Ninal vs.

Bayadog
328 SCRA 122
FACTS:
Pepito Ninal was married with Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. They had 3
children namely Babyline, Ingrid and Archie, petitioners. Due to the shot inflicted by Pepito
to Teodulfa, the latter died on April 24, 1985 leaving the children under the guardianship of
Engrace Ninal. 1 year and 8 months later, Pepito and Norma Badayog got married without
any marriage license. They instituted an affidavit stating that they had lived together for at
least 5 years exempting from securing the marriage license. Pepito died in a car accident on
February 19, 1977. After his death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the
marriage of Pepito and Norma alleging that said marriage was void for lack of marriage
license.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the second marriage of Pepito was void?
2. Whether or not the heirs of the deceased may file for the declaration of the nullity of
Pepitos marriage after his death?
HELD:
The marriage of Pepito and Norma is void for absence of the marriage license. They cannot
be exempted even though they instituted an affidavit and claimed that they cohabit for at
least 5 years because from the time of Pepitos first marriage was dissolved to the time of
his marriage with Norma, only about 20 months had elapsed. Albeit, Pepito and his first wife
had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and Norma had started living with each
other that has already lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period
cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by law. Hence, his marriage to Norma
is still void.
Void marriages are deemed to have not taken place and cannot be the source of rights. It
can be questioned even after the death of one of the parties and any proper interested party
may attack a void marriage.

TITLE: Tenchavez vs. Escano

CITATION: 15 SCRA 355
FACTS:
27 years old Vicenta Escano who belong to a prominent Filipino Family of Spanish ancestry
got married on Feburary 24, 1948 with Pastor Tenchavez, 32 years old engineer, and exarmy officer before Catholic chaplain Lt. Moises Lavares. The marriage was a culmination of
the love affair of the couple and was duly registered in the local civil registry. A certain
Pacita Noel came to be their match-maker and go-between who had an amorous relationship
with Tenchavez as written by a San Carlos college student where she and Vicenta are
studying. Vicenta and Pastor are supposed to renew their vows/ marriage in a church as
suggested by Vicentas parents. However after translating the said letter to Vicentas dad ,
he disagreed for a new marriage. Vicenta continued leaving with her parents in Cebu while
Pastor went back to work in Manila.
Vicenta applied for a passport indicating that she was single and when it was approved she
left for the United States and filed a complaint for divorce against Pastor which was later on
approved and issued by the Second Judicial Court of the State of Nevada. She then sought
for the annulment of her marriage to the Archbishop of Cebu. Vicenta married Russell Leo
Moran, an American, in Nevada and has begotten children. She acquired citizenship on
August 8, 1958. Petitioner filed a complaint against Vicenta and her parents whom he
alleged to have dissuaded Vicenta from joining her husband.
ISSUE: Whether the divorce sought by Vicenta Escano is valid and binding upon courts of
the Philippines.
HELD:
Civil Code of the Philippines does not admit divorce. Philippine courts cannot give
recognition on foreign decrees of absolute divorce between Filipino citizens because it would
be a violation of the Civil Code. Such grant would arise to discrimination in favor of rich
citizens who can afford divorce in foreign countries. The adulterous relationship of Escano
with her American husband is enough grounds for the legal separation prayed by
Tenchavez. In the eyes of Philippine laws, Tenchavez and Escano are still married. A foreign
divorce between Filipinos sought and decreed is not entitled to recognition neither is the
marriage of the divorcee entitled to validity in the Philippines. Thus, the desertion and
securing of an invalid divorce decree by one spouse entitled the other for damages.

WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby modified as follows;

(1) Adjudging plaintiff-appellant Pastor Tenchavez entitled to a decree of legal separation

from defendant Vicenta F. Escao;
(2) Sentencing defendant-appellee Vicenta Escao to pay plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez the
amount of P25,000 for damages and attorneys' fees;
(3) Sentencing appellant Pastor Tenchavez to pay the appellee, Mamerto Escao and the
estate of his wife, the deceased Mena Escao, P5,000 by way of damages and attorneys'
fees.
Or
Facts:
Vicenta Escao and Pastor Tenchavez secretly got married before a Catholic chaplain and planned
to elope.The elopement did not materialize because Vicentas mother discovered such marriage.
Her parents asked the advice of one Father Reynes and subsequently agreed to recelebrate the
marriage. However, Vicenta refused to proceed with the ceremony because a letter from the
students of san Carlos College disclosed that Pastor and their matchmaker, Pacita Noel had an
amorous relationship. Vicenta left for the States, acquired a foreign divorce and married an
American, Russel Leo Moran in Nevada. She sought for a divorce from Tenchavez in 1950 and
sought ecclesiastical release from her marriage to Tenchavez in 1954. Escano claims that state
recognition should be accorded the Church's disavowal of her marriage with Tenchavez.. Escano
argued that her second marriage deserves the laws recognition and protection over the other.es
the laws recognition and protection over the other since it fits concept of a marriage as a social
institution because publicly contracted, recognized by both civil and ecclesiastical authorities,
and blessed by three children. She also contends that the court has no jurisdiction over her.

Husband filed complaint:

Vs. Parents: for having dissuaded and discouraged Vicenta from joining her husband and
alienating her affections
Vs. Roman Catholic Church: for having decreed annulment
Parents filed counterclaim for moral and exemplary damages.
Issue
WON marriage between Tenchavez and Escano still subsists in lieu of the divorce
WON there is an action for alienation of affections against parents
Held
NO
Ratio:
1. no proof of malice
2. parents themselves suggested that the marriage be celebrated again
3. also, Vicenta appeared to have acted independently and being of age, she was entitled to 4.
judge what was best for her and ask that her decisions be respected
THERE WAS A VALID MARRIAGE between Vicenta and Tenchaves:
With regard to jurisdiction over Escano, the court states that when against the non-resident
defendant affects the personal status of the plaintiff, as, for instance, an action for separation or
for annulment of marriage, ..., Philippine courts may validly try and decide the case, because,

then, they have jurisdiction over the matter , and in that event their jurisdiction over the person
of the non-resident defendant is not essential. The point is the personal status of the plaintiff
domiciled in the Philippines. Divorce, although successfully obtained in another country, cannot
be applied in the Philippines since it is contrary to public policy. The principle is well-established,
in private international law, that foreign decrees cannot be enforced or recognized if they
contravene public policy. Furthermore, Vicentas refusal to perform her wifely duties, and her
denial of consortium and her desertion of husband constitute in law a wrong caused through her
fault, for which the husband is entitled to damages (2176). When, however, the action against
the non-resident defendant affects the personal status of the plaintiff, as, for instance, an action
for separation or for annulment of marriage, ..., Philippine courts may validly try and decide the
case, because, then, they have jurisdiction over the res, and in that event their jurisdiction over
the person of the non-resident defendant is not essential. The res is the personal status of the
plaintiff domiciled in the Philippines, 45,000 damages awarded to parents deemed excessive:
filing of suit nay have wounded their feelings and caused anxiety but this has not seriously
injured their reputation or otherwise prejudiced them, lawsuits having become a common
occurrence in present society.

Trinidad v. CA 289 SCRA 189

Facts
Arturio Trinidad claims to be the son of Inocentes Trinidad, who together with Felix
and Lourdes, his siblings, are heirs to four parcels of land of their deceased father.
He presented the following evidence.
a. testimony of Gerardo that Inocentes and his wife cohabited and had a child
b. testimony of Meren that she was present in the marriage of Inocentes
c. His own baptismal certificate (his birth certificate had been destroyed)
d. Family pictures and his own testimony that he lived with Lourdes, until he got
married.
Lourdes, the aunt of Inocentes, presented the following evidence to refute Arturios
claims:
a. testimony of Briones that Inocentes was never married
b. her own testimony that Inocentes died childless and she claimed that Arturio
was simply a neighbor. She denied knowledge of the pictures Arturio presented,
where she is shown holding the baby of Arturio, together with Arturio and his wife.
Issue
Whether or not evidence of the marriage of Inocentes and Arturios filiation are
sufficient.
Held
Yes. In the absence of a marriage certificate, any of the four can be sufficient proof
of marriage: fact of marriage ceremony, open cohabitation of the parties, birth
certificate of the child, and other documents. Arturio presented the first 3. For

filiation, when the birth certificate cant be produced, other evidence like the
baptismal certificate, is admissible. Use of surname without objection is also
presumptive evidence of legitimacy.
Or
Facts:
Arturio claimed that he is the child of the Respondents brother Innocentes. These were his
evidences:
1.

Testimony of Gerardo that Inocentes and his wife cohabited and had a child;

2.

Testimony of Meren that she was present in the marriage of Arturio's parents;

3.

His own baptismal certificate (his birth certificate had been destroyed); and

4.

Family pictures and his own testimony that he lived with Lourdes, until he got married.

Issue:
Whether or not the the above evidences are enough to prove that Arturio is the legitimate child
of innocentes.
Ruling:
Yes. In the absence of a marriage certificate, any of the four can be sufficient proof of marriage:
1.

Fact of marriage ceremony;

2.

Open cohabitation of the parties;

3.

Birth certificate of the child; and

4.
Other documents.
Arturio presented the first 3. For filiation, when the birth certificate cant be produced, other
evidence like the baptismal certificate, is admissible. Use of surname without objection is also
presumptive evidence of legitimacy.

PILAPIL VS IBAY-SOMERA
MARCH 28, 2013 ~ VBDIAZ
PILAPIL vs. HON IBAY-SOMERA, VICTOR AND GEILING et al
G.R. No. 80116
June 30, 1989
FACTS: Petitioner Imelda Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private respondent Erich Geiling, a
German national, were married in Germany. After about three and a half years of marriage,
such connubial disharmony eventuated in Geiling initiating a divorce proceeding against
Pilapil in Germany. The Local Court, Federal Republic of Germany, promulgated a decree of
divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses.
More than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, Geiling filed two complaints
for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging in one that, while still married to said
Geiling, Pilapil had an affair with a certain William Chia. The Assistant Fiscal, after the
corresponding investigation, recommended the dismissal of the cases on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence. However, upon review, the respondent city fiscal Victor approved a
resolution directing the filing of 2 complaint for adultery against the petitioner. The case
entitled PP Philippines vs. Pilapil and Chia was assigned to the court presided by the
respondent judge Ibay-Somera.
A motion to quash was filed in the same case which was denied by the respondent. Pilapil
filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a TRO, seeking
the annulment of the order of the lower court denying her motion to quash.
As cogently argued by Pilapil, Article 344 of the RPC thus presupposes that the marital
relationship is still subsisting at the time of the institution of the criminal action for adultery.
ISSUE: Did Geiling have legal capacity at the time of the filing of the complaint for adultery,
considering that it was done after obtaining a divorce decree?

HELD: WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying petitioners MTQ is SET ASIDE and
another one entered DISMISSING the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The TRO issued in
this case is hereby made permanent.
NO
Under Article 344 of the RPC, the crime of adultery cannot be prosecuted except upon a
sworn written complaint filed by the offended spouse. It has long since been established,
with unwavering consistency, that compliance with this rule is a jurisdictional, and not
merely a formal, requirement.
Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the action, it
necessarily follows that such initiator must have the status, capacity or legal representation
to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal action. This is a logical consequence since
the raison detre of said provision of law would be absent where the supposed offended
party had ceased to be the spouse of the alleged offender at the time of the filing of the
criminal case.
Stated differently, the inquiry would be whether it is necessary in the commencement of a
criminal action for adultery that the marital bonds between the complainant and the
accused be unsevered and existing at the time of the institution of the action by the former
against the latter.
In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country,
the Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be
recognized in the Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned in view of the
nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of status of persons Under the same
considerations and rationale, private respondent, being no longer the husband of petitioner,
had no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the
offended spouse at the time he filed suit.
or
FACTS:
Imelda M. Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, was married with private respondent, Erich Ekkehard
Geiling, a German national before the Registrar of Births, Marriages and Deaths at
Friedensweiler, Federal Republic of Germany. They have a child who was born on April 20,
1980 and named Isabella Pilapil Geiling. Conjugal disharmony eventuated in private
respondent and he initiated a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany before the
Schoneberg Local Court in January 1983. The petitioner then filed an action for legal
separation, support and separation of property before the RTC Manila on January 23, 1983.
The decree of divorce was promulgated on January 15, 1986 on the ground of failure of
marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child was granted to the petitioner.
On June 27, 1986, private respondent filed 2 complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of
Manila alleging that while still married to Imelda, latter had an affair with William Chia as
early as 1982 and another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983.

ISSUE: Whether private respondent can prosecute petitioner on the ground of adultery even
though they are no longer husband and wife as decree of divorce was already issued.
or
FACTS:
On September 7, 1979, Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipina and Erich Geiling were married at Friedenweiler in the Federal
Republic of Germany. After about three and a half years of marriage, Geiling initiated a divorce proceeding against Pilapil in
Germany in January 1983.
Pilapil, petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of property before RTC of
Manila on January 23, 1983 where it is still pending as a civil case. On January 15, 1986, the local Court of Germany
promulgated a divorce decree on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child was granted to
petitioner.
On June 27, 1986, private respondent filed two complaints for adultery alleging that, while still married to respondent,
petitioner had an affair with a certain William Chua as early as 1982 and with yet another man named Jesus Chua
sometime in 1983. The respondent city fiscal approved a resolution directing the filing of two complaints for adultery against
petitioner. Thereafter, petitioner filed a motion in both criminal cases to defer her arraignment and to suspend further
proceedings thereon. Respondent judge merely reset the date of the arraignment but before such scheduled date, petitioner
moved for the suspension of proceedings. On September 8, 1987, respondent judge denied the motion to quash and also
directed the arraignment of both accused. Petitioner refused to be arraigned and thus charged with direct contempt and
fined.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the case for adultery should prosper.
RULING:
The petition entered dismissing the complaint in criminal case was upheld for lack of jurisdiction. The temporary restraining
order issued in this case was made permanent. The law provides that in prosecutions for adultery and concubinage the
person who can legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse. The fact that private respondent obtained a valid
divorce in his country, is admitted. Private respondent, being no longer married to petitioner has no legal standing to
commence the adultery case under the posture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.

PLAINTIFF / PETITIONER: Tomasa Vda. De Jacob

DEFENDANT / RESPONDENTS: Court of Appeals, Pedro Pilapil, and Juan F. Trivino
NATURE: Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals
PONENTE: Panganiban, J.
FACTS:
Tomasa Vda. De Jacob, alleged surviving spouse of deceased Dr. Alfredo E. Jacob, has
been appointed Special Administratrix of the various estates of her late husband by
virtue of a reconstructed marriage contract between her and the deceased. Defendant
Pilapil intervened, claiming to be the legally adopted son of Alfredo and demanding his
share of the deceaseds estate, being the sole surviving heir. In so doing, Pilapil also
questions the validity of the Tomasa-Alfredo marriage. The trial court declared the
reconstructed marriage contract false while it sustained the defendants claim of being
the legally adopted son and sole surviving heir of Dr. Alfredo E. Jacob. The Court of
Appeals ruled in the same manner and affirmed the trial courts decision. It is from this
decision that the petition filed a petition for review before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether the marriage between plaintiff Tomasa Vda. De Jacob and deceased Dr.
Alfredo E. Jacob was valid; and

(2) Whether defendant Pedro Pilapil is the legally adopted son of Alfredo E. Jacob.
HELD:
(1) Yes; (2) No. Petition granted; decision reversed.

RATIO:
(1) a. Alfredo Jacob and Tomasa had lived together as husband and wife for 5 years.
Under Article 76 of the Civil Code, this qualifies the marriage as exceptional and
a marriage license is not deemed necessary. The Civil Code takes precedence
over the Family Code in this case since the marriage in issue occurred before the
FC took effect.

Art 76. No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a woman, who have
attained the age of majority and who, being unmarried, have lived together as husband
and wife for at least five years, desire to marry each other. The contracting parties shall
state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law or
administer oath. The official, priest or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also
state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of
the contracting parties and that he found no legal impediment to the marriage.

b. Evidence regarding the due execution and loss of the marriage contract have been
presented, but these were erroneously excluded by the trial court and the Court of
Appeal:
1.

testimony of Adelia Pilapil, a witness to the marriage ceremony

2.

testimony of the petitioner herself as a party to the event

3.

testimony and affidavit of the officiating priest, Msr. Yllana

Following such rejection, secondary evidence such as photographs of the wedding

ceremony and documentary evidence as to the loss of the marriage certificate were also
unfairly disregarded.
In doing so, the lower courts confused the aforementioned evidence to show due
execution and loss as secondary evidence of the marriage.
(2) The desposition of Judge Jose L. Moya himself, who allegedly granted the petition
for adoption, clearly and positively declares that he could not recall issuing such
petition, and that the signature over his name was not his.

The burden of proof in establishing adoption is upon the person claiming such
relationship, in this case, Pedro Pilapil. Having failed to produce such evidence, the
alleged adoption is concluded to be a sham.
Or
Tomasa Vda. de Jacob vs. CA (Presumption of Marriage)
Nature of the Case: This is a Petition for Review assailing the decision of the CA
denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration
Facts: Petitioner Tomasa Vda. de Jacob claimed to be the surviving spouse of deceased
Dr. Alfredo E. Jacob and was appointed Special Administratix for the various estates of
the deceased by virtue of a reconstructed Marriage Contract between herself and the
deceased.
Respondent Pedro Pilapil on the other hand, claimed to be the legally-adopted son of
Alfredo, purportedly supported by an Order issued by then Presiding Judge Jose L. Moya,
CFI, Camarines Sur, granting the petition for adoption filed by deceased Alfredo in favor
of Pedro Pilapil.
Pedro sought to intervene during the proceeding for the settlement of the estate of
Alfredo, claiming his share of the deceaseds estate as Alfredo's adopted son and sole
surviving heir. Pedro likewise questioned the validity of the marriage between Appellant
Tomasa and his adoptive father Alfredo.
Appellant claims that the marriage between her and Alfredo was solemnized by one
Msgr. Florencio C. Yllana, CBCP, Intramuros, Manila sometime in 1975. She could not
however present the original copy of the Marriage Contract stating that the original
document was lost when Msgr. Yllana allegedly gave it to Mr. Jose Centenera for
registration. In lieu of the original, Tomasa presented as secondary evidence a
reconstructed Marriage Contract issued in 1978. Several irregularities on the
reconstructed Marriage Contract were observed by the court such as: (1) no copy of the
Marriage Contract was sent to the local civil registrar by the solemnizing officer; (2) a
mere thumbmark was purportedly placed by the late Alfredo Jacob on said
reconstructed marriage contract on 16 September 1975 (date of the marriage), instead
of his customary signature as affixed in their Sworn Affidavit; (3) inconsistencies in the
circumstances and personalities surrounding the lost Marriage Contract mentioned in
the affidavit executed by Msgr. Yllana and in the testimony admitted by the appellant;
and (4) appellant admitted that there was no record of the purported marriage entered
in the book of records in San Agustin Church where the marriage was allegedly
solemnized.
Based on the evidence presented, the trial court ruled for defendant-appellee Pilapil,
sustaining his claim as the legally adopted child and sole heir of deceased Alfredo and
declaring the reconstructed Marriage Contract as spurious and non-existent. The Court
of Appeals sustained the decision of the trial court.

Issues: 1. WON the marriage between the plaintiff Tomasa Vda. De Jacob and deceased
Alfredo E. Jacob was indeed valid
Held: Yes. The marriage between appellant and the deceased was valid.
Ratio: Pilapils claim that the marriage was void due to absence of a marriage license
was misplaced. An affidavit executed by the appellant and the late Dr. Jacob that they
lived together as husband and wife for at least five years exempted them from the
marriage license requirement (Article 76 of the Civil Code).
Also misplaced was Pilapils argument that the marriage was void because of the
absence of a marriage contract and the absence of entry of such in the Books of
Marriage of the Local Civil Registrar and in the National Census and Statistics Office. A
marriage contract is the best evidence of a marriage ceremony. However, the contents
of a document may be proven by competent evidence other than the document itself,
provided that the offeror establishes its due execution and its subsequent loss or
destruction. Accordingly, the fact of marriage may be shown by extrinsic evidence other
than the marriage contract. In the instant case, appellant provided competent
evidence to prove that a marriage ceremony was solemnized between her and the late
Dr. Jacob. Such evidence was supplied by appellant Tomasa, witness Adela Pilapil and
the solemnizing officer Msgr. Yllana through their sworn testimonies both in open court
and in writing, and through the photographs taken during the ceremony.
The absence of an entry pertaining to 1975 in the Books of Marriage of the Local Civil
Registrar of Manila and in the National Census and Statistics Office (NCSO) does not
invalidate the marriage. It is primary duty of the solemnizing officer, not the petitioner,
to send a copy of the marriage certificate to these offices in order to be duly recorded.
In the absence of any counter presumption or evidence special to the case, a man and a
woman deporting themselves as husband and wife are presumed to have entered into a
lawful contract of marriage. As the fact that Dr. Jacob and appellant Tomasa lived
together as husband and wife was not disputed in this case, but was in fact even
accepted, it would follow that the presumption of marriage was not likewise rebutted.