BIACO vs PCRB

515 SCRA 106 Civil Procedure In rem vs In personam proceedings Service of Summons Resident Defendant Extrinsic Fraud
Ernesto Biaco, husband of Teresa Biaco, acquired several loans from Philippine Countryside Rural Bank (PCRB) from 1996 to 1998. To secure the
loans, he mortgaged certain property in favor of the bank. He was able to pay loans from 1996 to 1997 but he defaulted in loans obtained in 1998
which amounted to more than a million pesos.
Eventually, PCRB filed a complaint for foreclosure against the spouses Biaco. Summons were issued by the trial judge. The Sherriff served the
summons to Ernesto at the latters office. No summons was served to Teresa.
Ernesto did not file a responsive pleading (so did Teresa because she was not aware sans the summons being served her). The case was heard ex-parte
and the spouses were ordered to satisfy the debt and failure to do so will authorize the Sheriff to auction the mortgaged the property.
Eventually, the mortgaged property was auctioned for P150k which is not sufficient to cover the P1 M+ debt. Upon motion by PCRB, a notice of levy
was issued against the personal properties of Teresa to satisfy the deficiency.
It was only at this point that Teresa learned of the previous ex parte proceedings. She then sought to have the judgment annulled as she now claims
that she was deprived of due process when she did not receive summons; that it was only her husband who received the summons; that there was
extrinsic fraud because her husband deliberately hid the fact of the foreclosure proceeding.
PRCB argued that the foreclosure proceeding is an action quasi in rem, hence Teresas participation is not required so long as the court acquires
jurisdiction over the res which is what happened in the case at bar; that Teresa cannot invoke extrinsic fraud because such situation cannot occur in
her case because she is a co-defendant of Ernesto.
ISSUE: Whether or not the judgment of the trial court should be annulled.
HELD: Yes. It is admitted that the proceeding is a quasi in rem proceeding and that the presence of Teresa is not required because the trial court was
able to acquire jurisdiction over the res (mortgaged property). HOWEVER, her constitutional right to due process is superior over the procedural
matters mentioned. Her right to due process was violated when she did not receive summons. Teresa, as a resident defendant, who does not voluntary
appear in court must be personally served with summons as provided under Section 6, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. Even if the action is quasi in
rem, personal service of summons is essential in order to afford her due process. The substituted service made by the sheriff at her husbands office
cannot be deemed proper service absent any explanation that efforts had been made to personally serve summons upon her but that such efforts
failed. Further, the order of the trial court compelling Teresa to pay off the debt using her personal property is a judgment in personam which the
court cannot do because it only acquired jurisdiction over the res and not over the person of Teresa.
On the issue of extrinsic fraud, the Court of Appeals, agreeing with PCRB, is correct that there is none in the case at bar. Extrinsic fraud exists when
there is a fraudulent act committed by the prevailing party outside of the trial of the case, whereby the defeated party was prevented from presenting
fully his side of the case by fraud or deception practiced on him by the prevailing party. Extrinsic fraud is present where the unsuccessful party had
been prevented from exhibiting fully his case, by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent, as by keeping him away from court, a false
promise of a compromise; or where the defendant never had knowledge of the suit, being kept in ignorance by the acts of the plaintiff; or where an
attorney fraudulently or without authority assumes to represent a party and connives at his defeat; or where the attorney regularly employed corruptly
sells out his clients interest to the other side. The above is not applicable in the case of Teresa. It was not PCRB which made any fraud. It should be
noted that spouses Biaco were co-defendants in the case and shared the same interest.

El Banco Espanol-Filipino vs. Vicente Palanca G.R. No. L-11390, March 26, 1918
El Banco Espanol-Filipino vs. Palanca
G.R. No. L-11390, March 26, 1918
* JURISDICTION, HOW ACQUIRED: Jurisdiction over the property which is the subject of the litigation may result either from a seizure of the
property under legal process, whereby it is brought into the actual custody of the law, or it may result from the institution of legal proceedings
wherein, under special provisions of law, the power of the court over the property is recognized and made effective.
* The action to foreclose a mortgage is said to be a proceeding quasi in rem, by which is expressed the idea that while it is not strictly speaking an
action in rem yet it partakes of that nature and is substantially such.
* DUE PROCESS IN FORECLOSURE PROCEEDINGS: Property is always assumed to be in the possession of its owner, in person or by agent; and
he may be safely held, under certain conditions, to be affected with knowledge that proceedings have been instituted for its condemnation and sale.
FACTS:

Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng y Limquingco mortgaged various parcels of real property in Manila to El Banco Espanol-Filipino. Afterwards,
Engracio returned to China and there he died on January 29, 1810 without returning again to the Philippines. The mortgagor then instituted
foreclosure proceeding but since defendant is a non-resident, it was necessary to give notice by publication. The Clerk of Court was also directed to
send copy of the summons to the defendants last known address, which is in Amoy, China. It is not shown whether the Clerk complied with this
requirement. Nevertheless, after publication in a newspaper of the City of Manila, the cause proceeded and judgment by default was rendered. The
decision was likewise published and afterwards sale by public auction was held with the bank as the highest bidder. On August 7, 1908, this sale was
confirmed by the court. However, about seven years after the confirmation of this sale, a motion was made by Vicente Palanca, as administrator of
the estate of the original defendant, wherein the applicant requested the court to set aside the order of default and the judgment, and to vacate all the
proceedings subsequent thereto. The basis of this application was that the order of default and the judgment rendered thereon were void because the
court had never acquired jurisdiction over the defendant or over the subject of the action.
ISSUE:
* Whether or not the lower court acquired jurisdiction over the defendant and the subject matter of the action
* Whether or not due process of law was observed
RULING:
On Jurisdiction
The word jurisdiction is used in several different, though related, senses since it may have reference (1) to the authority of the court to entertain a
particular kind of action or to administer a particular kind of relief, or it may refer to the power of the court over the parties, or (2) over the property
which is the subject to the litigation.
The sovereign authority which organizes a court determines the nature and extent of its powers in general and thus fixes its competency or
jurisdiction with reference to the actions which it may entertain and the relief it may grant.
How Jurisdiction is Acquired
Jurisdiction over the person is acquired by the voluntary appearance of a party in court and his submission to its authority, or it is acquired by the
coercive power of legal process exerted over the person.
Jurisdiction over the property which is the subject of the litigation may result either from a seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is
brought into the actual custody of the law, or it may result from the institution of legal proceedings wherein, under special provisions of law, the
power of the court over the property is recognized and made effective. In the latter case the property, though at all times within the potential power of
the court, may never be taken into actual custody at all. An illustration of the jurisdiction acquired by actual seizure is found in attachment
proceedings, where the property is seized at the beginning of the action, or some subsequent stage of its progress, and held to abide the final event of
the litigation. An illustration of what we term potential jurisdiction over the res, is found in the proceeding to register the title of land under our
system for the registration of land. Here the court, without taking actual physical control over the property assumes, at the instance of some person
claiming to be owner, to exercise a jurisdiction in rem over the property and to adjudicate the title in favor of the petitioner against all the world.
In the terminology of American law the action to foreclose a mortgage is said to be a proceeding quasi in rem, by which is expressed the idea that
while it is not strictly speaking an action in rem yet it partakes of that nature and is substantially such. The expression "action in rem" is, in its narrow
application, used only with reference to certain proceedings in courts of admiralty wherein the property alone is treated as responsible for the claim or
obligation upon which the proceedings are based. The action quasi rem differs from the true action in rem in the circumstance that in the former an
individual is named as defendant, and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his interest therein to the obligation or lien burdening the property.
All proceedings having for their sole object the sale or other disposition of the property of the defendant, whether by attachment, foreclosure, or other
form of remedy, are in a general way thus designated. The judgment entered in these proceedings is conclusive only between the parties.
It is true that in proceedings of this character, if the defendant for whom publication is made appears, the action becomes as to him a personal action
and is conducted as such. This, however, does not affect the proposition that where the defendant fails to appear the action is quasi in rem; and it
should therefore be considered with reference to the principles governing actions in rem.
[G.R. No. 129184. February 28, 2001]
EMERGENCY LOAN PAWNSHOP INCORPORATED and DANILO R. NAPALA, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS (Tenth
Division) and TRADERS ROYAL BANK, respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
May an appeal be taken from a decision of the Regional Trial Court denying a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of improper
venue? If not, will certiorari lie?

The case before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals,[1] granting respondents petition
for certiorari and dismissing the complaint below on the ground of improper venue.
On January 18, 1996, Traders Royal Bank (TRB for brevity) sold in favor of petitioner Emergency Loan Pawnshop Incorporated (ELPI for
brevity) a parcel of land located at Km. 3 Asin, Baguio City for Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00).[2]
At the time of the sale, TRB misrepresented to ELPI that the subject property was a vacant residential lot valued at P600.00 to P800.00 per
square meters, with a usable land area of 1,143.75 square meters (approximately 75% of the land area of 1,525 sq.m.) without any illegal occupants
or squatters, when it truth the subject property was dominantly a public road with only 140 square meters usable area.
ELPI, after having spent to fully ascertain the actual condition of the property, demanded from TRB the rescission and cancellation of the sale
of the property. TRB refused, hence, on April 16, 1996, ELPI filed with the Regional Trial Court, Davao, Branch 17, a complaint for annulment of
sale and damages against TRB.[3]
On August 27, 1996, TRB filed a Motion to Dismiss [4] the complaint on the ground of improper venue. On September 18, 1996 the trial court
denied the motion to dismiss.[5] On October 21, 1996, TRB filed a motion for reconsideration. [6] On November 14, 1996, the trial court denied the
motion.[7]
On January 15, 1997, TRB elevated the case to the Court of Appeals by petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction or
temporary restraining order, contending that the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion in denying its motion to dismiss the complaint on
the ground of improper venue.[8]
After due proceedings, on March 11, 1997, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding merit in the petition, the Orders dated September 18,1996 and November 14, 1996 are hereby ANNULED and SET
ASIDE and Civil Case No. 24,317-96 is hereby DISMISSED on ground of improper venue.[9]
Hence, this petition.[10]
Petitioners seek to set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals alleging that:
1. The Court of Appeals erred in entertaining the petition for certiorari and prohibition, for lack of jurisdiction;
2. The Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the Regional Trial Court erred in not dismissing the complaint for improper venue. [11]
According to petitioners, the determination of whether the venue of an action was improperly laid was a question of law, thus, the Court of
Appeals had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition forcertiorari and prohibition, which involves pure questions of law.
Petitioners further alleged that an order denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory in nature that can not be the subject of an appeal and can
not be even reviewed by a special civil action for certiorari.
We find the petition not meritorious.
The general rule is that the denial of a motion to dismiss a complaint is an interlocutory order and, hence, cannot be appealed or
questioned via a special civil action of certiorari until a final judgment on the merits of the case is rendered. [12]
The remedy of the aggrieved party is to file an answer to the complaint and to interpose as defenses the objections raised in his motion to
dismiss, proceed to trial, and in case of an adverse decision, to elevate the entire case by appeal in due course. However, the rule is not
ironclad. Under certain situations, recourse to certiorari or mandamus is considered appropriate, that is, (a) when the trial court issued the order
without or in excess of jurisdiction; (b) where there is patent grave abuse of discretion by the trial court; or, (c) appeal would not prove to be a speedy
and adequate remedy as when an appeal would not promptly relieve a defendant from the injurious effects of the patently mistaken order maintaining
the plaintiffs baseless action and compelling the defendant needlessly to go through a protracted trial and clogging the court dockets by another futile
case."[13]
In the case at bar, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the trial court erred grievously amounting to ousting itself of jurisdiction. The motion
of respondent TRB was well founded because venue was clearly improperly laid. The action in the Regional Trial Court was for annulment of sale
involving a parcel of land located at Km. 3 Asin Road, Baguio City. The venue of such action is unquestionably within the territorial jurisdiction of

the proper court where the real property or part thereof lies. [14] An action affecting title to real property, or for recovery of, or foreclosure of mortgage
on real property, shall be commenced and tried in the proper court having jurisdiction over the area where the real property or any part thereof lies. [15]
Hence, the case at bar clearly falls within the exceptions to the rule. The Regional Trial Court has committed a palpable and grievous error
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying the motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of improper venue.
WHEREFORE, the Court denies the petition and affirms the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No. 43095, in toto.

Asiavest Limited vs Court of Appeals

Facts:

1. The plaintiff Asiavest Limited filed a complaint against the defendant Antonio Heras praying that said defendant be ordered to pay to the plaintiff
the amounts awarded by the Hong Kong Court Judgment. The action filed in Hong Kong against Heras was in personam, since it was based on his
personal guarantee of the obligation of the principal debtor.
2. The trial court concluded that the Hong Kong court judgment should be recognized and given effect in this jurisdiction for failure of HERAS to
overcome the legal presumption in favor of the foreign judgment.
3. Asiavest moved for the reconsideration of the decision. It sought an award of judicial costs and an increase in attorney's fees with interest until full
payment of the said obligations. On the other hand, Heras no longer opposed the motion and instead appealed the decision to CA.
4. The Court of Appeals (CA) agreed with Heras that notice sent outside the state to a non-resident is unavailing to give jurisdiction in an action
against him personally for money recovery. Summons should have been personally served on Heras in Hong Kong,
Issue: Whether or not the judgment of the Hong Kong Court has been repelled by evidence of want of jurisdiction due to improper notice to
the party
YES.
1. Asiavest cannot now claim that Heras was a resident of Hong Kong at the time since the stipulated fact that Heras "is a resident of New Manila,
Quezon City, Philippines" refers to his residence at the time jurisdiction over his person was being sought by the Hong Kong court. Accordingly,
since Heras was not a resident of Hong Kong and the action against him was, ne in personam, summons should have been personally served on him
in Hong Kong.
The extraterritorial service in the Philippines was therefore invalid and did not confer on the Hong Kong court jurisdiction over his person. It follows
that the Hong Kong court judgment cannot be given force and effect here in the Philippines for having been rendered without jurisdiction.
2. On the same note, Heras was also an absentee,hence, he should have been served with summons in the same manner as a non-resident not found in
Hong Kong. Section 17, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court providing for extraterritorial service will not apply because the suit against him was in
personam. Neither can we apply Section 18, which allows extraterritorial service on a resident defendant who is temporarily absent from the country,
because even if Heras be considered as a resident of Hong Kong, the undisputed fact remains that he left Hong Kong not only temporarily but for
good.
G.R. No. 169047

November 3, 2008

EVA FLOYD and RODOLFO CALIXTRO, petitioners

vs.
BENJAMIN GONZALES, ATILANO NANQUIL, LINDA NISPEROS, LILIAN NISPEROS, SALVADOR NISPEROS & VIRGILIO
CONSTANTINO, respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse the Decision 1 dated July 12, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 81618. Said
Decision affirmed with modification the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 45, San Fernando City, Pampanga in SP. Civil Action
No. 234-0-91, dismissing the complaint for injunction which sought to prevent the demolition of petitioners' houses built on the land claimed by
respondents Linda Nisperos, Lilian Nisperos and Salvador Nisperos.
The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows.

