Toward

A New
Maritime
Strategy

Toward
A New
Maritime
Strategy
American Naval Thinking
in the PostCold War Era
Peter D. Haynes

NAVAL INSTITUTE PRESS

Annapolis, Maryland

Naval Institute Press

291 Wood Road
Annapolis, MD 21402
2015 by Peter D. Haynes
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by
any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and recording, or by any
information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Haynes, Peter D.
Toward a new maritime strategy : American naval thinking in the postCold War era /
Peter D. Haynes.
pages cm
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-1-61251-852-7 (alk. paper) ISBN 978-1-61251-864-0 (ebook) 1. Naval
strategyHistory20th century. 2. Naval strategyHistory21st century. 3. United
States. NavyHistory. 4. Sea-powerUnited StatesHistory. 5. Military doctrine
United StatesHistory. I. Title.
V165.H39 2015
359.030973dc23

2015017477
Print editions meet the requirements of ANSI/NISO z39.48-1992
(Permanence of Paper).
Printed in the United States of America.
23 22 21 20 19 18 17 16 15
First printing

9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

To my lovely wife, Monica

Contents

List of Illustrations

viii

Acknowledgments

ix

Introduction

The Cold War

15

Maritime Strategy for the 1990s, 1989

35

The Way Ahead, 1990

48

. . . From the Sea, 199192

64

Forward . . . From the Sea, 199394

87

2020 Vision, 199596

104

Anytime, Anywhere, 199697

120

The Navy Strategic Planning Guidance, 19982000

132

Sea Power 21, 20002004

148

10

The 3/1 Strategy, 2005

172

11

The 1000-Ship Navy, 20056

196

12

A Cooperative Strategy, 2007

213

Conclusion

239

Notes

253

Index

283

vii

Illustrations

Figure 4.1. The Manthorpe Curve

69

Figure 4.2. The Pyramid Slide

76

Figure 10.1. The Bear Paw

185

Figure 11.1. The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Reviews Shift of Focus

203

Figure 11.2. The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Reviews New Force

Planning Construct

204

Figure 12.1. Admiral Rougheads Venn Diagram

230

viii

Acknowledgments

irst and foremost, I would like to thank my beautiful wife, Monica, the
love of my life, for her overwhelming support and love, and our two children, Dallan and Brietta, for their support, love, patience, and humor.
They are the center of my world, and the long journey of writing the book
would not have been completed without their infinite encouragement. I would
like to thank Mom and Dad for being great parents and role models, and Mo
for having been a wonderful mother-in-law. I am truly blessed to have such a
wonderful family. I would like to thank Dan Moran, a gentleman and scholar of
endearing brilliance and patience, for his insights and hard work, and Jim Wirtz
for his advice and enthusiasm. I am indebted to Dan and Jim for their support and friendship, and to other professors at the Naval Postgraduate School,
particularly David Yost, Anne Clunan, and Jeff Kline. I take great pleasure in
thanking Peter Swartz, a former Navy strategist and an analyst at the Center for
Naval Analyses, for his insights, friendship, and ever-present support, as well as
his dedication to maintain the flame of strategic thinking in the Navy. I am
beholden to Randy Papadopoulos, Tom Hone, Paul Nagy, and the Naval History
and Heritage Command for their encouragement, as well. Finally, I want to
thank the U.S. Naval Institute for its leadership and support, and for the institutes warm and professional folks that I have been privileged to work with, particularly Tom Cutler, Gary Thompson, Emily Bakely, and Claire Noble. During
the writing of this book, I have drawn strength from my faith in God, my family,
my friends, the United States, and the U.S. Navy. The Navy is an institution that
is woven into the fabric of my life and that of my family, one that I am privileged
and honored to be a part of.

