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(Article 26)

G.R. No. 171365 October 6, 2010

This was a petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision of the
Court Appeals of an unlawful detainer case in favor of respondent. The
cause of action was for damages because the respondent supposedly
suffered embarrassment and humiliation when petitioners distributed
copies of the abovementioned MTC decision to the homeowners of
Horseshoe Village while respondent's appeal was still pending before
the RTC. That from the time the said decision was distributed to said
homeowners, the respondent became the subject of conversation or
talk of the town and by virtue of which, greatly damaged respondent's
good name within the community; his reputation was besmirched;
suffered sleepless night and serious anxiety; and was deprived of his
political career.
Petitioners reason that respondent has no cause of action against
them since the MTC decision in the unlawful detainer case was part of
public records. On appeal, the CA decreed that although court
decisions are public documents, distribution of the same during the
pendency of an appeal was clearly intended to cause respondent
some form of harassment and/or humiliation so that respondent would
be ostracized by his neighbors.
ISSUE: Whether or not the act imputed to petitioner constitutes any
of those enumerated in Arts. 26.
Yes. The philosophy behind Art. 26 underscores the necessity for its
inclusion in our civil law. The Code Commission stressed in no
uncertain terms that the human personality must be exalted. Under
this article, the rights of persons are amply protected, and damages
are provided for violations of a person's dignity, personality, privacy
and peace of mind.
It is already settled that the public has a right to see and copy judicial
records and documents. However, this is not a case of the public
seeking and being denied access to judicial records and documents.
The controversy is rooted in the dissemination by petitioner of the
MTC judgment against respondent to Horseshoe Village homeowners,
who were not involved at all in the unlawful detainer case, thus,
purportedly affecting negatively respondent's good name and
reputation among said homeowners. While petitioners were free to

copy and distribute such copies of the MTC judgment to the public, the
question is whether they did so with the intent of humiliating
respondent and destroying the latter's good name and reputation in
the community.
(Article 26)
Zenaida Gregorio, petitioner, v. Court of Appeals, Sansio Philippines,
Inc. and Emma J. Datuin, respondents GR No. 179799, September 11,
FACTS: Respondents Emma J. Datuin (Datuin) and Sansio Philippines,
Inc. (Sansio) filed an affidavit of complaint for violation of B.P. Blg. 22
(Bouncing Checks Law) against petitioner Zenaida R. Gregorio
(Gregorio), a proprietor of Alvi Marketing. Datuin and Sansio claimed
that Gregorio delivered insufficiently funded bank checks as payment
for appliances Alvi Marketing bought from Sansio. Gregorio was then
indicted for three counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 before the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC), Branch 3, Manila. The MTC issued a
warrant of arrest and she was subsequently arrested by armed
operatives while visiting her family house in Quezon City.
December 5, 1997, Gregorio filed before the MTC a Motion for
Deferment of Arraignment and Reinvestigation. She alleged that she
could not have issued the bounced checks as she did not have a
checking account with the bank on which the checks were drawn. This
was certified by the manager of the said bank. Gregorio also alleged
that the signature on the bounced checks were radically and patently
different from her own signature. The MTC granted the motion, and a
reinvestigation was conducted. Subsequently, the MTC ordered the
B.P. Blg. 22 cases dismissed. On August 18, 2000, Gregorio filed a
complaint for damages against Sansio and Datuin before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 12, Ligao, Albay. Part of her complaint was
that as a result of her wrongful arrest and arraignment, she suffered
helplessness, hunger and humiliation and being distraught. Datuin
and Sansio meanwhile filed a Motion to Dismiss on grounds that
Gregorios complaint arose from grounds of compensation arising from
malicious prosecution. On October 10, 2000, the RTC denied this
Motion to Dismiss. Sansio and Datuin then filed a Motion for
Reconsideration but was again denied in January 5, 2001. They went
to the Court of Appeals alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the presiding judge of the RTC in denying their motions to dismiss
and for reconsideration. On January 31, 2007, the CA rendered a
Decision granting the petition and ordering Gregorios damage suit to
be dismissed.
ISSUE: Are Sansio and Datuin liable for damages to Gregorio?

HELD: Yes. Among other reasons, the Supreme Court decided that
Gregorios rights to personal dignity, personal security, privacy, and
peace of mind were infringed by Sansio and Datuin when they failed
to exercise the requisite diligence in determining the identity of the
person they should rightfully accuse of tendering insufficiently funded
checks. . . . Because she was not able to refute the charges against
her, petitioner was falsely indicted for three (3) counts of violation of
B.P. Blg. 22. Gregorio was conveniently at her city residence while
visiting her family. She suffered embarrassment and humiliation over
her sudden arrest and detention and she had to spend time, effort,
and money to clear her tarnished name and reputation, considering
that she had held several honorable positions in different
organizations and offices in the public service, particularly her being a
Kagawad in Oas, Albay at the time of her arrest.
(Article 31)
CUNANAN, Respondents (G.R. No. L-50959, dated 23 July 1980)
FACTS: Pedro Tayag, Sr., while riding on a bicycle, was hit by
Philippine Rabbit Bus bearing Body No. 1107 and Plate No. YL 604
PUB '74 driven in faster than prescribed speed by Romeo Villa Y
Cunanan on 02 September 1974 in Tarlac, Tarlac along MacArthur
Highway. The occurrence had him sustain physical injuries that caused
his immediate death and damages to his bicycle. The complaint filed
by the petitioners against the respondents on 25 September 1976,
docketed as Civil Case No. 5114, was suspended when the
respondent Judge granted the motion of the respondents to suspend
the trial on the ground that the criminal case against the driver of the
bus Romeo Villa Y Cunanan was still pending in the same court,
supported by Section 3, Rule III of the Revised Rules of Court. In
Criminal Case No. 836, accused Romeo Villa Y Cunanan was acquitted
of the crime of homicide on 25 October 1977. The respondent Judge
ordered the dismissal of Civil Case No. 5114, acting upon the motions
of the respondents, to dismiss the case on the ground that the
petitioners have no valid cause of action against them given that the
driver of the bus was acquitted in the criminal action and of the
petitioners, opposing with the argument that cause of action is not
based on crime, but on quasi-delict. Thereafter, the petitioners move
to reconsider was denied by the respondent Judge on 30 May 1979.
The petitioners presented the petition of certiorari, to annul and set
aside the order of respondent Judge. The respondents filed their
comments afterwards.
ISSUE: Whether or not to consider the petition of certiorari introduced
by the petitioners.

HELD: The court rendered the order of dismissal by respondent Judge

set aside, with the lower court to pursue proceedings of Civil Case No.
5114. It was decided that respondent Judge acted with abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in dismissing Civil Case
No. 5114. To underline the provisions of Article 31 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines and in reference to the case Elcano vs. Hill (GR. No. L24803), the court held that the extinction of civil liability referred to in
par. (e), Section 3, Rule III, refers exclusively to civil liability founded
on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for
the same act considered as a quasi-delict only (or from other source)
and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the
criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has
not been committed by the accused. The court also confirmed that all
essential factors for the cause of action as quasi-delict, are present,
i.e. no pre-existing contract between the two parties. The
abovementioned rationale was then applied to this case. The
petitioners' cause of action being based on a quasi-delict, the
acquittal of the driver, private respondent Romeo Villa Y Cunanan, of
the crime charged in Criminal Case No. 836, is not a bar to the
prosecution of Civil Case No. 5114 for damages based on quasidelict. Hence, allowing the civil action to continue, regardless of the
result of the criminal proceeding.
(Article 28)
Case Digest
PHILIP S. YU, Petitioner
G.R. No. 86683 January 21, 1993
Unfair competition in commercial enterprises is the reason that Mr. Yu
filed a case in RTC stating that he was practically bypassed and that
private respondent acted in concert with FNF Trading in misleading
Mayfair into believing that the goods ordered by the trading firm were
intended for shipment to Nigeria although they were actually shipped
to and sold in the Philippines. Resolving plaintiff's motion embodied in
the complaint for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction after
hearing, but without prejudging the merits of the case, and finding
from the evidences adduced by the plaintiff, that the terms and
conditions of the agency agreement between the plaintiff and The
House of Mayfair of England for the exclusive distributorship by the

