CIVIL LAW REVIEW ASSIGNED CASES

ANTHONY R. ESCASINAS
#7
FIRST DIVISION
G. R. No. 187587, June 05, 2013
NAGKAKAISANG MARALITA NG SITIO MASIGASIG, INC., Petitioner, v. MILITARY
SHRINE SERVICES PHILIPPINE VETERANS AFFAIRS OFFICE, DEPARTMENT
OF NATIONAL DEFENSE,Respondent.
RESOLUTION
[G. R. NO. 187654]
WESTERN BICUTAN LOT OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., REPRESENTED BY ITS
BOARD OF DIRECTORS, Petitioner, v. MILITARY SHRINE SERVICES PHILIPPINE
VETERANS AFFAIRS OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL
DEFENSE, Respondent.
DECISION
SERENO, C.J.:
Before us are consolidated Petitions for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
Decision1 promulgated on 29 April 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 97925.
THE FACTS
The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
On 12 July 1957, by virtue of Proclamation No. 423, President Carlos P. Garcia reserved parcels
of land in the Municipalities of Pasig, Taguig, Paraaque, Province of Rizal and Pasay City for a
military reservation. The military reservation, then known as Fort William McKinley, was later
on renamed Fort Andres Bonifacio (Fort Bonifacio).
On 28 May 1967, President Ferdinand E. Marcos (President Marcos) issued Proclamation No.
208, amending Proclamation No. 423, which excluded a certain area of Fort Bonifacio and
reserved it for a national shrine. The excluded area is now known as Libingan ng mga
Bayani, which is under the administration of herein respondent Military Shrine Services
Philippine Veterans Affairs Office (MSS-PVAO).
Again, on 7 January 1986, President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 2476, further amending
Proclamation No. 423, which excluded barangays Lower Bicutan, Upper Bicutan and Signal
Village from the operation of Proclamation No. 423 and declared it open for disposition under
the provisions of Republic Act Nos. (R.A.) 274 and 730.
At the bottom of Proclamation No. 2476, President Marcos made a handwritten addendum,
which reads:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
P.S. This includes Western Bicutan
(SGD.) Ferdinand E. Marcos2
The crux of the controversy started when Proclamation No. 2476 was published in the Official
Gazette3 on 3 February 1986, without the above-quoted addendum.
Years later, on 16 October 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino (President Aquino) issued
Proclamation No. 172 which substantially reiterated Proclamation No. 2476, as published, but

this time excluded Lots 1 and 2 of Western Bicutan from the operation of Proclamation No. 423
and declared the said lots open for disposition under the provisions of R.A. 274 and 730.
Memorandum Order No. 119, implementing Proclamation No. 172, was issued on the same day.
Through the years, informal settlers increased and occupied some areas of Fort Bonifacio
including portions of the Libingan ng mga Bayani. Thus, Brigadier General Fredelito Bautista
issued General Order No. 1323 creating Task Force Bantay (TFB), primarily to prevent further
unauthorized occupation and to cause the demolition of illegal structures at Fort Bonifacio.
On 27 August 1999, members of petitioner Nagkakaisang Maralita ng Sitio Masigasig, Inc.
(NMSMI) filed a Petition with the Commission on Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP),
where it was docketed as COSLAP Case No. 99-434. The Petition prayed for the following: (1)
the reclassification of the areas they occupied, covering Lot 3 of SWO-13-000-298 of Western
Bicutan, from public land to alienable and disposable land pursuant to Proclamation No. 2476;
(2) the subdivision of the subject lot by the Director of Lands; and (3) the Land Management
Bureaus facilitation of the distribution and sale of the subject lot to its bona fide occupants. 4
On 1 September 2000, petitioner Western Bicutan Lot Owners Association, Inc. (WBLOAI)
filed a Petition-in-Intervention substantially praying for the same reliefs as those prayed for by
NMSMI with regard to the area the former then occupied covering Lot 7 of SWO-00-001302 in
Western Bicutan.5
Thus, on 1 September 2006, COSLAP issued a Resolution6 granting the Petition and declaring
the portions of land in question alienable and disposable, with Associate Commissioner Lina
Aguilar-General dissenting.7
The COSLAP ruled that the handwritten addendum of President Marcos was an integral part of
Proclamation No. 2476, and was therefore, controlling. The intention of the President could not
be defeated by the negligence or inadvertence of others. Further, considering that Proclamation
No. 2476 was done while the former President was exercising legislative powers, it could not be
amended, repealed or superseded, by a mere executive enactment. Thus, Proclamation No. 172
could not have superseded much less displaced Proclamation No. 2476, as the latter was issued
on October 16, 1987 when President Aquinos legislative power had ceased.
In her Dissenting Opinion, Associate Commissioner Lina Aguilar-General stressed that pursuant
to Article 2 of the Civil Code, publication is indispensable in every case. Likewise, she held that
when the provision of the law is clear and unambiguous so that there is no occasion for the court
to look into legislative intent, the law must be taken as it is, devoid of judicial addition or
subtraction.8 Finally, she maintained that the Commission had no authority to supply the
addendum originally omitted in the published version of Proclamation No. 2476, as to do so
would be tantamount to encroaching on the field of the legislature.
Herein respondent MSS-PVAO filed a Motion for Reconsideration, 9 which was denied by the
COSLAP in a Resolution dated 24 January 2007. 10
MSS-PVAO filed a Petition with the Court of Appeals seeking to reverse the COSLAP
Resolutions dated 1 September 2006 and 24 January 2007.
Thus, on 29 April 2009, the then Court of Appeals First Division rendered the assailed Decision
granting MSS-PVAOs Petition, the dispositive portion of which reads:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The
Resolutions dated September 1, 2006 and January 24, 2007 issued by the Commission on the
Settlement of Land Problems in COSLAP Case No. 99-434 are herebyREVERSED and SET
ASIDE. In lieu thereof, the petitions of respondents in COSLAP Case No. 99-434
are DISMISSED, for lack of merit, as discussed herein. Further, pending urgent motions filed by
respondents are likewise DENIED.
SO ORDERED.11 (Emphasis in the original)
Both NMSMI12 and WBLOAI13 appealed the said Decision by filing their respective Petitions
for Review with this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

THE ISSUES
Petitioner NMSMI raises the following issues:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN
RULING THAT PROCLAMATION NO. 2476 DID NOT INCLUDE ANY PORTION OF
WESTERN BICUTAN AS THE HANDWRITTEN NOTATION BY PRESIDENT MARCOS
ON THE SAID PROCLAMATION WAS NOT PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN
RULING THAT PROCLAMATION NO. 172 LIKEWISE EXCLUDED THE PORTION OF
LAND OCCUPIED BY MEMBER OF HEREIN PETITIONER.
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT
CONSIDERING THAT THE HON. COSLAP HAS BROAD POWERS TO RECOMMEND TO
THE PRESIDENT INNOVATIVE MEASURES TO RESOLVE EXPEDITIOUSLY VARIOUS
LAND CASES.14
On the other hand, petitioner WBLOAI raises this sole issue:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTY WAS NOT DECLARED ALIENABLE AND
DISPOSABLE BY VIRTUE OF PROCLAMATION NO. 2476 BECAUSE THE
HANDWRITTEN ADDENDUM OF PRESIDENT FERDINAND E. MARCOS INCLUDING
WESTERN BICUTAN IN PROCLAMATION NO. 2476 WAS NOT INCLUDED IN THE
PUBLICATION.15
Both Petitions boil down to the principal issue of whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling
that the subject lots were not alienable and disposable by virtue of Proclamation No. 2476 on the
ground that the handwritten addendum of President Marcos was not included in the publication
of the said law.
THE COURTS RULING
We deny the Petitions for lack of merit.
Considering that petitioners were occupying Lots 3 and 7 of Western Bicutan (subject lots), their
claims were anchored on the handwritten addendum of President Marcos to Proclamation No.
2476. They allege that the former President intended to include all Western Bicutan in the
reclassification of portions of Fort Bonifacio as disposable public land when he made a notation
just below the printed version of Proclamation No. 2476.
However, it is undisputed that the handwritten addendum was not included when Proclamation
No. 2476 was published in the Official Gazette.
The resolution of whether the subject lots were declared as reclassified and disposable lies in the
determination of whether the handwritten addendum of President Marcos has the force and effect
of law. In relation thereto, Article 2 of the Civil Code expressly provides:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
ART. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in
the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after
such publication.
Under the above provision, the requirement of publication is indispensable to give effect to the
law, unless the law itself has otherwise provided. The phrase unless otherwise provided refers
to a different effectivity date other than after fifteen days following the completion of the laws
publication in the Official Gazette, but does not imply that the requirement of publication may be
dispensed with. The issue of the requirement of publication was already settled in the landmark
case Taada v. Hon. Tuvera,16 in which we had the occasion to rule thus:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide
that the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended. An example, as pointed out
by the present Chief Justice in his separate concurrence in the original decision, is the Civil Code

which did not become effective after fifteen days from its publication in the Official Gazette but
one year after such publication. The general rule did not apply because it was otherwise
provided.
It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be dispensed with
altogether. The reason is that such omission would offend due process insofar as it would deny
the public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern it. Surely, if the legislature could
validly provide that a law shall become effective immediately upon its approval notwithstanding
the lack of publication (or after an unreasonably short period after publication), it is not unlikely
that persons not aware of it would be prejudiced as a result; and they would be so not because of
a failure to comply with it but simply because they did not know of its existence. Significantly,
this is not true only of penal laws as is commonly supposed. One can think of many non-penal
measures, like a law on prescription, which must also be communicated to the persons they may
affect before they can begin to operate.
xxxx
The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly
speaking all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them
directly. An example is a law granting citizenship to a particular individual, like a relative of
President Marcos who was decreed instant naturalization. It surely cannot be said that such a law
does not affect the public although it unquestionably does not apply directly to all the
people. The subject of such law is a matter of public interest which any member of the body
politic may question in the political forums or, if he is a proper party, even in the courts of
justice. In fact, a law without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of
privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must
invariably affect the public interest even if it might be directly applicable only to one individual,
or some of the people only, and not to the public as a whole.
We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall
be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after
publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the
President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the
legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and
regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law
pursuant also to a valid delegation.
xxxx
Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be published notwithstanding that it applies to only
a portion of the national territory and directly affects only the inhabitants of that place. All
presidential decrees must be published, including even, say, those naming a public place after
a favored individual or exempting him from certain prohibitions or requirements. The circulars
issued by the Monetary Board must be published if they are meant not merely to interpret but to
"fill in the details" of the Central Bank Act which that body is supposed to enforce.
xxxx
We agree that the publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose
is to inform the public of the contents of the laws. As correctly pointed out by the petitioners,
the mere mention of the number of the presidential decree, the title of such decree, its
whereabouts (e.g., "with Secretary Tuvera"), the supposed date of effectivity, and in a mere
supplement of the Official Gazette cannot satisfy the publication requirement. This is not even
substantial compliance. This was the manner, incidentally, in which the General Appropriations
Act for FY 1975, a presidential decree undeniably of general applicability and interest, was
"published" by the Marcos administration. The evident purpose was to withhold rather than
disclose information on this vital law.
xxxx

Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows
with their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be
recognized as binding unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid
publication intended to make full disclosure and give proper notice to the people. The
furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot feint, parry or cut unless the naked blade is
drawn. (Emphases supplied)
Applying the foregoing ruling to the instant case, this Court cannot rely on a handwritten note
that was not part of Proclamation No. 2476 as published. Without publication, the note never had
any legal force and effect.
Furthermore, under Section 24, Chapter 6, Book I of the Administrative Code, [t]he publication
of any law, resolution or other official documents in the Official Gazette shall be prima facie
evidence of its authority. Thus, whether or not President Marcos intended to include Western
Bicutan is not only irrelevant but speculative. Simply put, the courts may not speculate as to the
probable intent of the legislature apart from the words appearing in the law.17 This Court cannot
rule that a word appears in the law when, evidently, there is none. In Pagpalain Haulers, Inc. v.
Hon. Trajano,18 we ruled that [u]nder Article 8 of the Civil Code, [j]udicial decisions applying
or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the
Philippines. This does not mean, however, that courts can create law. The courts exist for
interpreting the law, not for enacting it. To allow otherwise would be violative of the principle of
separation of powers, inasmuch as the sole function of our courts is to apply or interpret the laws,
particularly where gaps or lacunae exist or where ambiguities becloud issues, but it will not
arrogate unto itself the task of legislating. The remedy sought in these Petitions is not judicial
interpretation, but another legislation that would amend the law to include petitioners lots in the
reclassification.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petitions are hereby DENIED for lack of
merit. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 97925 dated 29 April
2009 isAFFIRMED in toto. Accordingly, this Courts status quo order dated 17 June 2009 is
hereby LIFTED. Likewise, all pending motions to cite respondent in contempt
is DENIED, having been rendered moot. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

#12

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

A.M. No. MTJ-92-706 March 29, 1995

LUPO ALMODIEL ATIENZA, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE FRANCISCO F. BRILLANTES, JR., Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 28,
Manila, respondent.

QUIASON, J.:

This is a complaint by Lupo A. Atienza for Gross Immorality and Appearance of Impropriety
against Judge Francisco Brillantes, Jr., Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch
20, Manila.
Complainant alleges that he has two children with Yolanda De Castro, who are living together at
No. 34 Galaxy Street, Bel-Air Subdivision, Makati, Metro Manila. He stays in said house, which
he purchased in 1987, whenever he is in Manila.
In December 1991, upon opening the door to his bedroom, he saw respondent sleeping on his
(complainant's) bed. Upon inquiry, he was told by the houseboy that respondent had been
cohabiting with De Castro. Complainant did not bother to wake up respondent and instead left
the house after giving instructions to his houseboy to take care of his children.
Thereafter, respondent prevented him from visiting his children and even alienated the affection
of his children for him.
Complainant claims that respondent is married to one Zenaida Ongkiko with whom he has five
children, as appearing in his 1986 and 1991 sworn statements of assets and liabilities.
Furthermore, he alleges that respondent caused his arrest on January 13, 1992, after he had a
heated argument with De Castro inside the latter's office.
For his part, respondent alleges that complainant was not married to De Castro and that the filing
of the administrative action was related to complainant's claim on the Bel-Air residence, which
was disputed by De Castro.
Respondent denies that he caused complainant's arrest and claims that he was even a witness to
the withdrawal of the complaint for Grave Slander filed by De Castro against complainant.
According to him, it was the sister of De Castro who called the police to arrest complainant.
Respondent also denies having been married to Ongkiko, although he admits having five
children with her. He alleges that while he and Ongkiko went through a marriage ceremony
before a Nueva Ecija town mayor on April 25, 1965, the same was not a valid marriage for lack
of a marriage license. Upon the request of the parents of Ongkiko, respondent went through
another marriage ceremony with her in Manila on June 5, 1965. Again, neither party applied for
a marriage license. Ongkiko abandoned respondent 17 years ago, leaving their children to his
care and custody as a single parent.
Respondent claims that when he married De Castro in civil rites in Los Angeles, California on
December 4, 1991, he believed, in all good faith and for all legal intents and purposes, that he
was single because his first marriage was solemnized without a license.
Under the Family Code, there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage
before a party thereto can enter into a second marriage. Article 40 of said Code provides:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for the purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void.
Respondent argues that the provision of Article 40 of the Family Code does not apply to him
considering that his first marriage took place in 1965 and was governed by the Civil Code of the
Philippines; while the second marriage took place in 1991 and governed by the Family Code.
Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the Family Code on
August 3, 1988 regardless of the date of the first marriage. Besides, under Article 256 of the
Family Code, said Article is given "retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair
vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws." This is particularly
true with Article 40, which is a rule of procedure. Respondent has not shown any vested right
that was impaired by the application of Article 40 to his case.
The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants' rights may not preclude their
retroactive application to pending actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not
violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected (Gregorio v. Court

of Appeals, 26 SCRA 229 [1968]). The reason is that as a general rule no vested right may attach
to, nor arise from, procedural laws (Billones v. Court of Industrial Relations, 14 SCRA 674
[1965]).
Respondent is the last person allowed to invoke good faith. He made a mockery of the institution
of marriage and employed deceit to be able to cohabit with a woman, who beget him five
children.
Respondent passed the Bar examinations in 1962 and was admitted to the practice of law in
1963. At the time he went through the two marriage ceremonies with Ongkiko, he was already a
lawyer. Yet, he never secured any marriage license. Any law student would know that a marriage
license is necessary before one can get married. Respondent was given an opportunity to correct
the flaw in his first marriage when he and Ongkiko were married for the second time. His failure
to secure a marriage license on these two occasions betrays his sinister motives and bad faith.
It is evident that respondent failed to meet the standard of moral fitness for membership in the
legal profession.
While the deceit employed by respondent existed prior to his appointment as a Metropolitan
Trial Judge, his immoral and illegal act of cohabiting with De Castro began and continued when
he was already in the judiciary.
The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff of
impropriety, not only with respect to his performance of his judicial duties but also as to his
behavior as a private individual. There is no duality of morality. A public figure is also judged by
his private life. A judge, in order to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of
the judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times, in the performance of his judicial duties
and in his everyday life. These are judicial guideposts too self-evident to be overlooked. No
position exacts a greater demand on moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a
seat in the judiciary (Imbing v. Tiongzon, 229 SCRA 690 [1994]).
WHEREFORE, respondent is DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all leave and
retirement benefits and with prejudice to reappointment in any branch, instrumentality, or agency
of the government, including government-owned and controlled corporations. This decision is
immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
#19
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-30642 April 30, 1985
PERFECTO S. FLORESCA, in his own behalf and on behalf of the minors ROMULO and
NESTOR S. FLORESCA; and ERLINDA FLORESCA-GABUYO, PEDRO S.
FLORESCA, JR., CELSO S. FLORESCA, MELBA S. FLORESCA, JUDITH S.
FLORESCA and CARMEN S. FLORESCA;
LYDIA CARAMAT VDA. DE MARTINEZ in her own behalf and on behalf of her minor
children LINDA, ROMEO, ANTONIO JEAN and ELY, all surnamed Martinez; and
DANIEL MARTINEZ and TOMAS MARTINEZ;
SALUSTIANA ASPIRAS VDA. DE OBRA, in her own behalf and on behalf of her minor
children JOSE, ESTELA, JULITA SALUD and DANILO, all surnamed OBRA;

LYDIA CULBENGAN VDA. DE VILLAR, in her own behalf and on behalf of her minor
children EDNA, GEORGE and LARRY III, all surnamed VILLAR;
DOLORES LOLITA ADER VDA. DE LANUZA, in her own behalf and on behalf of her
minor children EDITHA, ELIZABETH, DIVINA, RAYMUNDO, NESTOR and
AURELIO, JR. all surnamed LANUZA;
EMERENCIANA JOSE VDA. DE ISLA, in her own behalf and on behalf of her minor
children JOSE, LORENZO, JR., MARIA, VENUS and FELIX, all surnamed
ISLA, petitioners,
vs.
PHILEX MINING CORPORATION and HON. JESUS P. MORFE, Presiding Judge of
Branch XIII, Court of First Instance of Manila, respondents.
Rodolfo C. Pacampara for petitioners.
Tito M. Villaluna for respondents.

MAKASIAR, J.:
This is a petition to review the order of the former Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch
XIII, dated December 16, 1968 dismissing petitioners' complaint for damages on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction.
Petitioners are the heirs of the deceased employees of Philex Mining Corporation (hereinafter
referred to as Philex), who, while working at its copper mines underground operations at Tuba,
Benguet on June 28, 1967, died as a result of the cave-in that buried them in the tunnels of the
mine. Specifically, the complaint alleges that Philex, in violation of government rules and
regulations, negligently and deliberately failed to take the required precautions for the protection
of the lives of its men working underground. Portion of the complaint reads:
xxx xxx xxx
9. That for sometime prior and up to June 28,1967, the defendant PHILEX, with
gross and reckless negligence and imprudence and deliberate failure to take the
required precautions for the due protection of the lives of its men working
underground at the time, and in utter violation of the laws and the rules and
regulations duly promulgated by the Government pursuant thereto, allowed great
amount of water and mud to accumulate in an open pit area at the mine above
Block 43-S-1 which seeped through and saturated the 600 ft. column of broken
ore and rock below it, thereby exerting tremendous pressure on the working
spaces at its 4300 level, with the result that, on the said date, at about 4 o'clock in
the afternoon, with the collapse of all underground supports due to such enormous
pressure, approximately 500,000 cubic feet of broken ores rocks, mud and water,
accompanied by surface boulders, blasted through the tunnels and flowed out and
filled in, in a matter of approximately five (5) minutes, the underground workings,
ripped timber supports and carried off materials, machines and equipment which
blocked all avenues of exit, thereby trapping within its tunnels of all its men
above referred to, including those named in the next preceding paragraph,
represented by the plaintiffs herein;
10. That out of the 48 mine workers who were then working at defendant
PHILEX's mine on the said date, five (5) were able to escape from the terrifying
holocaust; 22 were rescued within the next 7 days; and the rest, 21 in number,
including those referred to in paragraph 7 hereinabove, were left mercilessly to
their fate, notwithstanding the fact that up to then, a great many of them were still
alive, entombed in the tunnels of the mine, but were not rescued due to defendant
PHILEX's decision to abandon rescue operations, in utter disregard of its bounden
legal and moral duties in the premises;

xxx xxx xxx

13. That defendant PHILEX not only violated the law and the rules and
regulations duly promulgated by the duly constituted authorities as set out by the
Special Committee above referred to, in their Report of investigation, pages 7-13,
Annex 'B' hereof, but also failed completely to provide its men working
underground the necessary security for the protection of their lives
notwithstanding the fact that it had vast financial resources, it having made,
during the year 1966 alone, a total operating income of P 38,220,254.00, or net
earnings, after taxes of P19,117,394.00, as per its llth Annual Report for the year
ended December 31, 1966, and with aggregate assets totalling P 45,794,103.00 as
of December 31, 1966;
xxx xxx xxx
(pp. 42-44, rec.)
A motion to dismiss dated May 14, 1968 was filed by Philex alleging that the causes of action of
petitioners based on an industrial accident are covered by the provisions of the Workmen's
Compensation Act (Act 3428, as amended by RA 772) and that the former Court of First
Instance has no jurisdiction over the case. Petitioners filed an opposition dated May 27, 1968 to
the said motion to dismiss claiming that the causes of action are not based on the provisions of
the Workmen's Compensation Act but on the provisions of the Civil Code allowing the award of
actual, moral and exemplary damages, particularly:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being
fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre- existing contractual relation between the parties, is
called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
Art. 2178. The provisions of articles 1172 to 1174 are also applicable to a quasidelict.
(b) Art. 1173The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of
that diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds
with the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place. When
negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of Articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2
shall apply.
Art. 2201. x x x x x x x x x
In case of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude, the obligor shall be
responsible for all damages which may be reasonably attributed to the nonperformance of the obligation.
Art. 2231. In quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant
acted with gross negligence.
After a reply and a rejoinder thereto were filed, respondent Judge issued an order dated June 27,
1968 dismissing the case on the ground that it falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Workmen's Compensation Commission. On petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the said
order, respondent Judge, on September 23, 1968, reconsidered and set aside his order of June 27,
1968 and allowed Philex to file an answer to the complaint. Philex moved to reconsider the
aforesaid order which was opposed by petitioners.
On December 16, 1968, respondent Judge dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction and ruled
that in accordance with the established jurisprudence, the Workmen's Compensation
Commission has exclusive original jurisdiction over damage or compensation claims for workconnected deaths or injuries of workmen or employees, irrespective of whether or not the
employer was negligent, adding that if the employer's negligence results in work-connected
deaths or injuries, the employer shall, pursuant to Section 4-A of the Workmen's Compensation
Act, pay additional compensation equal to 50% of the compensation fixed in the Act.

Petitioners thus filed the present petition.

In their brief, petitioners raised the following assignment of errors:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PLAINTIFFSPETITIONERS' COMPLAINT FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THE CLEAR
DISTINCTION BETWEEN CLAIMS FOR DAMAGES UNDER THE CIVIL
CODE AND CLAIMS FOR COMPENSATION UNDER THE WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION ACT.
A
In the first assignment of error, petitioners argue that the lower court has jurisdiction over the
cause of action since the complaint is based on the provisions of the Civil Code on damages,
particularly Articles 2176, 2178, 1173, 2201 and 2231, and not on the provisions of the
Workmen's Compensation Act. They point out that the complaint alleges gross and brazen
negligence on the part of Philex in failing to take the necessary security for the protection of the
lives of its employees working underground. They also assert that since Philex opted to file a
motion to dismiss in the court a quo, the allegations in their complaint including those contained
in the annexes are deemed admitted.
In the second assignment of error, petitioners asseverate that respondent Judge failed to see the
distinction between the claims for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act and
the claims for damages based on gross negligence of Philex under the Civil Code. They point out
that workmen's compensation refers to liability for compensation for loss resulting from injury,
disability or death of the working man through industrial accident or disease, without regard to
the fault or negligence of the employer, while the claim for damages under the Civil Code which
petitioners pursued in the regular court, refers to the employer's liability for reckless and wanton
negligence resulting in the death of the employees and for which the regular court has
jurisdiction to adjudicate the same.
On the other hand, Philex asserts that work-connected injuries are compensable exclusively
under the provisions of Sections 5 and 46 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, which read:
SEC. 5. Exclusive right to compensation.The rights and remedies granted by
this Act to an employee by reason of a personal injury entitling him to
compensation shall exclude all other rights and remedies accruing to the
employee, his personal representatives, dependents or nearest of kin against the
employer under the Civil Code and other laws because of said injury ...
SEC. 46. Jurisdiction. The Workmen's Compensation Commissioner shall have
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide claims for compensation under the
Workmen's Compensation Act, subject to appeal to the Supreme Court, ...
Philex cites the case of Manalo vs. Foster Wheeler (98 Phil. 855 [1956]) where it was held that
"all claims of workmen against their employer for damages due to accident suffered in the course
of employment shall be investigated and adjudicated by the Workmen's Compensation
Commission," subject to appeal to the Supreme Court.
Philex maintains that the fact that an employer was negligent, does not remove the case from the
exclusive character of recoveries under the Workmen's Compensation Act; because Section 4-A
of the Act provides an additional compensation in case the employer fails to comply with the
requirements of safety as imposed by law to prevent accidents. In fact, it points out that Philex
voluntarily paid the compensation due the petitioners and all the payments have been accepted in
behalf of the deceased miners, except the heirs of Nazarito Floresca who insisted that they are
entitled to a greater amount of damages under the Civil Code.

In the hearing of this case, then Undersecretary of Labor Israel Bocobo, then Atty. Edgardo
Angara, now President of the University of the Philippines, Justice Manuel Lazaro, as corporate
counsel and Assistant General Manager of the GSIS Legal Affairs Department, and
Commissioner on Elections, formerly UP Law Center Director Froilan Bacungan, appeared
as amici curiae and thereafter, submitted their respective memoranda.
The issue to be resolved as WE stated in the resolution of November 26, 1976, is:
Whether the action of an injured employee or worker or that of his heirs in case of
his death under the Workmen's Compensation Act is exclusive, selective or
cumulative, that is to say, whether his or his heirs' action is exclusively restricted
to seeking the limited compensation provided under the Workmen's
Compensation Act or whether they have a right of selection or choice of action
between availing of the worker's right under the Workmen's Compensation Act
and suing in the regular courts under the Civil Code for higher damages (actual,
moral and/or exemplary) from the employer by virtue of negligence (or fault) of
the employer or of his other employees or whether they may avail cumulatively of
both actions, i.e., collect the limited compensation under the Workmen's
Compensation Act and sue in addition for damages in the regular courts.
There are divergent opinions in this case. Justice Lazaro is of the opinion that an injured
employee or worker, or the heirs in case of his death, may initiate a complaint to recover
damages (not compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act) with the regular court on
the basis of negligence of an employer pursuant to the Civil Code provisions. Atty. Angara
believes otherwise. He submits that the remedy of an injured employee for work-connected
injury or accident is exclusive in accordance with Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation
Act, while Atty. Bacungan's position is that the action is selective. He opines that the heirs of the
employee in case of his death have a right of choice to avail themselves of the benefits provided
under the Workmen's Compensation Act or to sue in the regular court under the Civil Code for
higher damages from the employer by virtue of negligence of the latter. Atty. Bocobo's stand is
the same as that of Atty. Bacungan and adds that once the heirs elect the remedy provided for
under the Act, they are no longer entitled to avail themselves of the remedy provided for under
the Civil Code by filing an action for higher damages in the regular court, and vice versa.
On August 3, 1978, petitioners-heirs of deceased employee Nazarito Floresca filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground that they have amicably settled their claim with respondent Philex. In the
resolution of September 7, 1978, WE dismissed the petition only insofar as the aforesaid
petitioners are connected, it appearing that there are other petitioners in this case.
WE hold that the former Court of First Instance has jurisdiction to try the case,
It should be underscored that petitioners' complaint is not for compensation based on the
Workmen's Compensation Act but a complaint for damages (actual, exemplary and moral) in the
total amount of eight hundred twenty-five thousand (P825,000.00) pesos. Petitioners did not
invoke the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act to entitle them to compensation
thereunder. In fact, no allegation appeared in the complaint that the employees died from
accident arising out of and in the course of their employments. The complaint instead alleges
gross and reckless negligence and deliberate failure on the part of Philex to protect the lives of its
workers as a consequence of which a cave-in occurred resulting in the death of the employees
working underground. Settled is the rule that in ascertaining whether or not the cause of action is
in the nature of workmen's compensation claim or a claim for damages pursuant to the provisions
of the Civil Code, the test is the averments or allegations in the complaint (Belandres vs. Lopez
Sugar Mill, Co., Inc., 97 Phil. 100).
In the present case, there exists between Philex and the deceased employees a contractual
relationship. The alleged gross and reckless negligence and deliberate failure that amount to bad
faith on the part of Philex, constitute a breach of contract for which it may be held liable for
damages. The provisions of the Civil Code on cases of breach of contract when there is fraud or
bad faith, read:

Art. 2232. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the court may award exemplary
damages if the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or
malevolent manner.
Art. 2201. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the damages for which the obligor
who acted in good faith is able shall be those that are the natural and probable
consequences of the breach of the obligation, and which the parties have foreseen
or could have reasonably foreseen at the time the obligation was constituted.
In cases of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude, the obligor shall be
responsible for all damages which may be reasonably attributed to the nonperformance of the obligation.
Furthermore, Articles 2216 et seq., Civil Code, allow the payment of all kinds of damages, as
assessed by the court.
The rationale in awarding compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act differs from
that in giving damages under the Civil Code. The compensation acts are based on a theory of
compensation distinct from the existing theories of damages, payments under the acts being
made as compensation and not as damages (99 C.J.S. 53). Compensation is given to mitigate the
harshness and insecurity of industrial life for the workman and his family. Hence, an employer is
liable whether negligence exists or not since liability is created by law. Recovery under the Act
is not based on any theory of actionable wrong on the part of the employer (99 C.J.S. 36).
In other words, under the compensation acts, the employer is liable to pay compensation benefits
for loss of income, as long as the death, sickness or injury is work-connected or workaggravated, even if the death or injury is not due to the fault of the employer (Murillo vs.
Mendoza, 66 Phil. 689). On the other hand, damages are awarded to one as a vindication of the
wrongful invasion of his rights. It is the indemnity recoverable by a person who has sustained
injury either in his person, property or relative rights, through the act or default of another (25
C.J.S. 452).
The claimant for damages under the Civil Code has the burden of proving the causal relation
between the defendant's negligence and the resulting injury as well as the damages suffered.
While under the Workmen's Compensation Act, there is a presumption in favor of the deceased
or injured employee that the death or injury is work-connected or work-aggravated; and the
employer has the burden to prove otherwise (De los Angeles vs. GSIS, 94 SCRA 308; Carino vs.
WCC, 93 SCRA 551; Maria Cristina Fertilizer Corp. vs. WCC, 60 SCRA 228).
The claim of petitioners that the case is not cognizable by the Workmen's Compensation
Commission then, now Employees Compensation Commission, is strengthened by the fact that
unlike in the Civil Code, the Workmen's Compensation Act did not contain any provision for an
award of actual, moral and exemplary damages. What the Act provided was merely the right of
the heirs to claim limited compensation for the death in the amount of six thousand (P6,000.00)
pesos plus burial expenses of two hundred (P200.00) pesos, and medical expenses when incurred
(Sections 8, 12 and 13, Workmen's Compensation Act), and an additional compensation of only
50% if the complaint alleges failure on the part of the employer to "install and maintain safety
appliances or to take other precautions for the prevention of accident or occupational disease"
(Section 4-A, Ibid.). In the case at bar, the amount sought to be recovered is over and above that
which was provided under the Workmen's Compensation Act and which cannot be granted by
the Commission.
Moreover, under the Workmen's Compensation Act, compensation benefits should be paid to an
employee who suffered an accident not due to the facilities or lack of facilities in the industry of
his employer but caused by factors outside the industrial plant of his employer. Under the Civil
Code, the liability of the employer, depends on breach of contract or tort. The Workmen's
Compensation Act was specifically enacted to afford protection to the employees or workmen. It
is a social legislation designed to give relief to the workman who has been the victim of an
accident causing his death or ailment or injury in the pursuit of his employment (Abong vs.
WCC, 54 SCRA 379).

