Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
Government CA
Government AA
Certification Practice Statement
2.16.56.1.1.1.3
2.16.56.1.1.1.3.2
2.16.56.1.1.1.3.3
2.16.56.1.1.1.3.4
2.16.56.1.1.1.6
2.16.56.1.1.1.6.2
2.16.56.9.1.1.3
2.16.56.9.1.1.3.2
2.16.56.9.1.1.3.3
2.16.56.9.1.1.3.4
2.16.56.9.1.1.6
2.16.56.9.1.1.6.2
1 / 54
Contents
1.
1.1
1.2
1.3
2.
3.
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
2 / 54
7.5.1
Types of records ..........................................................................................................25
7.5.2
Retention period ..........................................................................................................25
7.5.3
Protection of archive ....................................................................................................25
7.5.4
Archive backup procedures .........................................................................................25
7.5.5
Requirements for Time-stamping of Records ..............................................................25
7.5.6
Archive Collection ........................................................................................................25
7.5.7
Procedures to obtain and verify archive information ...................................................25
7.6
Key Changeover ................................................................................................................. 26
7.7
Compromise and Disaster Recovery .................................................................................. 26
7.8
CA or RA Termination ........................................................................................................ 26
8.
TECHNICAL SECURITY CONTROLS ............................................................................... 27
8.1
Key Pair Generation and Installation .................................................................................. 27
8.1.1
CA Private Key Generation Process ...........................................................................27
8.1.2
CA Key Generation ......................................................................................................27
8.2
Key Pair re-generation and re-installation .......................................................................... 28
8.2.1
CA Key Generation Devices ........................................................................................28
8.2.2
CA Private Key Storage ...............................................................................................28
8.2.3
CA Private Key Distribution .........................................................................................29
8.2.4
CA Private Key Destruction .........................................................................................29
8.3
Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module Engineering Controls .......................... 29
8.4
Other Aspects of Key Pair Management ............................................................................ 30
8.4.1
Computing resources, software, and/or data corrupted ..............................................30
8.4.2
CA public key revocation .............................................................................................30
8.4.3
Compromise of the GCA-AA private key .....................................................................30
8.5
Activation Data.................................................................................................................... 30
8.6
Computer Security Controls ............................................................................................... 30
8.7
Life Cycle Security Controls ............................................................................................... 31
8.8
Network Security Controls .................................................................................................. 31
8.9
Time-stamping .................................................................................................................... 31
9.
CERTIFICATE AND CRL PROFILES ................................................................................ 32
9.1
Certificate Profile ................................................................................................................ 32
9.1.1
Government CA Cerificate ...........................................................................................32
9.1.2
Government AA Cerificate ...........................................................................................38
9.2
Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile ............................................................................ 41
10.
COMPLIANCE AUDIT AND OTHER ASSESSMENT ........................................................ 43
11.
OTHER BUSINESS AND LEGAL MATTERS .................................................................... 44
11.1
Fees .................................................................................................................................... 44
11.1.1 Refund policy ...............................................................................................................44
11.2
Financial Responsibility ...................................................................................................... 44
11.3
Liability ................................................................................................................................ 44
11.4
Confidentiality of Information .............................................................................................. 45
11.4.1 Disclosure Conditions ..................................................................................................45
11.4.2 Privacy of Personal Information ...................................................................................46
11.4.3 Intellectual Property Rights ..........................................................................................46
11.5
Representations and Warranties ........................................................................................ 46
11.5.1 Subscriber Obligations.................................................................................................46
11.5.2 Relying Party Obligations ............................................................................................47
11.5.3 Subscriber Liability towards Relying Parties ...............................................................47
11.5.4 CA Repository and Web site Conditions of Use ..........................................................47
11.5.5 GCA-AA Obligations ....................................................................................................48
11.5.6 Service Level Measurement ........................................................................................49
11.5.7 Registration Authority Obligations ...............................................................................49
11.6
Disclaimers of Warranties ................................................................................................... 49
11.6.1 Limitation for Other Warranties ....................................................................................49
11.6.2 Exclusion of Certain Elements of Damages ................................................................49
11.7
Indemnities ......................................................................................................................... 50
2
3 / 54
11.8
11.9
11.10
11.11
11.12
11.13
11.14
11.15
12.
13.
4 / 54
1. Document History
Fedict
Approved by
Fedict
Date
Signature
19 januari 2012
Company
Name
Fedict
Samoera Jacobs
Fedict
Action
Release Date
V0.1
04 March 03
V0.1.1
21 March 03
V0.1.2
12 October
2004
V0.2
V1.0
19 januari 2012
Status + Description
First draft
Update after comparison with the CPS for
the Admin CA
Update
Update regarding BRCA2 Introduction
Gov AA
Update, minor corrections
5 / 54
2. Acknowledgments
1
This Government CA - AA CPS describes certification practices for digital certificates issued for the
Belgian government applications or government platforms. These certification practices are compliant
with the following standards:
RFC 2527: Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure _ Certificate Policies and Certification
Practices Framework,
RFC 3280: Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure - Certificate and CRL Profile.
RFC 2560: X.509 Internet Public Key Infrastructure - Online Certificate Status Protocol OCSP
ETSI TS 101 042: Policy requirements for certification authorities issuing public key
certificates (Normalised level only).
The ISO 1-7799 standard on security and infrastructure.
1
2
CA = Certification Authority
Certification Practice Statement
Government CA - Government AA Certification Practice Statement
6 / 54
3. Introduction
This Certification Practice Statement (hereinafter, CPS) of the Government CA and Government AA
(hereinafter, the GCA-AA) applies to all certification services provided in the context of the GCA-AA.
Together with this CPS other documents may have to be taken into account. These documents will be
available through the CA repository at: http://repository.pki.belgium.be.
This CPS complies with the formal requirements of Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) RFC 2527,
version 12 July 2001 with regard to format and content. While certain section titles are included
according to the structure of RFC 2527, the topic may not necessarily apply in the implementation of
the certification services of the GCA-AA. Such sections are denoted as Section not applicable. Minor
editorial changes of RFC 2527 prescriptions have been inserted in this CPS to better adapt the
structure of RFC 2527 to the needs of this application domain.