plaintiff of the latter's goods, apertain to them; that there is no privity

of contract between the plaintiff and the defendant; that the
controversy in this case arose from a breach of contract by the FNF
Trading of Germany, for having shipped goods it had purchased from
The House of Mayfair to the Philippines: that the House of Mayfair
was demanding payment of 4,500.00 from the FNF Trading for
restitution of plaintiff's alleged loss on account of the shipment of the
goods in question here in the Philippines and now in the possession of
the defendant; it appears to the Court that to restrain the defendant
from selling the goods it has ordered from the FNF Trading of
Germany, would be without legal justification. Having the issuance of
writ of injunction denied, petitioners plea was brought to the filing of
a petition for review on certiorari with the Court of Appeals. But
according to the appellate court, petitioner was not able to
demonstrate the unequivocal right which he sought to protect and
that private respondent is a complete stranger vis-a-vis the covenant
between petitioner and Mayfair. Apart from these considerations, the
reviewing authority noted that petitioner could be fully compensated
for the prejudice he suffered. But the petitioner anchors his plea for
redress on his view that private respondent has distributed and
continues to sell Mayfair covering products in contravention of
petitioner's exclusive right granted by the covenant with the House of
Mayfair. Temporary restraining order was issued to last until further
notice from this Court directed against private respondent.
Notwithstanding such, private respondent persisted in the distribution
which triggered petitioner's motion to cite private respondent's
manager in contempt of court.
Whether the appellate court correctly agree with the lower court in
disallowing the writ solicited by herein petitioner due to reason that
petitioner was not able to demonstrate the unequivocal right which he
sought to protect and that private respondent is a complete stranger
(or is it unfair competition that gave rise to such which should be
stressed upon so as to issue writ of injunction).
The circumstance which respondent court overlooked was petitioner's
suggestion, which was not disputed by herein private respondent in its
comment, that the House of Mayfair in England was duped into
believing that the goods ordered through the FNF Trading were to be
shipped to Nigeria only, but the goods were actually sent to and sold
in the Philippines. A ploy of this character is akin to the scenario of a
third person who induces a party to renege on or violate his
undertaking under a contract, thereby entitling the other contracting

party to relief therefrom. The breach caused by private respondent

was even aggravated by the consequent diversion of trade from the
business of petitioner to that of private respondent caused by the
latter's species of unfair competition as demonstrated no less by the
sales effected inspite of this Court's restraining order. This brought the
irreparable mischief which respondent court overlooked when it
refused to grant the relief simply because of the observation that
petitioner can be fully compensated for the damage. With this, SC
issued the writ of preliminary injunction.
(Article 27)
Zulueta vs Nicolas G.R. No. L-8252 January 31, 1958
Facts: Plaintiff instituted the present action on May 19, 1954 against
the defendant to recover moral pecuniary damages in the sum of
P10,000 from the complaint for libel filed by plaintiff against the
provincial governor of Rizal and the staff members of the Philippine
Free Press. The defendant fiscal after conducting an investigation
rendered an opinion that there was no prima facie case, that the
alleged libelous statements were made in good faith. As a
consequence the fiscal absolved the said governor and the Free Press
staff from crime of libel.
Issue: Whether the plaintiffs complaint states a cause of action
Held: The Supreme Court held that the refusal of the fiscal to
prosecute when after the investigation he finds no sufficient evidence
to establish a prima facie case is not a refusal, without just cause, to
perform an official duty. As a general rule, a public prosecutor, being a
quasi-judicial officer empowered to exercise discretion or judgment, is
not personally liable for resulting injuries when acting within the scope
of his authority, and in the line of his official duty.


GR. NO. 101236 January 30, 1992
Petitioner: Juliana P. Yap
Respondents: Martin Paras and Alfredo D. Barcelona, Sr., Judge of the
3rd MTC of Glan Malapatan, South Cotabato
Ponente: J. Cruz
On October 31, 1971, according to Yap, Paras sold to her his share in
the intestate estate for P300.00. The sale was evidenced by a private

document. Nineteen years later, on May 2, 1990, Paras sold the same
property to Santiago Saya-ang for P5,000.00. This was evidenced by a
notarized Deed of Absolute Sale. When Yap learned of the second sale,
she filed a complaint for estafa against Paras and Saya-ang and filed a
complaint for the nullification of the said sale with the Regional Trial
Court of General Santos City. On April 17, 1991, before the
arraignment, the trial judge motu proporio issued an order dismissing
the criminal case on the ground that there is a prejudicial question,
citing Ras vs. Rasul, 100 SCRA 125. The petitioner came to the
Supeme Court for relief in this special civil action for certiorari. Her
contention is that where there is a prejudicial question in a civil case,
the criminal action may not be dismissed but not dismissed.

Whether there was a motion for suspension of the case by reason of
prejudicial question.
Whether the judge had a misconception of a prejudicial question.
Whether the defense involved an issue similar or intimately related to
the same issue raised in the criminal action and its resolution to
determine if the latter action may proceed.
The petition is granted therefore Judge Alfredo D. Barcelona, Sr.s
dismissal of Criminal Case No. 1902-G dated April 17, 1991 and the
Order dated April 30, 1991, denying the motion for reconsideration,
are all reversed and set aside. Criminal Case No. 1902-G is ordered
reinstated for further proceedings, but to be assigned to a different

(Article 22)
Republic v Lacap
G.R. No. 158253 March 2, 2007
Ponente: Justice Austria-Martinez
The respondent, Carlito Lacap, doing business under the name
entered into contract with the Philippine Government through the

validity of the awarded contract as a result of the bidding process

issued and duly published by the District Engineer of Pampanga dated
January 27, 1992. The contract awarded was the concreting of Sitio 5
Bahay Pare and the Contract Agreement was executed by the
respondent and petitioner on September 25, 1992. The respondent
assumed the works and made advances for the procurement of
materials and payment for labor costs as well. The project had been
completed in accordance with the approved layout and specifications,
thus, the Office of the District Engineer issued Certificate of Final
Inspection and Final Acceptance to the respondent. Consequently, the
respondent sought for the payment of completed project. However,
the District Auditor of Commission on Audit (COA) disapproved the
release of the particular funds on the ground that the contractors
license of the respondent has expired at the time the contract was
executedthe DPWH based their decision to defer the same.
Whether the contractor (respondent) who entered into Contract
Agreement be denied of the payment he is being sought for the
completed project or be paid of the same although its license has
expired at the time of the execution of its contract.

Different legal bases have been cited to support the decision

for this argument. Nonetheless, the court ruled that the petitioner is
compelled to pay the respondent for the completed project. Under
Article 22: Every person who through an act of performance by
another, or any other means, acquires or comes into possession of
something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground,
shall return the same to him. It explicitly suggests that the issuance
of the Certificate of Final Inspection and Final Acceptance by the Office
of the District Engineer to the respondent, the government arguably
gained from the said Contract Agreement. Also, the argument of the
petitioner did not suffice his claim that the respondent should not
grant him the payment on the ground that he secures expired
contracts license in violation of the law. It is true that the contractor
(respondent) violates the law. Section 35 of R.A. No. 4566, it explicitly
SEC. 35. Penalties. Any contractor who, for a price, commission, fee or
wage, submits or attempts to submit a bid to construct, or contracts
to or undertakes to construct, or assumes change in a supervisory
capacity of a construction work within the purview of this Act, without
first securing a license to engage in the business of contracting in this
country; or who shall present or file the license certificate of another,
give false evidence of any kind to the Board, or any member thereof
in obtaining a certificate or license, impersonate another, or use an

expired or revoked certificate or license, shall be deemed guilty of

misdemeanor, and shall, upon conviction, be sentenced to pay a fine
of not less than five hundred pesos but not more than five thousand
pesos (Emphasis supplied)
Based on Section 35 of R.A. No. 4566 the contractor
(respondent) is subject to penalties violating the same, but it does not
mean that the respondent would deprive him of the payment due him.
The Contract Agreement between the petitioner and respondent fully
satisfied both of them in terms of acceptance on the part of the
former and rendition of the particular service of the latter.
(Article 26)
People of the Philippines vs. Isauro Santiago
G. R. No. L-17663
May 30, 1962
The case relates to the exposure of Arsenio H. Lacson, then Mayor of
the City of Manila, to public hatred and ridicule by one Isauro
Santiago, in the course of a political speech in Quiapo, Manila on the
5th of October 1959. Defendant, through an amplifier system and in
the presence of a crowd of around a hundred persons called out
Arsenio Hayop Lacson, pinakawalang hiyang Alkalde, Mayor Lacson
raped a woman at the Aroma Cafe and another City Hall employee in
Shellborne Hotel" in which the plaintiff filed an information for libel
against the defendant on August 11, 1960. Defendant, through his
Motion to Quash Information, claimed that the charge is not libel, but
oral defamation, and the filing of information of the latter has already
Whether or not the crime charged in the information is oral
defamation, under Article 358 of the Revised Penal Code, or libel,
under Article 355, in relation to Article 353, of the same Code.
The Supreme Court, En Banc, held that the facts alleged in the
information constitute the crime of oral defamation, under Article 358
of the Revised Penal Code. The grounds by which the information for
libel was filed is the erroneous comparison of the media radio and
amplifier system.
According to Summit Hotel Co. vs. National
Broadcasting Co. (PA-124 A.L.R. 963), the rules governing such
offense were declared inapplicable to extemporaneous remarks of
scurrilous nature, made ad libitum in the course of a radio broadcast
by a person hired to read a prepared text, but not appearing
thereon. The statements, which were heard through an amplifier