WE now come to the query as to whether or not the injured employee or his heirs in case of
death have a right of selection or choice of action between availing themselves of the worker's
right under the Workmen's Compensation Act and suing in the regular courts under the Civil
Code for higher damages (actual, moral and exemplary) from the employers by virtue of that
negligence or fault of the employers or whether they may avail themselves cumulatively of both
actions, i.e., collect the limited compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act and sue in
addition for damages in the regular courts.
In disposing of a similar issue, this Court in Pacana vs. Cebu Autobus Company, 32 SCRA 442,
ruled that an injured worker has a choice of either to recover from the employer the fixed
amounts set by the Workmen's Compensation Act or to prosecute an ordinary civil action against
the tortfeasor for higher damages but he cannot pursue both courses of action simultaneously.
In Pacaa WE said:
In the analogous case of Esguerra vs. Munoz Palma, involving the application of
Section 6 of the Workmen's Compensation Act on the injured workers' right to
sue third- party tortfeasors in the regular courts, Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, again
speaking for the Court, pointed out that the injured worker has the choice of
remedies but cannot pursue both courses of action simultaneously and thus
balanced the relative advantage of recourse under the Workmen's Compensation
Act as against an ordinary action.
As applied to this case, petitioner Esguerra cannot maintain his action for
damages against the respondents (defendants below), because he has elected to
seek compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Law, and his claim (case
No. 44549 of the Compensation Commission) was being processed at the time he
filed this action in the Court of First Instance. It is argued for petitioner that as the
damages recoverable under the Civil Code are much more extensive than the
amounts that may be awarded under the Workmen's Compensation Act, they
should not be deemed incompatible. As already indicated, the injured laborer was
initially free to choose either to recover from the employer the fixed amounts set
by the Compensation Law or else, to prosecute an ordinary civil action against the
tortfeasor for higher damages. While perhaps not as profitable, the smaller
indemnity obtainable by the first course is balanced by the claimant's being
relieved of the burden of proving the causal connection between the defendant's
negligence and the resulting injury, and of having to establish the extent of the
damage suffered; issues that are apt to be troublesome to establish satisfactorily.
Having staked his fortunes on a particular remedy, petitioner is precluded from
pursuing the alternate course, at least until the prior claim is rejected by the
Compensation Commission. Anyway, under the proviso of Section 6 aforequoted,
if the employer Franklin Baker Company recovers, by derivative action against
the alleged tortfeasors, a sum greater than the compensation he may have paid the
herein petitioner, the excess accrues to the latter.
Although the doctrine in the case of Esguerra vs. Munoz Palma (104 Phil. 582), applies to thirdparty tortfeasor, said rule should likewise apply to the employer-tortfeasor.
Insofar as the heirs of Nazarito Floresca are concerned, as already stated, the petition has been
dismissed in the resolution of September 7, 1978 in view of the amicable settlement reached by
Philex and the said heirs.
With regard to the other petitioners, it was alleged by Philex in its motion to dismiss dated May
14, 1968 before the court a quo, that the heirs of the deceased employees, namely Emerito Obra,
Larry Villar, Jr., Aurelio Lanuza, Lorenzo Isla and Saturnino Martinez submitted notices and
claims for compensation to the Regional Office No. 1 of the then Department of Labor and all of
them have been paid in full as of August 25, 1967, except Saturnino Martinez whose heirs
decided that they be paid in installments (pp. 106-107, rec.). Such allegation was admitted by
herein petitioners in their opposition to the motion to dismiss dated May 27, 1968 (pp. 121-122,
rec.) in the lower court, but they set up the defense that the claims were filed under the
Workmen's Compensation Act before they learned of the official report of the committee created
to investigate the accident which established the criminal negligence and violation of law by

Philex, and which report was forwarded by the Director of Mines to the then Executive Secretary
Rafael Salas in a letter dated October 19, 1967 only (p. 76, rec.).
WE hold that although the other petitioners had received the benefits under the Workmen's
Compensation Act, such may not preclude them from bringing an action before the regular court
because they became cognizant of the fact that Philex has been remiss in its contractual
obligations with the deceased miners only after receiving compensation under the Act. Had
petitioners been aware of said violation of government rules and regulations by Philex, and of its
negligence, they would not have sought redress under the Workmen's Compensation
Commission which awarded a lesser amount for compensation. The choice of the first remedy
was based on ignorance or a mistake of fact, which nullifies the choice as it was not an
intelligent choice. The case should therefore be remanded to the lower court for further
proceedings. However, should the petitioners be successful in their bid before the lower court,
the payments made under the Workmen's Compensation Act should be deducted from the
damages that may be decreed in their favor.
B
Contrary to the perception of the dissenting opinion, the Court does not legislate in the instant
case. The Court merely applies and gives effect to the constitutional guarantees of social justice
then secured by Section 5 of Article 11 and Section 6 of Article XIV of the 1935 Constitution,
and now by Sections 6, 7, and 9 of Article 11 of the DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND
STATE POLICIES of the 1973 Constitution, as amended, and as implemented by Articles 2176,
2177, 2178, 1173, 2201, 2216, 2231 and 2232 of the New Civil Code of 1950.
To emphasize, the 1935 Constitution declares that:
Sec. 5. The promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic
security of all the people should be the concern of the State (Art. II).
Sec. 6. The State shall afford protection to labor, especially to working women,
and minors, and shall regulate the relations between landowner and tenant, and
between labor and capital in industry and in agriculture. The State may provide
for compulsory arbitration (Art. XIV).
The 1973 Constitution likewise commands the State to "promote social justice to insure the
dignity, welfare, and security of all the people "... regulate the use ... and disposition of private
property and equitably diffuse property ownership and profits "establish, maintain and ensure
adequate social services in, the field of education, health, housing, employment, welfare and
social security to guarantee the enjoyment by the people of a decent standard of living" (Sections
6 and 7, Art. II, 1973 Constitution); "... afford protection to labor, ... and regulate the relations
between workers and employers ..., and assure the rights of workers to ... just and humane
conditions of work"(Sec. 9, Art. II, 1973 Constitution, emphasis supplied).
The foregoing constitutional guarantees in favor of labor institutionalized in Section 9 of Article
11 of the 1973 Constitution and re-stated as a declaration of basic policy in Article 3 of the New
Labor Code, thus:
Art. 3. Declaration of basic policy.The State shall afford protection to labor,
promote full employment, ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race
or creed, and regulate the relations between workers and employers. The State
shall assure the rights of workers to self-organization, collective bargaining,
security of tenure, and just and humane conditions of work. (emphasis supplied).
The aforestated constitutional principles as implemented by the aforementioned articles of the
New Civil Code cannot be impliedly repealed by the restrictive provisions of Article 173 of the
New Labor Code. Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act (before it was amended by
R.A. No. 772 on June 20, 1952), predecessor of Article 173 of the New Labor Code, has been
superseded by the aforestated provisions of the New Civil Code, a subsequent law, which took
effect on August 30, 1950, which obey the constitutional mandates of social justice enhancing as
they do the rights of the workers as against their employers. Article 173 of the New Labor Code

seems to diminish the rights of the workers and therefore collides with the social justice
guarantee of the Constitution and the liberal provisions of the New Civil Code.
The guarantees of social justice embodied in Sections 6, 7 and 9 of Article II of the 1973
Constitution are statements of legal principles to be applied and enforced by the courts. Mr.
Justice Robert Jackson in the case of West Virginia State Board of Education vs. Barnette, with
characteristic eloquence, enunciated:
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the
vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities
and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts.
One's right to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of
worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to
vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections (319 U.S. 625, 638, 87 L.ed.
1638, emphasis supplied).
In case of any doubt which may be engendered by Article 173 of the New Labor Code, both the
New Labor Code and the Civil Code direct that the doubts should be resolved in favor of the
workers and employees.
Thus, Article 4 of the New Labor Code, otherwise known as Presidential Decree No. 442, as
amended, promulgated on May 1, 1974, but which took effect six months thereafter, provides
that "all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of this Code, including
its implementing rules and regulations, shall be resolved in favor of labor" (Art. 2, Labor Code).
Article 10 of the New Civil Code states: "In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of
laws, it is presumed that the law-making body intended right and justice to prevail. "
More specifically, Article 1702 of the New Civil Code likewise directs that. "In case of doubt, all
labor legislation and all labor contracts shall be construed in favor of the safety and decent living
of the laborer."
Before it was amended by Commonwealth Act No. 772 on June 20, 1952, Section 5 of the
Workmen's Compensation Act provided:
Sec. 5. Exclusive right to compensation.- The rights and remedies granted by this
Act to an employee by reason of a personal injury entitling him to compensation
shall exclude all other rights and remedies accruing to the employee, his personal
representatives, dependents or nearest of kin against the employer under the Civil
Code and other laws, because of said injury (emphasis supplied).
Employers contracting laborecsrs in the Philippine Islands for work outside the
same may stipulate with such laborers that the remedies prescribed by this Act
shall apply exclusively to injuries received outside the Islands through accidents
happening in and during the performance of the duties of the employment; and all
service contracts made in the manner prescribed in this section shall be presumed
to include such agreement.
Only the second paragraph of Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act No. 3428, was
amended by Commonwealth Act No. 772 on June 20, 1952, thus:
Sec. 5. Exclusive right to compensation.- The rights and remedies granted by this
Act to an employee by reason of a personal injury entitling him to compensation
shall exclude all other rights and remedies accruing to the employee, his personal
representatives, dependents or nearest of kin against the employer under the Civil
Code and other laws, because of said injury.
Employers contracting laborers in the Philippine Islands for work outside the
same shall stipulate with such laborers that the remedies prescribed by this Act
shall apply to injuries received outside the Island through accidents happening in
and during the performance of the duties of the employment. Such stipulation
shall not prejudice the right of the laborers to the benefits of the Workmen's

Compensation Law of the place where the accident occurs, should such law be
more favorable to them (As amended by section 5 of Republic Act No. 772).
Article 173 of the New Labor Code does not repeal expressly nor impliedly the applicable
provisions of the New Civil Code, because said Article 173 provides:
Art. 173. Exclusiveness of liability.- Unless otherwise provided, the liability of
the State Insurance Fund under this Title shall be exclusive and in place of all
other liabilities of the employer to the employee, his dependents or anyone
otherwise entitled to receive damages on behalf of the employee or his
dependents. The payment of compensation under this Title shall bar the recovery
of benefits as provided for in Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code,
Republic Act Numbered Eleven hundred sixty-one, as amended, Commonwealth
Act Numbered One hundred eighty- six, as amended, Commonwealth Act
Numbered Six hundred ten, as amended, Republic Act Numbered Forty-eight
hundred Sixty-four, as amended, and other laws whose benefits are administered
by the System during the period of such payment for the same disability or death,
and conversely (emphasis supplied).
As above-quoted, Article 173 of the New Labor Code expressly repealed only Section 699 of the
Revised Administrative Code, R.A. No. 1161, as amended, C.A. No. 186, as amended, R.A. No.
610, as amended, R.A. No. 4864, as amended, and all other laws whose benefits are administered
by the System (referring to the GSIS or SSS).
Unlike Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act as aforequoted, Article 173 of the New
Labor Code does not even remotely, much less expressly, repeal the New Civil Code provisions
heretofore quoted.
It is patent, therefore, that recovery under the New Civil Code for damages arising from
negligence, is not barred by Article 173 of the New Labor Code. And the damages recoverable
under the New Civil Code are not administered by the System provided for by the New Labor
Code, which defines the "System" as referring to the Government Service Insurance System or
the Social Security System (Art. 167 [c], [d] and [e] of the New Labor Code).
Furthermore, under Article 8 of the New Civil Code, decisions of the Supreme Court form part
of the law of the land.
Article 8 of the New Civil Code provides:
Art. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution
shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines.
The Court, through the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, in People vs. Licera ruled:
Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines decrees that judicial decisions
applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution form part of this jurisdiction's
legal system. These decisions, although in themselves not laws, constitute
evidence of what the laws mean. The application or interpretation placed by the
Court upon a law is part of the law as of the date of the enactment of the said law
since the Court's application or interpretation merely establishes the
contemporaneous legislative intent that the construed law purports to carry into
effect" (65 SCRA 270, 272-273 [1975]).
WE ruled that judicial decisions of the Supreme Court assume the same authority as the statute
itself (Caltex vs. Palomer, 18 SCRA 247; 124 Phil. 763).
The aforequoted provisions of Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, before and after it
was amended by Commonwealth Act No. 772 on June 20, 1952, limited the right of recovery in
favor of the deceased, ailing or injured employee to the compensation provided for therein. Said
Section 5 was not accorded controlling application by the Supreme Court in the 1970 case of
Pacana vs. Cebu Autobus Company (32 SCRA 442) when WE ruled that an injured worker has a
choice of either to recover from the employer the fixed amount set by the Workmen's

Compensation Act or to prosecute an ordinary civil action against the tortfeasor for greater
damages; but he cannot pursue both courses of action simultaneously. Said Pacana case penned
by Mr. Justice Teehankee, applied Article 1711 of the Civil Code as against the Workmen's
Compensation Act, reiterating the 1969 ruling in the case of Valencia vs. Manila Yacht Club (28
SCRA 724, June 30,1969) and the 1958 case of Esguerra vs. Munoz Palma (104 Phil. 582), both
penned by Justice J.B.L. Reyes. Said Pacana case was concurred in by Justices J.B.L. Reyes,
Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando and Villamor.
Since the first sentence of Article 173 of the New Labor Code is merely a re-statement of the
first paragraph of Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended, and does not even
refer, neither expressly nor impliedly, to the Civil Code as Section 5 of the Workmen's
Compensation Act did, with greater reason said Article 173 must be subject to the same
interpretation adopted in the cases of Pacana, Valencia and Esguerra aforementioned as the
doctrine in the aforesaid three (3) cases is faithful to and advances the social justice guarantees
enshrined in both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions.
It should be stressed likewise that there is no similar provision on social justice in the American
Federal Constitution, nor in the various state constitutions of the American Union. Consequently,
the restrictive nature of the American decisions on the Workmen's Compensation Act cannot
limit the range and compass of OUR interpretation of our own laws, especially Article 1711 of
the New Civil Code, vis-a-vis Article 173 of the New Labor Code, in relation to Section 5 of
Article II and Section 6 of Article XIV of the 1935 Constitution then, and now Sections 6, 7 and
9 of the Declaration of Principles and State Policies of Article II of the 1973 Constitution.
The dissent seems to subordinate the life of the laborer to the property rights of the employer.
The right to life is guaranteed specifically by the due process clause of the Constitution. To
relieve the employer from liability for the death of his workers arising from his gross or wanton
fault or failure to provide safety devices for the protection of his employees or workers against
the dangers which are inherent in underground mining, is to deprive the deceased worker and his
heirs of the right to recover indemnity for the loss of the life of the worker and the consequent
loss to his family without due process of law. The dissent in effect condones and therefore
encourages such gross or wanton neglect on the part of the employer to comply with his legal
obligation to provide safety measures for the protection of the life, limb and health of his worker.
Even from the moral viewpoint alone, such attitude is un-Christian.
It is therefore patent that giving effect to the social justice guarantees of the Constitution, as
implemented by the provisions of the New Civil Code, is not an exercise of the power of lawmaking, but is rendering obedience to the mandates of the fundamental law and the
implementing legislation aforementioned.
The Court, to repeat, is not legislating in the instant case.
It is axiomatic that no ordinary statute can override a constitutional provision.
The words of Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act and of Article 173 of the New
Labor Code subvert the rights of the petitioners as surviving heirs of the deceased mining
employees. Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act and Article 173 of the New Labor
Code are retrogressive; because they are a throwback to the obsolete laissez-faire doctrine of
Adam Smith enunciated in 1776 in his treatise Wealth of Nations (Collier's Encyclopedia, Vol.
21, p. 93, 1964), which has been discarded soon after the close of the 18th century due to the
Industrial Revolution that generated the machines and other mechanical devices (beginning with
Eli Whitney's cotton gin of 1793 and Robert Fulton's steamboat of 1807) for production and
transportation which are dangerous to life, limb and health. The old socio-political-economic
philosophy of live-and-let-live is now superdesed by the benign Christian shibboleth of live-andhelp others to live. Those who profess to be Christians should not adhere to Cain's selfish
affirmation that he is not his brother's keeper. In this our civilization, each one of us is our
brother's keeper. No man is an island. To assert otherwise is to be as atavistic and ante-deluvian
as the 1837 case of Prisley vs. Fowler (3 MN 1,150 reprint 1030) invoked by the dissent, The
Prisley case was decided in 1837 during the era of economic royalists and robber barons of
America. Only ruthless, unfeeling capitalistics and egoistic reactionaries continue to pay
obeisance to such un-Christian doctrine. The Prisley rule humiliates man and debases him;
because the decision derisively refers to the lowly worker as "servant" and utilizes with

aristocratic arrogance "master" for "employer." It robs man of his inherent dignity and
dehumanizes him. To stress this affront to human dignity, WE only have to restate the quotation
from Prisley, thus: "The mere relation of the master and the servant never can imply an
obligation on the part of the master to take more care of the servant than he may reasonably be
expected to do himself." This is the very selfish doctrine that provoked the American Civil War
which generated so much hatred and drew so much precious blood on American plains and
valleys from 1861 to 1864.
"Idolatrous reverence" for the letter of the law sacrifices the human being. The spirit of the law
insures man's survival and ennobles him. In the words of Shakespeare, "the letter of the law
killeth; its spirit giveth life."
C
It is curious that the dissenting opinion clings to the myth that the courts cannot legislate.
That myth had been exploded by Article 9 of the New Civil Code, which provides that "No judge
or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of
the laws. "
Hence, even the legislator himself, through Article 9 of the New Civil Code, recognizes that in
certain instances, the court, in the language of Justice Holmes, "do and must legislate" to fill in
the gaps in the law; because the mind of the legislator, like all human beings, is finite and
therefore cannot envisage all possible cases to which the law may apply Nor has the human mind
the infinite capacity to anticipate all situations.
But about two centuries before Article 9 of the New Civil Code, the founding fathers of the
American Constitution foresaw and recognized the eventuality that the courts may have to
legislate to supply the omissions or to clarify the ambiguities in the American Constitution and
the statutes.
'Thus, Alexander Hamilton pragmatically admits that judicial legislation may be justified but
denies that the power of the Judiciary to nullify statutes may give rise to Judicial tyranny (The
Federalist, Modern Library, pp. 503-511, 1937 ed.). Thomas Jefferson went farther to concede
that the court is even independent of the Nation itself (A.F.L. vs. American Sash Company, 1949
335 US 538).
Many of the great expounders of the American Constitution likewise share the same view. Chief
Justice Marshall pronounced: "It is emphatically the province and duty of the Judicial department
to say what the law is (Marbury vs. Madison I Cranch 127 1803), which was re-stated by Chief
Justice Hughes when he said that "the Constitution is what the judge says it is (Address on May
3, 1907, quoted by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt on March 9, 1937). This was reiterated
by Justice Cardozo who pronounced that "No doubt the limits for the judge are narrower. He
legislates only between gaps. He fills the open spaces in the law. " (The Nature of the Judicial
Process, p. 113). In the language of Chief Justice Harlan F. Stone, "The only limit to the judicial
legislation is the restraint of the judge" (U.S. vs. Butler 297 U.S. 1 Dissenting Opinion, p. 79),
which view is also entertained by Justice Frankfurter and Justice Robert Jackson. In the rhetoric
of Justice Frankfurter, "the courts breathe life, feeble or strong, into the inert pages of the
Constitution and all statute books."
It should be stressed that the liability of the employer under Section 5 of the Workmen's
Compensation Act or Article 173 of the New Labor Code is limited to death, ailment or injury
caused by the nature of the work, without any fault on the part of the employers. It is correctly
termed no fault liability. Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended, or Article
173 of the New Labor Code, does not cover the tortious liability of the employer occasioned by
his fault or culpable negligence in failing to provide the safety devices required by the law for
the protection of the life, limb and health of the workers. Under either Section 5 or Article 173,
the employer remains liable to pay compensation benefits to the employee whose death, ailment
or injury is work-connected, even if the employer has faithfully and diligently furnished all the
safety measures and contrivances decreed by the law to protect the employee.

The written word is no longer the "sovereign talisman." In the epigrammatic language of Mr.
Justice Cardozo, "the law has outgrown its primitive stage of formalism when the precise word
was the sovereign talisman, and every slip was fatal" (Wood vs. Duff Gordon 222 NW 88;
Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 100). Justice Cardozo warned that: "Sometimes the
conservatism of judges has threatened for an interval to rob the legislation of its efficacy. ...
Precedents established in those items exert an unhappy influence even now" (citing Pound,
Common Law and Legislation 21 Harvard Law Review 383, 387).
Finally, Justice Holmes delivered the coup de grace when he pragmatically admitted, although
with a cautionary undertone: "that judges do and must legislate, but they can do so only
interstitially they are confined from molar to molecular motions" (Southern Pacific Company vs.
Jensen, 244 US 204 1917). And in the subsequent case of Springer vs. Government (277 US 188,
210-212, 72 L.ed. 845, 852- 853), Justice Holmes pronounced:
The great ordinances of the Constitution do not establish and divide fields of
black and white. Even the more specific of them are found to terminate in a
penumbra shading gradually from one extreme to the other. x x x. When we come
to the fundamental distinctions it is still more obvious that they must be received
with a certain latitude or our government could not go on.
To make a rule of conduct applicable to an individual who but for such action
would be free from it is to legislate yet it is what the judges do whenever they
determine which of two competing principles of policy shall prevail.
xxx xxx xxx
It does not seem to need argument to show that however we may disguise it by
veiling words we do not and cannot carry out the distinction between legislative
and executive action with mathematical precision and divide the branches into
waterlight compartments, were it ever so desirable to do so, which I am far from
believing that it is, or that the Constitution requires.
True, there are jurists and legal writers who affirm that judges should not legislate, but
grudgingly concede that in certain cases judges do legislate. They criticize the assumption by the
courts of such law-making power as dangerous for it may degenerate into Judicial tyranny. They
include Blackstone, Jeremy Bentham, Justice Black, Justice Harlan, Justice Roberts, Justice
David Brewer, Ronald Dworkin, Rolf Sartorious, Macklin Fleming and Beryl Harold Levy. But
said Justices, jurists or legal commentators, who either deny the power of the courts to legislate
in-between gaps of the law, or decry the exercise of such power, have not pointed to examples of
the exercise by the courts of such law-making authority in the interpretation and application of
the laws in specific cases that gave rise to judicial tyranny or oppression or that such judicial
legislation has not protected public interest or individual welfare, particularly the lowly workers
or the underprivileged.
On the other hand, there are numerous decisions interpreting the Bill of Rights and statutory
enactments expanding the scope of such provisions to protect human rights. Foremost among
them is the doctrine in the cases of Miranda vs. Arizona (384 US 436 1964), Gideon vs.
Wainright (372 US 335), Escubedo vs. Illinois (378 US 478), which guaranteed the accused
under custodial investigation his rights to remain silent and to counsel and to be informed of such
rights as even as it protects him against the use of force or intimidation to extort confession from
him. These rights are not found in the American Bill of Rights. These rights are now
institutionalized in Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution. Only the peace-and-order
adherents were critical of the activism of the American Supreme Court led by Chief Justice Earl
Warren.
Even the definition of Identical offenses for purposes of the double jeopardy provision was
developed by American judicial decisions, not by amendment to the Bill of Rights on double
jeopardy (see Justice Laurel in People vs. Tarok, 73 Phil. 260, 261-268). And these judicial
decisions have been re-stated in Section 7 of Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure,
as well as in Section 9 of Rule 117 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court. In both provisions, the
second offense is the same as the first offense if the second offense is an attempt to commit the
first or frustration thereof or necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the first offense.

The requisites of double jeopardy are not spelled out in the Bill of Rights. They were also
developed by judicial decisions in the United States and in the Philippines even before people vs.
Ylagan (58 Phil. 851-853).
Again, the equal protection clause was interpreted in the case of Plessy vs. Ferguson (163 US
537) as securing to the Negroes equal but separate facilities, which doctrine was revoked in the
case of Brown vs. Maryland Board of Education (349 US 294), holding that the equal protection
clause means that the Negroes are entitled to attend the same schools attended by the whitesequal facilities in the same school-which was extended to public parks and public buses.
De-segregation, not segregation, is now the governing principle.
Among other examples, the due process clause was interpreted in the case of People vs. Pomar
(46 Phil. 440) by a conservative, capitalistic court to invalidate a law granting maternity leave to
working women-according primacy to property rights over human rights. The case of People vs.
Pomar is no longer the rule.
As early as 1904, in the case of Lochner vs. New York (198 US 45, 76, 49 L. ed. 937, 949),
Justice Holmes had been railing against the conservatism of Judges perverting the guarantee of
due process to protect property rights as against human rights or social justice for the working
man. The law fixing maximum hours of labor was invalidated. Justice Holmes was vindicated
finally in 1936 in the case of West Coast Hotel vs. Parish (300 US 377-79; 81 L. ed. 703) where
the American Supreme Court upheld the rights of workers to social justice in the form of
guaranteed minimum wage for women and minors, working hours not exceeding eight (8) daily,
and maternity leave for women employees.
The power of judicial review and the principle of separation of powers as well as the rule on
political questions have been evolved and grafted into the American Constitution by judicial
decisions (Marbury vs. Madison, supra Coleman vs. Miller, 307 US 433, 83 L. ed. 1385;
Springer vs. Government, 277 US 210-212, 72 L. ed. 852, 853).
It is noteworthy that Justice Black, who seems to be against judicial legislation, penned a
separate concurring opinion in the case of Coleman vs. Miller, supra, affirming the doctrine of
political question as beyond the ambit of judicial review. There is nothing in both the American
and Philippine Constitutions expressly providing that the power of the courts is limited by the
principle of separation of powers and the doctrine on political questions. There are numerous
cases in Philippine jurisprudence applying the doctrines of separation of powers and political
questions and invoking American precedents.
Unlike the American Constitution, both the 1935 and 1973 Philippine Constitutions expressly
vest in the Supreme Court the power to review the validity or constitutionality of any legislative
enactment or executive act.
WHEREFORE, THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER OF DISMISSAL IS HEREBY REVERSED
AND SET ASIDE AND THE CASE IS REMANDED TO IT FOR FURTHER
PROCEEDINGS. SHOULD A GREATER AMOUNT OF DAMAGES BE DECREED IN
FAVOR OF HEREIN PETITIONERS, THE PAYMENTS ALREADY MADE TO THEM
PURSUANT TO THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT SHALL BE DEDUCTED. NO
COSTS.
SO ORDERED.
#19 Digest
136 SCRA 141 Political Law Separation of Powers SC Cannot Legislate; Exception
Statutory Construction Determining the Purpose of the Law
Perfecto Floresca et al are the heirs of the deceased employees of Philex Mining Corporation
who, while working at its copper mines underground operations in Tuba, Benguet on June 28,
1967, died as a result of the cave-in that buried them in the tunnels of the mine. Theircomplaint
alleges that Philex, in violation of governmentrules and regulations, negligently and deliberately

failed to take the required precautions for the protection of the lives of its men
working underground. Floresca et al moved to claim their benefits pursuant to the Workmens
Compensation Act before the Workmens Compensation Commission. They also filed a separate
civil case against Philex for damages.
Philex sought the dismissal of the civil case as it insisted that Floresca et al have already claimed
benefits under the Workmens Compensation Act.
ISSUE: Whether or not Philex is correct.
HELD: Yes. Under the law, Floresca et al could only do either one. If they filed for benefits
under the WCA then they will be estopped from proceeding with a civil case before the regular
courts. Conversely, if they sued before the civil courts then they would also be estopped from
claiming benefits under the WCA.
HOWEVER, the Supreme Court ruled that Floresca et al are excused from this deficiency due to
ignorance of the fact. Had they been aware of such then they may have not availed of such a
remedy. But, if in case theyll win in the lower court whatever award may be granted, the amount
given to them under the WCA should be deducted. The SC emphasized that if they would go
strictly by the book in this case then the purpose of the law may be defeated. Idolatrous
reverence for the letter of the law sacrifices the human being. The spirit of the law insures mans
survival and ennobles him. As Shakespeare said, the letter of the law killeth but its spirit giveth
life.
#31
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 57227 May 14, 1992

AMELITA CONSTANTINO and MICHAEL CONSTANTINO, the latter represented
herein by the former, his mother and natural guardian, petitioners,
vs.
IVAN MENDEZ and the HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Roberto M. Sarenas for petitioners.
Bienvinido D. Cariaga for private respondent.