The CPS addresses in detail the technical, procedural and organisational policies and practices of the
GCA-AA with regard to all certification services it provides and during the complete lifetime of
certificates issued by the GCA-AA
Further information with regard to this CPS and the GCA-AA can be obtained from the GCA-AA itself
in the following address, attn. Fedict, Legal Practices, Rue Marie-Thrse 1-3 B-1000 Brussels,
BELGIUM.
When referring to the first BRCA it will be describe as BRCA(1), the number 1 is set between
brackets as the real name of this BRCA does not contain the number 1.
When referring in this document to the second BRCA it will be describe as BRCA2.
With the introduction of the BRCA2 a new set of OID numbers is used to clearly identify the difference
between the BRCA(1) and BRCA2.
For technical details regarding the BRCA certificates we refer to CHAPTER 7. CERTIFICATE AND CRL
PROFILES in CPS of the Belgium ROOT CA. This can be found at http://repository.pki.belgium.be
3.1 Overview
A certification practice statement (CPS) is a unilateral declaration of the practices that a Certification
Authority complies with when it provides certification services. A CPS is a comprehensive description
7 / 54
of how the CA makes its services available. This CPS is intended to be used within the CA domain to
the exclusion of any other. The CPS aims at delimiting the GCA-AA domain of providing certification
services to entities within the governmental context. This CPS also outlines the relationship between
the Government Certification Authority (GCA-AA) and other CAs within the Belgian Government PKI
4
hierarchy such as the Belgium Root Certification Authority (BRCA) . It also describes the relationship
between the Government CA and the other organisations involved in the delivery of the certificates for
the Belgian Electronic Identity Cards Infrastructure.
The organisation issuing certificates is called Certification Authority (CA), the organisation in charge of
the identification of the person applying for a certificate is called Registration Authorities (RA). The role
of the RA can be delegated to a LRA. Although the function of the issuer of the certificates and the
registration authority coincide on the same entity within the Belgian Public Administration, from a
systematic viewpoint they both fulfil different roles to meet different requirements. For example, only
the RA and the LRA can request the GCA-AA to issue a certificate.
This CPS also provides operational guidelines for all the civil servants responsible for the
infrastructure of the Belgian Electronic ID cards. This CPS provides operational guidelines to other
CAs, such as the BRCA, that belong to the PKI hierarchy of the Belgian State within the legal
framework for electronic signatures and electronic identity cards in Belgium. This CPS describes the
relationships between the GCA-AA and all other entities that retain an organisational link with the
GCA-AA such as suppliers of services. The Belgian State acquires these services through appropriate
agreements concluded with these third party suppliers. Finally in an accreditation and supervisory
perspective this CPS provides guidance to supervising authorities, accreditation bodies, accredited
auditors etc with regard to the practices.
This CPS is made available on-line in the Repository of the issuing CA under
http://repository.eid.belgium.be.
The GCA-AA accepts comments regarding this CPS addressed to: servicedesk@fedict.be or by post
to, attn. Fedict, Legal Practices, Rue Marie-Thrse 1-3 B-1000 Brussels BELGIUM.
The CA domain is the area of competence of the CA to provide certification services. This means the
CA domain does for instance not include the applications using the certificates, etc.
4
The BRCA is the CA that has certified the Government CA. Trust in the BRCA, automatically implies
that verification of the certificate of the Government CA may take place, hence resulting implicitly in
trusting the Government CA.
2
8 / 54
9 / 54
In the two-layered model the eID Citizen CA and the Self-Signed Belgium Root CA form a hierarchy,
which in an off-line mode allows validating the eID Citizen signing and authentication certificates.
In the three-layered model the GCA-AA, is signed by the Belgium Root CA (BRCA) which is signed by
the GlobalSign Top Root CA form a CA hierarchy. This approach allows the automated validation
within the most widely used applications, e.g. browsers; because these browsers have already
embedded the GlobalSign Top Root CA certificate and they list it as a trusted one. Just as the GCAAA inherits trust from the BRCA, the BRCA inherits trust from the GlobalSign Top Root CA. This threelayered model eliminates the need to individually import the Self-Signed Belgium Root CA certificate.
Because both the Self-Signed Belgium Root CA and the Belgium root signed Root CA share the same
key pair albeit using two different certificates, a certificate signed by the private key of that key pair can
be validated with both Belgium Root certificates.
In most case the application builder will have foreseen one of both models to be used, and the end
user will not have to choose between the two models.
A self-signed certificate is a certificate signed with the private key of the certified entity itself. Since there is no trust point
higher above in the Trust hierarchy, no trust can be build on that certificate or any of the certificates that are lower in the
hierarchy if that self-signed certificate is not trusted. This, however, is a case that very rarely might occur.
10 / 54
This CPS can also be identified by any party through the following OIDs :
Certificate Type
OID
Belgium Root CA (1) PKI BRCA(1)
Government CA certificate
2.16.56.1.1.1.3
Server Certificate
2.16.56.1.1.1.3.2
Applications Certificate
2.16.56.1.1.1.3.3
Persons certificate
2.16.56.1.1.1.3.4
Government AA certificate
2.16.56.1.1.1.6
Identity Provider Certificate
2.16.56.1.1.1.6.2
Belgium Root CA 2 PKI - BRCA2
Government CA certificate
2.16.56.9.1.1.3
Server Certificate
2.16.56.9.1.1.3.2
Applications Certificate
2.16.56.9.1.1.3.3
Persons certificate
2.16.56.9.1.1.3.4
Government AA certificate
2.16.56.9.1.1.6
Identity Provider Certificate
2.16.56.9.1.1.6.2
The GCA-AA is established in Belgium. It can be contacted at the address published elsewhere in this
CPS. To deliver CA services including the issuance, suspension, revocation, renewal, status
verification of certificates, the CA operates a secure facility and provides for a disaster recovery facility
in Belgium.
In specific the CAs domain of responsibility comprises the overall management of the certificate
lifecycle including:
1. Issuance
2. Suspension/Unsuspension
6
Object Identifier
Government CA - Government AA Certification Practice Statement
11 / 54
3. Revocation
4. Status verification (Certificate Status Service)
5. Directory service
The RA supplies the GCA-AA with the necessary data to enable it construct the certificates. For each
certificate the RA supplies the PKCS#10 requests including the public key as generated by the
subscriber.
