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THIRDDIVISION

[G.R.No.157214.June7,2005]

PHILIPPINEGLOBALCOMMUNICATIONS,INC.,petitioner,vs.RICARDODE
VERA,respondent.
DECISION
GARCIA,J.:

Beforeusisthisappealbywayofapetitionforreviewoncertiorarifromthe12September
[1]
[2]
2002Decision andthe13February2003Resolution oftheCourtofAppealsinCAG.R.SP
No. 65178, upholding the finding of illegal dismissal by the National Labor Relations
Commissionagainstpetitioner.
Asculledfromtherecords,thepertinentfactsare:
Petitioner Philippine Global Communications, Inc. (PhilCom), is a corporation engaged in
thebusinessofcommunicationservicesandalliedactivities,whilerespondentRicardoDeVera
is a physician by profession whom petitioner enlisted to attend to the medical needs of its
employees.AtthecruxofthecontroversyisDr.DeVerasstatusvisavispetitionerwhenthe
latterterminatedhisengagement.
[3]

It appears that on 15 May 1981, De Vera, via a letter dated 15 May 1981, offered his
services to the petitioner, therein proposing his plan of works required of a practitioner in
industrialmedicine,toincludethefollowing:
1.Applicationofpreventivemedicineincludingperiodiccheckupofemployees
2.Holdingofclinichoursinthemorningandafternoonforatotaloffive(5)hoursdailyfor
consultationservicestoemployees
3.Managementandtreatmentofemployeesthatmaynecessitatehospitalizationincluding
emergencycasesandaccidents
4.Conductpreemploymentphysicalcheckupofprospectiveemployeeswithnoadditional
medicalfee
5.Conducthomevisitswhenevernecessary
6.Attendtocertainmedicaladministrativefunctionsuchasaccomplishingmedicalforms,
evaluatingconditionsofemployeesapplyingforsickleaveofabsenceandsubsequently
issuingpropercertification,andallmattersreferredwhicharemedicalinnature.
The parties agreed and formalized respondents proposal in a document denominated as
[4]

RETAINERSHIP CONTRACT which will be for a period of one year subject to renewal, it

being made clear therein that respondent will cover the retainership the Company previously
had with Dr. K. Eulau and that respondents retainer fee will be at P4,000.00 a month. Said
[5]
contractwasrenewedyearly. Theretainershiparrangementwentonfrom1981to1994with
changes in the retainers fee. However, for the years 1995 and 1996, renewal of the contract
wasonlymadeverbally.
TheturningpointinthepartiesrelationshipsurfacedinDecember1996whenPhilcom,thru
[6]
a letter bearing on the subject boldly written as TERMINATION RETAINERSHIP
CONTRACT,informedDeVeraofitsdecisiontodiscontinuethelattersretainerscontractwith
the Company effective at the close of business hours of December 31, 1996 because
management has decided that it would be more practical to provide medical services to its
employeesthroughaccreditedhospitalsnearthecompanypremises.
On 22 January 1997, De Vera filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), alleging that that he had been actually employed by
Philcom as its company physician since 1981 and was dismissed without due process. He
averredthathewasdesignatedasacompanyphysicianonretainerbasisforreasonsallegedly
knownonlytoPhilcom.Helikewiseprofessedthatsincehewasnotconversantwithlaborlaws,
hedidnotgivemuchattentiontothedesignationasanywayheworkedonafulltimebasisand
was paid a basic monthly salary plus fringe benefits, like any other regular employees of
Philcom.
[7]

On21December1998,LaborArbiterRamonValentinC.Reyescameoutwithadecision
dismissing De Veras complaint for lack of merit, on the rationale that as a retained physician
under a valid contract mutually agreed upon by the parties, De Vera was an independent
contractorandthathewasnotdismissedbutratherhiscontractwith[PHILCOM]endedwhen
saidcontractwasnotrenewedafterDecember31,1996.
[8]