ix

Introduction

n October 2007 the U.S. Navy released A Cooperative Strategy for 21st
Century Seapower, a strategy that represented a fundamental shift in the
Navys strategic outlook.1 With it, the Navy sought not only to redefine the
terms of its own relevance but also to make a revolutionary argument about
where the vital interests of the United States lie and the nature of U.S. naval
power in relation to those interests. The Navy argued that those interests should
not be seen in terms of the threats to U.S. territory and lives, but rather in light
of the relationship between the United States and the international economic
and political system. A Cooperative Strategy argued that since the United
States security, prosperity, and vital interests...are increasingly coupled to
those of other nations, [its] interests are best served by fostering a peaceful global
system comprised of interdependent networks of trade, finance, information,
law, people and governance.2 This is not a recapitulation of a rhetorical claim,
familiar since the founding of the Republic, that Americas interests are humankinds interests: it is, essentially, the opposite of that claim.
This international economic and political system is the source from which
the United States draws most of its power, influence, and ability to provide for
and defend its way of life, the homeland, and the system itself. The system is the
wellspring of U.S. power, which should not be surprising as it was designed by
the United States as such. The institutions, regimes, and practices of this system,
many of whichsuch as the Bretton Woods accordswere developed by the
United States and its key allies during and shortly after World War II, were
1

Introduction

designed to privilege U.S. interests and those of its key security and economic
partners. By controlling the international monetary and financial structures it
designed into the system and providing a nuclear umbrella to its trading partners,
the United States fashioned itself into a systemic leader and manager of a highly
successful political and economic order that came to be called the free world.
The United States engineered the rise of its order in war-torn Europe and Japan
and the downfall of imperialism worldwide. In managing the system with and
on behalf of others as well as on behalf of its own interests, the United States
established a viable alternative to the Soviets vision of European modernity. In
practical terms, then, we might describe this system more accurately as the U.S.
liberal political and economic system.
With its A Cooperative Strategy, the Navy argued that the U.S. Navy,
Marine Corps, and Coast Guardthe nations maritime serviceshave a uniquely
preeminent role in protecting the system and sustaining the United States leadership of that system. By being deployed around the globe to manage crises, prevent
conflict, and deter large-scale war, these maritime services underwrite the political, commercial, and security conditions necessary for global prosperity. In part
because they operate in international waters, they knit broader interests with
like-minded states in ways that air forces and armies cannot. Since world trade is
essentially maritime trade, any compromise of the United States ability to secure
the freedom of the seasand specifically to ensure the flow of petroleum
threatens the prosperity of the United States, its allies, and its trading partners,
all of whom, regardless of rivalries, share a common interest in systemic prosperity, growth, and stability. By advancing a cooperative systemic strategy, one
that takes full account of the strategic importance of wealth accumulation and
distribution, the Navy acknowledged that its own strategic outlook, and by implication that of the United States, was too militaristic and threat-centric, that it
was focused too much on the requirements of operations and warfighting at the
expense of thinking about strategic requirements. By advancing such a strategy,
the Navy acknowledged that the U.S. maritime services and the United States
could no longer afford to separate military goals from economic and political goals.
Ironically, the Navy might have developed A Cooperative Strategy at
any time since World War II and most certainly since the collapse of the Soviet
Union. If one were to take a copy of A Cooperative Strategy and replace the
word global with free world or NATO, and otherwise read it in the context
of Cold War geopolitics, one might reasonably come away with the impression

Introduction

that it could have been written at any time since 1945.3 The Cold War was fundamentally a struggle between two anticolonial great powers striving to prove
the efficacy of their respective systemic models. Only one of these models
the free worldsdelivered unprecedented increases in the standards of living,
met societal expectations, and made up for its political leaders miscues. Among
the reasons why the United States won the Cold War was that nearly all the
worlds richest states ended up on its side linked by a robust network of trade
that was connected and sustained by American sea power. In the final analysis,
the strength of the U.S. system proved more instrumental in ending the war
than any explicit U.S. military strategy.
After the Cold War the free world expanded into the globalized world,
thereby expanding Americas responsibilities as well. At this point, one might
have expected that the Navyno longer burdened with having to prepare for
great-power warwould redefine its purpose in systemic versus threat-based
warfighting terms and restructure the fleet accordingly, focusing on developing
platforms more for its constabulary and diplomatic roles and less for its warfighting role.4 Given its unique relationship to the United States state-market relationship, no other U.S. military service was more suited to invoke and extend
a systemic history of the Cold War (and its role therein) as a basis for a more
systemic vision of U.S. postwar strategy. The Cold War had, ostensibly, validated
the relationship between global naval power, economic globalization, and liberal
political integration. The United States role as systemic manager had not changed,
nor had its geostrategic position astride the trade routes of Europe and Asia, a
reminder that sea power is not just about warships.
It is puzzling that the Navy did not advance A Cooperative Strategy much
earlier, because it is a maritime strategy as classically understood. A maritime
strategy is well suited to the interests of a state whose prosperity and security
interests have always been linked to and dependent on the vitality of the world
economy, and to the free markets, open societies, and democratic policies that
have (so far) accompanied sustained economic success. A maritime strategy has
always been more directly concerned with the relationship between the state
and global markets than with strategies associated with land power or airpower,
a statement as true during the Age of Sail as it is today. A maritime strategy ties
economic, political, and security interests, and offers a holistic, less militarized,
and less threat-centric worldview that, in this case, was free to emerge with the
disappearance of the Soviet threat.