All communications between the LRA, RA, GCA-AA and GCA-AA operator regarding any phase of the
life cycle of certificates is secured with PKI based encryption and signing techniques, to ensure
confidentiality and mutual authentication. This includes communications containing certificate
requests, issuance, suspension, un-suspension and revocation.
3.4.3 Subscribers
The Subscribers of the CA services in the GCA-AA domain are entities including natural or legal
persons in a governmental context whose identity and public key are certified in the certificates. In
case of a legal person, the requester is normally a legal representative of the requesting organisation
or department.
The Subscribers: :
Are identified
Hold the private keys corresponding to the respective public keys that are listed in their
respective certificates.
12 / 54
13 / 54
The GCA-AA makes available an OCSP server at http://ocsp. pki.belgium.be that provides notice on
the status of a certificate, issued by the GCA-AA upon request from a relying party, in compliance with
IETF RFC 2560. The status of any certificate listed in a CRL or delta CRL, must be consistent with the
information, delivered by the OCSP server.
The GCA-AA maintains the CRL distribution point and the information on this URL until the expiration
date of all certificates, containing the CRL distribution point. Approved versions of documents to be
published on the Repository are uploaded within 24 hours.
Due to their sensitivity the GCA-AA refrains from making publicly available certain subcomponents and
elements of such documents including certain security controls, procedures related with the
functioning of inter alia registration authorities, internal security polices etc. Such documents and
documented practices are, however, conditionally available to audit to designated parties that the
GCA-AA owes duty to.
A CRL or Certificate Revocation List is a list issued and digitally signed by a CA that includes revoked and suspended
certificates. Such list is to be consulted by relying parties at all times prior to relying on information featured in a certificate.
8
The Online Certificate Status Protocol (RFC 2560) is a real time status information resource used to determine the current
status of a digital certificate without requiring CRLs
14 / 54
5.1 Naming
To identify the CA, the GCA-AA follows certain naming and identification rules that include types of
names assigned to the subject, such as X.500 distinguished names RFC-822 names and X.400
names.
The GCA-AA does not issue anonymous certificates to subscribers.
Names assigned to subscribers of a certificate are unique within the domain of the GCA-AA as they
are always used together with a unique sequential number.
15 / 54
The GCA-AA issues, revokes or suspends certificates only at the request of the RA to the exclusion of
any other, unless explicitly instructed so by the RA.
16 / 54
Obligation to use the key pair for described usage and in accordance with any other limitations
notified to the subscriber;
Obligation to exercise reasonable care to avoid unauthorised use of the subscribers private
key;
Following compromise, the obligation to immediately and permanently discontinue the use of
the subject's private key.
Obligation to notify without any reasonable delay in case control over the private key has been
lost due to compromise of activation data (e.g. PIN code)
17 / 54
18 / 54
19 / 54
The GCA-AA automatically revokes a suspended certificate after a period of one week if it does not
receive in the meantime notification from the RA to unsuspend the certificate. The GCA-AA notifies the
RA of all revocations made.
The GCA-AA publishes notices of suspended or revoked certificates in the Repository.
20 / 54
21 / 54
The GCA-AA operator obtains a signed statement from each member of the staff on not having
conflicting interests with the CA, maintaining confidentiality and protecting personal data.
All members of the staff operating the key management operations, administrators, security officers,
and system auditors or any other operations that materially affect such operations are considered as
serving in a trusted position.
The GCA-AA operator conducts an initial investigation of all members of staff who are candidates to
serve in trusted roles to make a reasonable attempt to determine their trustworthiness and
competence.
Where dual control is required at least two trusted members of the GCA-AA staff need to bring their
respective and split knowledge in order to be able to proceed with the ongoing operation.
The GCA-AA operator ensures that all actions with respect to the GCA-AA can be attributed to the
system of the GCA-AA and the member of the GCA-AA staff that has performed the action.
For critical GCA-AA functions the GCA-AA implements dual control.
The GCA-AA separates among the following discreet work groups:
GCA-AA operating personnel that manages operations on certificates.
Administrative personnel to operate the platform supporting the GCA-AA.
Security personnel to enforce security measures.
22 / 54
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24 / 54
25 / 54
7.8 CA or RA Termination
This section is not applicable.
26 / 54
27 / 54
28 / 54
A secret shareholder receives the secret share within a physical medium, such as a GCA-AA
approved hardware cryptographic module. The GCA-AA keeps written records of secret share
distribution.
29 / 54
30 / 54
8.9 Time-stamping
This section is not applicable.