BIDIN, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari questioning the decision 1 dated April 30, 1981 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 61552-R which dismissed petitioner's complaint and set aside
the resolution 2 dated October 21, 1976 of the then Court of First Instance of Davao, 16th Judicial
District, amending the dispositive portion of its decision dated June 21, 1976 and ordering
private respondent Ivan Mendez: (1) to acknowledge the minor Michael Constantino as his
illegitimate child; (2) to give a monthly support of P300.00 to the minor child; (3) to pay
complainant Amelita Constantino the sum of P8,200.00 as actual and moral damages; and (4) to
pay attorney's fees in the sum of P5,000 plus costs.
It appears on record that on June 5, 1975, petitioner Amelita Constantino filed an action for
acknowledgment, support and damages against private respondent Ivan Mendez. The case was

filed with the then CFI of Davao, 10th Judicial District and docketed as Civil Case No. 8881. In
her complaint, Amelita Constantino alleges, among others, that sometime in the month of
August, 1974, she met Ivan Mendez at Tony's Restaurant located at Sta. Cruz, Manila, where she
worked as a waitress; that the day following their first meeting, Ivan invited Amelita to dine with
him at Hotel Enrico where he was billeted; that while dining, Ivan professed his love and courted
Amelita; that Amelita asked for time to think about Ivan's proposal; that at about 11:00 o'clock in
the evening, Amelita asked Ivan to bring her home to which the latter agreed, that on the pretext
of getting something, Ivan brought Amelita inside his hotel room and through a promise of
marriage succeeded in having sexual intercourse with the latter; that after the sexual contact,
Ivan confessed to Amelita that he is a married man; that they repeated their sexual contact in the
months of September and November, 1974, whenever Ivan is in Manila, as a result of which
Amelita got pregnant; that her pleas for help and support fell on deaf ears; that Amelita had no
sexual relations with any other man except Ivan who is the father of the child yet to be born at
the time of the filing of the complaint; that because of her pregnancy, Amelita was forced to
leave her work as a waitress; that Ivan is a prosperous businessman of Davao City with a
monthly income of P5,000 to P8,000. As relief, Amelita prayed for the recognition of the unborn
child, the payment of actual, moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees plus costs.
In his answer dated August 5, 1975, Ivan admitted that he met Amelita at Tony's Cocktail
Lounge but denied having sexual knowledge or illicit relations with her. He prayed for the
dismissal of the complaint for lack of cause of action. By way of counterclaim, he further prayed
for the payment of exemplary damages and litigation expense including attorney's fees for the
filing of the malicious complaint.
On September 1, 1975, Amelita Constantino filed a motion for leave to amend the complaint
impleading as co-plaintiff her son Michael Constantino who was born on August 3, 1975. In its
order dated September 4, 1975, the trial court admitted the amended complaint.
On September 11, 1975, Ivan Mendez filed his answer to the amended complaint reiterating his
previous answer denying that Michael Constantino is his illegitimate son.
After hearing, the trial court rendered a decision dated June 21, 1976, the dispositive portion of
which reads, viz:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of
plaintiff Amelita Constantino and against defendant Ivan Mendez, ordering the
latter to pay Amelita Constantino the sum of P8,000.00 by way of actual and
moral damages; and, the sum of P3,000.00, as and by way of attorney's fees. The
defendant shall pay the costs of this suit.
SO ORDERED.
From the above decision, both parties filed their separate motion for reconsideration. Ivan
Mendez anchored his motion on the ground that the award of damages was not supported by
evidence. Amelita Constantino, on the other hand, sought the recognition and support of her son
Michael Constantino as the illegitimate son of Ivan Mendez.
In its resolution dated October 21, 1976, the trial court granted Amelita Constantino's motion for
reconsideration, and amended the dispositive portion of its decision dated June 21, 1976 to read
as follows, viz:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of
plaintiff Amelita Constantino and plaintiff-minor Michael Constantino, and
against defendant Ivan Mendez ordering the latter to pay Amelita Constantino the
sum of P8,000.00 by way of actual and moral damages and the sum of P200.00 as
and by way of payment of the hospital and medical bills incurred during the
delivery of plaintiff-minor Michael Constantino; to recognize as his own
illegitimate child the plaintiff-minor Michael Constantino who shall be entitled to
all the rights, privileges and benefits appertaining to a child of such status; to give
a permanent monthly support in favor of plaintiff Michael Constantino the
amount of P300.00; and the sum of P5,000.00 as and by way of attorney's fees.
The defendant shall pay the costs of this suit.

Let this Order form part of the decision dated June 21, 1976.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the above amended decision was set aside and the complaint
was dismissed. Hence, this petition for review.
Basically, the issue to be resolved in the case at bar is whether or not the Court of Appeals
committed a reversible error in setting aside the decision of the trial court and in dismissing the
complaint.
Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the factual findings of the trial
and in not affirming the decision of the trial court. They also pointed out that the appellate court
committed a misapprehension of facts when it concluded that Ivan did not have sexual access
with Amelita during the first or second week of November, 1976 (should be 1974), the time of
the conception of the child.
It must be stressed at the outset that factual findings of the trial court have only a persuasive and
not a conclusive effect on the Court of Appeals. In the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, it is
the duty of the Court of Appeals to review the factual findings of the trial court and rectify the
errors it committed as may have been properly assigned and as could be established by a reexamination of the evidence on record. It is the factual findings of the Court of Appeals, not
those of the trial court, that as a rule are considered final and conclusive even on this Court
(Hermo v. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al., 155 SCRA 24 [1987]). This being a petition
for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, this Court will review only errors of law
committed by the Court of Appeals. It is not the function of this Court to re-examine all over
again the oral and documentary evidence submitted by the parties unless the findings of facts of
the Court of Appeals is not supported by the evidence on record or the judgment is based on
misapprehension of facts (Remalante v. Tibe, et al., 158 SCRA 138 [1988]; Hernandez v. Court
of Appeals, et al., 149 SCRA 97 [1987]).
It is the conclusion of the Court of Appeals, based on the evidence on record, that Amelita
Constantino has not proved by clear and convincing evidence her claim that Ivan Mendez is the
father of her son Michael Constantino. Such conclusion based on the evaluation of the evidence
on record is controlling on this Court as the same is supported by the evidence on record. Even
the trial court initially entertained such posture. It ordered the recognition of Michael as the
illegitimate son of Ivan only when acting on the motions for reconsideration, it reconsidered, on
October 21, 1976, its earlier decision dated June 21, 1976. Amelita's testimony on crossexamination that she had sexual contact with Ivan in Manila in the first or second week of
November, 1974 (TSN, December 8, 1975, p. 108) is inconsistent with her response that she
could not remember the date of their last sexual intercourse in November, 1974 (Ibid, p. 106).
Sexual contact of Ivan and Amelita in the first or second week of November, 1974 is the crucial
point that was not even established on direct examination as she merely testified that she had
sexual intercourse with Ivan in the months of September, October and November, 1974.
Michael Constantino is a full-term baby born on August 3, 1975 (Exhibit 6) so that as correctly
pointed out by private respondent's counsel, citing medical science (Williams Obstetrics, Tenth
Ed., p. 198) to the effect that "the mean duration of actual pregnancy, counting from the day of
conception must be close to 267 days", the conception of the child (Michael) must have taken
place about 267 days before August 3, 1975 or sometime in the second week of November,
1974. While Amelita testified that she had sexual contact with Ivan in November, 1974,
nevertheless said testimony is contradicted by her own evidence (Exh. F), the letter dated
February 11, 1975, addressed to Ivan Mendez requesting for a conference, prepared by her own
counsel Atty. Roberto Sarenas to whom she must have confided the attendant circumstances of
her pregnancy while still fresh in her memory, informing Ivan that Amelita is four (4) months
pregnant so that applying the period of the duration of actual pregnancy, the child was conceived
on or about October 11, 1974.
Petitioner's assertion that Ivan is her first and only boyfriend (TSN, December 8, 1975, p. 65) is
belied by Exhibit 2, her own letter addressed to Mrs. Mendez where she revealed the reason for
her attachment to Ivan who possessed certain traits not possessed by her boyfriend. She also
confided that she had a quarrel with her boyfriend because of gossips so she left her work. An

order for recognition and support may create an unwholesome atmosphere or may be an irritant
in the family or lives of the parties so that it must be issued only if paternity or filiation is
established by clear and convincing evidence. The burden of proof is on Amelita to establish her
affirmative allegations that Ivan is the father of her son. Consequently, in the absence of clear
and convincing evidence establishing paternity or filiation, the complaint must be dismissed.
As regards Amelita's claim for damages which is based on Articles 19 3 & 21 4 of the Civil Code
on the theory that through Ivan's promise of marriage, she surrendered her virginity, we cannot
but agree with the Court of Appeals that more sexual intercourse is not by itself a basis for
recovery. Damages could only be awarded if sexual intercourse is not a product of voluntariness
and mutual desire. At the time she met Ivan at Tony's Restaurant, Amelita was already 28 years
old and she admitted that she was attracted to Ivan (TSN, December 3, 1975, p. 83). Her
attraction to Ivan is the reason why she surrendered her womanhood. Had she been induced or
deceived because of a promise of marriage, she could have immediately severed her relation with
Ivan when she was informed after their first sexual contact sometime in August, 1974, that he
was a married man. Her declaration that in the months of September, October and November,
1974, they repeated their sexual intercourse only indicates that passion and not the alleged
promise of marriage was the moving force that made her submit herself to Ivan.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is Dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
#31 Digest
Constantino vs Mendez
Constantino vs. Mendez
209 SCRA 18

FACTS:

Michael Constantino, an illegitimate child, as represented by Amelita, her mother, sought

monthly support from Ivan Mendez including Amelias complaint on damages. The latter and
Amelita met in a restaurant in Manila where she was working as a waitress. Ivan invited him at
his hotel and through promise of marriage succeeded in having sexual intercourse with Amelita,
afterwards, he admitted being a married man. In spite of that, they repeated their sexual
contact. Subsequently, she became pregnant and had to resign from work.

Trial court ruled in favor of Amelita providing actual and moral damages, acknowledging
Michael as Ivans illegitimate child and giving monthly support to the latter which was set aside
by CA.

ISSUE: WON the alleged illegitimate child is entitled for the monthly support.

HELD:

Amelita Constantino has not proved by clear and convincing evidence her claim that Ivan
Mendez is the father of her son Michael Constantino. Sexual contact of Ivan and Amelita in the
first or second week of November, 1974 is the crucial point that was not even established on

direct examination as she merely testified that she had sexual intercourse with Ivan in the months
of September, October and November, 1974. More so, Amelita admitted that she was attracted
to Ivan and their repeated sexual intercourse indicated that passion and not alleged promise to
marriage was the moving force to submit herself with Ivan.

The petition was dismissed for lack of merit.

#42
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-28248 March 12, 1975

LEONORA PERIDO, joined by husband MANUEL PIROTE, INOCENCIA PERIDO,
ALBENIO PERIDO, PAULINO PERIDO, LETIA PERIDO, joined by husband
BIENVENIDO BALYAO, LETICIA PERIDO, joined by husband FELIX VILLARUZ,
EUFEMIA PERIDO, CONSOLACION PERIDO, ALFREDO PERIDO, GEORGE
PERIDO, AMPARO PERIDO, WILFREDO PERIDO, MARGARITA PERIDO,
ROLANDO SALDE and EDUARDO SALDE, petitioners,
vs.
MARIA PERIDO, SOFRONIO PERIDO, JUAN A. PERIDO, GONZALO PERIDO,
PACITA PERIDO, MAGDALENA PERIDO, ALICIA PERIDO, JOSEFINA PERIDO, FE
PERIDO, TERESA PERIDO and LUZ PERIDO, respondents.
Januario L. Jison, Jr. for petitioners.
Antonio T. de Jesus for respondents.

MAKALINTAL, C.J.:+.wph!1
This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals in its CA-G.R. No.
37034-R, affirming the decision of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental in Civil Case
No. 6529.
Lucio Perido of Himamaylan, Negros Occidental, married twice during his lifetime. His first
wife was Benita Talorong, with whom he begot three (3) children: Felix, Ismael, and Margarita.
After Benita died Lucio married Marcelina Baliguat, with whom he had five (5) children:
Eusebio, Juan, Maria, Sofronia and Gonzalo. Lucio himself died in 1942, while his second wife
died in 1943.
Of the three (3) children belonging to the first marriage only Margarita Perido is still living. Her
deceased brother, Felix Perido, is survived by his children Inocencia, Leonora, Albinio, Paulino,
Letia, Leticia, and Eufemia, all surnamed Perido. Nicanora Perido, another daughter of Felix, is
also deceased, but is survived by two (2) sons, Rolando and Eduardo Salde.
Margarita's other deceased brother, Ismael Perido, is survived by his children, namely:
Consolacion, Alfredo, Wilfredo, and Amparo. Susano Perido, another son of Ismael, is dead, but
survived by his own son George Perido.
Of Lucio Perido's five (5) children by his second wife, two are already dead, namely: Eusebio
and Juan. Eusebio is survived by his children Magdalena Perido, Pacita Perido, Alicia Perido,

Josefina Perido, Fe Perido, Teresa Perido, and Luz Perido, while Juan is survived by his only
child, Juan A. Perido.
On August 15, 1960 the children and grandchildren of the first and second marriages of Lucio
Perido executed a document denominated as "Declaration of Heirship and Extra-judicial
Partition," whereby they partitioned among themselves Lots Nos. 458, 471, 506, 511, 509, 513B, 807, and 808, all of the Cadastral Survey of Himamaylan, Occidental Negros.
Evidently the children belonging to the first marriage of Lucio Perido had second thoughts about
the partition. On March 8, 1962 they filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental, which complaint was later amended on February 22, 1963, against the children of the
second marriage, praying for the annulment of the so-called "Declaration of Heirship and ExtraJudicial Partition" and for another partition of the lots mentioned therein among the plaintiffs
alone. They alleged, among other things, that they had been induced by the defendants to execute
the document in question through misrepresentation, false promises and fraudulent means; that
the lots which were partitioned in said document belonged to the conjugal partnership of the
spouses Lucio Perido and Benita Talorong, and that the five children of Lucio Perido with
Marcelina Baliguat were all illegitimate and therefore had no successional rights to the estate of
Lucio Perido, who died in 1942. The defendants denied the foregoing allegations.
After trial the lower court rendered its decision dated July 31, 1965, annulling the "Declaration
of Heirship and Extra-Judicial Partition." However, it did not order the partition of the lots
involved among the plaintiffs exclusively in view of its findings that the five children of Lucio
Perido with his second wife, Marcelina Baliguat, were legitimate; that all the lots, except Lot No.
458, were the exclusive properties of Lucio Perido; and that 11/12 of Lot No. 458 belonged to
the conjugal partnership of Lucio Perido and his second wife, Marcelina Baliguat. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:t.hqw
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court renders judgment as follows:
declaring the following as the legitimate children and grandchildren and heirs of
Lucio Perido and Benita Talorong: Felix Perido, deceased; grandchildren:
Inocencia Perido, Leonora Perido, Albinio Perido, Paulino Perido, Letia Perido,
Leticia Perido, Eufemia Perido; Nicanora Perido, deceased; great grandchildren:
Rolando Salde and Eduardo Salde; Ismael Perido, deceased; grandchildren:
Consolacion Perido, Alfredo Perido, Susano Perido, deceased; great grandson:
George Perido; Amparo Perido and Wilfredo Perido; and, Margarita Perido; (2)
declaring the following as the legitimate children and grandchildren and heirs of
Lucio Perido and Marcelina Baliguat: Eusebio Perido, deceased; grandchildren:
Pacita Perido, Magdalena Perido, Alicia Perido, Josefina Perido, Fe Perido,
Teresa Perido, and Luz Perido; Juan B. Perido, deceased; grandson, Juan A.
Perido; Maria Perido; Sofronia Perido; and Gonzalo Perido; (3) declaring all lots
(471, 506, 511, 509, 513-part, 807, and 808) except Lot No. 458 as exclusive
properties of Lucio Perido so that each of them should be divided into eight (8)
equal parts: 1/8 belongs to Felix Perido, but because of his death leaving eight (8)
children, the same should be divided and alloted as follows: 1/64 to Inocencia
Perido of age, widow; 1/64 to Leonora Perido, of age, married to Manuel Pirote;
1/64 to Albinio Perido, of age, married to Honorata Villasana; 1/64 to Paulino
Perido, of age, married to Norma Villalba 1/64 to Letia Perido, of age, married to
Bienvenido Balyac; 1/64 to Leticia Perido, of age, married to Felix Villaruz; 1/64
to Eufemia Perido, of age, single; 1/64 to Nicanora Perido, but because she is now
dead the same should be divided and alloted as follows: 1/128 to Rolando Salde,
of age, single; and 1/128 to Eduardo Salde, of age, single; 1/8 belongs to Ismael
Perido, but because he is already dead leaving five children, the same should be
divided and alloted as follows: 1/40 to Consolacion Perido, of age, widow; 1/40 to
Alfredo Perido, of age married to Trinidad Tamargo; 1/40 to Susano Perido, but
he is already dead with one son, the same goes to George Perido, of age, single;
1/40 to Wilfredo Perido, of age, single; 1/8 belongs to Margarita Perido, of age,
widow; 1/8 belongs to Eusebio Perido, but because he is already dead with seven
children, the same should be divided and alloted as follows: 1/56 goes to Pacita
Perido, of age, single; 1/56 goes to Magdalena Perido, of age, single; 1/56 goes to
Alicia Perido, of age, married to Isaias Ruiz; 1/56 goes to Josefina Perido, of age,
married to Leopoldo Doloroso; 1/56 goes to Fe Perido, of age, single; 1/56 goes to

Teresa Perido, of are single; 1/56 goes to Luz Perido, of age, married to Fidel de
la Cruz; 1/8 belongs to Juan B. Perido, but because he is already dead with one
child, the same 1/8 goes to Juan A. Perido, of age, married to Salud Salgado 1/8
goes to Maria Perido. of age, married to Julio Pirote; 1/8 goes to Sofronia Perido,
of age, widow; and, 1/8 goes to Gonzalo Perido, of age, married to
Lacomemoracion Estiller; (4) declaring the 11/12 shares in Lot No. 458 as
conjugal partnership property of Lucio Perido and Marcelina Baliguat, which
should be divided and alloted as follows: 11/24 goes to Lucio Perido to be divided
into eight (8) equal shares and 11/24 goes to Marcelina Baliguat to be divided into
five (5) equal shares or 11/120 for each of the children and again to be divided by
the children of each child now deceased; (6) declaring Fidel Perido owner of 1/12
share in Lot 458 to be divided among his heirs to be determined accordingly later;
and (6) declaring null and void Exhibit "J" of the plaintiffs which is Exhibit "10"
for the defendants, without costs and without adjudication with respect to the
counterclaim and damages, they being members of the same family, for equity
and justice.
The plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeals, alleging that the trial court erred: (1) in declaring
that Eusebio Perido, Juan Perido, Maria Perido, Sofronia Perido and Gonzalo Perido, were the
legitimate children of Lucio Perido and his second wife, Marcelina Baliguat; (2) in declaring that
Lucio Perido was the exclusive owner of Lots Nos. 471, 506, 511, 509, 513-Part, 807, and 808 of
Cadastral Survey of Himamaylan, Negros Occidental, and in not declaring that said lots were the
conjugal partnership property of Lucio Perido and his first wife, Benita Talorong; and (3) in
holding that 11/12 of Lot 458 was the conjugal partnership property of Lucio Perido and
Marcelina Baliguat.
Finding no reversible error in the decision of the lower court, the Court of Appeals affirmed it in
toto. The appellants moved to reconsider but were turned down. Thereupon they instituted he
instant petition for review reiterating in effect the assignments of error and the arguments in the
brief they submitted to the appellate court.
The first issue pertains to the legitimacy of the five children of Lucio Perido with Marcelina
Baliguat. The petitioners insist that said children were illegitimate on the theory that the first
three were born out of wedlock even before the death of Lucio Perido's first wife, while the last
two were also born out of wedlock and were not recognized by their parents before or after their
marriage. In support of their contention they allege that Benita Talorong died in 1905, after the
first three children were born, as testified to by petitioner Margarita Perido and corroborated by
petitioner Leonora Perido; that as late as 1923 Lucio Perido was still a widower, as shown on the
face of the certificates of title issued to him in said year; and Lucio Perido married his second
wife, Marcelina Baliguat, only in 1925, as allegedly established through the testimony of
petitioner Leonora Perido.
The petition cannot be sustained. The Court of Appeals found that there was evidence to show
that Lucio Perido's wife, Benita Talorong, died during the Spanish regime. This finding
conclusive upon us and beyond our power of review. Under the circumstance, Lucio Perido had
no legal impediment to marry Marcelina Baliguat before the birth of their first child in 1900.
With respect to the civil status of Lucio Perido as stated in the certificates of title issued to him in
1923, the Court of Appeals correctly held that the statement was not conclusive to show that he
was not actually married to Marcelina Baliguat. Furthermore, it is weak and insufficient to rebut
the presumption that persons living together husband and wife are married to each other. This
presumption, especially where legitimacy of the issue is involved, as in this case, may be
overcome only by cogent proof on the part of those who allege the illegitimacy. In the case
of Adong vs. Cheong Seng Gee 1 this Court explained the rationale behind this presumption, thus:
"The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage. Marriage in this
jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance
of which the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward
legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the
absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The
reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus
hold themselves out as being, they would he living in the constant violation of decency and of
law. A presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is "that a man and woman

deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage." (Sec.
334, No. 28) Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio Always presume marriage."
While the alleged marriage ceremony in 1925, if true, might tend to rebut the presumption of
marriage arising from previous cohabitation, it is to be noted that both the trial court and the
appellate court did not even pass upon the uncorroborated testimony of petitioner Leonora Perido
on the matter. The reason is obvious. Said witness, when asked why she knew that Marcelina
Baliguat was married to Lucio Perido only in 1925, merely replied that she knew it because
"during the celebration of the marriage by the Aglipayan priest (they) got flowers from (their)
garden and placed in the altar." Evidently she was not even an eyewitness to the ceremony.
In view of the foregoing the Court of Appeals did not err in concluding that the five children of
Lucio Perido and Marcelina Baliguat were born during their marriage and, therefore, legitimate.
The second assignment of error refers to the determination of whether or not Lots Nos. 471, 506,
511, 509-513-Part, 807 and 808 were the exclusive properties of Lucio Perido. In disposing of
the contention of the petitioners that said lots belong to the conjugal partnership of spouses Lucio
Perido and Benita Talorong, the Court of Appeals said:t.hqw
... We cannot agree again with them on this point. It is to be noted that the lands
covered by the certificates of title (Exhs. B to G) were all declared in the name of
Lucio Perido. Then there is evidence showing that the lands were inherited by
Lucio Perido from his grandmother (t.s.n., p. 21, Feb. 20, 1964). In other words,
they were the exclusive properties of the late Lucio Perido which he brought into
the first and second marriages. By fiat of law said Properties should be divided
accordingly among his legal heirs.
The petitioners take exception to the finding of the appellate court that the aforementioned lots
were inherited by Lucio Perido from his grandmother and contend that they were able to
establish through the testimonies of their witnesses that the spouses Lucio Perido and Benita
Talorong acquired them during their lifetime. Again, the petitioners cannot be sustained. The
question involves appreciation of the evidence, which is within the domain of the Court of
Appeals, the factual findings of which are not reviewable by this Court.
The third assignment of error is with regard to the ruling of the Court of Appeals sustaining the
finding of the trial court that 11/12 of Lot 458 was the conjugal partnership property of Lucio
Perido and his second wife, Marcelina Baliguat. Said the appellate court:t.hqw
With respect to Lot No. 458 which is now covered by Original Certificate of Title
No. 21769 issued in 1925 the same should be considered conjugally owned by
Lucio Perido and his second wife, Marcelina Baliguat. The finding of the lower
court on this point need not be disturbed. It is expressly stated in the certificate of
title (Exh. L) that Lucio Perido, the registered owner, was married to Marcelina
Baliguat unlike in the previous land titles. If the law presumes a property
registered in the name of only one of the spouses to be conjugal (Guinguing vs.
Abutin, 48 Phil. 144; Flores vs. Flores, 48 Phil. 288, Escutin vs. Escutin, 60 Phil.
922), the presumption becomes stronger when the document recites that the
spouse in whose name the land is registered is married to somebody else, like in
the case at bar. It appearing that the legal presumption that the No. 458 belonged
to the conjugal partnership had not been overcome by clear proofs to the contrary,
we are constrained to rule, that the same is the conjugal property of the deceased
spouses Lucio Perido and Marcelina Baliguat.
In impugning the foregoing ruling, the petitioners maintain that they were able to prove that 6/12
of said Lot 458 was the conjugal property of spouses Lucio Perido and his first wife, Benita
Talorong, and that the purchase price of the additional 5/12 of said lot came from the proceeds of
sale of a lot allegedly belonging to Lucio Perido and his three children of the first marriage. As
in the second assignment of error, the issue raised here also involves appreciation of the evidence
and, consequently, the finding of the appellate court on the matter is binding on this Court.
Indeed, a review of that finding would require an examination of all the evidence introduced
before the trial court, a consideration of the credibility of witnesses and of the circumstances
surrounding the case, their relevancy or relation to one another and to the whole, as well as an

appraisal of the probabilities of the entire situation. It would thus abolish the distinction between
an ordinary appeal on the one hand and review on certiorari on the other, and thus defeat the
purpose for which the latter procedure has been established. 2
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed, with costs against the
petitioners.
#54
FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 132529. February 2, 2001]

SUSAN NICDAO CARIO, petitioner, vs. SUSAN YEE CARIO, respondent.

DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
The issue for resolution in the case at bar hinges on the validity of the two marriages
contracted by the deceased SPO4 Santiago S. Cario, whose death benefits is now the subject of
the controversy between the two Susans whom he married.
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51263, which affirmed in toto the decision[2] of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 87, in Civil Case No. Q-93-18632.
During the lifetime of the late SPO4 Santiago S. Cario, he contracted two marriages, the first
was on June 20, 1969, with petitioner Susan Nicdao Cario (hereafter referred to as Susan
Nicdao), with whom he had two offsprings, namely, Sahlee and Sandee Cario; and the second
was on November 10, 1992, with respondent Susan Yee Cario (hereafter referred to as Susan
Yee), with whom he had no children in their almost ten year cohabitation starting way back in
1982.
In 1988, SPO4 Santiago S. Cario became ill and bedridden due to diabetes complicated by
pulmonary tuberculosis. He passed away on November 23, 1992, under the care of Susan Yee,
who spent for his medical and burial expenses. Both petitioner and respondent filed claims for
monetary benefits and financial assistance pertaining to the deceased from various government
agencies. Petitioner Susan Nicdao was able to collect a total of P146,000.00 from MBAI,
PCCUI, Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig,[3] while respondent Susan Yee received a
total of P21,000.00 from GSIS Life, Burial (GSIS) and burial (SSS). [4]
On December 14, 1993, respondent Susan Yee filed the instant case for collection of sum of
money against petitioner Susan Nicdao praying, inter alia, that petitioner be ordered to return to
her at least one-half of the one hundred forty-six thousand pesos (P146,000.00) collectively
denominated as death benefits which she (petitioner) received from MBAI, PCCUI,
Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig. Despite service of summons, petitioner failed to
file her answer, prompting the trial court to declare her in default.
Respondent Susan Yee admitted that her marriage to the deceased took place during the
subsistence of, and without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of, the marriage
between petitioner and the deceased. She, however, claimed that she had no knowledge of the
previous marriage and that she became aware of it only at the funeral of the deceased, where she
met petitioner who introduced herself as the wife of the deceased. To bolster her action for
collection of sum of money, respondent contended that the marriage of petitioner and the
deceased is void ab initio because the same was solemnized without the required marriage
license. In support thereof, respondent presented: 1) the marriage certificate of the deceased and
the petitioner which bears no marriage license number;[5] and 2) a certification dated March 9,
1994, from the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, which reads

This is to certify that this Office has no record of marriage license of the spouses SANTIAGO
CARINO (sic) and SUSAN NICDAO, who are married in this municipality on June 20,
1969. Hence, we cannot issue as requested a true copy or transcription of Marriage License
number from the records of this archives.
This certification is issued upon the request of Mrs. Susan Yee Cario for whatever legal purpose
it may serve.[6]
On August 28, 1995, the trial court ruled in favor of respondent, Susan Yee, holding as
follows:
WHEREFORE, the defendant is hereby ordered to pay the plaintiff the sum of P73,000.00, half
of the amount which was paid to her in the form of death benefits arising from the death of SPO4
Santiago S. Cario, plus attorneys fees in the amount of P5,000.00, and costs of suit.
IT IS SO ORDERED.[7]
On appeal by petitioner to the Court of Appeals, the latter affirmed in toto the decision of
the trial court. Hence, the instant petition, contending that:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
FINDINGS OF THE LOWER COURT THAT VDA. DE CONSUEGRA VS. GSIS IS
APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN APPLYING EQUITY
IN THE INSTANT CASE INSTEAD OF THE CLEAR AND UNEQUIVOCAL
MANDATE OF THE FAMILY CODE.
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THE
CASE OF VDA. DE CONSUEGRA VS GSIS TO HAVE BEEN MODIFIED, AMENDED
AND EVEN ABANDONED BY THE ENACTMENT OF THE FAMILY CODE. [8]
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be
invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void.Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to
be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for
said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the previous
marriage void.[9] However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to
declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to the
determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution
of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of
marriage even after the death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted to
question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the
case.[10] In such instances, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the
existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be
limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void.[11]
It is clear therefore that the Court is clothed with sufficient authority to pass upon the
validity of the two marriages in this case, as the same is essential to the determination of who is
rightfully entitled to the subject death benefits of the deceased.
Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when the marriage of petitioner Susan
Nicdao and the deceased was solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite
of marriage,[12] and the absence thereof, subject to certain exceptions, [13] renders the marriage
void ab initio.[14]
In the case at bar, there is no question that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased does
not fall within the marriages exempt from the license requirement. A marriage license, therefore,

was indispensable to the validity of their marriage. This notwithstanding, the records reveal that
the marriage contract of petitioner and the deceased bears no marriage license number and, as
certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no record of
such marriage license. In Republic v. Court of Appeals,[15] the Court held that such a certification
is adequate to prove the non-issuance of a marriage license. Absent any circumstance of
suspicion, as in the present case, the certification issued by the local civil registrar enjoys
probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to
the issuance of a marriage license.
Such being the case, the presumed validity of the marriage of petitioner and the deceased
has been sufficiently overcome. It then became the burden of petitioner to prove that their
marriage is valid and that they secured the required marriage license. Although she was declared
in default before the trial court, petitioner could have squarely met the issue and explained the
absence of a marriage license in her pleadings before the Court of Appeals and this Court. But
petitioner conveniently avoided the issue and chose to refrain from pursuing an argument that
will put her case in jeopardy. Hence, the presumed validity of their marriage cannot stand.
It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the marriage between petitioner Susan Nicdao and the
deceased, having been solemnized without the necessary marriage license, and not being one of
the marriages exempt from the marriage license requirement, is undoubtedly void ab initio.
It does not follow from the foregoing disquisition, however, that since the marriage of
petitioner and the deceased is declared void ab initio, the death benefits under scrutiny would
now be awarded to respondent Susan Yee. To reiterate, under Article 40 of the Family Code, for
purposes of remarriage, there must first be a prior judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous
marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage, otherwise, the second
marriage would also be void.
Accordingly, the declaration in the instant case of nullity of the previous marriage of the
deceased and petitioner Susan Nicdao does not validate the second marriage of the deceased with
respondent Susan Yee. The fact remains that their marriage was solemnized without first
obtaining a judicial decree declaring the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased
void. Hence, the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is, likewise, void ab initio.
One of the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage is the separation of the property
of the spouses according to the applicable property regime. [16] Considering that the two
marriages are void ab initio, the applicable property regime would not be absolute community or
conjugal partnership of property, but rather, be governed by the provisions of Articles 147 and
148 of the Family Code on Property Regime of Unions Without Marriage.
Under Article 148 of the Family Code, which refers to the property regime of bigamous
marriages, adulterous relationships, relationships in a state of concubine, relationships where
both man and woman are married to other persons, multiple alliances of the same married
man,[17] ... [O]nly the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint
contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in
proportion to their respective contributions ...
In this property regime, the properties acquired by the parties through their actual joint
contribution shall belong to the co-ownership. Wages and salaries earned by each party belong
to him or her exclusively. Then too, contributions in the form of care of the home, children and
household, or spiritual or moral inspiration, are excluded in this regime.[18]
Considering that the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is a bigamous
marriage, having been solemnized during the subsistence of a previous marriage then presumed
to be valid (between petitioner and the deceased), the application of Article 148 is therefore in
order.
The disputed P146,000.00 from MBAI [AFP Mutual Benefit Association, Inc.],
NAPOLCOM, Commutation, Pag-ibig, and PCCUI, are clearly renumerations, incentives and
benefits from governmental agencies earned by the deceased as a police officer. Unless
respondent Susan Yee presents proof to the contrary, it could not be said that she contributed
money, property or industry in the acquisition of these monetary benefits. Hence, they are not
owned in common by respondent and the deceased, but belong to the deceased alone and
respondent has no right whatsoever to claim the same. By intestate succession, the said death

benefits of the deceased shall pass to his legal heirs. And, respondent, not being the legal wife of
the deceased is not one of them.
As to the property regime of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased, Article 147 of the
Family Code governs. This article applies to unions of parties who are legally capacitated and
not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void for
other reasons, like the absence of a marriage license. Article 147 of the Family Code reads Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively
with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage,
their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by
both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be
presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by
them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the
acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the
acquisition thereof if the formers efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and
of the household.
xxxxxxxxx
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad
faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default
of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall
belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall
belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the
cohabitation.
In contrast to Article 148, under the foregoing article, wages and salaries earned by either
party during the cohabitation shall be owned by the parties in equal shares and will be divided
equally between them, even if only one party earned the wages and the other did not contribute
thereto.[19] Conformably, even if the disputed death benefits were earned by the deceased alone
as a government employee, Article 147 creates a co-ownership in respect thereto, entitling the
petitioner to share one-half thereof. As there is no allegation of bad faith in the present case, both
parties of the first marriage are presumed to be in good faith. Thus, one-half of the subject death
benefits under scrutiny shall go to the petitioner as her share in the property regime, and the other
half pertaining to the deceased shall pass by, intestate succession, to his legal heirs, namely, his
children with Susan Nicdao.
In affirming the decision of the trial court, the Court of Appeals relied on the case of Vda. de
Consuegra v. Government Service Insurance System,[20] where the Court awarded one-half of the
retirement benefits of the deceased to the first wife and the other half, to the second wife, holding
that:
... [S]ince the defendants first marriage has not been dissolved or declared void the conjugal
partnership established by that marriage has not ceased. Nor has the first wife lost or
relinquished her status as putative heir of her husband under the new Civil Code, entitled to
share in his estate upon his death should she survive him. Consequently, whether as conjugal
partner in a still subsisting marriage or as such putative heir she has an interest in the husbands
share in the property here in dispute.... And with respect to the right of the second wife, this
Court observed that although the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was
celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting, still there is need for judicial declaration
of such nullity. And inasmuch as the conjugal partnership formed by the second marriage was
dissolved before judicial declaration of its nullity, [t]he only just and equitable solution in this
case would be to recognize the right of the second wife to her share of one-half in the property
acquired by her and her husband, and consider the other half as pertaining to the conjugal
partnership of the first marriage.[21]
It should be stressed, however, that the aforecited decision is premised on the rule which
requires a prior and separate judicial declaration of nullity of marriage. This is the reason why in
the said case, the Court determined the rights of the parties in accordance with their existing
property regime.

