Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
Voidable Marriages
Thursday, July 16, 2009
9:33 AM
Of unsound
mind
When
Parents /
guardian
Party
The insane
party
The sane party
who had no
knowledge of
the insanity of
the spouse.
Any parent,
guardian of
the insane
Cases
Parents /
Moe vs. Dinkins
guardian before the
party reaches
21years old
Party - within
5 years upon
reaching the
age of 21
The insane
spouse during a lucid
interval or
after
regaining
sanity
Others - any
time before
the death of
either party
Katipunan vs.
Tenorio
Suntay vs.
Cojuangco-Suntay
Consent
obtained
through fraud
Consent
obtained
through force,
intimidation, or
undue
influence
Physical
incapacity to
consummate
Not subject to
ratification (it is not a
vice of consent)
Jimenez vs.
Republic
Sarao vs. Guevara
(presumed that
it will be
discovered on
the same day of
the marriage)
marriage
Sexually
transmitted
disease
Not subject to
ratification
Important: defect must have occurred at the time of the celebration of the marriage. This affects
consent.
Any subsequent insanity is not ground for annulment. Annulment focuses on the time of the
wedding.
Buccat vs. Buccat
At 7 months, it would be impossible to hide the pregnancy. The husband entered the marriage
knowing full well what he was going into. He gave his consent (essential requisite).
Why do we give more importance to the prevailing marriage? (1). They instituted their marriage
upon good faith that the absent spouse is dead. (2). It's very easy for the reappearing spouse to file
an affidavit, nullifying the second marriage.
Reappearing spouse cannot remarry because, in relation to her, the marriage is not deemed as
terminated.
Termination of marriage:
1. Annulment
2. Declaration of nullity
3. Death
How the lack of divorce in the Philippines has been circumvented:
1. We have no divorce, however we have Art. 36 of the FC which accepts psychological
incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage.
2. Another way to "effect" divorce is to claim that one spouse is absent.
But the thing is, there must be a "well-founded belief" for any of these claims.
JURISDICTION
Legal Separation
Tuesday, July 21, 2009
10:32 AM
Legal separation presupposes a valid marriage
GROUNDS
Art. 55 FC
Art. 97 CC
Grossly abusive conduct - no intent to kill; ie. Cussing, affecting the self esteem, etc.
In the old civil code, there were only 2 provisions for legal separation: (1) adultery for the woman,
concubinage for the man; (2) attempt by one spouse against the life of the other
1. Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against the petitioner, a common
child, or a child of the petitioner;
Anti VAWC law is not unconstitutional. The very situation of our culture shows that men are still
more aggressive and dominant. Besides, there is in section II of the constitution, that recognizes
the role of women in nation-building.
2. Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the petitioner to change religious or political
affiliation
A single incident is enough.
Superfluous. Violence is violence for whatever purpose. It comes across as more serious than
number 1 too.
Attempt of the respondent to corrupt or induce the petitioner, a common child, or a child of the
petitioner to engage in prostitution, or connivance in such corruption or inducement
Final judgment sentencing the respondent to imprisonment of more than 6 years, even if
pardoned
6 years --> means that crime is serious (involving moral turpitude) and there is no probation
Adultery - involves sexual intercourse of the wife with a man not her husband who knows she is
married (involves every act)
Concubinage - man: (1) maintaining a mistress in the conjugal dwelling, (2) sexual intercourse with
the other woman under scandalous circumstances, (3) cohabiting with her in any other place
[relationship of 5 years] (involves the relationship under certain circumstances)
Punishment for concubinage: destierro (?)
The woman is punished more severely than the man. The circumstances for concubinage are very
difficult to fulfill.
Sexual infidelity is a gender neutral term.
Who determines if a sexual act is perverse? The offended spouse. Also, it should be decided on a
case to case basis.
People vs. Zapata and Bondoc
Defense during the 1st time: man did not know of the status of the woman. He cannot use this
defense again after the trial.
Every sexual act is considered a count of adultery. So if they are involved for a year, there are 365
counts of adultery.
Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more than 1 year
DEFENSES
Art. 56 FC
for separation. This is actually, anti family. With the exception, the court is telling the parties that,
the marriage can still be saved, and that the government supports this attempt.
The FC revised the provision in the CC. It removed the 1 year provision on the knowledge of the
innocent spouse. Why?
o It's difficult to determine when knowledge was really had.
o A spouse will not immediately rush to court. He or she will take time to get counseling, or
advice in order to try to fix the marriage.
If it's concubinage or adultery, the 5 year period is counted from the last instance of sexual
intercourse.
EFFECTS OF DECREE
Art. 63, 64 FC
PD 612, Sec 11 (Insurance Code)
Effects:
(1) husband and wife are entitled to live apart from each other, although marital bonds still
SUBSIST;
(2) ACP or CPG is DISSOLVED and LIQUIDATED, and the offending spouse is not entitled to
his or her share in the net profits of the properties;
(3) CUSTODY of minor children passes to the innocent spouse, subject to Art. 213 of the
Family Code;
(4) the offending spouse CANNOT INHERIT from the innocent spouse from intestate
succession, and any wills created before the decree are revoked by operation of the law.
Mother was declared unfit to care for her children by virtue of her poverty
However, wealth will not necessarily make one fit to take custody of a child
What role does financial situation play in the fitness or unfitness of a parent to take custody of the
children? It is not a factor to be disregarded. If it is a question of abject poverty on one hand and
means to live on the other, the child will be given to the latter. However, if it is a question of
relative wealth, it doesn't play a role. It doesnt matter who is a little wealthier than the other.
Other effects - Art. 372 CC
Will - same effect as in nullity; any will (tested or intested) will be revoked unless it was drawn up
after the offense was committed. (tolentino)
Art. 64 - The revocation or the change in the designation of the insurance beneficiary shall take
effect upon written notification thereof to the insured (the innocent spouse).
o The offended spouse still has to make a written notification to the insurance company that
she revokes the spouse as the beneficiary. The revocation shall finally be in effect when the
insured (the innocent spouse) is subsequently informed of such by the insurance company.
o If the innocent spouse dies before receiving notification from the insurance company, there
is no revocation.
o Why the unreasonableness? Typo. :o
Art. 64 - The action to revoke the donation must be brought within 5 years from the time of the
decree of legal separation has become final
Art. 372: When legal separation has been granted, the wide shall continue using her name and
surname before the legal separation.
Marital status is unaffected by legal separation. Woman must still use her husband's name. One
cannot deceive others by a change in name.
After the legal separation, the name used during the marriage shall subsist.
RECONCILIATION
How done
Art. 65 FC
Joint manifestation under oath duly signed, filed with the court in the same proceeding for legal
separation
Effects
Art. 66 - 67 FC
Property regime - separate regime shall subsist unless the spouses want to revive the old property
regime
Marriage
CPG
ACP
Legal Separation
Dissolve CPG
Dissolve ACP
Reconciliation
ACP
CPG
But Tolentino says that article 67 says that they can decide which properties to make
conjugal and which not to. They dont have to return to the old property regime.
ACP and CPG commence at the exact moment of marriage.
Divorces
Tuesday, July 28, 2009
10:11 AM
Nullity
Divorce
Annulment
Void ab intio
Marital ties
Allowed
Allowed
FOREIGN DIVORCES
Art. 15 CC
Art. 26 FC
Nationality principle - makes nationality or citizenship as the basis for determining the personal laws
of an individual
Exception to the rule that there are no divorces in the Philippines:
If Filipino is married to an alien and the latter is the one who secures the divorce in his /
her home country, then the Filipino spouse can likewise remarry (Art. 26)
Code of Muslim Personal Laws
MUSLIM DIVORCES
Code of Muslim Personal Laws
...
o
o
o
Takes the place of self defense. Unlawful aggression must be happening when the self
defense occurs.
Battered wife syndrome as a defense does not necessitate that the unlawful aggression must
be happening when the wife retaliates.
4 criteria should be fulfilled:
Woman believes that the violence was her fault.
The woman has an inability to place the responsibility for the violence elsewhere.
