Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
copy and distribute such copies of the MTC judgment to the public, the
question is whether they did so with the intent of humiliating
respondent and destroying the latter's good name and reputation in
the community.
(Article 26)
Zenaida Gregorio, petitioner, v. Court of Appeals, Sansio Philippines,
Inc. and Emma J. Datuin, respondents GR No. 179799, September 11,
2009
FACTS: Respondents Emma J. Datuin (Datuin) and Sansio Philippines,
Inc. (Sansio) filed an affidavit of complaint for violation of B.P. Blg. 22
(Bouncing Checks Law) against petitioner Zenaida R. Gregorio
(Gregorio), a proprietor of Alvi Marketing. Datuin and Sansio claimed
that Gregorio delivered insufficiently funded bank checks as payment
for appliances Alvi Marketing bought from Sansio. Gregorio was then
indicted for three counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 before the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC), Branch 3, Manila. The MTC issued a
warrant of arrest and she was subsequently arrested by armed
operatives while visiting her family house in Quezon City.
On
December 5, 1997, Gregorio filed before the MTC a Motion for
Deferment of Arraignment and Reinvestigation. She alleged that she
could not have issued the bounced checks as she did not have a
checking account with the bank on which the checks were drawn. This
was certified by the manager of the said bank. Gregorio also alleged
that the signature on the bounced checks were radically and patently
different from her own signature. The MTC granted the motion, and a
reinvestigation was conducted. Subsequently, the MTC ordered the
B.P. Blg. 22 cases dismissed. On August 18, 2000, Gregorio filed a
complaint for damages against Sansio and Datuin before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 12, Ligao, Albay. Part of her complaint was
that as a result of her wrongful arrest and arraignment, she suffered
helplessness, hunger and humiliation and being distraught. Datuin
and Sansio meanwhile filed a Motion to Dismiss on grounds that
Gregorios complaint arose from grounds of compensation arising from
malicious prosecution. On October 10, 2000, the RTC denied this
Motion to Dismiss. Sansio and Datuin then filed a Motion for
Reconsideration but was again denied in January 5, 2001. They went
to the Court of Appeals alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the presiding judge of the RTC in denying their motions to dismiss
and for reconsideration. On January 31, 2007, the CA rendered a
Decision granting the petition and ordering Gregorios damage suit to
be dismissed.
ISSUE: Are Sansio and Datuin liable for damages to Gregorio?
HELD: Yes. Among other reasons, the Supreme Court decided that
Gregorios rights to personal dignity, personal security, privacy, and
peace of mind were infringed by Sansio and Datuin when they failed
to exercise the requisite diligence in determining the identity of the
person they should rightfully accuse of tendering insufficiently funded
checks. . . . Because she was not able to refute the charges against
her, petitioner was falsely indicted for three (3) counts of violation of
B.P. Blg. 22. Gregorio was conveniently at her city residence while
visiting her family. She suffered embarrassment and humiliation over
her sudden arrest and detention and she had to spend time, effort,
and money to clear her tarnished name and reputation, considering
that she had held several honorable positions in different
organizations and offices in the public service, particularly her being a
Kagawad in Oas, Albay at the time of her arrest.
(Article 31)
HEIRS OF PEDRO TAYAG, SR., Petitioners, vs. HONORABLE FERNANDO
S.