In Domingo v. Court of Appeals,[22] however, the Court, construing Article 40 of the Family
Code, clarified that a prior and separate declaration of nullity of a marriage is an all important
condition precedent only for purposes of remarriage. That is, if a party who is previously married
wishes to contract a second marriage, he or she has to obtain first a judicial decree declaring the
first marriage void, before he or she could contract said second marriage, otherwise the second
marriage would be void. The same rule applies even if the first marriage is patently void because
the parties are not free to determine for themselves the validity or invalidity or their
marriage. However, for purposes other than to remarry, like for filing a case for collection of
sum of money anchored on a marriage claimed to be valid, no prior and separate judicial
declaration of nullity is necessary. All that a party has to do is to present evidence, testimonial or
documentary, that would prove that the marriage from which his or her rights flow is in fact
valid. Thereupon, the court, if material to the determination of the issues before it, will rule on
the status of the marriage involved and proceed to determine the rights of the parties in
accordance with the applicable laws and jurisprudence. Thus, in Nial v. Bayadog,[23] the Court
explained:
[T]he court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to
question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is without
prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of
declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause on the
basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void in Article 40 of the Family Code
connoted that such final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 51263 which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
ordering petitioner to pay respondent the sum of P73,000.00 plus attorneys fees in the amount of
P5,000.00, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint in Civil Case No. Q-93-18632, is
hereby DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
#54 Digest
NICDAO CARIO VS YEE CARIO
Posted by kaye lee on 10:00 PM
G.R. No. 132529 February 2 2001
[Article 147 Family Code-Property Regime of Union Without Marriage; Article 148 - Rules on
Co-ownership regarding polygamous/bigamous marriages, adulterous or concubinage
relationships; Article 40 - Judicial Declaration of Nullity of Marriage]

FACTS:
SPO4 Santiago Cario married Susan Nicdao in 1969 without marriage license. They had two
children. He then married Susan Yee on November 10 1992, with whom he had no children in
their almost 10 year cohabitation starting way back in 1982.
He passed away on November 23 1992. The two Susans filed with the RTC of Quezon City the
claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance pertaining to the deceased from various
government agencies. Nicdao collected a total of P146,000 while Yee received a total of
P21,000.
Yee filed an instant case for collection of half the money acquired by Nicdao, collectively
denominated as "death benefits." Yee admitted that her marriage with the SPO4 took place
during the subsistence of, and without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity, the
marriage between Nicdao and the SPO4. She however claimed that she became aware of the
previous marriage at the funeral of the deceased.
In 1995, the trial court ruled in favor of Yee. Nicdao appealed to the CA, which the CA affirmed
the decision of the trial court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Yee can claim half the amount acquired by Nicdao.
RULING:
No. SC held that the marriage between Yee and Cario falls under the Article 148 of the Family
Code, which refers to the property regime of bigamous or polygamous marriages, adulterous or
concubinage relationships.
Yee cannot claim the benefits earned by the SPO4 as a police officer as her marriage to the
deceased is void due to bigamy. She is only entitled to the properties acquired with the deceased
through their actual joint contribution. Wages and salaries earned by each party belong to him
or her exclusively. Hence, they are not owned in common by Yee and the deceased, but belong
to the deceased alone and Yee has no right whatsoever to claim the same. By intestate
succession, the said death benefits of the deceased shall pass to his legal heirs. And, Yee, not
being the legal wife, is not one of them.
As regards to the first marriage, the marriage between Nicdao and SPO4 is null and void due to
absence of a valid marriage license. Nicdao can claim the death benefits by the deceased even if
she did not contribute thereto. Article 147 creates a co-ownership in respect thereto, entitling
Nicdao to share one-half of the benefits. As there is no allegation of bad faith in the first
marriage, she can claim one-half of the disputed death benefits and the other half to the deceased'
to his legal heirs, by intestate succession.
The marriage between Yee and SPO4 is likewise null and void for the same has been solemnized
without the judicial declaration of the nullity of the marriage between Nicdao and SPO4. Under
Article 40, if a party who is previously married wishes to contract a second marriage, he or she
has to obtain first a judicial decree declaring the first marriage void, before he or she could
contract said second marriage, otherwise the second marriage would be void. However, for
purposes other than to remarry, no prior and separate judicial declaration of nullity is necessary.
#66
FIRST DIVISION

[A.M. No. MTJ-02-1390. April 11, 2002]

MERCEDITA
MATA
OCCIANO, respondent.

ARAES, petitioner, vs. JUDGE

SALVADOR

M.

DECISION
PUNO, J.:
Petitioner Mercedita Mata Araes charges respondent judge with Gross Ignorance of the
Law via a sworn Letter-Complaint dated 23 May 2001. Respondent is the Presiding Judge of the
Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur. Petitioner alleges that on 17 February 2000,
respondent judge solemnized her marriage to her late groom Dominador B. Orobia without the
requisite marriage license and at Nabua, Camarines Sur which is outside his territorial
jurisdiction.
They lived together as husband and wife on the strength of this marriage until her husband
passed away. However, since the marriage was a nullity, petitioners right to inherit the vast
properties left by Orobia was not recognized. She was likewise deprived of receiving the
pensions of Orobia, a retired Commodore of the Philippine Navy.

Petitioner prays that sanctions be imposed against respondent judge for his illegal acts and
unethical misrepresentations which allegedly caused her so much hardships, embarrassment and
sufferings.
On 28 May 2001, the case was referred by the Office of the Chief Justice to then Acting
Court Administrator Zenaida N. Elepao for appropriate action. On 8 June 2001, the Office of the
Court Administrator required respondent judge to comment.
In his Comment dated 5 July 2001, respondent judge averred that he was requested by a
certain Juan Arroyo on 15 February 2000 to solemnize the marriage of the parties on 17 February
2000. Having been assured that all the documents to the marriage were complete, he agreed to
solemnize the marriage in his sala at the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur.
However, on 17 February 2000, Arroyo informed him that Orobia had a difficulty walking and
could not stand the rigors of travelling to Balatan which is located almost 25 kilometers from his
residence in Nabua. Arroyo then requested if respondent judge could solemnize the marriage in
Nabua, to which request he acceded.
Respondent judge further avers that before he started the ceremony, he carefully examined
the documents submitted to him by petitioner. When he discovered that the parties did not
possess the requisite marriage license, he refused to solemnize the marriage and suggested its
resetting to another date. However, due to the earnest pleas of the parties, the influx of visitors,
and the delivery of provisions for the occasion, he proceeded to solemnize the marriage out of
human compassion. He also feared that if he reset the wedding, it might aggravate the physical
condition of Orobia who just suffered from a stroke. After the solemnization, he reiterated the
necessity for the marriage license and admonished the parties that their failure to give it would
render the marriage void. Petitioner and Orobia assured respondent judge that they would give
the license to him in the afternoon of that same day. When they failed to comply, respondent
judge followed it up with Arroyo but the latter only gave him the same reassurance that the
marriage license would be delivered to his sala at the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan,
Camarines Sur.
Respondent judge vigorously denies that he told the contracting parties that their marriage is
valid despite the absence of a marriage license. He attributes the hardships and embarrassment
suffered by the petitioner as due to her own fault and negligence.
On 12 September 2001, petitioner filed her Affidavit of Desistance dated 28 August 2001
with the Office of the Court Administrator. She attested that respondent judge initially refused to
solemnize her marriage due to the want of a duly issued marriage license and that it was because
of her prodding and reassurances that he eventually solemnized the same. She confessed that she
filed this administrative case out of rage. However, after reading the Comment filed by
respondent judge, she realized her own shortcomings and is now bothered by her conscience.
Reviewing the records of the case, it appears that petitioner and Orobia filed their
Application for Marriage License on 5 January 2000. It was stamped in this Application that the
marriage license shall be issued on 17 January 2000. However, neither petitioner nor Orobia
claimed it.
It also appears that the Office of the Civil Registrar General issued a Certification that it has
no record of such marriage that allegedly took place on 17 February 2000. Likewise, the Office
of the Local Civil Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur issued another Certification dated 7 May
2001 that it cannot issue a true copy of the Marriage Contract of the parties since it has no record
of their marriage.
On 8 May 2001, petitioner sought the assistance of respondent judge so the latter could
communicate with the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur for the
issuance of her marriage license. Respondent judge wrote the Local Civil Registrar of Nabua,
Camarines Sur. In a letter dated 9 May 2001, a Clerk of said office, Grace T. Escobal, informed
respondent judge that their office cannot issue the marriage license due to the failure of Orobia to
submit the Death Certificate of his previous spouse.
The Office of the Court Administrator, in its Report and Recommendation dated 15
November 2000, found the respondent judge guilty of solemnizing a marriage without a duly
issued marriage license and for doing so outside his territorial jurisdiction. A fine of P5,000.00
was recommended to be imposed on respondent judge.
We agree.

Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, or B.P.129, the authority of the regional
trial court judges and judges of inferior courts to solemnize marriages is confined to their
territorial jurisdiction as defined by the Supreme Court.
The case at bar is not without precedent. In Navarro vs. Domagtoy,[1] respondent judge
held office and had jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos,
Surigao del Norte. However, he solemnized a wedding at his residence in the municipality of
Dapa, Surigao del Norte which did not fall within the jurisdictional area of the municipalities of
Sta. Monica and Burgos. We held that:
A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinance to marry the faithful is
authorized to do so only within the area or diocese or place allowed by his Bishop. An appellate
court Justice or a Justice of this Court has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to solemnize
marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as the requisites of the law are complied
with. However, judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in
weddings only within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage
outside his courts jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid
down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject
the officiating official to administrative liability. [2] (Emphasis supplied.)
In said case, we suspended respondent judge for six (6) months on the ground that his act of
solemnizing a marriage outside his jurisdiction constitutes gross ignorance of the law. We further
held that:
The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts, are at least, proficient in the
law they are sworn to apply, more than the ordinary laymen. They should be skilled and
competent in understanding and applying the law. It is imperative that they be conversant with
basic legal principles like the ones involved in the instant case. x x x While magistrates may at
times make mistakes in judgment, for which they are not penalized, the respondent judge
exhibited ignorance of elementary provisions of law, in an area which has greatly prejudiced the
status of married persons.[3]
In the case at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge is limited to the
municipality of Balatan, Camarines Sur. His act of solemnizing the marriage of petitioner and
Orobia in Nabua, Camarines Sur therefore is contrary to law and subjects him to administrative
liability. His act may not amount to gross ignorance of the law for he allegedly solemnized the
marriage out of human compassion but nonetheless, he cannot avoid liability for violating the
law on marriage.
Respondent judge should also be faulted for solemnizing a marriage without the requisite
marriage license. In People vs. Lara,[4] we held that a marriage which preceded the issuance of
the marriage license is void, and that the subsequent issuance of such license cannot render valid
or even add an iota of validity to the marriage. Except in cases provided by law, it is the marriage
license that gives the solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize a marriage. Respondent
judge did not possess such authority when he solemnized the marriage of petitioner. In this
respect, respondent judge acted in gross ignorance of the law.
Respondent judge cannot be exculpated despite the Affidavit of Desistance filed by
petitioner. This Court has consistently held in a catena of cases that the withdrawal of the
complaint does not necessarily have the legal effect of exonerating respondent from disciplinary
action. Otherwise, the prompt and fair administration of justice, as well as the discipline of court
personnel, would be undermined.[5] Disciplinary actions of this nature do not involve purely
private or personal matters. They can not be made to depend upon the will of every complainant
who may, for one reason or another, condone a detestable act. We cannot be bound by the
unilateral act of a complainant in a matter which involves the Courts constitutional power to
discipline judges. Otherwise, that power may be put to naught, undermine the trust character of a
public office and impair the integrity and dignity of this Court as a disciplining authority. [6]
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Salvador M. Occiano, Presiding Judge of the Municipal
Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur, is fined P5,000.00 pesos with a STERN WARNING that
a repetition of the same or similar offense in the future will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.

#78
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 149498

May 20, 2004

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
LOLITA QUINTERO-HAMANO, respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Before us is a petition for review of the decision1 dated August 20, 2001 of the Court of
Appeals2 affirming the decision3 dated August 28, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court of Rizal,
Branch 72, declaring as null and void the marriage contracted between herein respondent Lolita
M. Quintero-Hamano and her husband Toshio Hamano.
On June 17, 1996, respondent Lolita Quintero-Hamano filed a complaint for declaration of
nullity of her marriage to her husband Toshio Hamano, a Japanese national, on the ground of
psychological incapacity.
Respondent alleged that in October 1986, she and Toshio started a common-law relationship in
Japan. They later lived in the Philippines for a month. Thereafter, Toshio went back to Japan and
stayed there for half of 1987. On November 16, 1987, she gave birth to their child.
On January 14, 1988, she and Toshio were married by Judge Isauro M. Balderia of the Municipal
Trial Court of Bacoor, Cavite. Unknown to respondent, Toshio was psychologically
incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities, which incapacity became manifest only after
the marriage. One month after their marriage, Toshio returned to Japan and promised to return by
Christmas to celebrate the holidays with his family. After sending money to respondent for two
months, Toshio stopped giving financial support. She wrote him several times but he never
responded. Sometime in 1991, respondent learned from her friends that Toshio visited the
Philippines but he did not bother to see her and their child.
The summons issued to Toshio remained unserved because he was no longer residing at his
given address. Consequently, on July 8, 1996, respondent filed an ex parte motion for leave to
effect service of summons by publication. The trial court granted the motion on July 12, 1996. In
August 1996, the summons, accompanied by a copy of the petition, was published in a
newspaper of general circulation giving Toshio 15 days to file his answer. Because Toshio failed
to file a responsive pleading after the lapse of 60 days from publication, respondent filed a
motion dated November 5, 1996 to refer the case to the prosecutor for investigation. The trial
court granted the motion on November 7, 1996.
On November 20, 1996, prosecutor Rolando I. Gonzales filed a report finding that no collusion
existed between the parties. He prayed that the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor be allowed to
intervene to ensure that the evidence submitted was not fabricated. On February 13, 1997, the
trial court granted respondents motion to present her evidence ex parte. She then testified on
how Toshio abandoned his family. She thereafter offered documentary evidence to support her
testimony.
On August 28, 1997, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which read:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the marriage between petitioner Lolita M.
Quintero-Hamano and Toshio Hamano, is hereby declared NULL and VOID.

The Civil Register of Bacoor, Cavite and the National Statistics Office are ordered to
make proper entries into the records of the afore-named parties pursuant to this judgment
of the Court.
SO ORDERED.4
In declaring the nullity of the marriage on the ground of Toshios psychological incapacity, the
trial court held that:
It is clear from the records of the case that respondent spouses failed to fulfill his
obligations as husband of the petitioner and father to his daughter. Respondent remained
irresponsible and unconcerned over the needs and welfare of his family. Such
indifference, to the mind of the Court, is a clear manifestation of insensitivity and lack of
respect for his wife and child which characterizes a very immature person. Certainly,
such behavior could be traced to respondents mental incapacity and disability of entering
into marital life.5
The Office of the Solicitor General, representing herein petitioner Republic of the Philippines,
appealed to the Court of Appeals but the same was denied in a decision dated August 28, 1997,
the dispositive portion of which read:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, and pursuant to applicable law and
jurisprudence on the matter and evidence on hand, judgment is hereby rendered
denying the instant appeal. The decision of the court a quo is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.6
The appellate court found that Toshio left respondent and their daughter a month after the
celebration of the marriage, and returned to Japan with the promise to support his family and
take steps to make them Japanese citizens. But except for two months, he never sent any support
to nor communicated with them despite the letters respondent sent. He even visited the
Philippines but he did not bother to see them. Respondent, on the other hand, exerted all efforts
to contact Toshio, to no avail.
The appellate court thus concluded that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform
his marital obligations to his family, and to "observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render
mutual help and support" pursuant to Article 68 of the Family Code of the Philippines. The
appellate court rhetorically asked:
But what is there to preserve when the other spouse is an unwilling party to the cohesion
and creation of a family as a social inviolable institution? Why should petitioner be made
to suffer in a marriage where the other spouse is not around and worse, left them without
even helping them cope up with family life and assist in the upbringing of their daughter
as required under Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code?7
The appellate court emphasized that this case could not be equated with Republic vs. Court of
Appeals and Molina8 and Santos vs. Court of Appeals.9 In those cases, the spouses were Filipinos
while this case involved a "mixed marriage," the husband being a Japanese national.
Hence, this appeal by petitioner Republic based on this lone assignment of error:
I
The Court of Appeals erred in holding that respondent was able to prove the
psychological incapacity of Toshio Hamano to perform his marital obligations, despite
respondents failure to comply with the guidelines laid down in the Molina case.10
According to petitioner, mere abandonment by Toshio of his family and his insensitivity to them
did not automatically constitute psychological incapacity. His behavior merely indicated simple
inadequacy in the personality of a spouse falling short of reasonable expectations. Respondent
failed to prove any severe and incurable personality disorder on the part of Toshio, in accordance
with the guidelines set in Molina.

The Office of the Public Attorney, representing respondent, reiterated the ruling of the
courts a quo and sought the denial of the instant petition.
We rule in favor of petitioner.
The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family
as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. 11 Thus,
any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.12
Respondent seeks to annul her marriage with Toshio on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines provides that:
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
In Molina, we came up with the following guidelines in the interpretation and application of
Article 36 for the guidance of the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and
our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. x x x
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d)
clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or
symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one
of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have
known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid
assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not
to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis (Salita vs.
Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100, June 13, 1994), nevertheless such root cause must be identified
as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence
may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the
marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties
exchanged their "I dos." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such
time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other
spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such
incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to
those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job.
Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing
medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and
raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume
the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness
must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty,
much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the
person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the
obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of
the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of

the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the
text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect
by our courts. x x x
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General
to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein
his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The
Solicitor-General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such
certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for
resolution of the court. The Solicitor-General shall discharge the equivalent function of
the defensor vinculicontemplated under Canon 1095.13 (emphasis supplied)
The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the Court in Santos:
"psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence and (c)
incurability."14 The foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to be
declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be "medically or clinically
identified." What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the
partys psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to
sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person
concerned need not be resorted to.15
We now proceed to determine whether respondent successfully proved Toshios psychological
incapacity to fulfill his marital responsibilities.
Petitioner showed that Toshio failed to meet his duty to live with, care for and support his
family. He abandoned them a month after his marriage to respondent. Respondent sent him
several letters but he never replied. He made a trip to the Philippines but did not care at all to see
his family.
We find that the totality of evidence presented fell short of proving that Toshio was
psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities. Toshios act of
abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never alleged nor proven to be due to
some kind of psychological illness. After respondent testified on how Toshio abandoned his
family, no other evidence was presented showing that his behavior was caused by a
psychological disorder. Although, as a rule, there was no need for an actual medical examination,
it would have greatly helped respondents case had she presented evidence that medically or
clinically identified his illness. This could have been done through an expert witness. This
respondent did not do.
We must remember that abandonment is also a ground for legal separation. 16 There was no
showing that the case at bar was not just an instance of abandonment in the context of legal
separation. We cannot presume psychological defect from the mere fact that Toshio abandoned
his family immediately after the celebration of the marriage. As we ruled in Molina, it is not
enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is
essential that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological,not
physical, illness.17 There was no proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an
adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates a person from
accepting and complying with the obligations essential to marriage. 18
According to the appellate court, the requirements in Molina and Santos do not apply here
because the present case involves a "mixed marriage," the husband being a Japanese national.
We disagree. In proving psychological incapacity, we find no distinction between an alien
spouse and a Filipino spouse. We cannot be lenient in the application of the rules merely because
the spouse alleged to be psychologically incapacitated happens to be a foreign national. The
medical and clinical rules to determine psychological incapacity were formulated on the basis of
studies of human behavior in general. Hence, the norms used for determining psychological
incapacity should apply to any person regardless of nationality.

In Pesca vs. Pesca,19 this Court declared that marriage is an inviolable social institution that the
State cherishes and protects. While we commiserate with respondent, terminating her marriage to
her husband may not necessarily be the fitting denouement.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby GRANTED. The decision dated August 28,
1997 of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
#78 Digest
Republic vs. Quintero-Hamano
GR No. 149498, May 20, 2004

FACTS:

Lolita Quintero-Hamano filed a complaint in 1996 for declaration of nullity of her marriage with
Toshio Hamano, a Japanese national, on the ground of psychological incapacity. She and Toshio
started a common-law relationship in Japan and lived in the Philippines for a month. Thereafter,
Toshio went back to Japan and stayed there for half of 1987. Lolita then gave birth on
November 16, 1987.

In 1988, Lolita and Toshio got married in MTC-Bacoor, Cavite. After a month of their marriage,
Toshio returned to Japan and promised to return by Christmas to celebrate the holidays with his
family. Toshio sent money for two months and after that he stopped giving financial
support. She wrote him several times but never respondent. In 1991, she learned from her friend
that Toshio visited the country but did not bother to see her nor their child.

Toshio was no longer residing at his given address thus summons issued to him remained
unserved. Consequently, in 1996, Lolita filed an ex parte motion for leave to effect service of
summons by publication. The motion was granted and the summons, accompanied by a copy of
the petition, was published in a newspaper of general circulation giving Toshio 15 days to file his
answer. Toshio filed to respond after the lapse of 60 days from publication, thus, Lolita filed a
motion to refer the case to the prosecutor for investigation.

ISSUE: Whether Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligation.

HELD:

The Court is mindful of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as basic
autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.

Toshios act of abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never alleged nor proven
to be due to some kind of psychological illness. Although as rule, actual medical examinations
are not needed, it would have greatly helped Lolita had she presented evidence that medically or
clinically identified Toshios illness. This could have been done through an expert witness. It is
essential that a person show incapability of doing marital obligation due to some psychological,
not physical illness. Hence, Toshio was not considered as psychologically incapacitated.
#90 Digest
Republic vs. Encelan
[Civil Law: marriage; psychological incapacity]

Republic of the Philippines, Petitioner vs. Cesar Encelan, Respondent

G.R. No. 170022; January 09, 2013

Facts:
Cesar Married Lolita, and they had two children. To support the family, Cesar went
abroad and worked as an OFW in Saudi Arabia. After two years of working abroad, Cesar
learned that Lolita is having an illicit affair with Alvin Perez, and thereafter, left the conjugal
dwelling together with the two children. But even with such circumstances, Cesar never failed to
send financial support for the family. On June 1995, Cesar filed a petition against Lolita for the
declaration of the nullity of his marriage based on Lolitas psychological incapacity. Cesar,
during a hearing even presented a psychological evaluation report on Lolita with the finding that
Lolita was not suffering from any form of psychiatric illness, but had been unable to provide the
expectations expected of her for a good and lasting marital relationship.... and her transferring
from one job to another depicts some interpersonal problem with co-workers as well as her
impatience in attaining her ambitions .... and her refusal to go with her husband abroad signifies
her reluctance to work out a good marital and family relationship... Cesar found ally in RTC as
it gave him a favourable decision which declared his marriage to Lolita null and void. The court
of Appeals also affirmed the decision of RTC, and thereafter, the case was elevated to the
Supreme Court, thus, this case.

Issue:
Whether or not psychological incapacity is indeed present in the person of Lolita as to
nullify a valid marriage.

Ruling: No. Marriage is an inviolable social institution protected by the State and any doubt
should be resolved in favour of its existence and continuation against its dissolution and nullity.
In this case, sexual infidelity and abandonment of the conjugal dwelling do not necessarily
constitute psychological incapacity; these are simply grounds for legal separation. To constitute
psychological incapacity, it must be shown that the unfaithfulness and abandonment are
manifestations of a disordered personality that actually prevented the erring spouse from
discharging the essential marital obligations, which the court found not present in the person of
Lolita.
#102
SECOND DIVISION

ATILANO O. NOLLORA, JR.,

Petitioner,

G.R. No. 191425

Present:

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

BRION,
PERALTA, *
PEREZ, and

- versus -

MENDOZA, ** JJ.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Promulgated:

Respondent.

September 7, 2011

x--------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

G.R. No. 191425 is a petition for review1 assailing the Decision2 promulgated on 30 September
2009 as well as the Resolution3 promulgated on 23 February 2010 by the Court of Appeals
(appellate court) in CA-G.R. CR No. 31538. The appellate court affirmed the 19 November 2007
Decision4 of Branch 215 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (trial court) in Criminal
Case No. Q-04-129031.

The trial court found accused Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. (Nollora) guilty of bigamy under Article
349 of the Revised Penal Code and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment. Co-accused
Rowena Geraldino (Geraldino) was acquitted for the prosecutions failure to prove her guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.

The Facts

The appellate court recited the facts as follows:

On August 24, 2004, Assistant City Prosecutor Raymond Jonathan B. Lledo filed an
Information against Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. (Nollora) and Rowena P. Geraldino (Geraldino) for
the crime of Bigamy. The accusatory portion of the Information reads:

That on or about the 8th day of December 2001 in Quezon City, Philippines, the
above-named accused ATILANO O. NOLLORA, JR., being then legally married
to one JESUSA PINAT NOLLORA, and as said marriage has not been legally
dissolved and still subsisting, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously contract a subsequent or second marriage with her [sic] co-accused
ROWENA P. GERALDINO, who knowingly consented and agreed to be married
to her co-accused ATILANO O. NOLLORA, JR. knowing him to be a married
man, to the damage and prejudice of the said offended party JESUSA PINAT
NOLLORA.

Upon his arraignment on April 18, 2005, accused Nollora assisted by counsel, refused to enter
his plea. Hence, a plea of not guilty was entered by the Court for him. Accused Geraldino, on the
other hand, entered a plea of not guilty when arraigned on June 14, 2005. On even date, pre-trial
conference was held and both the prosecution and defense entered the following stipulation of
facts:

1. the validity of the first marriage between Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.

and Jesusa Pinat Nollora solemnized on April 6, 1999 at Sapang Palay, San Jose
del Monte;
2. that Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. contracted the second marriage with Rowena
P. Geraldino on December 8, 2001 in Quezon City;

3. that in the Counter-Affidavit of Atilano O. Nollora, Jr., he admitted that he

contracted the second marriage to Rowena P. Geraldino;

4. that Rowena P. Geraldino attached to her Counter-Affidavit the Certificate of

Marriage with Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. dated December 8, 2001;

5. the fact of marriage of Rowena P. Geraldino with Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. as

admitted in her Counter-Affidavit.

The only issue thus proffered by the prosecution for the RTCs resolution is whether or not the
second marriage is bigamous. Afterwards, pre-trial conference was terminated and the case was
set for initial hearing. Thereafter, trial ensued.

Evidence for the Prosecution

As culled from the herein assailed Decision, the respective testimonies of prosecution witnesses
were as follows:

xxx (W)itness Jesusa Pinat Nollora xxx testified that she and
accused Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. met in Saudi Arabia while she was working there
as a Staff Midwife in King Abdulah Naval Base Hospital. Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.
courted her and on April 6, 1999, they got married at the [IE]MELIF Chruch [sic]
in Sapang Palay, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan (Exhibit A). While working in said
hospital, she heard rumors that her husband has another wife and because of
anxiety and emotional stress, she left Saudi Arabia and returned to the Philippines
(TSN, October 4, 2005, page 10). Upon arrival in the Philippines, the private
complainant learned that indeed, Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. contracted a second
marriage with co-accused Rowena P.Geraldino on December 8, 2001 (Exhibit B)
when she secured a certification as to the civil status of Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.
(Exhibit C) from the National Statistics Office (NSO) sometime in November
2003.

Upon learning this information, the private complainant confronted Rowena

P. Geraldino at the latters workplace in CBW, FTI, Taguig and asked her if she
knew of the first marriage between complainant and Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. to
which Rowena P. Geraldino allegedly affirmed and despite this knowledge, she
allegedly still married Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. because she loves him so much and
because they were neighbors and childhood friends. Private complainant also
knew that Rowena P. Geraldino knew of her marriage with Atilano O. Nollora,
Jr., because when she (private complainant) was brought by Atilano O. Nollora,
Jr. at the latters residence in Taguig, Metro Manila and introduced her
to Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.s parents, Rowena P. Geraldino was there in the house
together with a friend and she heard everything that they were talking about.