Petitioners Eva Floyd and Rodolfo Calixtro are occupants of a lot in Jolo Street, Tabacuhan Road, Sta. Rita, Olongapo City. Floyd started occupying
the said lot in 1986 while Calixtro started doing so in 1988. The lot forms part of a 1,337.50-square meter property which was the subject of a
complaint3for forcible entry filed by respondents Lilian Nisperos, Linda Nisperos and Salvador Nisperos, through their attorney-in-fact Virgilio
Constantino, against Clemente Abarnas. The complaint, filed on September 25, 1984, charged Abarnas of constructing a house on the subject land in
July 1984 through stealth and strategy. The Nisperoses claimed ownership and prior possession of the land by succession, alleging that their father,
Igmedio Nisperos, occupied and tilled it from 1950 to 1982.
On February 10, 1986, the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Olongapo City dismissed the ejectment complaint. On appeal however, the Olongapo
City RTC on January 20, 1987 reversed the dismissal of the complaint and ordered Abarnas to remove any improvements introduced on the land and
surrender possession thereof to the Nisperoses.4
On July 8, 1987, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Olongapo City RTC's Decision. 5 When the appellate court's decision attained finality, the
Olongapo City RTC issued an Alias Writ of Execution6on April 3, 1991 and an Alias Writ of Special Demolition7 on April 4, 1991. A Notice to
Vacate8 was likewise issued on April 23, 1991.
In June 1991, when respondents Sheriffs Benjamin Gonzales and Atilano Nanquil went to the subject land to implement the writs, they found that
petitioners and Fe Ongsotto were also occupying the property. To prevent the demolition, petitioners and Ongsotto filed a complaint 9 for injunction,
SP. Civil Action No. 234-0-91, before the RTC of Olongapo City.
On February 5, 1992, the RTC of Olongapo City issued a Writ of Preliminary Injunction. 10 It observed that petitioners do not appear to be mere
trespassers, squatters or Abarnas' agents; and that the respondent sheriffs exceeded their authority granted by the writs of execution and demolition,
considering that they were only directed against Abarnas. 11
The complaint was transferred to the RTC of San Fernando City by virtue of Supreme Court A.M. No. 00-11-523-RTC, following a judicial audit.
On August 8, 2003, the RTC of San Fernando City, dismissed the injunction complaint. It considered petitioners as occupants in bad faith and
squatters on the lots, making the judgment in the ejectment case binding on them. The court recognized the Nisperoses' prior possession and claim
over the lots which started in 1950 with their father, Igmedio. The RTC noted that Floyd and Calixtro admitted that they started occupying the
premises only in 1986 and 1988, respectively. It also concluded that petitioners impliedly admitted that the lots are part of the Nisperoses' property
because instead of claiming the opposite, they attempted to prove that they had a better right thereto. It also ordered petitioners to pay private
respondents moral damages and attorney's fees.12
Petitioners and Ongsotto, separately, appealed the judgment in the injunction case before the Court of Appeals.
On July 12, 2005, the appellate court ruled against petitioners, thus:
WHEREFORE, upon the premises, the appealed Decision is AFFIRMED with theMODIFICATION that the awards of moral damages
and attorney's fees are DELETED.
SO ORDERED.13
The Court of Appeals held that petitioners have not shown a clear and unmistakable right to be protected, and found that they occupied the land
during the pendency of the ejectment case, thereby taking advantage of such conflict. 14
On August 22, 2005, Ongsotto, alone, filed a Motion for Reconsideration. 15 On September 21, 2005, Floyd and Calixtro filed the instant petition. 16 On
February 15, 2006, the Court of Appeals deferred ruling on Ongsotto's motion in view of this petition. 17
Before us, petitioners raise the following assignment of errors:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION IN CIVIL CASE NO. 234-0-91 HOLDING
THAT THE PETITIONERS ARE BOUND BY THE DECISION IN CIVIL CASE NO. 139-0-86 ALTHOUGH THEY WERE NOT
IMPLEADED AS PARTY DEFENDANTS THEREIN.
II.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE PETITIONERS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO A WRIT OF
INJUNCTION ALTHOUGH THE PROPERTY THEY ARE IN POSSESSION OF IS OWNED AND TITLED IN THE NAME OF
ANOTHER PERSON.
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE LAND SUBJECT OF CIVIL CASE NO. 139-0-86
INCLUDES THE LOTS BEING OCCUPIED AND POSSESSED BY THE PETITIONERS. 18
Simply stated, the issues are as follows: Are petitioners bound by the decision in the ejectment case? Are they entitled to an injunctive writ to prevent
the demolition of their houses? Who has a better right of possession over the land where their houses are erected?
Petitioners aver that only Abarnas was ordered by the Olongapo City RTC to surrender possession of the land and remove any construction thereon,
and that they are not trespassers, squatters, or Abarnas' relatives, successors-in-interest, or privies. They further contend that judgments in ejectment
cases are in personam. Thus, even assuming that they are occupying the premises subject of the ejectment case, the judgment cannot be enforced
against them as they were not made parties to it. Petitioners likewise point to several pieces of documentary evidence which allegedly show that the
Nisperoses are not the true owners of the lots on which the houses sought to be demolished stand, since said lots are registered in the name of one
Rodrigo C. Domingo, Jr. They further argue that there is no factual basis for the appellate court's finding that they impliedly admitted that the lots
they are occupying form part of the property claimed by the Nisperoses. 19
The Nisperoses on the other hand state that petitioners were not impleaded as defendants in the ejectment case as the latter were not yet on the
premises "or hid themselves" during the pendency of the case until the time the latter were served with a notice to vacate on December 21, 1988.
They claim that petitioners connived with Abarnas and his wife Angelina, and insist that petitioners are privies of the Abarnases. They accuse
petitioners of bad faith in applying for a Miscellaneous Sales Application and for belatedly securing other documents, which were "self-serving."
Lastly, they aver that the genuineness of the documents presented by petitioners and the ownership of the lots mentioned in it can only be determined
in a full-blown trial.20
An ejectment suit is an action in personam wherein judgment is binding only upon parties properly impleaded and given an opportunity to be
heard.21 Petitioners were not made party-defendants by the Nisperoses. Hence, they can be bound by said judgment in the ejectment suit, even if they
were not impleaded as defendants, only if they are shown to be (a) trespassers, squatters or agents of the defendant fraudulently occupying the
property to frustrate the judgment; (b) guests or other occupants of the premises with the permission of the defendant; (c) transferees pendente lite;
(d) sub-lessees; (e) co-lessees; or (f) members of the family, relatives and other privies of the defendant. 22 In such cases, court hearing is a must to
determine the character of such possession. If the execution court finds that they are mere successors-in-interest, guests, or agents of the defendant,
the order of execution shall be enforced against them. 23
In the forcible entry case, petitioners had not been given their day in court to present their side to prove their alleged bona fide possession. Neither
was a court hearing held to prove that they are mere successors-in-interest, guests, or agents of defendant Abarnas when the ejectment judgment was
sought to be enforced against them. Thus, they cannot be bound by the decision in the ejectment case.
We now go to the second issue.
A writ of preliminary injunction may only be issued upon a clear showing that there exists a right to be protected and that the action sought to be
enjoined is violative of that right.24 From the foregoing discussion, it is clear that petitioners have a right to be protected against the summary
demolition of their houses. Hence, the RTC correctly issued a writ of preliminary injunction. However, whether the injunction should be made
permanent is another matter.
The determination as to whether petitioners are entitled to a permanent injunction rests on the issue of who between petitioners and respondents have
a better right of possession over the land on which the houses sought to be demolished stand.
It is relevant to point out that in the pre-trial conference before the Olongapo City RTC the parties agreed on the following issues for resolution:
(1) Whether or not the plaintiffs were mere trespassers in the property in question or do they have title over the premises in question.
(2) Whether or not the plaintiffs can be ejected or their house demolished erected on the land in question inasmuch as they are not parties in
the case of Linda Nisperos, et al. versus Rodolfo Calixtro and Fe Ongsotto, Civil Case No. 139-0-86.
(3) Whether or not the spaces which plaintiffs' houses are erected are owned by plaintiffs. 25

Clearly, apart from the matter of enjoining the execution against petitioners of the judgment in Civil Case No. 139-0-86, the issue of who between the
petitioners and respondents are entitled to possession of, as a consequence of title over, the land where the formers' houses are erected was also
squarely raised and fully tried before the lower courts. During trial, petitioners fully ventilated their claim / right to possession of the subject land.
Sec. 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court states that "[w]hen issues not raised by the pleadings are tried with the express or implied consent of the parties,
they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings." Under the circumstances, it is just and proper to resolve the issue of
possession over the subject land. To rule otherwise and require respondents to file another case for ejectment, or institute supplemental proceedings in
Civil Case No. 139-0-86, against petitioners would not be in accord with justice and would only entail more unnecessary expenses and contribute to
the clogged court dockets.
Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals categorically found that respondents have the better right to possession of the land. The RTC ruled that
"[petitioners'] claim of possession that started in 1988 must yield to that of the Nisperoses who trace their possession of the property to that of
their predecessor-in-interest, their father Igmedio who began occupying the property in 1950." 26 The Court of Appeals, for its part, ruled that:
[Petitioner] Floyd occupied the property only in 1986; [petitioner] Calixtro occupied the property in 1988 while admitting that the
property was owned by I. Hauseco Subd. Appellant Ongsotto likewise occupied the property in 1988 and expressed that she derived her
alleged title from a waiver and quitclaim executed by Angelina Abarnas, the wife of Clemente Abarnas, defendant in the ejectment case.
Thus, she is considered as the latter's successor-in-interest, bound by the judgment in the ejectment case which is conclusive between the
parties and their successors-in-interest. The MSAs [Miscellaneous Sales Applications] and unapproved survey plans presented by Floyd
and Ongsotto are self-serving and of little evidentiary value.
In sum, the [petitioners] have not proved a clear and unmistakable right to the possession of the property. On the other hand, Nisperos'
better right was established by final judgment in Civil Case No. 139-0-86. 27
We find no cogent reason to overturn the consistent findings of both the RTC and the Court of Appeals that, as against petitioners, the Nisperoses are
entitled to possession of the subject land where the petitioners' houses are erected. Applicable to the instant case, which is an offshoot of an ejectment
case and which also in part partakes of an ejectment case, is the following pronouncement of the Court on the matter of ejectment and possession
in Pajuyo v. Court of Appeals:28
The only question that the courts must resolve in ejectment proceedings is-who is entitled to the physical possession of the premises, that is,
to the possession de facto and not to the possession de jure. It does not even matter if a party's title to the property is questionable, or when
both parties intruded into public land and their applications to own the land have yet to be approved by the proper government agency.
Regardless of the actual condition of the title to the property, the party in peaceable quiet possession shall not be thrown out by a strong
hand, violence or terror. Neither is the unlawful withholding of property allowed. Courts will always uphold respect for prior possession.
Thus, a party who can prove prior possession can recover such possession even against the owner himself. Whatever may be the character
of his possession, if he has in his favor prior possession in time, he has the security that entitles him to remain on the property until a person
with a better right lawfully ejects him. To repeat, the only issue that the court has to settle in an ejectment suit is the right to physical
possession.29
Petitioners Floyd and Calixtro, in SP. Civil Action No. 234-0-91 admitted having possessed the subject land only in 1986 and 1988 respectively.
These cannot prevail over the Nisperoses' possession through their father Igmedio that started in 1950. Since the Nisperoses have proven prior
possession in time, they indeed have a better right to the possession of the land. Hence, petitioners must relinquish possession of the land to the
Nisperoses and accordingly remove their houses which are built on the subject land.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 12, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 81618 isAFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
Petitioners are ORDERED to SURRENDER to the respondents Linda, Lilian and Salvador Nisperos the possession of the land in dispute
and REMOVE the improvements that they introduced thereon.
G.R. No. 160280

March 13, 2009

SOFIA ANIOSA SALANDANAN, Petitioner,

vs.
SPOUSES MA. ISABEL and BAYANI MENDEZ, Respondents.*
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