ALCANTARA, PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC. and ROMEO VILLA Y
CUNANAN, Respondents (G.R. No. L-50959, dated 23 July 1980)
FACTS: Pedro Tayag, Sr., while riding on a bicycle, was hit by
Philippine Rabbit Bus bearing Body No. 1107 and Plate No. YL 604
PUB '74 driven in faster than prescribed speed by Romeo Villa Y
Cunanan on 02 September 1974 in Tarlac, Tarlac along MacArthur
Highway. The occurrence had him sustain physical injuries that caused
his immediate death and damages to his bicycle. The complaint filed
by the petitioners against the respondents on 25 September 1976,
docketed as Civil Case No. 5114, was suspended when the
respondent Judge granted the motion of the respondents to suspend
the trial on the ground that the criminal case against the driver of the
bus Romeo Villa Y Cunanan was still pending in the same court,
supported by Section 3, Rule III of the Revised Rules of Court. In
Criminal Case No. 836, accused Romeo Villa Y Cunanan was acquitted
of the crime of homicide on 25 October 1977. The respondent Judge
ordered the dismissal of Civil Case No. 5114, acting upon the motions
of the respondents, to dismiss the case on the ground that the
petitioners have no valid cause of action against them given that the
driver of the bus was acquitted in the criminal action and of the
petitioners, opposing with the argument that cause of action is not
based on crime, but on quasi-delict. Thereafter, the petitioners move
to reconsider was denied by the respondent Judge on 30 May 1979.
The petitioners presented the petition of certiorari, to annul and set
aside the order of respondent Judge. The respondents filed their
comments afterwards.
ISSUE: Whether or not to consider the petition of certiorari introduced
by the petitioners.
document. Nineteen years later, on May 2, 1990, Paras sold the same
property to Santiago Saya-ang for P5,000.00. This was evidenced by a
notarized Deed of Absolute Sale. When Yap learned of the second sale,
she filed a complaint for estafa against Paras and Saya-ang and filed a
complaint for the nullification of the said sale with the Regional Trial
Court of General Santos City. On April 17, 1991, before the
arraignment, the trial judge motu proporio issued an order dismissing
the criminal case on the ground that there is a prejudicial question,
citing Ras vs. Rasul, 100 SCRA 125. The petitioner came to the
Supeme Court for relief in this special civil action for certiorari. Her
contention is that where there is a prejudicial question in a civil case,
the criminal action may not be dismissed but not dismissed.
ISSUES:
Whether there was a motion for suspension of the case by reason of
prejudicial question.
Whether the judge had a misconception of a prejudicial question.
Whether the defense involved an issue similar or intimately related to
the same issue raised in the criminal action and its resolution to
determine if the latter action may proceed.
HELD:
The petition is granted therefore Judge Alfredo D. Barcelona, Sr.s
dismissal of Criminal Case No. 1902-G dated April 17, 1991 and the
Order dated April 30, 1991, denying the motion for reconsideration,
are all reversed and set aside. Criminal Case No. 1902-G is ordered
reinstated for further proceedings, but to be assigned to a different
judge.
(Article 22)
Republic v Lacap
G.R. No. 158253 March 2, 2007
Ponente: Justice Austria-Martinez
FACTS:
The respondent, Carlito Lacap, doing business under the name
and style CARWIN CONSTRUCTION AND CONSTRUCTION SUPPLY had
entered into contract with the Philippine Government through the
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS (DPWH) on the
(Article 28)
Calamba Medical Center, INC. vs National Labor Relations
Commission, Ronaldo Lanzanas and Merceditha Lanzanas
G.R. No. 176484 November 25, 2008
Facts:
Dr. Ronaldo and Merceditha Lanzanas are both former
employees of Calamba Medical Center INC. Circumstances led to the
termination of their employment hospital. It was also found that a
watchlist or watch out list containing the names of the couple was in
circulation among the local hospitals, and was allegedly distributed by
a stockholder of the petitioner.
The couple filed complaints for illegal dismissal before the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) Regional Arbitration Board which
were consolidated and docketed as NLRC CASE NO. RAB-IV-3-9879-98L.
The NLRC, on appeal, awarded full backwages, separation pay, 500,
000 pesos in moral damages each, exemplary damages of 250,000
pesos each, and 10% of the total award for attorneys fees to the
doctors on May 3, 2002.
The case was brought to the Court of Appeals on certiorari and on
June 30, 2004, the appellate court reinstated the NLRC decision,
however the award to each of the spouses no longer included the
attorney fees and the moral and exemplary damages were tempered
to 100,000 pesos and 50,000 pesos.