Because of this case, private complainant was not able to return to Saudi Arabia
to work as a Staff Midwife thereby losing income opportunity in the amount
of P34,000.00 a month, more or less. When asked about the moral damages she
suffered, she declared that what happened to her was a tragedy and she had
entertained [thoughts] of committing suicide. She added that because of what
happened to her, her mother died and she almost got raped
when Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. left her alone in their residence in Saudi Arabia.
However, she declared that money is not enough to assuage her sufferings.
Instead, she just asked for the return of her money in the amount
of P50,000.00 (TSN, July 26, 2005, pages 4-14).

Prosecution witness Ruth Santos testified that she knew of the marriage between
the private complainant and Atilano O. Nollora, Jr., because she was one of the
sponsors in said wedding. Sometime in November 2003, she was asked by the
private complainant to accompany the latter to the workplace of Rowena
P. Geraldino in FTI, Taguig, Metro Manila. She declared that the private
complainant and Rowena P. Geraldino had a confrontation and she heard that
Rowena P. Geraldino admitted that she (Rowena) knew of the first marriage
of Atilano O.Nollora, Jr. and the private complainant but she still went on to
marry Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. because she loves him very much (TSN, October 24,
2005, pages 3-5).

Evidence for the Defense

The defenses version of facts, as summarized in the herein assailed Decision, is as follows:

Accused Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. admitted having contracted two (2) marriages, the
first with private complainant Jesusa Pinat and the second with Rowena
P. Geraldino. He, however, claimed that he was a Muslim convert way back on
January 10, 1992, even before he contracted the first marriage with the private
complainant. As a [M]uslim convert, he is allegedly entitled to marry four (4)
wives as allowed under the Muslim or Islam belief.

To prove that he is a Muslim convert even prior to his marriage to the private
complainant, Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. presented a Certificate of Conversion dated
August 2, 2004 issued by oneHadji Abdul Kajar Madueo and approved by
one Khad Ibrahim A. Alyamin wherein it is stated that Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.
allegedly converted as a Muslim since January 19, 1992 (Exhibit 2, 3 and 4).
Aside from said certificate, he also presented a Pledge of Conversion dated
January 10, 1992 issued by the same Hadji Abdul Kajar Madueo and approved by
oneKhad Ibrahim A. Alyamin (Exhibit 7).

He claimed that the private complaint knew that he was a Muslim convert prior to
their marriage because she [sic] told this fact when he was courting her in Saudi
Arabia and the reason why said private complainant filed the instant case was due
to hatred having learned of his second marriage with Rowena P. Geraldino. She
[sic] further testified that Rowena P. Geraldinowas not aware of his first marriage
with the private complainant and he did not tell her this fact because Rowena
P. Geraldino is a Catholic and he does not want to lose her if she learns of his first
marriage.

He explained that in his Marriage Contract with Jesusa Pinat, it is indicated that
he was a Catholic Pentecostal but that he was not aware why it was placed as such
on said contract. In his Marriage Contract with Rowena P. Geraldino, the religion
Catholic was also indicated because he was keeping as a secret his being a
Muslim since the society does not approve of marrying a Muslim. He also
indicated that he was single despite his first marriage to keep said first marriage a
secret (TSN, January 30, 2006, pages 2-13).

Defense witness Hadji Abdul Qasar Madueo testified that he is the founder and
president of Balik Islam Tableegh Foundation of the Philippines and as
such president, he has the power and authority to convert any applicant to the
Muslim religion. He alleged that sometime in 1992, he met
accused Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. in Mabini (Manila) who was then going
abroad.Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. applied to become a Muslim (Exhibit 14) and after
receiving the application, said accused was indoctrinated regarding his obligations
as a Muslim. On January 10, 1992, Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. embraced the Muslim
faith. He was then directed to report every Sunday to monitor his development.

In the year 2004, Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. visited him and asked for a certification
because of the filing of the instant case. On October 2, 2004, he issued a
Certificate of Conversion wherein it is stated that Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. is a
Muslim convert since January 10, 1992. Apart from the above-mentioned
document, their Imam also issued a Pledge of Conversion (Exhibit 7). He declared
that a Muslim convert could marry more than one according to the Holy Koran.
However, before marrying his second, third and fourth wives, it is required that
the consent of the first Muslim wife be secured. Thus, if the first wife is not a
Muslim, there is no necessity to secure her consent (TSN, October 9, 2006, pages
2-12).

During his cross-examinations, he declared that if a Muslim convert gets married

not in accordance with the Muslim faith, the same is contrary to the teachings of
the Muslim faith. A Muslim also can marry up to four times but he should be able
to treat them equally. He claimed that he was not aware of the first marriage but
was aware of the second. Since his second marriage with Rowena
P. Geraldino was not in accordance with the Muslim faith, he
advised Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. to re-marry Rowena P. Geraldino in accordance
with Muslim marriage celebration, otherwise, he will not be considered as a true
Muslim (TSN, June 25, 2007, pages 3-7).

Accused Rowena P. Geraldino alleged that she was only a victim in this incident
of bigamous marriage. She claimed that she does not know the private
complainant Jesusa Pinat Nolloraand only came to know her when this case was
filed. She insists that she is the one lawfully married to Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.,
having been married to the latter since December 8, 2001. Upon learning
that Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. contracted a first marriage with the private
complainant, she confronted the former who admitted the said marriage. Prior to
their marriage, she asked Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. if he was single and the latter
responded that he was single. She also knew that her husband was a Catholic prior
to their marriage but after she learned of the first marriage of her husband, she
learned that he is a Muslim convert. She also claimed that after learning that her
husband was a Muslim convert, she and Atilano O. Nollora, Jr., also got married
in accordance with the Muslim rites. She also belied the allegations of the private
complainant that she was sought by the private complainant and that they had a
confrontation where she admitted that she knew that Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. was
married to the private complainant and despite this knowledge, she went on to
marry him because she loved him very much. She insisted that she only came to
know the private complainant when she (private complainant) filed this case
(TSN, August 14, 2007, pages 2-8).5

The Trial Courts Ruling

In its Decision6 dated 19 November 2007, the trial court convicted Nollora and
acquitted Geraldino.

The trial court stated that there are only two exceptions to prosecution for bigamy: Article 41 7 of
the Family Code, or Executive Order No. 209, and Article 180 8 of the Code of Muslim Personal
Laws of the Philippines, or Presidential Decree No. 1083. The trial court also cited Article 27 of
the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, which provides the qualifications for
allowing Muslim men to have more than one wife: [N]o Muslim male can have more than one
wife unless he can deal with them in equal companionship and just treatment as enjoined by
Islamic Law and only in exceptional cases.

In convicting Nollora, the trial courts Decision further stated thus:

The principle in Islam is that monogamy is the general rule and polygamy is allowed only to
meet urgent needs. Only with the permission of the court can a Muslim be permitted to have a
second wife subject to certain requirements. This is because having plurality of wives is merely
tolerated, not encouraged, under certain circumstances (Muslim Law on Personal Status in the
Philippines by Amer M. Bara-acal and Abdulmajid J. Astir, 1998 First Edition, Pages 64-65).
Arbitration is necessary. Any Muslim husband desiring to contract subsequent marriages, before
so doing, shall notify the Sharia Circuit Court of the place where his family resides. The clerk of
court shall serve a copy thereof to the wife or wives. Should any of them objects [sic]; an Agama
Arbitration Council shall be constituted. If said council fails to secure the wifes consent to the
proposed marriage, the Court shall, subject to Article 27, decide whether on [sic] not to sustain
her objection (Art. 162, Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines).

Accused Atilano Nollora, Jr., in marrying his second wife, co-accused Rowena
P. Geraldino, did not comply with the above-mentioned provision of the law. In fact, he did not
even declare that he was a Muslim convert in both marriages, indicating his criminal intent. In
his converting to the Muslim faith, said accused entertained the mistaken belief that he can just
marry anybody again after marrying the private complainant. What is clear, therefore, is [that] a
Muslim is not given an unbridled right to just marry anybody the second, third or fourth time.
There are requirements that the Sharia law imposes, that is, he should have notified
the Sharia Court where his family resides so that copy of said notice should be furnished to the
first wife. The argument that notice to the first wife is not required since she is not a Muslim is of
no moment. This obligation to notify the said court rests upon accused Atilano Nollora, Jr. It is
not for him to interpret the Sharia law. It is the Sharia Court that has this authority.

In an apparent attempt to escape criminal liability, the accused recelebrated their marriage in
accordance with the Muslim rites. However, this can no longer cure the criminal liability that has
already been violated.

The Court, however, finds criminal liability on the person of accused Atilano Nollora, Jr., only.
There is no sufficient evidence that would pin accused Rowena P. Geraldino down. The evidence
presented by the prosecution against her is the allegation that she knew of the first marriage
between private complainant and Atilano Nollora, Jr., is insufficient[,] being open to several
interpretations. Private complainant alleged that when she was brought by Atilano Nollora, Jr., to
the latters house in Taguig, Metro Manila, Rowena P. Geraldino was there standing near the door
and heard their conversation. From this incident, private complainant concluded that said
Rowena P. Geraldino was aware that she and Atilano Nollora, Jr., were married. This conclusion
is obviously misplaced since it could not be reasonably presumed that Rowena

P. Geraldino understands what was going on between her and Atilano Nollora, Jr. It is axiomatic
that (E)verycircumstance favoring accuseds innocence must be taken into account, proof against
him must survive the test of reason and the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway
judgment (People vs. Austria, 195 SCRA 700). This Court, therefore, has to acquit Rowena
P. Geraldino for failure of the prosecution to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered, as follows:

a) Finding accused ATILANO O. NOLLORA, JR. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of Bigamy punishable under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. This court hereby renders
judgment imposing upon him a prison term of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day
of prision correccional, as minimum of his indeterminate sentence, to eight (8) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor, as maximum, plus accessory penalties provided by law.

b) Acquitting accused ROWENA P. GERALDINO of the crime of Bigamy for failure of the
prosecution to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Costs against accused Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.

SO ORDERED.9

Nollora filed a notice of appeal and moved for the allowance of his temporary liberty under the
same bail bond pending appeal. The trial court granted Nolloras motion.

Nollora filed a brief with the appellate court and assigned only one error of the trial court:

The trial court gravely erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty of the crime charged despite
the prosecutions failure to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 10

The Appellate Courts Ruling

On 30 September 2009, the appellate court dismissed Nolloras appeal and affirmed the trial
courts decision.11

The appellate court rejected Nolloras defense that his second marriage to Geraldino was in
lawful exercise of his Islamic religion and was allowed by the Quran. The appellate court
denied Nolloras invocation of his religious beliefs and practices to the prejudice of the nonMuslim women who married him pursuant to Philippine civil laws. Nolloras two marriages were
not conducted in accordance with the Code of Muslim Personal Laws, hence the Family Code of

the Philippines should apply. Nolloras claim of religious freedom will not immobilize the State
and render it impotent in protecting the general welfare.

In a Resolution12 dated 23 February 2010, the appellate court denied Nolloras motion for
reconsideration. The allegations in the motion for reconsideration were a mere rehash
ofNolloras earlier arguments, and there was no reason for the appellate court to modify its 30
September 2009 Decision.

Nollora filed the present petition for review before this Court on 6 April 2010.

The Issue

The issue in this case is whether Nollora is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
bigamy.

The Courts Ruling

Nolloras petition has no merit. We affirm the rulings of the appellate court and of the trial court.

Elements of Bigamy

Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

Art. 349. Bigamy. The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall
contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved,
or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment
rendered in the proper proceedings.

The elements of the crime of bigamy are:

1. That the offender has been legally married.

2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent,
the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code.
3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage.

4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.13

The circumstances in the present case satisfy all the elements of bigamy. (1) Nollora is legally
married to Pinat;14 (2) Nollora and Pinats marriage has not been legally dissolved prior to the
date of the second marriage; (3) Nollora admitted the existence of his second marriage to
Geraldino;15 and (4) Nollora and Geraldinos marriage has all the essential requisites for validity
except for the lack of capacity of Nollora due to his prior marriage.16

The marriage certificate17 of Nollora and Pinats marriage states that Nollora and Pinat were
married at Sapang Palay IEMELIF Church, Sapang Palay, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan on 6
April 1999. Rev. Jonathan De Mesa, Minister of the IEMELIF Church officiated the ceremony.
The marriage certificate18 of Nollora and Geraldinos marriage states
that Nollora andGeraldino were married at Maxs Restaurant, Quezon Avenue, Quezon
City, Metro Manila on 8 December 2001. Rev. Honorato D. Santos officiated the ceremony.

A certification dated 4 November 2003 from the Office of the Civil Registrar General reads:

We certify that ATILANO JR O. NOLLORA who is alleged to have been born on February 22,
1968 from ATILANO M. NOLLORA SR and FLAVIANA OCLARIT, appears in our National
Indices of Marriage for Groom for the years 1973 to 2002 with the following information:

Date of Marriage
a) April 06, 1999
a) December 08, 2001

Place of Marriage
b) SAN JOSE DEL MONTE,
BULACAN
b) QUEZON CITY, METRO
MANILA (2nd District)19

Before the trial and appellate courts, Nollora put up his Muslim religion as his sole defense. He
alleged that his religion allows him to marry more than once. Granting arguendo thatNollora is
indeed of Muslim faith at the time of celebration of both marriages, 20 Nollora cannot deny that
both marriage ceremonies were not conducted in accordance with the Code of Muslim Personal
Laws, or Presidential Decree No. 1083. The applicable Articles in the Code of Muslim Personal
Laws read:

Art. 14. Nature. - Marriage is not only a civil contract but a civil institution. Its nature,
consequences and incidents are governed by this Code and the Sharia and not subject to
stipulation, except that the marriage settlements to a certain extent fix the property relations of
the spouses.

Art. 15. Essential Requisites. - No marriage contract shall be perfected unless the following
essential requisites are complied with:
(a) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;

(b) Mutual consent of the parties freely given;

(c) Offer (ijab) and acceptance (qabul) duly witnessed by at least two competent persons after
the proper guardian in marriage (wali) has given his consent; and
(d) Stipulation of the customary dower (mahr) duly witnessed by two competent persons.
Art. 16. Capacity to contract marriage. - (1) Any Muslim male at least fifteen years of age and
any Muslim female of the age of puberty or upwards and not suffering from any impediment
under the provisions of this Code may contract marriage. A female is presumed to have attained
puberty upon reaching the age of fifteen.
x x x.

Art. 17. Marriage Ceremony. - No particular form of marriage ceremony is required but
the ijab and the qabul in marriage shall be declared publicly in the presence of the person
solemnizing the marriage and the two competent witnesses. The declaration shall be set forth in
an instrument in triplicate, signed or marked by the contracting parties and said witnesses, and
attested by the person solemnizing the marriage. One copy shall be given to the contracting
parties and another sent to the Circuit Registrar by the solemnizing officer who shall keep the
third.

Art. 18. Authority to solemnize marriage. - Marriage maybe solemnized:

(a) By the proper wali by the woman to be wedded;
(b) Upon the authority of the proper wali, by any person who is competent under Muslim law to
solemnize marriage; or
(c) By the judge of the Sharia District Court or Sharia Circuit Court or any person designated by
the judge, should the proper wali refuse without justifiable reason, to authorize
the solemnization.

Art. 19. Place of solemnization. - Marriage shall be solemnized publicly in any mosque, office of
the Sharia judge, office of the Circuit Registrar, residence of the bride or her wali, or at any other
suitable place agreed upon by the parties.

Art. 20. Specification of dower. - The amount or value of dower may be fixed by the contracting
parties (mahr-musamma) before, during or after the celebration of marriage. If the amount or the
value thereof has not been so fixed, a proper dower (mahr-mithl) shall, upon petition of the wife,
be determined by the court according to the social standing of the parties.

Indeed, Article 13(2) of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws states that [i]n case of a marriage
between a Muslim and a non-Muslim, solemnized not in accordance with Muslim law or
this Code, the [Family Code of the Philippines, or Executive Order No. 209, in lieu of the
Civil Code of the Philippines] shall apply. Nolloras religious affiliation is not an issue here.
Neither is the claim that Nolloras marriages were solemnized according to Muslim law. Thus,
regardless of his professed religion, Nollora cannot claim exemption from liability for the crime
of bigamy.21

Nollora asserted in his marriage certificate with Geraldino that his civil status is single.
Moreover, both of Nolloras marriage contracts do not state that he is a Muslim. Although the
truth or falsehood of the declaration of ones religion in the marriage certificate is not an essential
requirement for marriage, such omissions are sufficient proofs of Nolloras liability for
bigamy. Nolloras false declaration about his civil status is thus further compounded by these
omissions.

[ATTY. CALDINO:]
Q: In your marriage contract, Mr. Witness, with Jesusa Pinat, you indicated here as your religion,
Catholic Pentecostal, and you were saying that since January 10, 1992, you are already a
[M]uslim convert. . . you said, Mr. Witness, that you are already a [M]uslim convert since
January 10, 1992. However, in your marriage contract with Jesusa Pinat, there is no indication
here that you have indicated your religion. Will you please go over your marriage contract?

[NOLLORA:]
A: When we got married, they just placed there Catholic but I didnt know why they did not place
any Catholic there.

xxx

Q: Now, Mr. Witness, I would like to call your attention with respect to your marriage
contract with your co-accused in this case, Rowena Geraldino, x x x will you please tell us,
Mr. Witness, considering that you said that you are already a [M]uslim convert on January
10, 1992, why in the marriage contract with Rowena Geraldino, you indicated there your
religion as Catholic, Mr. Witness?
A: Since I was a former Catholic and since I was then keeping, I was keeping it as a secret
my being my Balik-Islam, thats why I placed there Catholic since I know that the society
doesnt approve a Catholic to marry another, thats why I placed there Catholic as my
religion, sir.

Q: How about under the column, civil status, why did you indicate there that youre single,
Mr. Witness?

A: I also kept it as a secret that I was married, earlier married. 22 (Emphasis supplied)

xxx

[PROSECUTOR TAYLOR:]
Q: Would you die for your new religion, Mr. Nollora?

A: Yes, maam.

Q: If you would die for your new religion, why did you allow that your faith be indicated as
Catholic when in fact you were already as you alleged [M]uslim to be put in your marriage
contract?

xxx

[A:] I dont think there is anything wrong with it, I just signed it so we can get married under the
Catholic rights [sic] because after that we even got married under the [M]uslim rights [sic], your
Honor.

xxx

Q: Under your Muslim faith, if you marry a second wife, are you required under your faith to
secure the permission of your first wife to get married?

A: Yes, maam.

Q: Did you secure that permission from your first wife, Jesusa Nollora?

A: I was not able to ask any permission from her because she was very mad at me, at the start,
she was always very mad, maam.23

In his petition before this Court, Nollora casts doubt on the validity of his marriage
to Geraldino. Nollora may not impugn his marriage to Geraldino in order to extricate himself
from criminal liability; otherwise, we would be opening the doors to allowing the solemnization
of multiple flawed marriage ceremonies. As we stated in Tenebro v. Court of Appeals:24
There is therefore a recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although
void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences. Among these legal consequences is
incurring criminal liability for bigamy. To hold otherwise would render the States penal laws on
bigamy completely nugatory, and allow individuals to deliberately ensure that each marital
contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the consequences of contracting multiple
marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women with the promise of futurity and
commitment.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR
No. 31538 promulgated on 30 September 2009 and the Resolution promulgated on 23 February
2010 are AFFIRMED. Petitioner Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
Bigamy in Criminal Case No. Q-04-129031 and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment with a term of two years, four months and one day of prision correccional as
minimum to eight years and one day of prision mayor as maximum of his indeterminate
sentence, as well as the accessory penalties provided by law.

Costs against petitioner Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.

SO ORDERED.
#102 Digest
NOLLORA VS REPUBLIC
Posted by kaye lee on 7:00 PM
G.R. No. 191425 September 7, 2011 [Article 349 Revised Penal Code - Bigamy; Article 35 Marriage void ab initio]

FACTS:
While Jesusa Pinat Nollora was still in Saudi Arabia, she heard rumors that her husband of two
years has another wife. She returned to the Philippines and learned that indeed, Atilano O.
Nollora, Jr., contracted second marriage with a certain Rowena Geraldino on December 8, 2001.
Jesusa filed an instant case against Atilano and Rowena for bigamy. When asked about the
moral damages she suffered, she declared that money is not enough to assuage her sufferings.
Instead, she just asked for return of her money in the amount of P 50,000.
Atilano admitted having contracted 2 marriages, however, he claimed that he was a Muslim
convert way back to 1992. He presented Certificate of Conversion and Pledge of Conversion,
proving that he allegedly converted as a Muslim in January 1992. And as a Muslim convert, he is
allegedly entitled to marry wives as allowed under the Islam belief.
Accused Rowena alleged that she was a victim of bigamous marriage. She claimed that she does
not know Jesusa and only came to know her when the case was filed. She insisted that she is the
one lawfully married to Nollora because she believed him to be single and a Catholic, as he told
her so prior to their marriage. After she learned of the first marriage of her husband, she learned
that he is a Muslim convert. After learning that Nollora was a Muslim convert, she and he also
got married in accordance with the Muslim rites.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the second marriage is bigamous.
RULING:
Yes, the marriage between the Nollora and Geraldino is bigamous under Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code, and as such, the second marriage is considered null and void ab initio under
Article 35 of the Family Code.
The elements of the crime of bigamy are all present in the case: that 1) Atilano is legally married
to Jesusa; 2) that their marriage has not been legally dissolved prior to the date of the second
marriage; 3)that Atilano admitted the existence of his second marriage to Rowena; and 4) the

second marriage has all the essential requisites for validity except for the lack of capacity of
Atilano due to his prior marriage.
Before the trial and appellate courts, Atilano put up his Muslim religion as his sole defense.
Granting arguendo that he is indeed of Muslim faith at the time of celebration of both marriages,
he cannot deny that both marriage ceremonies were not conducted in accordance with Articles
14, 15, 17 up to 20 of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws .
In Article 13 (2) of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws states that any marriage between a
Muslim and a non-Muslim solemnized not in accordance with the Muslim law, hence the Family
Code of the Philippines shall apply. Nollora's religious affiliation or his claim that his marriages
were solemnized according to Muslim law. Thus, regardless of his professed religion, he cannot
claim exemption from liability for the crime of bigamy.
His second marriage did not comply with the Article 27 of the Muslim Personal Laws of the
Philippines providing: "[N]o Muslim male can have more than one wife unless he can deal with
them in equal companionship and just treatment as enjoined by Islamic Law and only in
exceptional cases." Only with the permission of the Shari'a Circuit Court can a Muslim be
permitted to have a second, third or fourth wife. The clerk of court shall serve a copy to the wife
or wives, and should any of them objects, an Agama Arbitration Council shall be constituted. If
the said council fails to secure the wife's consent to the proposed marriage, the Court shall
subject to Article 27, decide whether on not to sustain her objection (Art. 162, Muslim Personal
Laws)
Atilano asserted in his marriage certificate with Rowena that his civil status is "single." Both of
his marriage contracts do not state that he is a Muslim. Although the truth or falsehood of the
declaration of one's religion in the marriage is not an essential requirement for marriage, his
omissions are sufficient proofs of his liability for bigamy. His false declaration about his civil
status is thus further compounded by these omissions.
It is not for him to interpret the Shari'a law, and in apparent attempt to escape criminal liability,
he recelebrated their marriage in accordance with the Muslim rites. However, this can no longer
cure the criminal liability that has already been violated.
#114
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-67888 October 8, 1985
IMELDA ONG, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
ALFREDO ONG, ET AL., respondents.
Faustino Y Bautista and Fernando M. Mangubat for private respondent.

RELOVA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision, dated June 20, 1984, of the Intermediate
Appellate Court, in AC-G.R. No. CV-01748, affirming the judgment of the Regional Trial Court
of Makati, Metro Manila. Petitioner Imelda Ong assails the interpretation given by respondent
Appellate Court to the questioned Quitclaim Deed.

Records show that on February 25, 1976 Imelda Ong, for and in consideration of One (P1.00)
Peso and other valuable considerations, executed in favor of private respondent Sandra Maruzzo,
then a minor, a Quitclaim Deed whereby she transferred, released, assigned and forever quitclaimed to Sandra Maruzzo, her heirs and assigns, all her rights, title, interest and participation in
the ONE-HALF () undivided portion of the parcel of land, particularly described as follows:
A parcel of land (Lot 10-B of the subdivision plan (LRC) Psd 157841, being a
portion of Lot 10, Block 18, Psd-13288, LRC (GLRC) Record No. 2029, situated
in the Municipality of Makati, Province of Rizal, Island of Luzon ... containing an
area of ONE HUNDRED AND TWENTY FIVE (125) SQUARE METERS, more
or less.
On November 19, 1980, Imelda Ong revoked the aforesaid Deed of Quitclaim and, thereafter, on
January 20, 1982 donated the whole property described above to her son, Rex Ong-Jimenez.
On June 20, 1983, Sandra Maruzzo, through her guardian (ad litem) Alfredo Ong, filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila an action against petitioners, for the recovery of
ownership/possession and nullification of the Deed of Donation over the portion belonging to her
and for Accounting.
In their responsive pleading, petitioners claimed that the Quitclaim Deed is null and void
inasmuch as it is equivalent to a Deed of Donation, acceptance of which by the donee is
necessary to give it validity. Further, it is averred that the donee, Sandra Maruzzo, being a minor,
had no legal personality and therefore incapable of accepting the donation.
Upon admission of the documents involved, the parties filed their responsive memoranda and
submitted the case for decision.
On December 12, 1983, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of respondent Maruzzo and
held that the Quitclaim Deed is equivalent to a Deed of Sale and, hence, there was a valid
conveyance in favor of the latter.
Petitioners appealed to the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court. They reiterated their
argument below and, in addition, contended that the One (P1.00) Peso consideration is not a
consideration at all to sustain the ruling that the Deed of Quitclaim is equivalent to a sale.
On June 20, 1984, respondent Intermediate Appellate Court promulgated its Decision affirming
the appealed judgment and held that the Quitclaim Deed is a conveyance of property with a valid
cause or consideration; that the consideration is the One (P1.00) Peso which is clearly stated in
the deed itself; that the apparent inadequacy is of no moment since it is the usual practice in
deeds of conveyance to place a nominal amount although there is a more valuable consideration
given.
Not satisfied with the decision of the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court, petitioners came
to Us questioning the interpretation given by the former to this particular document.
On March 15, 1985, respondent Sandra Maruzzo, through her guardian ad litem Alfredo Ong,
filed an Omnibus Motion informing this Court that she has reached the age of majority as
evidenced by her Birth Certificate and she prays that she be substituted as private respondent in
place of her guardian ad litem Alfredo Ong. On April 15, 1985, the Court issued a resolution
granting the same.
A careful perusal of the subject deed reveals that the conveyance of the one- half () undivided
portion of the above-described property was for and in consideration of the One (P 1.00) Peso
and the other valuable considerations (emphasis supplied) paid by private respondent Sandra
Maruzzo through her representative, Alfredo Ong, to petitioner Imelda Ong. Stated differently,
the cause or consideration is not the One (P1.00) Peso alone but also the other valuable
considerations. As aptly stated by the Appellate Court... although the cause is not stated in the contract it is presumed that it is existing
unless the debtor proves the contrary (Article 1354 of the Civil Code). One of the
disputable presumptions is that there is a sufficient cause of the contract (Section

5, (r), Rule 131, Rules of Court). It is a legal presumption of sufficient cause or

consideration supporting a contract even if such cause is not stated therein
(Article 1354, New Civil Code of the Philippines.) This presumption cannot be
overcome by a simple assertion of lack of consideration especially when the
contract itself states that consideration was given, and the same has been reduced
into a public instrument with all due formalities and solemnities. To overcome the
presumption of consideration the alleged lack of consideration must be shown by
preponderance of evidence in a proper action. (Samanilla vs, Cajucom, et al., 107
Phil. 432).
The execution of a deed purporting to convey ownership of a realty is in itself prima facie
evidence of the existence of a valuable consideration, the party alleging lack of consideration has
the burden of proving such allegation. (Caballero, et al. vs. Caballero, et al., (CA), 45 O.G.
2536).
Moreover, even granting that the Quitclaim deed in question is a donation, Article 741 of the
Civil Code provides that the requirement of the acceptance of the donation in favor of minor by
parents of legal representatives applies only to onerous and conditional donations where the
donation may have to assume certain charges or burdens (Article 726, Civil Code). The
acceptance by a legal guardian of a simple or pure donation does not seem to be necessary (Perez
vs. Calingo, CA-40 O.G. 53). Thus, Supreme Court ruled in Kapunan vs. Casilan and Court of
Appeals, (109 Phil. 889) that the donation to an incapacitated donee does not need the
acceptance by the lawful representative if said donation does not contain any condition. In
simple and pure donation, the formal acceptance is not important for the donor requires no right
to be protected and the donee neither undertakes to do anything nor assumes any obligation. The
Quitclaim now in question does not impose any condition.
The above pronouncement of respondent Appellate Court finds support in the ruling of
this Court in Morales Development Co., Inc. vs. CA, 27 SCRA 484, which states that "the major
premise thereof is based upon the fact that the consideration stated in the deeds of sale in favor of
Reyes and the Abellas is P1.00. It is not unusual, however, in deeds of conveyance adhering to
the Anglo-Saxon practice of stating that the consideration given is the sum of P1.00, although the
actual consideration may have been much more. Moreover, assuming that said consideration of
P1.00 is suspicious, this circumstance, alone, does not necessarily justify the inference that
Reyes and the Abellas were not purchasers in good faith and for value. Neither does this
inference warrant the conclusion that the sales were null and void ab initio. Indeed, bad faith and
inadequacy of the monetary consideration do not render a conveyance inexistent, for the
assignor's liberality may be sufficient cause for a valid contract (Article 1350, Civil Code),
whereas fraud or bad faith may render either rescissible or voidable, although valid until
annulled, a contract concerning an object certain entered into with a cause and with the consent
of the contracting parties, as in the case at bar."
WHEREFORE. the appealed decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court should be, as it is
hereby AFFIRMED, with costs against herein petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
#114 Digest
Ong v. Ong
Facts:
On February 25, 1976, Imelda Ong, for and in consideration of P1.00 and other valuable
considerations, executed a quitclaim over a parcel of land in Makati in favor of Sandra Maruzzo,
then a minor. On November 19, 1980, Imelda revoked the quitclaim and donated the property to
her son Rex. On June 20, 1983, Sandra, through her guardial ad litem Alfredo Ong, filed an
action to recover the land and to declare the donation to Rex null and void. In their responsive
pleading, petitioners claimed that the quitclaim is equivalent to a donation which requires
acceptance by the donee, and since Sandra was a minor, there was no valid acceptance. The trial
court ruled that the quitclaim is equivalent to a sale. The Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed
the decision.
Issue:
Whether the quitclaim is equivalent to a deed of sale or to a deed of donation

Held:
The execution of a deed purporting to convey ownership of a realty is in itself prima facie
evidence of the existence of a valuable consideration, the party alleging lack of consideration has
the burden of proving such allegation. Even granting that the Quitclaim deed in question is a
donation, Article 741 of the Civil Code provides that the requirement of the acceptance of the
donation in favor of minor by parents of legal representatives applies only to onerous and
conditional donations where the donation may have to assume certain charges or burdens.
Donation to an incapacitated donee does not need the acceptance by the lawful representative if
said donation does not contain any condition. In simple and pure donation, the formal acceptance
is not important for the donor requires no right to be protected and the donee neither undertakes
to do anything nor assumes any obligation. The Quitclaim now in question does not impose any
condition.