The woman fears for her life and/or her children's lives.
The woman has an irrational belief that the abuser is omnipresent and omniscient.
Cycle
Types of domicile:
o Domicile of origin
o Domicile of choice
o Constructive domicile -when the people are not capacitated to choose their own domicile; ex.
For children; insane or very ill; prisoners; diplomats; military
Traditionally, women are placed under constructive domicile. Women are expected join the
husband wherever he is.
Art. 69 FC
Residence - where one physically is, where one actually lives
Ex. I live in manila only for lawschool
Domicile - factum (fact) et animus (intent): place one considers home; if you leave it, you intend to
return to it
Manendi - if you leave for a while but intend to return
Nintendi (?)
Ex. But I'm really from Surigao.
Ma'am's problem with the FC: there is no distinction between residence and domicile; the wife may
be installed in a residence while the husband is in a domicile
Tenchavez vs. Escano
Facts:
o 1st: Pastor Tenchavez & Vicenta Escao were married in 1948. In 1950, defendant Escao
obtained a foreign divorce in Nevada. She further sought papal dispensation of the marriage
but no document was presented.
2nd: Escaos marriage to American Rusell Leo Moran in the US in 1954, which was later
blessed with 3 children.
Decision:
o Wife had to pay moral damages
o Divorce was rendered invalid
issues:
o WON divorce is valid
o WON Court may then compel Escao to cohabit with Tenchavez
Ratio:
NO; Divorce is invalid for a foreign divorce decree cannot be recognized in the Phils especially
if it was granted by court of the place which was not the parties bona fide domicile and on a
ground not recognized by our law, which does not allow absolute divorce. Even in private
international law, foreign decrees (esp those confirming or dissolving a marriage) cannot be
enforced or recognized if they contravene public policy.
No. It is not within the province of courts to attempt to compel one of the spouses to cohabit
with, and render conjugal rights to the other. However, a sp who unjustifiable deserts the
conjugal abode can be denied support.
The law is not so unreasonable as to require the wife to live with the husband under those
circumstances.
Issues:
o WON the wife is entitled for separate support from her husband.
o WON she is entitled to P750 monthly allowance
Ratio:
o Yes;
In order to entitle a wife to maintain a separate home and to require separate
maintenance from the husband it is not necessary that the husband should bring a
concubine into the home. Perverse and illicit relations with women outside the conjugal
home are sufficient grounds.
Ruling in Arroyo vs. Vasquez de Arroyo is not applicable because in the Arroyo case the
only grounds that were alleged was cruelty and that charge was not proven. In the
present case the charge of cruelty was also not proven but the Aurelia also accused her
husband of infidelity and that charge has been proven (repeated acts of conjugal
infidelity) and the husband appears to be a recurrent, if not incurable offender. This fact
gives the wife an undeniable right to relief.
Goita vs. Campos Rueda husband cannot by his own wrongful acts, relieve himself
from the duty to support his wife. When he drives his wife from the domicile fixed by
him, he cannot take advantage of her departure to abrogate the law applicable to the
marital relations and repudiate his duties.
No; Court granted allowance of P500 a month. P750 would be excessive since the living
quarters that she uses are part of the conjugal estate.
Facts:
April 8, 1910 Cipriana Garcia & Isabelo Santiago were married
Feb. 3, 1925 Cipriana was compelled to leave the conjugal dwelling due to:
continued family dissensions
Alejo, Isabelos son by his first wife seduced Prisca Aurelio, Ciprianas daughter
by her first husband. Prisca gave birth to a child. Isabelo, instead of requiring his son to
marry Prisca, refused to interfere & he seemed to tolerate the illicit relationship.
Isabelo has conveyed/been conveying their conjugal properties to Alejo to
foster latters whims & caprices and thus, damaging & prejudicing her rights. Some of
these properties include lands acquired during their marriage with money belonging to
the conjugal partnership. Land annually produces 4,500 cavanes of palay at
P4.00/cavan.
o Other allegations of Cipriana/Prayers to the Court:
Their separation is necessary to avoid personal violence. She could not live in the
i.
conjugal dwelling due to the illicit relationship of Alejo & Prisca tolerated by Isabelo.
ii.