Introduction

The Navys institutional history speaks of an intimate relationship between

U.S. foreign policy, trade, and the Navy. Its history also reflects the exhortations of its own Alfred Thayer Mahan, maritime theorist, political economist,
and U.S. naval advocate, who famously related international relations, economic
prosperity, and naval power. Despite such a history, however, the Navy did not
advance a maritime strategy in an era in which the relative saliency of such
should have, in principle, been much more apparent. In short, A Cooperative
Strategy might have been developed at any time since the end of the Cold War,
if not well before. That it was not developed earlier is not because its ideas are
new or complicated, but because the forces that shape how the Navy thinks and
learns effectively pushed those ideas to the margins of official consideration.
More than twenty-five years have passed since the Cold War ended, and an
appraisal of the general trend of strategic thought on the part of the worlds only
remaining global navy is long overdue. This book seeks to understand how the
Navy arrived at its current strategic outlook and why it took nearly two decades
for a maritime strategy to emerge. In so doing, it also assesses expectations of
how the Navy as an institution will confront equally disorienting changes in the
future. This book asks two questions: (1)Why did the Navy not develop a maritime strategy earlier in the postCold War era? And (2)What explains why it
eventually did develop a maritime strategy?
This book examines U.S. naval strategy from the fall of the Berlin Wall in
November 1989 to the release of A Cooperative Strategy in November 2007.
It links a description and what is at times an unpleasant analysis of U.S. naval
strategy in the postCold War era to an explanation of the forces that influenced
its course. It argues that how the United States and specifically the U.S. Navy
adapted to the immense strategic, political, bureaucratic, technological, and
operational challenges of the Cold War shaped distinctive national and institutional approaches to strategy that were then applied to the problems encountered in the postCold War era. The unexpected passing of the Cold War did
little to alter the logic of U.S. strategy or the Navys institutional ways of thinking, which worked together in shaping the course of U.S. naval strategy away
from maritime-systemic ideas during the Cold War, the inertia of which continued well into the postwar era. It argues that it took a peculiar series of sometimes traumatic events for a maritime strategy to emerge. These included the
realization among American leaders that the United States faced a generational
struggle against Islamist terrorists threats and that it could lose the war in Iraq

Introduction

in 20047events so sobering that they called into question long-standing

assumptions about U.S. strategy, threatened the Navys relevance, and brought
about a systemically oriented U.S. strategic approach. These events also included
a catalyst for institutional change in the form of two Navy leaders, one of whose
late-life conversion to a maritime orientation was as implausible as the others
promotion to a position of strategic leadership.
Why did the Navy not develop a maritime strategy earlier in the postCold
War era? The logic inherent in U.S. strategy during the Cold War bounded and
channeled U.S. naval strategy away from a maritime strategy. In the early years of
the Cold War, U.S. civilian strategic theorists implanted a way of thinking that
was hyperrationalist, apolitical, and ahistorical. The nuclear bomb had, as Henry
Kissinger put it, turned strategy into deterrence, and deterrence into an esoteric
intellectual exercise.5 Viewed as a cost-effective means of deterring and, failing
that, winning a war, the bomb obviated the need for the United States to develop
an excellence in systemic management and alliance diplomacy and made the
tasks of hegemonic statecraft less complex and far easier.6 Americas Cold War
leaders and strategists did not take into account how liberal, alliance-based maritime powers like Great Britain had defeated continental hegemons in the past.
Instead, U.S. strategy fixated on the Soviet threat and the balance of military
power, and on deterring a hot war, and not on winning a cold one. American vital
interests, U.S. strategy, and the U.S. militarys purpose were defined in terms of
the threat and not of the system.
The U.S. militarys adherence to the rationalist tradition of the nineteenthcentury Swiss military theorist Antoine-Henri Jomini reinforced the separation
between military goals and economic and political goals. The Jominian approach
reduces complex problems to apolitical principles that, if followed, would lead
to quick and decisive victories. It blithely assumes that the political goals for
which a war was to be fought would somehow be realized after the field of battle
had been won. Seduced by Jominis formula of efficiency, the military focused
more on how to realize high-tech shortcuts to quick and decisive victory, particularly by applying the nations preferred mode of warfareairpowerthan
on how to use force for greater political effect.
Having been relieved from figuring out how to win a seemingly perpetual
cold war, and given constant interservice rivalry and the high cost of modern
weapons systems, Congress and the Department of Defenses civilian leaders
sought to turn the Department into a well-run business. The Departments civilian