This refers to the Petition for Review on Certiorari of the June 27, 2003 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) and its September 3, 2003
Resolution2 in CA-G.R. SP No. 76336 denying the petition for clarification and intervention filed by Sofia Aniosa Salandanan (petitioner) and
affirming in toto the March 6, 2003 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 30 in Civil Case No. 02-104406 which affirmed
the August 9, 2002 Decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila, Branch 15 in Civil Case No. 172530 ordering Delfin Fernandez 3 and
Carmen Fernandez (Spouses Fernandez) and all persons claiming rights under them to vacate and surrender possession of a house and lot located at
1881 Antipolo St., corner Vision St., Sta. Cruz, Manila (subject lot) to Spouses Bayani Mendez and Ma. Isabel S. Mendez (respondents) and to pay
the latter monthly rental of P5,000.00 from January 29, 2002 until they vacate the property and P15,000.00 as attorneys fees.
The case stemmed from a complaint for ejectment instituted by respondents against Spouses Fernandez before the MeTC on April 18, 2002.
In their Complaint,4 respondents alleged that they are the owners of the subject property as evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 246767 of
the Registry of Deeds of Manila; that they became the owners thereof by virtue of a deed of donation; that Spouses Fernandez and their families were
occupying the subject property for free through the generosity of respondent Isabels father; that a letter of demand to vacate the subject property was
sent to Spouses Fernandez but they refused to vacate the same; that respondents brought the matter to the Barangay Lupon for possible settlement but
the same failed.
In their Answer,5 Spouses Fernandez denied the allegations of the complaint and averred that Spouses Pablo and Sofia Salandanan (Spouses
Salandanan) are the registered owners of the subject property and the improvements therein; that respondent Isabel is not a daughter of Spouses
Salandanan; that Delfin Fernandez (Delfin) is the nearest of kin of Pablo Salandanan being the nephew of the latter; that Delfin has continuously
occupied the said property since time immemorial with the permission of Spouses Salandanan; that they did not receive any notice to vacate the
subject property either from respondents or their counsel.
Further, Spouses Fernandez claimed that respondents were able to transfer the subject property to their name through fraud; that sometime in
November 1999, respondents went to the house of Spouses Salandanan in Dasmarias, Cavite and asked the latter to sign a special power of attorney;
that the supposed special power of attorney was in fact a deed of donation wherein Spouses Salandanan was alleged to have donated in favor of
respondents the subject property; that said deed of donation was simulated and fictitious and that by virtue of the alleged deed of donation,
respondent Isabel was able to transfer the title of the subject property in her name; that in fact, the subject property is the subject of a separate case
filed on July 31, 2001 before the RTC of Manila docketed as Civil Case No. 01101487 6 for annulment, revocation and reconveyance of title. By way
of counterclaim, Spouses Fernandez prayed for moral damages and attorneys fees.
On August 9, 2002 the MeTC rendered its decision in favor of respondents and against Spouses Fernandez, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants, ordering the latter and all persons claiming rights
under them to peacefully vacate the premises and surrender possession thereof to the plaintiffs and for the defendants to pay plaintiffs: 1) P5,000.00 a
month beginning January 29, 2002 (when the demand letter was received by defendants by registered mail) until they finally vacate the premises and
2) the amount of P15,000.00 as and for attorneys fees.
The counterclaim of the defendants is dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.7
Dissatisfied, Spouses Fernandez appealed to the RTC. Respondents then filed a Motion for Execution Pending Appeal with the RTC. On December 9,
2002, the RTC issued an Order directing the issuance of a writ of execution to place respondents in possession of the disputed property on the ground
that Spouses Fernandez failed to periodically deposit the monthly rentals as they fell due. The Writ of Execution was issued on January 10, 2003. The
Spouses Fernandez moved for reconsideration of the Order for issuance of the writ of execution, but the same was denied.
Thus, on February 20, 2003, the sheriff went to the subject premises to implement the writ of execution but found the place padlocked. The sheriff
also found the petitioner, an old woman, all alone inside the house. Taking pity on the old woman, the sheriff was unable to implement the writ. On
the same day, respondents filed an Urgent Motion to Break Open, alleging that Spouses Fernandez fetched petitioner earlier that day from her
residence in Dasmarias, Cavite and purposely placed her inside the subject premises so the old woman could plead for mercy from the executing
sheriff.
On March 6, 2003, the RTC promulgated its Decision affirming the decision of the MeTC of Manila, 8 and on April 8, 2003, the RTC also issued an
Order authorizing the sheriff "to employ the necessary force to enable him to enter the subject premises and place the plaintiffs-appellees in actual
possession thereof."9
Meanwhile, on April 4, 2003, Spouses Fernandez filed before the CA a petition for review with prayer for a temporary restraining order seeking to
stay the immediate execution pending appeal. 10 In a Resolution dated April 15, 2003, the CA granted the prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order.

On June 27, 2003, the CA rendered its Decision affirming in toto the decision of the RTC and ordered Spouses Fernandez and all persons claiming
rights under them including petitioner to vacate the premises, ruling thus:
Verily, the only issue to be resolved in the present ejectment case is who between petitioners [Spouses Fernandez] and respondents has the better right
to possess the disputed premises. The issue as to who between Sofia Aniosa Salandanan and respondents is the real owner of subject premises could
be properly threshed out in a separate proceedings, which in this case is already pending resolution in another court.
Interestingly, nowhere in any pleadings of petitioners submitted below could We find any allegations to the effect that their possession of the disputed
premises sprung from their claim of ownership over the same nor, at the very least, that they are in possession of any document that would support
their entitlement to enjoy the disputed premises.
As between respondents' Torrens Title to the premises juxtaposed that of petitioners' barren claim of ownership and absence of any document
showing that they are entitled to possess the same, the choice is not difficult. Simply put, petitioners plainly have no basis to insist that they have a
better right to possess the premises over respondents who have a Torrens Title over the same. Hence, the MTC, as well as the RTC, correctly ordered
petitioners to vacate the premises since respondents have a better right to possess the same by virtue of the latter's Torrens Title. 111avvphi1
The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The assailed Decision, dated 06 March 2003, of Hon. Judge Lucia Pea
Purugganan of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Brach 50, affirming on appeal the Decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila (MTC for
brevity), Branch 15, is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. Accordingly, the Temporary Restraining Order is hereby LIFTED. As a legal consequence,
petitioners and all persons claiming rights under them, including Sofia Aniosa Salandanan, are hereby ORDERED to vacate the premises
immediately upon receipt hereof. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.12 (Emphasis supplied)
On July 29, 2003, Spouses Fernandez filed their motion for reconsideration. 13
On even date, Sofia Salandanan (petitioner) filed a Motion for Clarification and Intervention 14 and attached a Motion for Reconsideration.15 In her
motion for clarification and intervention, she alleged that she and her deceased spouse are the real owners of the subject property; that she was not a
party to the case for ejectment and did not receive any notice therefrom; and that by virtue of the said decision, she was about to be evicted from her
property without having participated in the entire process of the ejectment proceeding.
Petitioner further claims that sometime in 1999, respondents went to their house and showed certain papers purportedly copies of a special power of
attorney but which turned out to be a deed of donation involving the subject property; that by virtue of the said donation, respondents were able to
register the subject properties in their name and were issued Transfer Certificate of Title No. 246767; that on July 31, 2001, Spouses Salandanan with
the assistance of Delfin, filed a civil case before the RTC of Manila for Revocation/Annulment of the said title and Reconveyance; and that
consequently, petitioner was forced to intervene in order to protect her interests over the subject property. Petitioner prayed for (1) clarification of the
CAs decision asking whether the said decision applies to her as a relative of Spouses Fernandez claiming right under them or as possessor of the
subject property in her right as owner of the subject property; (2) that she be allowed to intervene in the appeal; and (3) that the attached motion for
reconsideration be admitted.
In a Resolution dated September 3, 2003, the CA denied the motion for reconsideration filed by Spouses Fernandez and petitioners motion for
clarification and intervention, for lack of merit, 16 thus:
We have carefully perused petitioners Motion and find the arguments raised therein a mere rehash, if not a repetition, of the arguments raised in their
petition, which have already been thoroughly discussed and passed upon in our Decision.
Anent the movant Sofia Salandanans Motion for Clarification and Intervention, We hereby deny the same on the ground that it is belatedly filed by
virtue of the rendition of Our Decision on June 27, 2003.
Section 2, Rule 19 of 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure expressly provides:
Section 2. Time to Intervene. The motion to intervene may be filed at any time before rendition of judgment by the trial court. x x x

Moreover, it is undisputed that on 31 July 2001, movant Sofia Salandanan represented by petitioner has already instituted a Civil Case for
Revocation/ Annulment of T.C.T. 246767 and Reconveyance before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 50 and docketed as Civil Case No.
01101487. As such We find movants motion to be wanting of merit as her rights are already fully protected in said separate proceeding.
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for Clarification and Intervention are hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.17
Hence, herein petition anchored on the following assignment of errors:
1. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION
WHEN IT INCLUDED PETITIONER IN ITS ADVERSE JUDGMENT IN VIOLATION OF THE LATTERS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO
DUE PROCESS DESPITE THE FACT THAT PETITIONER WAS NOT PRIVY TO THE INSTANT CASE AND DOES NOT DERIVE HER
RIGHT TO STAY IN THE CONTESTED PROPERTY FROM THE SPOUSES DELFIN AND CARMEN FERNANDEZ.
2. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION
WHEN IT DENIED THE MOTION FOR INTERVENTION BY PETITIONER DESPITE THE FACT IT WAS ONLY BY VIRTUE OF ITS
DECISION DATED JUNE 27, 2003 THAT PETITIONER WAS INCLUDED IN THE EJECTMENT PROCEEDINGS, AND THE EARLIEST
OPPURTUNE TIME WHEN PETITIONER COULD HAVE INTERVENED WAS AFTER THE COURT OF APPEALS RULED AGAINST HER.
3. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION
WHEN IT DID NOT TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE ISSUE OF OWNERSHIP IN RESOLVING THE ISSUE OF WHO HAS BETTER
POSSESSION.
4. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION
WHEN IT DID NOT SUSPEND THE CASE DESPITE THE EQUITABLE CIRCUMSTANCES PRESENT IN THE CASE AT BAR IN THE
LIGHT OF THE AMAGAN VS. MARAMAG CASE.18
Petitioner contends that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it included petitioner in its decision despite the fact that she is not a party
in the ejectment case, thus, violating her right to due process; and considering that the court did not acquire jurisdiction over her person, she cannot
be bound by the Decision of the CA.
Petitioner also asserts that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it denied petitioners motion
for clarification and intervention. According to her, she was constrained to file a motion for clarification and intervention because the CA included
her in its decision in spite of the fact that she was not impleaded as a party to the unlawful detainer case.
Petitioner ascribes grave abuse of discretion when the CA failed to resolve the issue of ownership in order to determine the party who has the better
right to possess the subject property. She asserts that the CA should have suspended the unlawful detainer case since the ownership of the subject
property is in issue.
Finally, petitioner maintains that she is the owner of the property by virtue of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 9937 issued on October 2, 1947 by the
Register of Deeds of Manila. Hence, as the owner of the subject property, she has all the right to use, the right to allow others to use and the right to
exclude others from using the same. Petitioner further claims that respondents were able to transfer the title of the subject property in their name
through manipulation wherein respondents asked her and her deceased husband to sign a special power of attorney but later turned out to be a deed of
donation. As a matter of fact, upon learning of the said transfer, petitioner filed before the RTC of Manila a case for annulment and/or revocation of
the title.
We find the petition unmeritorious.
Let us first tackle the issue of whether petitioner should have been allowed to intervene even after the CA had promulgated its Decision.
Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 19 of the Rules of Court provide:
Section 1. Who may intervene. A person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest
against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer
thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the action. The court shall consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay

or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties, and whether or not the intervenors rights may be fully protected in a
separate proceeding.
Section 2. Time to intervene. The motion to intervene may be filed at any time before rendition of judgment by the trial court. A copy of the
pleading-in-intervention shall be attached to the motion and served on the original parties.
As a rule, intervention is allowed at any time before rendition of judgment by the trial court. After the lapse of this period, it will not be warranted
anymore because intervention is not an independent action but is ancillary and supplemental to an existing litigation. 19 The permissive tenor of the
provision on intervention shows the intention of the Rules to give to the court the full measure of discretion in permitting or disallowing the
same,20 but under Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court, the courts are nevertheless mandated to consider several factors in determining whether
or not to allow intervention. The factors that should be reckoned are whether intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the
rights of the original parties and whether the intervenors rights may be fully protected in a separate proceeding.
Keeping these factors in mind, the courts have to give much consideration to the fact that actions for ejectment are designed to summarily restore
physical possession to one who has been illegally deprived of such possession. 21 It is primarily a quieting process intended to provide an expeditious
manner for protecting possession or right to possession without involvement of the title. 22 In Five Star Marketing Co., Inc. v. Booc,23 the Court
elucidated the purpose of actions for ejectment in this wise:
Forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases are summary proceedings designed to provide for an expeditious means of protecting actual possession or
the right to the possession of the property involved. It does not admit of a delay in the determination thereof. It is a "time procedure" designed to
remedy the situation. Stated in another way, the avowed objective of actions for forcible entry and unlawful detainer, which have purposely
been made summary in nature, is to provide a peaceful, speedy and expeditious means of preventing an alleged illegal possessor of property
from unjustly continuing his possession for a long time, thereby ensuring the maintenance of peace and order in the community; otherwise,
the party illegally deprived of possession might feel the despair of long waiting and decide as a measure of self-protection to take the law into his
hands and seize the same by force and violence. And since the law discourages continued wrangling over possession of property for it involves
perturbation of social order which must be restored as promptly as possible, technicalities or details of procedure which may cause unnecessary
delays should accordingly and carefully be avoided.24 (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, as stated above, ejectment cases must be resolved with great dispatch.
Moreover, petitioner's intervention in the ejectment case would not result in a complete adjudication of her rights. The issue raised by petitioner is
mainly that of ownership, claiming that the property in dispute was registered and titled in the name of respondents through the use of fraud. Such
issue cannot even be properly threshed out in an action for ejectment, as Section 18, Rule 70 provides that "[t]he judgment rendered in an action for
forcible entry or detainer shall be conclusive with respect to the possession only and shall in no wise bind the title or affect the ownership of the land
or building. x x x" In Malison v. Court of Appeals,25 the Court held thus:
Verily, in ejectment cases, the word "possession" means nothing more than actual physical possession, not legal possession, in the sense contemplated
in civil law. The only issue in such cases is who is entitled to the physical or material possession of the property involved, independently of any claim
of ownership set forth by any of the party-litigants. It does not even matter if the party's title to the property is questionable.26 (Emphasis
supplied)
Hence, a just and complete determination of petitioner's rights could actually be had in the action for annulment, revocation and reconveyance of title
that she had previously filed, not in the instant action for ejectment.
It is likewise for this reason that petitioner is not an indispensable party in the instant case. The records bear out that the disputed property is in the
possession of Spouses Fernandez. Even petitioner does not allege that she was in the possession of subject premises prior to or during the
commencement of the ejectment proceedings. Since her claim of ownership cannot be properly adjudicated in said action, she is, therefore, not an
indispensable party therein.
It is also misleading for petitioner to say that the earliest opportune time when petitioner could have intervened was after the CA ordered her to
vacate the subject property in its Decision dated June 27, 2003. As early as when the sheriff attempted to implement the writ of execution pending
appeal issued by the RTC, when she pleaded not to be evicted from the subject premises, she already became aware that the RTC had ordered to place
respondents in possession of the subject property pending appeal with the RTC. That would have been the proper time for her to intervene if she truly
believed that her interests would be best protected by being a party to the ejectment case.
Verily, allowing petitioner's intervention at this late stage of the ejectment proceedings would only cause undue delay without affording petitioner the
relief sought since the issue of ownership cannot be determined with finality in the unlawful detainer case.

