1208 Book Reviews

Reasons and Recognition: Essays on the Philosophy of T. M.

Scanlon, edited by R. Jay Wallace, Rahul Kumar, and Samuel Freeman.
New York: Oxford University Press, 2011. Pp. xi + 379. H/b 40.00.

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T. M. Scanlon is undoubtedly one of the greatest moral and political philosophers of our time. This volume brings together fifteen first-class critical
essays on different aspects of his work, written by both early career and more
established authors.
The book consists of four thematically unified parts. The first part is a tour
de force through Scanlons views on the nature of reasons and value. Essays in
the second part engage with Scanlons moral theory, in particular contractualism and promissory obligations. The third part is reserved for Scanlons
political philosophy. There we find a wide range of topics, from social and
global justice to free speech and political neutrality. In the fourth part, several
authors critically discuss Scanlons account of blame. Given the constraints of
space, I will address the central arguments only of some of the essays I find
important.
The volume opens with Christine Korsgaards The Activity of Reason, in
which she argues against the realist understanding of normative reasons
Scanlon advances in What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1998, hereafter WWOTEO). Realism about reasons
is the view that reasons are mind-independent considerations that count in
favour of or against some action, belief, or attitude. Most debates about
realism revolve around specifying the metaphysical nature and epistemic
access to such reasons. Korsgaard takes a different argumentative route.
She claims that realists cannot explain why reasons exist and have claims
on us. The problem as she sees it lies in the fact that realists ascribe a receptive
role to reason, identifying it with the recognition of and response to substantive reasons (p. 4). Korsgaard argues that reasons function should rather
be conceived as active in the sense of employing rational principles
(hypothetical and categorical imperatives) to pick out the reasons
(pp. 46). Reasons then exist and have their normative force only because
we, as rational beings who engage with the world in a certain way, exist
(p. 12).
What can be said as a consolation to realists is that, similarly to her previous well-known critiques of realism, Korsgaards position in this essay relies
on the Kantian self-legislating view of practical reason. Those who find that
view unconvincing will hardly buy any of its inferences.
Two other essays dealing with reasons are Niko Kolodny s Aims as
Reasons and Michael Smiths Scanlon on Desire and the Explanation of
Action. Like Scanlon, Kolodny argues that it is a mistake to believe that
intentions are normative reasons. The apparent role of intentions as reasons
in tie-breaking cases the cases in which one has a conclusive reason to do

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either one thing or the other but no sufficient reason to do both should be
explained, Kolodny argues, through what Scanlon calls the predictive significance of intentions (pp. 5563). In such situations, intending one of the
options makes it only likelier that one will do it but does not affect or ground
the reason one has to do it. Since, under normal circumstances, intending
results in acting, intentions can serve to predict what one will do and hence
indicate normative reasons for acting but cannot themselves be reasons.
I agree with Kolodny that intentions are only derivatively significant in
tie-breaking cases. It remains, however, unclear whether Kolodny subscribes
to a stronger claim Scanlon makes, namely that intentions are never reasons
for action. If so, Kolodny s argument cannot be generalized to reach that
conclusion for there seem to be situations where intentions are normative
reasons (e.g. lying, direct discrimination, civil disobedience, etc.).
On the other hand, Smith argues, contra Scanlon, that desires are motivating reasons. In WWOTEO, Scanlon swims against the current claiming that
desires have no substantive role in the explanation of actions. Scanlons
argument is that desires are attitudes for which reasons can be given.
Desires are products of our beliefs about the reasons to have those desires.
It then only seems to us that what explains our actions are desires, although
the whole explanatory job is done by beliefs about the reasons. Smith thinks
that Scanlon overlooks the fact that desires which are sensitive to reasons are
amalgams of intrinsic desires, for which no reason can be given, and beliefs
about how the world would need to be for the intrinsic desires to be satisfied
(pp. 878). If it is true that intrinsic desires cannot themselves be produced
by beliefs about the reasons to have them, then they, in combination with
beliefs about reasons, must be that which explains and motivates our actions.
Scanlon can indeed press the point that there are no genuinely intrinsic
desires. Smith argues convincingly, in my opinion that such a position
is implausible because it has to postulate a problematic claim that certain
things have intrinsic natures which count in favour of desiring them but only
to those people who already intrinsically desire them. Moreover, Smith notes,
even if intrinsic desires do rest on beliefs, these beliefs add nothing to the
explanation of action stemming from such desires.
Apart from normativity, WWOTEO became known for its ingenious
answers to pressing issues of moral theory. The most important idea is, of
course, contractualism. Contractualism is the view that an action is wrong if
and only if it would be disallowed by a set of principles which no one could
reasonably reject. Many have argued that, as a view of wrongness, contractualism is redundant, circular, or it gives an incorrect explanation of what
makes an action wrong.
In On Metaethics and Motivation: The Appeal of Contractualism, Pamela
Hieronymi tries to show why these accusations are unfounded. Most interestingly, Hieronymi defends an interpretation of contractualism as a

