RAMOS VS.

DIRECTOR OF LANDS
FACTS:
1. Romero gained possession of tract of land located in Nueva Ecija.
2. Romero took advantage of the Royal Decree to obtain a possessory
information title to the land and was registered as such and known as
Parcel No. 1.
3. Parcel No. 1 which is included within the limits of the possessory
information title of Romero was sold to Ramos.
4. Ramos instituted proceedings to have his title registered.
5. Director of Lands opposed on the ground that Ramos had not acquired a
good title from the Spanish government.
6. Director of Forestry also opposed on the ground that the parcel of land is
forest land.
7. The trial court agreed with the Director of Lands and Director of Forestry
and excluded parcel No. 1 from registration.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the actual occupancy of a part of the land described in the
instrument giving color of title sufficient to give title to the entire tract of
land?
HELD:
Yes. The general rule is that possession and cultivation of a portion of a tract
of land under the claim of ownership of all is a constructive possession of
all, if the remainder is not in the adverse possession of another. In the case
at bar, the claimant has color of title; he acted in good faith and he has
open, peaceable, and notorious possession of a portion of the property,
sufficient to prove that the land was for his enjoyment.
On the issue of forest land, the Director of Forestry did not support
satisfactory evidence that the property in question is a forest land. On the
other hand, Petitioner has proved a title to the entire tract of land for which
he asked for registration.

THE DIRECTOR vs. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:
1. Private Respondent, Aquilino Cario, filed a petition for registration of Lot
No. 6 which is a a sugar land located in Laguna.

2. Aquilino declared that subject land was originally owned by his deceased
mother, Teresa Lauchangco, and later administered by him in behalf of
his five brothers and sisters.

3. Sometime in 1949, private respondent and his brother, Severino, became

co-owners of Lot No. 6 by virtue of an extra-judicial partition of the land.
On 1963, through another deed of extrajudicial settlement, sole
ownership of Lot No. 6 was adjudicated to the private respondent.
4. Aquilino filed a petition to register Lot No. 6 under his name but was
opposed by the Director of Bureau of Lands. Nevertheless, Trial court
granted the petition of Aquilino. which was granted by the Trial Court and
also affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Aquilino hgas submitted proof of his simple title or proof of
possession in the manner and length of time required by law to justify
confirmation of an imperfect title.
HELD:
No. According to SC, The petition for land registration at bar is under the
Land Registration Act. Pursuant to said Act, he who alleges in his petition or
application, ownership in fee simple, must present muniments of title since
the Spanish times, such as a titulo real or royal grant and others.
In the case at bar, Aquilino has not produced a single muniment of title to
substantiate his claim of ownership. The Court has therefore no other
recourse, but to dismiss private respondent's petition for the registration of
subject land under Act 496.

PLEASANTVILLE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION V. CA

FACTS:
1. Robillo bought Lot 9 from Pleasantville Development Corporation. Robillo
then sold his rights to Lot 9 to Jardinico.
2. Jardinico then secured a TCT in his name. It was then that he learned that
the respondent Kee had taken possession of the said lot and had made
improvements thereon.
3. Kee bought on installment Lot 8 from C.T. Torres Enterprise, which is an
exclusive real estate agent of Pleasantville.
4. After Kee receive the lot plan, Octaviano (a CTTEI employee) mistakenly
pointed out to Kee's wife Lot 9 instead of the lot they bought. Thereafter,
Kee proceeded to construct improvements on it.
5. Jardenico's lawyer notified Kee of the misunderstanding and ordered
removal of constructions as well as evacuation but Kee refused.
6. A complaint for ejectment was then filed against Kee. In return, Kee filed
filed a complaint against CTTEI.
7. MTC held that Kee no longer had any right over the lot 8 because his
contract with Pleasantville is already rescinded due to Kees failure to pay
the installments due. MTC also said that Kee must pay reasonable rentals
for the use of Lot 9, and he cannot claim reimbursement for the
improvements he introduced on said lot. RTC affirmed the decision.
8. CA reversed the decision declaring Wilson Kee a builder in good faith
with respect to the improvements he introduced on Lot 9 and is entitled
to reimbursements; and that CTTEI and Pleasantville are solidarily liable
to pay the following circumstances:
a.
If Jardinico decides to appropriate the improvements and,
thereafter, remove these structures, CTTEI and Pleasantville shall
answer for all demolition expenses and the value of the improvements;
b.
If Jardinico prefers that Kee buy the land, CTTEI and Pleasantville
shall answer for the amount of Lot 9 that Kee should pay to Jardinico.
ISSUE: Whether or not KEE is a builder in good faith.
HELD:
Yes. Mr. Kee is a builder in good faith. At the time he made improvements on