Introduction

leaders imposed a centrally controlled programming and budgeting process and

the rationality of the science of management in which the coin of the realm was
marginal cost-benefit analysis. In so doing, these civilian leaders shifted the locus
of U.S. strategy-making from the ways-means-ends dialectic that is strategy to a
myopic focus on determining the means. Mirroring American culture, the outlook
of U.S. strategy was scientific-methodological, profoundly pragmatic, and technologically dependent, and the style of U.S. defense leadership was industrialmanagerial, not strategic.
The logic inherent in American naval thinking was not any more conducive to the Navys development of a maritime strategy than the logic inherent
in U.S. strategy. The Cold War did not demand much competency in systemic
thought on the part of the U.S. government, which meant that the U.S. government did not demand the same of its Navy. Relieved from that task, the Navy
was allowed to frame its own rationality, identity, and strategic outlook. These
elements of institutional thinking were rooted in the institutions seminal event,
the Pacific War against Japan, a campaign that demonstrated the versatility and
flexibility of a balanced, aircraft carrierbased fleet.7 The campaign vindicated
how the Navy saw the purpose of its officers, which was to apply an adaptable
mindset and technological knowledge to the problems associated with war at sea.
The establishment after World War II of lengthy overseas deployments as standard practice meant that the institutions knowledge became almost exclusively
operational-experiential. Operationsmeaning being at sea (either deployed or
training to deploy)became the lens through which Navy officers viewed the
world; to most in the Navy, operations also became the Navys raison dtre.
Given the constant demands of operations and advancing naval technology,
officers now had little room in their careers to take up the (potentially) careerdamaging task of contemplating the Navys purpose beyond operations. Given
the Navys pragmatic outlook, what the institution learned and inculcated into
its members was limited to what was useful operationally.
The institutions knowledge base narrowed further in the 1960s when Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara embedded his programming and budgetary process in the Pentagon. The process became the essential means by which
the U.S. military services protected their respective identities, preferred weapons
systems, and relevance. The Navy did not view any problem as more critical or
long-standing during the Cold War than the need to justify its strategic relevance
on a par with that of the Air Force and Army. In terms of U.S. declaratory