system, though defamatory, are extemporaneous such that no

manuscript or prepared text was read.
(Article 29)
129 SCRA 558, 565-566 (May 31, 1984)
Ponente: GUTIERREZ, JR., J.
The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's judgment of conviction
and acquitted the petitioners of the crime of grave coercion on the
ground of reasonable doubt but inspite of the acquittal ordered them
to pay jointly and severally the amount of P9,000.00 to the
complainants as actual damages.
The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the
acquittal of the defendants-appellants as to criminal liability results in
the extinction of their civil liability. The Court of Appeals denied the
Whether or not the respondent court committed a reversible error in
requiring the petitioners to pay civil indemnity to the complainants
after acquitting them from the criminal charge.
No. The extinction of the civil action by reason of acquittal in the
criminal case refers exclusively to civil liability ex delicto founded on
Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code. In other words, the civil liability
which is also extinguished upon acquittal of the accused is the civil
liability arising from the act as a crime.
The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability of the accused for
damages only when it includes a declaration that the facts from which
the civil might arise did not exist. Thus, the civil liability is not
extinguished by acquittal where the acquittal is based on reasonable
doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required in civil cases;
where the court expressly declares that the liability of the accused is
not criminal but only civil in nature.

(Article 28)
Calamba Medical Center, INC. vs National Labor Relations
Commission, Ronaldo Lanzanas and Merceditha Lanzanas
G.R. No. 176484 November 25, 2008
Dr. Ronaldo and Merceditha Lanzanas are both former
employees of Calamba Medical Center INC. Circumstances led to the
termination of their employment hospital. It was also found that a
watchlist or watch out list containing the names of the couple was in
circulation among the local hospitals, and was allegedly distributed by
a stockholder of the petitioner.
The couple filed complaints for illegal dismissal before the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) Regional Arbitration Board which
were consolidated and docketed as NLRC CASE NO. RAB-IV-3-9879-98L.
The NLRC, on appeal, awarded full backwages, separation pay, 500,
000 pesos in moral damages each, exemplary damages of 250,000
pesos each, and 10% of the total award for attorneys fees to the
doctors on May 3, 2002.
The case was brought to the Court of Appeals on certiorari and on
June 30, 2004, the appellate court reinstated the NLRC decision,
however the award to each of the spouses no longer included the
attorney fees and the moral and exemplary damages were tempered
to 100,000 pesos and 50,000 pesos.
Issue: Can the respondents, Doctor Ronaldo and Merceditha
Lanzanas, claim more in damages for the actions against them?
Held: The distribution of the watchlist constitutes as an unfair labor
practice, due to its intent to prevent further gainful employment of
those listed. As such, Dr. Ronaldo and Merceditha Lanzanas have a
right to action for damages by Calamba Medical Center, INC.
On November 25, 2008, the Court of Appeals reinstated the 10% of
the total judgement award as attorney fees as action for damages of
unfair labor practices by Calamba Medical Center, INC.

(Article 31)
G & S Transport Corporation, petitioner vs. Heirs of Jose Marcial K.
Ochoa namely Ruby B. Ochoa, Micaela B. Ochoa and Jomar B. Ochoa,
(G.R. No. 170125 March 9, 2011)
Jose Marcial K. Ochoa, husband of respondent Ruby B. Ochoa,
died on the night of March 10, 1995 while on board an Avis taxicab
owned and operated by G & S Transport Corporation, petitionercommon carrier. Ruby Ochoa and her children, Micaela and Jomar,
through counsel, filed a complaint against G & S for damages before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City which was raffled to Branch
164 of said court.
On December 27, 2001, the trial court rendered a Decision
finding the vehicular mishap caused by the negligence of Bibiano
Padilla, the driver. It likewise found the evidence adduced by G & S to
show that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of its employees as insufficient. Hence, the
trial court declared G & S civilly liable to the heirs. However, for lack
of receipts or any proof of funeral expenses and other actual
damages, the trial court denied the heirs claim for actual damages,
moral and exemplary damages for lack of legal basis.
G & S filed a Notice of Appeal while the heirs filed a Motion for
Partial Reconsideration. After G & S filed its Opposition (To Plaintiffs
Motion for Partial Reconsideration), the trial court favored the heirs
Motion for Partial Reconsideration and thus declared them entitled to
moral and exemplary damages.
Padilla was convicted of reckless imprudence resulting to
homicide in an MTC Decision but was later on acquitted in the RTC
Before the CA, G & S continued to insist that it exercised the
diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and
supervision of its employees. G & S also argued that the proximate
cause of Jose Marcials death is a fortuitous event and/or the fault or
negligence of another and not of its employee.
On the other hand, the heirs maintained that Padilla was
grossly negligent in driving the Avis taxicab on the night of March 10,

1995. In a Decision dated June 29, 2005, the CA ruled in favor of the
With respect to the award of P6,537,244.96 for Jose Marcials
loss of earning capacity, the CA declared the same unwarranted. It
found the Certification issued by Jose Marcials employer as selfserving, unreliable, and biased. Anent moral damages, the CA reduced
it to P200,000.00 as to make it proportionate to the award of
exemplary damages which is P50,000.00. CA denied both parties
respective motions for reconsideration.
Hence, G & S and the heirs filed their respective Petitions for
Review on Certiorari before the Supreme Court. The heirs petition was
docketed as G.R. No. 170071 and that of G & S as G.R. No. 170125.
These petitions were later consolidated pursuant to this Courts
Resolution of November 21, 2005.
One of the grounds in the petition of G & S is that CA gravely
erred in not taking note of the fact that the petitioners employee had
been acquitted of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting (in)

criminal case. Moreover, while the CA quoted some portions of the

MTC Decision in said criminal case, we however find that those quoted
portions were only meant to belie G & S claim that the proximate
cause of the accident was the negligence of the driver of the delivery
van which allegedly hit the Avis taxicab. Even without those quoted
portions, the appellate courts ultimate finding that it was Padillas
negligence which was the proximate cause of the mishap would still
be the same. This is because the CA has, in fact, already made this
declaration in the earlier part of its assailed Decision. The fact that
the MTC Decision from which the subject quoted portions were lifted
has already been reversed by the RTC is therefore immaterial.

Issue: Did the Court of Appeals made an error by not taking note of
the fact that Padilla, an employee of the petitioner, has been
acquitted of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide?

(Article 20)

Held: NO. According to Article 31 of the Civil Code of the Philippines,

When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the
act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may
proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of
the result of the latter.
The Supreme Court decided that in this case, the action filed by the
heirs is primarily for the recovery of damages arising from breach of
contract of carriage allegedly committed by G & S. The Court further
said that As a common carrier, G & S is bound to carry [Jose Marcial]
safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the
utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the
circumstances. However, Jose Marcial did not reach his destination
due to the accident and G & S failed to prove that it exercised
diligence, thereby making it liable to the heirs of Jose Marcial for
breach of contract of carriage. Clearly, it is an independent civil action
arising from contract which is separate and distinct from the criminal
action for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide filed by the heirs
against Padilla by reason of the same incident. Hence, regardless of
Padillas acquittal or conviction in said criminal case, same has no
bearing in the resolution of the present case. There was therefore no
error on the part of the CA when it resolved this case without regard
to the fact that Padilla has already been acquitted by the RTC in the

Sonny Romero Y Dominguez VS People of the Philippines, Isabel

Padua, Regina Breis, Minerva Montes and Ofelia Belando Breis
G.R. No. 167546
Promulgated: July 7, 2009
FACTS: On April 1, 1999 a JC Liner bus driven by the petition, Sonny
Romero, and an Apego taxi driven by Jimmy Padua figured in a head
on collision that resulted in the death of Gerardo Breis Sr., Arnaldo
Breis, Gerardo Breis Jr., Rene Montes, Erwin Breis and Jimmy Padua.
The incident also injured Edwin and Edmund Breis. Petition was
charged with the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in multiple
homicide and multiple serious physical injuries with damage to
property in the Camarines Sur MTC. The trial acquitted the petitioner
on November 9, 2000 of the crimes charged but was held civilly liable
and was ordered to pay the heirs of the victims the amount of
P3,541,900 for actual damages, civil indemnity for death, moral
damages, temperate damages and loss of earning capacity. Petitioner
appealed to both the RTC and CA and argued that the MTC made a
mistake in making him civilly liable. Both the RTC and CA affirmed the
MTC decision.
ISSUE: Whether the petitioner can be held civilly liable for damages
due to negligence.