There is also no merit to petitioner's argument that it was grave abuse of discretion for the CA to include her in its Decision because she is not a party
to the ejectment case, and neither is she claiming right to possession under the Spouses Fernandez, but as its alleged rightful owner.
Note that the MeTC, RTC, and the CA unanimously found that the disputed property is presently registered under the Torrens System in the name of
respondents. The lower courts then concluded that respondents presented the best proof to establish the right to possess the same. It should be borne
in mind that unless the case falls under one of the recognized exceptions, to wit:
(1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact
are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions
of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of
specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not
disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on
record; and (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered,
would justify a different conclusion.27
factual findings of the trial court are conclusive on the parties and not reviewable by this Court, more so when the CA affirms the factual findings of
the trial court.28 This case does not fall under any of the exceptions, thus, the factual finding of the lower courts, that the new registered owners of the
subject premises are respondents, must be respected and upheld by this Court.
In Malison, the Court emphasized that when property is registered under the Torrens system, the registered owner's title to the property is presumed
legal and cannot be collaterally attacked, especially in a mere action for unlawful detainer. 29 In this particular action where petitioner's alleged
ownership cannot be established, coupled with the presumption that respondents' title to the property is legal, then the lower courts are correct in
ruling that respondents are the ones entitled to possession of the subject premises.
Petitioner's ownership not having been fully established in this case, she cannot, therefore, claim that the lower court's decision divesting the Spouses
Fernandez of possession should not apply to her. In Stilgrove v. Sabas,30the Court held that:
A judgment directing a party to deliver possession of a property to another is in personam. x x x Any judgment therein is binding only upon the
parties properly impleaded and duly heard or given an opportunity to be heard. However, this rule admits of the exception, such that even a nonparty may be bound by the judgment in an ejectment suit where he is any of the following: (a) trespasser, squatter or agent of the defendant
fraudulently occupying the property to frustrate the judgment; (b) guest or occupant of the premises with the permission of the defendant; (c)
transferee pendente lite; (d) sublessee; (e) co-lessee; or (f) member of the family, relative or privy of the defendant.31 (Emphasis supplied)
Of particular significance is the fact that in Spouses Fernandez's Answer, they never alleged that petitioner was in actual possession of the disputed
property. In fact, in said Answer, they stated that it was Delfin Fernandez, Jr. who has continuously occupied the premises since time immemorial and
that petitioner resides in her house in Dasmarias, Cavite. Likewise worthy of note is the fact that the Spouses Fernandez never refuted in their
Opposition to Amended Motion to Break Open the allegation of respondents that petitioner was merely fetched by the Spouses Fernandez from her
residence in Dasmarias, Cavite on the day (February 20, 2003) that the sheriff was to implement the writ of execution, and placed her inside the
subject premises so the old woman could plead for mercy from the executing sheriff. In the petition for review dated April 3, 2003 filed with the CA,
Spouses Fernandez admitted that it was only after the RTC issued its Order dated February 10, 2003, denying the motion for reconsideration of the
Order for issuance of the writ of execution, that petitioner took possession of the subject premises. 32
Taking the foregoing into account, it is clear that petitioner, even though a non-party, is bound by the judgment because aside from being a relative of
or privy to Spouses Fernandez, she is also acting as their agent when she occupied the property after the RTC ordered execution pending appeal in
order to frustrate the judgment.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 27, 2003 affirming the
decision of the Regional Trial Court and its Resolution dated September 3, 2003 in CA-G.R. SP No. 76336, denying the petition for clarification and
intervention filed by Sofia Aniosa Salandanan, are AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. 172595

April 10, 2008

BIENVENIDO EJERCITO and JOSE MARTINEZ, petitioners,

vs.
M.R. VARGAS CONSTRUCTION, BRION, MARCIAL R. VARGAS, Sole Owner, RENATO AGARAO**,respondents.
DECISION

TINGA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, assailing the Court of Appeals' Decision 1 and
Resolution2 in CA-G.R. SP No. 89001. The appellate court's decision dismissed the petition for certiorari, which sought to set aside the Order 3 dated
08 November 2004 issued by Hon. Marie Christine Jacob, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 100. The
appellate court's resolution denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the decision.
As culled from the records, the following factual antecedents appear:
On 5 March 2004, the City Government of Quezon City, represented by Mayor Feliciano Belmonte, Jr., entered into a construction contract 4 with
M.R. Vargas Construction, represented by Marcial Vargas in his capacity as general manager of the said business enterprise, for the improvement and
concreting of Panay Avenue.5Pursuant to the contract, the business enterprise commenced its clearing operations by removing the structures and
uprooting the trees along the thoroughfare. Its foreman, Renato Agarao, supervised the clearing operations. 6
Claiming that the clearing operations lacked the necessary permit and prior consultation, petitioners Bienvenido Ejercito and Jose Martinez, as well
as a certain Oscar Baria, brought the matter to the attention of the barangay authorities, Mayor Belmonte, Senator Ma. Ana Consuelo A.S. Madrigal,
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources and the Philippine Coconut Authority.7
The efforts of petitioners proved unsuccessful. Hence, on 10 September 2004, they filed a petition for injunction before the Quezon City RTC. The
petition named "M.R. Vargas Construction Co., represented by herein Marcial R. Vargas and Renato Agarao," as respondent. 8
The Petition,9 docketed as Civil Case No. Q-04-53687, indicated that "Respondent M.R. Vargas Construction, is an entity, with office address at the
4th Floor, President Tower, Timog Avenue corner Scout Ybardaloza [sic] St., Quezon City, represented herein by its President Marcial Vargas and its
construction foreman Renato Agarao, where they may be served with summons and other court processes." 10
The petition was accompanied with an application for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and a writ of preliminary injunction. 11 Thus, the Office of
the Clerk of Court forthwith issued summons and notice of raffle on 10 September 2004. 12 Upon service of the processes on the aforementioned
address, they were returned unserved on the ground that respondent enterprise was unknown thereat. 13
The petition was subsequently raffled to the sala of Judge Jacob, before which petitioners' application for a temporary restraining order was heard on
15 September 2004.14 On the same day, when Agarao was also present in court, Judge Jacob issued a TRO directing respondent enterprise to desist
from cutting, damaging or transferring the trees found along Panay Avenue. 15
On 23 September 2004, the Mangoba Tan Agus Law Offices filed a special appearance on behalf of respondent enterprise and moved for the
dismissal of the petition as well as the quashal of the temporary restraining order on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over respondent enterprise. The
motion also assailed the raffle of the case for having been conducted in violation of Section 4, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court; the issuance of the TRO
without requiring the posting of a bond; the failure to implead the Government of Quezon City despite its being the real party-in-interest; and
petitioners' application for the injunctive writ which was allegedly grossly defective in form and substance. 16
The motion to dismiss the petition and to quash the TRO was heard on 24 September 2004. 17 Before the hearing, a court interpreter showed to
respondent enterprise's counsel a copy of the summons and of the notice of raffle in which appear a signature at the bottom of each copy, apparently
indicating the receipt of the summons.18 On the mistaken belief that the summons was received by respondent enterprise, at the hearing of the motion,
its counsel withdrew two of the grounds stated in the motion, to wit, lack of jurisdiction and irregularity in the raffle of the case. 19
At the hearing of petitioners' application for a writ of preliminary injunction on 1 October 2004, the counsel for respondent enterprise manifested that
he was adopting the arguments in the motion to quash the TRO. 20 On 6 October 2004, the RTC issued an Order granting petitioners' application for a
writ of preliminary injunction.21
On 7 October 2004, counsel for respondent enterprise filed a manifestation with urgent omnibus motion to nullify the proceedings and to cite
petitioners and the process server in contempt of court. 22 He argued that respondent enterprise failed to receive the summons, alleging that it was
herein petitioner Jose Martinez who signed as recipient thereof as well as of the notice of raffle that was served on 10 September 2004. 23
On 18 October 2004, the writ of preliminary injunction was issued. Subsequently, petitioners filed a motion for ocular inspection and another motion
praying that respondent enterprise be ordered to
restore the structures damaged by its clearing operations. 24

On 8 November 2004, the RTC issued the assailed Order,25 nullifying the proceedings thus far conducted in the case. 26 Petitioners sought
reconsideration, but the motion was denied in an Order dated 20 December 2004. 27
Thus, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals assailing the 8 November 2004 Order issued by Judge Jacob. 28 This time,
aside from Judge Jacob and the enterprise "M.R. Vargas Construction" itself, the petition also named Marcial R. Vargas and Renato Agarao, the
enterprise's owner and foreman, respectively, as individual respondents. The separate addresses of said respondents were also indicated in the initial
part of the petition.
It was argued in the petition that Judge Jacob committed grave abuse of direction in nullifying the proceedings on the ground of lack of jurisdiction in
view of Agarao's presence at the hearing on petitioners' application for TRO, in failing to act on petitioners' pending motions and in directing instead
the issuance of new summons on respondent enterprise.29
On 10 October 2005, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision dismissing the petition for certiorari for lack of merit. 30 In its Order dated
28 April 2006, the Court of Appeals denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
Hence, the instant petition attributes the following errors to the Court of Appeals:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT DID NOT OBTAIN JURISDICTION OVER
THE RESPONDENTS, DEPSITE THE RECEIPT OF COURT PROCESSES AND VOLUNTARY APPEARANCE BEFORE THE
COURTS.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE WITHDRAWAL BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS OF THE
GROUND OF ABSENCE OF JURISDICTION OVER ITS PERSON CONSTITUTED A WAIVER OF SUCH OBJECTION 31
The instant petitionwhich similarly impleads the enterprise, M.R. Vargas Construction, Marcial R. Vargas and Renato Agarao as respondentsraises
two issues, namely: (1) whether the trial court acquired jurisdiction over respondent enterprise and (2) whether the defense of lack of jurisdiction had
been waived.
Jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired either upon a valid service of summons or the defendant's voluntary appearance in court. When the
defendant does not voluntarily submit to the court's jurisdiction or when there is no valid service of summons, any judgment of the court, which has
no jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is null and void. In an action strictly in personam, personal service on the defendant is the preferred
mode of service, that is, by handing a copy of the summons to the defendant in person. 32
Citing the jurisdictional implications of the failure of service of summons, the Court of Appeals concluded that no grave abuse of discretion was
committed by Judge Jacob in nullifying the proceedings thus far conducted in the case based on the finding that the summons had not been served on
respondent enterprise and that Agarao, despite being present at the 15 September 2004 hearing, was not authorized to represent respondent enterprise
in said hearing.
Petitioners take exception. They argue that the trial court acquired jurisdiction over respondent enterprise, an entity without juridical personality,
through the appearance of its foreman, Agarao, at the 15 September 2004 hearing on the TRO application. Petitioners theorize that the voluntary
appearance of Agarao in said hearing was equivalent to service of summons binding upon respondent enterprise, following by analogy, Section 8,
Rule 1433which allows the service of summons on any of the defendants associated to an entity without juridical personality. Furthermore, they
contend that the receipt by a certain Rona Adol of the court processes was binding upon respondent enterprise because the latter did not deny the
authority of Adol to receive communications on its behalf.
Petitioners' argument is untenable.
At the outset, it is worthy to note that both the Court of Appeals and the trial court found that summons was not served on respondent enterprise. The
Officer's Return stated essentially that the server failed to serve the summons on respondent enterprise because it could not be found at the address
alleged in the petition. This factual finding, especially when affirmed by the appellate court, is conclusive upon this Court and should not be disturbed
because this Court is not a trier of facts.

A sole proprietorship does not possess a juridical personality separate and distinct from the personality of the owner of the enterprise. The law does
not vest a separate legal personality on the sole proprietorship or empower it to file or defend an action in court. 34 Only natural or juridical persons or
entities authorized by law may be parties to a civil action and every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real parties-ininterest.35
The records show that respondent enterprise, M.R. Vargas Construction Co., is a sole proprietorship and, therefore, an entity without juridical
personality. Clearly, the real party-in-interest is Marcial R. Vargas who is the owner of the enterprise. Thus, the petition for injunction should have
impleaded him as the party respondent either simply by mention of his name or by denominating him as doing business under the name and style of
"M.R. Vargas Construction Co." It was erroneous to refer to him, as the petition did in both its caption and body, as representing the enterprise.
Petitioners apparently realized this procedural lapse when in the petition for certiorari filed before the Court of Appeals and in the instant petition,
M.R. Vargas Construction, Marcial R. Vargas and Renato Agaro were separately named as individual respondents.
Since respondent enterprise is only a sole proprietorship, an entity without juridical personality, the suit for injunction may be instituted only against
its owner, Marcial Vargas. Accordingly summons should have been served on Vargas himself, following Rule 14, Sections 6 36 and 737 of the Rules of
Court on personal service and substituted service. In the instant case, no service of summons, whether personal or substituted, was effected on
Vargas. It is well-established that summons upon a respondent or a defendant must be served by handing a copy thereof to him in person or, if he
refuses to receive it, by tendering it to him. Personal service of summons most effectively ensures that the notice desired under the constitutional
requirement of due process is accomplished. If however efforts to find him personally would make prompt service impossible, service may be
completed by substituted service, i.e., by leaving copies of the summons at his dwelling house or residence with some person of suitable age and
discretion then residing therein or by leaving the copies at his office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof. 38
The modes of service of summons should be strictly followed in order that the court may acquire jurisdiction over the respondents, and failure to
strictly comply with the requirements of the rules regarding the order of its publication is a fatal defect in the service of summons. It cannot be
overemphasized that the statutory requirements on service of summons, whether personally, by substituted service or by publication, must be
followed strictly, faithfully and fully, and any mode of service other than that prescribed by the statute is considered ineffective. 39
Agarao was not a party respondent in the injunction case before the trial court. Certainly, he is not a real party-in-interest against whom the injunction
suit may be brought, absent any showing that he is also an owner or he acts as an agent of respondent enterprise. Agarao is only a foreman, bereft of
any authority to defend the suit on behalf of respondent enterprise. As earlier mentioned, the suit against an entity without juridical personality like
respondent enterprise may be instituted only by or against its owner. Impleading Agarao as a party-respondent in the suit for injunction would have
no legal consequence. In any event, the petition for injunction described Agarao only as a representative of M.R. Vargas Construction Co., which is a
mere inconsequentiality considering that only Vargas, as its sole owner, is authorized by the Rules of Court to defend the suit on behalf of the
enterprise.
Despite Agarao's not being a party-respondent, petitioners nevertheless confuse his presence or attendance at the hearing on the application for TRO
with the notion of voluntary appearance, which interpretation has a legal nuance as far as jurisdiction is concerned. While it is true that an appearance
in whatever form, without explicitly objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the person, is a submission to the jurisdiction of the court over the
person, the appearance must constitute a positive act on the part of the litigant manifesting an intention to submit to the court's jurisdiction. 40 Thus, in
the instances where the Court upheld the jurisdiction of the trial court over the person of the defendant, the parties showed the intention to participate
or be bound by the proceedings through the filing of a motion, a plea or an answer.41
Neither is the service of the notice of hearing on the application for a TRO on a certain Rona Adol binding on respondent enterprise. The records
show that Rona Adol received the notice of hearing on behalf of an entity named JCB. More importantly, for purposes of acquiring jurisdiction over
the person of the defendant, the Rules require the service of summons and not of any other court processes.
Petitioners also contend that respondent enterprise waived the defense of lack of jurisdiction when its counsel actively demanded positive action on
the omnibus motion. The argument is implausible.
It should be noted that when the defendant's appearance is made precisely to object to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, it cannot be
considered as appearance in court.42 Such was the purpose of the omnibus motion, as counsel for respondent enterprise precisely manifested therein
that he erroneously believed that Vargas himself had received the summons when in fact it was petitioner Martinez who signed as recipient of the
summons. Noteworthy is the fact that when the counsel first appeared in court his appearance was "special" in character and was only for the purpose
of questioning the court's jurisdiction over Vargas, considering that the latter never received the summons. However, the counsel was shown a copy of
the summons where a signature appears at the bottom which led him to believe that the summons was actually received by Vargas when in fact it was
petitioner Martinez himself who affixed his signature as recipient thereof. When the counsel discovered his mistake, he lost no time pleading that the
proceedings be nullified and that petitioners and the process server be cited for contempt of court. Both the trial and appellate courts concluded that
the improvident withdrawal of the defense of lack of jurisdiction was an innocuous error, proceeding on the undeniable fact that the summons was
not properly served on Vargas. Thus, the Court of Appeals did not commit a reversible error when it affirmed the trial court's nullification of the
proceedings for lack of jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 89001
are AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against petitioners.
The temporary restraining order issued in this case is DISSOLVED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 160280