Introduction

strategy, neither the Navys purpose nor the reasons for its force structure were
ever self-evident. Consequently, the Navy sent its best, most-promising officers
to the Pentagon between sea tours to manage its weapons systems programs.
Navy officers assumed leadership positions devoid of anything but operational
and programmatic experience and technical-technological knowledge, none of
which required a deeper understanding of the Navys purpose. The Navy thus
produced leaders whose intellects were of a peculiar mixture, one that combined
brilliance with the narrowness of the institutions rationality and knowledge
base. In short, U.S. naval strategy during the Cold War was simply the application of the narrow professional experiences of Navy officers to the solution of
problems associated with operating, procuring, and rationalizing a generic and
forward-deployed fleet.8
Their backgrounds shaped an implicit institutional strategic outlook that was
an intuitive expression of how they defined the Navys purpose and identity. The
Navy saw its purpose as being contingent operationally, and not instrumental
strategically. The Navy prized being prepared for the unknown over understanding its purpose beyond tactical and operational goals. It sought to maintain the
operational flexibility that came with an offensive-minded, forward-deployed,
and balanced carrier-based fleet that was central to its identity as a warfighting
organization and key to its ability and demand to be prepared to project power
across an enormous range of circumstances. Emblematic of its contingent outlook was the aircraft carrier, the ultimate hedge against the unknown. Its versatility
allowed the Navy to participate meaningfully in a wide breadth of missions,
from nuclear retaliation, full-scale and limited war, day-to-day foreign policy
needs, and a myriad of ways short of war, a range unique among the services.
Absent a Pearl Harborlike attack or rapid unexpected technological obsolescence, the fleets composition could not (and still cannot) be changed overnight.
Hence, the Navy balked at attempts to narrow the fleets capabilities to conform
to a White Housemandated vision of war. A carrier-based fleet accommodated
shifts in the strategic and operational environs and in U.S. declaratory strategy
more readily than a fleet built for specific missions like nuclear retaliation or sea
control, for example. Specialization meant operational vulnerability, which meant
political vulnerability. Only when the fleet was built to handle just about any
contingency and was forward deployed (which cost only marginally more than
keeping it tied up) could American sea power be fully realized operationally and
rationalized politically.

Introduction

The Navys emphasis on operational experience, warfighting skills, technological knowledge, and resource management proficiency on the part of its officers
was a reasoned response to the operational, technological, managerial, and political demands of the Cold War. This reasoned response came at the expense of
a greater understanding of or a desire to understand the Navys strategic effects,
to redress the inchoate nature of sea power theory, and to grasp the nature of the
war between the Soviet and U.S. systems enough to develop the functioning and
legitimating ideas behind a maritime strategy. The Navy only dimly understood
this state of affairs, and yet casually dismissed the need to redress it throughout the Cold War (and after). The logic inherent in American naval thinking
was internally consistent with excellence in naval warfare; indeed, the logic was
exquisite given the Navys superb operational performance over the past seventy
years. But what made the Navy arguably the most operationally adaptable of the
services made it intellectually weak and uninterested in understanding the Navys
deeper purpose and strategic effects. This was ironic, as no other U.S. military
service could claim such a unique and direct relationship with the United States
managed system and lay claim to a central role in the United States systemic
Cold War victory.
The Cold War ultimately taught the Navy how to exploit the trade winds
of U.S. strategy and defense policy and the currents of U.S. foreign policy, and
to catch the occasional wave of American insecurity and budgetary permissiveness. The Navy came to view changing environmental conditions rather in the
way sailors view the wind: something that may only limit their options without
necessarily changing their mind about where they want to go. The Navys goal
was to remain a forward-deployed, balanced, carrier-based fleet, and the Navy
tacked and wore as needed to maintain that general bearing.
After the end of the Cold War, Congress and the Department of Defenses
leaders focused on downsizing the military and optimizing how it fought. The
Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (Goldwater-Nichols)
elevated the stature of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the commanders in
chief of the unified commands (CINCs) (a term changed to combatant commanders in 2002). Goldwater-Nichols demanded that the services integrate,
which the U.S. defense establishment termed jointness. It also empowered
the chairman of the Joint Chiefs to mandate a single vision that defined the
militarys purpose. That vision was concerned with how so-called revolutionary
precision strike and informational capabilities would deliver a swift and decisive