She is entitled to P500.00 pendente lite monthly pension from conjugal partnership.
However, Isabelo refused to provide for her support despite her demands.
iii.
She should be in-charge of the administration of the property of their conjugal
partnership because Isabelo is unfit to do so. He exhibits immoral conduct & acts by
publicly maintaining an illicit relationship with Geronima Yap.
o Isabelo: answered with a general denial.
o COFI: dismissed petition.
Decision: Judgment modified. Separation is allowed. Isabelo ordered provide Cipriana with a
P50.00 monthly allowance to be paid within the first 10 days of each month. No costs allowed.
Issues:
o WON their separation is unjustified
o WON transfers of property from Isabelo to Alejo are illegal
o WON Cipriana is entitled to P500.00 monthly maintenance
o WON Isabelo is unfit to administer their conjugal property
o WON Cipriana is entitled to an allowance of attorneys fees
Ratio:
o NO; They were having a stormy life prior to the separation due to the frequent fights. Isabelo
ordered her to leave the house & threatened to ill-treat her if she returned. Priscas situation
is embarrassing for her mother. Highly possible that Alejo caused Priscas pregnancy.
Compelling them to cohabit could lead to further quarrels.
o NO; Failed to prove that property was community property. Documentary evidence even
show that it was acquired by Isabelo before their marriage.
o NO; Thats too much. P50.00 would be enough.
o NO; No sufficient reason found to deprive him of this right.
o NO.
o
o
Facts:
On May 9, 1940, plaintiff Genoveva D.R. (widow w/ 2 kids) and defendant Teoderico D.R.
(mechanic, widower w/ a son) were married. They lived together in the house of defendant's
mother. Because of petty quarrels, plaintiff left the conjugal home in 1942.
Decision: Judgment appealed from is affirmed. Costs against appellant.
Issue:
o WON plaintiff is justified in leaving and is entitled to support
o WON Php 150 is too much for support
Ratio:
o YES; As the marriage vow does not include making sacrifices for the in-laws, there is legal
justification for wifes refusal to live with her husband, taking into account the traditional
hatred between the wife and her mother-in-law. It is true that the wife is obliged to follow
her husband wherever he wishes to establish the residence (Art 58 CC), but this right does not
include compelling her to live with her mother-in-law, if they cannot get along together.
o NO; Alimony will be set according to the husbands ability to pay and the wife's need. Php 150
is not excessive.
o
Notes:
Ground that makes continued marital life impossible should be given by the husband and not the inlaws.
Court's inconsistent in judging cases regarding in-laws
Art. 111 CC
Tolentino says that if there is conflict, the husband assumes the same responsibility in the Civil
Code. :o BOOOOOO.
Art. 199 - 200 FC
Art. 199. Whenever two or more persons are obliged to give support, the liability shall devolve
upon the following persons in the order herein provided:
(1) The spouse;
(2) The descendants in the nearest degree;
(3) The ascendants in the nearest degree; and
(4) The brothers and sisters. (294a)
Art. 200. When the obligation to give support falls upon two or more persons, the payment of
the same shall be divided between them in proportion to the resources of each.
McGuire vs. McGuire
Nature: Action in equity by wife to recover suitable maintenance and support money.
Facts:
o Plaintiff (wife) and Defendant (husband) were married on August 11, 1919. The husband had
a reputation for more than ordinary frugality and the wife was aware of this situation.
o The wife had been previously married but her first husband died. She and her 2 daughters
inherited an 80 acre land of which she has 1/3 interest.
o The defendant would not tolerate any charge amounts and he would not inform her as to
finances or business.
o There were several occasions wherein the plaintiff would ask for money but it would not be
granted by the husband. During the marriage the plaintiff raised chickens and the she used
the proceeds of the chickens and eggs to buy things that she wanted, clothing and groceries.