HELD: The court affirmed the MTC decision. Although the evidence
failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt the negligence of the
petitioner, thus absolving him of criminal liability, preponderant
evidence is enough to hold him civilly liable for damages.

The creditors agreed to have a working group composed of three

parties to come up with an agreement to distribute the assets, and
that a representative must be appointed; and that all creditors should
refrain from claiming their assets, and appearing before an insolvency
court unless no agreement was met. Mr. Fitzgerald was appointed
On 9 August 1948, the working committees first meeting took place.
The members tried to agree on the equal distribution of assets. At the
same time, the defendant assigned its credit against CALI to Shell Oil
Company, Inc., an American venture, for $79,440.00. On 10 August
1948, the amount was raised to $85,081.29.
On 12 August 1948, Shell Oil Company, Inc. filed a formal complaint
against CALI before the Superior Court of California, for the collection
of said credit. A writ of attachment was also applied for and issued
against the C-54 plane. The writ meant that Shell Oil Company, Inc.
alone would benefit from selling the plane.


Velayo vs. Shell Company of the Philippine Islands, Ltd.

G.R. No. L-7817, 31 October 1956
Ponente: Justice Felix
The Commercial Air Lines, Inc. a.k.a. CALI and a corporation duly
enlisted in the Philippines was previously engaged in the air transport
business. The Shell Company of the Philippine Islands, Limited
(defendant), a corporation enlisted in England, was authorized to do
business in the country. The defendant supplied the fuel needs of
On 6 August 1948, CALI set a meeting to inform all its creditors that
the company was in grave debt; the operation would be halted. Mr.
Desmond Fitzgerald represented the Shell Company of P.I., Ltd. in the
meeting. CALI owed the defendant P152,641.68.
During the meeting, CALI's board of directors raised the proposal to
sell CALIs assets to Philippine Air Lines (PAL). The corporations
balance sheet was also presented to the assembled parties; part of it
was a C-54 plane in the United States.

The stockholders of CALI, unaware of the settlement between the two

companies, decided to discuss the sale of CALI's properties to PAL. On
7 October 1948, CALI learned about the defendants move thus, filed
a petition for insolvency.
Mr. Velayo was appointed Assignee of CALI in the legal proceedings,
and sought a writ of injunction to hold back the complaint filed in the
U.S. The court denied the petition. A Philippine court would not be in a
position to enforce its orders against the Shell Oil Company which
happened to be an American corporation outside the Philippine
jurisdiction. Mr. Velayo eventually confined his action to recover
damages against the defendant. The court dismissed the complaint,
and an appeal was made.
ISSUE: Whether the defendant committed a betrayal of trust and
HELD: Yes. Section 37 of the insolvency law was violated. The
defendant transferred the credit at the time of CALIs unstable
financial situation without other creditors knowledge and despite an
agreement that a fair distribution must be met first prior to making a
legal move. Legal bases were cited including Article 23 of the Civil
Code which states that, Even when an act or event causing damage
to anothers property was not due to the fault or negligence of the
defendant, the latter shall be liable for indemnity if through the act or
event he was benefited.

The court ordered the defendant to pay Mr. Velayo twice the amount
of the value of the plane for compensatory and exemplary damages.

(Article 34)
G.R. No. 122150
March 17, 2003
On June 6, 1989, the petitioner filed before the Regional Trial
Court of Baguio, a complaint for damages for the injuries and
expenses he incurred last December 9, 1985. However, the Criminal
Case No. 2049 for Serious Physical Injuries thru Reckless Imprudence
filed on January 8, 1986 was already dismissed by the Municipal Trial
Court of Tuba, Benguet due to lack of petitioners interest and that the
dismissal was with respect to both the criminal and civil case.
After the trial, the RTC of Baguio ruled that the petitioner is
entitled to damages. However, the Court of Appeals, in its decision on
March 8, 1995, refused to affirm the decision of the Regional Trial
Court and dismissed the petitioners claim for damages based on
Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as
amended in 1988, which is the prevailing and governing law in this
case, viz.:
SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. When a
criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil
liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the
offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it
separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the
Revised Penal Code, and damages under Article 32, 33, 34 and 2176
of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or
omission of the accused.
Whether or not a civil case for damages based on an
independent civil action be duly dismissed for failure to make
reservation to file a separate civil action in a criminal case filed arising
from the same act or omission of the accused?

Yes. The Court ruled that the petitioner should have reserved
his right to separately institute the civil action for damages. Due to
this failure, the civil case was deemed impliedly instituted with the
Criminal Case No. 2049 which was then previously dismissed by the
Court. In effect, Civil Case No. 1761-R for damages subsequently filed
by him without prior reservation should be dismissed.

(Article 21)
Gashem Shookat Baksh vs. CA
219 SCRA 115
Facts: The petitioner, Gashem Shookat Baksh is an Iranian National
studying medicine at the Lyceum Northwestern Colleges in Dagupan
City; while the private respondent name is Marilou Gonzales who
works in the cafeteria of the said school. She is 22 years old, single,
Filipina of good moral character and reputation duly respected in her
community. Gashem courted and proposed to marry her which she
accepted on the premise that they would be married. The petitioner
even went to the province of the private respondent to ask the
approval of her parents. The petitioner forced her to live with him in
his apartment in which she allowed herself to be deflowered by him.
After about two months, the petitioner began to change and started to
maltreated her even threatened to kill her and later repudiated their
marriage agreement. No marriage came hence an action for breach
of promise to marry.
Issue: Whether or not Article 21 of the Civil Code is applicable in the
case and whether or not a breach of promise to marry an actionable
Held: The existing rule is that breach of promise to marry per se is
not actionable wrong. Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft
of the New Civil Code the provisions that would have made it so.
Where a mans promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the
acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill
that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of
herself unto him in sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no
intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle
scheme or perceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept his
and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of
damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry

but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and wilful injury to her
honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential
however, that such injury should have been committed in manner
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.
(Article 36)
Berbari vs. Concepcion
G.R. No. L-16189 February 26, 1920
Ponente: Justice Torres

Petitioner filed a complaint against the respondent, judge of the

first court of first instance, praying that the criminal cause for estafa
found against him be declared null and void due to a prejudicial
question; wherein, petitioner received a sum arising from an
agreement of capital subscription from a debtor-third party and is still
awaiting further payment.

Whether the civil action sought after by the petitioner to settle

the pending prejudicial question is apt and correct, thereby removing
any criminal liability.
The fact that the petitioner appropriated himself a sum of
money from the foregoing agreement goes to show that a contract
have been entered into. The debtor-third partys future payment as
demanded by the petitioner that resulted into his filed civil action
cannot be construed as a prejudicial question. Prejudicial question is
understood in law to be that which must precede the criminal action
that requires a decision before a final judgment is rendered in the
principal action with which said question is closely connected.
Petitioners civil action that asks for settlement of payment is a
prejudicial question. However, it does not ascertain whether or not he
committed the crime of estafa filed against him by the debtor-third
party. If any action at all must be suspended, it would be the civil
action and in no way the criminal action once reason for the latter has
been found against the petitioner.
(Article 19)
G.R. No. L 19313