31 / 54
OID
Include
Critical
Value
Certificate
SignatureAlgorithm
Algorithm
1.2.840.113549.1.1.5
Issuing CA Signature
Version
SerialNumber
Signature
Sha-1WithRSAEncryption
NotBefore
NotAfter
RSA 2048
SignatureValue
Fixed
TBSCertificate
Validity
SubjectPublicKeyInfo
Fixed
Issuer
CountryName
{ id-at-6 }
BE
Fixed
CommonName
{ id-at-3 }
Under BRCA(1)
Belgium Root CA
Under BRCA2
Belgium Root CA2
Fixed
CountryName
{ id-at-6 }
BE
Fixed
CommonName
{ id-at-3 }
Government CA
Fixed
<yyyy>9
Subject
serialNumber
Standard Extensions
OID
CertificatePolicies
{id-ce 32}
policyIdentifier
Include
X
X
policyQualifierrs
policyQualifierId
Critical Value
FALSE
Under BRCA(1)
2.16.56.1.1.1.3
Under BRCA2
2.16.56.9.1.1.3
Fixed
N/a
{ id-qt-1 }
CPS
Fixed
32 / 54
Qualifier
http://repository.pki.belgium.be
Fixed
CertificateSigning
Set
Fixed
crlSigning
Set
Fixed
KeyUsage
{id-ce 15}
authorityKeyIdentifier
{id-ce 35}
KeyIdentifier
TRUE
FALSE
subjectKeyIdentifier
{id-ce 14}
KeyIdentifier
SHA-1 Hash
FALSE
cRLDistributionPoints
{id-ce 31}
SHA-1 Hash
FALSE
distributionPoint
FullName
BasicConstraints
{id-ce 19}
CA
pathLenConstraint
NetscapeCertType
Under BRCA(1)
http://crl.pki.belgium.be/belgium.crl
Under BRCA2
Fixed
TRUE
Fixed
0 (Zero)
Fixed
Fixed
TRUE
FALSE
2.16.840.1.113730.1.1
9.1.1.1Server Certificate
Server Certificate (issued automatically via RA interface + registration interface)
Base Certificate
OID
Include
Critical Value
Certificate
SignatureAlgorithm
Algorithm
Fixed
SignatureValue
Issuing CA Signature
Dynamic
Version
Fixed
SerialNumber
Dynamic
Signature
Sha-1WithRSAEncryption
Dynamic
notBefore
Dynamic
notAfter
Dynamic
Dynamic
TBSCertificate
Validity
SubjectPublicKeyInfo
Issuer
CountryName
{ id-at-6 }
BE
Fixed
CommonName
{ id-at-3 }
Government CA
Fixed
<yyyy>10
serialNumber
Subject
Required
CommonName
{ id-at-3 }
YES
Dynamic
CountryName
{ id-at-6 }
YES
Dynamic
Dynamic
Dynamic
Locality
Dynamic
State or province
Dynamic
10
33 / 54
Organization Unit
Dynamic
Organization
Dynamic
Standard Extensions
OID
CertificatePolicies
{id-ce 32}
PolicyIdentifier
Include
X
Critical Value
FALSE
2.16.56.1.1.1.3.2
PolicyQualifiers
Fixed
NA
PolicyQualifierId
{ id-qt-1 }
Qualifier
X
X
KeyUsage
{id-ce 15}
CPS
Fixed
Http://repository.pki.belgium.be
Fixed
TRUE
NonRepudiation
Set
Fixed
DigitalSignature
Set
Fixed
KeyEncipherment
Set
Fixed
DataEncipherment
Set
Fixed
BasicConstraints
{id-ce 19}
FALSE
CA
FALSE
Fixed
PathLenConstraint
None
Fixed
AuthorityKeyIdentifier
FALSE
SubjectkeyIdentifier
FALSE
DistributionPoint
FullName
NetscapeCertType
{id-ce 35}
2.16.840.1.113730.1.1
SSL Server
X
X
AuthorityInfoAccess
{id-pe 1}
AccessMethod
{ id-ad-2 }
AccessLocation
AccessMethod
{ id-ad-1 }
Fixed
Set
Fixed
Set
Fixed
FALSE
http://certs.pki.belgium.be/belgiumrs.crt
Fixed
Points to GlobalSign Signed Government top root CA.
AccessLocation
http://crl.pki.belgium.be/government<yyyy> 11.crl
FALSE
S/MIME
Fixed
X
http://ocsp.pki.belgium.be
Fixed
OID
Include
Critical Value
Certificate
SignatureAlgorithm
Algorithm
Fixed
SignatureValue
Issuing CA Signature
Dynamic
Version
Fixed
SerialNumber
Dynamic
Signature
Sha-1WithRSAEncryption
Dynamic
notBefore
Dynamic
notAfter
Dynamic
TBSCertificate
Validity
11
34 / 54
SubjectPublicKeyInfo
Dynamic
Issuer
CountryName
{ id-at-6 }
BE
Fixed
CommonName
{ id-at-3 }
Government CA
Fixed
<yyyy>12
serialNumber
Subject
Require
d
CommonName
{ id-at-3 }
YES
Dynamic
CountryName
{ id-at-6 }
YES
Dynamic
Dynamic
Dynamic
Locality
Dynamic
State or province
Dynamic
Organization Unit
Dynamic
Organization
Dynamic
Standard Extensions
OID
CertificatePolicies
{id-ce 32}
PolicyIdentifier
Include
X
Critical Value
FALSE
2.16.56.1.1.1.3.3
PolicyQualifiers
Fixed
NA
PolicyQualifierId
{ id-qt-1 }
Qualifier
KeyUsage
{id-ce 15}
CPS
Fixed
Http ://repository.pki.belgium.be
Fixed
TRUE
NonRepudiation
Set
Fixed
DigitalSignature
Set
Fixed
KeyEncipherment
Set
Fixed
DataEncipherment
Set
Fixed
BasicConstraints
{id-ce 19}
FALSE
CA
FALSE
Fixed
PathLenConstraint
None
Fixed
AuthorityKeyIdentifier
FALSE
SubjectkeyIdentifier
FALSE
DistributionPoint
FullName
NetscapeCertType
{id-ce 35}
2.16.840.1.113730.1.1
Fixed
http://crl.pki.belgium.be/government<yyyy> 13.crl
Fixed
FALSE
SSL Client
Set
Fixed
S/MIME
Set
Fixed
Object Signing
Set
Fixed
AuthorityInfoAccess
{id-pe 1}
AccessMethod
{ id-ad-2 }
AccessLocation
AccessMethod
AccessLocation
12
13
FALSE
X
{ id-ad-1 }
http://certs.pki.belgium.be/belgiumrs.crt
Fixed
Points to GlobalSign Signed Government top root CA.