During the last 3 or 4 years the defendant allowed her to buy groceries but we would pay for
the items purchased via check. The house in not equipped with a bathroom, bathing facilities
or inside toilet.
o Defendant owns 398 acres of land, bank deposits, and government bonds. The plaintiff owns
a bank account which include the required $200 and $100 deposits of the defendant during
the pendency of the proceedings.
o During the trial the plaintiff continued to live with the defendant.
o District court ruled in favor of the plaintiff
o Errors assigned by the defendant
Decree was not supported by sufficient evidence
Decree is contrary to law
Decree is an unwarranted usurpation and invasion of the defendants fundamental and
constitutional right
Court erred in allowing fees for the plaintiffs attorney
o Allegations of the plaintiff
Extreme cruelty
Decision: Judgment rendered by the district court is reversed. Cause remanded with directions
to dismiss cause.
Issues:
o WON the wife is entitled to Separate Maintenance
o WON wife is entitled to attorney's fees from the husband
Ratio:
o NO
Where a husband and wife were not separated or living apart from each other and the
purpose of marriage relation was being carried out, wife could not maintain action in
equity against husband for maintenance.
As long as the home is maintained and the parties are living as husband and wife, public
policy requires a holding that the husband is legally supporting his wife and that the
purpose of the marriage is being carried out.
Indispensable requirements that the wife should be living separate and apart from her
husband without her fault and therefore a wife living in the same house with her
husband, occupying a different room and eating at a different time was not entitled to
separate maintenance [Lowe v. Lowe]
Marital relation has continued for 33 years and the wife has been supported in the
same manner without and complaint on her part. The parties have not been separated
or living apart. Action for support and maintenance parties must be separated or
living apart from each other
o NO
Where no legal basis existed for action by wife for maintenance because she was not
living separate and apart from husband, allowance of attorney's fees is unauthorized
and erroneous.
The practice in this state is to allow attorney's fees only in such cases as are provided
for by statute, or where the uniform course of procedure has been to allow such
recovery.
Dissent [Justice Yeager]
o If the right is to be extended only to one who is separated from the husband equity and
effective justice would be denied where a wealthy husband refused proper support and
maintenance to a wife physically or mentally incapable of putting herself in a position where
the rule could be applicable to her.
o Within the power of every man, who, unrestrained by conscience, seeks to be freed from his
obligations to his wife and family, by withholding the necessary comforts and support due
them, to compel her to so that for hi which the law would not do upon his own application.
Notes:
Basically the wife was complaining of extreme cruelty.
The husband was a millionaire but there was no bathroom inside the house, he wouldn't give
money to her for grocery, he only bought her 1 coat in 4 years, he didn't take her to the movies for
12 years, etc. :(
Oct. 13, 1906 Arturo Pelayo, a physician based in Cebu, was called to the house of Marcelo
Lauron & Juana Abella (defendants) in San Nicolas. Their daughter-in-law was about to give
birth & they requested him to render medical assistance. Since it was a difficult birth, he had
to perform a surgery to remove the fetus using forceps. He also removed the afterbirth. He
finished all of these until the following morning.
o He visited the patient several times the following day.
o Just & equitable value for the services he rendered: P500.00.
o Without any good reason, defendants refused to pay said amount. Thus he filed a case
praying for a judgment in his favor against defendants for the sum of P500.00 + costs along
with other relief that may be deemed proper.
o Defendants alleged:
Their daughter-in-law died in consequence of the childbirth.
Their son & daughter-in-law lived independently & her giving birth in their house was
only accidental.
Prayed that they be absolved.
o CFI: Defendants absolved due to lack of sufficient evidence to establish right of action.
Issue: WON the defendants are bound to pay the bill for the services Pelayo has rendered.
Decision: NO. CFI judgment affirmed. Costs against appellant.
Ratio:
o NO; Among the reciprocal obligations existing between a husband and wife is that of support,
which obligation is established by law.
o Where a husband whom the law compels to support his wife is living, the father and mother
in law of the latter are under no liability to provide for her.
o The law does not compel any person to support a stranger unless such person bound himself
to do so by an express contract.
o
Notes:
Sources of obligations:
Law
Contract - when there is an express agreement between the parties
Quasi-contract - when there is no agreement between the parties (ex. A storm comes and the
door gets blown off. The carpenter, who just happens to be there, fixes it. You have the
obligation to pay even though you didn't have an express agreement.)
o Delicts
o Quasi-delicts
Pelayo case: focus is the contract only. They forgot the quasi-contract and law aspects of the
case. The lawyer of the doctor is at fault for not knowing that the parents-in-law are not obligated.