January 19, 1962


ET AL., Respondents
FACTS: While the Commission on Appointments was not in session,
then President Carlos P. Garcia made appointments, on December 29,
1961 including Dominador R. Aytona, as ad interim Governor of the
Central Bank, who on the same day, took the corresponding oath.
At noon on December 30, 1961, President elect Diosdado Macapagal
assumed office and on December 31, 1961, he issued Administrative
Order No. 2 recalling, withdrawing, and cancelling all ad interim
appointments made by President Garcia after Macapagal had been
proclaimed elected by Congress on December 13, 1961. President
Macapagal then appointed Andres V. Castillo as ad interim Governor of
the Central Bank on January 1, 1962 and the latter qualified
Both ad interim appointees exercised the powers of their office on
January 2, 1962. Castillo informed Aytona of his title and the latter
was prevented from holding office in the Central Bank the next day
and thereafter, prompting a proceeding which is practically a quo
warranto, challenging the formers right to exercise the powers of
Governor of the Central Bank. Aytona Claims he was validly appointed,
had qualified for the post, making Castillos appointment void. Castillo
replies that the appointment of Aytona had been revoked by
Administrative Order No. 2 as issued by President Macapagal.
ISSUE: Whether President Macapagal had the power to issue the
order of cancellation of the ad interim appointments made by
President Garcia, even after the appointees had already qualified.
HELD: The Court, exercising its judgment and discretion dismissed
the action as instituted by Aytona. With the separation of powers, it
resolves that it must not disregard the Presidential Administrative
Order No. 2, cancelling the midnight or last minute
Customarily, when a president makes appointments, he has the
benefit of the advice of the Commission on Appointments. In ad
interim appointments, he exercises a special prerogative and is bound
to be prudent to insure approval of his selection either previous
consultation with the members of the Commission or by thereafter
explaining to them the reason for selection. In this case, where the
Commission that will consider the appointees is different from that
existing at the time of the appointment, and where the names are to
be submitted by successor who may not wholly approve of the

selections, the President should be doubly careful in extending such

appointments. It is difficult to believe that in signing several
appointments in one night, President Garcia exercised such caution
which was required and expected of him.
The underlying reason for denying the power to revoke after the
appointee has qualified is the latters equitable rights. Yet, it is
uncertain if such equity is present in the situation, considering the
circumstances detracting from that degree of good faith, morality and
propriety which form the basic foundation of claims to equitable relief.
It might be argued that the appointees, wittingly or unwittingly
cooperated with the maneuver to beat the deadline. Occasions
wherein not only strict legality, but also fairness, justice and
righteousness should be taken into account.

(Article 24)
G.R. No. 169578 November 30, 2006
On December 11, 1973, Teresita Dio agreed to buy, on
instalment basis, a memorial lot from the St. Ferdinand Memorial Park,
Inc. (SFMPI) in Lucena City. The 36-square-meter memorial lot is
particularly described as Block 2, Section F, Lot 15. The purchase was
evidenced by a Pre-Need Purchase Agreement dated December 11,
1973 and denominated as Contract No. 384. She obliged herself to
abide by all such rules and regulations governing the SFMPI dated May
25, 1972.
SFMPI issued a Deed of Sale and Certificate of Perpetual
Care dated April 1, 1974 denominated as Contract No. 284. The
ownership of Dio over the property was made subject to the rules and
regulations of SFMPI, as well as the government, including all
amendments, additions and modifications that may later be
adopted. Rule 69 of the Rules reads:
Rule 69. Mausoleum building and memorials should be
constructed by the Park Personnel. Lot Owners
construction of the said buildings and memorial,
however, the lot owner is free to give their own

design for the mausoleum to be constructed, as long

as it is in accordance with the park standards. The
construction shall be under the close supervision of
the Park Superintendent.
In the early part of October 1986, Dio informed SFMPI, through
its president and controlling stockholder, Mildred F. Tantoco, that she
was planning to build a mausoleum on her lot and sought the approval
On December 23, 1986, Dio filed a Complaint for Injunction
with Damages against SFMPI and Tantoco before the RTC of Lucena
City. She averred that she was not aware of Rule 69 of the
SFMPI Rules and Regulations; the amount of P100, 000.00 as
construction cost of the mausoleum was unconscionable and
oppressive. In addition Plaintiff was initially surprised by Tantocos
statement because she knew that their contract did not provide for
such stipulation.
On August 3, 1995, the trial court rendered judgment in favor
of defendants. Upon appeal the CA affirmed the decision of the trial
1. Whether or not petitioner had knowledge of Rule 69 of SFMPI
Rules and Regulations for memorial works in the mausoleum
areas of the park when the Pre-Need Purchase Agreement and
the Deed of Sale was executed.
The supreme courts declared that Basic is the principle that
contracts, once perfected, bind both contracting parties. The parties
may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they
may deem convenient, provided these are not contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public order, or public policy. It follows that obligations
arising from contracts have the force of law between the contracting
parties and should be complied with in good faith.
Petitioner is an experienced businesswoman. She doubtlessly
dealt with numerous documents, and is therefore presumed to know
the import thereof.
We are not persuaded by petitioners claim that Rule 69 of
respondents rules and regulations is unreasonable and oppressive

because the provision unduly restricts her right of ownership over the
The validity or enforceability of the impugned contracts will
have to be determined by the peculiar circumstances obtaining in
each case and the situation of the parties concerned. Indeed, Article
24 of the New Civil Code provides that [in] all contractual,
property or other relations, when one of the parties is at a
disadvantage on account of his moral dependence, ignorance,
indigence, mental weakness, tender age, or other handicap,
the courts must be vigilant for his protection. In this case,
however, there is no reason for the Court to apply the rule on
stringent treatment towards contracts of adhesion. To reiterate, not
only is petitioner educated, she is likewise a well-known and
experienced businesswoman; thus, she cannot claim to be the weaker
or disadvantaged party in the subject contracts so as to call for a
strict interpretation against respondents. Moreover, she executed the
Pre-Need Purchase Agreement and Deed of Sale without any
complaint or protest. She assailed Rule 69 of the Rules and
Regulations of respondent SFMPI only when respondents rejected her
request to cause the construction of the mausoleum.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 52311 dated May 10, 2005,
and the Resolution dated September 6, 2005, are AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioner.

(Article 20)
G.R. No. 142943.
April 3, 2002



laboratory testing and if the meter did turn out to be tampered,

electrical services of the plaintiffs will be disconnected. After an hour,
the inspectors informed the plaintiffs that meted had been indeed
tampered and they need to pay P178,875.01 so that their electric
would not be disconnected. The electric service was immediately
reconnected. Still, the plaintiffs filed a complaint for damages with
prayer for the issuance of writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
and also alleging the defendant of acted maliciously and
disconnecting the electricity without due process and without regard
with the plaintiff's rights, feelings, peace of mind, social and business
reputation .
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner and the respondent are entitled
to damages.
HELD: The petitioners are entitled to moral damages although in a
reduced amount only, exemplary damages, and attorney's fees. Moral
damages are recovered when the rights of individuals, including the
right against deprivation of property without due process of law, are
violated. Exemplary damages, on the other hand, are imposed by way
of example or correction for the public good in addition to moral,
temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages. In this case, the
requisites of law must be complied with before the disconnection of
electrical supply can be effected. The petitioners' claim for actual
damages, however, was not granted due to failure to provide proof.
On the other hand, the petitioners were ordered to pay the
respondent the billing differential of P193,332.96. The respondents
were able to present sufficient evidences regarding the amount


FACTS: Spouses Antonio and Lorna Quisumbing are owners of a

house and lot located at Greenmeadows Avenue, Quezon City. Both
also engaged in the export of furniture. The defendant-appellant
Manila Electric Company's (MERALCO) inspectors headed by
Emmanuel Orlino conducted an inspection on the said avenue. The
house of the Quisumbings were inspected by the defendant after
observing a standard operated procedure. After the inspection, it was
found out that the meter has been tampered. The results were relayed
to the plaintiff's secretary who shared the information to the owners.
The owners were advised that defendant will bring the meter for

(Article 19)
University of the East vs. Jader
G.R. No. 132344 February 17, 2000
Ponente: Justice Ynares-Santiago
FACTS: Romeo A. Jader, respondent, in his first semester of his last
school year (School Year 1987-1988) at the University of the East
College of Law, failed to take the regular final examination in Practice
Court I for which he received an incomplete grade. He filed an
application in the second semester, for the removal of the incomplete
grade given by his professor in the aforementioned subject. The
application was approved by the Dean after payment of the required

fee. The respondent took the examination. After which, his grade was
submitted by the professor. It was a failing grade of 5.
On the other hand, after deliberation of the Dean and Faculty
members of the College, respondent's name appeared in the Tentative
List of Candidates for graduation for the Degree of Bachelor of Laws
(LL.B) as of Second Semester (1987-1988). He was among the
students who were given invitations to participate in the
commencement exercises for the candidates of Bachelor of Laws. The
respondent attended the said ceremonies, during the program of
which he went up the stage when his name was called, with her
mother and his eldest brother who assisted in placing the Hood, and
his Tassel was turned from left to right, and he was thereafter handed
by the Dean a rolled white sheet of paper symbolical of the Law
During his review for the bar examinations, he learned of the
deficiency in his grade and was not able to take the bar examination.
He sued his college for moral and exemplary damages arising from
the latters negligence of not urgently informing his deficiency.
ISSUE: Whether or not an educational institution may be held to have
acted in bad faith for misleading a student into believing that the
latter had satisfied all requirements for graduation when such is not.
HELD: The court held that the Petitioner, in belatedly informing
respondent of the result of the removal examination, particularly at a
time when he had already commenced preparing for the bar exams,
cannot be said to have acted in good faith. Absence of good faith
must be sufficiently established for a successful prosecution by the
aggrieved party in a suit for abuse of right under Article 19 of the Civil
Code. Good faith connotes an honest intention to abstain from taking
undue advantage of another, even though the forms and technicalities
of the law, together with the absence of all information or belief of
facts, would render the transaction unconscientious. It is the school
that has access to those information and it is only the school that can
compel its professors to act and comply with its rules, regulations and
policies with respect to the computation and the prompt submission of
grades. Students do not exercise control, much less influence, over
the way an educational institution should run its affairs, particularly in
disciplining its professors and teachers and ensuring their compliance
with the school's rules and orders. Being the party that hired them, it
is the school that exercises general supervision and exclusive control
over the professors with respect to the submission of reports involving
the students' standing. Exclusive control means that no other person

