are suggesting that this is
somehow classified. It is not classified. There is no legal require-
ment, no authority, no instruction to you that this is classified in-
formation.
You are using an evasive tactic. I want to know what the answer
is. Were they afforded legal counsel? Yes or no?
Mr. LIOTTA. Sir, I regret I cannot talk about the specifics of any
visit for foreign——
Mr. MORAN. Who says you can’t talk about it?
Mr. LIOTTA. Under the current policy, sir.
Mr. MORAN. Whose policy is that?
Mr. LIOTTA. Department of Defense classified policy.
Mr. MORAN. Who made the policy specifically?
Mr. LIOTTA. I don’t know specifically. I can get you the informa-
tion. It was established before I came to my position, sir.
Mr. MORAN. You have been in since July 2004. I want to know
and you need to provide us now where you get this information.
Let me tell you. You know, there are some tools we have as well,
and one of them is to eliminate funding for various offices to get
38
a point across. Now, I understand that Ms. Flournoy is a very nice

person. I have read about her policy and so on, but maybe it is time
to get this to her attention.
Why she is retaining someone that has been instrumental in sus-
taining a policy that has done more damage to our reputation and
has provided more potency to the propaganda of the enemy than
perhaps any other single policy, and that is our policy with regard
to Guantanamo. Why you are still in your position since July 2004
is beyond me, so it brings into question her judgment.
Now, we are going to mark up the Defense appropriations bill,
and unless we get a full and accurate answer now I intend to offer
an amendment to defund that office, and we will go as high as we
need to do. It will give me an opportunity. Whether I insist that
it be included in the bill or not, it will certainly give me an oppor-
tunity to explain to the entire Appropriations Committee and in
front of television cameras why this is necessary.
Now understanding the consequences of your response, do you
still maintain that that is the appropriate response?
Mr. LIOTTA. Yes, sir, I do.
Mr. DELAHUNT. Is this a defensible policy to allow Chinese intel-
ligence Communist agents to interrogate people under our control
who we have recognized are no threat to the United States without
legal counsel, to allow them to do that, not to allow United States
Members of Congress access to them and then to provide personal
information with regard to their families?
This is a defensible policy on the part of the Department of De-
fense and you are prepared to defend that policy?
Mr. LIOTTA. That is the policy that exists today. Yes, sir.
Mr. MORAN. That is the policy that exists today. Thank you. I
wanted you to be on the record on that.
One more point. Do you know what the disposition is of the fami-
lies whose identities you revealed to these Chinese Communist
agents in China? Do you know whether they have been executed
or not?
Mr. LIOTTA. Without reference to whether the Chinese visit oc-
curred, which I can’t refer to in this meeting, sir, I do not know
their disposition of the families.
I do know that we have established phone calls for the Uighurs
on a regular basis so they can call back to their families, and they
have done so successfully.
Mr. MORAN. Do you know whether they are still alive since there
have been almost 200 Uighurs executed by the Communist Chinese
Government in the last 2 to 3 weeks?
Mr. LIOTTA. I do not know the specific dispositions of their family
members with regard to——
Mr. MORAN. Do you think it is any responsibility of the Federal
Government since you revealed that information to the Chinese
Government?
Mr. LIOTTA. I don’t understand the question, sir.
Mr. MORAN. Well, do you think we have any responsibility or cul-
pability as to the welfare of those families since we revealed per-
sonal information as to who their families are?
Mr. LIOTTA. I cannot respond to questions that deal with whether
or not a Chinese visit occurred, but I will say that we have as the
39
Department of Defense undertaken and successfully been able to