On De Veras appeal to the NLRC, the latter, in a decision dated 23 October 2000,
reversed (the word used is modified) that of the Labor Arbiter, on a finding that De Vera is
Philcomsregularemployeeandaccordinglydirectedthecompanytoreinstatehimtohisformer
positionwithoutlossofseniorityrightsandprivilegesandwithfullbackwagesfromthedateof
hisdismissaluntilactualreinstatement.Wequotethedispositiveportionofthedecision:
WHEREFORE,theassaileddecisionismodifiedinthatrespondentisorderedtoreinstatecomplainantto
hisformerpositionwithoutlossofseniorityrightsandprivilegeswithfullbackwagesfromthedateof
hisdismissaluntilhisactualreinstatementcomputedasfollows:
Backwages:
a)BasicSalary
FromDec.31,1996toApr.10,2000=39.33mos.
P44,400.00x39.33mos.P1,750,185.00
th
b)13 MonthPay:
1/12ofP1,750,185.00145,848.75
c)Travellingallowance:
P1,000.00x39.33mos.39,330.00
GRANDTOTALP1,935,363.75
Thedecisionstandsinotheraspects.

SOORDERED.
With its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the NLRC in its order of 27
[9]
February2001, PhilcomthenwenttotheCourtofAppealsonapetitionforcertiorari,thereat
docketedasCAG.R.SPNo.65178,imputinggraveabuseofdiscretionamountingtolackor
excessofjurisdictiononthepartoftheNLRCwhenitreversedthefindingsofthelaborarbiter
andawardedthirteenthmonthpayandtravelingallowancetoDeVeraevenassuchawardhad
nobasisinfactandinlaw.
[10]

On12September2002,theCourtofAppealsrenderedadecision, modifyingthatofthe
NLRCbydeletingtheawardoftravelingallowance,andorderingpaymentofseparationpayto
DeVerainlieuofreinstatement,thus:
WHEREFORE,premisesconsidered,theassailedjudgmentofpublicrespondent,dated23October
2000,isMODIFIED.TheawardoftravelingallowanceisdeletedasthesameisherebyDELETED.
Insteadofreinstatement,privaterespondentshallbepaidseparationpaycomputedatone(1)month
salaryforeveryyearofservicecomputedfromthetimeprivaterespondentcommencedhisemployment
in1981uptotheactualpaymentofthebackwagesandseparationpay.Theawardsofbackwagesand
13thmonthpaySTAND.
SOORDERED.
Intime,Philcomfiledamotionforreconsiderationbutwasdeniedbytheappellatecourtin
[11]

itsresolutionof13February2003.

Hence,Philcomspresentrecourseonitsmainsubmissionthat
THECOURTOFAPPEALSERREDINSUSTAININGTHEDECISIONOFTHENATIONAL
LABORRELATIONSCOMMISSIONANDRENDERINGTHEQUESTIONEDDECISIONAND
RESOLUTIONINAWAYTHATISNOTINACCORDWITHTHEFACTSANDAPPLICABLE
LAWSANDJURISPRUDENCEWHICHDISTINGUISHLEGITIMATEJOBCONTRACTING
AGREEMENTSFROMTHEEMPLOYEREMPLOYEERELATIONSHIP.
WeGRANT.
UnderRule45oftheRulesofCourt,onlyquestionsoflawmaybereviewedbythisCourt
indecisionsrenderedbytheCourtofAppeals.Thereareinstances,however,wheretheCourt
departsfromthisruleandreviewsfindingsoffactsothatsubstantialjusticemaybeserved.The
exceptionalinstancesarewhere:
xxxxxxxxx(1)theconclusionisafindinggroundedentirelyonspeculation,surmiseandconjecture(2)
theinferencemadeismanifestlymistaken(3)thereisgraveabuseofdiscretion(4)thejudgmentis
basedonamisapprehensionoffacts(5)thefindingsoffactareconflicting(6)theCourtofAppeals
wentbeyondtheissuesofthecaseanditsfindingsarecontrarytotheadmissionsofbothappellantand
appellees(7)thefindingsoffactoftheCourtofAppealsarecontrarytothoseofthetrialcourt(8)said
findingsoffactsareconclusionswithoutcitationofspecificevidenceonwhichtheyarebased(9)the
factssetforthinthepetitionaswellasinthepetitionersmainandreplybriefsarenotdisputedbythe
respondentsand(10)thefindingsoffactoftheCourtofAppealsarepremisedonthesupposedabsence
[12]
ofevidenceandcontradictedbytheevidenceonrecord.
Asweseeit,thepartiesrespectivesubmissionsrevolveontheprimordialissueofwhether