the lot, he believed that it was the lot that he bought from Pleasantville, as
pointed out by Ocataviano.
Pleasantville and C.T. Torres are solidarily liable for damages due to
negligence.

KASILAG VS. ROQUE

FACTS:
1. Ambrosio acquired the possession of a land and its improvements by way
of homestead.
2. Ambrosio mortgaged only the improvements of his land to Kasilag in
consideration of 1k paid by Kasilag to him. The improvements referred to
in the contract are the following: 4 mango trees, 110 hills of bamboo
trees; 1 tamarind and 6 boga trees.
3. In their contract they stipulated that Ambrosio was to pay the debt with
interest within 4 years, and in such case, mortgage would not have any
effect.
4. They also stipulated that the tax on the land, during the existence of the
mortgage, should be paid by Ambrosio.
5. They also agreed that if Ambrosio fails to pay within the period, Ambrosio
will execute a deed of sale in favor of Kasilag and that Ambrosio would
pay the tax on the land.
6. One year after the execution of the mortgage deed, Ambrosio was unable
to pay the stipulated interest as well as the tax on the land and its
improvements.
7. For this reason, Ambrosio and Kasilag entered into another verbal
contract whereby Ambrosio conveyed to Kasilag the possession of the
land on condition that:
1. Kasilag would not collect the interest on the loan,
2. Kasilag would attend to the payment of the land tax and would
benefit by the fruits of the land, and
3. Kasilag introduce improvements thereon.
8. The respondents and heirs of the deceased Emiliana Ambrosio, filed an
action to recover from Kasilag the possession of the land and its
improvements.
9. Lower Court held that petitioner is a possessor in good faith within the
meaning of article 433 of the Civil Code.
10. The CA reversed the decision saying that petitioner acted In BF in taking
possession of the land because he knew that the contract he made with
Ambrosio was an absolute sale, and that Ambrosio could not sell the land
because it is prohibited by Sec. 116 of Act 2874.

ISSUE: W/N Kasilag should be deemed the possessor of the land in good
faith.
HELD: Yes. A person is deemed a possessor in BF when he knows that there
is a flaw in his title or in the manner of its acquisition, by which it is
invalidated. But in the case at bar, the petitioner was unaware of any flaws.
The petitioner is not conversant with the laws. And when he accepted the
mortgage, he believes that he was not violating the prohibition regarding
the alienation of the land. In taking possession of the land, he did not know
that they are attributes of the contract of antichresis which is prohibited by
Sec. 116. The petitioners being in GF, the respondents may choose to pay
the improvements introduced by the petitioner or to compel the petitioner
to buy the land by paying them its market value.
(Continuation of Kasilag v. Roque) Section 116. Except in favor of the
Government lands acquired under the free patent or homestead provisions
shall not be subject to encumbrance or alienation for a term of five years
from, nor shall they become liable to the satisfaction of any debt contracted
prior to the expiration of said period; but the improvements or crops on the
land may be mortgaged or pledged to qualified persons, associations, or
corporations.)
BANCO ESPANOL FILIPINO V PETERSON
FACTS:
Banco Espanol Filipino (BEP) executed a contract of loan in favor of Reyes
for P141K
Reyes was already indebted to the bank for P84K.
To secure payment of the P141k and the P84k, Reyes executed a public
instrument:
Mortgaging several of his properties
Pledging part of his personal property to BEP (P90K worth of
wines,liquors and canned goods) stored in a warehouse in Manila.
BEP and Reyes agreed that the goods should be delivered to Ramon Garcia
(depositary) for safekeeping.
Reyes turned over the goods to R. Garcia by giving him the warehouse keys.
Subsequently, BEP and Reyes substituted Sierra in place of Garcia as the
depositary.
Sometime 1905, Juan Garcia (related to Ramon) brought an action against
Reyes and one Agtarat.
CFI Manila ruled against Reyes and Agtarat for P15 000.00.