March 13, 2009

SOFIA ANIOSA SALANDANAN, Petitioner,

vs.
SPOUSES MA. ISABEL and BAYANI MENDEZ, Respondents.*
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
This refers to the Petition for Review on Certiorari of the June 27, 2003 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) and its September 3, 2003
Resolution2 in CA-G.R. SP No. 76336 denying the petition for clarification and intervention filed by Sofia Aniosa Salandanan (petitioner) and
affirming in toto the March 6, 2003 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 30 in Civil Case No. 02-104406 which affirmed
the August 9, 2002 Decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila, Branch 15 in Civil Case No. 172530 ordering Delfin Fernandez 3 and
Carmen Fernandez (Spouses Fernandez) and all persons claiming rights under them to vacate and surrender possession of a house and lot located at
1881 Antipolo St., corner Vision St., Sta. Cruz, Manila (subject lot) to Spouses Bayani Mendez and Ma. Isabel S. Mendez (respondents) and to pay
the latter monthly rental of P5,000.00 from January 29, 2002 until they vacate the property and P15,000.00 as attorneys fees.
The case stemmed from a complaint for ejectment instituted by respondents against Spouses Fernandez before the MeTC on April 18, 2002.
In their Complaint,4 respondents alleged that they are the owners of the subject property as evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 246767 of
the Registry of Deeds of Manila; that they became the owners thereof by virtue of a deed of donation; that Spouses Fernandez and their families were
occupying the subject property for free through the generosity of respondent Isabels father; that a letter of demand to vacate the subject property was
sent to Spouses Fernandez but they refused to vacate the same; that respondents brought the matter to the Barangay Lupon for possible settlement but
the same failed.
In their Answer,5 Spouses Fernandez denied the allegations of the complaint and averred that Spouses Pablo and Sofia Salandanan (Spouses
Salandanan) are the registered owners of the subject property and the improvements therein; that respondent Isabel is not a daughter of Spouses
Salandanan; that Delfin Fernandez (Delfin) is the nearest of kin of Pablo Salandanan being the nephew of the latter; that Delfin has continuously
occupied the said property since time immemorial with the permission of Spouses Salandanan; that they did not receive any notice to vacate the
subject property either from respondents or their counsel.
Further, Spouses Fernandez claimed that respondents were able to transfer the subject property to their name through fraud; that sometime in
November 1999, respondents went to the house of Spouses Salandanan in Dasmarias, Cavite and asked the latter to sign a special power of attorney;
that the supposed special power of attorney was in fact a deed of donation wherein Spouses Salandanan was alleged to have donated in favor of
respondents the subject property; that said deed of donation was simulated and fictitious and that by virtue of the alleged deed of donation,
respondent Isabel was able to transfer the title of the subject property in her name; that in fact, the subject property is the subject of a separate case
filed on July 31, 2001 before the RTC of Manila docketed as Civil Case No. 01101487 6 for annulment, revocation and reconveyance of title. By way
of counterclaim, Spouses Fernandez prayed for moral damages and attorneys fees.
On August 9, 2002 the MeTC rendered its decision in favor of respondents and against Spouses Fernandez, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants, ordering the latter and all persons claiming rights
under them to peacefully vacate the premises and surrender possession thereof to the plaintiffs and for the defendants to pay plaintiffs: 1) P5,000.00 a
month beginning January 29, 2002 (when the demand letter was received by defendants by registered mail) until they finally vacate the premises and
2) the amount of P15,000.00 as and for attorneys fees.
The counterclaim of the defendants is dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.7

Dissatisfied, Spouses Fernandez appealed to the RTC. Respondents then filed a Motion for Execution Pending Appeal with the RTC. On December 9,
2002, the RTC issued an Order directing the issuance of a writ of execution to place respondents in possession of the disputed property on the ground
that Spouses Fernandez failed to periodically deposit the monthly rentals as they fell due. The Writ of Execution was issued on January 10, 2003. The
Spouses Fernandez moved for reconsideration of the Order for issuance of the writ of execution, but the same was denied.
Thus, on February 20, 2003, the sheriff went to the subject premises to implement the writ of execution but found the place padlocked. The sheriff
also found the petitioner, an old woman, all alone inside the house. Taking pity on the old woman, the sheriff was unable to implement the writ. On
the same day, respondents filed an Urgent Motion to Break Open, alleging that Spouses Fernandez fetched petitioner earlier that day from her
residence in Dasmarias, Cavite and purposely placed her inside the subject premises so the old woman could plead for mercy from the executing
sheriff.
On March 6, 2003, the RTC promulgated its Decision affirming the decision of the MeTC of Manila, 8 and on April 8, 2003, the RTC also issued an
Order authorizing the sheriff "to employ the necessary force to enable him to enter the subject premises and place the plaintiffs-appellees in actual
possession thereof."9
Meanwhile, on April 4, 2003, Spouses Fernandez filed before the CA a petition for review with prayer for a temporary restraining order seeking to
stay the immediate execution pending appeal. 10 In a Resolution dated April 15, 2003, the CA granted the prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order.
On June 27, 2003, the CA rendered its Decision affirming in toto the decision of the RTC and ordered Spouses Fernandez and all persons claiming
rights under them including petitioner to vacate the premises, ruling thus:
Verily, the only issue to be resolved in the present ejectment case is who between petitioners [Spouses Fernandez] and respondents has the better right
to possess the disputed premises. The issue as to who between Sofia Aniosa Salandanan and respondents is the real owner of subject premises could
be properly threshed out in a separate proceedings, which in this case is already pending resolution in another court.
Interestingly, nowhere in any pleadings of petitioners submitted below could We find any allegations to the effect that their possession of the disputed
premises sprung from their claim of ownership over the same nor, at the very least, that they are in possession of any document that would support
their entitlement to enjoy the disputed premises.
As between respondents' Torrens Title to the premises juxtaposed that of petitioners' barren claim of ownership and absence of any document
showing that they are entitled to possess the same, the choice is not difficult. Simply put, petitioners plainly have no basis to insist that they have a
better right to possess the premises over respondents who have a Torrens Title over the same. Hence, the MTC, as well as the RTC, correctly ordered
petitioners to vacate the premises since respondents have a better right to possess the same by virtue of the latter's Torrens Title. 111avvphi1
The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The assailed Decision, dated 06 March 2003, of Hon. Judge Lucia Pea
Purugganan of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Brach 50, affirming on appeal the Decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila (MTC for
brevity), Branch 15, is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. Accordingly, the Temporary Restraining Order is hereby LIFTED. As a legal consequence,
petitioners and all persons claiming rights under them, including Sofia Aniosa Salandanan, are hereby ORDERED to vacate the premises
immediately upon receipt hereof. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.12 (Emphasis supplied)
On July 29, 2003, Spouses Fernandez filed their motion for reconsideration. 13
On even date, Sofia Salandanan (petitioner) filed a Motion for Clarification and Intervention 14 and attached a Motion for Reconsideration.15 In her
motion for clarification and intervention, she alleged that she and her deceased spouse are the real owners of the subject property; that she was not a
party to the case for ejectment and did not receive any notice therefrom; and that by virtue of the said decision, she was about to be evicted from her
property without having participated in the entire process of the ejectment proceeding.
Petitioner further claims that sometime in 1999, respondents went to their house and showed certain papers purportedly copies of a special power of
attorney but which turned out to be a deed of donation involving the subject property; that by virtue of the said donation, respondents were able to
register the subject properties in their name and were issued Transfer Certificate of Title No. 246767; that on July 31, 2001, Spouses Salandanan with
the assistance of Delfin, filed a civil case before the RTC of Manila for Revocation/Annulment of the said title and Reconveyance; and that
consequently, petitioner was forced to intervene in order to protect her interests over the subject property. Petitioner prayed for (1) clarification of the
CAs decision asking whether the said decision applies to her as a relative of Spouses Fernandez claiming right under them or as possessor of the

subject property in her right as owner of the subject property; (2) that she be allowed to intervene in the appeal; and (3) that the attached motion for
reconsideration be admitted.
In a Resolution dated September 3, 2003, the CA denied the motion for reconsideration filed by Spouses Fernandez and petitioners motion for
clarification and intervention, for lack of merit, 16 thus:
We have carefully perused petitioners Motion and find the arguments raised therein a mere rehash, if not a repetition, of the arguments raised in their
petition, which have already been thoroughly discussed and passed upon in our Decision.
Anent the movant Sofia Salandanans Motion for Clarification and Intervention, We hereby deny the same on the ground that it is belatedly filed by
virtue of the rendition of Our Decision on June 27, 2003.
Section 2, Rule 19 of 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure expressly provides:
Section 2. Time to Intervene. The motion to intervene may be filed at any time before rendition of judgment by the trial court. x x x
Moreover, it is undisputed that on 31 July 2001, movant Sofia Salandanan represented by petitioner has already instituted a Civil Case for
Revocation/ Annulment of T.C.T. 246767 and Reconveyance before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 50 and docketed as Civil Case No.
01101487. As such We find movants motion to be wanting of merit as her rights are already fully protected in said separate proceeding.
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for Clarification and Intervention are hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.17
Hence, herein petition anchored on the following assignment of errors:
1. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION
WHEN IT INCLUDED PETITIONER IN ITS ADVERSE JUDGMENT IN VIOLATION OF THE LATTERS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO
DUE PROCESS DESPITE THE FACT THAT PETITIONER WAS NOT PRIVY TO THE INSTANT CASE AND DOES NOT DERIVE HER
RIGHT TO STAY IN THE CONTESTED PROPERTY FROM THE SPOUSES DELFIN AND CARMEN FERNANDEZ.
2. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION
WHEN IT DENIED THE MOTION FOR INTERVENTION BY PETITIONER DESPITE THE FACT IT WAS ONLY BY VIRTUE OF ITS
DECISION DATED JUNE 27, 2003 THAT PETITIONER WAS INCLUDED IN THE EJECTMENT PROCEEDINGS, AND THE EARLIEST
OPPURTUNE TIME WHEN PETITIONER COULD HAVE INTERVENED WAS AFTER THE COURT OF APPEALS RULED AGAINST HER.
3. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION
WHEN IT DID NOT TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE ISSUE OF OWNERSHIP IN RESOLVING THE ISSUE OF WHO HAS BETTER
POSSESSION.
4. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION
WHEN IT DID NOT SUSPEND THE CASE DESPITE THE EQUITABLE CIRCUMSTANCES PRESENT IN THE CASE AT BAR IN THE
LIGHT OF THE AMAGAN VS. MARAMAG CASE.18
Petitioner contends that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it included petitioner in its decision despite the fact that she is not a party
in the ejectment case, thus, violating her right to due process; and considering that the court did not acquire jurisdiction over her person, she cannot
be bound by the Decision of the CA.
Petitioner also asserts that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it denied petitioners motion
for clarification and intervention. According to her, she was constrained to file a motion for clarification and intervention because the CA included
her in its decision in spite of the fact that she was not impleaded as a party to the unlawful detainer case.
Petitioner ascribes grave abuse of discretion when the CA failed to resolve the issue of ownership in order to determine the party who has the better
right to possess the subject property. She asserts that the CA should have suspended the unlawful detainer case since the ownership of the subject
property is in issue.