achieve phone calls between the detainees and their families so
that they can stay in contact with them.
Mr. MORAN. Mr. Chairman, again we have made note of this, but
the idea that the reasons for not allowing Members of Congress to
have communication directly with detainees is concern for the safe-
ty of the detainees.
Now, you allowed intelligence agents of a foreign country to in-
terrogate them, but you are concerned about their safety and that
is why you don’t allow United States Members of Congress.
You are concerned about public curiosity. As Mr. Rohrabacher
suggested, apparently you are implying we would be seeing them
out of some public curiosity.
And then the third reason is to avoid complications with ongoing
litigation in U.S. courts. Is there any litigation with regard to these
Uighurs who have been determined by the Bush and Obama Ad-
ministrations not to be any threat to the United States citizens?
Mr. LIOTTA. There has been litigation. Yes, sir.
Mr. MORAN. With regard to these Uighur detainees, is there on-
going litigation in U.S. courts, reading from your testimony?
Mr. LIOTTA. I would defer to the Department of Justice on the
status of the ongoing litigation.
Mr. MORAN. Defer to the Department of Justice, and the Depart-
ment of Justice says they defer to you.
Mr. LIOTTA. Sir, I am deferring solely on the aspects of whether
there is ongoing litigation with them.
Mr. MORAN. Mr. Chairman, this witness, while it has been in-
formative to us to see how evasive the executive branch’s policy is,
has been singularly uncooperative and uninformative and evasive.
I would hope that we would communicate that to Secretary Gates
of the Department of Defense. To take up 2 hours of our time and
not to directly answer any of the relevant questions I think is an
absolute insult to the United States Congress.
Mr. DELAHUNT. I thank the gentleman for his line of inquiry.
Mr. Liotta, I understand that this is a difficult moment for you.
I have no doubt that you have received instructions. I also have no
doubt that you have seen the passion and the conviction of mem-
bers who have participated in this phase of the hearing.
I think there is a lot to learn in terms of the Executive’s view
of where we have been in the past in terms of this specific policy,
and I daresay that it cuts across all of the relevant committees, be-
tween Foreign Affairs, Appropriations, the Committee on the
Armed Services and the Intelligence Committee.
Again, you find yourself in a very awkward situation, and I un-
derstand that and I respect that. At the same time, I know that
you will return and report to your superiors about the passion with
which members have spoken on this issue.
It is of grave concern to us. It truly is because it is my belief and
that of Mr. Rohrabacher that much of what has been said about
the Uighurs, those that were detained, is false, is inaccurate, that
they are not terrorists, and to deny them simply on that label the
right to resettle in this country is a wrong that is a stain on our
national honor and our history as articulated by the words I quoted
from George Washington.
40
I hope that you go back to your superiors, and I know that the
Administration is working on a plan and a policy in terms of clos-
ing Guantanamo. While we ask other nations to take detainees, the
fact that we will not at this point in time it would appear accept
some detainees is unacceptable. Is unacceptable.
Americans will understand if they hear the truth. If they know
that these 22 men were innocent, were, as Secretary Shriver said,
wrongly imprisoned and that their story is a tragedy they would
welcome them, as Washington would.
Rather than simply listen to pundits and those who want to se-
cure political advantage by fear mongering, let us just do the right
thing in this matter. That is the message I want you to take back
to the executive branch.
Congresswoman Eshoo and Mr. Carnahan, do you have anything
to add?
Mr. ESHOO. Mr. Chairman, I would just like to thank you for
your legislative courtesy in inviting me to this hearing. It has been
instructive.
What I also want to extend to you is the full hand of cooperation
of the House Intelligence Committee should you need it. I think the
whole question of what is classified, why it was classified, has real-
ly not been established very well, at least not in terms of what I
have heard, with all due respect to the witness.
I think it would be very important to understand (A) who actu-
ally employed the statute to classified and the reason for it, which
I don’t think has been established here.
Mr. DELAHUNT. Correct.
Mr. ESHOO. And how we allow foreign intelligence services into
our operations; of all foreign intelligence services the PRC.
We have done a lot of work with foreign countries. I just left an
Italian delegation who works with the United States so coopera-
tively.
I am not aware of a great and high level of cooperation with the
PRC intelligence services and the United States of America, so why
we would entrust them to be in charge of U.S. detainees is a huge
question.
Mr. DELAHUNT. And subsequently label them as terrorists, a mi-
nority that we have prosecuted, and we accept their information at
least in part and put the label of terrorist on these men whom, as
Secretary Shriver said, were wrongfully imprisoned and now some
would incite the fears that American people legitimately have and
deny them the right to be paroled into the United States while we
ask other nations to take them. That is not our America.
Mr. ESHOO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Carnahan?
Mr. ESHOO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. CARNAHAN. I know we have votes, but I just want to add my
thanks to you, Mr. Chairman, to our colleagues from other commit-
tees in this Congress.
I think the witness and those watching this understand just how
serious the Members of Congress take this and how we need to get
to the bottom of this and find a solution.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you, Mr. Carnahan.
41
Mr. Liotta, thank you. Thanks for the forbearance, the courage.
You can bring the message back. I want you to know that I know
how difficult your task is, and I respect you for it. You are excused.
We shall return in about 1 hour and look forward to the testi-
mony from the other three witnesses.
[Recess.]
Mr. DELAHUNT. The committee will come to order again. Let me
express my apologies and my gratitude for your indulgence.
This is an important panel. I have read your testimony, and I
think it is important that as we build a record of what occurred
with the 22 Uighurs I think it is important that those who may be
viewing this, whether it is C–SPAN or some other outlet, and clear-
ly the committee will have a transcript available. I really do mean
it when I say that your written statements were apropos, very in-
formative, and I believe we are beginning to peel the skin off this
onion.
It is painstaking at times, but clearly I can tell from the con-
versations with my colleagues that interest is emerging not only in
terms of the treatment of the Uighurs and the fact that they were
wrongly imprisoned—and, as Secretary Shriver said, their story is
a tragic one—but also the issue of classification and government se-
crecy. There is a growing concern on the part of Members of Con-
gress. I wish that concern had arrived at an earlier date. Maybe
we wouldn’t be here today.
But in any event, let me introduce for the record our second
panel. The first witness will be Jason Pinney. He is an attorney
with Bingham McCutchen in Boston. He, along with a team of law-
yers from that firm, represent a number of former and current
Uighur detainees at Guantanamo on a pro bono basis.
I want to recognize in the audience Susan Baker Manning, who
also has made a magnificent contribution to the rule of law.
His billable work—I don’t know whether he has time for billable
work, but when he is earning his living he focuses on general, com-
mercial and securities litigation. He regularly advises clients on a
number of business matters, including class actions, shareholder
suits and securities arbitration. He is a graduate of Union College
and attended Boston College Law School where I graduated from
as well a few years before you did, Jason.
I am also very pleased once again to welcome my friend, Bruce
Fein, as a panelist. He is a nationally and internationally re-
nowned constitutional lawyer, scholar and writer, served as both
Associate Deputy Attorney General for the Justice Department and
General Counsel for the Federal Communications Commission
under President Reagan. He later served as legal advisor to then
Congressman Dick Cheney on the Joint Committee on Covert Arms
Sales to Iran.
Mr. Fein is the founding partner of Bruce Fein & Associates and
is currently writing a sequel to his recent book, Constitutional
Peril.
Finally, I am happy to welcome Tom Parker of Amnesty Inter-
national. He is the policy director for tourism, counter-terrorism
and human rights at Amnesty. He was previously executive direc-
tor of the Iran Human Rights Documentation Center in New
Haven, Connecticut, and has worked extensively during the past 5
42
years as a consultant on post conflict justice issues for clients such

as USAID and the MacArthur Foundation.
In 2003 to 2004, he served with the Coalition Provisional Author-
ity in Iraq as the head of the Crimes Against Humanity Investiga-
tion Unit. He spent 4 years as a war crimes investigator with the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and 6
years as a counterterrorist official with the British Government. He
holds degrees from the London School of Economics, the University
of Leiden and Brown.
It is a pleasure to welcome such a distinguished group of wit-
nesses, and why don’t we proceed first with Mr. Pinney?
Mr. PINNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. DELAHUNT. Jason, can you make sure you hit that?
Mr. PINNEY. Yes. There we go. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. May
it please the subcommittee, though.
Mr. Fein I believe has a time commitment of concern, so if we
could defer to him I think that would accommodate the schedule.
Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you for your courtesy.
Bruce?
Mr. FEIN. I have to leave at 2:35 or something like that. Maybe
it won’t be necessary to curtail the full explication.
STATEMENT OF BRUCE FEIN, ESQ., PRINCIPAL, THE
LITCHFIELD GROUP
Mr. FEIN. I want to address the points that I made in my written
testimony that I guess have been submitted to the record because
I think the Uighurs are a symptom rather than an aberration here
of what has gone wrong with the United States not only post 9/11,
but previously.
The oversight function of Congress has been crippled. It is not
just the lack of access for interviews, the withholding of informa-
tion that should be reported to the Intelligence Committees, the in-
vocation of state secrets, repeatedly keeping Congress in the dark,
so there are no checks and balances.
What I would like to do in my oral testimony here is to explain
what I think can be institutional remedies to ensure that not only
will we uncover what exactly happened with regard to the Uighurs.
How did the Chinese Community security services get access? Who
gave them access? Was it in exchange for a deal that the Chinese
Communists would not veto our U.N. Security Council proposal to
invade Iraq or otherwise?
Those things linger, and I think I would suggest that the Con-
gress consider the power of the purse as being really the jug-
gernaut that enables them to get access to anything they want. For
instance, what about, Mr. Chairman, access to detainees to inter-
view?
If you passed a law that simply said no monies of the United
States shall be expended to detain any person at Guantanamo Bay
who is withheld from an interview with a Member of Congress,
that then ends the issue of whether or not they can withhold per-
mission for you to visit. If they do, they cannot then detain that
individual anymore. Put the Administration in the position of say-
ing we have let go the worst of the worst because we don’t trust
your elected officials to interview these people.
43
That is the kind of muscular effort that in my earlier years in

