Sherman Tank Myths - The Issue of Shermans Versus Panthers and Tigers was Dire

By Copyright 2015, J.D. Neal, All Rights Reserved

Some people enjoy sensationalizing the differences between the Sherman tank and
the German Panther and Tiger as if it nearly cost the war. Which is wrong. While it is
fashionable to try to enhance the mood of stories with the concept that no one knew the Allies
could win even in 1943, only an idiot would think that. The Germans were outnumbered by the
Soviets, USA and United Kingdom alone. The Germans could only win if the Allies were idiots.
The British and their allies had stopped the advance in Europe with the Battle of Britain
in 1940, proving that the German war machine was limited like everyone else. In North Africa
in 1940 to 1942 the United Kingdom (without the help of the Soviets and the USA) brought
Germanys attempts at expansion on the ground to a halt. When Germany attacked the
Soviets in 1942, it was an act of desperation, an attempt to glom onto the Soviet industrial
complex and convert them from a potential threat into a resource to help them balance
numbers against the USA and British.
The Germans were going to lose the war; the USs entry into the war merely sped the
process along. The issue of Sherman tank versus the German Panther and Tiger was not an
issue of losing the war.
Above all else, the Sherman tank versus the German Panther and Tiger situation was
a humanitarian issue - frustration and anguish over how Allied troops fighting in the Sherman
deserved more and better equipment. It is a testament to how military leaders can be given a
technically competent and industrially proficient nation and squander it with stupid choices. If
you read detailed accounts of the technological developments in the USA you find a repeated
theme of killing good programs and not accepting better equipment because, We see no need
for it. The idea that Allied ground troops could benefit from better weapons seemed to baffle
the minds of the military leaders of the time, whose main response was, The Sherman and its
75 is working fine. Why change it? They constantly made assertions that a better tank and
gun would hinder them, using overly simplistic excuses and grasping for the slightest thread of
flaws.
For example, the Main supporter of the 76-mm armed Sherman was canned for being
too argumentative and replaced by someone the Army Chief of Staff thought would cause
fewer issues. Said man became enthusiastic for the Sherman with a 76-mm. He penned a
memo pointing out the possible negatives so that no one could mistake it for a super-tank; and
said memo was used to poison the 76-mm gun with poor assertions. Once the Ground forces
met Panther tanks in numbers and began to demand the 76 and anything else they could get,
battlefield experience showed that the 76-mm was indeed a damn better gun than the 75. The
Ordnance Department developed the 76 on their own and could have supported it better by
starting out with a muzzle break, propellants to reduce flash and bang, and better ammunition
choices, but in the end the 76 was shunned more for a pig-headed sentimentality for the 75
than any real faults.
Various entities kept saying We have the best tank ever, and the officers in control of
the ground forces often resisted being upgraded even when better tanks were offered. Then
came the bloody, frustrating Battle of the Bulge (Ardennes Offense or Operation Nordwind)
where Germans drove a deep wedge in US lines and delayed the end of the war. Tanks were
not the major issue - the Germans struck a weak point with a large mass of men and materials,
catching US ground forces by surprise - but the weakness of US tanks hurt the cause.
Men died or were maimed simply because their 75-mm and 76-mm shots bounced off a
German tank's front - even though they had gotten the first shot in and scored a hit. Men died
because German shells went through Sherman tanks at any angle and at long range like it
was butter.

With better armor - or at least a better gun like the 17-pounder - US forces would have
had fewer issues during the Battle. And during the war.
Indeed, US and other Allied tankers wanted to be able to engage German tanks at long
range with a hope of success. You can dig up statistics showing that the average range at
which an enemy vehicle was destroyed was 900 yards for Germans and 800 for Allied troops
(or something like that). Averages are not the "norm". They are not the range everyone fought
at. They are simply the short ranges added to long ranges and divided by the number of
actions. Indeed, averages are what happened; not what might have happened. With a better
gun, the average for the US kills could have been 900 or 1,000 yards or more.
US troops wanted to be able to engage German tanks at 2,000 or 3,000 yards with a
high degree of success. Sometimes they did. During the early days of the North African
campaign and Tunisia it was marked that the 75-mm gun on the Sherman and M3 Lee/Grant
could reach and smash German tanks at 2,500 yards well beyond the range of the German
guns then in use (except the 88). During the Battle of the Bulge a Sherman tank gunner took
out 3 Panthers at around 2,000 yards with side shots from a 76. There are plenty of other
situations where a better gun helped tankers destroy enemy armor at long ranges.
The tankers eagerly and gladly fired at any German vehicle they saw, sometimes at
extremely long ranges. But the Germans learned their lessons from both Russia and Africa and
added more armor to their basic tanks and began fielding the Tiger and Panther. The Tiger
was not new as such; it had been developed over years with the typical German desire to plan
ahead and lead with technology. Which is why it wasnt something of a crude upgrade to the
MK-IV series.
The Panther was new, developed after experiencing the Soviet T34 in 1942. While
German officers begged to be allowed to copy and produce the T-34 as-is, Hitler wanted a
better tank and thus the Panther was created.
These tanks were hardly invincible. Their forte was thick frontal armor; the side and
rear armor was less thick and many Allied guns could penetrate it, some at long ranges. In
Africa, the first encounter with the British was a failure for the Tiger; 6-pounders knocked two
out with side shots. The USA has its own account of a Sherman (broken down) being passed
by three unaware Tigers which it proceeded to knock out one by one with flank shots. An M8
Armored car with a 37-mm gun rushed in behind a Tiger and knocked it out with shots to the
rear 9they likely bounced down into the thin engine deck). Both Tigers and Panthers were
knocked out by 75s and 76s with frontal shots when the shells glanced down into the bow
plates.
General Patton himself was fond of the hunting spirit, that all the tankers needed was
training, skill and dash needed to outmaneuver German tanks and shoot them in the sides.
That attitude defies reality: in reality the Germans werent stupid nor did the situation always
allow sneaky tactics.
Allied tankers did not like the attitude of Outfox them! in their leaders because it was
an excuse to short-change them in equipment. What they wanted and needed was a better
gun and/or better ammunition that let them shoot at and knock out Tigers, Panthers, and
other heavily armored German vehicles from the front at long ranges.
That is what serious discussions of the Sherman tank versus the German Panther and
Tiger are about: what things could the US and British have done to make the war nicer for US
ground forces?