The Government of the United Kingdom carry tremendous power and all people of the state

are affected by it. It has been said that governments have become the most powerful organs
of nation states.(1) With this in mind, it is recognised that a Separation of Powers of some
sort is required in a democracy to ensure no one branch of a state holds more power than it
ought to.(2) In the UK parliamentary institutions and structures are in place to scrutinise the
Governments use of power. They work to ensure the Government are not simply satisfying
their own interests and objectives.(3) How effectively Parliament holds individual ministers
and the Government to account for their policy, legislation and administration will be
examined. This will be done through the relevant law, convention and parliamentary
procedure, namely Parliaments scrutiny of Government bills and The Convention of
Individual Ministerial Responsibility.

Parliaments scrutinising function in the passage of Government bills works to hold the
Governments policy and the law it makes to account. It has been recognised in legislation,
since the Bill of Rights 1688, that people of the state will be fully and freely represented.(4)
Today, safeguarding this basic principle, includes the procedure of Draft Legislative
Programmes published by Governments from 2007 which allow Parliamentary debate and
public consultation on suggested legislation.(5) The Electoral Registration and
Administration Act 2013 was preceded by a white paper and draft legislation which was
subject to public consultation and to pre-legislative scrutiny by the Political and
Constitutional Reform Committee. They recommended that the Government ensure underrepresented people on the registers are not deprived of their right to vote.(6) It is indicated
that the Government were held to account through pre-legislative scrutiny because Section 14
of the 2013 Act now extends the time for finalising the register which allows this group more
(1) P Craig & A Tomkins, The Executive and Public Law: Power and Accountability in Comparative

Perspective (2006), p1.

(2) Montesque, The Spirit of Laws (1748), Book XI, Chapter 6.
(3) Montesquieu, Charles de Secondat, baron de. The Sprit of Laws (c.1748). Translated and edited by
Anne Cohler, Basia Miller, Harold Stone. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989)
(4) The Bill of Rights 1688, paragraph 1, p 1.
(5)- C. Turpin & A. Tomkins, British Government and The Constitution: Text, Cases and Material,
Seventh Edition. (Cambridge University Press), p 457.
(6)- Political and Constitutional Reform Committee- Tenth Report (Ordered by The House of Commons
October 2011) Section 3, Subsection 39.

opportunity to participate in voting.(7) However, bills usually conform with Government

interest at this stage as pre-legislative scrutiny only call on the Government to amend the
bill and the Government itself puts the bill into shape.(8) Parliamentary debate may be relied
upon if draftsmanship is not as analytical or developed as would be anticipated.(9) Prelegislative scrutiny may hold the Government, as a whole, accountable for its law and policy
but its effectiveness requires Government cooperation as it can dismiss outside interest at this
stage.(10)

In the House of Commons most debate on principle of the bill is done at

second reading as opposition parties deliver their challenge to the policy
of the bill. Under Standing Order No. 83A, the bill is committed to a
Committee of the whole House. The person responsible for the bill opens
the debate, the opposition spokesperson responds with their views on the
Bill and the debate continues with other opposition parties and backbench
MPs giving their opinions. A bill is debated, although rarely defeated and it

is possible for a bill to have a second reading with no debate as long as

MPs agree to its progress. MPs may vote at the end (7)- Electoral Registration
and Administration Act 2013, Section 14, Subsections (1-5)
(8)- Making The Law: The Report of the Hansard Society Commission on The
Legislative Process (The Hansard Society for Parliamentary Government November
1992) , chapter 2, p 7.
(9)- Lt-Col. Lockwood in 1907, quoted by Walkland, The House of Commons in the
Twentieth Century, pp. 253-4
(10)- The Modernisation Committee (1st Report of 2005-06, HC 1097) paragraph 56.

of this stage, though it is extremely rare that the Government is defeated

on the motion for second reading, the Reduction of Redundancy Rebates
Bill 1977 and the Shops Bill 1986 were the only two instances since 1927.
The Hansard Societys recommendation of reducing the time for debate in
second reading(11) conflicts with some constitutional law texts(12) because
second reading allows many MPs, instead of smaller committees of the
Commons, to argue the bills principles, allowing Parliament to effectively
hold the Government as a whole to account for its policy and legislation as
greater numbers of MPs have opportunities to voice concern over
Government proposals.
Most argument which allows Parliament to hold the Government to
account on the detail of provisions is done at committee stage. Most bills
are referred to public bill committees and their impact relies on MPs
learning about the background, aims and the mechanics of the bill. In
1985 a committee was so strong in succeeding changes to the