Washington I saw exercised. For instance, the 1970s when there
was complaints about the CIA’s covert operations in Angola. The
Congress simply passed a statute. There is no money for the CIA
to fund any covert operations in Angola, and that was the end of
the matter. So that is one thing that I think is exceptionally impor-
tant.
Also, I think that it was the testimony today by the witness for
the Defense Department that I think reveals this psychology of Ex-
ecutive supremacy that is so dangerous to our institutions, the
checks and balances to the ability to know what is going on, to sug-
gest there may be wrongdoing or need for change not only because
of the individuals involved, but because what we do also sets a
precedent for what the other countries may do to our prisoners, our
detainees, if we are captured and we don’t want to give license to
having happen to our American citizens what we may be doing to
detainees from other countries.
But let us look and see what the considerations that the Defense
Department officials said in forming their decision whether to
grant access for an interview or otherwise. First he says to ensure
the safety of the detainees. Well, remember it is up to the Congress
to decide what is the relative tradeoff between the need for open-
ness and access in order to detect abuses and what the risk to the
detainee.
It is also somewhat odd that they would identify this as a consid-
eration since by exposing the Uighurs to the Chinese security serv-
ices they were creating a danger to the detainee and the family,
not the other way around. So this is rather an Orwellian concept
that only had credibility because the individual claimed classified
information prevented him from answering directly what was done
and what kind of information was given to the security services
from the People’s Republic of China.
Now, the second consideration is to shield detainees from public
curiosity to remain consistent with the Geneva Conventions. Now,
I guess it is laudatory that now there seems to be a newfound scru-
pulousness toward compliance with the Geneva Conventions when
before it didn’t apply at all. Common Article I didn’t prevent tor-
ture or inhumane, degrading treatment of detainees.
But again, this comes back to the question of which branch of
government makes this policy. There is assumption that the execu-
tive branch decides anything and you then are beholden to what-
ever they decide. The Congress of the United States decides wheth-
er or not that privacy interest justifies withholding sunshine, and
we know that sunshine is the best disinfectant. That was a phrase
Louis Brandeis fashioned well over a century ago.
But this suggestion that it is up to the executive branch to make
that tradeoff totally misconceives the Constitution of the United
States. And then it says there is a third consideration here, and
this relates to litigation. Well, we need to decide whether or not ac-
cess would impair our ability to defend particular interests in liti-
gation.
There were two kinds of litigation that were mentioned this
morning, Mr. Chairman. One was habeas corpus proceedings. Well,
you will recall that habeas corpus was resisted and denied, anyone
44
at Guantanamo Bay, until the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in the

Boumediene case, which was a year ago.
So this policy as crafted in 2002, 2003, were years before habeas
corpus was available and was over the dead bodies of the Defense
Department, not something that they welcomed in any event.
Now, the second category of cases that he was referring to was
military commissions. Now, military commissions are tried by mili-
tary personnel. He was insinuating the Department of Justice tries
those cases, but that is wrong.
Now, there have been a grand total of three out of all the detain-
ees, three military commission trials, and the vast majority of those
at Guantanamo Bay the Administration has said are not going to
be headed for military commission. I think the high water mark of
the number who might be tried was going to be 20.
So how does that apply to all the others who are not subject to
any conceivable military commission trial? It just shows that this
seemed like a concocted argument. In any event, it is up to the
Congress of the United States to decide what risks you will have
to litigation that are a tradeoff for the openness that you want in
order to prevent abuses.
Congress has done that with the Intelligence Secrets Act, which
decides what kind of information has to be disclosed to the defend-
ant if you are going to have a trial and if you withhold others
which will end up in an ending of the prosecution because that de-
nies the individual a fair trial.
But I think Congress has to step up to the plate here. It is not
going to be good enough just on can this individual get waivers, get
them to tell you in public what happened to the Uighurs. There
will be a second group of Uighurs in another 2 or 3 weeks’ time
unless institutionally you have access.
Just the threat, just the knowledge down there in Guantanamo
that Mr. Delahunt can come down and look and interview these
people at any time, that will have an enormous deterrent effect be-
fore anything happens whatsoever.
It was President Reagan who said trust, but verify, and that is
something that was needed not only with regard to the Soviet
Union at the time, but all branches of government. What I found
most disturbing about the Defense Department is that they view
the Congress of the American people as their enemy, their adver-
sary in this process.
I remember Robert Jackson, the Associate Justice, writing in the
Youngstown Sheet & Tube case the Constitution certainly antici-
pates a separation of power, a diffusion of power, but also some
kind of integration, some kind of comity, because the fact is if you
have that attitude of an enemy or an adversary or relationship be-
tween the branches the whole system will shut down.
There would be an ability, for example, of the Congress to totally
enfeeble the Executive. Just don’t appropriate any money. If you
want to shut down the White House, the Patorian guards, say
there is only money for the President’s salary. Nothing else.
That obviously contradicts the whole purpose of having a sepa-
rate branch of government, just like it would be the ability of the
President to say we are going to shut down the Judiciary. Do you
know why? I won’t nominate anybody to fill vacancies. Then there
45
can’t be a Judiciary. So there has to be some kind of comity and

understanding that you have to work in some sense together as an
integrated whole if the whole system is going to work
I would be delighted to amplify on these particular proposals, but
I want to underscore my view. You have to change the whole struc-
tural way in which we conduct our operations openly if we are
going to prevent these abuses.
Transparency should be the rule. There should be a huge hurdle
to deny transparency. Right now it is the opposite. The rule is se-
crecy, and it is like we make an exception to give you knowledge.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Fein follows:]
46
51104c-1.eps
47
51104c-2.eps
48
51104c-3.eps
49
51104c-4.eps
50
Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you, Mr. Fein. You echo my own senti-
ments.
I would suggest, and we will go to Mr. Pinney in 30 seconds, that
is more than just simply structural, but I think what has evolved,
and let me be very clear, under the Bush-Cheney Administration
is this penchant for lack of transparency and secrecy not just in
issues such as this, but on every single issue.
The head of the National Archives—I forget his name; I am sure
you know it—commented on the overclassification of government
documents. It is cultural, you know. And I have great hope that the
Obama Administration will begin to erode that curtain of secrecy.
Clearly there are remnants of that culture that are still very
much embedded into the mindset, if you will, of many in the execu-
tive branch, but I think you probably observed today the fact that
the lack of transparency and overclassification is a festering sore
for many in the first branch of government.
As you and I have discussed, I think it is really important that
we begin to restore the appropriate role of the U.S. Congress in our
constitutional scheme. So we will continue to move in that direc-
tion, and I am aware that it is going to be an effort of long duration
and tedious and at times frustrating, but I can’t agree more.
Jason?
STATEMENT OF JASON PINNEY, ESQ., COUNSEL TO UIGHUR
DETAINEES, BINGHAM MCCUTCHEN, LLP
Mr. PINNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. At this point I would
like to read my written testimony into the record.
My name is Jason Pinney, and I am an attorney with Bingham
McCutchen in Boston, Massachusetts. First I would like to begin
by thanking the subcommittee for holding these hearings con-
cerning the continuing detention of the Uighurs at Guantanamo.
Although these men have long been cleared of any wrongdoing,
it is unclear why they were ever labeled as enemy combatants in
the first place. As Justice Brandeis famously remarked and as Mr.
Fein just reminded us, sunlight is the best of disinfectants.
For the past 4 years I have been part of a team at Bingham
McCutchen that has represented on a pro bono basis as many as
11 of the 22 Uighurs imprisoned at Guantanamo. None of these
men are enemy combatants, and there has never been any justifica-
tion for holding them.
Thirteen Uighurs are still imprisoned at Guantanamo today.
They remain there this afternoon. They remain there because no
country, including our own, has the courage to stand up to the Chi-
nese and offer them refuge.
The problem, however, goes far beyond our failure to resettle
these men. An objective look at the evidence reveals that our coun-
try imprisoned the Uighurs as part of a quid pro quo with China.
China, as Mr. Fein mentioned, is one of the five countries on the
United Nations Security Council. In 2002 and 2003, we needed
China’s support in order to invade Iraq. In exchange for Chinese
acquiescence in our war plans, we agreed, among other things, to
label the Uighurs as terrorists and to house then at Guantanamo.
What is more, we agreed to provide the Chinese with special and
unprecedented access to the Uighur men. In September 2002, we
51
allowed a delegation from the Communist Chinese Government to