Introduction

victory against a generic foe in lieu of (or in support of) ground troops. Many
in the defense establishment believed that this vision was vindicated in various
operations throughout the 1990s. Goldwater-Nichols also further limited the
Navys ability to influence U.S. strategy, and altered how the Navys senior uniformed leader, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), understood the role of
that position. To the CNOs of the postCold War era, the White House, the secretary of defense, and the chairman determined the ends, the CINCs determined
the ways, while the CNO and the CNOs Pentagon-based staff, the Office of the
CNO (OPNAV), focused on the means. These CNOs assumed that they were
not responsible for anything other than equipping, training, and organizing the
Navy: strategy was someone elses job.
The end of the Cold War found Navy leaders and strategists intellectually
unprepared to advance a peacetime maritime strategy. It is reasonable to assume
that if such strategy had been developed, which is not likely to have occurred,
Congress and the Pentagons leaders would have rejected it: they would have
viewed anything not aligned with the prescribed vision as solipsistic. The need to
align in some manner with the prescribed ideas is a reminder that strategic ideas
are contingent; one persons strategy depends on everyone elses. Strategythe
relating of military force and political purposeis an inherently practical endeavor.
As Bernard Brodie noted, The question that matters in strategy is:Will the idea
work?9 Moreover, Congress and the Department of Defenses civilian leaders
had come to see the Navys purpose in light of the Soviet threat, which the Navy
itself did much to bring about because it had rationalized itself, particularly in
the late Cold War, exclusively in those terms.
Marginalized by the lessons drawn by the U.S. military from the 199091
Gulf War, the Navy was not about to challenge the direction of U.S. strategy. It
soon found that direction accommodating enough and aligned itself with U.S.
strategys focus on warfighting, conflict with regional powers including Iran and
North Korea, jointness, and strike warfare. The latter was a capability the Navy
was well positioned to embrace technologically and conceptually. The Navys
embracing of strike warfare was reflected in its new focus on adversaries on shore
as captured in its 1992 ...From the Sea, which was the Navys first postCold
War strategy.10 The move protected the carriers, which were now needed in the
scenarios facing U.S. forces, scenarios in which the carriers had excelled during
the Cold War. The Navy staked its claim on its ability to provide the CINCs
with a breadth of capabilities, none more critical than striking targets on shore

10

Introduction

on very short notice. As in the Cold War, the gravitational pull of advanced
technologies and associated concepts was the safest and surest route to budgetary success. A flexible, power-projecting fleet allowed the Navy to justify itself
in terms of major combat operations against regional powers, which was the
Armys and the Air Forces raisons dtre and the locus of U.S. strategy, as well as
an everyday instrument of U.S. statecraft.
Why did the Navy subsequently develop a maritime strategy? The U.S.
invasions of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003 were seen as vindicating the
direction of postCold War American strategy. In short order, however, the failure to counter the Iraqi insurgency exposed as insufficient the American way of
war, which assumed wrongly that tactical and operational success would speak
for itself. The military had equated a theory of highly planned and precisionenabled destruction with a theory of success in war, and assumed wrongly that
political goals like stability and democracy would self-organize in the wake of
technology-enabled battlefield victories. This complacent outlook disintegrated
in 2005, and with it the importance of jointness, talismanic strike warfare and
information technologies, and high-end (i.e., the high end of the spectrum of
conflict) conventional capabilities. For the Navy, the winds were shifting unfavorably; the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, which only marginally involved
the Navy, promised to elevate the Armys and Marine Corps standing and to
undermine the Navys relevance for at least a decade. In contrast with previous
generational wars, the Navy was unable to catch the wave of societal insecurity
and fiscal permissiveness that had sustained the fleets size and preferred composition in the past.
In 20056 two maritime-minded Navy leaders recognized in the confused
context a set of trends that promised to buoy the Navys long-term standing via a
maritime strategy. CNO Adm. Mike G. Mullen and Vice Adm. John G. Morgan
Jr. sought to shift the national-level debate about the direction of U.S. strategy
to one they believed was more appropriate to U.S. interests in a globalizing era.
They also sought to start a conversation in the Navy to shift the internal debate
about its purpose.
From their perspective, globalization had shifted the security calculus toward
a greater emphasis on economics, the central element around which any maritime (as distinct from naval) strategy is organized. Globalization has been driven
by a revolution in computer and telecommunication technologies; the spread of