X
X
http://ocsp.pki.belgium.be
Fixed
35 / 54
OID
Include
Critical Value
Certificate
SignatureAlgorithm
Algorithm
Fixed
SignatureValue
Issuing CA Signature
Dynamic
Version
Fixed
SerialNumber
Dynamic
Signature
Sha-1WithRSAEncryption
Dynamic
notBefore
Dynamic
notAfter
Dynamic
Dynamic
TBSCertificate
Validity
SubjectPublicKeyInfo
Issuer
CountryName
{ id-at-6 }
BE
Fixed
CommonName
{ id-at-3 }
Government CA
Fixed
<yyyy>14
serialNumber
Subject
Require
d
CommonName
{ id-at-3 }
YES
Dynamic
CountryName
{ id-at-6 }
YES
Dynamic
GivenName
Dynamic
SurName
Dynamic
Dynamic
Dynamic
Locality
Dynamic
State or province
Dynamic
Organization Unit
Dynamic
Organization
Dynamic
Standard Extensions
OID
CertificatePolicies
{id-ce 32}
PolicyIdentifier
Include
X
Critical Value
FALSE
Under BRCA(1)
2.16.56.1.1.1.3.4
Under BRCA2
2.16.56.9.1.1.3.4
PolicyQualifiers
PolicyQualifierId
NA
{ id-qt-1 }
Qualifier
KeyUsage
Fixed
X
X
{id-ce 15}
CPS
Fixed
Http ://repository.pki.belgium.be
Fixed
TRUE
NonRepudiation
Set
Fixed
DigitalSignature
Set
Fixed
KeyEncipherment
Set
Fixed
14
36 / 54
DataEncipherment
BasicConstraints
{id-ce 19}
Set
Fixed
FALSE
CA
FALSE
Fixed
PathLenConstraint
None
Fixed
AuthorityKeyIdentifier
FALSE
SubjectkeyIdentifier
FALSE
DistributionPoint
FullName
NetscapeCertType
{id-ce 35}
2.16.840.1.113730.1.1
Fixed
http://crl.pki.belgium.be/government<yyyy> 15.crl
Fixed
FALSE
SSL client
Set
Fixed
S/MIME
Set
Fixed
Under BRCA(1)
http://certs.pki.belgium.be/belgiumrs.crt
Under BRCA2
http://certs.pki.belgium.be/belgiumrs2.crt
Fixed
http://ocsp.pki.belgium.be
Fixed
AuthorityInfoAccess
{id-pe 1}
AccessMethod
{ id-ad-2 }
AccessLocation
AccessMethod
AccessLocation
15
FALSE
{ id-ad-1 }
X
X
37 / 54
OID
Include
Critical Value
Certificate
SignatureAlgorithm
Algorithm
1.2.840.113549.1.1.5
Issuing CA Signature
Version
SerialNumber
Signature
Sha-1WithRSAEncryption
NotBefore
NotAfter
RSA 2048
SignatureValue
Fixed
TBSCertificate
Validity
SubjectPublicKeyInfo
Fixed
Issuer
CountryName
{ id-at-6 }
BE
Fixed
CommonName
{ id-at-3 }
Under BRCA(1)
Belgium Root CA
Under BRCA2
Belgium Root CA2
Fixed
CountryName
{ id-at-6 }
BE
Fixed
CommonName
{ id-at-3 }
Government AA
Fixed
<yyyy>16
Subject
serialNumber
Standard Extensions
OID
CertificatePolicies
{id-ce 32}
policyIdentifier
Include
X
Critical Value
FALSE
Under BRCA(1)
2.16.56.1.1.1.6
Under BRCA2
2.16.56.9.1.1.6
policyQualifierrs
Fixed
N/a
policyQualifierId
{ id-qt-1 }
Qualifier
KeyUsage
{id-ce 15}
CPS
Fixed
http://repository.pki.belgium.be
Fixed
Set
Fixed
Set
Fixed
TRUE
CertificateSigning
crlSigning
authorityKeyIdentifier
{id-ce 35}
KeyIdentifier
FALSE
subjectKeyIdentifier
{id-ce 14}
KeyIdentifier
SHA-1 Hash
FALSE
cRLDistributionPoints
{id-ce 31}
SHA-1 Hash
FALSE
distributionPoint
16
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FullName
BasicConstraints
{id-ce 19}
Under BRCA(1)
http://crl.pki.belgium.be/belgium.crl
Under BRCA2
http://crl.pki.belgium.be/belgium2.crl
TRUE
Fixed
N/a
CA
TRUE
Fixed
pathLenConstraint
0 (Zero)
Fixed
Fixed
NetscapeCertType
FALSE
2.16.840.1.113730.1.1
OID
Include
Critical Value
Certificate
SignatureAlgorithm
Algorithm
Fixed
SignatureValue
Issuing CA Signature
Dynamic
Version
Fixed
SerialNumber
Dynamic
Signature
Sha-1WithRSAEncryption
Dynamic
notBefore
Dynamic
notAfter
Dynamic
Dynamic
TBSCertificate
Validity
SubjectPublicKeyInfo
Issuer
CountryName
{ id-at-6 }
BE
Fixed
CommonName
{ id-at-3 }
Government AA
Fixed
<yyyy>17
serialNumber
Subject
Require
d
CommonName
{ id-at-3 }
CountryName
{ id-at-6 }
YES
Dynamic
YES
Dynamic
Dynamic
Dynamic
Locality
Dynamic
State or province
Dynamic
Organization Unit
Dynamic
Organization
Dynamic
Standard Extensions
OID
CertificatePolicies
{id-ce 32}
PolicyIdentifier
17
Include
X
Critical Value
FALSE
Under BRCA(1)
2.16.56.1.1.1.6.2
Under BRCA2
2.16.56.9.1.1.6.2
Fixed
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PolicyQualifiers
NA
PolicyQualifierId
{ id-qt-1 }
qualifier
KeyUsage
{id-ce 15}
CPS
Fixed
http://repository.pki.belgium.be
Fixed
TRUE
NonRepudiation
Set
Fixed
DigitalSignature
Set
Fixed
KeyEncipherment
Set
Fixed
Set
Fixed
FALSE
Fixed
None
Fixed
DataEncipherment
BasicConstraints
{id-ce 19}
CA
FALSE
PathLenConstraint
AuthorityKeyIdentifier
FALSE
SubjectkeyIdentifier
FALSE
DistributionPoint
FullName
NetscapeCertType
{id-ce 35}
2.16.840.1.113730.1.1
Fixed
http://crl.pki.belgium.be/governmentAA<yyyy>18 .crl
Fixed
FALSE
SSL Server
Set
Fixed
SSL Client
Set
Fixed
S/MIME
Set
Fixed
Object Signing
Set
Fixed
Under BRCA(1)
http://certs.pki.belgium.be/belgiumrs.crt
Under BRCA2
http://certs.pki.belgium.be/belgiumrs2.crt
Fixed
http://ocsp.pki.belgium.be
Fixed
AuthorityInfoAccess
{id-pe 1}
AccessMethod
{ id-ad-2 }
AccessLocation
AccessMethod
AccessLocation
18
FALSE
{ id-ad-1 }
X
X
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Value
Version
SignatureAlgorithm
Sha1 RSA
Issuer
For BRCA(1)
CN = Belgium Root CA,C = BE
For BRCA2
CN = Belgium Root CA2,C = BE
ThisUpdate
<creation time>
NextUpdate
RevokedCertificates
UserCertificate
RevocationDate
<revocation time>
The profile of the Certificate Revocation List is showing in the table below:
Value
Version
SignatureAlgorithm
Sha1 RSA
Issuer
<subject CA>
ThisUpdate
<creation time>
NextUpdate
RevokedCertificates
UserCertificate
RevocationDate
<revocation time>
CrlEntryExtensions
CRL Reason Code
CrlExtensions
Authority Key Identifier
CRL Number
The profile of the delta Certificate Revocation List is showing in the table below:
Value
Version
SignatureAlgorithm
Sha1 RSA
Issuer
<subject CA>
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<creation time>
NextUpdate
RevokedCertificates
UserCertificate
RevocationDate
<revocation time>
CrlEntryExtensions
CRL Reason Code
CrlExtensions
Authority Key Identifier
CRL Number
The GCA-AA CRLs and delta CRLs support the fields and extensions, specified in chapter 5 of RFC
3280: Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and CRL profile.