or entity had any control over the instrumentality which caused the
damage or injury.
(Article 21)
G.R. No. 154259. February 28, 2005
On 13 October 1994, Roberto Reyes alleged that he was invited
by Dr. Violeta Filart to join her in the party of Mr. Masakazu Tsuruoka,
the former general manager of Nikko Hotel. The said party was
organized by Ruby Lim, the Executive Secretary of the hotel for the
past twenty (20) years. The guest list was limited to approximately
sixty (60) of Mr. Tsuruokas closest friends and some hotel employees.
Knowing that Mr. Reyes was not one of those invited, Ms. Lim asked
the former to leave the party. Mr. Reyes claimed that he was asked to
leave the party in a scandalous manner. On the other hand, Ms. Lim
claimed that she asked Mr. Reyes politely and discreetly.
The lower court ruled that Ms. Lim did not abuse her right to
ask Mr. Reyes to leave the party as she talked to him politely and
The appellate court, on the other hand, held that Ms. Lim is
liable for damages as she needlessly embarrassed Mr. Reyes by telling
him not to finish his food and to leave the place within hearing
distance of the other guests.
Whether or not Ruby Lim is liable under Article 21 of the Civil

No. Ms. Ruby Lim is not liable under Article 21.

Article 21 refers to acts contra bonus mores and has the

following elements: (1) There is an act which is legal; (2) but which is
contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or public policy; and (3)
it is done with intent to injure.
In the determination of the manner in which Mr. Reyes was asked
to leave, the court reviewed the findings of fact. Mr. Reyes himself
admitted that when Ms. Lim asked him to leave she was so close to
him to a point that they almost kissed. This suggested that Ms. Lim
did not intend herself to be heard by other people to the
embarrassment of Mr. Reyes. The fact that these two did not
personally know each other prior to the party, fails to show that the
act of Ms. Lim was driven by animosity against Mr. Reyes. The
attribution of the alleged misconduct of Ms. Lim to her age and
working environment is a lame argument that cannot be considered.
The absence of any proof of motive on the part of Ms. Lim to
humiliate Mr. Reyes and expose him to ridicule and shame, makes it
highly unlikely that she would shout at him from a very close
distance. Ms. Lim having been in the hotel business for twenty years
wherein being polite and discreet are virtues to be emulated, the
testimony of Mr. Reyes that she acted to the contrary does not inspire
belief and is indeed incredible.
Under Article 21 the nature of the act to be able to claim damages
must be intentional.
In this case, it was not proven that Ms. Ruby Lim has a motive to
intentionally embarrass Mr. Reyes in asking him to leave the party
wherein he was not invited. Thus, Ms. Lim is not liable under Article 21
of the Civil Code.

(Article 26)
People of the Philippines vs. Isauro Santiago
G. R. No. L-17663
May 30, 1962
The case relates to the exposure of Arsenio H. Lacson, then Mayor of
the City of Manila, to public hatred and ridicule by one Isauro
Santiago, in the course of a political speech in Quiapo, Manila on the
5th of October 1959. Defendant, through an amplifier system and in
the presence of a crowd of around a hundred persons called out
Arsenio Hayop Lacson, pinakawalang hiyang Alkalde, Mayor Lacson
raped a woman at the Aroma Cafe and another City Hall employee in
Shellborne Hotel" in which the plaintiff filed an information for libel
against the defendant on August 11, 1960. Defendant, through his
Motion to Quash Information, claimed that the charge is not libel, but
oral defamation, and the filing of information of the latter has already
Whether or not the crime charged in the information is oral
defamation, under Article 358 of the Revised Penal Code, or libel,
under Article 355, in relation to Article 353, of the same Code.
The Supreme Court, En Banc, held that the facts alleged in the
information constitute the crime of oral defamation, under Article 358
of the Revised Penal Code. The grounds by which the information for
libel was filed is the erroneous comparison of the media radio and
amplifier system.
According to Summit Hotel Co. vs. National
Broadcasting Co. (PA-124 A.L.R. 963), the rules governing such
offense were declared inapplicable to extemporaneous remarks of
scurrilous nature, made ad libitum in the course of a radio broadcast
by a person hired to read a prepared text, but not appearing
thereon. The statements, which were heard through an amplifier
system, though defamatory, are extemporaneous such that no
manuscript or prepared text was read.

(Article 36)
ABUNADO V. PEOPLE (G.R. No. 159218. March 30, 2004)

of suspending a criminal case in view of a prejudicial question is to

avoid two conflicting decisions.
The declaration of the judicial
declaration of nullity is immaterial to the prosecution of the criminal
case of bigamy because such crime has been consummated during
the period wherein the marriage is supposedly subsisting.
innocence or guilt of the petitioner is not determined by the
annulment case. A marriage is deemed valid until the declaration of
its nullity or a judicial declaration of annulment.


On September 18, 1967, Salvador Abunado married Narcisa

Arceo at the Manila City Hall before Rev. Pedro Tiangco. In 1988,
Narcisa left for Japan to work but returned to the Philippines in 1992,
when she learned that her husband was having an extra-marital affair
and has left their conjugal home. Narcisa found that Salvador is
cohabiting with Fe Corazon Plato. She also found out that Salvador
contracted a second marriage with certain a Zenaida Bias before
Judge Lilian Dinulos Panontongan in San Mateo, Rizal. On January 19,
1995, an annulment case was filed by Salvador against Narcisa. On
May 18, 1995, a case for bigamy was filed by Narcisa against Salvador
and Zenaida. Salvador admitted that he first married Zenaida on
December 24, 1955 before a municipal trial court judge in
Concepcion, Iloilo and has four children with her prior to their
separation in 1966. It appeared however that there was no evidence
of their 1955 marriage so he and Zenaida remarried on January 10,
1989, upon the request of their son for the purpose of complying with
the requirements for his commission in the military. Salvador was
convicted for bigamy by the trial court. Salvador petitioned for a
review and claims that his petition for annulment/declaration of nullity
of marriage was a prejudicial question, hence, the proceedings in the
bigamy case should have been suspended during the pendency of the
annulment case.

Whether the petition for annulment or nullity of marriage was a

prejudicial question, hence the proceedings in the bigamy case should
be suspended.
No. A prejudicial question has been defined as one based on a
fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected
with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and
for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said
case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal
prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue
or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused
would necessarily be determined. The rationale behind the principle

(Article 27)
G.R. No. L-30745 January 18, 1978
ZABATE, Acting City Treasurer
FACTS: This case is about the legality of the tax collected by the City
of Cebu on sales of matches stored by the Philippine Match Co., Ltd. in
Cebu City but delivered to customers outside of the City.
Ordinance No. 279 of Cebu City (approved by the mayor on March 10,
1960 and also approved by the provincial board) is "an ordinance
imposing a quarterly tax on gross sales or receipts of merchants,
dealers, importers and manufacturers of any commodity doing
business" in Cebu City. It imposes a sales tax of one percent (1%) on
the gross sales, receipts or value of commodities sold, bartered,
exchanged or manufactured in the city in excess of P2,000 a quarter.
Section 9 of the ordinance provides that, for purposes of the tax, "all
deliveries of goods or commodities stored in the City of Cebu, or if not
stored are sold" in that city, "shall be considered as sales" in the city
and shall be taxable.
It assails the legality of the tax which the city treasurer collected on
out-of- town deliveries of matches, to wit: (1) sales of matches booked
and paid for in Cebu City but shipped directly to customers outside of
the city; (2) transfers of matches to newsmen assigned to different
agencies outside of the city and (3) shipments of matches to
provincial customers pursuant to salesmen's instructions.
The company in its letter of April 15, 1961 to the city treasurer sought
the refund of the sales tax paid for out-of-town deliveries of matches.
It invoked Shell Company of the Philippines, Ltd. vs. Municipality of
Sipocot, Camarines Sur, 105 Phil. 1263. In that case sales of oil and
petroleum products effected outside the territorial limits of Sipocot,