anemployeremployeerelationshipexistsbetweenpetitionerandrespondent,theexistenceof
[13]

whichis,initself,aquestionoffact wellwithintheprovinceoftheNLRC.Nonetheless,given
the reality that the NLRCs findings are at odds with those of the labor arbiter, the Court,
[14]

consistentwithitsrulinginJimenezvs.NationalLaborRelationsCommission, isconstrained
tolookdeeperintotheattendantcircumstancesobtaininginthiscase,asappearingonrecord.
[15]

In a long line of decisions, the Court, in determining the existence of an employer


employeerelationship,hasinvariablyadheredtothefourfoldtest,towit:[1]theselectionand
engagementoftheemployee[2]thepaymentofwages[3]thepowerofdismissaland[4]the
powertocontroltheemployeesconduct,orthesocalledcontroltest,consideredtobethemost
importantelement.
Applyingthefourfoldtesttothiscase,weinitiallyfindthatitwasrespondenthimselfwho
sets the parameters of what his duties would be in offering his services to petitioner. This is
[16]
bornebynolessthanhis15May1981letter which,infull,reads:
May15,1981
Mrs.AdelaL.Vicente
VicePresident,IndustrialRelations
PhilCom,PaseodeRoxas
Makati,MetroManila
Madam:
IshallhavethetimeandeffortforthepositionofCompanyphysicianwithyourcorporationifyou
deemeditnecessary.Ihavethenecessaryqualifications,trainingandexperiencerequiredbysuch
positionandIamconfidentthatIcanservethebestinterestsofyouremployees,medically.
Myplanofworksandtargetsshallcoverthedutiesandresponsibilitiesrequiredofapractitionerin
industrialmedicinewhichincludesthefollowing:
1.Applicationofpreventivemedicineincludingperiodiccheckupofemployees
2.Holdingofclinichoursinthemorningandafternoonforatotaloffive(5)hoursdailyfor
consultationservicestoemployees
3.Managementandtreatmentofemployeesthatmaynecessitatehospitalizationincluding
emergencycasesandaccidents
4.Conductpreemploymentphysicalcheckupofprospectiveemployeeswithnoadditional
medicalfee
5.Conducthomevisitswhenevernecessary
6.Attendtocertainmedicaladministrativefunctionssuchasaccomplishingmedicalforms,
evaluatingconditionsofemployeesapplyingforsickleaveofabsenceandsubsequently
issuingpropercertification,andallmattersreferredwhicharemedicalinnature.
OnthesubjectofcompensationfortheservicesthatIproposetorendertothecorporation,youmaystate
anofferbasedonyourbeliefthatIcanverywellqualifyforthejobhavingworkedwithyour

organizationforsometimenow.
Ishallbeverygratefulforwhateverkindattentionyoumayextendonthismatterandhopingthatitwill
meritacceptance,Iremain
Verytrulyyours,
(signed)
RICARDOV.DEVERA,M.D.
Significantly,theforegoingletterwassubstantiallythebasisofthelaborarbitersfindingthat
there existed no employeremployee relationship between petitioner and respondent, in
additiontothefollowingfactualsettings:
Thefactthatthecomplainantwasnotconsideredanemployeewasrecognizedbythecomplainant
himselfinasignedlettertotherespondentdatedApril21,1982attachedasAnnexGtotherespondents
ReplyandRejoinder.Quotingthepertinentportionofsaidletter:
Tocarryoutyourmemoeffectivelyandtoprovideasystematicandworkabletimeschedulewhichwill
servethebestinterestsofboththepresentandabsentemployee,mayIproposeanextendedtwohour
service(1:003:00P.M.)duringwhichperiodIcandevoteampletimetobothgroupsdependinguponthe
urgencyofthesituation.Ishallreadjustmyprivatescheduletobeavailableforthehereinproposed
extendedhours,shouldyouconsiderthisproposal.
AsregardscompensationfortheadditionaltimeandservicesthatIshallrendertotheemployees,itis
dependentonyourevaluationofthemeritofmyproposalandyourconfidenceonmyabilitytocarryout
efficientlysaidproposal.
Thetenorofthisletterindicatesthatthecomplainantwasproposingtoextendhistimewiththe
respondentandseekingadditionalcompensationforsaidextension.Thisshowsthattherespondent
PHILCOMdidnothavecontroloverthescheduleofthecomplainantasit[is]thecomplainantwhois
proposinghisownscheduleandaskingtobepaidforthesame.Thisisproofthatthecomplainant
understoodthathisrelationshipwiththerespondentPHILCOMwasaretainedphysicianandnotasan
employee.Ifhewereanemployeehecouldnotnegotiateastohishoursofwork.
ThecomplainantisaDoctorofMedicine,andpresumably,awelleducatedperson.Yet,thecomplainant,
inhispositionpaper,isclaimingthatheisnotconversantwiththelawanddidnotgivemuchattentionto
hisjobtitleonaretainerbasis.Butthesamecomplainantadmitsinhisaffidavitthathisserviceforthe
respondentwascoveredbyaretainershipcontract[which]wasrenewedeveryyearfrom1982to1994.
UponreadingthecontractdatedSeptember6,1982,signedbythecomplainanthimself(AnnexCof
RespondentsPositionPaper),itclearlystatesthatisaretainershipcontract.Theretainerfeeisindicated
thereonandthedurationofthecontractforoneyearisalsoclearlyindicatedinparagraph5ofthe
RetainershipContract.Thecomplainantcannotclaimthathewasunawarethatthecontractwasgood
onlyforoneyear,ashesignedthesamewithoutanyobjections.Thecomplainantalsoacceptedits
renewaleveryyearthereafteruntil1994.Asaliteratepersonandeducatedperson,thecomplainant
cannotclaimthathedoesnotknowwhatcontracthesignedandthatitwasrenewedonayeartoyear
[17]
basis.
The labor arbiter added the indicia, not disputed by respondent, that from the time he
started to work with petitioner, he never was included in its payroll was never deducted any
contributionforremittancetotheSocialSecuritySystem(SSS)andwasinfactsubjectedby
petitionertotheten(10%)percentwithholdingtaxforhisprofessionalfee,inaccordancewith

theNationalInternalRevenueCode,matterswhicharesimplyinconsistentwithanemployer
employeerelationship.Intheprecisewordsofthelaborarbiter:
xxxxxxxxxAftermorethantenyearsofservicestoPHILCOM,thecomplainantwouldhavenoticed
thatnoSSSdeductionsweremadeonhisremunerationorthattherespondentwasdeductingthe10%tax
forhisfeesandhesurelywouldhavecomplainedaboutthemifhehadconsideredhimselfanemployee
ofPHILCOM.Butheneverraisedthoseissues.AnordinaryemployeewouldconsidertheSSSpayments
importantandthusmakesuretheywouldbepaid.Thecomplainantneverbotheredtoasktherespondent
toremithisSSScontributions.Thisclearlyshowsthatthecomplainantneverconsideredhimselfan
employeeofPHILCOMandthus,respondentneednotremitanythingtotheSSSinfavorofthe
[18]
complainant.
Clearly, the elements of an employeremployee relationship are wanting in this case. We
may add that the records are replete with evidence showing that respondent had to bill
[19]
petitioner for his monthly professional fees. It simply runs against the grain of common
experience to imagine that an ordinary employee has yet to bill his employer to receive his
salary.
Wenote,too,thatthepowertoterminatethepartiesrelationshipwasmutuallyvestedon
[20]
both.Eithermayterminatethearrangementatwill,withorwithoutcause.
Finally,remarkablyabsentfromthepartiesarrangementistheelementofcontrol,whereby
theemployerhasreservedtherighttocontroltheemployeenotonlyastotheresultofthework
[21]
donebutalsoastothemeansandmethodsbywhichthesameistobeaccomplished.
Here, petitioner had no control over the means and methods by which respondent went
about performing his work at the company premises. He could even embark in the private
practice of his profession, not to mention the fact that respondents work hours and the
[22]

additional compensation therefor were negotiated upon by the parties. In fine, the parties
themselves practically agreed on every terms and conditions of respondents engagement,
which thereby negates the element of control in their relationship. For sure, respondent has
nevercitedevenasingleinstancewhenpetitionerinterferedwithhiswork.
Yet,despitetheforegoing,allofwhichareextantonrecord,boththeNLRCandtheCourt
ofAppealsruledthatrespondentispetitionersregularemployeeatthetimeofhisseparation.
Partlysaystheappellatecourtinitsassaileddecision:
Bethatasitmay,itisadmittedthatprivaterespondentswrittenretainercontractwasrenewedannually
from1981to1994andtheallegedrenewalfor1995and1996,whenitwasallegedlyterminated,was
verbal.
Article280oftheLaborcode(sic)provides:
Theprovisionsofwrittenagreementtothecontrarynotwithstandingandregardlessoftheoral
agreementsoftheparties,anemploymentshallbedeemedtoberegularwheretheemployeehasbeen
engagedtoperformintheusualbusinessortradeoftheemployer,exceptwheretheemploymenthas
beenfixedforaspecificprojectorundertakingthecompletionorterminationofwhichhasbeen
determinedatthetimeoftheengagementoftheemployeeorwheretheworkorservicestobeperformed
isseasonalinnatureandtheemploymentisforthedurationoftheseason.
Anemploymentshallbedeemedtobecasualifitisnotcoveredbytheprecedingparagraph:

Provided,That,anyemployeewhohasrenderedatleastone(1)yearofservice,whethersuchis
continuousorbroken,shallbeconsideredaregularwithrespecttotheactivityinwhichheis
employedandhisemploymentshallcontinuewhilesuchactivityexists.
Parenthetically,thepositionofcompanyphysician,inthecaseofpetitioner,isusuallynecessaryand
desirablebecausetheneedformedicalattentionofemployeescannotbeforeseen,hence,itisnecessary
tohaveaphysicianathand.Infact,theimportanceanddesirabilityofaphysicianinacompanypremises
isrecognizedbyArt.157oftheLaborCode,whichrequiresthepresenceofaphysiciandependingon
thenumberofemployeesandinthecaseatbench,inpetitionerscase,asfoundbypublicrespondent,
petitioneremploysmorethan500employees.
GoingbacktoArt.280oftheLaborCode,itwasmadethereinclearthattheprovisionsofawritten
agreementtothecontrarynotwithstandingortheexistenceofamereoralagreement,iftheemployeeis
engagedintheusualbusinessortradeoftheemployer,moreso,thatherenderedserviceforatleastone
year,suchemployeeshallbeconsideredasaregularemployee.Privaterespondenthereinhasbeenwith
petitionersince1981andhisemploymentwasnotforaspecificprojectorundertaking,theperiodof
whichwaspredeterminedandneithertheworkorserviceofprivaterespondentseasonal.(Emphasisby
theCAitself).
Wedisagreetotheforegoingratiocination.
The appellate courts premise that regular employees are those who perform activities
whicharedesirableandnecessaryforthebusinessoftheemployerisnotdeterminativeinthis
case.For,wetakeitthatanyagreementmayprovidethatonepartyshallrenderservicesfor
andinbehalfofanother,nomatterhownecessaryforthelattersbusiness,evenwithoutbeing
hired as an employee. This setup is precisely true in the case of an independent
contractorship as well as in an agency agreement. Indeed, Article 280 of the Labor Code,
quoted by the appellate court, is not the yardstick for determining the existence of an
employmentrelationship.Asitis,theprovisionmerelydistinguishesbetweentwo(2)kindsof
employees,i.e.,regularandcasual.Itdoesnotapplywhere,ashere,theveryexistenceofan
[23]
employmentrelationshipisindispute.
Buttressinghiscontentionthatheisaregularemployeeofpetitioner,respondentinvokes
Article157oftheLaborCode,andarguesthathesatisfiesalltherequirementsthereunder.The
provisionrelieduponreads:
ART.157.Emergencymedicalanddentalservices.Itshallbethedutyofeveryemployertofurnishhis
employeesinanylocalitywithfreemedicalanddentalattendanceandfacilitiesconsistingof:
(a)Theservicesofafulltimeregisterednursewhenthenumberofemployeesexceedsfifty
(50)butnotmorethantwohundred(200)exceptwhentheemployerdoesnotmaintain
hazardousworkplaces,inwhichcasetheservicesofagraduatefirstaidershallbe
providedfortheprotectionoftheworkers,wherenoregisterednurseisavailable.The
SecretaryofLaborshallprovidebyappropriateregulationstheservicesthatshallbe
requiredwherethenumberofemployeesdoesnotexceedfifty(50)andshalldetermineby
appropriateorderhazardousworkplacesforpurposesofthisArticle
(b)Theservicesofafulltimeregisterednurse,aparttimephysiciananddentist,andan
emergencyclinic,whenthenumberofemployeesexceedstwohundred(200)butnot
morethanthreehundred(300)and
(c)Theservicesofafulltimephysician,dentistandfulltimeregisterednurseaswellasa

dentalclinic,andaninfirmaryoremergencyhospitalwithonebedcapacityforeveryone
hundred(100)employeeswhenthenumberofemployeesexceedsthreehundred(300).
Incasesofhazardousworkplaces,noemployershallengagetheservicesofaphysicianordentistwho
cannotstayinthepremisesoftheestablishmentforatleasttwo(2)hours,inthecaseofthoseengagedon
parttimebasis,andnotlessthaneight(8)hoursinthecaseofthoseemployedonfulltimebasis.Where
theundertakingisnonhazardousinnature,thephysiciananddentistmaybeengagedonretainedbasis,
subjecttosuchregulationsastheSecretaryofLabormayprescribetoinsureimmediateavailabilityof
medicalanddentaltreatmentandattendanceincaseofemergency.
Hadonlyrespondentreadcarefullytheverystatutoryprovisioninvokedbyhim,hewould
have noticed that in nonhazardous workplaces, the employer may engage the services of a
physician on retained basis. As correctly observed by the petitioner, while it is true that the
provision requires employers to engage the services of medical practitioners in certain
establishmentsdependingonthenumberoftheiremployees,nothingisthereinthelawwhich
[24]
saysthatmedicalpractitionerssoengagedbeactuallyhiredasemployees, addingthatthe
law, as written, only requires the employer to retain, not employ, a parttime physician who
[25]
neededtostayinthepremisesofthenonhazardousworkplacefortwo(2)hours.
Respondenttakesnoissueonthefactthatpetitionersbusinessoftelecommunicationsis
nothazardousinnature.Assuch,whatapplieshereisthelastparagraphofArticle157which,
to stress, provides that the employer may engage the services of a physician and dentist on
retained basis, subject to such regulations as the Secretary of Labor may prescribe. The
successiveretainershipagreementsofthepartiesdefinitelyhuetotheverystatutoryprovision
relieduponbyrespondent.
Deeply embedded in our jurisprudence is the rule that courts may not construe a statute
that is free from doubt. Where the law is clear and unambiguous, it must be taken to mean
[26]

exactlywhatitsays,andcourtshavenochoicebuttoseetoitthatthemandateisobeyed.
As it is, Article 157 of the Labor Code clearly and unequivocally allows employers in non
hazardous establishments to engage on retained basis the service of a dentist or physician.
Nowhere does the law provide that the physician or dentist so engaged thereby becomes a
regularemployee.Theveryphrasethattheymaybeengagedonretainedbasis,revoltsagainst
theideathatthisengagementgivesrisetoanemployeremployeerelationship.
With the recognition of the fact that petitioner consistently engaged the services of
respondent on a retainer basis, as shown by their various retainership contracts, so can
petitionerputanend,withorwithoutcause,totheirretainershipagreementasthereinprovided.
[27]

Wenote,however,thatevenasthecontractsenteredintobythepartiesinvariablyprovide
for a 60day notice requirement prior to termination, the same was not complied with by
petitioner when it terminated on 17 December 1996 the verballyrenewed retainership
agreement,effectiveatthecloseofbusinesshoursof31December1996.
[28]