Finally, petitioner maintains that she is the owner of the property by virtue of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 9937 issued on October 2, 1947 by the
Register of Deeds of Manila. Hence, as the owner of the subject property, she has all the right to use, the right to allow others to use and the right to
exclude others from using the same. Petitioner further claims that respondents were able to transfer the title of the subject property in their name
through manipulation wherein respondents asked her and her deceased husband to sign a special power of attorney but later turned out to be a deed of
donation. As a matter of fact, upon learning of the said transfer, petitioner filed before the RTC of Manila a case for annulment and/or revocation of
the title.
We find the petition unmeritorious.
Let us first tackle the issue of whether petitioner should have been allowed to intervene even after the CA had promulgated its Decision.
Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 19 of the Rules of Court provide:
Section 1. Who may intervene. A person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest
against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer
thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the action. The court shall consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay
or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties, and whether or not the intervenors rights may be fully protected in a
separate proceeding.
Section 2. Time to intervene. The motion to intervene may be filed at any time before rendition of judgment by the trial court. A copy of the
pleading-in-intervention shall be attached to the motion and served on the original parties.
As a rule, intervention is allowed at any time before rendition of judgment by the trial court. After the lapse of this period, it will not be warranted
anymore because intervention is not an independent action but is ancillary and supplemental to an existing litigation. 19 The permissive tenor of the
provision on intervention shows the intention of the Rules to give to the court the full measure of discretion in permitting or disallowing the
same,20 but under Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court, the courts are nevertheless mandated to consider several factors in determining whether
or not to allow intervention. The factors that should be reckoned are whether intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the
rights of the original parties and whether the intervenors rights may be fully protected in a separate proceeding.
Keeping these factors in mind, the courts have to give much consideration to the fact that actions for ejectment are designed to summarily restore
physical possession to one who has been illegally deprived of such possession. 21 It is primarily a quieting process intended to provide an expeditious
manner for protecting possession or right to possession without involvement of the title. 22 In Five Star Marketing Co., Inc. v. Booc,23 the Court
elucidated the purpose of actions for ejectment in this wise:
Forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases are summary proceedings designed to provide for an expeditious means of protecting actual possession or
the right to the possession of the property involved. It does not admit of a delay in the determination thereof. It is a "time procedure" designed to
remedy the situation. Stated in another way, the avowed objective of actions for forcible entry and unlawful detainer, which have purposely
been made summary in nature, is to provide a peaceful, speedy and expeditious means of preventing an alleged illegal possessor of property
from unjustly continuing his possession for a long time, thereby ensuring the maintenance of peace and order in the community; otherwise,
the party illegally deprived of possession might feel the despair of long waiting and decide as a measure of self-protection to take the law into his
hands and seize the same by force and violence. And since the law discourages continued wrangling over possession of property for it involves
perturbation of social order which must be restored as promptly as possible, technicalities or details of procedure which may cause unnecessary
delays should accordingly and carefully be avoided.24 (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, as stated above, ejectment cases must be resolved with great dispatch.
Moreover, petitioner's intervention in the ejectment case would not result in a complete adjudication of her rights. The issue raised by petitioner is
mainly that of ownership, claiming that the property in dispute was registered and titled in the name of respondents through the use of fraud. Such
issue cannot even be properly threshed out in an action for ejectment, as Section 18, Rule 70 provides that "[t]he judgment rendered in an action for
forcible entry or detainer shall be conclusive with respect to the possession only and shall in no wise bind the title or affect the ownership of the land
or building. x x x" In Malison v. Court of Appeals,25 the Court held thus:
Verily, in ejectment cases, the word "possession" means nothing more than actual physical possession, not legal possession, in the sense contemplated
in civil law. The only issue in such cases is who is entitled to the physical or material possession of the property involved, independently of any claim
of ownership set forth by any of the party-litigants. It does not even matter if the party's title to the property is questionable.26 (Emphasis
supplied)

Hence, a just and complete determination of petitioner's rights could actually be had in the action for annulment, revocation and reconveyance of title
that she had previously filed, not in the instant action for ejectment.
It is likewise for this reason that petitioner is not an indispensable party in the instant case. The records bear out that the disputed property is in the
possession of Spouses Fernandez. Even petitioner does not allege that she was in the possession of subject premises prior to or during the
commencement of the ejectment proceedings. Since her claim of ownership cannot be properly adjudicated in said action, she is, therefore, not an
indispensable party therein.
It is also misleading for petitioner to say that the earliest opportune time when petitioner could have intervened was after the CA ordered her to
vacate the subject property in its Decision dated June 27, 2003. As early as when the sheriff attempted to implement the writ of execution pending
appeal issued by the RTC, when she pleaded not to be evicted from the subject premises, she already became aware that the RTC had ordered to place
respondents in possession of the subject property pending appeal with the RTC. That would have been the proper time for her to intervene if she truly
believed that her interests would be best protected by being a party to the ejectment case.
Verily, allowing petitioner's intervention at this late stage of the ejectment proceedings would only cause undue delay without affording petitioner the
relief sought since the issue of ownership cannot be determined with finality in the unlawful detainer case.
There is also no merit to petitioner's argument that it was grave abuse of discretion for the CA to include her in its Decision because she is not a party
to the ejectment case, and neither is she claiming right to possession under the Spouses Fernandez, but as its alleged rightful owner.
Note that the MeTC, RTC, and the CA unanimously found that the disputed property is presently registered under the Torrens System in the name of
respondents. The lower courts then concluded that respondents presented the best proof to establish the right to possess the same. It should be borne
in mind that unless the case falls under one of the recognized exceptions, to wit:
(1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact
are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions
of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of
specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not
disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on
record; and (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered,
would justify a different conclusion.27
factual findings of the trial court are conclusive on the parties and not reviewable by this Court, more so when the CA affirms the factual findings of
the trial court.28 This case does not fall under any of the exceptions, thus, the factual finding of the lower courts, that the new registered owners of the
subject premises are respondents, must be respected and upheld by this Court.
In Malison, the Court emphasized that when property is registered under the Torrens system, the registered owner's title to the property is presumed
legal and cannot be collaterally attacked, especially in a mere action for unlawful detainer. 29 In this particular action where petitioner's alleged
ownership cannot be established, coupled with the presumption that respondents' title to the property is legal, then the lower courts are correct in
ruling that respondents are the ones entitled to possession of the subject premises.
Petitioner's ownership not having been fully established in this case, she cannot, therefore, claim that the lower court's decision divesting the Spouses
Fernandez of possession should not apply to her. In Stilgrove v. Sabas,30the Court held that:
A judgment directing a party to deliver possession of a property to another is in personam. x x x Any judgment therein is binding only upon the
parties properly impleaded and duly heard or given an opportunity to be heard. However, this rule admits of the exception, such that even a nonparty may be bound by the judgment in an ejectment suit where he is any of the following: (a) trespasser, squatter or agent of the defendant
fraudulently occupying the property to frustrate the judgment; (b) guest or occupant of the premises with the permission of the defendant; (c)
transferee pendente lite; (d) sublessee; (e) co-lessee; or (f) member of the family, relative or privy of the defendant.31 (Emphasis supplied)
Of particular significance is the fact that in Spouses Fernandez's Answer, they never alleged that petitioner was in actual possession of the disputed
property. In fact, in said Answer, they stated that it was Delfin Fernandez, Jr. who has continuously occupied the premises since time immemorial and
that petitioner resides in her house in Dasmarias, Cavite. Likewise worthy of note is the fact that the Spouses Fernandez never refuted in their
Opposition to Amended Motion to Break Open the allegation of respondents that petitioner was merely fetched by the Spouses Fernandez from her
residence in Dasmarias, Cavite on the day (February 20, 2003) that the sheriff was to implement the writ of execution, and placed her inside the
subject premises so the old woman could plead for mercy from the executing sheriff. In the petition for review dated April 3, 2003 filed with the CA,

Spouses Fernandez admitted that it was only after the RTC issued its Order dated February 10, 2003, denying the motion for reconsideration of the
Order for issuance of the writ of execution, that petitioner took possession of the subject premises. 32
Taking the foregoing into account, it is clear that petitioner, even though a non-party, is bound by the judgment because aside from being a relative of
or privy to Spouses Fernandez, she is also acting as their agent when she occupied the property after the RTC ordered execution pending appeal in
order to frustrate the judgment.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 27, 2003 affirming the
decision of the Regional Trial Court and its Resolution dated September 3, 2003 in CA-G.R. SP No. 76336, denying the petition for clarification and
intervention filed by Sofia Aniosa Salandanan, are AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. 124320 March 2, 1999
HEIRS OF GUIDO YAPTINCHAY AND ISABEL YAPTINCHAY, NAMELY: vs. HON. ROY S. DEL ROSARIO, PRESIDING JUDGE,
RTC, BRANCH 21, IMUS, CAVITE;
PURISIMA, J.:
At bar is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court assailing the Orders dated October 25, 1995 and February 23, 1996,
respectively, of Branch 21 of the Regional Trial Court in Imus, Cavite ("RTC").
The facts that matter are, as follows:
Petitioners claim that they are the legal heirs of the late Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay, the owners-claimants of Lot No. 1131 with an area of 520,638
and Lot No. 1132 with an area of 96,235 square meters, more or less situated in Bancal, Carmona, Cavite.
On March 17, 1994, petitioners executed an Extra-Judicial Settlement of the estate of the deceased Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay.
On August 26, 1994, petitioners discovered that a portion, if not all, of the aforesaid properties were titled in the name of respondent Golden Bay
Realty and Development Corporation ("Golden Bay") under Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. ("TCT") 225254 and 225255. With the discovery of
what happened to subject parcels of land, petitioners filed a complaint for ANNULMENT and/or DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF TCT NO.
493363, 493364, 493665, 493366, 493367; and its Derivatives; As Alternative Reconveyance of Realty WITH A PRAYER FOR A WRIT OF
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION and/or RESTRAINING ORDER WITH DAMAGES, docketed as RTC BCV-94-127 before Branch 21 of the
Regional Trial Court in Imus, Cavite.
Upon learning that "Golden Bay" sold portions of the parcels of land in question, petitioners filed with the "RTC" an Amended Complaint to implead
new and additional defendants and to mention the TCTs to be annulled. But the respondent court dismissed the Amended Complaint.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration of the Order dismissing the Amended Complaint. The motion was granted by the RTC in an Order 1 dated July
7, 1995, which further allowed the herein petitioners to file a Second Amended Complaint, 2 which they promptly did.
On August 12, 1995, the private respondents presented a Motion to Dismiss 3 on the grounds that the complaint failed to state a cause of action, that
plaintiffs did not have a right of action, that they have not established their status as heirs, that the land being claimed is different from that of the
defendants, and that plaintiffs' claim was barred by laches. The said Motion to Dismiss was granted by the respondent court in its Order 4 dated
October 25, 1995, holding that petitioners "have not shown any proof or even a semblance of it except the allegations that they are the legal heirs
of the above-named Yaptinchays that they have been declared the legal heirs of the deceased couple."
Petitioners interposed a Motion for Reconsideration 5 but to no avail. The same was denied by the RTC in its Order 6of February 23, 1996.
Undaunted, petitioners have come before this Court to seek relief from respondent court's Orders under attack.
Petitioners contend that the respondent court acted with grave abuse of discretion in ruling that the issue of heirship should first be determined before
trial of the case could proceed. It is petitioners' submission that the respondent court should have proceeded with the trial and simultaneously
resolved the issue of heirship in the same case.
The petition is not impressed with merit.

To begin with, petitioners' Petition for Certiorari before this Court is an improper recourse. Their proper remedy should have been an appeal. An
order of dismissal, be it right or wrong, is a final order, which is subject to appeal and not a proper subject of certiorari. 7 Where appeal is available
as a remedy certiorari will not lie. 8
Neither did the respondent court commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the questioned Order dismissing the Second Amended Complaint of
petitioners, as it aptly ratiocinated and ruled:
But the plaintiffs who claimed to be the legal heirs of the said Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay have not shown any proof or even a
semblance of it except the allegations that they are the legal heirs of the aforementioned Yaptinchays that they have been
declared the legal heirs of the deceased couple. Now, the determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased couple must be
made in the proper special proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for reconveyance of property. This must take
precedence over the action for reconveyance (Elena c. Monzon, et al., v. Angelita Taligato, CA-G-R- No. 33355, August 12,
1992).
In Litam, etc., et. al. v. Rivera 9 this court opined that the declaration of heirship must be made in an administration proceeding, and not in an
independent civil action. This doctrine was reiterated in Solivio v. Court of Appeals 10 where the court held:
In Litam, et al. v. Rivera, 100 Phil. 364, where despite the pendency of the special proceedings for the settlement of the intestate
estate of the deceased Rafael Litam, the plaintiffs-appellants filed a civil action in which they claimed that they were the children
by a previous marriage of the deceased to a Chinese woman, hence, entitled to inherit his one-half share of the conjugal
properties acquired during his marriage to Marcosa Rivera, the trial court in the civil case declared that the plaintiffs-appellants
were not children of the deceased, that the properties in question were paraphernal properties of his wife, Marcosa Rivera, and
that the latter was his only heir. On appeal to this Court, we ruled that "such declarations (that Marcosa Rivera was the only heir
of the decedent) is improper, in Civil Case No. 2071, it being within the exclusive competence of the court in Special Proceedings
No. 1537, in which it is not as yet, in issue, and, will not be, ordinarily, in issue until the presentation of the project of partition."
(p. 378).
The trial court cannot make a declaration of heirship in the civil action for the reason that such a declaration can only be made in a special
proceeding. Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court, a civil action is defined as "one by which a party sues another for the
enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong" while a special proceeding is "a remedy by which a party seeks to
establish a status, a right, or a particular fact." It is then decisively clear that the declaration of heirship can be made only in a special proceeding
inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking the establishment of a status or right.
We therefore hold that the respondent court did the right thing in dismissing the Second Amended Complaint, which stated no cause of action.
In Travel Wide Associated Sales (Phils.), Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 11 it was ruled that:
. . . If the suit is not brought in the name of or against the real party in interest, a motion to dismiss may be filed on the ground
that the complaint states no cause of action.
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the Petition under consideration is hereby DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.
G.R. NO. 129242

January 16, 2001

PILAR S. VDA. DE MANALO, ANTONIO S. MANALO, ORLANDO S. MANALO, and ISABELITA MANALO ,petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA (BRANCH 35), PURITA S. JAYME, MILAGROS M.
TERRE, BELEN M. ORILLANO, ROSALINA M. ACUIN, ROMEO S. MANALO, ROBERTO S. MANALO, AMALIA MANALO and
IMELDA MANALO, respondents.
DE LEON, JR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioners Pilar S. Vda De Manalo, et. Al., seeking to annul the Resolution 1 of the Court of
Appeals 2 affirming the Orders 3 of the Regional Trial Court and the Resolution 4which denied petitioner' motion for reconsideration.
The antecedent facts 5 are as follows:

Troadio Manalo, a resident of 1996 Maria Clara Street, Sampaloc, Manila died intestate on February 14, 1992. He was survived by his wife, Pilar S.
Manalo, and his eleven (11) children, namely: Purita M. Jayme, Antonio Manalo, Milagros M. Terre, Belen M. Orillano, Isabelita Manalo, Rosalina
M. Acuin, Romeo Manalo, Roberto Manalo, Amalia Manalo, Orlando Manalo and Imelda Manalo, who are all of legal age.1wphi1.nt
At the time of his death on February 14, 1992, Troadio Manalo left several real properties located in Manila and in the province of Tarlac including a
business under the name and style Manalo's Machine Shop with offices at No. 19 Calavite Street, La Loma, Quezon City and at NO. 45 General
Tinio Street, Arty Subdivision, Valenzuela, Metro Manila.
On November 26, 1992, herein respondents, who are eight (8) of the surviving children of the late Troadio Manalo, namely; Purita, Milagros, Belen
Rocalina, Romeo, Roberto, Amalia, and Imelda filed a petition 6 with the respondent Regional Trial Court of Manila 7 of the judicial settlement of the
estate of their late father, Troadio Manalo, and for the appointment of their brother, Romeo Manalo, as administrator thereof.
On December 15, 1992, the trial court issued an order setting the said petition for hearing on February 11, 1993 and directing the publication of the
order for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in Metro Manila, and further directing service by registered mail of the
said order upon the heirs named in the petition at their respective addresses mentioned therein.
On February 11, 1993, the date set for hearing of the petition, the trial court issued an order 'declaring the whole world in default, except the
government," and set the reception of evidence of the petitioners therein on March 16, 1993. However, the trial court upon motion of set this order of
general default aside herein petitioners (oppositors therein) namely: Pilar S. Vda. De Manalo, Antonio, Isabelita and Orlando who were granted then
(10) days within which to file their opposition to the petition.
Several pleadings were subsequently filed by herein petitioners, through counsel, culminating in the filling of an Omnibus Motion 8 on July 23, 1993
seeking; (1) to seat aside and reconsider the Order of the trial court dated July 9, 1993 which denied the motion for additional extension of time file
opposition; (2) to set for preliminary hearing their affirmative defenses as grounds for dismissal of the case; (3) to declare that the trial court did not
acquire jurisdiction over the persons of the oppositors; and (4) for the immediate inhibition of the presiding judge.
On July 30, 1993, the trial court issued an order9 which resolved, thus:
A. To admit the so-called Opposition filed by counsel for the oppositors on July 20, 1993, only for the purpose of considering the merits
thereof;
B. To deny the prayer of the oppositors for a preliminary hearing of their affirmative defenses as ground for the dismissal of this
proceeding, said affirmative defenses being irrelevant and immaterial to the purpose and issue of the present proceeding;
C. To declare that this court has acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the oppositors;
D. To deny the motion of the oppositors for the inhibition of this Presiding Judge;
E. To set the application of Romeo Manalo for appointment as regular administrator in the intestate estate of the deceased Troadio Manalo
for hearing on September 9, 1993 at 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon.
Herein petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP. No. 39851,
after the trial court in its Order 10 dated September 15, 1993. In their petition for improperly laid in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626; (2) the trial court did
not acquire jurisdiction over their persons; (3) the share of the surviving spouse was included in the intestate proceedings; (4) there was absence of
earnest efforts toward compromise among members of the same family; and (5) no certification of non-forum shopping was attached to the petition.
Finding the contentions untenable, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari in its Resolution 11promulgated on September 30, 1996.
On May 6, 1997 the motion for reconsideration of the said resolution was likewise dismissed. 12
The only issue raised by herein petitioners in the instant petition for review is whether or not the respondent Court of Appeals erred in upholding the
questioned orders of the respondent trial court which denied their motion for the outright dismissal of the petition for judicial settlement of estate
despite the failure of the petitioners therein to aver that earnest efforts toward a compromise involving members of the same family have been made
prior to the filling of the petition but that the same have failed.
Herein petitioners claim that the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 is actually an ordinary civil action involving members of the same family. They
point out that it contains certain averments, which, according to them, are indicative of its adversarial nature, to wit:

Par. 7. One of the surviving sons, ANTONIO MANALO, since the death of his father, TROADIO MANALO, had not made any settlement,
judicial or extra-judicial of the properties of the deceased father TROADIO MANALO.
Par. 8. xxx the said surviving son continued to manage and control the properties aforementioned, without proper accounting, to his own
benefit and advantage xxx.
X

Par. 12. That said ANTONIO MANALO is managing and controlling the estate of the deceased TROADIO MANALO to his own
advantage and to the damage and prejudice of the herein petitioners and their co-heirs xxx.
X

Par. 14. For the protection of their rights and interests, petitioners were compelled to bring this suit and were forced to litigate and incur
expenses and will continue to incur expenses of not less than, P250,000.00 and engaged the services of herein counsel committing to pay
P200,000.00 as and attorney's fees plus honorarium of P2,500.00 per appearance in court xxx. 13
Consequently, according to herein petitioners, the same should be dismissed under Rule 16, Section 1(j) of the Revised Rules of Court which
provides that a motion to dismiss a complaint may be filed on the ground that a condition precedent for filling the claim has not been complied with,
that is, that the petitioners therein failed to aver in the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626, that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made
involving members of the same family prior to the filling of the petition pursuant to Article 222 14 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
The instant petition is not impressed with merit.
It is a fundamental rule that in the determination of the nature of an action or proceeding, the averments 15 and the character of the relief sought 16 in
the complaint, or petition, as in the case at bar, shall be controlling. A careful srutiny of the Petition for Issuance of Letters of Administration,
Settlement and Distribution of Estatein SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 belies herein petitioners' claim that the same is in the nature of an ordinary civil
action. The said petition contains sufficient jurisdictional facts required in a petition for the settlement of estate of a deceased person such as the fat of
death of the late Troadio Manalo on February 14, 1992, as well as his residence in the City of Manila at the time of his said death. The fact of death
of the decedent and of his residence within he country are foundation facts upon which all the subsequent proceedings in the administration of the
estate rest.17The petition is SP.PROC No. 92-63626 also contains an enumeration of the names of his legal heirs including a tentative list of the
properties left by the deceased which are sought to be settled in the probate proceedings. In addition, the relief's prayed for in the said petition leave
no room for doubt as regard the intention of the petitioners therein (private respondents herein) to seek judicial settlement of the estate of their
deceased father, Troadio Manalo, to wit;
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed for of this Honorable Court:
a. That after due hearing, letters of administration be issued to petitioner ROMEO MANALO for the administration of the estate of the
deceased TROADIO MANALO upon the giving of a bond in such reasonable sum that this Honorable Court may fix.
b. That after all the properties of the deceased TROADIO MANALO have been inventoried and expenses and just debts, if any, have been
paid and the legal heirs of the deceased fully determined, that the said estate of TROADIO MANALO be settled and distributed among the
legal heirs all in accordance with law.
c. That the litigation expenses of these proceedings in the amount of P250,000.00 and attorney's fees in the amount of P300,000.00 plus
honorarium of P2,500.00 per appearance in court in the hearing and trial of this case and costs of suit be taxed solely against ANTONIO
MANALO.18
Concededly, the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 contains certain averments which may be typical of an ordinary civil action. Herein petitioners,
as oppositors therein, took advantage of the said defect in the petition and filed their so-called Opposition thereto which, as observed by the trial
court, is actually an Answer containing admissions and denials, special and affirmative defenses and compulsory counterclaims for actual, moral and
exemplary damages, plus attorney's fees and costs 19 in an apparent effort to make out a case of an ordinary civil action and ultimately seek its
dismissal under Rule 16, Section 1(j) of the Rules of Court vis--vis, Article 222 of civil of the Civil Code.

It is our view that herein petitioners may not be allowed to defeat the purpose of the essentially valid petition for the settlement of the estate of the
late Troadio Manalo by raising matters that as irrelevant and immaterial to the said petition. It must be emphasized that the trial court, siting as a
probate court, has limited and special jurisdiction 20 and cannot hear and dispose of collateral matters and issues which may be properly threshed out
only in an ordinary civil action. In addition, the rule has always been to the effect that the jurisdiction of a court, as well as the concomitant nature of
an action, is determined by the averments in the complaint and not by the defenses contained in the answer. If it were otherwise, it would not be too
difficult to have a case either thrown out of court or its proceedings unduly delayed by simple strategem. 21 So it should be in the instant petition for
settlement of estate.
Herein petitioners argue that even if the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 were to be considered as a special proceeding for the settlement of estate
of a deceased person, Rule 16, Section 1(j) of the Rules of Court vis--visArticle 222 of the Civil Code of the Philippines would nevertheless apply as
a ground for the dismissal of the same by virtue of ule 1, Section 2 of the Rules of Court which provides that the 'rules shall be liberally construed in
order to promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action and proceedings.'
Petitioners contend that the term "proceeding" is so broad that it must necessarily include special proceedings.
The argument is misplaced. Herein petitioners may not validly take refuge under the provisions of Rule 1, Section 2, of the Rules of Court to justify
the invocation of Article 222 of the Civil Code of the Philippines for the dismissal of the petition for settlement of the estate of the deceased Troadio
Manalo inasmuch as the latter provision is clear enough. To wit:
Art. 222. No suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the same family unless it should appear that earnest efforts toward a compromise
have been made, but that the same have failed, subject to the limitations in Article 2035(underscoring supplied).22
The above-quoted provision of the law is applicable only to ordinary civil actions. This is clear from the term 'suit' that it refers to an action by one
person or persons against another or other in a court of justice in which the plaintiff pursues the remedy which the law affords him for the redress of
an injury or the enforcement of a right, whether at law or in equity. 23 A civil action is thus an action filed in a court of justice, whereby a party sues
another for the enforcement of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong. 24 Besides, an excerpt form the Report of the Code Commission
unmistakably reveals the intention of the Code Commission to make that legal provision applicable only to civil actions which are essentially
adversarial and involve members of the same family, thus:
It is difficult to imagine a sadder and more tragic spectacle than a litigation between members of the same family. It is necessary that every
effort should be made toward a compromise before litigation is allowed to breed hate and passion in the family. It is know that lawsuit
between close relatives generates deeper bitterness than stranger.25
It must be emphasized that the oppositors (herein petitioners) are not being sued in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 for any cause of action as in fact no
defendant was imploded therein. The Petition for issuance of letters of Administration, Settlement and Distribution of Estate in SP. PROC. No. 9263626 is a special proceeding and, as such, it is a remedy whereby the petitioners therein seek to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. 26 the
petitioners therein (private respondents herein) merely seek to establish the fat of death of their father and subsequently to be duly recognized as
among the heirs of the said deceased so that they can validly exercise their right to participate in the settlement and liquidation of the estate of the
decedent consistent with the limited and special jurisdiction of the probate court.1wphi1.nt
WHEREFORE, the petition in the above-entitled case, is DENIED for lack of merit, Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 163604

May 6, 2005

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS (Twentieth Division), HON. PRESIDING JUDGE FORTUNITO L. MADRONA, RTC-BR. 35 and
APOLINARIA MALINAO JOMOC, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO-MORALES, J.:
In "In the Matter of Declaration of Presumptive Death of Absentee Spouse Clemente P. Jomoc, Apolinaria Malinao Jomoc, petitioner," the Ormoc
City, Regional Trial Court, Branch 35, by Order of September 29, 1999,1 granted the petition on the basis of the Commissioners Report 2 and
accordingly declared the absentee spouse, who had left his petitioner-wife nine years earlier, presumptively dead.

In granting the petition, the trial judge, Judge Fortunito L. Madrona, cited Article 41, par. 2 of the Family Code. Said article provides that for the
purpose of contracting a valid subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a previous marriage where the prior spouse had been absent for four
consecutive years, the spouse present must institute summary proceedings for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee spouse, without
prejudice to the effect of the reappearance of the absent spouse.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General, sought to appeal the trial courts order by filing a Notice of Appeal. 3
By Order of November 22, 1999s,4 the trial court, noting that no record of appeal was filed and served "as required by and pursuant to Sec. 2(a), Rule
41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the present case being a special proceeding," disapproved the Notice of Appeal.
The Republics Motion for Reconsideration of the trial courts order of disapproval having been denied by Order of January 13, 2000,5 it filed a
Petition for Certiorari6 before the Court of Appeals, it contending that the declaration of presumptive death of a person under Article 41 of the Family
Code is not a special proceeding or a case of multiple or separate appeals requiring a record on appeal.
By Decision of May 5, 2004,7 the Court of Appeals denied the Republics petition on procedural and substantive grounds in this wise:
At the outset, it must be stressed that the petition is not sufficient in form. It failed to attach to its petition a certified true copy of the
assailed Order dated January 13, 2000 [denying its Motion for Reconsideration of the November 22, 1999 Order disapproving its Notice of
Appeal]. Moreover, the petition questioned the [trial courts] Order dated August 15, 1999, which declared Clemente Jomoc presumptively
dead, likewise for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, yet, not even a copy could be found
in the records. On this score alone, the petition should have been dismissed outright in accordance with Sec. 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of
Court.
However, despite the procedural lapses, the Court resolves to delve deeper into the substantive issue of the validity/nullity of the assailed
order.
The principal issue in this case is whether a petition for declaration of the presumptive death of a person is in the nature of a
special proceeding. If it is, the period to appeal is 30 days and the party appealing must, in addition to a notice of appeal, file with the trial
court a record on appeal to perfect its appeal. Otherwise, if the petition is an ordinary action, the period to appeal is 15 days from notice or
decision or final order appealed from and the appeal is perfected by filing a notice of appeal (Section 3, Rule 41, Rules of Court).
As defined in Section 3(a), Rule 1 of the Rules of Court, "a civil action is one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or
protection of a right, or the prevention of redress of a wrong" while a special proceeding under Section 3(c) of the same rule is defined as "a
remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular fact (Heirs of Yaptinchay, et al. v. Del Rosario, et al., G.R. No.
124320, March 2, 1999).
Considering the aforementioned distinction, this Court finds that the instant petition is in the nature of a special proceeding and not an
ordinary action. The petition merely seeks for a declaration by the trial court of the presumptive death of absentee spouse Clemente
Jomoc. It does not seek the enforcement or protection of a right or the prevention or redress of a wrong. Neither does it involve a demand
of right or a cause of action that can be enforced against any person.
On the basis of the foregoing discussion, the subject Order dated January 13, 2000 denying OSGs Motion for Reconsideration of the Order
dated November 22, 1999 disapproving its Notice of Appeal was correctly issued. The instant petition, being in the nature of a special
proceeding, OSG should have filed, in addition to its Notice of Appeal, a record on appeal in accordance with Section 19 of the
Interim Rules and Guidelines to Implement BP Blg. 129 and Section 2(a), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court . . . (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
The Republic (petitioner) insists that the declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code is not a special proceeding involving
multiple or separate appeals where a record on appeal shall be filed and served in like manner.
Petitioner cites Rule 109 of the Revised Rules of Court which enumerates the cases wherein multiple appeals are allowed and a record on appeal is
required for an appeal to be perfected. The petition for the declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse not being included in the
enumeration, petitioner contends that a mere notice of appeal suffices.
By Resolution of December 15, 2004,8 this Court, noting that copy of the September 27, 2004 Resolution9requiring respondent to file her comment
on the petition was returned unserved with postmasters notation "Party refused," Resolved to consider that copy deemed served upon her.