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Free of charge
10 requests per user per day
1 download per user per week
8 downloads per user per day
30 downloads per week
2 downloads per user per day
11.1.1
Refund policy
11.3 Liability
The GCA-AA is liable for damage caused to any entity or legal or natural person who reasonably relies on
that certificate:
a. as regards the accuracy at the time of issuance of all information contained in the certificate;
b. for assurance that at the time of the issuance of the certificate, the signatory identified in the end
entity certificate held the private key corresponding to the public key given or identified in the
certificate;
c. for assurance that the private key and the public key can be used in a complementary manner;
unless the GCA-AA proves that he has not acted negligently.
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Unless otherwise stated in the Certificate Policy, the GCA-AA is liable for damage caused to any entity or
legal or natural person who reasonably relies on the certificate for failure to register revocation of the
certificate unless the GCA-AA proves that he has not acted negligently.
Unless indicated otherwise the liability of the GCA-AA is limited for usages and applications authorized by
Fedict only.
Parties requesting and receiving confidential information are granted permission on the condition that
they use it for the requested purposes, secure it from compromise, and refrain from using it or
disclosing it to third parties.
Also these parties are bound to observe personal data privacy rules in accordance with the law.
11.4.1
Disclosure Conditions
Non-confidential information can be disclosed to any subscriber and relying party under the conditions
below:
The status of a single certificate is provided per inquiry by a subscriber or relying party.
Subscribers can consult non-confidential information the GCA-AA holds about them.
Confidential information will not be disclosed by the GCA-AA to subscribers nor relying parties with the
exception of information about:
Themselves.
Persons in their custody.
Only the RA is permitted to access confidential information.
The GCA-AA properly manages the disclosure of information to the GCA-AA personnel.
The GCA-AA authenticates itself to any party requesting the disclosure of information by:
Presenting an authentication certificate at the request of the subscriber or relying party
2
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11.4.2
The GCA-AA operates within the boundaries of the Belgian Law of 8 December 1992 on Privacy
Protection in relation to the Processing of Personal Data amended by the law of 11 December 1998
implementing the European Union Directive 95/46/EC On The Protection Of Individuals With Regard
To The Processing Of Personal Data And On The Free Movement Of Such Data. The GCA-AA also
acknowledges Directive 2002/58/EC Concerning The Processing Of Personal Data And The
Protection Of Privacy In The Electronic Communications Sector.
The GCA-AA does not store any other data on certificates or on subscribers, other than the data,
transferred to it and authorised by the RA. Without consent of the data subject or explicit authorization
by law, personal data processed by the GCA-AA will not be used for other purposes.
11.4.3
The Belgian State owns and reserves all intellectual property rights associated with its own databases,
web sites, the GCA-AA digital certificates and any other publication whatsoever originating from the
GCA-AA including this CPS.
The GCA-AA operator owns and reserves any and all intellectual property rights it holds on its own
infrastructure, databases, web site etc.
11.5.1
Subscriber Obligations
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Obligation to use the key pair for described usage and in accordance with any other limitations
notified to the subscriber;
Obligation to exercise reasonable care to avoid unauthorised use of the subscribers private
key;
Following compromise, the obligation to immediately and permanently discontinue the use of
the subject's private key.
the obligation to notify without any reasonable delay in case control over the private key has
been lost due to compromise of activation data (e.g. PIN code)
11.5.2
11.5.3
Without limiting other subscriber obligations stated elsewhere in this CPS, subscribers are liable for
any misrepresentations they make in certificates to third parties that, reasonably rely on the
representations contained therein and have verified one or more digital signatures with the certificate.
11.5.4
Parties, including subscribers and relying parties, accessing the GCA-AA Repository and web site
agree with the provisions of this CPS and any other conditions of usage. Citizens and relying parties
demonstrate acceptance of the conditions of usage and this CPS by submitting a query with regard to
the status of a digital certificate or by anyway using or relying upon any such information or services
provided. Using GCA-AA Repositories can happen in the form of:
Obtaining information as a result of the search for a digital certificate.
Verifying the status of digital signatures created with a private key corresponding to a public
key included in a certificate.
Obtaining information published on the GCA-AA web site.
Any other services that the GCA-AA might advertise or provide through its web site.
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11.5.4.1
It is the sole responsibility of the parties accessing information featured in the Repositories and web
site to assess and rely on information featured therein.
11.5.4.2
Accuracy of Information
It is the sole responsibility of the parties accessing information featured in the Repositories and web
site to assess and rely on information featured therein. Parties acknowledge that they have received
adequate information to decide whether to rely upon any information provided in a certificate.
The GCA-AA makes every effort to ensure that parties accessing its Repositories receive accurate,
updated and correct information. The GCA-AA, however, cannot accept any liability beyond the limits
set in this CPS under article 9.2.
11.5.5
GCA-AA Obligations
To the extent specified in the relevant sections of the CPS, the GCA-AA will:
Comply with this CPS and its amendments as published under
http://repository.pki.belgium.be.
Provide infrastructure and certification services, including the establishment and operation of
the GCA-AA Repository and web site for the operation of public certification services.
Provide Trust mechanisms, including a key generation mechanism, key protection, and secret
sharing procedures regarding its own infrastructure.
Promptly notify the RA in case of compromise of its own private key(s).
Issue electronic certificates in accordance with this CPS and fulfil its obligations presented
herein.
Notify the RA if the GCA-AA is unable to validate the application according to this CPS.