Bethatasitmay,therecordshows,andthisisadmittedbybothparties, thatexecution
oftheNLRCdecisionhadalreadybeenmadeattheNLRCdespitethependencyofthepresent
recourse. For sure, accounts of petitioner had already been garnished and released to
[29]
respondent despite the previous Status Quo Order issued by this Court. To all intents and
purposes, therefore, the 60day notice requirement has become moot and academic if not
waivedbytherespondenthimself.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the challenged decision of the Court of
AppealsREVERSEDandSETASIDE.The21December1998decisionofthelaborarbiteris
REINSTATED.
Nopronouncementastocosts.
SOORDERED.
Panganiban,(Chairman),Corona,andCarpioMorales,JJ.,concur.
SandovalGutierrez,J.,onofficialleave.
[1]

[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]

PennedbyAssociateJusticeEdgardoF.Sundiam,andconcurredinbyAssociateJusticesBennieA.Adefuin
DeLaCruz(ret.)andWenceslaoI.Agnir,Jr.(ret.)
Rolloatp.62.
Id.atp.98.
Id.atp.100.
Id.atpp.101112.
Id.atp.116.
Id.atpp.276285.
Id.atpp.327333.
Id.atpp.360363.

[10]
[11]
[12]

[13]
[14]
[15]

[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]

Id.atpp.735743.
Id.atp.746.
Bautista v. Mangaldan Rural Bank, Inc., 230 SCRA 16 [1994] citing De la Puerta v. Court of Appeals, 181
SCRA861[1990].
MainlandConstructionCompany,Inc.v.Movilla,250SCRA290[1995].
256SCRA84[1996].
MAMRealtyDevelopmentCorporationv.NationalLaborRelationsCommission,244SCRA797[1995]Zanotte
Shoesv.NationalLaborRelationsCommission,241SCRA261[1995]SingerSewingMachineCompany
v. Drilon, 193 SCRA 270 [1991] Development Bank of the Philippines v. National Labor Relations
Commission 175 SCRA 537 [1989] Broadway Motors, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 156
SCRA522[1987]BrotherhoodLaborUnityMovementinthePhilippinesv.Zamora,147SCRA49[1986]
Rosario Brothers, Inc. v. Ople, 131 SCRA 72 [1984] SSS v. Cosmos Aerated Water Factory, Inc., 112
SCRA47[1982]andMafincoTradingCorporationv.Ople,70SCRA139[1976].
Rollo,p.98.
Rollo,atpp.279280.
Id.atpp.280281.
Id.atpp.181187.

[20]

[21]

[22]
[23]
[24]
[25]
[26]

[27]
[28]
[29]

ItemNo.5oftheRetainershipContractwhichreads:5.Thiscontractwillbeforaperiodofoneyearsubjectto
renewal between you and the Company. If either you or the Company will terminate this Agreement at
anytimebeforeitsexpirydate,anadvancenoticeof60daysisrequiredtobeservedbytheconcernedparty
totheothertoavoidunnecessaryadjustmentproblems.
Sarav.Agarrado,166SCRA625[1988]citingLVNPictures,Inc.v.Phil.MusiciansGuild,1SCRA312[1961]
InvestmentPlanningCorp.v.SSS,21SCRA924[1967]SSSv.CourtofAppeals,30SCRA210[1968]
andPhilippineRefiningCo.,Inc.v.CourtofAppeals,117SCRA84[1982].
Rollo,atp.191.
SingerSewingMachineCompanyv.Drilon,193SCRA270[1991].
Rollo,atp.774.
Id.,atp.777.
Ramos v. Court of Appeals, 108 SCRA 728 [1981] Banawa v. Mirano, 97 SCRA 517 [1980] Espiritu v.
Cipriano,55SCRA533[1974]andRepublicFlourMills,Inc.v.CommissionerofCustoms,39SCRA269
[1971].
Supra,Seefootnote21.
PhilcomsMemorandum,Rolloatp.779andDeVerasMemorandum,Rolloatp.708.
Dated09June2003,Rolloatpp.576578.

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