were held not to be subject to the tax imposed by an ordinance of that

The city treasurer denied the request. His stand is that under section
9 of the ordinance all out-of-town deliveries of latches stored in the
city are subject to the sales tax imposed by the ordinance.
On August 12, 1963 the company filed the complaint herein, praying
that the ordinance be d void insofar as it taxed the deliveries of
matches outside of Cebu City, that the city be ordered to refund to the
company the said sum of P12,844.61 as excess sales tax paid, and
that the city treasurer be ordered to pay damages.
After hearing, the trial court sustained the tax on the sales of matches
booked and paid for in Cebu City although the matches were shipped
directly to customers outside of the city. The lower court held that the
said sales were consummated in Cebu City because delivery to the
carrier in the city is deemed to be a delivery to the customers outside
of the city.
But the trial court invalidated the tax on transfers of matches to
salesmen assigned to different agencies outside of the city and on
shipments of matches to provincial customers pursuant to the
instructions of the newsmen It ordered the defendants to refund to the
plaintiff the sum of P8,923.55 as taxes paid out the said out-of-town
deliveries with legal rate of interest from the respective dates of
The city did not appeal from that decision. The company appealed
from that portion of the decision upholding the tax on sales of
matches to customers outside of the city but which sales were booked
and paid for in Cebu City, and also from the dismissal of its claim for
damages against the city treasurer.
ISSUE: Whether or not the City of Cebu erred in imposing tax sales on
matches which were perfected and paid for in Cebu City but the
matches were delivered to customers outside of the City.
HELD: We hold that the appeal is devoid of merit bemuse the city can
validly tax the sales of matches to customers outside of the city as
long as the orders were booked and paid for in the company's branch
office in the city. Those matches can be regarded as sold in the city,
as contemplated in the ordinance, because the matches were
delivered to the carrier in Cebu City. Generally, delivery to the carrier
is delivery to the buyer (Art. 1523, Civil Code; Behn, Meyer & Co. vs.
Yangco, 38 Phil. 602).

The sales in the instant case were in the city and the matches sold
were stored in the city. The fact that the matches were delivered to
customers, whose places of business were outside of the city, would
not place those sales beyond the city's taxing power. Those sales
formed part of the merchandising business being assigned on by the
company in the city. In essence, they are the same as sales of
matches fully consummated in the city.
Furthermore, because the sellers place of business is in Cebu City, it
cannot be sensibly argued that such sales should be considered as
transactions subject to the taxing power of the political subdivisions
where the customers resided and accepted delivery of the matches
The company in its second assignment of error contends that the trial
court erred in not ordering defendant acting city treasurer to pay
exemplary damages of P20,000 and attorney's fees.
Article 27 presupposes that the refuse or omission of a public official is
attributable to malice or inexcusable negligence. In this case, it
cannot be said that the city treasurer acted wilfully or was grossly t in
not refunding to the plaintiff the taxes which it paid under protest on
out-of-town sales of matches.
The record clearly reveals that the city treasurer honestly believed
that he was justified under section 9 of the tax ordinance in collecting
the sales tax on out-of-town deliveries, considering that the
company's branch office was located in Cebu City and that all out-oftown purchase order for matches were filled up by the branch office
and the sales were duly reported to it.
The city treasurer acted within the scope of his authority and in
consonance with his bona fide interpretation of the tax ordinance. The
fact that his action was not completely sustained by the courts would
not him liable for We have upheld his act of taxing sales of matches
booked and paid for in the city.

(Article 24)
G.R. NO.88229 May 31, 1994

Guillermo Casipit yRadam, 22 at the time of the incident, appeals to

insist on his innocence after being found guilty of raping Myra
Reynaldo, 14 years old and a sixth grader back then. The two are
neighbors in Victoria, Alaminos, Pangasinan. On 19 September 1986,
Myra was invited by Guillermo to the town of Alaminos to buy rice and
bananas but went to Dagupan instead because of cheaper prices. The
two watched a movie and had dinner before proceeding to Victoria. It
rained hard on their way home so they decided to stay in a hut in the
open field of Barangay Talbang. Inside the hut, Guillermo forced
himself into Myra and Myra could not stop him as he was big and
strong. After arriving at their respective homes, Myra narrated to her
aunt NenitaRabadon everything that took place inside the hut. The
two then reported the incident to the authorities and headed to the
Western Pangasinan General Hospital for a medical examination the
following afternoon.
Guillermo denied all the charges and contested that he and Myra were
sweethearts long before the incident. According to him, Myra gave her
consent to the sexual intercourse that took place in the hut since they
are lovers. Guillermo contended that Myra was probably induced by
her aunt Nenitato file the case. Further, the accused argued that their
movie date and stay in the hut until morning are indicative of Myras
attraction to Guillermo, thereby nullifying her claim of being forced
into having sexual intercourse with him.
Which should the court believe Guillermos or Myras version of the
The court found Guillermo Casipit y Radam guilty of raping Myra
Reynaldo and affirmed his sentence of reclusion perpetua. Further, the
indemnity in favor of Myra was increased to P50,000.00 from P30,000.
According to the court, Myra, at that time, was only 14 years old, an
innocent barrio lass who placed her trust on appellant that day. Her
immediate disclosure of the incident to her family and to the
authorities and submission to medical examination augments the
truthfulness of her case. Further, records showed that she was not a
woman of a flirtatious nature to provoke Guillermo to have sex with
The ruling was based on the States role as parenspatriae having
the obligation to minimize the risk of harm to those who, because of
their minority, are not yet able to fully protect themselves.The court
placed more weight on Myras testimony because of its marked
receptivityto lend credence to the testimonies of victims who
are tender years regarding their versions of what transpired.

(Article 22)



On September 5, 1995 Virgilio C. Crystal and Glynna F. Crystal
obtained a P3,000,000 loan from Citytrust Banking Corporation
secured by a mortgage of land. In 1996, Bank of the Philippine Islands
(BPI) merged with and absorbed Citytrust. Due to the failure of the
petitioners to settle the loan, the mortgaged land was foreclosed and
sold in a public auction on July 21, 1997, to the highest bidder, BPI,
amounting to P5,604,000. The respondent subsequently filed on
March 19, 2001, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu a
complaint against the petitioners for the collection of the deficiency of
mortgage obligation and damages alleging that the total mortgage
obligation amounted to P6,490,623.18resulting to a deficiency of
P886,623.18 to earn 27% interest from the date of the auction sale to
January 1, 2001 and 20% per annum for January 1, 2001 to March 15,
2001. In addition to the claim are the incidental expenses incurred
after the bidding amounting to P1,665,946.69, thus, a total claim of
P3,425,386.27. The petitioners argued that they were not informed of
the interest rates per annum, thus, the foreclosure should be null and
void due to BPIs violation of the Truth in Lending Act. RTC reduced the
petitioners obligation to P5,248,888.65 due to the excessive charges
for interests, penalty charges, liquidated damages and attorneys
fees. Thus, RTC ordered BPI to pay the petitioners P319,111.35 plus
interest of 12% per annum from July 21, 1997 until the debt is fully
paid. On BPIs appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts
decision, but deleted the award of interest. Both parties filed their
respective motions for reconsideration, which were denied.
Thereupon, both parties filed their petitions to the Supreme Court.The
respondents petitionwas denied in G.R. 180129 for failure to
sufficiently show that the appellate court committed any reversible
error in the challenged decision and resolution. The subject of the
petitioners petition is the deletion of RTCs decision of imposing of
interest on the amount to be returned by the respondents.

Should interest be imposed on the surplus to be returned by the

Yes, hence, the petition is granted.The decision of the Court of
Appeals is modified in that the respondent, Bank of the Philippine
Islands will return P319,111.35 representing the excess amount from
the foreclosure sale, to bear interest at 6% per annum starting from
the time the trial court rendered its judgment on September 27,
2004, not after the filing of the complaint, until the finality of this
decision. Legal interest of 12% per annum shall be imposed on the
judgment award inclusive of interest from the finality of this decision
until fully paid.

(Article 33)
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXI; JAIME NAVOA and
MILAGROS DE LEOS, Respondents.
G.R. No. 49588 : December 21, 1990
Private respondents Jaime Navoa and Milagros de Leos filed a criminal
case against petitioners Diong Bi Chu alias "Patrick Chang" and Chang
Ka Hi alias "Chang Ka Hee" with estafa. The charge against Chang Ka
Hee was dismissed on the ground that he had nothing to do with the
transaction. Military Commission No. 3 rendered judgment acquitting
petitioner Diong Bi Chu alias "Patrick Chang", holding that the
transaction between the parties was a joint venture, requiring each
party to contribute to a common fund.