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two-level view: lower-order reasons counting against an action, such as someones suffering, might explain what makes an action wrong, but the higherorder reason of violation of principles which no one could reasonably reject is
what it is for an action to be wrong (p. 113). Hieronymis point is that, just
like any other moral theory, contractualism needs to be seen as explaining the
wrongness of actions by unifying the relevant considerations that make an
action wrong (pp. 11415). If we find contractualism unsatisfactory, that can
be only because we think the process of unifying should be done differently;
that is, it can be done better by some other moral theory.
The problem with this interpretation is that it makes contractualism somewhat trivial. Contractualism seems to be appealing primarily because it
implies that reasonable rejection is a consideration which, on a certain
level, influences the deontic status of action (this is evident in Scanlons
treatment of promissory obligations).
One vocal objection to contractualism is that, as a theory, it fares worse in
comparison to consequentialism because it leaves no room for aggregative
considerations. The debate starts with Scanlons idea that principles which no
one could reasonably reject are those that are justifiable to each person. The
question which then arises is whether saving two rather than one can ever be
justified to that one and, if yes, how? In WWOTEO, Scanlon argued that the
claims of each of the two, added together, as opposed to the claim of the one,
tip the balance of reasons in favour of saving the two. That strategy was
criticized as smuggling into contractualism a consequentialist rationale that
the greater number should be saved just because it is greater.
In Contractualism on the Shoal of Aggregation, Rahul Kumar offers an
alternative contractualist solution. He introduces the idea of interpersonal
recognition. Each agent has to recognize the other as a moral equal and to
justify his conduct to the other by the principle which cannot be reasonably
rejected. What the rescuer owes to the two and to the one, Kumar claims, is
only to set a fair procedure recognizing each of their lives as important as a
reason for his action. This is because none of the victims has a prima facie
claim against him to be rescued but only a claim to be recognized (pp. 1423).
For Kumar, saving the two is the only permissible option. Surprisingly
enough, Kumar believes that his strategy is different from that of pairwise
comparison (p. 143). I have to admit I fail to see where the difference lies.
Pairwise comparison need not be the method in which, as Kumar puts it, the
rescuer (is left) to exercise his prerogative to decide whom to save (p. 143).
It can be the method in which the rescuer considers reasons of the one versus
the reasons of one among the two, neutralizing them, and then taking into
account the fact that the life of the other one among the two is at stake as a
consideration favouring saving the two.
In his other influential book, Moral Dimensions (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 2008), among other things, Scanlon argues against the

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Humean view which conceives blame as the evaluation of ones character as

bad and the Strawsonian view which ties it to moral emotions such as resentment and contempt. Scanlons is a relationship-based view, saying that
one is blameworthy when ones behaviour indicates something about ones
attitudes to others which impairs ones relationship with them. Scanlon then
defines blaming as judging someone to be blameworthy and modifying the
relationship with him accordingly (by, for example, distancing oneself from
that person).
Scanlons account of blame is criticized in this volume by Susan Wolf (in
Blame, Italian Style) and R. Jay Wallace (in Dispassionate Opprobrium: On
Blame and the Reactive Sentiments) for paying no attention to the condemnatory aspect of blame. Both Wolf and Wallace argue that blame is an emotional response to ones wrongdoing, involving righteous anger, resentment,
indignation, or guilt (in the case of self-blame). As Wallace puts it, the central
quality in blame is opprobrium (p. 348). Wolf argues that when blame
expresses anger or resentment, it need not indicate an impaired relationship
and it can even improve the relationship by triggering a need for apology and
remorse (pp. 3367). Wolf believes this is most visible in blaming near and
dear for some frivolous wrongs. Similarly, discussing the case of friendship,
Wallace claims that emotions, such as resentment, give additional reasons for
modifying ones attitudes (p. 357). If blame would be an adjustment of attitudes solely as a response to a relationship-impairment, a crucial kind of
reason would be left out. Emotions are important, Wallace claims, because
they colour the act of blaming with expressive meaning (p. 357).
Wolf and Wallace are undoubtedly right that emotions are crucial in
blaming. However, it seems to me that Scanlons account can make room
for emotions. What Scanlon needs to emphasize is that emotions do not
themselves give reasons but only signify the presence of reasons favouring
change in ones behaviour as a consequence of others blameworthy actions.
Scanlons other important idea is that blame does not presuppose free will.
Since, in his view, the fact that ones action evinces the attitude which impaired the relation with others is sufficient to blame that person, whether the
action was a product of free will or not, is immaterial to blame. What about
those who are mentally unfit to realize the force of moral reasons, such as
psychopaths? Can we blame them? Psychopaths obviously impair the relationship with those whom they harm but they are incapable of judging why
their behaviour is morally wicked. It then seems that they cannot be the
object of legitimate blame. Gary Watson develops this line of thought in
The Problem with Psychopaths.
It can be said in Scanlons favour that, while it is true that we cannot be
justified in blaming those who are unable to understand and respond to
moral requirements, psychopaths often act as if they do have such an understanding. In most cases this is just an illusion, though an illusion which

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explains why we tend to blame psychopaths and why, in limited cases, we

might be right in doing so.
Scanlons work on tolerance and free speech is arguably his most important contribution to political philosophy. In his The Difficulty of
Tolerance (reprinted in The Difficulty of Tolerance, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2003), Scanlon argues that, when parties disagree about some issue but nevertheless respect each other as moral equals,
tolerance understood as an attitude of embracing that kind of respect
is an ideal worth pursuing.
The aim of Angela Smiths The Trouble with Tolerance is to show that,
even in these contexts, tolerance is not morally valuable. Smith claims that, in
its definition, tolerance includes an (implicit) presumption of a legitimate
authority over the conduct of others (p. 182). When I say that I disagree with
libertarians but tolerate their desire to cut taxes, in Smiths view, I assume
that I have a legitimate authority to permit them to continue with their
policies. But no one, qua citizen, can have such an authority over other
citizens because, qua citizens, we are each others equals (p. 186).
Expressing the attitude of tolerance thus counters moral equality of persons.
Smith, however, suggests that being a tolerant person is desirable. Being
tolerant does not mean having tolerant attitudes but rather being non-judgemental, open-minded, respectful, and alike (p. 191).
The problem with Smiths argument seems to be that in many cases saying
that I tolerate X does not imply that I have an authority over X but only that
I abstain from interfering in Xs business. Saying that I tolerate libertarians,
I mean only that I have no aspiration to engage politically to get them banned
or prosecuted.
At the end, let me offer a few critical observations about the volumes
structure. In the preface, the editors write that the topics that have been
selected reflect the full range of Scanlons interests (p. vi), although that is
not quite true. Some essays in the third part, such as G. A. Cohens defence of
conservatism (Rescuing Conservatism: A Defense of Existing Value), have
only a loose connection to Scanlons work and seem to have been included in
appreciation of him. Moreover, some recognizably Scanlonian themes are
unfortunately left out. Apart from a few suggestions in Kolodny s essay,
there is no discussion of Scanlons arguments against the relevance of intentions to the permissibility of actions. No essay deals with Scanlons views on
the normativity of rationality, his arguments in favour of non-naturalism or
the value of choice, his scepticism about the notion of well-being, etc.
Furthermore, it is regrettable that the volume lacks an introduction with a
summary of Scanlons most important positions.
Despite the mentioned weaknesses, this collection does a very good job.
It contains some of the finest essays on Scanlonian themes available at the

Book Reviews 1213

moment, any of which will prove useful to those interested in moral and
political philosophy.

doi:10.1093/mind/fzt105

ANTON MARKOC

Advance Access publication 15 December 2013

Hegels Science of Logic: A Critical Rethinking in Thirty Lectures,

by Richard Dien Winfield. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2012.
Pp. x + 376. H/b and ebook $95.00/59.95.
Anyone writing a commentary on the whole of Hegels Science of Logic is
faced with almost insurmountable challenges. Hegel explores a series of concepts or categories through twenty-seven chapters, all of which have a sequence of subordinate stages. Since he is exploring the patterns of pure
thought, the argument is developed using language that leaves concrete
illustrations and applications to asides and independent remarks, and requires disciplined thought to grasp its implications. Any serious attempt to
unpack the entirety of that dense prose as it wends its way through its extended itinerary needs to provide not only an integrating overview of Hegels
program, but also a detailed explanation of the transitions he makes from
concept to concept.
Richard Winfield adopts a simple approach to these challenges. The lectures he gave in a course on the Logic were recorded, transcribed, and then
edited into a manageable volume. That format imposed a restraint on the
length of the resulting analysis, but the benefit is balanced by the need it
imposes to skate lightly over many of the details.
Central to Winfields interpretation of Hegel is his claim that Hegel avoids
the introduction of any assumptions or presuppositions but develops his
argument in a strictly a priori manner drawing on nothing more than
what has previously emerged. This means that the beginning of the discussion
has to be carefully identified so that it assumes nothing determinate; and it
means that every transition has to follow with strict necessity from what
precedes and can introduce nothing from outside the framework of the logical discussion itself. This thesis has the merit of taking seriously Hegels
concern to develop his thought systematically, to explore the dynamics of
pure reason, and to distinguish carefully the logic of the categorial concepts

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Philosophy Department
Central European University
Zrnyi u. 14, 4TH floor
Budapest 1051
Hungary
Markoc_Anton@ceu-budapest.edu