Issue: Can the respondents, Doctor Ronaldo and Merceditha
Lanzanas, claim more in damages for the actions against them?
Held: The distribution of the watchlist constitutes as an unfair labor
practice, due to its intent to prevent further gainful employment of
those listed. As such, Dr. Ronaldo and Merceditha Lanzanas have a
right to action for damages by Calamba Medical Center, INC.
On November 25, 2008, the Court of Appeals reinstated the 10% of
the total judgement award as attorney fees as action for damages of
unfair labor practices by Calamba Medical Center, INC.
(Article 31)
G & S Transport Corporation, petitioner vs. Heirs of Jose Marcial K.
Ochoa namely Ruby B. Ochoa, Micaela B. Ochoa and Jomar B. Ochoa,
respondents
(G.R. No. 170125 March 9, 2011)
FACTS:
Jose Marcial K. Ochoa, husband of respondent Ruby B. Ochoa,
died on the night of March 10, 1995 while on board an Avis taxicab
owned and operated by G & S Transport Corporation, petitionercommon carrier. Ruby Ochoa and her children, Micaela and Jomar,
through counsel, filed a complaint against G & S for damages before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City which was raffled to Branch
164 of said court.
On December 27, 2001, the trial court rendered a Decision
finding the vehicular mishap caused by the negligence of Bibiano
Padilla, the driver. It likewise found the evidence adduced by G & S to
show that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of its employees as insufficient. Hence, the
trial court declared G & S civilly liable to the heirs. However, for lack
of receipts or any proof of funeral expenses and other actual
damages, the trial court denied the heirs claim for actual damages,
moral and exemplary damages for lack of legal basis.
G & S filed a Notice of Appeal while the heirs filed a Motion for
Partial Reconsideration. After G & S filed its Opposition (To Plaintiffs
Motion for Partial Reconsideration), the trial court favored the heirs
Motion for Partial Reconsideration and thus declared them entitled to
moral and exemplary damages.
Padilla was convicted of reckless imprudence resulting to
homicide in an MTC Decision but was later on acquitted in the RTC
Decision.
Before the CA, G & S continued to insist that it exercised the
diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and
supervision of its employees. G & S also argued that the proximate
cause of Jose Marcials death is a fortuitous event and/or the fault or
negligence of another and not of its employee.
On the other hand, the heirs maintained that Padilla was
grossly negligent in driving the Avis taxicab on the night of March 10,
1995. In a Decision dated June 29, 2005, the CA ruled in favor of the
heirs.
With respect to the award of P6,537,244.96 for Jose Marcials
loss of earning capacity, the CA declared the same unwarranted. It
found the Certification issued by Jose Marcials employer as selfserving, unreliable, and biased. Anent moral damages, the CA reduced
it to P200,000.00 as to make it proportionate to the award of
exemplary damages which is P50,000.00. CA denied both parties
respective motions for reconsideration.
Hence, G & S and the heirs filed their respective Petitions for
Review on Certiorari before the Supreme Court. The heirs petition was
docketed as G.R. No. 170071 and that of G & S as G.R. No. 170125.
These petitions were later consolidated pursuant to this Courts
Resolution of November 21, 2005.
One of the grounds in the petition of G & S is that CA gravely
erred in not taking note of the fact that the petitioners employee had
been acquitted of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting (in)
homicide.
Issue: Did the Court of Appeals made an error by not taking note of
the fact that Padilla, an employee of the petitioner, has been
acquitted of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide?
(Article 20)
HELD: The court affirmed the MTC decision. Although the evidence
failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt the negligence of the
petitioner, thus absolving him of criminal liability, preponderant
evidence is enough to hold him civilly liable for damages.
(Article
The court ordered the defendant to pay Mr. Velayo twice the amount
of the value of the plane for compensatory and exemplary damages.
(Article 34)
G.R. No. 122150
March 17, 2003
HAMBON vs. COURT OF APPEALS
Petitioner: GEORGE (CULHI) HAMBON
Respondents: COURT OF APPEALS AND VALENTINO U. CARANTES
Ponente: AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
FACTS:
On June 6, 1989, the petitioner filed before the Regional Trial
Court of Baguio, a complaint for damages for the injuries and
expenses he incurred last December 9, 1985. However, the Criminal
Case No. 2049 for Serious Physical Injuries thru Reckless Imprudence
filed on January 8, 1986 was already dismissed by the Municipal Trial
Court of Tuba, Benguet due to lack of petitioners interest and that the
dismissal was with respect to both the criminal and civil case.
After the trial, the RTC of Baguio ruled that the petitioner is
entitled to damages. However, the Court of Appeals, in its decision on
March 8, 1995, refused to affirm the decision of the Regional Trial
Court and dismissed the petitioners claim for damages based on
Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as
amended in 1988, which is the prevailing and governing law in this
case, viz.:
SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. When a
criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil
liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the
offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it
separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the
Revised Penal Code, and damages under Article 32, 33, 34 and 2176
of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or
omission of the accused.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a civil case for damages based on an
independent civil action be duly dismissed for failure to make
reservation to file a separate civil action in a criminal case filed arising
from the same act or omission of the accused?
HELD:
Yes. The Court ruled that the petitioner should have reserved
his right to separately institute the civil action for damages. Due to
this failure, the civil case was deemed impliedly instituted with the
Criminal Case No. 2049 which was then previously dismissed by the
Court. In effect, Civil Case No. 1761-R for damages subsequently filed
by him without prior reservation should be dismissed.
(Article 21)
Gashem Shookat Baksh vs. CA
219 SCRA 115
Facts: The petitioner, Gashem Shookat Baksh is an Iranian National
studying medicine at the Lyceum Northwestern Colleges in Dagupan
City; while the private respondent name is Marilou Gonzales who
works in the cafeteria of the said school. She is 22 years old, single,
Filipina of good moral character and reputation duly respected in her
community. Gashem courted and proposed to marry her which she
accepted on the premise that they would be married. The petitioner
even went to the province of the private respondent to ask the
approval of her parents. The petitioner forced her to live with him in
his apartment in which she allowed herself to be deflowered by him.
After about two months, the petitioner began to change and started to
maltreated her even threatened to kill her and later repudiated their
marriage agreement. No marriage came hence an action for breach
of promise to marry.
Issue: Whether or not Article 21 of the Civil Code is applicable in the
case and whether or not a breach of promise to marry an actionable
wrong.
Held: The existing rule is that breach of promise to marry per se is
not actionable wrong. Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft
of the New Civil Code the provisions that would have made it so.
Where a mans promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the
acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill
that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of
herself unto him in sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no
intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle
scheme or perceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept his
and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of
damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry
but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and wilful injury to her
honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential
however, that such injury should have been committed in manner
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.
(Article 36)
Berbari vs. Concepcion
G.R. No. L-16189 February 26, 1920
Ponente: Justice Torres
Facts:
(Article 24)
TERESITA DIO versus ST. FERDINAND MEMORIAL PARK, INC. and
MILDRED F. TANTOCO
G.R. No. 169578 November 30, 2006
FACTS:
On December 11, 1973, Teresita Dio agreed to buy, on
instalment basis, a memorial lot from the St. Ferdinand Memorial Park,
Inc. (SFMPI) in Lucena City. The 36-square-meter memorial lot is
particularly described as Block 2, Section F, Lot 15. The purchase was
evidenced by a Pre-Need Purchase Agreement dated December 11,
1973 and denominated as Contract No. 384. She obliged herself to
abide by all such rules and regulations governing the SFMPI dated May
25, 1972.
SFMPI issued a Deed of Sale and Certificate of Perpetual
Care dated April 1, 1974 denominated as Contract No. 284. The
ownership of Dio over the property was made subject to the rules and
regulations of SFMPI, as well as the government, including all
amendments, additions and modifications that may later be
adopted. Rule 69 of the Rules reads:
Rule 69. Mausoleum building and memorials should be
constructed by the Park Personnel. Lot Owners
cannot
contract
other
contractors
for
the
construction of the said buildings and memorial,
however, the lot owner is free to give their own
because the provision unduly restricts her right of ownership over the
property.
The validity or enforceability of the impugned contracts will
have to be determined by the peculiar circumstances obtaining in
each case and the situation of the parties concerned. Indeed, Article
24 of the New Civil Code provides that [in] all contractual,
property or other relations, when one of the parties is at a
disadvantage on account of his moral dependence, ignorance,
indigence, mental weakness, tender age, or other handicap,
the courts must be vigilant for his protection. In this case,
however, there is no reason for the Court to apply the rule on
stringent treatment towards contracts of adhesion. To reiterate, not
only is petitioner educated, she is likewise a well-known and
experienced businesswoman; thus, she cannot claim to be the weaker
or disadvantaged party in the subject contracts so as to call for a
strict interpretation against respondents. Moreover, she executed the
Pre-Need Purchase Agreement and Deed of Sale without any
complaint or protest. She assailed Rule 69 of the Rules and
Regulations of respondent SFMPI only when respondents rejected her
request to cause the construction of the mausoleum.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 52311 dated May 10, 2005,
and the Resolution dated September 6, 2005, are AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioner.
(Article 20)
Spouses ANTONIO and LORNA
ELECTRIC COMPANY (MERALCO)
G.R. No. 142943.
April 3, 2002
QUISUMBING
vs.
MANILA
(Article 19)
University of the East vs. Jader
G.R. No. 132344 February 17, 2000
Ponente: Justice Ynares-Santiago
FACTS: Romeo A. Jader, respondent, in his first semester of his last
school year (School Year 1987-1988) at the University of the East
College of Law, failed to take the regular final examination in Practice
Court I for which he received an incomplete grade. He filed an
application in the second semester, for the removal of the incomplete
grade given by his professor in the aforementioned subject. The
application was approved by the Dean after payment of the required
fee. The respondent took the examination. After which, his grade was
submitted by the professor. It was a failing grade of 5.
On the other hand, after deliberation of the Dean and Faculty
members of the College, respondent's name appeared in the Tentative
List of Candidates for graduation for the Degree of Bachelor of Laws
(LL.B) as of Second Semester (1987-1988). He was among the
students who were given invitations to participate in the
commencement exercises for the candidates of Bachelor of Laws. The
respondent attended the said ceremonies, during the program of
which he went up the stage when his name was called, with her
mother and his eldest brother who assisted in placing the Hood, and
his Tassel was turned from left to right, and he was thereafter handed
by the Dean a rolled white sheet of paper symbolical of the Law
Diploma.
During his review for the bar examinations, he learned of the
deficiency in his grade and was not able to take the bar examination.
He sued his college for moral and exemplary damages arising from
the latters negligence of not urgently informing his deficiency.
ISSUE: Whether or not an educational institution may be held to have
acted in bad faith for misleading a student into believing that the
latter had satisfied all requirements for graduation when such is not.
HELD: The court held that the Petitioner, in belatedly informing
respondent of the result of the removal examination, particularly at a
time when he had already commenced preparing for the bar exams,
cannot be said to have acted in good faith. Absence of good faith
must be sufficiently established for a successful prosecution by the
aggrieved party in a suit for abuse of right under Article 19 of the Civil
Code. Good faith connotes an honest intention to abstain from taking
undue advantage of another, even though the forms and technicalities
of the law, together with the absence of all information or belief of
facts, would render the transaction unconscientious. It is the school
that has access to those information and it is only the school that can
compel its professors to act and comply with its rules, regulations and
policies with respect to the computation and the prompt submission of
grades. Students do not exercise control, much less influence, over
the way an educational institution should run its affairs, particularly in
disciplining its professors and teachers and ensuring their compliance
with the school's rules and orders. Being the party that hired them, it
is the school that exercises general supervision and exclusive control
over the professors with respect to the submission of reports involving
the students' standing. Exclusive control means that no other person
or entity had any control over the instrumentality which caused the
damage or injury.
(Article 21)
G.R. No. 154259. February 28, 2005
NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN and RUBY LIM vs. ROBERTO
REYES, a.k.a. AMAY BISAYA
Facts:
On 13 October 1994, Roberto Reyes alleged that he was invited
by Dr. Violeta Filart to join her in the party of Mr. Masakazu Tsuruoka,
the former general manager of Nikko Hotel. The said party was
organized by Ruby Lim, the Executive Secretary of the hotel for the
past twenty (20) years. The guest list was limited to approximately
sixty (60) of Mr. Tsuruokas closest friends and some hotel employees.
Knowing that Mr. Reyes was not one of those invited, Ms. Lim asked
the former to leave the party. Mr. Reyes claimed that he was asked to
leave the party in a scandalous manner. On the other hand, Ms. Lim
claimed that she asked Mr. Reyes politely and discreetly.
The lower court ruled that Ms. Lim did not abuse her right to
ask Mr. Reyes to leave the party as she talked to him politely and
discreetly.
The appellate court, on the other hand, held that Ms. Lim is
liable for damages as she needlessly embarrassed Mr. Reyes by telling
him not to finish his food and to leave the place within hearing
distance of the other guests.
Issue:
Whether or not Ruby Lim is liable under Article 21 of the Civil
Code.
Ruling:
No. Ms. Ruby Lim is not liable under Article 21.
(Article 26)
People of the Philippines vs. Isauro Santiago
G. R. No. L-17663
May 30, 1962
Facts:
The case relates to the exposure of Arsenio H. Lacson, then Mayor of
the City of Manila, to public hatred and ridicule by one Isauro
Santiago, in the course of a political speech in Quiapo, Manila on the
5th of October 1959. Defendant, through an amplifier system and in
the presence of a crowd of around a hundred persons called out
Arsenio Hayop Lacson, pinakawalang hiyang Alkalde, Mayor Lacson
raped a woman at the Aroma Cafe and another City Hall employee in
Shellborne Hotel" in which the plaintiff filed an information for libel
against the defendant on August 11, 1960. Defendant, through his
Motion to Quash Information, claimed that the charge is not libel, but
oral defamation, and the filing of information of the latter has already
prescribed.
Issue:
Whether or not the crime charged in the information is oral
defamation, under Article 358 of the Revised Penal Code, or libel,
under Article 355, in relation to Article 353, of the same Code.
Held:
The Supreme Court, En Banc, held that the facts alleged in the
information constitute the crime of oral defamation, under Article 358
of the Revised Penal Code. The grounds by which the information for
libel was filed is the erroneous comparison of the media radio and
amplifier system.
According to Summit Hotel Co. vs. National
Broadcasting Co. (PA-124 A.L.R. 963), the rules governing such
offense were declared inapplicable to extemporaneous remarks of
scurrilous nature, made ad libitum in the course of a radio broadcast
by a person hired to read a prepared text, but not appearing
thereon. The statements, which were heard through an amplifier
system, though defamatory, are extemporaneous such that no
manuscript or prepared text was read.
(Article 36)
ABUNADO V. PEOPLE (G.R. No. 159218. March 30, 2004)
Facts
(Article 27)
G.R. No. L-30745 January 18, 1978
PHILIPPINE MATCH CO., LTD. VS. THE CITY OF CEBU and JESUS E.
ZABATE, Acting City Treasurer
FACTS: This case is about the legality of the tax collected by the City
of Cebu on sales of matches stored by the Philippine Match Co., Ltd. in
Cebu City but delivered to customers outside of the City.
Ordinance No. 279 of Cebu City (approved by the mayor on March 10,
1960 and also approved by the provincial board) is "an ordinance
imposing a quarterly tax on gross sales or receipts of merchants,
dealers, importers and manufacturers of any commodity doing
business" in Cebu City. It imposes a sales tax of one percent (1%) on
the gross sales, receipts or value of commodities sold, bartered,
exchanged or manufactured in the city in excess of P2,000 a quarter.
Section 9 of the ordinance provides that, for purposes of the tax, "all
deliveries of goods or commodities stored in the City of Cebu, or if not
stored are sold" in that city, "shall be considered as sales" in the city
and shall be taxable.
It assails the legality of the tax which the city treasurer collected on
out-of- town deliveries of matches, to wit: (1) sales of matches booked
and paid for in Cebu City but shipped directly to customers outside of
the city; (2) transfers of matches to newsmen assigned to different
agencies outside of the city and (3) shipments of matches to
provincial customers pursuant to salesmen's instructions.
The company in its letter of April 15, 1961 to the city treasurer sought
the refund of the sales tax paid for out-of-town deliveries of matches.
It invoked Shell Company of the Philippines, Ltd. vs. Municipality of
Sipocot, Camarines Sur, 105 Phil. 1263. In that case sales of oil and
petroleum products effected outside the territorial limits of Sipocot,
The sales in the instant case were in the city and the matches sold
were stored in the city. The fact that the matches were delivered to
customers, whose places of business were outside of the city, would
not place those sales beyond the city's taxing power. Those sales
formed part of the merchandising business being assigned on by the
company in the city. In essence, they are the same as sales of
matches fully consummated in the city.
Furthermore, because the sellers place of business is in Cebu City, it
cannot be sensibly argued that such sales should be considered as
transactions subject to the taxing power of the political subdivisions
where the customers resided and accepted delivery of the matches
sold.
The company in its second assignment of error contends that the trial
court erred in not ordering defendant acting city treasurer to pay
exemplary damages of P20,000 and attorney's fees.
Article 27 presupposes that the refuse or omission of a public official is
attributable to malice or inexcusable negligence. In this case, it
cannot be said that the city treasurer acted wilfully or was grossly t in
not refunding to the plaintiff the taxes which it paid under protest on
out-of-town sales of matches.
The record clearly reveals that the city treasurer honestly believed
that he was justified under section 9 of the tax ordinance in collecting
the sales tax on out-of-town deliveries, considering that the
company's branch office was located in Cebu City and that all out-oftown purchase order for matches were filled up by the branch office
and the sales were duly reported to it.
The city treasurer acted within the scope of his authority and in
consonance with his bona fide interpretation of the tax ordinance. The
fact that his action was not completely sustained by the courts would
not him liable for We have upheld his act of taxing sales of matches
booked and paid for in the city.
(Article 24)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. GUILLERMO CASIPIT Y RADAM
G.R. NO.88229 May 31, 1994
FACTS:
(Article 22)
Facts:
On September 5, 1995 Virgilio C. Crystal and Glynna F. Crystal
obtained a P3,000,000 loan from Citytrust Banking Corporation
secured by a mortgage of land. In 1996, Bank of the Philippine Islands
(BPI) merged with and absorbed Citytrust. Due to the failure of the
petitioners to settle the loan, the mortgaged land was foreclosed and
sold in a public auction on July 21, 1997, to the highest bidder, BPI,
amounting to P5,604,000. The respondent subsequently filed on
March 19, 2001, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu a
complaint against the petitioners for the collection of the deficiency of
mortgage obligation and damages alleging that the total mortgage
obligation amounted to P6,490,623.18resulting to a deficiency of
P886,623.18 to earn 27% interest from the date of the auction sale to
January 1, 2001 and 20% per annum for January 1, 2001 to March 15,
2001. In addition to the claim are the incidental expenses incurred
after the bidding amounting to P1,665,946.69, thus, a total claim of
P3,425,386.27. The petitioners argued that they were not informed of
the interest rates per annum, thus, the foreclosure should be null and
void due to BPIs violation of the Truth in Lending Act. RTC reduced the
petitioners obligation to P5,248,888.65 due to the excessive charges
for interests, penalty charges, liquidated damages and attorneys
fees. Thus, RTC ordered BPI to pay the petitioners P319,111.35 plus
interest of 12% per annum from July 21, 1997 until the debt is fully
paid. On BPIs appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts
decision, but deleted the award of interest. Both parties filed their
respective motions for reconsideration, which were denied.