Art. 199 is counter-intuitive to the practice in our society that parents-in-law are considered as
parents in a marriage
o
o
o
Art. 71 FC
Art. 115 CC
Art. 115. The wife manages the affairs of the household. She may
purchase things necessary for the support of the family, and the
conjugal partnership shall be bound thereby. She may borrow
money for this purpose, if the husband fails to deliver the proper
sum. The purchase of jewelry and precious objects is voidable,
unless the transaction has been expressly or tacitly approved by the
husband, or unless the price paid is from her paraphernal property.
Under Art. 71, can the wife buy jewelry? Yes. But who is responsible for it financially? She is. It is
not for the management of the household.
Art. 71 is not a free pass for the wife to buy anything.
Art. 71 is still not equal because although the law says it is joint, it further says that in case of
disagreement, the decision of the husband prevails.
The couple never explicitly talked about who should be the bread-winner and who should be the
home-maker. The husband just fell into the latter category because he didn't want to look for a job.
Concurring opinion:
o Even if the children were given to the mom, the court said that they did not break the
continuity of the child-rearing because even if the dad, for the past 3 years, was a primary
care-taker, he would be gone, would disappear, etc. If the mom takes custody, their routine
would basically be the same.
Dissenting opinion:
o If it was the other way around, they wouldn't put pressure on the mother to get employment.
There seems to be something wrong with a man who stays at home taking care of the
children.
o The court seems to have ignored the gender-neutral policy of the law.
o If it was the other way around with the mother as the primary care-giver, she would have
been given custody.
EXERCISE OF PROFESSION
Art. 73 FC, compared with Art. 117 CC
RA 7192 Women in Development and Nation Building Act
Art. 73 FC, compared with Art. 117 CC
Art. 73 FC
Art. 117 CC
Art. 117. The wife may exercise any profession or occupation or
engage in business. However, the husband may object,
provided:
(1) His income is sufficient for the family, according to its
social standing, and
(2) His opposition is founded on serious and valid
grounds.
In case of disagreement on this question, the parents and
grandparents as well as the family council, if any, shall be
consulted. If no agreement is still arrived at, the court will
decide whatever may be proper and in the best interest of the
family.
Art. 73 (2) - doesn't make sense, neither logical or fair. Benefit accrued to the whole family when
there was no objection. And yet, the obligation is enforced upon the property of the spouse who
did not ask for consent. It should be charged against conjugal property since the whole family has
benefited already.
o Did the law not just say earlier that there is no need for consent? And yet in the latter part of
the article, punishes the spouse who engages in a business without the consent of the latter. _Some people suspect that there is a type in the law.
Correction: If the benefit accrued prior to the objection, the resulting obligation shall be
enforced against the conjugal property of the spouses.
RA 7192
Sec. 5. Equality in Capacity to Act. Women of legal age, regardless of civil status, shall have
the capacity to act and enter into contracts which shall in every respect be equal to that of men
under similar circumstances.
In all contractual situations where married men have the capacity to act, married women shall have
equal rights.
To this end:
(1) Women shall have the capacity to borrow and obtain loans and execute security and credit
arrangement under the same conditions as men;.
(2) Women shall have equal access to all government and private sector programs granting
agricultural credit, loans and non-material resources and shall enjoy equal treatment in
agrarian reform and land resettlement programs;
(3) Women shall have equal rights to act as incorporators and enter into insurance contracts;
and
(4) Married women shall have rights equal to those of married men in applying for passport,
secure visas and other travel documents, without need to secure the consent of their
spouses.
In all other similar contractual relations, women shall enjoy equal rights and shall have the capacity
to act which shall in every respect be equal to those of men under similar circumstances.
The first time we hear of the role of women in nation building, was in the constitution.
USE OF SURNAME
Art. 370, 373, 377, 378 CC
Civil Code Articles:
Art. 370: A married woman may use:
o Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband's surname
o Her maiden first name and her husband's surname
o Her husband's full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is his wife (ex. "Mrs.")
Art. 373: A widow may use the deceased husband's surname as though he were still living, in
accordance with Art. 370
Art. 377: Usurpation of a name and surname may be the subject of an action for damages and
other relief
Art. 378: The unauthorized or unlawful use of another person's surname gives a right of action
to the latter
Silva vs. Peralta
Facts:
o 1944 - defendant Esther Peralta accompanied younger sister Florence in the latters arrest
and investigation in Anibongan for having collaborated with the enemy.
o There, defendant met plaintiff and appellant Saturnino Silva, a US citizen and officer of the US
Army.
o Silva then started courting Esther and she later accepted his proposal of marriage having been
made to believe that he was single. They started living together as common-law H & W in Dec
1944 and bore a son, Saturnino Silva, Jr. They were married on Jan 14, 1945. However, no
documents of marriage were prepared nor executed. Only evidence offered was testimonies
of the defendant and her counsel.
Appellant Silva however, was married to one Priscilla Isabel of Australia during such time. It
was only after May 1945, when he was sent back to US for medical treatments of his battle
wounds, did he divorce Aussie.
o To add, on May 9, 1948, he contracted another marriage with co-plaintiff Elenita Ledesma
Silva.
Decision: Judgment modified.
o Defendant is enjoined from representing herself, directly or indirectly as the wife of Saturnino
Silva
o Appellant is ordered to pay defendant Php 30,000 pecuniary and moral damages; and Php
5000 as attorney's fees
Issues:
o WON appellants deception and fraud justified award of damages to defendant
o WON defendant misrepresented herself as Mrs. Silva
Ratio:
o Yes; if appellant revealed his true situation, appellee would never have agreed to be with
appellant. Esthers loss of employment in the Girl Scouts Davao Council was ultimately a
result of Silvas deception and she should be indemnified for it. His concealment of his real
status was fraud. He should then stand solely liable for any & all damages arising therefrom.
o NO; Esther acted in good faith since Silva formerly introduced her as Mrs. Silva, and sent her
letters thus addressed which implied authority to use his name. However, in the face of
evidence, it is safe to conclude that no marriage had really taken place. Therefore, it is not
proper for Esther to continue representing herself as the wife of Saturnino considering that at
the time, he was still married to Priscilla Isabel. And as per Art 370 CC, a married woman is
authorized to use husbands surname, impliedly, it also excludes others from doing likewise.
Tolentino vs. CA
Nature: Petition for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals
Facts:
o February 8, 1931 Respondent Consuelo David married Arturo Tolentino.
o September 15, 1943 Marriage was dissolved and terminated pursuant to the law during the
Japanese occupation by a decree of absolute divorce on the grounds of desertion and
abandonment by the wife for a t least 3 continuous years
o Arturo Tolentio married Pilar Adorable but she died soon after the marriage
o Constancia married Arturo Tolentino on April 21, 1945 and they have 3 children. Constancia
Tolentino is the present legal wife of Arturo Tolentino
o Consuelo David continued using the surname Tolentino after the divorce and up to the time
that the complaint was filed. Her usage of the surname Tolentino was authorized by the
family of Arturo Tolentino (brothers and sisters)
o Trial Court ruled that Consuelo David should discontinue her usage of the surname of
Tolentino
o Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Trial Court.
Issues:
o WON the petitioners cause of action has already prescribed
o WON the petitioner can exclude by injunction Consuelo David from using the surname of her
former husband from whom she was divorced.
Ratio:
o YES;
Art. 1150 (CC) The time for prescription of all kinds of actions, when there in no special
provision which ordains otherwise, shall be counted from the day they may be brought
Art. 1149 Period of prescription is 5 years from the right of action accrues.
The action has long prescribed because she married Arturo Tolentino on April 21, 1945;
Civil Code took effect on August 30, 1950; She acquired knowledge that Consuelo David
was still using the surname Tolentino in 1951.