Introduction

11

Western rationality, norms, and culture; and the worldwide movement to freemarket economies.11 Globalization, which is the process of increasing interconnectedness between societies that is brought about by the expansive movement
of trade, capital, information, and ideas, was reconfiguring political power.12
Globalization was empowering non-state threats like al-Qaeda and was undermining the ability of individual states to govern and making their prosperity
more dependent on the smooth functioning of the system.13 All of this, Mullen
and Morgan thought, required more cooperative governing instruments.
In a more multipolar world, a unilateral, preemptive, and threat-centric
approach, which the United States had applied in Iraq with destabilizing effect,
was inimical to U.S. interests. A more appropriate approach would be an approach
that is collective and defensive minded, that focuses on maintaining the status
quo of U.S. systemic leadershipand with it continued global prosperityby
using maritime forces to connect interests, expand markets, and open societies
to liberal (as in the political philosophy) ideas. Mullen and Morgan believed that
U.S. allies and partners would more readily support such an approach, and thus
be more willing to share the United States increasingly expensive burdens as the
systemic security manager.
Apart from globalization, these trends included an emerging U.S. declaratory strategic approach that portrayed the United States as the guardian of the
system, a shift that came in 2005 from the sobering realization by American
leaders that the United States could lose its war in Iraq. The systems functioning was threatened by al-Qaeda, which not only was collocated with the worlds
largest supply of petroleum and maritime choke points through which that
petroleum and most of global trade flowed, but also, from an existential perspective, was alienated from and hostile to the United Statesmanaged system. A
maritime strategy would also place the Armys and Marine Corps efforts into a
wider perspective in a way that did not impugn those efforts, and would assert
the Navys broader strategic relevance without unduly denying the Navys previous postCold War strategic approach. Mullen (whose late-career conversion
to a maritime perspective was rather implausible) and Morgan (whose appointment as an admittedly nonpromotable three-star to the upwardly mobile position of deputy CNO for Plans, Policies, and Operations [N3/N5] was equally
so) hoped to place the Navy in an advantageous position when the wars in Iraq
and Afghanistan were ending and U.S. leaders were debating a new strategic

12

Introduction

direction.14 Americanstired of messy, open-ended interventions that called

U.S. leadership into question and indebted the nation to its economic competitorsmight welcome a systemic approach, one that sought foremost to extend
U.S. leadership over a system that has sustained its preeminence and brought
untold prosperity and freedom to ever-expanding parts of the world.
U.S. Navy officers are the product of their experiences, as is, ultimately, U.S.
naval strategy, which may be defined as the relating of seaborne U.S. military
force to political purpose (and vice versa). The officers acquire these experiences
during many years spent at sea operating complex technology and advancing in a
meritocracy. During those years they assimilate institutional beliefs (which they
generally understand) and assumptions (which are hidden and therefore more
difficult for them to understand and question). Immersed in a belief system
called the U.S. Navy, these experiences structure how the officers think, what
they believe the Navys purpose and aspirations to be, and how they come to
understand naval strategy and define and solve the problems associated with it.
As Herbert Simon noted, a person does not live for months or years in...an
organization, exposed to some streams of communication, shielded from others,
without the most profound effects upon what he knows, believes, attends to, hopes,
wishes, emphasizes, fears, and proposes.15 These officers apply their experiences
later in their careers while serving in high-level strategy and policy-making
positions.16 Those experiences and the nature of the Navys iterative, multilevel
staffing and traditional consensus-driven strategy-development approval process
mean that U.S. naval strategy is more the product of the institution of the U.S.
Navy than it is of individual leaders.17
What follows will focus on the Navys strategy-making process. This process
is where Navy officers assemble, negotiate, and reshape ideas in light of a range of
exogenous influenceswhich include, for example, the direction of U.S. strategy, budgetary constraints, and perceived threatsand the competing interests
of other domestic political and internal actors. The book focuses on this process
because even though the subject of the study is American naval thinkingand in
this regard it must be emphasized that the concept itself is somewhat metaphorical as only people can thinkthat is how real strategy is made.
This book examines how key U.S. naval strategic statements and policies were developed and the documents themselves, which are manifestations
of American naval thinking. These statements and policies were developed by

Introduction

13

OPNAV and not by the Navys operational commanders, who answer to the
CINCs/combatant commanders and the secretary of defense. In general, the
statements are self-generated and episodic. These statements vary in form, substance, and authorship; in the problems the commanders sought to solve; and in
their intended audience, which includes the Navy, the White House, Congress,
senior civilian and military leaders of the Department of Defense and their staffs,
the CINCs/combatant commanders, defense analysts, and American society.18
These statements provide the CNO with a way to rationalize the Navy and its
claims on the defense budget, to establish a conceptual framework to align the
activities of a complex warfighting organization, and to provide views on the
maritime dimensions of U.S. strategy.