The pertinent provisions on the General Provisions on Special Proceedings, Part II of the Revised Rules of Court entitled SPECIAL
PROCEEDINGS, read:
RULE 72
SUBJECT MATTER AND APPLICABILITY
OF GENERAL RULES
Section 1. Subject matter of special proceedings. Rules of special proceedings are provided for in the following:
(a) Settlement of estate of deceased persons;
(b) Escheat;
(c) Guardianship and custody of children;
(d) Trustees;
(e) Adoption;
(f) Rescission and revocation of adoption;
(g) Hospitalization of insane persons;
(h) Habeas corpus;
(i) Change of name;
(j) Voluntary dissolution of corporations;
(k) Judicial approval of voluntary recognition of minor natural children;
(l) Constitution of family home;
(m) Declaration of absence and death;
(n) Cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry.
Sec. 2. Applicability of rules of civil actions. In the absence of special provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far
as practicable, applicable in special proceedings. (Underscoring supplied)
The pertinent provision of the Civil Code on presumption of death provides:
Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still lives, he shall be presumed dead for all
purposes, except for those of succession.
x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Upon the other hand, Article 41 of the Family Code, upon which the trial court anchored its grant of the petition for the declaration of presumptive
death of the absent spouse, provides:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the
celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouses had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a wellfounded belief that the absent spouses was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances
set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.

For the purpose pf contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouses present must institute a summary
proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of a
reappearance of the absent spouse. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Rule 41, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court, on Modes of Appeal, invoked by the trial court in disapproving petitioners Notice of Appeal,
provides:
Sec. 2. Modes of appeal. (a) Ordinary appeal. - The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and serving
a copy thereof upon the adverse party. No record on appeal shall be required except in special proceedings and other cases of multiple or
separate appeals where the law or these Rules so require. In such cases, the record on appeal shall be filed and served in like manner.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
xxx
By the trial courts citation of Article 41 of the Family Code, it is gathered that the petition of Apolinaria Jomoc to have her absent spouse declared
presumptively dead had for its purpose her desire to contract a valid subsequent marriage. Ergo, the petition for that purpose is a "summary
proceeding," following above-quoted Art. 41, paragraph 2 of the Family Code.
Since Title XI of the Family Code, entitled SUMMARY JUDICIAL PROCEEDING IN THE FAMILY LAW, contains the following provision, inter
alia:
xxx
Art. 238. Unless modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules in this Title shall apply in all casesprovided for in this Codes
requiring summary court proceedings. Such cases shall be decided in an expeditious manner without regard to technical
rules. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
x x x,
there is no doubt that the petition of Apolinaria Jomoc required, and is, therefore, a summary proceeding under the Family Code, not a special
proceeding under the Revised Rules of Court appeal for which calls for the filing of a Record on Appeal. It being a summary ordinary proceeding, the
filing of a Notice of Appeal from the trial courts order sufficed.
That the Family Code provision on repeal, Art. 254, provides as follows:
Art. 254. Titles III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, IX, XI and XV of Book I of Republic Act No. 386, otherwise known as the Civil Code of the
Philippines, as amended, and Articles 17, 18, 19, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 39, 40, 41 and 42 of Presidential Decree No. 603, otherwise known as
the Child and Youth Welfare Code, as amended, andall laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations rules and regulations, or parts
thereof, inconsistent therewith are hereby repealed, (Emphasis and underscoring supplied),
seals the case in petitioners favor.
Finally, on the alleged procedural flaw in petitioners petition before the appellate court. Petitioners failure to attach to his petition before the
appellate court a copy of the trial courts order denying its motion for reconsideration of the disapproval of its Notice of Appeal is not necessarily
fatal, for the rules of procedure are not to be applied in a technical sense. Given the issue raised before it by petitioner, what the appellate court
should have done was to direct petitioner to comply with the rule.
As for petitioners failure to submit copy of the trial courts order granting the petition for declaration of presumptive death, contrary to the appellate
courts observation that petitioner was also assailing it, petitioners 8-page petition 10 filed in said court does not so reflect, it merely having assailed
the order disapproving the Notice of Appeal.
WHEREFORE, the assailed May 5, 2004 Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Let the case be REMANDED
to it for appropriate action in light of the foregoing discussion.

G.R. No. 128646

March 14, 2003

CRISELDA F. JOSE, petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and DANILO OMEGA, respondents.
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us is a petition erroneously entitled as a "Petition for Review on Certiorari" which should be a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court.
The factual background of the case is as follows:
On November 14, 1994, the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City (Branch 22) rendered a decision in Civil Case No. CEO-15709, entitled "Danilo
Omega, Plaintiff, versus, Criselda F. Jose, Defendant.", the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, based on the evidence thus presented, this Court finds for the plaintiff. Judgment is hereby rendered declaring the March
3, 1981 marriage between plaintiff Danilo Omega and Criselda F. Jose, null and void ab initio. Custody over the three children Joselyn,
Danilo, Jr. and Jordan, all surnamed Omega shall be entrusted to plaintiff Danilo Omega.
"Furnish the Local Civil Registrar of Manila with a copy of this judgment. No costs.
"SO ORDERED."1
The ground for declaring the marriage null and void is psychological incapacity on the part of defendant Criselda under Article 36 of the Family
Code of the Philippines. During the trial, the counsel on record of defendant Criselda was Atty. Margarito D. Yap of the Cebu City District Office of
the Public Attorneys Office (PAO). However, defendant Criselda filed a Notice of Appeal, dated December 7, 1994, on her own, without the
assistance of Atty. Yap.2
The Judicial Records Division (JRD) of the Court of Appeals sent a notice to pay docket fee, dated August 3, 1995 to Atty. Yap which was received
by him.3 On October 24, 1995, the appellate court, through the Former Sixteenth Division, 4 promulgated a Resolution which reads as follows:
"For failure of the defendant-appellant to pay the docketing fee in this case within the reglementary period which expired on August 25,
1995, despite receipt by his counsel on August 10, 1995 of this Courts notice dated August 3, 1995, this appeal is hereby DISMISSED
pursuant to Section 1(d), Rule 50 of the Rules of Court.
SO ORDERED."5
On May 9, 1996, the Division Clerk of Court issued the Entry of Judgment certifying that the above-quoted Resolution had become final and
executory as of December 1, 1995.6 It is indicated at the bottom of said Entry of Judgment that Atty. Yap and the Special and Appealed Cases
Division of the PAO were sent copies of the Entry of Judgment.
On May 13, 1996, the appellate court received a letter of even date from defendant-appellant Criselda addressed to the Clerk of Court of the Court of
Appeals inquiring about the status of her appeal and claiming that she has not received any notice from the appellate court. 7
The appellate court noted the explanation of the clerk in the Civil Cases Section of the Judicial Records Division (JRD) of said court that Atty. Yap
was sent the notice to pay docket fee because Criselda had sent a copy of her Notice of Appeal to Atty. Yap and that per the records of the case, Atty.
Yap was earlier sent a copy of the formal offer of exhibits and duly received in his behalf, he filed the comments and objections to the exhibits for the
plaintiff; he appeared at the hearings conducted by the trial court. 8
On October 28, 1996, Criselda through counsel filed a Motion for Leave of Court to File Omnibus Motions/Motion to Reinstate Appeal. 9 On
December 16, 1996, the Court of Appeals issued the following Resolution:
"Considering that the Resolution dismissing this appeal has become final on December 1, 1995 and an Entry of Judgment has in fact been
made on May 9, 1996, the Motion for Leave of Court to File Omnibus Motions/Motion to Reinstate Appeal and the Omnibus
Motions/Motion to Reinstate Appeal are hereby denied.

SO ORDERED."10
Criseldas motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals.
Hence, the present petition on the following ground:
"The public respondent Honorable Court of Appeals committed grave error in denying the petitioners Motion for Leave of Court to file
Omnibus Motions/Motion to Reinstate Appeal and the Omnibus Motions/Motion to Reinstate Appeal which if not corrected, would deprive
petitioner of her constitutional right to due process and injustice would be done to her." 11
on which basis, petitioner Criselda raises the following issues:
"I.
"WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONER WHO APPEALED HER CASE BY HERSELF WITHOUT COUNSEL WAS VALIDLY SERVED WITH
NOTICE TO PAY THE DOCKETING FEE AND NOTICE OF THE RESOLUTION DISMISSING HER APPEAL FOR FAILURE TO PAY THE
DOCKETING FEE.
"II.
"WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DENYING THE PETITIONERS MOTION FOR LEAVE OF
COURT TO FILE OMNIBUS MOTIONS/MOTION TO REINSTATE APPEAL AND THE OMNIBUS MOTIONS/MOTION TO REINSTATE
APPEAL."12
After private respondent filed his Comment, parties filed their respective Memoranda in compliance with the Resolution of the Court dated
December 14, 1998.
We find the petition devoid of merit.
Based on the records, it appears that the PAO, through Atty. Victor C. Laborte and Atty. Yap, represented petitioner during the trial of the case.
Although petitioner herself personally filed the Notice of Appeal, the fact remains that Atty. Yap or the PAO has not filed any formal notice of
withdrawal of appearance in the trial court. Therefore, insofar as the appellate court is concerned, Atty. Yap is the counsel of record. As such, the
appellate court did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners motion for leave of court to file omnibus motions or motion to
reinstate appeal.
Section 22, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, provides:
"Section 22. Attorney who appears in lower court presumed to represent client on appeal. An attorney who appears de parte in a case
before a lower court shall be presumed to continue representing his client on appeal, unless he files a formal petition withdrawing his
appearance in the appellate court."
Payment of the docket and other legal fees within the prescribed period is both mandatory and jurisdictional, and failure of the appellant to conform
with the rules on appeal renders the judgment final and executory.13
Indeed, the Court, in some instances, had allowed liberal construction of the Rules of Court with respect to the rules on the manner and periods for
perfecting appeals on equitable consideration. 14 In Buenaflor vs. Court of Appeals, the Court has enunciated the following:
"The established rule is that the payment in full of the docket fees within the prescribed period is mandatory. Nevertheless, this rule must be
qualified, to wit: First, the failure to pay appellate court docket fee within the reglementary period allows only discretionary dismissal, not
automatic dismissal, of the appeal; Second, such power should be used in the exercise of the Courts sound discretion in accordance with
the tenets of justice and fair "play and with great deal of circumspection considering all attendant circumstances.
"Admittedly, this Court has allowed the filing of an appeal in some cases where a stringent application of the rules would have denied it,
only when to do so would serve the demands of justice and in the exercise of the Courts equity jurisdiction. This is based on the rule of
liberality in the interpretation of the Rules to achieve substantial justice. It may be recalled that the general rule is that the Rules of Court
are rules of procedure and whenever called for they should be so construed as to give effect rather than defeat their essence.

"Section 6, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

SEC. 6. Construction These Rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and
inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.
"Rules of procedures are intended to promote, not to defeat, substantial justice and, therefore, they should not be applied in a very rigid and
technical sense. The exception is that, while the Rules are liberally construed, the provisions with respect to the rules on the manner and
periods for perfecting appeals are strictly applied. As an exception to the exception, these rules have sometimes been relaxed on equitable
considerations. Also, in some cases the Supreme Court has given due course to an appeal perfected out of time where a stringent
application of the rules would have denied it, but only when to do so would serve the demands of substantial justice, and in the exercise of
equity jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
"The underlying consideration in this petition is that the act of dismissing the notice of appeal, if done in excess of the trial courts
jurisdiction, amounts to an undue denial of the petitioners right to appeal. The importance and real purpose of the remedy of appeal has
been emphasized in Castro v. Court of Appealswhere this Court ruled that an appeal is an essential part of our judicial system and trial
courts are advised to proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of the right to appeal and instructed that every party-litigant should
be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his cause, freed from the constraints of technicalities." 15
However, the Court finds no cogent reason to be liberal in the present case for the following reasons:
Petitioners counsel, Atty. Margarito Yap of the PAO was properly sent by the appellate court a notice to pay the docket fees. Atty. Yap or the PAO did
not file any formal withdrawal of appearance and therefore, for all intents and purposes, the appellate court correctly sent the notice to Atty. Yap. It is
settled that clients are bound by the mistakes, negligence and omission of their counsel. 16
Moreover, under Section 21, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, an attorney is presumed to be properly authorized to represent any cause in which he
appears. Under Section 22 of the same Rule, an attorney who appears de partein a case before a lower court shall be presumed to continue
representing his client on appeal, unless he files a formal petition withdrawing his appearance in the appellate court.
Petitioner failed to pursue her appeal for almost two years. She herself filed the notice of appeal on December 4, 1994 but thought of inquiring from
the Court of Appeals about her appeal only on May 13, 1996 (or after the lapse of one year and five months) as to the status of her appeal.
Petitioner failed to show that her appeal is extremely meritorious that to deprive her of an appeal would unduly affect her substantial rights.
In other words, petitioner failed to show any compelling reason to warrant the issuance of the writ of certiorari. The Court of Appeals committed no
grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners Motion for Leave of Court to File Omnibus Motions/Motion to Reinstate Appeal. Its Resolution
dated October 24, 1995 dismissing petitioners appeal had become final and executory as of December 1, 1995.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner.