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Socrates
Benjamin A. Rider
Socrates (ca. 469399 bce) is at once one of the most influential and one of the
mostmysterious and malleable figures in the history of Western ethical philosophy.
Almost every ancient Greek and Roman philosophical school, from the iconoclastic
Cynics and skeptical Academy to the system-building Stoics and hedonistic
Cyrenaics, claimed Socrates as an intellectual ancestor and moral exemplar (see
ancient ethics; cyrenaics; hellenistic ethics; stoicism). His ideas about
virtue, wisdom, and happiness set the agenda for subsequent ethical inquiry, and
his life and example continued to exert their power down through the Western
philosophical tradition, influencing and inspiring philosophers from Kierkegaard
and Freud to contemporary proponents of virtue ethics (see eudaimonism; virtue
ethics). Yet, as this diversity of appropriations of Socrates and the Socratic life
indicates, the man himself has always been something of an enigma, his life, ideas,
and significance seen differently depending on who is looking at him. This held
trueeven for those who knew him when he was alive: the decades after Socrates
death saw the emergence of a surprisingly diverse group of Socratic philosophers,
as former companions of Socrates debated vigorously about the meaning of their
mentors life and work, often through the medium of Socratic dialogues (Dring
2011). Socrates himself, however, wrote nothing, and the three significant surviving
depictions of Socrates in the works of the comic playwright Aristophanes, the
soldier and historian Xenophon, and the philosopher Plato ascribe very different
personalities and philosophical interests and commitments to their subject (on
Aristophanes Socrates, see Konstan 2011; on Xenophons, see Dorion 2006). All
agree he was a strange but compelling man, but they disagree about most of the
reasons why.
Given these challenges, reconstructing the ethical views of the historical
Atheniannamed Socrates has proven a nearly impossible task. (For an influential
but controversial attempt, see Vlastos 1991: 45106; Dorion 2011: 1821 suggests
an alternative approach.) This essay, therefore, focuses on the version of Socrates
with the greatest historical influence the Socrates depicted in Platos Apology, as
well as in Platos shorter ethical works. (The rough division of Platos dialogues into
groups distinguished by purpose, content, and style is generally but not universally
accepted by scholars. Kraut 2006: 2313 explains the reasoning.) Platos Apology
dramatizes Socrates defense speech at his trial in 399 bce, as he defiantly defends
himself and his way of life to the Athenian jury in response to charges of impiety
and corrupting the young. In his speech, Socrates expresses a powerful ethical
outlook, which he claims has motivated his life and activities in Athens. Plato
continued to explore and develop the Socratic worldview in his other work, and it
The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Edited by Hugh LaFollette, print pages 49494957.
2013 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2013 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
DOI: 10.1002/ 9781444367072.wbiee750

served as a source of inspiration for the philosophers whom Socrates influenced

(see plato).

Human Wisdom and the Examined Life

In Platos Apology, Socrates seeks to refute the charges against him by explaining his
lifes work, its goals, and its value to the city. His mission began, he says, when he was
struggling to understand the Delphic Oracles pronouncement that no one is wiser
than he (Apology 21a). He was puzzled by this he did not think he possessed
any significant wisdom, so he wondered what the Oracle could mean (21b). He
determined, therefore, to investigate. He decided to examine men with a reputation
for wisdom, asking questions and testing their claims, hoping to find someone wiser
than he whom he could cite as a counterexample to the Oracles assertion. Again
and again, however, he was disappointed. He discovered that, although many
thought themselves wise and enjoyed great reputations for wisdom, none actually
possessed the wisdom they claimed. Socrates explains how, after an early encounter,
he thought to himself:
Im wiser than that person. For its likely that neither of us knows anything fine
and good, but he thinks he knows something he doesnt know, whereas I, since I
dont infact know, dont think that I do either. At any rate, it seems that Im wiser
than he in just this one small way: that what I dont know, I dont think I know.
(Reeve, 2002:21d)

Eventually, Socrates concluded that he is the wisest of humans precisely because he,
unlike others, recognizes that he knows nothing about the most important matters.
This is his human wisdom (20d).
Inspired by this experience, Socrates made it his mission in life to confront his
fellow-citizens, showing them their ignorance and limitations and urging them to
change their priorities in life. At one point, Socrates imagines the jury offering
to acquit him, on the condition that he cease practicing philosophy, and he
responds:
Ill obey the god rather than you, and as long as I draw breath and am able, I wont give
up practicing philosophy, exhorting and showing the way to any of you I ever happen
to meet, saying just the sorts of things I am accustomed to say: My excellent man
are you not ashamed that you take care to acquire as much wealth as possible
and reputation and honor but that about wisdom and truth, about how your soul
may be in the best possible condition, you take neither care nor thought? (29d3e3;
Reeve 2002)

Several important themes emerge in this story, which together form the basis of
Socrates ethical and philosophical stance. First, Socrates himself disclaims
knowledge of anything fine and good, and he professes never to have found anyone

else who has the knowledge he lacks. The knowledge at issue is specifically ethical
wisdom. Socrates admits that craftsmen, for example, have a sort of knowledge, but
their skill makes them arrogantly suppose that they also understand the most
important things, such as virtue and living well. According to Socrates, their
presumption is the most reproach-worthy ignorance (29b12), and he sees it as his
mission on behalf of Apollo to disabuse people of this hubris (23b).
Second, this story also describes, in outline, Socrates distinctive method for
revealing ignorance: cross-examination of a persons knowledge claims. Plato
vividly represents this process which commentators sometimes refer to as the
Socratic elenchus, from the Greek term for examination or testing in several
dialogues, including the Euthyphro, Laches, Charmides, Hippias Minor and Major,
and others. The examinations typically proceed as follows: Socrates begins by
asking his discussion partner to explain or define some topic of ethical importance,
often a virtue, such as piety, courage, or self-control. The partner confidently
proposes an answer, a definition or account meant to explain the topic. Socrates
proceeds to ask further questions, sometimes to clarify the proposal, often to elicit
other beliefs the partner has on the matter. Frequently, Socrates uses simple,
commonsense examples to illustrate his points and extract his partners agreement
to key premises. From these premises all of which, crucially, his partner has
accepted Socrates draws a conclusion that contradicts the original proposal.
Usually, the interlocutor tries again to answer Socrates question, but, inevitably,
the dialogue ends with none of the proposed definitions having proven adequate,
suggesting that the person does not actually know what he thinks he knows. (For
more on Socrates method and its epistemic limitations, see Vlastos 1983; Benson
2000: 1757; Scott 2002.)
According to his story in the Apology, however, Socrates efforts do not end when
he has shown someone their ignorance. He also exhorts people to make positive
changes in their lives and priorities and, above all, to care for virtue and the state of
their souls (29d30a; 31b). In other words, Socrates mission is not simply to refute
people. He wants them both to consider their souls (more than their bodies and
possessions) as worthy of and requiring care, attention, and thought, and to act to
make themselves as good and wise as possible.
The best way to do that, Socrates suggests, is to practice philosophy, the love
and pursuit of wisdom. In a memorable passage, Socrates proclaims, It is the
greatest good for a human being to discuss virtue every day and the other things
about which you hear me conversing and examining both myself and others, for
the unexamined life is not worth living for a human being (Apology 38a25).
This famous aphorism, which has inspired generations of philosophers, follows
from Socrates recognition of his own and others epistemic limitations. Given
our human condition ignorant of the most important matters of life, bombarded by conventional falsehoods and convenient oversimplifications the
philosophical life of questioning and discussing virtue, happiness, and other ethical matters offers our best hope for caring for ourselves and living the best lives
possible.

The Value of Virtue

Given Socrates insistence that he is wise only insofar as he recognizes he knows
nothing, we might expect him to refrain from making strong ethical claims. He does
not. On the contrary, even in the Apology and other dialogues where he protests his
ignorance most fiercely, he frequently professes and defends several powerful and
unconventional ethical theses. According to Socrates:

The fundamental human good is virtue or moral excellence, which is identical to

the health of the soul.
The various forms of virtue courage, self-control, reverence, justice are
actually constituted by one and the same thing: ethical wisdom, understood as
expertise about human well-being.
A person who possesses this wisdom of life can make good decisions and act
correctly and will, consequently, live well and happily. A person lacking wisdom
(and, in particular, unaware of his deficiency) makes mistakes, acts badly, and is
miserable.
No one does wrong willingly. When a person acts badly, it is because he is
ignorant about the good that he ultimately desires.

Scholars debate the status of these claims. Where do Socrates ethical convictions
come from, and what justifies his belief in them? If we take Socrates at his word, it
cannot be that he thinks he knows these things. Rather, they apparently represent an
ethical outlook that he has found particularly coherent and compelling, and which
has proven resistant to refutation throughout his extensive ethical discussions (Crito
46bc, 48c49b; Gorgias 508e509a). (For more on Socrates claims in light of his
protestations of ignorance, see Woodruff 1990 and Bett 2011.)
Socrates most distinctive and historically significant positive claim is that virtue
or moral excellence ought to be a persons first priority. This idea pervades his
defense speech in the Apology, as he tells his fellow-citizens: I do nothing else except
go around trying to persuade you, both young and old alike, not to care about your
bodies or your money as intensely as about how your soul may be in the best possible
condition (30ab; see also 28b, 29b, 31b, 36c). Socrates implies that the soul, or
psyche, is a persons true self; therefore, those who prioritize external goods bodily
health and pleasure, wealth and possessions, or reputation and honor commit a
fundamental error, valuing something that belongs to them rather than their true
selves (cf. Crito 47e49b). Socrates expresses the claim starkly in the Gorgias, while
trying to convince the young orator Polus that it is better to suffer injustice than to
commit it. Socrates proposes, and Polus eventually agrees, that the corrupt condition
of the soul is injustice, ignorance, cowardice, and the like (Gorgias 477b, trans.
Donald Zeyl, in Cooper 1997). Injustice, then, and lack of discipline and all other
forms of corruption of the soul are the worst thing there is, Socrates contends
(477e). Injustice and other vices are diseases that infect and threaten to destroy
thesoul, our truest self, and must be avoided at all costs (479bc). Any harm to body,

wealth, or reputation is to be preferred to vice (cf. 512de; 521b522e). (See

happiness; virtue.)
Socrates claims about the sovereign value of virtue are associated with and partly
explained by the second of his distinctive paradoxes: that virtue or excellence is
really a kind of wisdom or expertise, and vice a kind of ignorance. Virtues such as
courage, self-control, justice, and piety are states of soul that enable a person to act
correctly, to respond appropriately and well to the situations he faces in his life.
Courage, for example, enables one to do what is good and right in the face of danger
and to handle ones fear appropriately (see courage). It is not enough to stand firm
mindlessly or rush fearlessly into danger; you have to act at the right time, in the
right way, and for the right reasons (Laches 192c195a; cf. Protagoras 349e350c).
But a person is able reliably to act correctly only if he has the wisdom to discern
the appropriate response and to use what life gives him well and beneficially
(Euthydemus 278e282a; Protagoras 352c356e; Meno 87d89a; see wisdom). In
particular, he needs to understand what is genuinely good and worth pursuing, and
what is bad and worth fearing and avoiding. The truly courageous man, therefore,
has cultivated the wisdom to discern what goods are at stake in his situation, and
what evils are worth risking for their sake (Laches 197ac, 198b199c). An ignorant
person, by contrast, will often act incorrectly, make mistakes, and frustrate his own
goals and purposes (Gorgias 466e, 521b; Alcibiades 133d134a). This ethical
ignorance is particularly dangerous when a person fails to recognize that he is
ignorant which is why, when Socrates exposes peoples ignorance, he thinks he
does them a great service. (For more on the relation between virtue, wisdom, and
happiness, see Annas 1993 and Irwin 1995: 5263.)
Finally, Socrates held, again paradoxically, that no one does wrong willingly
(Protagoras 352b358e; Meno 77b48b; see weakness of will). Socrates assumes
that everyone desires what is intrinsically good well-being or happiness
(cf. Euthydemus 278e). Therefore, when we act, we do so believing our action
constitutes or promotes the good, either directly or as an instrumental means
(Gorgias 467c468b; Lysis 219c220b). But when someone has false beliefs about the
good and how it is produced for example, when a tyrant believes it is good tomaintain his power by unjustly killing or confiscating property he actually frustrates his
own true desires. He is vicious, then, only because of his false beliefs and ignorance
(Penner 2011: 2889). As Socrates puts it in the Gorgias, the tyrant wants to be
happy; however, he sees fit to commit injustice, and, insofar as these actions
inflame his souls disease and undermine his happiness, he does not really want to
do them (466b468e; see also Segvic 2006).

Love and Philosophical Friendship

For Socrates, philosophy is not a solitary undertaking. The Apology makes clear that
although Socrates denied taking pay as a sophist and teacher, he plainly sought and
collected friends and companions to share his inquiries (Apology 33c34b; Crito
44e45b; Phaedo 59bc). As Rudebusch (2004) explains, Socrates sought to form

problem-solving partnerships with friends working together to investigate the

nature of human excellence and well-being.
Platos Lysis presents not only Socrates inquiry into the nature and causes of
friendship but also his demonstration of how true philosophical friendships are
created (205c). Like many dialogues, the Lysis ends inconclusively, but one consistent theme that emerges in the discussion is the idea that human friendship arises
because we humans, unlike gods, have needs and deficiencies (210ad; 216de;
219d220a; cf. Symposium 2046). We are not self-sufficient, which is why we value
and love others. This idea emerges most clearly when Socrates criticizes the
proposalthat likeness explains friendship (214a215a). This will not work, Socrates
contends, because to the extent that people are alike, they have nothing to offer each
other, and so will not prize or value each other and cannot be friends (215a; cf.
200ad). On the other hand, Socrates continues, a being without needs, who is
good and thus self-sufficient, does not prize or value anything (215b). As a result,
nothing is friend to such a being (215ab). Humans, however, are not good in this
sense. We are, as Socrates puts it, neither good nor bad (217a; also 218ab, 219a),
and therefore we do love and desire things, including other humans as friends
(cf.Protagoras 322ad; Charmides 171d172a; Republic 2.369b).
Of course, our greatest need is not security or luxury, but wisdom. Given human
limitations, companionship and discussion with others philosophical friendship are necessary conditions to attain any wisdom. Even Socrates, depicted as the
model philosopher, needs and desires friends with whom he can share his search
(Lysis 211e212a). In the Gorgias, after the politician Callicles chastises Socrates for
his way of life, Socrates tells him: I well know that if you concur with what my soul
believes, then that is the very truth. I realize that the person who intends to put a
soul to an adequate test to see whether it lives rightly or not must have three
qualities, all of which you have: knowledge, good will, and frankness (486e487a).
Lacking knowledge, a discussion partner cannot recognize when Socrates has gone
wrong; lacking frankness, he will lack the nerve to tell him. But most importantly, a
person without good will, who is not a friend, will not care enough to try to help his
friend by preventing him from believing falsely about the most important matters
in life.

Conclusion
Socrates believed that by practicing philosophical inquiry and examining himself
and others, he was living the best available human life, as well as contributing
significantly to the well-being of others. In the Gorgias, he suggests that he is one of
the few Athenians to take up the true political craft and practice the true politics,
since his speeches aim at the best (521d). His belief rests partly on his conviction,
gained through years of questioning, that we humans lack the comprehensive ethical wisdom we need reliably to act correctly and avoid mistakes. Philosophy offers
the best path forward. It enables us, first, to maintain an awarenessof our limitations, and, second, to work out, in cooperative inquiry with friends, the best

possible positive ideas about how to live well and continually to test and improve
those ideas.In this way, we care not only for our own souls, but also for each other.
Socrates model for the ethical and philosophical life has had ajustifiably enduring
appeal.
See also: ancient ethics; courage; cyrenaics; eudaimonism; happiness;
hellenistic ethics; plato; political obligation; stoicism; virtue; virtue
ethics; weakness of will; wisdom

REFERENCES
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Benson, Hugh 2000. Wisdom: The Model of Knowledge in Platos Early Dialogues. New York:
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Bett, Richard 2011. Socratic Ignorance, in Donald R. Morrison (ed.), The Cambridge
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Cooper, John (ed.) 1997. Plato: Complete Works. Indianapolis: Hackett.
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Dorion, Louis-Andr 2006. Xenophons Socrates, in S. Ahbel-Rappe and R. Kamtekar
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Konstan, David 2011. Socrates in Aristophanes Clouds, in Donald R. Morrison (ed.),
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Kraut, Richard 2006. The Examined Life, in S. Ahbel-Rappe and R. Kamtekar (eds.),
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Reeve, C. D. C. (ed.) 2002. The Trials of Socrates: Six Classic Texts, trans. C. D. C. Reeve,
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Rudebusch, George 2004. True Love is Requited: The Argument of Lysis 221d222a, Ancient
Philosophy, vol. 24, pp. 114.
Scott, Gary Allen (ed.) 2002. Does Socrates Have a Method? Rethinking the Elenchus in Platos
Dialogues and Beyond. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.
Segvic, Heda 2006. No One Errs Willingly: The Meaning of Socratic Intellectualism, in
S. Ahbel-Rappe and R. Kamtekar (eds.), A Companion to Socrates. Malden, MA:
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Vlastos, Gregory 1983. The Socratic Elenchus, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, vol. 1.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 2758.
Vlastos, Gregory 1991. Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Woodruff, Paul 1990. Platos Earlier Epistemology, in S. Everson (ed.), Greek Epistemology.
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FURTHER READINGS
Benson, Hugh (ed.) 1992. Essays on the Philosophy of Socrates. New York: Oxford University
Press.
Brickhouse, T. C., and N. Smith 2000. The Philosophy of Socrates. Boulder, CO: Westview.
Gomez-Lobo, A. 1994. The Foundations of Socratic Ethics. Indianapolis: Hackett.
Guthrie, W. K. C. 1969. Socrates, in A History of Greek Philosophy, vol. 3, Ch. 2. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Kahn, Charles 1996. Plato and the Socratic Dialogue: The Philosophical Use of a Literary Form.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kraut, Richard. 1984. Socrates and the State. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Nehamas, Alexander 1999. Virtues of Authenticity. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Reeve, C. D. C. 1989. Socrates in the Apology. Indianapolis: Hackett.
Rudebusch, George 2009. Socrates. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.
Santas, Gerasimos 1979. Socrates: Philosophy in Platos Early Dialogues. Boston: Routledge &
Kegan Paul.
Taylor, A. E. 1952. Socrates. Boston: Beacon.
Taylor, C. C. W. 1998. Socrates. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Waterfield, Robin 2009. Why Socrates Died. New York: Norton.