travel to Guantanamo and interrogate the Uighurs imprisoned
there. The interrogations lasted for days.
Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Pinney, let me interrupt you for a moment.
At any time did any representative of the U.S. Government con-
tact you or any other attorney, counsel to any of these Uighurs, if
you know, seeking your consent that Chinese Communist agents
interview your clients?
Mr. PINNEY. No, we were never contacted, nor, as you heard from
the gentleman from the Department of Defense this morning, do
they even confirm that the Chinese visited our clients at Guanta-
namo.
Mr. DELAHUNT. But your clients have informed you that in fact
their interrogation back in September 2002 in fact occurred?
Mr. PINNEY. That is correct. In addition, we have uncovered
other government documents that have confirmed the visit, so we
have absolutely no doubt that the visit occurred.
Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you. Proceed.
Mr. PINNEY. No representative from the United States was
present during these interrogations. In the history of our republic,
I cannot think of another example where a Communist country was
invited to interrogate unsupervised prisoners of the United States
in a United States detention facility.
Despite our best efforts as counsel, no one has been permitted to
meet with our clients at Guantanamo. The United Nations has
been barred from meeting with the Uighurs. So have several
human rights groups. The press has been denied permission to
speak with the men or to publish pictures of their faces.
Even members of this subcommittee, as you well know, Mr.
Chairman, have been denied access to the Uighurs despite the per-
mission of counsel and the desire of our clients to meet with you.
It makes no difference that they are innocent men. The answer has
always been the same. No contact has been allowed.
The exception to this rule is the Chinese visit in September 2002.
At that time our country permitted a delegation from the People’s
Republic of China to travel to Guantanamo and interrogate all 22
Uighurs held at the prison. Prior to the interrogations, the Ameri-
cans, as you said earlier, Mr. Chairman, softened up the men by
denying them sleep and in some cases food.
Our Government also provided the Chinese interrogators with
copies of the Uighurs’ files, personal files with family information,
despite prior assurances to the men that the information would
never be shared with their Chinese oppressors.
Mr. DELAHUNT. Let me interrupt you there. Your testimony is
today that you were told by clients that you represented that they
had been reassured that information regarding their family and
their identity would not be shared with the Communist Chinese
intel agents? Am I repeating what your testimony is accurately?
Mr. PINNEY. That is correct, Mr. Chairman. When our clients
were picked up it was very important to them, given the prior con-
duct of the Chinese regime to do harm to family members of polit-
ical dissidents. It was very important to them to keep that informa-
tion confidential.
52
They agreed to share that information with our military on the

condition that it was not shared with the Chinese. That promise
was broken in September 2002.
Mr. DELAHUNT. In fact, they had fled their homeland because
they feared persecution by the Chinese Communist regime. Is that
what you have been informed by your clients?
Mr. PINNEY. That is correct. Many of our clients fled Chinese op-
pression that began in the late 1990s and continues to this past
July 4 holiday.
Mr. DELAHUNT. Please proceed.
Mr. PINNEY. Many of our clients have said that these interroga-
tions were the hardest thing they had to endure during their 7
years of incarceration at Guantanamo.
The Chinese made threats against their family and threats
against the men themselves. Each of the Uighurs was told that he
would be sent back to China and imprisoned or worse. The men
were petrified what would happen to themselves and their family
members if the Chinese carried out on their threats.
They were also subjected to stress techniques such as forced sit-
ting for many hours in a cold room, hands bound together, legs
shackled to the floor. Some of this mistreatment appears to have
been administered by United States military personnel at the in-
struction of the Chinese.
All of this would not be possible without the support and co-
operation of the United States. Military personnel went as far as
forcefully holding up my clients’ heads by the hair and by the beard
so that the Chinese could take their picture.
Statements from our clients’ Combatant Status Review Tribunal
transcripts exemplify the Uighurs’ experiences at the hands of the
Communist Chinese interrogators. Remarkably, these CSRT state-
ments were all made in response to direct questions from Tribunal
panel members.
Sometimes it was the first question that these Tribunal panel
members asked during our clients’ hearings. It appears that some
of the military officers at least were concerned about this Chinese
visit way back in 2004 when these hearings were held.
There are several examples from the CSRT transcripts that I can
cite. I would like to share one with you today, and then I would
like to talk a little about some statements that my clients made
just recently and we have submitted into this subcommittee’s
record.
Salahidin Abdulahat, who is one of my clients now in Bermuda,
described to his Combatant Status Review Tribunal how he was
forcefully interrogated, threatened and deprived of sleep and food
by the Chinese delegation. Furthermore, he described how, ‘‘There
was an American person representing the President’s house,’’ who
threatened to send him back to China if he did not cooperate with
the Chinese delegation.
He said that the Chinese ‘‘took our picture forcefully and re-
corded our voices and threatened to hit us and do other things.’’ He
pleaded with the CSRT panel to ‘‘not let those things happen to us
again because it would hurt us really bad.’’
Most of the Uighurs refused to cooperate with the Chinese inter-
rogators in September 2002. As punishment, the Americans put all
53
but two of them in solitary confinement for up to 20 days. No light,

no air, no human contact.
I asked three of my clients prior to testifying here today to de-
scribe their interrogation experiences in greater detail. Abu Bakker
Qassim, who is now in Albania, Ablikim Turahun, who is now in
Bermuda, and Khalil Mamut, who is also in Bermuda, have all
submitted written statements to the subcommittee. I would like to
take a brief moment to highlight a few excerpts from these state-
ments.
First is from the statement of Mr. Qassim. Mr. Qassim was re-
leased into Albania in 2006 along with four other Uighurs. Picking
up in the middle:
‘‘After I refused to answer any more questions, the Chinese
interrogators failed to proceed further. They brought out their
camera to take a picture. I refused to be photographed. One
Chinese interrogator went outside and brought in two Amer-
ican soldiers. These two soldiers held me tight, and the Chi-
nese forcefully took a picture of me. I had never thought that
American soldiers would work with Chinese and treat us like
this.
‘‘Then I was locked in a cold, dark steel prison cell for 5
days. I was released to a regular prison cell after the Chinese
left. During the 5 days when I was in the cold, dark cell, while
thinking about the Chinese harsh treatment toward us in a
U.S. prison, I felt sick with the American soldiers.
‘‘After the Chinese had left, during an interrogation I asked
the interrogators why they released all of our materials to the
Chinese, even though they had promised to keep our informa-
tion confidential. The Chinese could now randomly oppress our
family members. The interrogators did not feel a bit ashamed
about it. They apologized by saying that someone in Wash-
ington had given our materials to the Chinese.’’
Now, Mr. Chairman, I would like to read a brief excerpt from the
statement of Khalil Mamut:
‘‘In the beginning of autumn of 2002, a delegation from
China representing the Chinese Government arrived. It was
afternoon when I was informed by one of the MPs that I was
to get ready for an appointment. I was later escorted by two
military soldiers to the interrogation room.
‘‘Once I arrived there, two men came in. One was from the
American Government, and the other was from the Communist
Chinese Government. The American spoke Chinese, saying I
am from the American Government, and we have an agree-
ment with the Chinese Government. Therefore, we have al-
lowed them to come here to interrogate you. The Uighur man
translated the American man’s instructions into our language.
‘‘After the introduction, the Americans departed. Following
their departure, two different men arrived. One looked Uighur
and the other Chinese. They abused me by telling me that they
would take me by force when I returned to China and I would
be beaten and eventually killed. I informed them that I do not
wish to go back to China. Then they became even angrier, and
they attempted to take my picture. I refused to allow them to
54
do this. However, they were eventually able to take some pic-