Governments Civil Aviation Bill that the criticism of opposition and

backbenchers gave the Government no choice but to give up the bill .(13)
An assessment of the stage said that it has become more transparent
and improved debate resulted from the power to receive oral evidence
and expert advice on proposed Government legislation.(14) Evidence
based decisions of public bill committees give more independent
scrutiny(15) of Government bills with the power to alter the attitude of
MPs.

(16)

Small majority Governments or minority governments may have

(11) Making The Law: The Report of the Hansard Society Commission on The
Legislative Process (The Hansard Society for Parliamentary Government November
1992) Chapter 5, p 84.
(12) JAG Griffith, Standing Committees in the House of Commons, in SA Walkland
and Michael Ryle (eds), The Commons Today (rev edn 1981), pp 121-2,130-1.
(13) C. Turpin & A. Tomkins, British Government and The Constitution: Text, Cases
and Material, Seventh Edition. (Cambridge University Press), p 638
(14) J. Levy, Strengthening Parliaments Powers of Scrutiny?, An assessment of the
Introduction of Public Bill Committees, (The Constitution Unit, 2009), p 30.
(15) One report concluded that, the time has come to make it possible to receive
direct evidence on bills in committee, showing outside support in increasing the
transparency and evidence based decision making transition of the committee stage.

Making The Law: The Report of The Hansard Society Commission on The Legislative
Process (The Hansard Society for Parliamentary Government November 1992)
Chapter 5, p86.
(16) J. Levy, Strengthening Parliaments Powers of Scrutiny?, An assessment of the

Introduction of Public Bill Committees, (The Constitution Unit, 2009), p 50

difficulty in managing the Public Bill Committee because Government

strength in the House mirrors representation in the committee.(17) The
committee stage is able to hold the Government as a whole to account for
its law and policy as more evidence based committees have made the
passage of Government bills tougher for Governments. However, the
Governments strength in The House can vary the effectiveness of
committees.

When bills are sent for approval in the Second Chamber of Parliament
holding the Government to account for their law and policy includes
scrutinising the work of the Government in committees. It has been said
that undoubtedly the most significant work of the Lords today is its
consideration of public bills.(18) At committee stage the Lords can meet
as a committee of the whole house or in Grand committee in a
committee room where no voting takes place but decisions must be
unanimous. Rarely bills are referred to Special Public Bills Committee. The
Constitutional Reform Bill 2004 was not given pre-legislative scrutiny and
the procedure of the House of Lords allowed major amendments to be
made to the bill. Legislation can contain provisions allowing ministers to
make laws, called delegated powers. Ministers use these powers to
create secondary legislation, usually in the form of statutory instruments.

The Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee examine public

bills to see if the powers given to ministers are appropriately
delegated(19) and considered the power to enable the Secretary of State
to reduce the duration of copyright for certain works(20) to be wide,
unclear, and asked for the provision of greater safeguards for private
rights. However, The Upper House is subject to constraint through the
Government using procedure in the Parliament Act 1911 and 1949. From
1914-2004 seven bills passed by the Lords and received royal assent with
no scrutiny of any kind from the House. The Acts are in place to recognise
the importance of a democratically elected chamber in the UK.(21)
Therefore, The House of Lords have means of holding the Government as
a whole to account for its legislation and policy, particularly, through
committee proceedings, but when provided in legislation, Government
proposals can bypass the house without accountability of any sort.

(17) C. Turpin & A. Tomkins, British Government and The Constitution: Text, Cases and
Material, Seventh Edition. (Cambridge University Press), p 461.
(18) R. Brazier, Constitutional Reform, Reshaping the British Political System, Second
Edition,(Oxford University Press), p 89.
(19) House of Lords, Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, Sixth Report

of Session 2010-11, Government Amendment & Response, pp.3-4

(20) The Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, ss 12-15A
(21) Overcoming the Lords through this procedure is a last resort, but the Parliament Acts
1911 and 1949 restrict the powers of The House of Lords in relation to primary
legislation.