On the same day, Sheriff Peterson entered the warehouse where the goods
pledged to BEP were stored under the custody of the depositary, Sierra.
Peterson levied upon P30 000 worth of the goods pledged to the bank,
depriving the BEP of possession of the same.
ISSUE: Whether or not Juan Garcia has better right to the goods compared
to BEP.
HELD: The contract between Reyes and BEP was valid because it complies
with all the requisites of a valid pledge. Reyes was no longer in possession
of the pledged property. BEP had symbolic possession of the pledged
property. The transfer of goods through delivery of the keys of the
warehouse where the goods were stored was sufficient evidence to show
that Sierra (depositary), was legally placed in possession of the goods.
Therefore, BEP had a better right to the goods compared to Juan Garcia.

Macasaet vs Macasaet
FACTS:
1. Petitioners Ismael and Teresita Macasaet and respondents Vicente and
RosarioMacasaet are first-degree relatives. Ismael is the son of
respondents, and Teresita is his wife.
2. The respondents alleged that they were the owners of two (2) parcels of
land covered in Lipa City. And by way of a verbal lease agreement, the
petitioners occupied these lots sometime 1992 and used them as their
residence and the site of their construction business
3. Petitioners denied the existence of any verbal lease agreement. They
claimed that the respondents had invited them to construct their
residence and business on the subject lots. They added that the
respondents to allot the land as an advance grant of inheritance in favor
them. Thus, they contended that the one lot had been allotted to Ismael
as advance inheritance. While the other lot, was given to them as
payment for construction materials used in the renovation of the
respondents house.
4. Subsequently, the respondents filed with an ejectment suit against
petitioners.
5. MTTC ruled in favor of the respondents and ordered the petitioners to
vacate the premises. Lower court said that the petitioner had occupied

the lots, not by virtue of a verbal lease agreement but by tolerance of the
parents.
6. RTC upheld the findings of the MTCC. RTC allowed the respondents to
appropriate the building and other improvements introduced by the
petitioners, after payment by indemnity.
7. CA sustained the finding of the lower courts that the children had been
occupying the subject lots only by the tolerance of their parent. Thus,
possession of the subject lots by the children became illegal upon their
receipt of letter to vacate it.
Issues: WON the children can be ejected.
Held: Yes.
1. The agreement between the parties can be terminated. There is no
resolutory condition existing between the parties like a change of
ownership, necessity or death of either party.
2. The petitioners had no right to retain possession. The right of the
petitioners to inherit
from the respondents is unperfected and is vested only upon the death of
the respondents.
3. And as a rule, the right of ownership carries with it the right of possession
therefore the respondents can eject the petitioners.

CUAYCONG V BENEDICTO

FACTS:

4. Benedicto owns Hacienda Toreno which is located in Negros Occidental.

5. Two roads pass through the said hacienda: the Dacuman-Toreno Road and
the Nanca-Victorias Road.

6. For forty years, the owners of the nearby hacienda, Cuaycong et al, had
been using the said roads to transport their products.

7. Sometime in 1911, Benedicto decided to close the road and began asking
for toll fees for wagons passing through their hacienda.

8. Because of this, Cuaycong et al sued Benedicto. Cuaycong et al claimed

that they have a right of way over the said Nanca-Victorias Road
considering that they have been using it since time immemorial.

9. The lower court dismissed the claim over the Dacuman-Toreno Road. But
with regard to Nanca-Victorias Road, the lower court declared that
Cuaycong et al do have a right of way over the said road.