#125
SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 122134. October 3, 2003]

ROMANA LOCQUIAO VALENCIA and CONSTANCIA L. VALENCIA, petitioners,

vs. BENITO A. LOCQUIAO, now deceased and substituted by JIMMY
LOCQUIAO, TOMASA MARA and the REGISTRAR OF DEEDS OF
PANGASINAN, respondents.
CONSTANCIA L. VALENCIA, petitioner, vs. BENITO A. LOCQUIAO, now deceased and
substituted by JIMMY LOCQUIAO, respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
The Old Civil Code[1] and the Old Code of Civil Procedure, [2] repealed laws that they both
are notwithstanding, have not abruptly become mere quiescent items of legal history since their
relevance do not wear off for a long time. Verily, the old statutes proved to be decisive in the
adjudication of the case at bar.
Before us is a petition for review seeking to annul and set aside the joint Decision[3] dated
November 24, 1994, as well as the Resolution[4] dated September 8, 1995, of the former Tenth
Division[5] of the Court of Appeals in two consolidated cases involving an action for annulment
of title[6] and an action for ejectment.[7]
Both cases involve a parcel of land consisting of 4,876 square meters situated in Urdaneta,
Pangasinan. This land was originally owned by the spouses Herminigildo and Raymunda
Locquiao, as evidenced by Original Certificate of Title No. 18383[8] issued on October 3, 1917
by the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan.
On May 22, 1944, Herminigildo and Raymunda Locquiao executed a deed of
donation propter nuptias which was written in the Ilocano dialect, denominated as Inventario Ti
Sagut[9] in favor of their son, respondent Benito Locquiao (hereafter, respondent Benito) and his
prospective bride, respondent Tomasa Mara (hereafter, respondent Tomasa). By the terms of the
deed, the donees were gifted with four (4) parcels of land, including the land in question, as well
as a male cow and one-third (1/3) portion of the conjugal house of the donor parents, in
consideration of the impending marriage of the donees.
The donees took their marriage vows on June 4, 1944 and the fact of their marriage was
inscribed at the back of O.C.T. No. 18383. [10]

Herminigildo and Raymunda died on December 15, 1962 and January 9, 1968, respectively,
leaving as heirs their six (6) children, namely: respondent Benito, Marciano, Lucio, Emeteria,
Anastacia, and petitioner Romana, all surnamed Locquiao [11]. With the permission of
respondents Benito and Tomasa, petitioner Romana Valencia (hereinafter, Romana) took
possession and cultivated the subject land. [12] When respondent Romanas husband got sick
sometime in 1977, her daughter petitioner Constancia Valencia (hereafter, petitioner Constancia)
took over, and since then, has been in possession of the land. [13]
Meanwhile, respondents Benito and Tomasa registered the Inventario Ti Sagut with the
Office of the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan on May 15, 1970. [14] In due course, the original
title was cancelled and in lieu thereof Transfer Certificate of Title No. 84897[15] was issued in the
name of the respondents Benito and Tomasa.
On March 18, 1973, the heirs of the Locquiao spouses, including respondent Benito and
petitioner Romana, executed a Deed of Partition with Recognition of Rights,[16] wherein they
distributed among only three (3) of them, the twelve (12) parcels of land left by their common
progenitors, excluding the land in question and other lots disposed of by the Locquiao spouses
earlier. Contained in the deed is a statement that respondent Benito and Marciano Locquiao,
along with the heirs of Lucio Locquiao, have already received our shares in the estates of our
parents, by virtue of previous donations and conveyances, and that for that reason the heirs of
Lucio Locquaio were not made parties to the deed. All the living children of the Locquaio
spouses at the time, including petitioner Romana, confirmed the previous dispositions and
waived their rights to whomsoever the properties covered by the deed of partition were
adjudicated.[17]
Later on, disagreements among five (5) heirs or groups of heirs, including petitioner
Romana, concerning the distribution of two (2) of the lots covered by the deed of partition which
are Lots No. 2467 and 5567 of the Urdaneta Cadastral Survey surfaced. As their differences were
settled, the heirs concerned executed a Deed of Compromise Agreement[18] on June 12, 1976,
which provided for the re-distribution of the two (2) lots. Although not directly involved in the
discord, Benito signed the compromise agreement together with his feuding siblings, nephews
and nieces. Significantly, all the signatories to the compromise agreement, including petitioner
Romana, confirmed all the other stipulations and provisions of the deed of partition. [19]
Sometime in 1983, the apparent calm pervading among the heirs was disturbed when
petitioner Constancia filed an action for annulment of title against the respondents before the
Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan. [20] The record shows that the case was dismissed by the trial
court but it does not indicate the reason for the dismissal. [21]
On December 13, 1983, respondent Benito filed with the Municipal Trial Court of Urdaneta,
Pangasinan a Complaint[22] seeking the ejectment of petitioner Constancia from the subject
property.
On November 25, 1985, the Municipal Trial Court rendered a Decision,[23] ordering the
defendant in the case, petitioner Constancia, to vacate the land in question.
Petitioners Romana and Constancia countered with a Complaint[24] for the annulment
of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 84897 against respondents Benito and Tomasa [25] which they
filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan on December 23, 1985. Petitioners alleged that
the issuance of the transfer certificate of title was fraudulent; that the Inventario Ti Sagut is
spurious; that the notary public who notarized the document had no authority to do so, and; that
the donation did not observe the form required by law as there was no written acceptance on the
document itself or in a separate public instrument.
Meanwhile, the decision in the ejectment case was appealed to the same RTC where the case
for annulment of title was also pending. Finding that the question of ownership was the central
issue in both cases, the court issued an Order[26] suspending the proceedings in the ejectment
case until it shall have decided the ownership issue in the title annulment case.
After trial, the RTC rendered a Decision[27] dated January 30, 1989 dismissing the complaint
for annulment of title on the grounds of prescription and laches. It likewise ruled that
theInventario Ti Sagut is a valid public document which transmitted ownership over the subject
land to the respondents. With the dismissal of the complaint and the confirmation of the
respondents title over the subject property, the RTC affirmed in toto the decision of the MTC in
the ejectment case[28].

Dissatisfied, petitioners elevated the two (2) decisions to the respondent Court of
Appeals. Since they involve the same parties and the same property, the appealed cases were
consolidated by the appellate court.
On November 24, 1994, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision affirming the
appealed RTC decisions. The appellate court upheld the RTCs conclusion that the petitioners
cause of action had already prescribed, considering that the complaint for annulment of title was
filed more than fifteen (15) years after the issuance of the title, or beyond the ten (10) - year
prescriptive period for actions for reconveyance. It likewise rejected the petitioners assertion that
the donation propter nuptias is null and void for want of acceptance by the donee, positing that
the implied acceptance flowing from the very fact of marriage between the respondents, coupled
with the registration of the fact of marriage at the back of OCT No. 18383, constitutes substantial
compliance with the requirements of the law.
The petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration[29] but it was denied by the appellate
court in its Resolution[30] dated September 8, 1995. Hence, this petition.
We find the petition entirely devoid of merit.
Concerning the annulment case, the issues to be threshed out are: (1) whether the
donation propter nuptias is authentic; (2) whether acceptance of the donation by the donees is
required; (3) if so, in what form should the acceptance appear, and; (4) whether the action is
barred by prescription and laches.
The Inventario Ti Sagut which contains the donation propter nuptias was executed and
notarized on May 22, 1944. It was presented to the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan for
registration on May 15, 1970. The photocopy of the document presented in evidence as Exhibit 8
was reproduced from the original kept in the Registry of Deeds of Pangasinan.[31]
The petitioners have launched a two-pronged attack against the validity of the
donation propter nuptias, to wit: first, the Inventario Ti Sagut is not authentic; and second, even
assuming that it is authentic, it is void for the donees failure to accept the donation in a public
instrument.
To buttress their claim that the document was falsified, the petitioners rely mainly on
the Certification[32] dated July 9, 1984 of the Records Management and Archives Office that
there was no notarial record for the year 1944 of Cipriano V. Abenojar who notarized the
document on May 22, 1944 and that therefore a copy of the document was not available.
The certification is not sufficient to prove the alleged inexistence or spuriousness of the
challenged document. The appellate court is correct in pointing out that the mere absence of the
notarial record does not prove that the notary public does not have a valid notarial commission
and neither does the absence of a file copy of the document with the archives effect evidence of
the falsification of the document.[33] This Court ruled that the failure of the notary public to
furnish a copy of the deed to the appropriate office is a ground for disciplining him, but
certainly not for invalidating the document or for setting aside the transaction therein
involved.[34]
Moreover, the heirs of the Locquaio spouses, including petitioner Romana, made reference
in the deed of partition and the compromise agreement to the previous donations made by the
spouses in favor of some of the heirs. As pointed out by the RTC,[35] respondent Benito was not
allotted any share in the deed of partition precisely because he received his share by virtue of
previous donations. His name was mentioned in the deed of partition only with respect to the
middle portion of Lot No. 2638 which is the eleventh (11 th) parcel in the deed but that is the
same one-third (1/3) portion of Lot No. 2638 covered by O.C.T. No. 18259 included in the
donation propter nuptias. Similarly, Marciano Locquiao and the heirs of Lucio Locquiao were
not allocated any more share in the deed of partition since they received theirs by virtue of prior
donations or conveyances.
The pertinent provisions of the deed of partition read:
That the heirs of Lucio Locquiao are not included in this Partition by reason of the fact that in the
same manner as we, BENITO and MARCIANO LOCQUIAO are concerned, we have
already received our shares in the estate of our parents by virtue of previous donations and
conveyances, and that we hereby confirm said dispositions, waiving our rights to
whomsoever will these properties will now be adjudicated;

That we, the Parties herein, do hereby waive and renounce as against each other any claim or
claims that we may have against one or some of us, and that we recognize the rights of
ownership of our co-heirs with respect to those parcels already distributed and
adjudicated and that in the event that one of us is cultivating or in possession of any one of the
parcels of land already adjudicated in favor of another heir or has been conveyed, donated or
disposed of previously, in favor of another heir, we do hereby renounce and waive our right
of possession in favor of the heir in whose favor the donation or conveyance was made
previously.[36] (Emphasis supplied)
The exclusion of the subject property in the deed of partition dispels any doubt as to the
authenticity of the earlier Inventario Ti Sagut.
This brings us to the admissibility of the Deed of Partition with Recognition of Rights,
marked as Exhibit 2, and the Deed of Compromise Agreement, marked as Exhibit 3.
The petitioners fault the RTC for admitting in evidence the deed of partition and the
compromise agreement on the pretext that the documents were not properly submitted in
evidence, pointing out that when presented to respondent Tomasa Mara for identification, she
simply stated that she knew about the documents but she did not actually identify them. [37]
The argument is not tenable. Firstly, objection to the documentary evidence must be made at
the time it is formally offered. [38] Since the petitioners did not even bother to object to the
documents at the time they were offered in evidence, [39] it is now too late in the day for them to
question their admissibility. Secondly, the documents were identified during the Pre-Trial,
marked as Exhibits 2 and 3 and testified on by respondent Tomasa. [40] Thirdly, the questioned
deeds, being public documents as they were duly notarized, are admissible in evidence without
further proof of their due execution and are conclusive as to the truthfulness of their contents, in
the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. [41] A public document executed and
attested through the intervention of the notary public is evidence of the facts therein expressed in
clear, unequivocal manner.[42]
Concerning the issue of form, petitioners insist that based on a provision[43] of the Civil
Code of Spain (Old Civil Code), the acceptance by the donees should be made in a public
instrument. This argument was rejected by the RTC and the appellate court on the theory that
the implied acceptance of the donation had flowed from the celebration of the marriage between
the respondents, followed by the registration of the fact of marriage at the back of OCT No.
18383.
The petitioners, the appellate court and the trial court all erred in applying the requirements
on ordinary donations to the present case instead of the rules on donation propter
nuptias.Underlying the blunder is their failure to take into account the fundamental dichotomy
between the two kinds of donations.
Unlike ordinary donations, donations propter nuptias or donations by reason of marriage are
those made before its celebration, in consideration of the same and in favor of one or both of the
future spouses.[44] The distinction is crucial because the two classes of donations are not
governed by exactly the same rules, especially as regards the formal essential requisites.
Under the Old Civil Code, donations propter nuptias must be made in a public
instrument in which the property donated must be specifically described.[45] However, Article
1330 of the same Code provides that acceptance is not necessary to the validity of such gifts. In
other words, the celebration of the marriage between the beneficiary couple, in tandem with
compliance with the prescribed form, was enough to effectuate the donation propter
nuptias under the Old Civil Code.
Under the New Civil Code, the rules are different. Article 127 thereof provides that the form
of donations propter nuptias are regulated by the Statute of Frauds. Article 1403, paragraph 2,
which contains the Statute of Frauds requires that the contracts mentioned thereunder need be in
writing only to be enforceable. However, as provided in Article 129, express acceptance is not
necessary for the validity of these donations. Thus, implied acceptance is sufficient.
The pivotal question, therefore, is which formal requirements should be applied with respect
to the donation propter nuptias at hand. Those under the Old Civil Code or the New Civil Code?
It is settled that only laws existing at the time of the execution of a contract are applicable
thereto and not later statutes, unless the latter are specifically intended to have retroactive
effect.[46] Consequently, it is the Old Civil Code which applies in this case since the

donation propter nuptias was executed in 1944 and the New Civil Code took effect only on
August 30, 1950.[47] The fact that in 1944 the Philippines was still under Japanese occupation is
of no consequence. It is a well-known rule of the Law of Nations that municipal laws, as contradistinguished from laws of political nature, are not abrogated by a change of sovereignty. [48] This
Court specifically held that during the Japanese occupation period, the Old Civil Code was in
force.[49] As a consequence, applying Article 1330 of the Old Civil Code in the determination of
the validity of the questioned donation, it does not matter whether or not the donees had accepted
the donation. The validity of the donation is unaffected in either case.
Even the petitioners agree that the Old Civil Code should be applied. However, they invoked
the wrong provisions[50] thereof.
Even if the provisions of the New Civil Code were to be applied, the case of the petitioners
would collapse just the same. As earlier shown, even implied acceptance of a donationpropter
nuptias suffices under the New Civil Code.[51]
With the genuineness of the donation propter nuptias and compliance with the applicable
mandatory form requirements fully established, petitioners hypothesis that their action is
imprescriptible cannot take off.
Viewing petitioners action for reconveyance from whatever feasible legal angle, it is
definitely barred by prescription. Petitioners right to file an action for the reconveyance of the
land accrued in 1944, when the Inventario Ti Sagut was executed. It must be remembered that
before the effectivity of the New Civil Code in 1950, the Old Code of Civil Procedure (Act No.
190) governed prescription.[52] Under the Old Code of Civil Procedure, an action for recovery of
the title to, or possession of, real property, or an interest therein, can only be brought within ten
years after the cause of such action accrues. [53] Thus, petitioners action, which was filed on
December 23, 1985, or more than forty (40) years from the execution of the deed of donation on
May 22, 1944, was clearly time-barred.
Even following petitioners theory that the prescriptive period should commence from the
time of discovery of the alleged fraud, the conclusion would still be the same. As early as May
15, 1970, when the deed of donation was registered and the transfer certificate of title was
issued, petitioners were considered to have constructive knowledge of the alleged fraud,
following the jurisprudential rule that registration of a deed in the public real estate registry is
constructive notice to the whole world of its contents, as well as all interests, legal and equitable,
included therein.[54] As it is now settled that the prescriptive period for the reconveyance of
property allegedly registered through fraud is ten (10) years, reckoned from the date of the
issuance of the certificate of title, [55] the action filed on December 23, 1985 has clearly
prescribed.
In any event, independent of prescription, petitioners action is dismissible on the ground of
laches. The elements of laches are present in this case, viz:
(1) conduct on the part of the defendant, or one under whom he claims, giving rise to the
situation that led to the complaint and for which the complainant seeks a remedy;
(2) delay in asserting the complainants rights, having had knowledge or notice of defendants
conduct and having been afforded an opportunity to institute a suit;
(3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant would assert
the right on which he bases his suit, and
(4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant, or the
suit is not held barred.[56]
Of the facts which support the finding of laches, stress should be made of the following: (a)
the petitioners Romana unquestionably gained actual knowledge of the donation propter
nuptias when the deed of partition was executed in 1973 and the information must have surfaced
again when the compromise agreement was forged in 1976, and; (b) as petitioner Romana was a
party-signatory to the two documents, she definitely had the opportunity to question the
donation propter nuptias on both occasions, and she should have done so if she were of the
mindset, given the fact that she was still in possession of the land in dispute at the time. But she
did not make any move. She tarried for eleven (11) more years from the execution of the deed of
partition until she, together with petitioner Constancia, filed the annulment case in 1985.

Anent the ejectment case, we find the issues raised by the petitioners to be factual and,
therefore, beyond this Courts power of review. Not being a trier of facts, the Court is not tasked
to go over the proofs presented by the parties and analyze, assess, and weigh them to ascertain if
the trial court and the appellate court were correct in according them superior credit in this or
that piece of evidence of one party or the other. [57] In any event, implicit in the affirmance of the
Court of Appeals is the existence of substantial evidence supporting the decisions of the courts
below.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the assailed decision, the same is hereby
AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
#137
FERRER V. FERRER
DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before this Court is an Appeal by Certiorari which assails the Decision[1] of the Court of
Appeals dated 16 August 2004 in CA-G.R. SP No. 78525, reversing and setting aside the
Order[2] dated 16 December 2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Mandaluyong City, Branch
212 in Civil Case No. MC02-1780. The Court of Appeals ordered the dismissal of the
Complaint[3] filed by petitioner Josefa Bautista Ferrer against respondents Sps. Manuel M. Ferrer
and Virginia Ferrer, and Sps. Ismael M. Ferrer and Flora Ferrer in the aforesaid Civil Case No.
MC02-1780.
In her Complaint for payment of conjugal improvements, sum of money, and accounting
with prayer for injunction and damages, petitioner alleged that she is the widow of Alfredo
Ferrer (Alfredo), a half-brother of respondents Manuel M. Ferrer (Manuel) and Ismael M. Ferrer
(Ismael). Before her marriage to Alfredo, the latter acquired a piece of lot, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 67927. [4] He applied for a loan with the Social Security System
(SSS) to build improvements thereon, including a residential house and a two-door apartment
building. However, it was during their marriage that payment of the loan was made using the
couples conjugal funds. From their conjugal funds, petitioner posited, they constructed a
warehouse on the lot. Moreover, petitioner averred that respondent Manuel occupied one door of
the apartment building, as well as the warehouse; however, in September 1991, he stopped
paying rentals thereon, alleging that he had acquired ownership over the property by virtue of a
Deed of Sale executed by Alfredo in favor of respondents, Manuel and Ismael and their
spouses. TCT No. 67927 was cancelled, and TCT. No. 2728 was issued and registered in the
names of respondents.

It is petitioners contention that on 2 October 1989, when her husband was already
bedridden, respondents Ismael and Flora Ferrer made him sign a document, purported to be his
last will and testament. The document, however, was a Deed of Sale covering Alfredos lot and
the improvements thereon. Learning of this development, Alfredo filed with the RTC of Pasig, a
Complaint for Annulment of the said sale against respondents, docketed as Civil Case No.

61327.[5] On 22 June 1993, the RTC dismissed the same. [6] The RTC found that the terms and
conditions of the Deed of Sale are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, and public policy,
and should be complied with by the parties in good faith, there being no compelling reason
under the law to do otherwise. The dismissal was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals. Subsequently, on 7 November 1994, this Court, in G.R. No. L-117067, finding no
reversible error committed by the appellate court in affirming the dismissal of the RTC, affirmed
the Decision of the Court of Appeals. [7]

Further, in support of her Complaint, petitioner alluded to a portion of the Decision dated 22
June 1993 of the RTC in Civil Case No. 61327, which stated, to wit:

In determining which property is the principal and which is the accessory, the
property of greater value shall be considered the principal. In this case, the lot is
the principal and the improvements the accessories. Since Article 120 of the
Family Code provides the rule that the ownership of accessory follows the
ownership of the principal, then the subject lot with all its improvements became
an exclusive and capital property of Alfredo with an obligation to reimburse the
conjugal partnership of the cost of improvements at the time of liquidation of
[the] conjugal partnership. Clearly, Alfredo has all the rights to sell the subject
property by himself without need of Josefas consent. [8]

According to petitioner, the ruling of the RTC shows that, when Alfredo died on 29
September 1999, or at the time of the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, she had the right to
be reimbursed for the cost of the improvements on Alfredos lot. She alleged that the cost of the
improvements amounted to P500,000.00; hence, one-half thereof should be reimbursed and paid
by respondents as they are now the registered owners of Alfredos lot. She averred that
respondents cannot claim lack of knowledge about the fact that the improvements were
constructed using conjugal funds as they had occupied one of the apartment buildings on
Alfredos lot, and even paid rentals to petitioner. In addition, petitioner prayed that respondents
be ordered to render an accounting from September, 1991, on the income of the boarding house
constructed thereon which they had appropriated for themselves, and to remit one-half thereof as
her share. Finally, petitioner sought from respondents moral and exemplary damages, litigation
and incidental expenses.

For their part, respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss, [9] contending that petitioner had no
cause of action against them, and that the cause of action was barred by prior judgment.

On 16 December 2002, the RTC rendered an Order, [10] denying the Motion to
Dismiss. According to the RTC, no pronouncement as to the improvements constructed on
Alfredos lot has been made in Civil Case No. 61327, and the payment of petitioners share in the

conjugal partnership constitutes a separate cause of action. A subsequent Order[11] dated 17

January 2003 was issued by the RTC, denying respondents Motion for Reconsideration.

Aggrieved, respondents elevated the case to the Court of Appeals by way of a Petition
for Certiorari, alleging grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the RTC in denying the dismissal.

On 16 August 2004, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision granting the Petition. It held that
petitioners Complaint failed to state a cause of action. The appellate court rationalized as
follows:

[W]e believe that the instant complaint is not the proper action for the respondent
to enforce her right of reimbursement of the cost of the improvement[s] on the
subject property. As correctly pointed out by the petitioners, the same should be
made and directed in the settlement of estate of her deceased husband Alfredo
Ferrer pursuant to Article 129[12] of the Family Code. Such being the case, it
appears that the complaint herein fails to state a cause of action against the
petitioners, the latter not being the proper parties against whom the subject action
for reimbursement must be directed to. A complaint states a cause of action where
it contains three essential elements of a cause of action, namely: (1) the legal right
of the plaintiff; (2) the correlative obligation of the defendant, and (3) the act or
omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right. If these elements are
absent, the complaint becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss on the ground of
failure to state a cause of action. Albeit the respondent herein has the legal right to
be reimbursed of the cost of the improvements of the subject property, it is not the
petitioners but the estate of her deceased husband which has the obligation to pay
the same. The complaint herein is therefore dismissible for failure to state a cause
of action against the petitioners. Needless to say, the respondent is not without
any further recourse as she may file her claim against the estate of her deceased
husband.

In light of the foregoing, we find that the public respondent committed grave
abuse of discretion in denying the petitioners motion to dismiss for failure to state
a cause of action.[13]

Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereon. However, on 17

December 2004, the Court of Appeals rendered a Resolution[14] denying the motion.

Hence, the present recourse.

Petitioner submits the following grounds for the allowance of the instant Petition, to wit:

A. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT

PETITIONERS COMPLAINT FAILS TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION
AGAINST THE RESPONDENTS, THE LATTER NOT BEING THE PROPER
PARTIES
AGAINST
WHOM
THE
SUBJECT
ACTION
FOR
REIMBURSEMENT MUST BE DIRECTED TO.

B. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT

THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT, HON. RIZALINA T. CAPCO-UMALI,
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DENYING THE
[RESPONDENTS] MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A
CAUSE OF ACTION.[15]

Both arguments raise the sole issue of whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing
petitioners Complaint for failure to state a cause of action.

Section 1(g) Rule 16[16] of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure makes it clear that failure to make a
sufficient allegation of a cause of action in the complaint warrants the dismissal thereof. Section
2, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure defines a cause of action as the act or omission by
which a party violates the right of another. It is the delict or the wrongful act or omission
committed by the defendant in violation of the primary right of the plaintiff. [17]

A cause of action has the following essential elements, viz:

(1) A right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it
arises or is created;
(2) An obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate
such right; and
(3) Act or omission on the part of such defendant in violation of the right of the
plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the
plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of
damages or other appropriate relief. [18]

A complaint states a cause of action only when it has the three indispensable elements. [19]

In the determination of the presence of these elements, inquiry is confined to the four
corners of the complaint. Only the statements in the Complaint may be properly

considered.[20] The absence of any of these elements makes a complaint vulnerable to a Motion
to Dismiss on the ground of a failure to state a cause of action.[21]

After a reading of the allegations contained in petitioners Complaint, we are convinced

that the same failed to state a cause of action.

In the case at bar, petitioner asserts a legal right in her favor by relying on the Decision of
the RTC in Civil Case No. 61327. It can be recalled that the aforesaid case is an action for
Annulment filed by Alfredo and petitioner against the respondents to seek annulment of the Deed
of Sale, executed by Alfredo in respondents favor and covering the herein subject premises. The
Complaint was dismissed by the RTC, and subsequently affirmed by the Court of Appeals and
by this Court in G.R. No. L-117067.

According to petitioner, while the RTC in Civil Case No. 61327 recognized that the
improvements constructed on Alfredos lots were deemed as Alfredos exclusive and capital
property, the court also held that petitioner, as Alfredos spouse, has the right to claim
reimbursement from the estate of Alfredo. It is argued by petitioner that her husband had no
other property, and his only property had been sold to the respondents; hence, she has the legal
right to claim for reimbursement from the respondents who are now the owners of the lot and the
improvements thereon. In fine, petitioner asseverates that the Complaint cannot be dismissed on
the ground of failure to state a cause of action because the respondents have the correlative
obligation to pay the value of the improvements.

Petitioner was not able to show that there is an obligation on the part of the respondents
to respect or not to violate her right. While we could concede that Civil Case No. 61327 made a
reference to the right of the spouse as contemplated in Article 120[22] of the Family Code to be
reimbursed for the cost of the improvements, the obligation to reimburse rests on the spouse
upon whom ownership of the entire property is vested. There is no obligation on the part of the
purchaser of the property, in case the property is sold by the owner-spouse.

Indeed, Article 120 provides the solution in determining the ownership of the
improvements that are made on the separate property of the spouses at the expense of the
partnership or through the acts or efforts of either or both spouses. Thus, when the cost of the
improvement and any resulting increase in value are more than the value of the property at the
time of the improvement, the entire property of one of the spouses shall belong to the conjugal
partnership, subject to reimbursement of the value of the property of the owner-spouse at the
time of the improvement; otherwise, said property shall be retained in ownership by the ownerspouse, likewise subject to reimbursement of the cost of the improvement. The subject property
was precisely declared as the exclusive property of Alfredo on the basis of Article 120 of the
Family Code.

What is incontrovertible is that the respondents, despite the allegations contained in the
Complaint that they are the buyers of the subject premises, are not petitioners spouse nor can
they ever be deemed as the owner-spouse upon whom the obligation to reimburse petitioner for
her costs rested. It is the owner-spouse who has the obligation to reimburse the conjugal
partnership or the spouse who expended the acts or efforts, as the case may be. Otherwise stated,
respondents do not have the obligation to respect petitioners right to be reimbursed.

On this matter, we do not find an act or omission on the part of respondents in violation of
petitioners rights. The right of the respondents to acquire as buyers the subject premises from
Alfredo under the assailed Deed of Sale in Civil Case No. 61327 had been laid to rest. This is
because the validity of the Deed of Sale had already been determined and upheld with
finality. The same had been similarly admitted by petitioner in her Complaint. It can be said,
thus, that respondents act of acquiring the subject property by sale was not in violation of
petitioners rights. The same can also be said of the respondents objection to reimburse
petitioner. Simply, no correlative obligation exists on the part of the respondents to reimburse the
petitioner. Corollary thereto, neither can it be said that their refusal to reimburse constituted a
violation of petitioners rights. As has been shown in the foregoing, no obligation by the
respondents under the law exists. Petitioners Complaint failed to state a cause of action against
the respondents, and for this reason, the Court of Appeals was not in error in dismissing the
same.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 16 August 2004 and the
Resolution dated 17 December 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP. No. 78525
are AFFIRMED. Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.
#143
SECOND DIVISION

SECURITY BANK and TRUST G.R. No. 143382

COMPANY,
Petitioner, Present:

PUNO, J., Chairperson,

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
- v e r s u s - CORONA,
AZCUNA and
GARCIA, JJ.
MAR TIERRA CORPORATION,
WILFRIDO C. MARTINEZ,
MIGUEL J. LACSON and

RICARDO A. LOPA,
Respondents. Promulgated:

November 29, 2006

x--------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
CORONA, J.:

May the conjugal partnership be held liable for an indemnity agreement entered into by
the husband to accommodate a third party?

This issue confronts us in this petition for review on certiorari assailing the November 9,
1999 decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 48107.

On May 7, 1980, respondent Mar Tierra Corporation, through its president, Wilfrido C.
Martinez, applied for a P12,000,000 credit accommodation with petitioner Security Bank and
Trust Company. Petitioner approved the application and entered into a credit line agreement with
respondent corporation. It was secured by an indemnity agreement executed by individual
respondents Wilfrido C. Martinez, Miguel J. Lacson and Ricardo A. Lopa who bound themselves
jointly and severally with respondent corporation for the payment of the loan.

On July 2, 1980, the credit line agreement was amended and increased to P14,000,000.
Individual respondents correspondingly executed a new indemnity agreement in favor of the
bank to secure the increased credit line.

On September 25, 1981, respondent corporation availed of its credit line and received the
sum of P9,952,000 which it undertook to pay on or before November 30, 1981. It was able to
pay P4,648,000 for the principal loan and P2,729,195.56 for the interest and other charges.
However, respondent corporation was not able to pay the balance as it suffered business
reversals, eventually ceasing operations in 1984.

Unable to collect the balance of the loan, petitioner filed a complaint for a sum of money
with a prayer for preliminary attachment against respondent corporation and individual
respondents in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, Branch 66. It was docketed as Civil
Case No. 3947.
Subsequently, however, petitioner had the case dismissed with respect to individual
respondents Lacson and Lopa,[2] leaving Martinez as the remaining individual respondent.

On August 10, 1982, the RTC issued a writ of attachment on all real and personal
properties of respondent corporation and individual respondent Martinez. As a consequence, the
conjugal

house

and

lot

of

the

spouses Wilfrido and

Josefina

Martinez

in

Barrio Calaanan, Caloocan City covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 49158 was
levied on.

The RTC rendered its decision[3] on June 20, 1994. It held respondent corporation and individual
respondent Martinez jointly and severally liable to petitioner for P5,304,000 plus 12% interest
per annum and 5% penalty commencing on June 21, 1982 until fully paid, plus P10,000 as
attorneys fees. It, however, found that the obligation contracted by individual respondent
Martinez did not redound to the benefit of his family, hence, it ordered the lifting of the
attachment on the conjugal house and lot of the spouses Martinez.

Dissatisfied with the RTC decision, petitioner appealed to the CA but the appellate court
affirmed the trial courts decision in toto. Petitioner sought reconsideration but it was denied.
Hence, this petition.