tures as I was shackled and chained.
‘‘Then the two men ordered the American soldiers to take me
to another room. Once I arrived at this new location the air
conditioning unit was turned onto full blast and I was left in
this room for 7 straight hours. The room became extremely
cold. In this room I once again had shackles on my feet with
my hands also chained. In the evening I was returned to my
cell.’’
Mr. Chairman, if I could one more brief statement from——
Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Pinney, let me ask you a question on that
last recitation. It was the Chinese Communist agents that in-
structed the American military personnel to take your client to an-
other room?
Mr. PINNEY. That is correct. Mr. Chairman, there is a report
issued by the FBI last year that confirms that American military
personnel operated under the instruction of the Chinese in abusing
our clients during this visit.
Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you. Proceed.
Mr. PINNEY. Finally, I would like to read a brief excerpt from the
statement of Mr. Turahun:
‘‘They called for American soldiers and ordered them to hold
me so that my picture could be taken. The soldiers grabbed me,
pulled my beard, pressing my throat, twisting my hands be-
hind my back, and as a result my picture was taken by force.
‘‘The air conditioner in the room was placed on high, making
the room very cold. I was left in this room for 6 hours. As a
result of the room being so very cold, I felt somewhat frozen
at times.
‘‘After this 6 hour period I was placed in an isolation room
that was made of metal and measured six feet by eight feet.
There I remained for 20 days in isolation. The room was so
very cold and dark. I was not able to see daylight or another
person. During the 20 days it was very difficult to sleep be-
cause I was not given any blankets or sheets by which to cover
myself in this isolation room. I spent those days suffering.
‘‘I requested to speak to the Uighur interpreter so that he
could translate to the guard commander. I wanted to speak to
the commander, asking him why I had been placed here. The
commander replied that it was not his decision, but that of the
Chinese delegation, who instructed that I should be put in iso-
lation. Following this the interpreter and guard commander
departed.’’
Mr. Chairman, to allow the Chinese in to interrogate the
Uighurs is not like allowing the British, for example, to meet with
their citizens at Guantanamo. England is an American ally. It is
a democracy that promotes liberty and, most importantly, it does
not have a long and well recorded history of torturing and oppress-
ing its Muslim citizens.
China has an abysmal human rights record generally and when
it comes to the Uighurs specifically, everything from forced abor-
tions to torture to execution for ideological dissent. The sub-
committee has already heard testimony on these abuses.
55
Moreover, it has been widely acknowledged that the Chinese

have used the so-called war on terror as a pretext for abusing the
Uighurs. Our own State Department has concluded that, and I
quote:
‘‘The Chinese Government used the international war on ter-
ror as a justification for cracking down harshly on suspected
Uighur separatists expressing peaceful political dissent on
independent Muslim leaders. Uighurs were executed and sen-
tenced to long prison terms during the years on charges of sep-
aratism.’’
In allowing the Chinese to interrogate the Uighurs then, Mr.
Chairman, we by extension aided in the persecution of these men.
To more fully understand the significance of the Chinese visit to
Guantanamo it must be viewed in context. When the pieces of the
puzzle are put together it appears that our country, as Mr. Fein
suggested earlier, made a deal with China. As part of the deal we
agreed to label the men as terrorists. In exchange, the Chinese
agreed not to oppose our invasion of Iraq.
In my written testimony I have included a detailed chronology.
I would just like to pick a few points from this. (1) After 9/11, the
Chinese Government announced their intent to encourage the
international community to view these East Turkistan organiza-
tions as terrorist organizations.
On December 6, 2001, the United States refused to label the East
Turkistan Movement as a terrorist organization. Francis Taylor
made the following statement: ‘‘The U.S. has not designated or con-
siders the East Turkistan organization as a terrorist organization.’’
That was December 6, 2001.
On August 26, 2002, after Deputy Secretary of State Richard
Armitage met with senior Chinese officials in Beijing to discuss the
invasion of Iraq, he immediately announced from Beijing that a
group called the ‘‘East Turkistan Islamic Movement’’ will be placed
on the State Department’s list of terrorist organizations.
The next month, Mr. Chairman, a Chinese delegation was al-
lowed to visit our clients in Guantanamo and forcefully interrogate
them over a period of 10 days. The next month the Chinese Presi-
dent at the time, President Zemin, traveled to Texas to meet with
our own President, George W. Bush. Two months later, an FBI re-
port confirmed that the Uighurs were being used as a pawn in
order to gain support from the Chinese for our invasion of Iraq.
This is a quote from an unnamed FBI agent in an FBI report
dated December 2002:
‘‘U.S. officials are considering whether to return the Uighurs to
the Chinese, possibly to gain support for the anticipated U.S.
action in the Middle East. The Uighur detainees at Guanta-
namo are convinced that they would be immediately executed
if they are returned to China.’’
And the last item I would like to point out from the chronology
is a May 2008 FBI report that I referenced earlier. This is the re-
port, from our perspective, that confirms the Chinese visit to Guan-
tanamo. A Department of Justice report confirms that ‘‘several
56
Uighur detainees were subjected to sleep deprivation or disruption

while being interrogated at Camp X-Ray by Chinese officials.’’
And as one agent noted, ‘‘The treatment of the Uighur detainees
was either carried out by the Chinese interrogators themselves or,’’
Mr. Chairman, ‘‘was carried out by U.S. military personnel at the
behest of the Chinese interrogators.’’
So what does this all mean? I think it means that our country
sacrificed a small, oppressed minority in order to win the support
of the Communist Chinese Government for our invasion of Iraq. In
doing so, America turned its back on the values and freedoms that
serve as the bedrock of our republic. We should have been offering
to help the Uighurs in their struggle against the oppression. In-
stead we sacrificed them to advance our own interests.
I think we can do better. We have the strength and character as
a nation to stand up to countries that persecute their citizens and
smother liberty. We are strong enough to withstand the Chinese
pressure. We are capable of doing the right thing.
According to the Chinese, the lonely man who confronted a tank
in Tiananmen Square 20 years ago is a terrorist. So is the Dalai
Lama. So is Rebiya Kadeer and so is the old Uighur woman armed
only with a cane—she needs to walk—who stood alone against the
Chinese Army in Urumqi less than 2 weeks ago, and yet our own
Government has yielded to this Chinese propaganda not just in
2002, but also, Mr. Chairman, in 2009.
I am sad to say that many Members of this Congress embraced
the lies when they lobbied against the release of the Uighurs, our
clients and others, into the United States earlier this year. Four of
these Uighurs, as we have mentioned, are free men in Bermuda
today. They are peaceful and law abiding.
But, as unimaginable as it is to say, 13 of their Uighur brothers,
brave dissidents from the leading Communist power, long cleared
by the American military, both the Bush and Obama Administra-
tions and by several U.S. courts, these men remain prisoners of the
propaganda machine that has beguiled two Presidents, the Con-
gress and the American people.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for this opportunity to speak with you
and the members of the subcommittee, and thank you for your dili-
gent efforts to uncover the truth behind the imprisonment of the
Uighurs at Guantanamo.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Pinney follows:]
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Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you, Mr. Pinney. Let me just note that
the Obama Administration of course is designing a plan in terms
of dealing with those who have been cleared for release, and I hope
they have an opportunity to read the words of George Washington
and to examine the transcripts of these hearings that we have held
and offer to the remaining Uighurs an opportunity to resettle in
the United States so that we can reclaim our moral authority de-
spite what has occurred in the past.
Mr. FEIN. If I could interject, Mr. Chairman? You remember the
Congress passed the Military Commissions Act of 2006, a quite dis-
graceful statute, but it was a statute.
I would suggest that Congress may want to consider stealing a
march on time on the Obama Administration. By statute you clear-
ly have authority to dictate those Uighur detainees come to the
United States of America. It could be one of the Congress’ finest
hours.
You don’t need to wait. You didn’t wait on the Military Commis-
sions Act. You don’t need to wait now.
Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you, Mr. Fein.
Mr. Parker, you are our cleanup hitter, so to speak.
Mr. PARKER. I only wish I knew what that meant.
Mr. DELAHUNT. It is a term we use in Red Sox Nation. You prob-
ably have not heard that. Well, I am sure you have heard the term
Red Sox Nation.
Mr. PARKER. Red Sox Nation I have. Having lived in New Haven,
Connecticut, I have heard of this team they call Red Sox.
STATEMENT OF MR. TOM PARKER, POLICY DIRECTOR,

COUNTER-TERRORISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS, AMNESTY
INTERNATIONAL USA
Mr. PARKER. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for the oppor-
tunity to testify here today. It is an honor to address the sub-
committee on such an important issue and to share my organiza-
tion’s thoughts on the plight of the Uighurs and the implications
for an effective national security policy.
I would like to address several points in my testimony: The na-
ture of human rights conditions in Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous
Region, the security situation there, and the interrogation of
Uighur detainees at the Guantanamo Bay detention facility.
Amnesty International views with sadness and great concern the
recent ethnic violence in Xinjiang, which has been one of the worst
outbreaks of violence in China in recent years. Violence has once
again placed this region in the headlines, but the causes and
human rights conditions that underlie these riots have been devel-
oping for decades, both from the fundamental conditions that exist
in the region and the policies and programs and reactions of the
central and local government in the XUAR.
The recent violence is not an isolated event, but part of a wider
story. In 1955, the People’s Republic of China established the
Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region in recognition of the Uighurs’
predominance in the region, a status that according to the Chinese
constitution entitles ethnic minorities to organs of self-government
in order to exercise autonomy.
64
According to the latest Chinese census, in 2000 there were more

than 18 million people living in the Autonomous Region, of whom
47 percent are Uighurs, 40 percent Han Chinese and 12 percent
from other ethnic groups. The Han Chinese population has in-
creased significantly from an estimated 6 percent in 1949 due to
central government policies that include providing financial incen-
tives for Han Chinese to migrate to the region.
This sustained influx of Han Chinese migrants into the region
has contributed to the destruction of local customs and, together
with employment discrimination, has fueled discontent and ethnic
tension.
On paper, Islam is one of the official religions of China and peo-
ple are accorded special privileges because of their cultural back-
ground, but in reality the government has pursued a policy of un-
dercutting the Uighurs’ cultural, linguistic and religious life.
According to one of our organization’s reports, in 2009 the au-
thorities still maintain a tight control of the mosques and religious
clergy, intervening in the appointment of local imams, stationing
police within and outside mosques and closely monitoring all reli-
gious activities.
Government employees in the Autonomous Region, including
teachers, police officers, state enterprise workers and civil servants,
risk losing their jobs if they engage in religious activity.
Chinese authorities have also put many obstacles in the way of
Uighurs attempting to make the pilgrimage to Mecca, the Hajj,
which is a requirement for all practicing Muslims. Children under
the age of 18 are not allowed to enter mosques or receive any sort
of religious education. Many young Uighurs are afraid that if they
do enter a mosque that they will be expelled from school.
A supposedly bilingual education system in fact actually makes
Mandarin the sole language of instruction and is steadily under-
mining the foundations of Uighur culture.
The post-Mao era in the 1980s liberalized policy throughout
China, allowing citizens greater freedom, including some freedom
of religion and expression, and strengthened legal protections.
However, since the mid 1990s Uighurs have experienced a sharp
reversal in this policy as authorities have embarked on a very ag-
gressive campaign against what have been termed the three evils:
Terrorism, separatism and religious extremism.
As a result, increased numbers of Uighurs have been subjected
to arbitrary arrests, unfair trials and torture, and their economic,
social and cultural rights have been slowly eroded. This has wors-
ened since 9/11 as the authorities have cast Uighur discontent
within the framework of international terrorism. Most academics
and other observers consider these claims to be unsubstantiated.
In 2008, the authorities used a series of violent incidents alleg-
edly carried out by Uighur separatist groups as a pretext for
launching a sweeping crackdown population in the Xinjiang Auton-
omous Region. According to the official media, almost 1,300 people
were arrested in 2008 on state security charges that included ter-
rorism, separatism and religious extremism and 1,154 were for-
mally charged and faced trials or administered punishments.
On August 14 last year, Wang Lequan, the Communist Party
Secretary of the Autonomous Region, announced a life and death
65
struggle, his words, against Uighur separatism. Currently there

are thousands of Uighur political prisoners imprisoned in China
without charge or trial or after unfair trials. Torture is common-
place, and statements extracted through torture are used to convict
Uighurs, including convicting them of the death penalty.
Coercive methods reportedly used by the Chinese public security
agents include physical beatings, prodding people with electric
shock batons, the insertion of needles under fingernails and the use
of stress positions.
Shahir Ali is a young Uighur or was a young Uighur political ac-
tivist who fled from China to Nepal in 2000. He was forcibly re-
turned to China by the Nepalese authorities in 2002. He was tried
and sentenced to death in 2003 for the crimes of separatism, orga-
nizing and leading a terrorist organization and the illegal manufac-
ture, trading and possession of weapons and explosives.
The evidence was presented in a secret case. None of this evi-
dence has ever been made public, but there is no independent in-
formation to suggest that Ali was involved in terrorist activities of
any nature.
His circumstances are broadly similar, we would suggest, to
those of the Uighurs currently held in Guantanamo, and one might
reasonably expect that if they were returned to China they would
share Ali’s fate.
Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Parker, are you aware of a statement by the
former Speaker of the House of Representatives, Mr. Gingrich?
Mr. PARKER. You would have to elaborate further, sir.
Mr. DELAHUNT. Well, recently, within the past several months,
he made the statement that the Uighurs are not an American prob-
lem and they should be sent back to China.
Would you care to make a comment on that particular state-
ment?
Mr. PARKER. Well, if you send them back to China you could
quite literally be signing their death warrant.
Mr. DELAHUNT. In your opinion, and I would solicit comments
from our other two panelists, if the United States should send
them back to China, if they followed the wishes of Mr. Gingrich,
would it violate domestic law and would it contradict our treaty ob-
ligations under the Convention Against Torture?
Mr. PARKER. With two distinguished legal colleagues on the
panel, I won’t talk about American law, but the principle of non-
refoulement is an international custom or international principle
which states you do not return people to face torture or inhumane
or degrading treatment, so, yes, it would be a violation of inter-
national law.
Mr. FEIN. It would be a violation of United States law as well.
It is one of the reasons why we haven’t sent the Uighurs back to
China.
In fact, the State Department has publicly stated that they fear
that they would be tortured or killed, so that is the official position
of the United States Government as well.
Mr. DELAHUNT. Then I would obviously conclude that Mr. Ging-
rich was ignorant of the realities affecting the Uighurs and was un-
aware of the treaty obligations, as well as domestic law.
You can continue to proceed, Mr. Parker.
66
Mr. PARKER. It is against this underlying set of conditions that

we have to view the current situation for the Uighur detainees still
at Guantanamo. No other group of prisoners was so clearly wrongly
apprehended and detained, reportedly sold to United States forces
for a bounty of $5,000 per person after they fled from the village
that they were living in in Afghanistan.
Soon after they were picked up in 2002, our own intelligence and
security personnel concluded that they posed no threat to the
United States. However, from the outset ill treatment was a pre-
dictable part of a detention regime operated away from inde-
pendent judicial oversight, and the Uighur detainees were not
spared abuse.
In May 2004, Amnesty International broke the story of the access
of Chinese Government officials to these detainees in Guantanamo
in 2002 and that American military personnel had assisted in the
preparation of these individuals for interview by the Chinese au-
thorities.
In the years since then and in the absence of judicial oversight,
the indefinite and isolating nature of the detentions at Guanta-
namo has remained cruel, inhumane and degrading. In February
2007, for example, Uighur detainee Ali Mohammed was being held
in isolation in Camp Six, a super max prison one might call it, for
at least 22 hours a day. He never sees direct sunlight and has no
access to fresh air.
During his 2 hours per day of recreational time, which on alter-
nating days is in the middle of the night, Ali is placed in a cage
where he can sometimes see other prisoners, but is punished if he
tries to touch or greet them. He is compelled to complain to get
clean clothes. He is denied privacy when he uses the toilet. Female
guards can watch him using the toilet. His food and drinks are al-
ways cold. He eats every meal alone.
Like all Guantanamo prisoners, he is not allowed any visitors
other than occasional trips by counsel and the Red Cross. He is not
allowed to make phone calls. As the Supreme Court recently af-
firmed, even convicted murderers cannot be made to endure condi-
tions like this without first providing them with the benefit of due
process.
The physical and psychological well-being of detainees kept in
such conditions has long been of concern. The treatment of the
Uighurs has illustrated the pursuit of unaffected Executive power
that has characterized the USA’s conduct in the war on terror and
led to systematic human rights violations, including arbitrary de-
tention, torture and other ill treatment.
Resolving their situation should mark not only a new start for
these men, but also a full recognition by the United States of its
obligation to ensure that anyone whose rights under international
law have been violated in U.S. custody has access to effective rem-
edy.
Remedy for the Uighur detainees arbitrarily detained in violation
of international human rights law is long overdue. The legal con-
cept of remedy as enshrined in the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, of which the United States is both a signatory
and historically a strong supporter, includes not only the restora-
tion of liberty but also reparation.
67
Four Uighur former Guantanamo inmates are now in Bermuda,

four in Albania and one in Sweden. But consider for a moment
what those men have lost. They have lost 7 years of their lives.
Quite apart from the personal deprivation of liberty, that is also 7
years of lost earning potential, one-fifth of a working life. Their
families too have been without their primary bread winner all of
that time.
Furthermore, what kind of future do they have to look forward
to? They certainly haven’t had the opportunity to learn or develop
a trade while in detention, nor are they returning to a society they
know well. Some may not even speak the local language.
And however idyllic Bermuda may appear in press photographs,
it is a world away from the central Asia steppe the Uighurs are
used to. A refugee center in Albania certainly lacks any appeal
whatsoever.
Some released inmates may be grappling with medical or mental
health problems. We know five inmates have committed suicide in
the detention facility in Guantanamo since it opened.
In March this year, the Department of Defense has reported that
34 inmates were on hunger strike. Such figures give some insight
into the harrowing nature of the detainees’ experiences, yet no pro-
vision has been made to support their rehabilitation.
A recent study of the post release lives of 62 former Guantanamo
inmates compiled by Professors Eric Stover and Laurel Fletcher of
UC-Berkeley found that two out of every three former detainees re-
ported psychological problems resulting from their confinement.
Only six of those 62 have been able to find permanent jobs. Some
are actually indigent and destitute.
Releasing inmates cleared for release such as the Uighurs is not
in and of itself enough. We have a moral and legal obligation to aid
the reintegration of former inmates back into society. These men
have been convicted of no crime, and in our system that means
they are innocent. No ifs. No buts.
Innocent men wrongly held for 7 years have a right to compensa-
tion, yet we understand some detainees have even been asked by
camp authorities at Guantanamo to sign a waiver that they will
not seek redress as a condition extracted under duress for their re-
lease. How low have we sunk?
The Obama Administration cannot simply shove cleared detain-
ees out of the gates of Camp Delta and forget about them. The
United States must take responsibility for rebuilding lives it has
ruined. If simple decency is not reason enough, consider also that
Guantanamo stigma means that former detainees with no other
source of support have little choice but to turn to radical mosques
and extremist networks for help.
It is in our interest to help these individuals make a fresh start.
Indeed, our very security may even depend on it. In the pursuit of
any conflict there are always mistakes and always casualties, but
it is incumbent on us to act honorably, to tell the truth and to free-
ly acknowledge our mistakes.
In the long, sorry saga of the detention facility at Guantanamo
Bay, no cases are more deserving of our sympathy and our apolo-
gies than the Uighurs both for the length of their detention and the
68
manner of their treatment. These men have never posed any gen-
uine or meaningful threat to the United States of America.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Parker follows:]
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Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you, Mr. Parker.

I am sure you heard the remarks by my colleague, Mr. Rohr-
abacher, where he extended his apologies, his personal apologies,
to the Uighurs, and I would hope, Mr. Pinney, that you would con-
vey back to your clients that America is getting it right.
Mr. PINNEY. Of course, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. DELAHUNT. I know Mr. Fein has another obligation, and I
know you have been waiting a long time.
I think it was you, Mr. Pinney, that made the distinction be-
tween allowing say British, United Kingdom or better yet Irish;
Irish security agents in to conduct interviews as opposed to those
nations that have an abysmal human rights record.
Information has come to my attention that the security appa-
ratus of Uzbekistan has been allowed to visit detainees from
Uzbek, and the only way to describe the leader of Uzbekistan, Mr.
Karimov, is that he is the thug of Tashkent and has massacred
thousands of innocent people who were protesting against the re-
pressive nature of his government.
I think you said it very well. Where are we and isn’t it time, and
I do hope that this is the case, that the Obama Administration is
doing a full reassessment of this I think horrific policy that results
in human rights violators free and unfettered access to detainees.
There is no gain. There is only disdain, if you will, for the U.S. that
comes from this.
But I guess I would pose a question to you. Has Amnesty or any-
body reflected and thought about a policy that would meet the
standards of the human rights community so that interviews done
appropriately and done in a fashion that is reflective of our values
could be conducted by agents of foreign governments?
Mr. PARKER. Well, our standard basically is we should be using
the criminal justice system to detain people that we suspect of ter-
rorism, and there are legal instruments that allow foreign coun-
tries to request access to people in detention.
Lettre rogatoire, for example. As a law enforcement or a former
law enforcement official myself, I have often applied to foreign gov-
ernments for access to talk to both witnesses and detainees, and
it is done through normal judicial mechanisms and that serves per-
fectly well.
Mr. FEIN. But because we do still have a President that says
there is a category of persons who are not criminals but we will re-
tain for some reason, for the Congress of the United States simply
having a presumption of nonaccess by any foreign intelligence secu-
rity service unless the President makes a waiver and certifies that
that intelligence service satisfies certain human rights standards
so that the burden of proof is on the President.
The President has to disclose it and share it with Congress. At
least it is a statement out of this Congress that the norm is no, you
can’t share it and no one will be out there who is outside the
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United States unless the President certifies that there is not going
to be abuse basically.
I come back to Congress has got to assert itself. It is not just the
Obama Administration.
Mr. DELAHUNT. You are really making us the first branch of gov-
ernment.
Mr. FEIN. It is the first branch. That is what I read about in the
Constitution. It is the very first article, and that was authority
under the necessary and proper clause. You can regulate any exe-
cution of any executive power whatsoever.
Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Pinney?
Mr. PINNEY. Mr. Chairman, from the legal cases we have had, we
have had the ability to work with the Administration in resettling
one detainee to Saudi Arabia in 2006 and of course with the four
men that went to Bermuda in 2009, and we were able to coordinate
the logistics behind that in a way that was fair, open and approved
by the court.
Just to come back to a comment you said earlier, China has a
terrible human rights record, but it is not just that they have a ter-
rible human rights record. It is that they have a record that our
Department of State has documented for years and years about
these particular individuals.
They have a record of abusing and oppressing and executing and
torturing unfairly the Uighurs and we let those men in to talk to
them in 2002, so it goes beyond really what could ever be consid-
ered a fair process.
Mr. PARKER. Could I add one thing as well? It is incumbent upon
me as the Amnesty representative to point out it is not just a for-
eign problem. It is also how we treat individuals at Guantanamo
Bay. It is not just foreigners coming in and doing this. American
service personnel have been complicit in the mistreatment of de-
tainees.
I am not aware if the Angard of Shekinah has ever sent anybody
to Cuba, whether there has ever been an Irish detainee in Cuba,
but the British Government certainly has sent security service offi-
cers there, and there is currently a metropolitan police investiga-
tion into the activities of those officers not simply because of what
they may have done themselves, but what they were associated
with by working with American service personnel.
So this is not an issue just about Chinese access. This is an issue
about how we treat detainees in our power period.
Mr. DELAHUNT. Gentlemen, thank you. It has been a most in-
formative hearing. Your testimony was excellent. It has been a long
day.
I have a request. Well, let me make the request. There has I
thought been an exceedingly inciteful opinion piece by David
Keene, who I usually don’t agree with, but it relates to this par-
ticular issue.
If there is no objection, and hearing none, I am going to enter
this into the record of the committee. It has a number of good
things to say about Mr. Rohrabacher, and I hope I don’t hurt his
political career by saying that they are true in this particular case.
76
But in any event, the opinion piece by Mr. Keene, who happens
to be the chairman of the American Conservative Union, will be en-
tered into the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
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Mr. DELAHUNT. And I should note too that genuine conservatives

are informing themselves about this particular issue and are
speaking out and I think are reinforcing those conservative values
that have traditionally been a worthy reflection of what America is
about.
I applaud them for doing that because there are some in the Mi-
nority party that see a political opportunity here, but those people,
their behavior will be noted and the people like David Keene and
Dana Rohrabacher and others that don’t come to mind right now,
they will be the ones who will speak to principle.
In the end, history will respect them because I think we are
making progress. I think we have a long road to go, but you have
helped us along that road today.
So, gentlemen, thank you. We are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 2:26 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
APPENDIX
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Chinese Interrogation vs. Congressional Oversight: The Uighurs at Guantanamo

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CHINESE INTERROGATION VS.

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

JULY 16, 2009

Serial No. 111–53

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS,

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING

THURSDAY, JULY 16, 2009

munist Chinese persecution to come forward and testify so that our

Mr. DELAHUNT. The Chinese delegation interrogated each of the

videotaped because you then have proof of exactly—you have hon-

Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you, Mr. Moran.

We do this for three principal reasons: First and foremost, to en-

recommendations, the Department provides regular briefings to

To conclude, Mr. Chairman, our detention policies ensure that

Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you very much, Mr. Liotta.

within their borders, possible crimes of one kind or another under

Mr. LIOTTA. Again, sir, I would defer that to a classified briefing.

either control access to Guantanamo Bay detainees, and for interro-

ment, by the Department of Defense or by somebody we don’t

I mean, this is an extraordinarily difficult part of that overall op-

Is that what the Defense Department believes is what elected

a point across. Now, I understand that Ms. Flournoy is a very nice

Department of Defense undertaken and successfully been able to

years as a consultant on post conflict justice issues for clients such

That is the kind of muscular effort that in my earlier years in

at Guantanamo Bay, until the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in the

can’t be a Judiciary. So there has to be some kind of comity and

allowed a delegation from the Communist Chinese Government to

They agreed to share that information with our military on the

but two of them in solitary confinement for up to 20 days. No light,

do this. However, they were eventually able to take some pic-

Moreover, it has been widely acknowledged that the Chinese

Uighur detainees were subjected to sleep deprivation or disruption

STATEMENT OF MR. TOM PARKER, POLICY DIRECTOR,

According to the latest Chinese census, in 2000 there were more

struggle, his words, against Uighur separatism. Currently there

Mr. PARKER. It is against this underlying set of conditions that

Four Uighur former Guantanamo inmates are now in Bermuda,

Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you, Mr. Parker.

Mr. DELAHUNT. And I should note too that genuine conservatives

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