10. Benedicto appealed. Cuaycong et al then claimed that the road is a

public highway.

ISSUE: Whether or not Cuaycong et al were able to establish their right

over the Nanca-Victorias Road.

HELD: No.

1. First it was shown that in the Torrens title held by Benedicto, there was no
encumbrance attached to the hacienda, and that is nowhere nearby a
road.

2. Second, the road was not maintained by the local government. It is solely
supported by the road users for their benefits and convenience. There
was no adverse possession by the government.

3. Third, there was no evidence which shows that the land is of the nature of
a public highway.

4. Fourth, the road was closed in 1911; it was only in 1912 that Cuaycong et
al filed their suit and they did not acquire acquired a right of private
easement. Cuaycong et al said that they had been using the said road
since time immemorial yet they only showed evidence that it was in use
in 1885.

ASTUDILLO v PHHC
FACTS:
1. In behalf of his minor son, Mitra applied, for the purchase of Lot 16, of the
East Avenue Subdivision of the PHHC in Quezon City.
2. His application was approved so he made a down payment of an amount
equivalent to ten percent of the price of the lot. PHHC and Mitra then
executed a contract of conditional sale.
3. After Mitra had paid in full the price, a final deed of sale was executed in
his favor and TCT was issued to him.
4. The lot in question is in the possession of Astudillo. She constructed
thereon a residential house (a shanty, according to Mitra). She admits
that she has been squatting on the said lot uninterruptedly since 1957 up
to the present.
5. Astudillo filed a petition with the administrative investigating committee
to cancel the award of Lot 16 to Mitra.
6. Subsequently, Astudillo filed the same petition with the lower court
against the PHHC, Register of deeds of Quezon City and the spouses
Mitra.
7. After the respondents had filed their answers, the Mitra spouses filed a
verified motion for summary judgment. Astudillo opposed the motion.
8. The lower court treated the motion for summary judgment as a motion to
dismiss. It dismissed Peregrina's petition on the grounds that she is a
mala fide squatter and that the sale of Lot 16 to Mitra cannot be assailed
by means of certiorari and mandamus.
ISSUE: W/N Astudillo has a cause of action to annul the sale of Lot 16 to
Mitra.
HELD:
No. Astudillo has no cause of action to impugn the award to of Lot 16 to
Mitra. As a squatter, she has no possessory rights over Lot 16. In the eyes
of the law, the award to Mitra did not prejudice her since she has no rights
over the said lot which could have been impaired by that award.

PERAN v CFI
FACTS:
1. Jose Evasco owns an unregistered land.
2. He executed an extrajudicial partition of it among his 5 heirs, one of
which was his son, Alejandro.
3. He allowed and tolerated his niece Encarnacion to erect a house on a
portion of his lot.
4. In 1972, Alejandro sold the lot to Torella.
5. Torella sold it to Sabater.
6. In 1979, Sabater sold it to Peran.
7. Peran then asked Encarnacion to vacate the lot, but Encarnacion refused.
8. Thus, Pera filed a complaint of Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer
against Encarnacion.
9. Municpal Circuit Court of Bulusan-Barcelona rendered its Decision
ordering private respondents to vacate the lot in question, return its
possession to petitioner
HELD:
The CFI erred when it reckoned the counting of the 1 yr period within which
to file the action from Dec 31, 1972, and not from the time of demand. A
forcible entry and unlawful detainer action must be brought within 1 yr. The
1 yr period of limitation period commences from the time of demand to
vacate, and when several demands are made, the same is counted from the
last letter of demand. The demand to vacate having been made in Jan 1979
and the suit having been instituted on Feb 8, 1979, the Municipal Court
acted within its jurisdiction.
The CFI also erred in assuming that prior
possession in whatever character is protected
by law. The prior possession of Encarnacion
and her husband was only by mere tolerance and therefore does not vest in
them a right which they can assert against Peran. Possession by tolerance is
lawful, but this becomes illegal when, upon demand to vacate by the owner,
the possessor refuses to comply with such demand. A possessor by mere
tolerance is necessarily bound by an implied promise to vacate upon
demand.