Petitioner makes two basic assertions: (1) the RTC and CA erred in finding that respondent
corporation availed of P9,952,000 only from its credit line and not the entireP14,000,000 and (2)
the RTC and CA were wrong in ruling that the conjugal partnership of the Martinez spouses
could not be held liable for the obligation incurred by individual respondent Martinez.

We uphold the CA.

Factual findings of the CA, affirming those of the trial court, will not be disturbed on
appeal but must be accorded great weight. [4] These findings are conclusive not only on the parties
but on this Court as well.[5]

The CA affirmed the finding of the RTC that the amount availed of by respondent
corporation from its credit line with petitioner was only P9,952,000. Both courts correctly
pointed out that petitioner itself admitted this amount when it alleged in paragraph seven of its
complaint

that

respondent

corporation

borrowed

and

received

the

principal

sum

of P9,952,000.[6] Petitioner was therefore bound by the factual finding of the appellate and trial
courts, as well as by its own judicial admission, on this particular point.

At any rate, the issue of the amount actually availed of by respondent corporation is
factual. It is not within the ambit of this Courts discretionary power of judicial review under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court which is concerned solely with questions of law. [7]

We now move on to the principal issue in this case.

Under Article 161(1) of the Civil Code, [8] the conjugal partnership is liable for all debts
and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. But when
are debts and obligations contracted by the husband alone considered for the benefit of and
therefore chargeable against the conjugal partnership? Is a surety agreement or an
accommodation contract entered into by the husband in favor of his employer within the
contemplation of the said provision?

We ruled as early as 1969 in Luzon Surety Co., Inc. v. de Garcia[9] that, in acting as a
guarantor or surety for another, the husband does not act for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership as the benefit is clearly intended for a third party.

In Ayala Investment and Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[10] we ruled that,

if the husband himself is the principal obligor in the contract, i.e., the direct recipient of the
money and services to be used in or for his own business or profession, the transaction falls
within the term obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. In other words, where the

husband contracts an obligation on behalf of the family business, there is a legal presumption
that such obligation redounds to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. [11]

On the other hand, if the money or services are given to another person or entity and the
husband acted only as a surety or guarantor, the transaction cannot by itself be deemed an
obligation for the benefit of the conjugal partnership.[12] It is for the benefit of the principal
debtor and not for the surety or his family. No presumption is raised that, when a husband enters
into a contract of surety or accommodation agreement, it is for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership. Proof must be presented to establish the benefit redounding to the conjugal
partnership.[13] In the absence of any showing of benefit received by it, the conjugal partnership
cannot be held liable on an indemnity agreement executed by the husband to accommodate a
third party.[14]

In this case, the principal contract, the credit line agreement between petitioner and
respondent corporation, was solely for the benefit of the latter. The accessory contract (the
indemnity agreement) under which individual respondent Martinez assumed the obligation of a
surety for respondent corporation was similarly for the latters benefit. Petitioner had the burden
of proving that the conjugal partnership of the spouses Martinez benefited from the transaction.
It failed to discharge that burden.

To hold the conjugal partnership liable for an obligation pertaining to the husband alone
defeats the objective of the Civil Code to protect the solidarity and well being of the family as a
unit.[15] The underlying concern of the law is the conservation of the conjugal
partnership.[16] Hence, it limits the liability of the conjugal partnership only to debts and
obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

#149
IRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 125172. June 26, 1998]

Spouses ANTONIO and LUZVIMINDA GUIANG, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS

and GILDA CORPUZ, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The sale of a conjugal property requires the consent of both the husband and the wife. The
absence of the consent of one renders the sale null and void, while the vitiation thereof makes it
merely voidable. Only in the latter case can ratification cure the defect.
The Case

These were the principles that guided the Court in deciding this petition for review of the
Decision[1] dated January 30, 1996 and the Resolution[2] dated May 28, 1996, promulgated by the
Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV No. 41758, affirming the Decision of the lower court and
denying reconsideration, respectively.
On May 28, 1990, Private Respondent Gilda Corpuz filed an Amended Complaint [3] against
her husband Judie Corpuz and Petitioners-Spouses Antonio and Luzviminda Guiang. The said
Complaint sought the declaration of a certain deed of sale, which involved the conjugal property
of private respondent and her husband, null and void. The case was raffled to the Regional Trial
Court of Koronadal, South Cotabato, Branch 25. In due course, the trial court rendered a
Decision[4] dated September 9, 1992, disposing as follows:[5]
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is rendered for the plaintiff and against the defendants,
1. Declaring both the Deed of Transfer of Rights dated March 1, 1990 (Exh. A) and the amicable
settlement dated March 16, 1990 (Exh. B) as null and void and of no effect;
2. Recognizing as lawful and valid the ownership and possession of plaintiff Gilda Corpuz over
the remaining one-half portion of Lot 9, Block 8, (LRC) Psd-165409 which has been the subject
of the Deed of Transfer of Rights (Exh. A);
3. Ordering plaintiff Gilda Corpuz to reimburse defendants Luzviminda and Antonio Guiang the
amount of NINE THOUSAND (P9,000.00) PESOS corresponding to the payment made by
defendants Guiangs to Manuel Callejo for the unpaid balance of the account of plaintiff in favor
of Manuel Callejo, and another sum of P379.62 representing one-half of the amount of realty
taxes paid by defendants Guiangs on Lot 9, Block 8, (LRC) Psd-165409, both with legal interests
thereon computed from the finality of the decision.
No pronouncement as to costs in view of the factual circumstances of the case.
Dissatisfied, petitioners-spouses filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. Respondent
Court, in its challenged Decision, ruled as follows: [6]
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the lower court in Civil Case No. 204 is hereby
AFFIRMED by this Court. No costs considering plaintiff-appellees failure to file her
brief, despite notice.
Reconsideration was similarly denied by the same court in its assailed Resolution: [7]
Finding that the issues raised in defendants-appellants motion for reconsideration of Our
decision in this case of January 30, 1996, to be a mere rehash of the same issues which

We have already passed upon in the said decision, and there [being] no cogent reason to
disturb the same, this Court RESOLVES to DENY the instant motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit.
The Facts

The facts of this case are simple. Over the objection of private respondent and while she was
in Manila seeking employment, her husband sold to the petitioners-spouses one half of their
conjugal property, consisting of their residence and the lot on which it stood. The circumstances
of this sale are set forth in the Decision of Respondent Court, which quoted from the Decision of
the trial court, as follows:[8]
1. Plaintiff Gilda Corpuz and defendant Judie Corpuz are legally married spouses. They
were married on December 24, 1968 in Bacolod City, before a judge. This is admitted by
defendants-spouses Antonio and Luzviminda Guiang in their answer, and also admitted
by defendant Judie Corpuz when he testified in court (tsn. p..3, June 9, 1992), although
the latter says that they were married in 1967. The couple have three children,
namely: Junie 18 years old, Harriet 17 years of age, and Jodie or Joji, the youngest, who
was 15 years of age in August, 1990 when her mother testified in court.
Sometime on February 14, 1983, the couple Gilda and Judie Corpuz, with plaintiff-wife
Gilda Corpuz as vendee, bought a 421 sq. meter lot located in Barangay Gen. Paulino
Santos (Bo. 1), Koronadal, South Cotabato, and particularly known as Lot 9, Block 8,
(LRC) Psd-165409 from Manuel Callejo who signed as vendor through a conditional
deed of sale for a total consideration of P14,735.00. The consideration was payable in
installment, with right of cancellation in favor of vendor should vendee fail to pay three
successive installments (Exh. 2, tsn. p. 6, February 14, 1990).
2. Sometime on April 22, 1988, the couple Gilda and Judie Corpuz sold one-half portion
of their Lot No. 9, Block 8, (LRC) Psd-165409 to the defendants-spouses Antonio and
Luzviminda Guiang. The latter have since then occupied the one-half portion [and] built
their house thereon (tsn. p. 4, May 22, 1992). They are thus adjoining neighbors of the
Corpuzes.
3. Plaintiff Gilda Corpuz left for Manila sometime in June 1989. She was trying to look
for work abroad, in [the] Middle East. Unfortunately, she became a victim of an
unscrupulous illegal recruiter. She was not able to go abroad. She stayed for sometime in
Manila however, coming back to Koronadal, South Cotabato, x x x on March 11,
1990. Plaintiffs departure for Manila to look for work in the Middle East was with the
consent of her husband Judie Corpuz (tsn. p. 16, Aug.12, 1990; p. 10, Sept. 6, 1991).
After his wifes departure for Manila, defendant Judie Corpuz seldom went home to the
conjugal dwelling. He stayed most of the time at his place of work at Samahang Nayon
Building, a hotel, restaurant, and a cooperative. Daughter Harriet Corpuz went to school
at Kings College, Bo. 1, Koronadal, South Cotabato, but she was at the same time
working as household help of, and staying at, the house of Mr. Panes. Her brother Junie
was not working. Her younger sister Jodie (Joji) was going to school. Her mother
sometimes sent them money (tsn. p. 14, Sept. 6, 1991).
Sometime in January 1990, Harriet Corpuz learned that her father intended to sell the
remaining one-half portion including their house, of their homelot to defendants
Guiangs. She wrote a letter to her mother informing her. She [Gilda Corpuz] replied that
she was objecting to the sale. Harriet, however, did not inform her father about this; but
instead gave the letter to Mrs. Luzviminda Guiang so that she [Guiang] would advise her
father (tsn. pp. 16-17, Sept. 6, 1991).
4. However, in the absence of his wife Gilda Corpuz, defendant Judie Corpuz pushed
through the sale of the remaining one-half portion of Lot 9, Block 8, (LRC) Psd165409. On March 1, 1990, he sold to defendant Luzviminda Guiang thru a document
known as Deed of Transfer of Rights (Exh. A) the remaining one-half portion of their lot
and the house standing thereon for a total consideration of P30,000.00 of
which P5,000.00 was to be paid in June , 1990. Transferor Judie Corpuzs children Junie
and Harriet signed the document as witnesses.

Four (4) days after March 1, 1990 or on March 5, 1990, obviously to cure whatever
defect in defendant Judie Corpuzs title over the lot transferred, defendant Luzviminda
Guiang as vendee executed another agreement over Lot 9, Block 8, (LRC) Psd-165408
(Exh. 3), this time with Manuela Jimenez Callejo, a widow of the original registered
owner from whom the couple Judie and Gilda Corpuz originally bought the lot (Exh. 2),
who signed as vendor for a consideration of P9,000.00. Defendant Judie Corpuz signed
as a witness to the sale (Exh. 3-A). The new sale (Exh. 3) describes the lot sold as Lot 8,
Block 9, (LRC) Psd-165408 but it is obvious from the mass of evidence that the correct
lot is Lot 8, Block 9, (LRC) Psd-165409, the very lot earlier sold to the couple Gilda and
Judie Corpuz.
5. Sometime on March 11, 1990, plaintiff returned home. She found her children staying
with other households. Only Junie was staying in their house. Harriet and Joji were with
Mr. Panes. Gilda gathered her children together and stayed at their house. Her husband
was nowhere to be found. She was informed by her children that their father had a wife
already.
6. For staying in their house sold by her husband, plaintiff was complained against by
defendant Luzviminda Guiang and her husband Antonio Guiang before the Barangay
authorities of Barangay General Paulino Santos (Bo. 1), Koronadal, South Cotabato, for
trespassing (tsn. p. 34, Aug. 17, 1990). The case was docketed by the barangay
authorities as Barangay Case No. 38 for trespassing. On March 16, 1990, the parties
thereat signed a document known as amicable settlement. In full, the settlement provides
for, to wit:
That respondent, Mrs. Gilda Corpuz and her three children, namely: Junie,
Hariet and Judie to leave voluntarily the house of Mr. and Mrs. Antonio
Guiang, where they are presently boarding without any charge, on or before
April 7, 1990.
FAIL NOT UNDER THE PENALTY OF THE LAW.
Believing that she had received the shorter end of the bargain, plaintiff went to the
Barangay Captain of Barangay Paulino Santos to question her signature on the amicable
settlement. She was referred however to the Officer-In-Charge at the time, a certain Mr.
de la Cruz. The latter in turn told her that he could not do anything on the matter (tsn. p.
31, Aug. 17, 1990).
This particular point was not rebutted. The Barangay Captain who testified did not deny
that Mrs. Gilda Corpuz approached him for the annulment of the settlement. He merely
said he forgot whether Mrs. Corpuz had approached him (tsn. p. 13, Sept. 26, 1990). We
thus conclude that Mrs. Corpuz really approached the Barangay Captain for the
annulment of the settlement. Annulment not having been made, plaintiff stayed put in
her house and lot.
7. Defendant-spouses Guiang followed thru the amicable settlement with a motion for
the execution of the amicable settlement, filing the same with the Municipal Trial Court
of Koronadal, South Cotabato. The proceedings [are] still pending before the said court,
with the filing of the instant suit.
8. As a consequence of the sale, the spouses Guiang spent P600.00 for the preparation of
the Deed of Transfer of Rights, Exh. A; P9,000.00 as the amount they paid to Mrs.
Manuela Callejo, having assumed the remaining obligation of the Corpuzes to Mrs.
Callejo (Exh. 3); P100.00 for the preparation of Exhibit 3; a total of P759.62 basic tax
and special educational fund on the lot; P127.50 as the total documentary stamp tax on
the various documents; P535.72 for the capital gains tax; P22.50 as transfer tax; a
standard fee ofP17.00; certification fee of P5.00. These expenses particularly the taxes
and other expenses towards the transfer of the title to the spouses Guiangs were incurred
for the whole Lot 9, Block 8, (LRC) Psd-165409.
Ruling of Respondent Court

Respondent Court found no reversible error in the trial courts ruling that any alienation or
encumbrance by the husband of the conjugal property without the consent of his wife is null and
void as provided under Article 124 of the Family Code. It also rejected petitioners contention
that the amicable settlement ratified said sale, citing Article 1409 of the Code which expressly
bars ratification of the contracts specified therein, particularly those prohibited or declared void
by law.
Hence, this petition.[9]
The Issues

In their Memorandum, petitioners assign to public respondent the following errors:[10]

I
Whether or not the assailed Deed of Transfer of Rights was validly executed.
II
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in not declaring as voidable contract under
Art. 1390 of the Civil Code the impugned Deed of Transfer of Rights which was validly
ratified thru the execution of the amicable settlement by the contending parties.
III
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in not setting aside the findings of the Court a
quo which recognized as lawful and valid the ownership and possession of private
respondent over the remaining one half (1/2) portion of the subject property.
In a nutshell, petitioners-spouses contend that (1) the contract of sale (Deed of Transfer of
Rights) was merely voidable, and (2) such contract was ratified by private respondent when she
entered into an amicable settlement with them.
This Courts Ruling

The petition is bereft of merit.

First Issue: Void or Voidable Contract?

Petitioners insist that the questioned Deed of Transfer of Rights was validly
executed by the parties-litigants in good faith and for valuable consideration. The absence of
private respondents consent merely rendered the Deed voidable under Article 1390 of the Civil
Code, which provides:
ART. 1390. The following contracts are voidable or annullable, even though there may
have been no damage to the contracting parties:
xxxxxxxxx
(2) Those where the consent is vitiated by mistake, violence, intimidation, undue
influence or fraud.
These contracts are binding, unless they are annulled by a proper action in court. They
are susceptible of ratification.(n)
The error in petitioners contention is evident. Article 1390, par. 2, refers to contracts visited
by vices of consent, i.e., contracts which were entered into by a person whose consent was
obtained and vitiated through mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence or fraud. In this
instance, private respondents consent to the contract of sale of their conjugal property was totally
inexistent or absent. Gilda Corpuz, on direct examination, testified thus:[11]
Q Now, on March 1, 1990, could you still recall where you were?
A I was still in Manila during that time.

xxxxxxxxx
ATTY. FUENTES:
Q When did you come back to Koronadal, South Cotabato?
A That was on March 11, 1990, Maam.
Q Now, when you arrived at Koronadal, was there any problem which arose concerning the
ownership of your residential house at Callejo Subdivision?
A When I arrived here in Koronadal, there was a problem which arose regarding my
residential house and lot because it was sold by my husband without my knowledge.
This being the case, said contract properly falls within the ambit of Article 124 of the Family
Code, which was correctly applied by the two lower courts:
ART. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall
belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husbands decision shall
prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be
availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the
administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance
which must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In
the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be
void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the
consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon
the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is
withdrawn by either or both offerors.(165a) (Italics supplied)
Comparing said law with its equivalent provision in the Civil Code, the trial court adroitly
explained the amendatory effect of the above provision in this wise: [12]
The legal provision is clear. The disposition or encumbrance is void. It becomes still
clearer if we compare the same with the equivalent provision of the Civil Code of the
Philippines.Under Article 166 of the Civil Code, the husband cannot generally alienate
or encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership without the wifes consent. The
alienation or encumbrance if so made however is not null and void. It is merely
voidable. The offended wife may bring an action to annul the said alienation or
encumbrance. Thus, the provision of Article 173 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, to
wit:
Art. 173. The wife may, during the marriage and within ten years from the
transaction questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of any contract of the
husband entered into without her consent, when such consent is required, or
any act or contract of the husband which tends to defraud her or impair her
interest in the conjugal partnership property. Should the wife fail to exercise
this right, she or her heirs after the dissolution of the marriage, may demand the
value of property fraudulently alienated by the husband.(n)
This particular provision giving the wife ten (10) years x x x during [the] marriage to
annul the alienation or encumbrance was not carried over to the Family Code. It is thus
clear that any alienation or encumbrance made after August 3, 1988 when the Family
Code took effect by the husband of the conjugal partnership property without the consent
of the wife is null and void.
Furthermore, it must be noted that the fraud and the intimidation referred to by petitioners
were perpetrated in the execution of the document embodying the amicable settlement. Gilda
Corpuz alleged during trial that barangay authorities made her sign said document through
misrepresentation and coercion.[13] In any event, its execution does not alter the void character of
the deed of sale between the husband and the petitioners-spouses, as will be discussed later. The
fact remains that such contract was entered into without the wifes consent.
In sum, the nullity of the contract of sale is premised on the absence of private respondents
consent. To constitute a valid contract, the Civil Code requires the concurrence of the following
elements: (1) cause, (2) object, and (3) consent, [14] the last element being indubitably absent in
the case at bar.

Second Issue: Amicable Settlement

Insisting that the contract of sale was merely voidable, petitioners aver that it was duly
ratified by the contending parties through the amicable settlement they executed on March 16,
1990 in Barangay Case No. 38.
The position is not well taken. The trial and the appellate courts have resolved this issue in
favor of the private respondent. The trial court correctly held:[15]
By the specific provision of the law [Art. 1390, Civil Code] therefore, the Deed of
Transfer of Rights (Exh. A) cannot be ratified, even by an amicable settlement. The
participation by some barangay authorities in the amicable settlement cannot otherwise
validate an invalid act. Moreover, it cannot be denied that the amicable settlement (Exh.
B) entered into by plaintiff Gilda Corpuz and defendant spouses Guiang is a contract. It
is a direct offshoot of the Deed of Transfer of Rights (Exh. A). By express provision of
law, such a contract is also void. Thus, the legal provision, to wit:
Art. 1422. A contract which is the direct result of a previous illegal contract, is
also void and inexistent. (Civil Code of the Philippines).
In summation therefore, both the Deed of Transfer of Rights (Exh. A) and the amicable
settlement (Exh. 3) are null and void.
Doctrinally and clearly, a void contract cannot be ratified. [16]
Neither can the amicable settlement be considered a continuing offer that was accepted and
perfected by the parties, following the last sentence of Article 124. The order of the pertinent
events is clear: after the sale, petitioners filed a complaint for trespassing against private
respondent, after which the barangay authorities secured an amicable settlement and petitioners
filed before the MTC a motion for its execution. The settlement, however, does not mention a
continuing offer to sell the property or an acceptance of such a continuing offer. Its tenor was to
the effect that private respondent would vacate the property. By no stretch of the imagination,
can the Court interpret this document as the acceptance mentioned in Article 124.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the challenged
Decision and Resolution. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
#161
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 136803

June 16, 2000

EUSTAQUIO MALLILIN, JR., petitioner,

vs.
MA. ELVIRA CASTILLO, respondent.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the amended decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated May 7, 1998
in CA G.R. CV No. 48443 granting respondent's motion for reconsideration of its decision dated
November 7, 1996, and of the resolution dated December 21, 1998 denying petitioner's motion
for reconsideration.
The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows:
On February 24, 1993, petitioner Eustaquio Mallilin, Jr. filed a complaint 2 for "Partition and/or
Payment of Co-Ownership Share, Accounting and Damages" against respondent Ma. Elvira
Castillo. The complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 93-656 at the Regional Trial Court in Makati

City, alleged that petitioner and respondent, both married and with children, but separated from
their respective spouses, cohabited after a brief courtship sometime in 1979 while their
respective marriages still subsisted. During their union, they set up the Superfreight Customs
Brokerage Corporation, with petitioner as president and chairman of the board of directors, and
respondent as vice-president and treasurer. The business flourished and petitioner and respondent
acquired real and personal properties which were registered solely in respondent's name. In 1992,
due to irreconcilable differences, the couple separated. Petitioner demanded from respondent his
share in the subject properties, but respondent refused alleging that said properties had been
registered solely in her name.
In her Amended Answer,3 respondent admitted that she engaged in the customs brokerage
business with petitioner but alleged that the Superfreight Customs Brokerage Corporation was
organized with other individuals and duly registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission in 1987. She denied that she and petitioner lived as husband and wife because the
fact was that they were still legally married to their respective spouses. She claimed to be the
exclusive owner of all real personal properties involved in petitioner's action for partition on the
ground that they were acquired entirely out of her own money and registered solely in her name.
On November 25, 1994, respondent filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, 4 in accordance with
Rule 34 of the Rules of Court. 5 She contended that summary judgment was proper, because the
issues raised in the pleadings were sham and not genuine, to wit:
A.
The main issue is Can plaintiff validly claim the partition and/or payment of coownership share, accounting and damages, considering that plaintiff and defendant are
admittedly both married to their respective spouses under still valid and subsisting
marriages, even assuming as claimed by plaintiff, that they lived together as husband and
wife without benefit of marriage? In other words, can the parties be considered as coowners of the properties, under the law, considering the present status of the parties as
both married and incapable of marrying each other, even assuming that they lived
together as husband and wife (?)
B.
As a collateral issue, can the plaintiff be considered as an unregistered co-owner of the
real properties under the Transfer Certificates of Title duly registered solely in the name
of defendant Ma. Elvira Castillo? This issue is also true as far as the motor vehicles in
question are concerned which are also registered in the name of defendant.6
On the first point, respondent contended that even if she and petitioner actually cohabited,
petitioner could not validly claim a part of the subject real and personal properties because Art.
144 of the Civil Code, which provides that the rules on co-ownership shall govern the properties
acquired by a man and a woman living together as husband and wife but not married, or under a
marriage which is void ab initio, applies only if the parties are not in any way incapacitated to
contract marriage.7 In the parties' case, their union suffered the legal impediment of a prior
subsisting marriage. Thus, the question of fact being raised by petitioner, i.e., whether they lived
together as husband and wife, was irrelevant as no co-ownership could exist between them.
As to the second issue, respondent maintained that petitioner cannot be considered an
unregistered co-owner of the subject properties on the ground that, since titles to the land are
solely in her name, to grant petitioner's prayer would be to allow a collateral attack on the
validity of such titles.
Petitioner opposed respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment. 8 He contended that the case
presented genuine factual issues and that Art. 144 of the Civil Code had been repealed by the
Family Code which now allows, under Art. 148, a limited co-ownership even though a man and
a woman living together are not capacitated to marry each other. Petitioner also asserted that an
implied trust was constituted when he and respondent agreed to register the properties solely in
the latter's name although the same were acquired out of the profits made from their brokerage
business. Petitioner invoked the following provisions of the Civil Code:

Art. 1452. If two or more persons agree to purchase property and by common consent the
legal title is taken in the name of one of them for the benefit of all, a trust is created by
force of law in favor of the others in proportion to the interest of each.
Art. 1453. When the property is conveyed to a person in reliance upon his declared
intention to hold it for, or transfer it to another grantor, there is an implied trust in favor
of the person whose benefit is contemplated.
On January 30, 1995, the trial court rendered its decision9 granting respondent's motion for
summary judgment. It ruled that an examination of the pleadings shows that the issues involved
were purely legal. The trial court also sustained respondent's contention that petitioner's action
for partition amounted to a collateral attack on the validity of the certificates of title covering the
subject properties. It held that even if the parties really had cohabited, the action for partition
could not be allowed because an action for partition among co-owners ceases to be so and
becomes one for title if the defendant, as in the present case, alleges exclusive ownership of the
properties in question. For these reasons, the trial court dismissed Civil Case No. 93-656.
On appeals, the Court of Appeals on November 7, 1996, ordered the case remanded to the court
of origin for trial on the merits. It cited the decision in Roque v. Intermediate Appellate
Court 10 to the effect that an action for partition is at once an action for declaration of coownership and for segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of the properties
involved. If the defendant asserts exclusive title over the property, the action for partition should
not be dismissed. Rather, the court should resolve the case and if the plaintiff is unable to sustain
his claimed status as a co-owner, the court should dismiss the action, not because the wrong
remedy was availed of, but because no basis exists for requiring the defendant to submit to
partition. Resolving the issue whether petitioner's action for partition was a collateral attack on
the validity of the certificates of title, the Court of Appeals held that since petitioner sought to
compel respondent to execute documents necessary to effect transfer of what he claimed was his
share, petitioner was not actually attacking the validity of the titles but in fact, recognized their
validity. Finally, the appellate court upheld petitioner's position that Art. 144 of the Civil Code
had been repealed by Art. 148 of the Family Code.
Respondent moved for reconsideration of the decision of Court of Appeals. On May 7, 1998,
nearly two years after its first decision, the Court of Appeals granted respondent's motion and
reconsidered its prior decision. In its decision now challenged in the present petition, it held
Prefatorily, and to better clarify the controversy on whether this suit is a collateral attack on the
titles in issue, it must be underscored that plaintiff-appellant alleged in his complaint that all the
nine (9) titles are registered in the name of defendant-appellee, Ma. Elvira T. Castillo, except one
which appears in the name of Eloisa Castillo (seepar. 9, Complaint). However, a verification of
the annexes of such initiatory pleading shows some discrepancies, to wit:
1. TCT No. 149046 (Annex A) = Elvira T. Castillo, single
2. TCT No. 168208 (Annex B) = do
3. TCT No. 37046 (Annex C) = do
4. TCT No. 37047 (Annex D) = do
5. TCT No. 37048 (Annex E) = do
6. TCT No. 30368 (Annex F) = Steelhaus Realty & Dev. Corp.
7. TCT No. 30369 (Annex G) = do
8. TCT No. 30371 (Annex F) = do
9. TCT No. (92323) 67881 (Annex I) = Eloisa Castillo
In this action, plaintiff-appellant seeks to be declared as 1/2 co-owner of the real properties
covered by the above listed titles and eventually for their partition [par. (a), Prayer; p. 4