Upon receipt of an authenticated request sent by the RA act promptly to issue a certificate in
accordance with this CPS.
Upon receipt of an authenticated request for revocation from the RA to revoke promptly a
certificate in accordance with this CPS.
Upon receipt of an authenticated request for suspension from the RA to suspend promptly a
certificate in accordance with this CPS.
Upon receipt of an authenticated request for unsuspension from the RA to unsuspend
promptly a certificate in accordance with this CPS.
Publish certificates in accordance with this CPS.
Publish CRLs, delta CRLs and OCSP responses of all suspended and revoked certificates on
a regular basis in accordance with this CPS.
Provide appropriate service levels according to a service level agreement as defined within
the framework of the GCA-AA operator contract with the Belgian Government.
Make a copy of this CPS and applicable policies available through its web site.
If the GCA-AA becomes aware of or suspects the compromise of a private key including its
own, it will immediately notify the RA.
When using third party agents make best efforts to ensure the proper financial responsibility
and liability of such contractor.
The GCA-AA is responsible towards subscribers and relying parties for the following acts or
omissions:
Issue digital certificates not listing data as submitted by the RA.
If a private signing key of the GCA-AA is compromised.
The failure to revoke a suspended certificate after a period of one week.
Failure to list a revoked or suspended certificate in a CRL or delta CRL.
Failure of the OCSP responder to report a certificate as revoked or suspended.
Failure of a Web interface to report certificate status information.
2
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11.5.6
11.5.7
The RA (and the LRA when it performs RA tasks) operating within the GCA-AA domain will:
Generate securely the key pair, using a trustworthy system directly.
Provide correct and accurate information in their communications with the GCA-AA.
Ensure that the public key submitted to the GCA-AA corresponds to the private key used.
Create applications for certificates in accordance with this CPS.
Perform all verification and authenticity actions prescribed by the GCA-AA procedures and this
CPS.
Submit to the GCA-AA the applicants request in a signed message.
Receive, verify and relay to the GCA-AA all requests for revocation, suspension and
unsuspension of a certificate in accordance with the GCA-AA procedures and the CPS.
If the RA becomes aware of or suspects the compromise of a private key, it will immediately
notify the GCA-AA.
The RA has sole responsibility for the directories it maintains including certificate directories.
The RA is responsible for all audits it makes, the results and recommendations of audits
thereof.
The RA is solely responsible for the accuracy of the data it provides the GCA-AA with. The RA
and not the GCA-AA is liable for any damages suffered as a result of unverified data that has
been listed in a certificate.
The RA complies with Belgian laws and regulations pertaining to the functioning of certification
services.
The RA and the LRA are liable for their acts or omissions under Belgian Law.
11.6.1
Within the limits under Belgian Law the GCA-AA does not warrant:
The accuracy of any the information contained in certificates except as it is warranted by the
RA that is the party responsible for the ultimate correctness and accuracy of all data
transmitted to the GCA-AA with the intention to be included in a certificate.
The fitness of any certificate for a particular purpose.
The accuracy, authenticity, completeness or fitness of any information contained in, test
prototype or demo certificates.
11.6.2
Within the limit set by Belgian Law, in no event (except for fraud or wilful misconduct) will the GCA-AA
be liable for:
2
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11.7 Indemnities
This section is not applicable.
11.10
Survival
11.11
Severability
If any provision of this CPS, including limitation of liability clauses, is found to be invalid or
unenforceable, the remainder of this CPS will be interpreted in such manner as to affect the original
intention of the parties.
11.12
Amendments
Minor changes to this CPS that do not materially affect the assurance level of this CPS are indicated
by version number that contains a decimal number e.g. version 1.1 for a version with minor changes
as opposed to e.g. version 2.0 that addresses major issues.
Minor changes to this CPS do not require a change in the CPS OID or the CPS pointer qualifier (URL)
that might be communicated by the GCA-AA. Major changes that may materially change the
acceptability of certificates for specific purposes and these changes may require corresponding
changes to the CPS OID or CPS pointer qualifier (URL).
The GCA-AA Policy Authority has competence over the numbering of versions and all issues
pertaining to this CPS.
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11.13
All disputes associated with this CPS will be resolved according to Belgian law.
11.14
Governing Law
The GCA-AA provides its services under the provisions of the Belgian law
11.15
Miscellaneous Provisions
The GCA-AA incorporates by reference the following information in all digital certificates it issues:
Terms and conditions in this CPS.
Any other applicable certificate policy as may be stated on an issued certificate.
The mandatory elements of applicable standards.
Any non-mandatory but customised elements of applicable standards.
Content of extensions and enhanced naming not addressed elsewhere.
Any other information that is indicated to be so in a field of a certificate.
To incorporate information by reference the GCA-AA uses computer-based and text-based pointers
that include URLs, OIDs etc.
.
51 / 54
A formal declaration by an approving authority that a certain function/entity meets specific formal requirements.
ARCHIVE
To store records for period of time for purposes such as security, backup, or audit.
AUDIT
A process used to confirm the identity of a person or to prove the integrity of specific information by placing them within the
right context and verifying such relationship.
eID
The complete system of the e-ID card. This includes the organisation, infrastructure, procedures, contacts and all necessary
resources, pertaining to the e-ID card.
CERTIFICATE
An electronic statement that maps the signature verification data to a physical or moral person and confirms the identity of this
person.
CERTIFICATION AUTHORITY OR CA
An entity that is trusted to associate a public key to the information on the subject, contained in the certificate by means of
signing it with its private key. Unless explicitly specified, the CA described herein is the Government Certification Authority.
CERTIFICATE PRACTICE STATEMENT OR CPS
A statement of the practices in the management of certificates during all life phases.
CERTIFICATE STATUS SERVICE
A service, enabling relying parties and others to verify the status of certificates.
CERTIFICATION SERVICES
Services related to the certificate lifecycle. Certification services are public services.
CONTRACT PERIOD
The duration of the GCA-AA contract between the Belgian Government and the GCA-AA organization.
CERTIFICATE CHAIN
A field in the digital certificate used to convey additional information on issues that include: the public key, the certified ciserver,
the certificate issuer, and/or the certification process.
CERTIFICATE HIERARCHY
A level based sequence of certificates of one (root) CA and subordinate entities that include, GCA-AA.