She should have filed the case after she obtained knowledge that Consuelo David was
still using the surname Tolentino. The case was filed on November 23, 1971 or 20 years
after she obtained knowledge.
NO;
Philippine law is silent whether or not a divorced woman may continue to use the
surname of her husband because there are no provisions for divorce under Philippine
law.
Commentary of Tolentino with regards to Art. 370 of the CC: the wife cannot claim an
exclusive right to use the husbands surname. She cannot be prevented from using it;
but neither can she restrain others from using it.
Art 371 is not applicable because it contemplates annulment while the present case
refers to absolute divorce where there is severance of valid marriage ties. Effect of
divorce more akin to death of the spouse where the deceased woman is continued to
be referred to as Mrs. Of the husband even if he has remarried.
If the appeal would be granted the respondent would encounter problems because she
was able to prove that she entered into contracts with third persons, acquired
properties and entered into other legal relations using the surname Tolentino.
Petitioner failed to show the she would suffer any legal injury or deprivation of right.
There is no usurpation of the petitioners name and surname. Usurpation implies injury
to the interests of the owner of the name. It consists with the possibility of confusion of
identity
Elements of usurpation
Actual use of anothers name
Use is unauthorized
Use of anothers name is to designate personality or identity of a person
None of these elements were present in the case
Silva v. Peralta case was cited by the petitioner but the case is not applicable. In the
Silva case it was not mere use of the surname that was enjoined but the defendants
representation that she was the wife of Saturnino Silva. Silva case there was usurpation
of the status of the wife.
The children may have a last name that is a combination of both her parents (ie. Kwan +
Sabalo = kwabalo):D haha
first cause of action: since it involves guardianship, its under Sec. 38-b.
third cause of action: since Angelas acts placed Antonio in an embarrassing &
contemptible position causing him grave anxiety, wounded feeling, extreme
humiliation, this is under Sec. 38-d & Art. 116 since it involves acts that bring
dishonor upon the other spouse.
second cause of action: under Art. 116 provision on matl injury according to CFI.
But material injury is not economic but personal (physical/moral). This cause of
action is dependent on & an incident of the first cause of action, demanding
guardianship of Angela. It cant stand independently. Thus, it is also covered by
Sec. 38-b.
3. Allegation re: estoppel of jurisdiction cant operate against Court. Court can inquire &
determine whether it has jurisdiction over the subject matter of an action & can dismiss
the case if it doesnt fall under its jurisdiction.
If the only thing that the wife is doing is wasting her CPG, would it fall under article 72?
Economic injury, moral, physical injuries are covered under Article 73
The obligation which the law imposes on the husband to maintain the wife is a duty
universally recognized and is clearly expressed in articles 142 and 143, CC. Accordingly,
where the wife is forced to leave the matrimonial abode and to live apart from her
husband, she can, in this jurisdiction, compel him to make provision for her separate
maintenance; and he may be required to pay the expenses, including attorneys fees,
necessarily incurred in enforcing such obligation. Nevertheless, the interests of both
parties as well as of society at large require that the courts should move with caution in
enforcing the duty to provide for the separate maintenance of the wife, for this step
involves a recognition of the de facto separation of the spousesa state which is
abnormal and fraught with grave danger to all concerned.
From this consideration it follows that provision should not be made for separate
maintenance in favor of the wife unless it appears that the continued cohabitation of
the pair has become impossible and separation necessary from the fault of the
husband.
Facts of the case show that the plaintiff has done nothing to forfeit his right to the
marital society of his wife and she is under a moral and legal obligation to return to the
common home and cohabit with him.
NO
Although the husband is entitled to a judicial declaration that his wife has absented
herself without sufficient cause and that it is her duty to return, the Court is disinclined
to sanction the doctrine that an order, enforceable by process of contempt, may be
entered to compel the restitution of the purely personal right of consortium.
Thus, that the plaintiff in this case is not entitled to the unconditional and absolute
order for the return of the wife to the marital domicile, which is sought in the petitory
part of the complaint.