When examining the convention of Individual Ministerial responsibility it

should be said from the outset that Parliament places less emphasis on its
formal powers and relies on practices of conventional responsibility to
hold the Government to account for its policy and administration. The
Ministerial Code 2010 sets out general principle of how Ministers of the
Crown are expected to behave. It states that all Ministers are
responsible to Parliament for the policies decisions and actions of
their department and his or her own official conduct. It goes on to provide
Ministers are obliged to give accurate and truthful information to
Parliament. Ministers who intentionally mislead Parliament will be
expected to offer their resignation to the Prime Minister;(22) Ministers
should be as open as possible with Parliament and the public, not
providing information only when disclosure would not be in the public
interest.(23)

(22) The Ministerial Code, Cabinet Office, 2010, Section 1, p1.

(23) The Ministerial Code, Cabinet Office, 2010, Section 1, p1, The Freedom of
Information Act 2000.

How the convention of ministerial responsibility is interpreted was

developed by the Scott Report on arms to Iraq. Sir Richard Scott
emphasised the responsibility of ministers to account fully to Parliament.
It is said in paragraph K8.2 of the Report, the obligation Ministers have to
give information and explanations for acts and omissions of their civil
servants lies at the heart of Ministerial accountability. It was later
revealed, the provisions of individual ministerial responsibility were not
followed by ministers when they hounded policy on defence sales to Iraq
and Iran from 1984 to 1990. Specifically the report said Ammunitions,
guns.. were not licensed for export to Iraq. Nor.. Iran. This is important
when discussing Individual Ministerial responsibility because one vital
aspect of accountable and democratic parliamentary Government is the
responsibility individual ministers have for their own conduct and that of
their departments. Lord Morrison wrote
some minister of the Crown is responsible to Parliament,
and through Parliament to the Public, for every act of the Executive.
This convention was said to be One of the fundamentals of our
system of Government.(24) Without this convention of the uncodified

constitution there would not be at least one identifiable minister under a

duty to answer to Parliament. Parliaments ability to hold individual
ministers to account by convention, for its policy and administration,
partly relies on the honesty of ministers to reveal information and
evidence. It is therefore natural to fear that personal interest of ministers
may override national interest and those of Parliament.
(24) Lord Morrison of Lambeth, Government and Parliament, (3rd Edition 1964),
p332.

However, when the Government or their officials are not honest when
disclosing information to Parliament, traditionally, it is solely the head of
department punished for departmental failure regardless of whether or
not it was themselves at fault. In Crichel Down land purchased by the Air
Ministry was used as a bombing range. When a previous land owner
attempted to buy it back his proposal was refused and surrounding land
tenants were falsely led to believe they would be able to bid for ownership
of the land. An official inquiry concluded that civil servants from the
Ministry of Agriculture acted in an overbearing and dishonest manner.(25)
Subsequently Sir Thomas Dugdale, the Minister of Agriculture resigned
because of heavy criticism stemming from the report.(26) A House of
Commons Research Paper comments on the extreme resulting action of
the Ministers resignation because of a failure of the civil service(27); Sir

David Maxwell Fyfe, the then Home Secretary affirmed the convention and
how it should be valued:
The Minister.. remains constitutionally responsible to Parliament
for the fact that something has gone wrong, and he alone can.. render an
account of his stewardship.
This emphasises the necessity of the convention and no matter how
extreme it may be regarded by some it is in place to safeguard and
uphold basic principles of democracy by holding those with power
responsible for both, their own policy and administration, and by
extension that of their department.

(25) Report of the Public Inquiry into the Disposal of Land at Crichel Down, (Ordered
by the Minister of Agriculture), Cmd. 9176, (1954)
(26) Handsard Millbanksystems,
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1954/jul/20/crichel-down, House of
Commons, HC Deb vol 530, cols 1194-7, (20 July 1954)
(27) O. Gay & T. Powell, Individual ministerial responsibility- Issues and Examples,
(The House of Commons Library 2004), RESEARCH PAPER 04/31, p11.

In conclusion, Parliament can hold the Government to account for its law, policy and
administration through convention, legislation and parliamentary procedure but only to an
effective extent. Government law and policy can be held to account by the passage of bills
through Parliament, Draft Legislative programmes scrutinise Government bills although pre-

legislative scrutiny is under Government control. Second reading provides a debate on

principle of a bill, however a bill is rarely defeated at this stage and, there are occasions
where no debate is required. Committee stage allows argument on provision of a bill and
changes are said to have improved debate, but the very make up of committees is affected by
how strong party representation is in Parliament; strong Governments may dominate the
stage. The Second Chamber is said to hold the Government to account for their law and
policy most effectively through committees but the chamber itself is constrained by the
Parliament Acts 1911 and 1949. The Convention of Individual Ministerial Responsibility
holds the Government to account for its policy and administration, but its effectiveness can be
challenged because Ministers have to be re-reminded of the convention when they disobey it.
When Government officials do act dishonestly traditional convention ensures at least one
individual, the head of department, is responsible to Parliament for their own conduct and
that of their department. Checks are in place to ensure the Government are held to account for
their law, policy and administration. However the law, procedure and convention relied upon
can only hold the Government to account with certain effectiveness.

Bibliography

Textbooks
R. Brazier, Constitutional Reform, Reshaping the British Political System,
Second Edition,(Oxford University Press)
P. Craig & A. Tomkins, The Executive and Public Law: Power and
Accountability in Comparative Perspective (2006)
JAG Griffith, Standing Committees in the House of Commons, in SA
Walkland and Michael Ryle (eds), The Commons Today (rev edn 1981)
Lt-Col. Lockwood in 1907, quoted by Walkland, The House of Commons in
the Twentieth Century.
Montesque, The Spirit of Laws (1748), Book XI, Chapter 6.

Montesquieu, Charles de Secondat, baron de. The Sprit of Laws (c.1748).

Translated and edited by Anne Cohler, Basia Miller, Harold Stone. (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
C. Turpin & A. Tomkins, British Government and The Constitution: Text,
Cases and Material, Seventh Edition. (Cambridge University Press)
Lord Morrison of Lambeth, Government and Parliament, (3rd Edition 1964)

Statutes
Electoral Registration and Administration Act 2013, Section 14,
Subsections (1-5)
The Bill of Rights 1688, paragraph 1, p 1.
The Parliament Act 1911, The Parliament Act 1949.
The Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, ss 12-15A

Committee and Commission Reports

Political and Constitutional Reform Committee- Tenth Report (Ordered by
The House of Commons October 2011) Section 3, Subsection 39.
Making The Law: The Report of the Hansard Society Commission on The
Legislative Process (The Hansard Society for Parliamentary Government
November 1992) , chapter 2,p7.
The Modernisation Committee, (1st Report of 2005-06, HC 1097),
paragraph 56.
Handsard Millbanksystems,
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1954/ jul/20/crichel-down,

House of Commons, HC Deb vol 530, cols 1194-7, (20 July 1954)
Making The Law: The Report of the Hansard Society Commission on The
Legislative Process (The Hansard Society for Parliamentary Government
November 1992) Chapter 5, p 84.
Making The Law: The Report of The Hansard Society Commission on The
Legislative Process (The Hansard Society for Parliamentary Government
November 1992) Chapter 5, p86.
Report of the Public Inquiry into the Disposal of Land at Crichel Down,
(Ordered by the Minister of Agriculture), Cmd. 9176, (1954)
O. Gay & T. Powell, Individual ministerial responsibility- Issues and
Examples, (The House of Commons Library 2004), RESEARCH PAPER
04/31, p11.

Journal Articles
J. Levy, Strengthening Parliaments Powers of Scrutiny?, An assessment of
the Introduction of Public Bill Committees, (The Constitution Unit, 2009)
House of Lords, Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee,
Sixth Report of Session 2010-11, Government Amendment & Response,
pp.3-4

Conventions on Individual Ministerial Responsibility

The Ministerial Code, Cabinet Office, 2010, Section 1, p1.
The Ministerial Code, Cabinet Office, 2010, Section 1, p1, The Freedom of
Information Act 2000.