Thereupon, both parties filed their petitions to the Supreme Court.The
respondents petitionwas denied in G.R. 180129 for failure to
sufficiently show that the appellate court committed any reversible
error in the challenged decision and resolution. The subject of the
petitioners petition is the deletion of RTCs decision of imposing of
interest on the amount to be returned by the respondents.
Issue:
Should interest be imposed on the surplus to be returned by the
respondents?
Held:
Yes, hence, the petition is granted.The decision of the Court of
Appeals is modified in that the respondent, Bank of the Philippine
Islands will return P319,111.35 representing the excess amount from
the foreclosure sale, to bear interest at 6% per annum starting from
the time the trial court rendered its judgment on September 27,
2004, not after the filing of the complaint, until the finality of this
decision. Legal interest of 12% per annum shall be imposed on the
judgment award inclusive of interest from the finality of this decision
until fully paid.
(Article 33)
DIONG BI CHU, alias PATRICK CHANG, CHANG KA HEE and LU
LIONG CORPORATION, Petitioners, vs. THE HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, HON. GREGORIO G. PINEDA, as Presiding Judge,
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXI; JAIME NAVOA and
MILAGROS DE LEOS, Respondents.
G.R. No. 49588 : December 21, 1990
FACTS:
Private respondents Jaime Navoa and Milagros de Leos filed a criminal
case against petitioners Diong Bi Chu alias "Patrick Chang" and Chang
Ka Hi alias "Chang Ka Hee" with estafa. The charge against Chang Ka
Hee was dismissed on the ground that he had nothing to do with the
transaction. Military Commission No. 3 rendered judgment acquitting
petitioner Diong Bi Chu alias "Patrick Chang", holding that the
transaction between the parties was a joint venture, requiring each
party to contribute to a common fund.
ISSUES:
a. Whether the effectivity of the decision is to be rolled back as
requested by the plaintiffs.
b. Whether the lower court was erroneous in the delay of the decision
for the increase in the claim of the heir of Petra dela Cruz.
(Article 24)
HELD:
The court granted the petition noting that the plaintiffs were unable to
make an appeal in the lower court due to the fact that the petitioners
are seeking judicial remedy as impoverished individuals. They were
hopeful that the adjudged amount will be provided to them by the
transportation company. With the case pending for thirty years, the
court aptly found this as a sufficient justification to grant the legal
interest as well as the increase in indemnity.
FACTS:
On June 3, 1958, an accident between a Laguna Tayabas Co. (LTB) bus
and Seven-up Bottlers Co. delivery truck resulted to the death of an
LTB passenger named Petra dela Cruz. Two other LTB passengers
namely Eladia de Lima and Nemesio Flores also incurred physical
injuries. De Lima, Flores and the heir of dela Cruz filed suits to the bus
company.
It was found that the rolling back of the effectivity date was necessary
to compensate for the monetary loss the plaintiffs incurred from the
accident, death and court proceedings. Moreover, the claim for Petra
dela Cruz was increased from P3,000.00 to P30,000.00. The decision
was immediately executory in response to the identified urgent need
of the plaintiffs.
(Article 23)
DEL MONTE CORPORATION-USA, PAUL E. DERBY, JR., DANIEL
COLLINS and LUIS HIDALGO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, JUDGE BIENVENIDO L. REYES in his capacity as
Presiding Judge, RTC-Br. 74, Malabon, Metro Manila,
MONTEBUENO MARKETING, INC., LIONG LIONG C. SY and
SABROSA FOODS, INC., respondents.
FACTS:
On July 1, 1994, Del Monte Corporation-USA (DMC-USA) and
Montebueno Marketing, Inc. (MMI) entered in a Distributorship