CERTIFICATE MANAGEMENT
Actions associated with certificate management include, storage, dissemination, publication, revocation, and suspension of
certificates.
CERTIFICATE REVOCATION LIST (CRL)
A list issued and digitally signed by a GCA-AA that includes revoked and suspended certificates. Such list is to me consulted by
relying parties at all times prior to relying on information featured in a certificate.
CERTIFICATE SERIAL NUMBER
A sequential number that uniquely identifies a certificate within the domain of a GCA-AA.
CERTIFICATE ISSUANCE
Delivery of X.509 v3 digital certificates for authentication and digital signature based on personal data and public keys provided
by the RA and compliant with the CPS.
CERTIFICATE SUSPENSION
Online service used to temporarily disable a digital certificate and to automatically revoke it if no request for re-activating it is
submitted within a certain time period
CERTIFICATE REVOCATION
Online service used to permanently disable a digital certificate before its expiration date
CONFIDENTIALITY
To validate a certificate chain in order to validate each certificate in the certificate chain in order to validate an end-user citizen
certificate.
DIGITAL SIGNATURE
To encode a message by using an asymmetric cryptosystem and a hash function such that a person having the initial message
and the signers public key can accurately determine whether the transformation was created using the private key that
corresponds to the signers public key and whether the initial message has been altered since the transformation was made.
52 / 54
DISTINGUISHED NAME
A set of data that identifies a real-world entity, such as a person in a computer-based context.
DIRECTORY SERVICE
Online publication of certificates allowing the retrieval of a certificate based on its certificate identifier
ELECTRONIC SIGNATURE
Electronic data, attached or logically linked to other electronic data and enabling authentication method.
EUROPEAN DIRECTIVE
The European Directive 1999/93/CE of the European Parliament and the Council of 13 December 1999 on a community
framework for electronic signature.
eID CARD
Electronic identity card as defined in the Royal Decree of XX Month 2003.
GENERATE A KEY PAIR
A trustworthy process to create mathematically (e.g. according to the RSA algorithm) linked private and public keys.
CA PUBLIC CERTIFICATION SERVICES
A digital certification system made available by the GCA-AA as well as the entities that belong to the GCA-AA domain as
described in this CPS.
INCORPORATE BY REFERENCE
To make one document a part of another by identifying the document to be incorporated, with information that allows the
recipient to access and obtain the incorporated message in its entirety, and by expressing the intention that it be part of the
incorporating message. Such an incorporated message shall have the same effect as if it had been fully stated in the message.
KEY PAIR
The result of notification to parties involved in receiving GCA-AA services in accordance with this CPS.
NORMALISED CERTIFICATE
A Certificate that is used to support any usage but Qualified Electronic Signatures of a cryptographic key pair whose
corresponding public key pair is certified. The certified key usages can be any or any mix of the following usages: encryption,
authentication, non-Qualified signatures, etc.
A Normalised Certificate is issued according to the requirements of the ETSI technical standard TS 102 042.
OBJECT ODENTIFIER (OID)
A sequence of integer components that can be assigned to a registered object and that has the property of being unique
among all object identifiers within a specific domain.
ONLINE CERTIFICATE STATUS PROTOCOL (OCSP)
The Online Certificate Status Protocol (RFC 2560) is a real time status information resource used to determine the current
status of a digital certificate without requiring CRLs
PKI HIERARCHY
A set of GCA-AAs whose functions are organised according to the principle of delegation of authority and related to each other
as subordinate and superior GCA-AA.
PRIVATE KEY
A mathematical key to create digital signatures and sometimes (depending upon the algorithm) to decrypt messages in
combination with the corresponding public key.
PUBLIC KEY
A mathematical key that can be made publicly available that is used to verify signatures created with its corresponding private
key. Depending on the algorithm, public keys can also be used to encrypt messages or files which can then be decrypted with
the corresponding private key.
PUBLIC KEY CRYPTOGRAPHY
An entity that has the responsibility to identify and authenticate servers. The RA does not issue certificates. Within the GCA-AA
domain, RRN is the RA.
RELIANCE
To accept a digital signature and act in a way that shows trust in it.
RELYING PARTY
Any entity that relies on a certificate for carrying out any action.
53 / 54
REPOSITORY
A database and/or directory listing digital certificates and other relevant information accessible on-line.
REVOKE A CERTIFICATE
To permanently end the operational period of a certificate from a specified time forward.
ROOT SIGNING
An action by which a hierarchically higher authority conditionally grants its trust status to an authority at a lower hierarchical
level. In eID GlobalSign is a root sign authority that allows the GCA-AA to benefit from the same Trust status in software
applications, as GlobalSigns own certificates do.
SECRET SHARE
A portion of a cryptographic secret that has been divided among a number of physical tokens, such as smart cards etc.
SECRET SHARE HOLDER
A method that is used or adopted by a document originator to identify himself or herself, which is either accepted by the
recipient or its use is customary under the circumstances.
SIGNATORY
A person who creates a digital signature for a message, or a signature for a document.
STATUS VERIFICATION
Online service based e.g. on the Online Certificate Status Protocol (RFC 2560) used to determine the current status of a digital
certificate without requiring CRLs. Within eID several status verification mechanisms are made available, including CRLs, delta
CRLs, OCSP and web interfaces.
SUBSCRIBER
The person whose identity and public key are certified in an eID certificates.
SUSPENDED CERTIFICATE
Temporarily discarded certificate, which nevertheless is kept on hold for one week until revocation or reactivation notice is given
to the GCA-AA by RRN.
TRUSTED POSITION
A role within an GCA-AA that includes access to or control over cryptographic operations that may allow for privileged access to
the issuance, use, suspension, or revocation of certificates, including operations that restrict access to a repository.
TRUSTWORTHY SYSTEM
Computer hardware, software, and procedures that provide an acceptable level against security risks, provide a reasonable level
of availability, reliability, and correct operation and enforce a security policy.
X.509
The standard of the ITU-T (International Telecommunications Union-T) for digital certificates.
Belgium Root CA
Certification Authority
Certificate Practise Statement
Certificate Revocation List
Government CA Government AA
Local Registration Authority
Object Identifier
Online Certificate Status Protocol
Public Key Infrastructure
Registration Authority
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