As an offshoot of the criminal case, private respondents filed a civil

action against Diong Bi Chu, Chang Ka Hee and Lu Liong Corporation
for recovery of damages arising from guaranty and fraud, before the
Court of First Instance of Rizal. Petitioners moved for the dismissal of
the civil action for damages filed against them, on the ground that the
same is barred by the prior judgment of Military Commission No. 3
and by private respondents' failure to reserve their right to file a
separate civil action. The court denied said motion to dismiss.
A petition was then filed by herein petitioners before the Court of
Appeals. The appellate court dismissed said petition, holding that the
civil action for damages under Art. 33 of the Civil Code is independent
of the criminal case and that the dismissal of the criminal case against
petitioner Chang Ka Hee and the acquittal of petitioner Diong Bi Chu
do not constitute a bar to the prosecution of the civil action for
damages against them.
Whether or not a civil action for damages based on fraud under Art.
33 of the Civil Code is barred by a prior judgment of acquittal in a
criminal case.
Art. 33 of the Civil Code provides that "(I)n cases of defamation, fraud,
and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and
distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party.
Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal
prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence."
To hold a person liable for damages under the foregoing provision,
only a preponderance of evidence is required. An acquittal in a
criminal case is not a bar to the filing of an action for civil damages,
for one may not be criminally liable and still be civilly liable. Thus, the
outcome or result of the criminal case, whether an acquittal or
conviction, is really inconsequential and will be of no moment in the
civil action. The civil action under Art. 33 need not be reserved
because the law itself already makes the reservation.
Applying the foregoing principles, despite the validity of the acquittal
of Diong Bi Chu and the dismissal of the criminal case against Chang
Ka Hee by Military Commission No. 3, such fact does not deprive
private respondents of their right to recover civil damages against
said persons based on fraud under Art. 33 of the Civil Code.

a. Whether the effectivity of the decision is to be rolled back as
requested by the plaintiffs.
b. Whether the lower court was erroneous in the delay of the decision
for the increase in the claim of the heir of Petra dela Cruz.
(Article 24)


G.R. No. L-35697-99 April 15, 1988

The court granted the petition noting that the plaintiffs were unable to
make an appeal in the lower court due to the fact that the petitioners
are seeking judicial remedy as impoverished individuals. They were
hopeful that the adjudged amount will be provided to them by the
transportation company. With the case pending for thirty years, the
court aptly found this as a sufficient justification to grant the legal
interest as well as the increase in indemnity.

On June 3, 1958, an accident between a Laguna Tayabas Co. (LTB) bus
and Seven-up Bottlers Co. delivery truck resulted to the death of an
LTB passenger named Petra dela Cruz. Two other LTB passengers
namely Eladia de Lima and Nemesio Flores also incurred physical
injuries. De Lima, Flores and the heir of dela Cruz filed suits to the bus

In December 29, 1971, the petitioners requested to expedite the

decision of the case with the hope that the legal interest is to be given
immediately from the date of the decision. By January 31, 1972, the
decision was given. Again, the petitioners reiterated their request for
the modification of the decision in such a way that the effectivity is to
be rolled back to December 27, 1963. Furthermore, the heir of dela
Cruz filed a reconsideration for the increase of indemnity from P3,000
to P12,000. With this pending motion for reconsideration, LTB filed an
appeal for the case. The appellate court turned down the motion for
reconsideration of the plaintiffs indicating that an appeal should have
been filed for the awarding of the legal interest. The petition was
reviewed in 1988, thirty years after the actual incident.

It was found that the rolling back of the effectivity date was necessary
to compensate for the monetary loss the plaintiffs incurred from the
accident, death and court proceedings. Moreover, the claim for Petra
dela Cruz was increased from P3,000.00 to P30,000.00. The decision
was immediately executory in response to the identified urgent need
of the plaintiffs.

(Article 23)
COLLINS and LUIS HIDALGO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF
Presiding Judge, RTC-Br. 74, Malabon, Metro Manila,
SABROSA FOODS, INC., respondents.
On July 1, 1994, Del Monte Corporation-USA (DMC-USA) and
Montebueno Marketing, Inc. (MMI) entered in a Distributorship

Agreement, the latter being as exclusive distributor of products in the

Philippines for a period of five (5) years, renewable for two (2)
consecutive five (5) year periods The Agreement provided, among
others, for an arbitration clause which states 12. GOVERNING LAW AND ARBITRATION
This Agreement shall be governed by the laws of the State of
California and/or, if applicable, the United States of America. All
disputes arising out of or relating to this Agreement or the parties
relationship, including the termination thereof, shall be resolved by
arbitration in the City of San Francisco, State of California, under the
Rules of the American Arbitration Association. The arbitration panel
shall consist of three members, one of whom shall be selected by
DMC-USA, one of whom shall be selected by MMI, and third of whom
shall be selected by the other two members and shall have relevant
experience in the industry x x x x
MMI appointed Sabrosa Foods, Inc. (SFI), with the approval of
petitioner DMC-USA, as MMI's marketing arm to concentrate on its
marketing and selling function as well as to manage its critical
relationship with the trade.
On 3 October 1996, MMI, SFI and MMI's Managing Director Liong Liong
C. Sy filed a Complaint against petitioners DMC-USA, Paul E. Derby, Jr.,
Daniel Collins and Luis Hidalgo, and Dewey Ltd. before the Regional
Trial Court of Malabon, Metro Manila, their complaint is on the alleged
violations by petitioners of Arts. 20, 21, and 23 of the Civil Code.
The complainant claimed, DMC-USA products continued to be brought
into the country by parallel importers despite the appointment of
private respondent MMI as the sole and exclusive distributor of Del
Monte products thereby causing them great embarrassment and
substantial damage. They alleged that the products brought into the
country by these importers were aged, damaged, fake or counterfeit.
The complainant had exhausted all possible avenues for the resolution
and settlement of their grievances and that as a result of the fraud,
bad faith and malice they should be held responsible for all the actual
expenses incurred by private respondents in the delayed shipment of
orders which resulted in the extra handling thereof, the actual
expenses and cost of money for the unused Letters of Credit (LCs) and
the substantial opportunity losses due to created out-of-stock
situations and unauthorized shipments of Del Monte-USA products to
the Philippine Duty Free Area and Economic Zone; that the bad faith,
fraudulent acts and willful negligence of petitioners, motivated by

their determination to squeeze private respondents out of the

outstanding and ongoing Distributorship Agreement in favor of
another party.
On 21 October 1996 petitioners filed a Motion to Suspend
Proceedings invoking the arbitration clause in their Agreement. In a
Resolutioni dated 23 December 1996 the trial court deferred
consideration of petitioners. On 15 January 1997 petitioners filed a
Motion for Reconsideration. On 11 November 1997 the Motion to
Suspend Proceedings was denied by the trial court
Petitioners Motion to suspend proceedings on complaint filed
at Regional Trial Court of Malabon, Metro Manila, invoking the
arbitration clause in their Agreement.
The petition is DENIED
There is no doubt that arbitration is valid and constitutional in our
jurisdiction. Even before the enactment of RA 876, this Court has
countenanced the settlement of disputes through arbitration.
The Agreement between petitioner DMC-USA and private
respondent MMI is a contract. As a rule, contracts are respected as the
law between the contracting parties and produce effect as between
them, their assigns and heirs. Clearly, only parties to the Agreement,
i.e., petitioners DMC-USA and its Managing Director for Export Sales
Paul E. Derby, Jr., and private respondents MMI and its Managing
Director LILY SY are bound by the Agreement and its arbitration clause
as they are the only signatories thereto. Petitioners Daniel Collins and
Luis Hidalgo, and private respondent SFI, not parties to the Agreement
and cannot even be considered assigns or heirs of the parties, are not
bound by the Agreement and the arbitration clause therein.
Consequently, referral to arbitration in the State of California pursuant
to the arbitration clause and the suspension of the proceedings in Civil
Case No. 2637-MN pending the return of the arbitral award could be
called for but only as to petitioners DMC-USA and Paul E. Derby, Jr.,
and private respondents MMI and LILY SY, and not as to the other
parties in this case thus, Daniel Collins and Luis Hidalgo, and private
respondent SFI, not parties to the Agreement and cannot even be
considered assigns or heirs of the parties, are not bound by the
Agreement and the arbitration clause therein.