Records]. Notably, in order to achieve such prayer for a joint co-ownership declaration, it is
unavoidable that the individual titles involved be altered, changed, cancelled or modified to
include therein the name of the appellee as a registered 1/2 co-owner. Yet, no cause of action or
even a prayer is contained filed. Manifestly, absent any cause or prayer for the alteration,
cancellation, modification or changing of the titles involved, the desired declaration of coownership and eventual partition will utterly be an indirect or collateral attack on the subject
titled in this suit.
It is here that We fell into error, such that, if not rectified will surely lead to a procedural lapse
and a possible injustice. Well settled is the rules that a certificate of title cannot be
altered, modified or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.
In this jurisdiction, the remedy of the landowner whose property has been wrongfully or
erroneously registered in another name is, after one year from the date of the decree, not to set
aside the decree, but respecting it as incontrovertible and no longer open to review, to bring an
action for reconveyance or, if the property had passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser for
value, for damages. Verily, plaintiff-appellant should have first pursued such remedy or any
other relief directly attacking the subject titles before instituting the present partition
suit. Apropos, the case at bench appears to have been prematurely filed.
Lastly, to grant the partition prayed for by the appellant will in effect rule and decide against the
properties registered in the names of Steelhouse Realty and Development Corporation and Eloisa
Castillo, who are not parties in the case. To allow this to happen will surely result to injustice and
denial of due process of law. . . . 11
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but his motion was denied by the Court of Appeals in its
resolution dated December 21, 1998. Hence this petition.
Petitioner contends that: (1) the Court of Appeals, in its first decision of November 7, 1996, was
correct in applying the Roque ruling and in rejecting respondent's claim that she was the sole
owner of the subject properties and that the partition suit was a collateral attack on the titles; (2)
the Court of Appeals correctly rules in its first decision that Art. 148 of the Family Code governs
the co-ownership between the parties, hence, the complaint for partition is proper; (3) with
respect to the properties registered in the name of Steelhouse Realty, respondent admitted
ownership thereof and, at the very least, these properties could simply be excluded and the
partition limited to the remaining real and personal properties; and (4) the Court of Appeals erred
in not holding that under the Civil Code, there is an implied trust in his favor. 12
The issue in this case is really whether summary judgment, in accordance with Rule 35 of the
Rules of Court, is proper. We rule in the negative.
First. Rule 35, 3 of the Rules of Court provides that summary judgment is proper only when,
based on the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, and after summary hearing, it is
shown that except as to the amount of damages, there is no veritable issue regarding any material
fact in the action and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 1 Conversely, where
the pleadings tender a genuine issue, i.e., an issue of fact the resolution of which calls for the
presentation of evidence, as distinguished from an issue which is sham, fictitious, contrived, setup in bad faith, or patently unsubstantial, summary judgment is not proper. 14
In the present case, we are convinced that genuine issues exist. Petitioner anchors his claim of
co-ownership on two factual grounds: first, that said properties were acquired by him and
respondent during their union from 1979 to 1992 from profits derived from their brokerage
business; and second, that said properties were registered solely in respondent's name only
because they agreed to that arrangement, thereby giving rise to an implied trust in accordance
with Art. 1452 and Art. 1453 of the Civil Code. These allegations are denied by respondent. She
denies that she and petitioner lived together as husband and wife. She also claims that the
properties in question were acquired solely by her with her own money and resources. With such
conflicting positions, the only way to ascertain the truth is obviously through the presentation of
evidence by the parties.
The trial court ruled that it is immaterial whether the parties actually lived together as husband
and wife because Art. 144 of the Civil Code can not be made to apply to them as they were both

incapacitated to marry each other. Hence, it was impossible for a co-ownership to exist between
them.
We disagree.
Art. 144 of the Civil Code provides:
When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not married, or
their marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by either or both of them
through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules
on co-ownership.
This provision of the Civil Code, applies only to cases in which a man and a woman live together
as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage provided they are not incapacitated or are
without impediment to marry each other, 15 or in which the marriage is void ab initio, provided it
is not bigamous. Art. 144, therefore, does not cover parties living in an adulterous relationship.
However, Art. 148 of the Family Code now provides for a limited co-ownership in cases where
the parties in union are incapacitated to marry each other. It states:
In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding article, 16 only the properties
acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property
or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective
contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and
corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall
apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credits.
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership
shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid
marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her
share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding
article.
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith.
It was error for the trial court to rule that, because the parties in this case were not capacitated to
marry each other at the time that they were alleged to have been living together, they could not
have owned properties in common. The Family Code, in addition to providing that a coownership exists between a man and a woman who live together as husband and wife without the
benefit of marriage, likewise provides that, if the parties are incapacitated to marry each other,
properties acquired by them through their joint contribution of money, property or industry shall
be owned by them in common in proportion to their contributions which, in the absence of proof
to the contrary, is presumed to be equal. There is thus co-ownership eventhough the couple are
not capacitated to marry each other.
In this case, there may be a co-ownership between the parties herein. Consequently, whether
petitioner and respondent cohabited and whether the properties involved in the case are part of
the alleged co-ownership are genuine and material. All but one of the properties involved were
alleged to have been acquired after the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. With respect
to the property acquired before the Family Code took effect if it is shown that it was really
acquired under the regime of the Civil Code, then it should be excluded.
Petitioner also alleged in paragraph 7 of his complaint that:
Due to the effective management, hardwork and enterprise of plaintiff assisted by
defendant, their customs brokerage business grew and out of the profits therefrom, the
parties acquired real and personal properties which were, upon agreement of the parties,
listed and registered in defendant's name with plaintiff as the unregistered co-owner of
all said properties. 17
On the basis of this, he contends that an implied trust existed pursuant to Art. 1452 of the Civil
Code which provides that "(I)f two or more persons agree to purchase property and by common
consent the legal title is taken in the name of one of them for the benefit of all, a trust is created

by force of law in favor of the others in proportion to the interest of each." We do not think this
is correct. The legal relation of the parties is already specifically covered by Art. 148 of the
Family Code under which all the properties acquired by the parties out of their actual joint
contributions of money, property or industry shall constitute a co-ownership. Co-ownership is a
form of trust and every co-owner is a trustee for the other. 18 The provisions of Art. 1452 and
Art. 1453 of the Civil Code, then are no longer material since a trust relation already inheres in a
co-ownership which is governed under Title III, Book II of the Civil Code.
Second. The trial court likewise dismissed petitioner's action on the ground that the same
amounted to a collateral attack on the certificates of title involved. As already noted, at first, the
Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner's action does not challenge the validity of respondent's
titles. However, on reconsideration, it reversed itself and affirmed the trial court. It noted that
petitioner's complaint failed to include a prayer for the alteration, cancellation, modification, or
changing of the titles involved. Absent such prayer, the appellate court ruled that a declaration of
co-ownership and eventual partition would involve an indirect or collateral attack on the titles.
We disagree.
A torrens title, as a rule, is conclusive and indefeasible. Proceeding from this, P.D. No.
1529, 19 48 provides that a certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack and can not
be altered, modified, or canceled except in a direct proceeding. When is an action an attack on a
title? It is when the object of the action or proceeding is to nullify the title, and thus challenge the
judgment pursuant to which the title was decreed. The attack is direct when the object of an
action or proceeding is to annul or set aside such judgment, or enjoin its enforcement. On the
other hand, the attack is indirect or collateral when, in an action to obtain a different relief, an
attack on the judgment is nevertheless made as an incident thereof. 20
In his complaint for partition, consistent with our ruling in Roque regarding the nature of an
action for partition, petitioner seeks first, a declaration that he is a co-owner of the subject
properties; and second, the conveyance of his lawful shares. He does not attack respondent's
titles. Petitioner alleges no fraud, mistake, or any other irregularity that would justify a review of
the registration decree in respondent's favor. His theory is that although the subject properties
were registered solely in respondent's name, but since by agreement between them as well as
under the Family Code, he is co-owner of these properties and as such is entitled to the
conveyance of his shares. On the premise that he is a co-owner, he can validly seek the partition
of the properties in co-ownership and the conveyance to him of his share.
Thus, in Guevara v. Guevara, 21 in which a parcel of land bequeathed in a last will and testament
was registered in the name of only one of the heirs, with the understanding that he would deliver
to the others their shares after the debts of the original owner had been paid, this Court ruled that
notwithstanding the registration of the land in the name of only one of the heirs, the other heirs
can claim their shares in "such action, judicial or extrajudicial, as may be necessary to partition
the estate of the testator." 22
Third. The Court of Appeals also reversed its first decision on the ground that to order partition
will, in effect, rule and decide against Steelhouse Realty Development Corporation and Eloisa
Castillo, both strangers to the present case, as to the properties registered in their names. This
reasoning, however, ignores the fact that the majority of the properties involved in the present
case are registered in respondent's name, over which petitioner claims rights as a co-owner.
Besides, other than the real properties, petitioner also seeks partition of a substantial amount of
personal properties consisting of motor vehicles and several pieces of jewelry. By dismissing
petitioner's complaint for partition on grounds of due process and equity, the appellate court
unwittingly denied petitioner his right to prove ownership over the claimed real and personal
properties. The dismissal of petitioner's complaint is unjustified since both ends may be amply
served by simply excluding from the action for partition the properties registered in the name of
Steelhouse Realty and Eloisa Castillo.
WHEREFORE, the amended decision of the Court of Appeals, dated May 7, 1998, is
REVERSED and the case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 59, Makati City
for further proceedings on the merits.
SO ORDERED.

#173
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 86355 May 31, 1990
JOSE MODEQUILLO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. AUGUSTO V. BREVA FRANCISCO SALINAS, FLORIPER ABELLANSALINAS, JUANITO CULAN-CULAN and DEPUTY SHERIFF FERNANDO
PLATA respondents.
Josefina Brandares-Almazan for petitioner.
ABC Law Offices for private respondents.

GANCAYCO, J.:
The issue in this petition is whether or not a final judgment of the Court of Appeals in an action
for damages may be satisfied by way of execution of a family home constituted under the Family
Code.
The facts are undisputed.
On January 29, 1988, a judgment was rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
09218 entitled"Francisco Salinas, et al. vs. Jose Modequillo, et al.," the dispositive part of which
read as follows:
WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal should be, as it is hereby, reversed and
set aside. Judgment is hereby rendered finding the defendants-appellees Jose
Modequillo and Benito Malubay jointly and severally liable to plaintiffsappellants as hereinbelow set forth. Accordingly, defendants-appellees are
ordered to pay jointly and severally to:
1. Plaintiffs-appellants, the Salinas spouses:
a. the amount of P30,000.00 by way of compensation for the death of their son
Audie Salinas;
b. P10,000.00 for the loss of earnings by reason of the death of said Audie
Salinas;
c. the sum of P5,000.00 as burial expenses of Audie Salinas; and
d. the sum of P5,000.00 by way of moral damages.
2. Plaintiffs-appellants Culan-Culan:
a. the sum of P5,000.00 for hospitalization expenses of Renato Culan- Culan; and
b. P5,000.00 for moral damages.
3. Both plaintiff-appellants Salinas and Culan-Culan, P7,000.00 for attorney's fees
and litigation expenses.

All counterclaims and other claims are hereby dismissed. 1

The said judgment having become final and executory, a writ of execution was issued by the
Regional Trial Court of Davao City to satisfy the said judgment on the goods and chattels of the
defendants Jose Modequillo and Benito Malubay at Malalag, Davao del Sur.
On July 7, 1988, the sheriff levied on a parcel of residential land located at Poblacion Malalag,
Davao del Sur containing an area of 600 square meters with a market value of P34,550.00 and
assessed value of P7,570.00 per Tax Declaration No. 87008-01359, registered in the name of
Jose Modequillo in the office of the Provincial Assessor of Davao del Sur; and a parcel of
agricultural land located at Dalagbong Bulacan, Malalag, Davao del Sur containing an area of 3
hectares with a market value of P24,130.00 and assessed value of P9,650.00 per Tax Declaration
No. 87-08-01848 registered in the name of Jose Modequillo in the office of the Provincial
Assessor of Davao del Sur. 2
A motion to quash and/or to set aside levy of execution was filed by defendant Jose Modequillo
alleging therein that the residential land located at Poblacion Malalag is where the family home
is built since 1969 prior to the commencement of this case and as such is exempt from execution,
forced sale or attachment under Articles 152 and 153 of the Family Code except for liabilities
mentioned in Article 155 thereof, and that the judgment debt sought to be enforced against the
family home of defendant is not one of those enumerated under Article 155 of the Family Code.
As to the agricultural land although it is declared in the name of defendant it is alleged to be still
part of the public land and the transfer in his favor by the original possessor and applicant who
was a member of a cultural minority was not approved by the proper government agency. An
opposition thereto was filed by the plaintiffs.
In an order dated August 26, 1988, the trial court denied the motion. A motion for
reconsideration thereof was filed by defendant and this was denied for lack of merit on
September 2, 1988.
Hence, the herein petition for review on certiorari wherein it is alleged that the trial court erred
and acted in excess of its jurisdiction in denying petitioner's motion to quash and/or to set aside
levy on the properties and in denying petitioner' motion for reconsideration of the order dated
August 26, 1988. Petitioner contends that only a question of law is involved in this petition. He
asserts that the residential house and lot was first occupied as his family residence in 1969 and
was duly constituted as a family home under the Family Code which took effect on August 4,
1988. Thus, petitioner argues that the said residential house and lot is exempt from payment of
the obligation enumerated in Article 155 of the Family Code; and that the decision in this case
pertaining to damages arising from a vehicular accident took place on March 16, 1976 and which
became final in 1988 is not one of those instances enumerated under Article 155 of the Family
Code when the family home may be levied upon and sold on execution. It is further alleged that
the trial court erred in holding that the said house and lot became a family home only on August
4, 1988 when the Family Code became effective, and that the Family Code cannot be interpreted
in such a way that all family residences are deemed to have been constituted as family homes at
the time of their occupancy prior to the effectivity of the said Code and that they are exempt
from execution for the payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity of said Code; and
that it also erred when it declared that Article 162 of the Family Code does not state that the
provisions of Chapter 2, Title V have a retroactive effect.
Articles 152 and 153 of the Family Code provide as follows:
Art. 152. The family home, constituted jointly by the husband and the wife or by
an unmarried head of a family, is the dwelling house where they and their family
reside, and the land on which it is situated.
Art. 153. The family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time
it is occupied as a family residence. From the time of its constitution and so long
as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein, the family home continues to be
such and is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except as
hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value allowed by law.

Under the Family Code, a family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it
is occupied as a family residence. There is no need to constitute the same judicially or
extrajudicially as required in the Civil Code. If the family actually resides in the premises, it is,
therefore, a family home as contemplated by law. Thus, the creditors should take the necessary
precautions to protect their interest before extending credit to the spouses or head of the family
who owns the home.
Article 155 of the Family Code also provides as follows:
Art. 155. The family home shall be exempt from execution, forced sale or
attachment except:
(1) For non-payment of taxes;
(2) For debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home;
(3) For debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such
constitution; and
(4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, material men and
others who have rendered service or furnished material for the construction of the
building.
The exemption provided as aforestated is effective from the time of the constitution of the family
home as such, and lasts so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein.
In the present case, the residential house and lot of petitioner was not constituted as a family
home whether judicially or extrajudicially under the Civil Code. It became a family home by
operation of law only under Article 153 of the Family Code. It is deemed constituted as a family
home upon the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 not August 4, one year after its
publication in the Manila Chronicle on August 4, 1987 (1988 being a leap year).
The contention of petitioner that it should be considered a family home from the time it was
occupied by petitioner and his family in 1969 is not well- taken. Under Article 162 of the Family
Code, it is provided that "the provisions of this Chapter shall also govern existing family
residences insofar as said provisions are applicable." It does not mean that Articles 152 and 153
of said Code have a retroactive effect such that all existing family residences are deemed to have
been constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the
Family Code and are exempt from execution for the payment of obligations incurred before the
effectivity of the Family Code. Article 162 simply means that all existing family residences at
the time of the effectivity of the Family Code, are considered family homes and are prospectively
entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the Family Code. Article 162 does not
state that the provisions of Chapter 2, Title V have a retroactive effect.
Is the family home of petitioner exempt from execution of the money judgment aforecited No.
The debt or liability which was the basis of the judgment arose or was incurred at the time of the
vehicular accident on March 16, 1976 and the money judgment arising therefrom was rendered
by the appellate court on January 29, 1988. Both preceded the effectivity of the Family Code on
August 3, 1988. This case does not fall under the exemptions from execution provided in the
Family Code.
As to the agricultural land subject of the execution, the trial court correctly ruled that the levy to
be made by the sheriff shall be on whatever rights the petitioner may have on the land.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
#185

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 159785

April 27, 2007

TEOFISTO I. VERCELES, Petitioner,

vs.
MARIA CLARISSA POSADA, in her own behalf, and as mother of minor VERNA AIZA
POSADA, CONSTANTINO POSADA and FRANCISCA POSADA, Respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review seeks the reversal of the Decision1 dated May 30, 2003 and the
Resolution2 dated August 27, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 50557. The
appellate court had affirmed with modification the Judgment 3 dated January 4, 1995 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Virac, Catanduanes, Branch 42, in Civil Case No. 1401. The RTC
held petitioner liable to pay monthly support to Verna Aiza Posada since her birth on September
23, 1987 as well as moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees and costs of suit.
The facts in this case as found by the lower courts are as follows:
Respondent Maria Clarissa Posada (Clarissa), a young lass from the barrio of Pandan,
Catanduanes, sometime in 1986 met a close family friend, petitioner Teofisto I. Verceles, mayor
of Pandan. He then called on the Posadas and at the end of the visit, offered Clarissa a job.
Clarissa accepted petitioners offer and worked as a casual employee in the mayors office
starting on September 1, 1986. From November 10 to 15 in 1986, with companions Aster de
Quiros, Pat del Valle, Jaime and Jocelyn Vargas, she accompanied petitioner to Legaspi City to
attend a seminar on town planning. They stayed at the Mayon Hotel.
On November 11, 1986, at around 11:00 a.m., petitioner fetched Clarissa from "My Brothers
Place" where the seminar was being held. Clarissa avers that he told her that they would have
lunch at Mayon Hotel with their companions who had gone ahead. When they reached the place
her companions were nowhere. After petitioner ordered food, he started making amorous
advances on her. She panicked, ran and closeted herself inside a comfort room where she stayed
until someone knocked. She said she hurriedly exited and left the hotel. Afraid of the mayor, she
kept the incident to herself. She went on as casual employee. One of her tasks was followingupbarangay road and maintenance projects.
On December 22, 1986, on orders of petitioner, she went to Virac, Catanduanes, to follow up
funds for barangayprojects. At around 11:00 a.m. the same day, she went to Catanduanes Hotel
on instructions of petitioner who asked to be briefed on the progress of her mission. They met at
the lobby and he led her upstairs because he said he wanted the briefing done at the restaurant at
the upper floor.
Instead, however, petitioner opened a hotel room door, led her in, and suddenly embraced her, as
he told her that he was unhappy with his wife and would "divorce" her anytime. He also claimed
he could appoint her as a municipal development coordinator. She succumbed to his advances.
But again she kept the incident to herself.
Sometime in January 1987, when she missed her menstruation, she said she wrote petitioner that
she feared she was pregnant. In another letter in February 1987, she told him she was pregnant.
In a handwritten letter dated February 4, 1987, he replied:
My darling Chris,

Should you become pregnant even unexpectedly, I should have no regret, because I love you and
you love me.
Let us rejoice a common responsibility you and I shall take care of it and let him/her see the
light of this beautiful world.
We know what to do to protect our honor and integrity.
Just relax and be happy, if true.
With all my love,
Ninoy
2/4/874
Clarissa explained petitioner used an alias "Ninoy" and addressed her as "Chris," probably
because of their twenty-five (25)-year age gap. In court, she identified petitioners penmanship
which she claims she was familiar with as an employee in his office.
Clarissa presented three other handwritten letters5 sent to her by petitioner, two of which were in
his letterhead as mayor of Pandan. She also presented the pictures6 petitioner gave her of his
youth and as a public servant, all bearing his handwritten notations at the back.
Clarissa avers that on March 3, 1987, petitioner, aware of her pregnancy, handed her a letter
and P2,000 pocket money to go to Manila and to tell her parents that she would enroll in a CPA
review course or look for a job. In June 1987, petitioner went to see her in Manila and gave her
another P2,000 for her delivery. When her parents learned of her pregnancy, sometime in July,
her father fetched her and brought her back to Pandan. On September 23, 1987, 7 she gave birth to
a baby girl, Verna Aiza Posada.
Clarissas mother, Francisca, corroborated Clarissas story. She said they learned of their
daughters pregnancy through her husbands cousin. She added that she felt betrayed by
petitioner and shamed by her daughters pregnancy.
The Posadas filed a Complaint for Damages coupled with Support Pendente Lite before the
RTC, Virac, Catanduanes against petitioner on October 23, 1987.8
On January 4, 1995, the trial court issued a judgment in their favor, the dispositive portion of
which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
[respondents] and against the [petitioner] and ordering the latter:
1. to pay a monthly support of P2,000.00 to Verna Aiza Posada since her birth on
September 23, 1987 as he was proved to be the natural father of the above-named minor
as shown by the exhibits and testimonies of the [respondents];
2. to pay the amount of P30,000.00 as moral damages;
3. to pay the amount of P30,000.00 as exemplary damages;
4. to pay the sum of P10,000.00 as attorneys fees; and
5. to pay the costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED.9
Verceles appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the judgment with modification,
specifying the party to whom the damages was awarded. The dispositive portion of the Court of
Appeals decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is AFFIRMED with modification by ordering

[petitioner] Teofisto I. Verceles:
1. To pay a monthly support of P2,000.00 to Verna Aiza Posada from her birth on
September 23, 1987.
2. To pay [respondent] Maria Clarissa Posada the sum of P15,000.00 as moral damages
and [P]15,000.00 as exemplary damages.
3. To pay [respondents] spouses Constantino and Francisca Posada the sum
of P15,000.00 as moral damages and P15,000.00 as exemplary damages.
4. To pay each of the said three [respondents] P10,000.00 as attorneys fees; and
5. To pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.10
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner now presents the following issues for resolution:
I.
WAS THERE ANY EVIDENCE ON RECORD TO PROVE THAT APPELLANT VERCELES
WAS THE FATHER OF THE CHILD?
II.
WOULD THIS ACTION FOR DAMAGES PROSPER?
III.
WOULD THE RTC COURT HAVE ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER THIS ISSUE OF
APPELLANTS PATERNITY OF THE CHILD, WHICH IS MADE COLLATERAL TO THIS
ACTION FOR DAMAGES?11
In sum, the pertinent issues in this case are: (1) whether or not paternity and filiation can be
resolved in an action for damages with support pendente lite; (2) whether or not the filiation of
Verna Aiza Posada as the illegitimate child of petitioner was proven; and (3) whether or not
respondents are entitled to damages.
In his Memorandum, petitioner asserts that the fact of paternity and filiation of Verna Aiza
Posada has not been duly established or proved in the proceedings; that the award for damages
and attorneys fees has no basis; and that the issue of filiation should be resolved in a direct and
not a collateral action.
Petitioner argues he never signed the birth certificate of Verna Aiza Posada as father and that it
was respondent Clarissa who placed his name on the birth certificate as father without his
consent. He further contends the alleged love letters he sent to Clarissa are not admissions of
paternity but mere expressions of concern and advice. 12 As to the award for damages, petitioner
argues Clarissa could not have suffered moral damages because she was in pari delicto, being a
willing participant in the "consensual carnal act" between them. 13 In support of his argument that
the issue on filiation should have been resolved in a separate action, petitioner cited the case
of Rosales v. Castillo Rosales14 where we held that the legitimacy of a child which is
controversial can only be resolved in a direct action. 15
On the other hand, respondents in their Memorandum maintain that the Court of Appeals
committed no error in its decision. They reiterate that Clarissas clear narration of the
circumstances on "how she was deflowered" by petitioner, the love letters and pictures given by
petitioner to Clarissa, the corroborating testimony of Clarissas mother, the fact that petitioner
proffered no countervailing evidence, are preponderant evidence of paternity. They cited the case

of De Jesus v. Syquia16 where we held that a conceived child can be acknowledged because this
is an act favorable to the child.17 They also argue that damages should be awarded because
petitioner inveigled Clarissa to succumb to his sexual advances. 18
Could paternity and filiation be resolved in an action for damages? On this score, we find
petitioners stance unmeritorious. The caption is not determinative of the nature of a pleading. In
a string of cases we made the following rulings. It is not the caption but the facts alleged which
give meaning to a pleading. Courts are called upon to pierce the form and go into the substance
thereof.19 In determining the nature of an action, it is not the caption, but the averments in the
petition and the character of the relief sought, that are controlling. 20
A perusal of the Complaint before the RTC shows that although its caption states "Damages
coupled with SupportPendente Lite," Clarissas averments therein, her meeting with petitioner,
his offer of a job, his amorous advances, her seduction, their trysts, her pregnancy, birth of her
child, his letters, her demand for support for her child, all clearly establish a case for recognition
of paternity. We have held that the due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a
will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated
act of acknowledgement of the child, and no further court action is required. In fact, any
authentic writing is treated not just a ground for compulsory recognition; it is in itself a voluntary
recognition that does not require a separate action for judicial approval. 21
The letters of petitioner marked as Exhibits "A" to "D" are declarations that lead nowhere but to
the conclusion that he sired Verna Aiza. Although petitioner used an alias in these letters, the
similarity of the penmanship in these letters vis the annotation at the back of petitioners fading
photograph as a youth is unmistakable. Even an inexperienced eye will come to the conclusion
that they were all written by one and the same person, petitioner, as found by the courts a quo.
We also note that in his Memorandum, petitioner admitted his affair with Clarissa, the exchange
of love letters between them, and his giving her money during her pregnancy. 22
Articles 172 and 175 of the Family Code are the rules for establishing filiation. They are as
follows:
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on
the same evidence as legitimate children.
The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the
action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought
during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
The letters, one of which is quoted above, are private handwritten instruments of petitioner
which establish Verna Aizas filiation under Article 172 (2) of the Family Code. In addition, the
array of evidence presented by respondents, the dates, letters, pictures and testimonies, to us, are
convincing, and irrefutable evidence that Verna Aiza is, indeed, petitioners illegitimate child.
Petitioner not only failed to rebut the evidence presented, he himself presented no evidence of his
own. His bare denials are telling. Well-settled is the rule that denials, if unsubstantiated by clear
and convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving which merit no weight in law and cannot

be given greater evidentiary value over the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on
affirmative matters.23
We, however, cannot rule that respondents are entitled to damages. Article 2219 24of the Civil
Code which states moral damages may be recovered in cases of seduction is inapplicable in this
case because Clarissa was already an adult at the time she had an affair with petitioner.
Neither can her parents be entitled to damages. Besides, there is nothing in law or jurisprudence
that entitles the parents of a consenting adult who begets a love child to damages. Respondents
Constantino and Francisca Posada have not cited any law or jurisprudence to justify awarding
damages to them.
We, however, affirm the grant of attorneys fees in consonance with Article 2208 (2)25 and
(11)26 of the New Civil Code.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision dated May 30, 2003 and the Resolution dated August 27,
2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 50557 are AFFIRMED, with the
MODIFICATION that the award of moral damages and exemplary damages be DELETED.
SO ORDERED.
#197
DELA CRUZ V. GARCIA
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
For several months in 2005, then 21-year old petitioner Jenie San Juan Dela Cruz (Jenie)
and then 19-year old Christian Dominique Sto. Tomas Aquino (Dominique) lived together as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. They resided in the house of Dominiques
parents Domingo B. Aquino and Raquel Sto. Tomas Aquino at Pulang-lupa, Dulumbayan,
Teresa, Rizal.
On September 4, 2005, Dominique died.[1] After almost two months, or on November 2,
2005, Jenie, who continued to live with Dominiques parents, gave birth to her herein copetitioner minor child Christian Dela Cruz Aquino at the Antipolo Doctors Hospital, Antipolo
City.
Jenie applied for registration of the childs birth, using Dominiques surname Aquino, with
the Office of the City Civil Registrar, Antipolo City, in support of which she submitted the
childs Certificate of Live Birth,[2] Affidavit to Use the Surname of the Father[3] (AUSF) which
she had executed and signed, and Affidavit of Acknowledgmentexecuted by Dominiques father
Domingo Butch Aquino.[4] Both affidavits attested, inter alia, that during the lifetime of
Dominique, he had continuously acknowledged his yet unborn child, and that his paternity had
never been questioned. Jenie attached to the AUSF a document entitled AUTOBIOGRAPHY
which Dominique, during his lifetime, wrote in his own handwriting, the pertinent portions of
which read:
AQUINO, CHRISTIAN DOMINIQUE S.T.
AUTOBIOGRAPHY
IM CHRISTIAN DOMINIQUE STO. TOMAS AQUINO, 19 YEARS OF
AGE TURNING 20 THIS COMING OCTOBER 31, 2005. [5] I RESIDE AT

PULANG-LUPA STREET BRGY. DULUMBAYAN, TERESA, RIZAL. I AM

THE YOUNGEST IN OUR FAMILY. I HAVE ONE BROTHER NAMED
JOSEPH BUTCH STO. TOMAS AQUINO. MY FATHERS NAME IS
DOMINGO BUTCH AQUINO AND MY MOTHERS NAME IS RAQUEL STO.
TOMAS AQUINO. x x x.
xxxx
AS OF NOW I HAVE MY WIFE NAMED JENIE DELA CRUZ. WE
MET EACH OTHER IN OUR HOMETOWN, TEREZA RIZAL. AT FIRST WE
BECAME GOOD FRIENDS, THEN WE FELL IN LOVE WITH EACH
OTHER, THEN WE BECAME GOOD COUPLES. AND AS OF NOW SHE IS
PREGNANT AND FOR THAT WE LIVE TOGETHER IN OUR HOUSE
NOW. THATS ALL.[6] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
By letter dated November 11, 2005,[7] the City Civil Registrar of Antipolo City, Ronald
Paul S. Gracia (respondent), denied Jenies application for registration of the childs name in this
wise:
7.

Rule 7 of Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 2004 (Implementing Rules

and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9255 [An Act Allowing Illegitimate
Children to Use the Surname of their Father, Amending for the Purpose,
Article 176 of Executive Order No. 209, otherwise Known as the Family Code
of the Philippines]) provides that:
Rule 7. Requirements for the Child to Use the Surname of the Father
7.1 For Births Not Yet Registered
7.1.1 The illegitimate child shall use the surname of the father if a public
document is executed by the father, either at the back of the
Certificate of Live Birth or in a separate document.
7.1.2 If admission of paternity is made through a private handwritten
instrument, the child shall use the surname of the father,
provided the registration is supported by the following
documents:
a. AUSF[8]
b. Consent of the child, if 18 years old and over at the time of the
filing of the document.
c. Any two of the following documents showing clearly the
paternity between the father and the child:

1. Employment records
2. SSS/GSIS records
3. Insurance
4. Certification of membership in any organization
5. Statement of Assets and Liability
6. Income Tax Return (ITR)
In summary, the child cannot use the surname of his father because he was born
out of wedlock and the father unfortunately died prior to his birth and has no more
capacity to acknowledge his paternity to the child (either through the back of
Municipal Form No. 102 Affidavit of Acknowledgment/Admission of Paternity or
the Authority to Use the Surname of the Father). (Underscoring supplied)

Jenie and the child promptly filed a complaint [9] for injunction/registration of name
against respondent before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, docketed as SCA Case No.
06-539, which was raffled to Branch 73 thereof. The complaint alleged that, inter alia, the denial
of registration of the childs name is a violation of his right to use the surname of his deceased

father under Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9255,[10] which provides:
Article 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under
the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in
conformity with this Code. However,illegitimate children may use the surname of
their father if their filiation has been expressly recognized by the father through
the record of birth appearing in the civil register, or when an admission in
a public document or private handwritten instrument is made by the
father. Provided, the father has the right to institute an action before the regular
courts to prove non-filiation during his lifetime. The legitime of each illegitimate
child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

They maintained that the Autobiography executed by Dominique constitutes an admission of

paternity in a private handwritten instrument within the contemplation of the above-quoted
provision of law.
For failure to file a responsive pleading or answer despite service of summons,
respondent was declared in default.
Jenie thereupon presented evidence ex-parte. She testified on the circumstances of her
common-law relationship with Dominique and affirmed her declarations in her AUSF that during
his lifetime, he had acknowledged his yet unborn child. [11] She offered Dominiques handwritten
Autobiography (Exhibit A) as her documentary evidence-in-chief.[12] Dominiques lone brother,
Joseph Butch S.T. Aquino, also testified, corroborating Jenies declarations.[13]
By Decision[14] of April 25, 2007, the trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of cause
of action as the Autobiography was unsigned, citing paragraph 2.2, Rule 2 (Definition of Terms)
of Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 1, Series of 2004 (the Rules and Regulations Governing
the Implementation of R.A. 9255) which defines private handwritten document through which
a father may acknowledge an illegitimate child as follows:
2.2 Private handwritten instrument an instrument executed in the
handwriting of the father and duly signed by him where he expressly recognizes
paternity to the child. (Underscoring supplied)

The trial court held that even if Dominique was the author of the handwritten Autobiography, the
same does not contain any express recognition of paternity.
Hence, this direct resort to the Court via Petition for Review on Certiorari raising this
purely legal issue of:
WHETHER OR NOT THE UNSIGNED HANDWRITTEN
STATEMENT OF THE DECEASED FATHER OF MINOR CHRISTIAN DELA
CRUZ CAN BE CONSIDERED AS A RECOGNITION OF PATERNITY IN A
PRIVATE
HANDWRITTEN
INSTRUMENT
WITHIN
THE
CONTEMPLATION OF ARTICLE 176 OF THE FAMILY CODE, AS
AMENDED BY R.A. 9255, WHICH ENTITLES THE SAID MINOR TO USE
HIS FATHERS SURNAME.[15] (Underscoring supplied)

Petitioners contend that Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended, does not expressly
require that the private handwritten instrument containing the putative fathers admission of
paternity must be signed by him. They add that the deceaseds handwritten Autobiography,

though unsigned by him, is sufficient, for the requirement in the above-quoted paragraph 2.2 of
the Administrative Order that the admission/recognition must be duly signed by the father is void
as it unduly expanded the earlier-quoted provision of Article 176 of the Family Code. [16]
Petitioners further contend that the trial court erred in not finding
that Dominiques handwritten Autobiography contains a clear and unmistakable recognition of
the childs paternity.[17]
In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) submits that respondents
position, as affirmed by the trial court, is in consonance with the law and thus prays for the
dismissal of the petition. It further submits that Dominiques Autobiography merely
acknowledged Jenies pregnancy but not [his] paternity of the child she was carrying in her
womb.[18]
Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by R.A. 9255, permits an illegitimate child
to use the surname of his/her father if the latter had expressly recognized him/her as his offspring
through the record of birth appearing in the civil register, or through an admission made in a
public or private handwritten instrument. The recognition made in any of these documents is, in
itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of the childs paternity; hence, no separate action
for judicial approval is necessary. [19]
Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended, does not, indeed, explicitly state that the
private handwritten instrument acknowledging the childs paternity must be signed by the
putative father. This provision must, however, be read in conjunction with related provisions of
the Family Code which require that recognition by the father must bear his signature, thus:
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in
the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.
xxxx
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the
following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final
judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or
a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

That a father who acknowledges paternity of a child through a written instrument must
affix his signature thereon is clearly implied in Article 176 of the Family Code.Paragraph 2.2,
Rule 2 of A.O. No. 1, Series of 2004, merely articulated such requirement; it did not unduly
expand the import of Article 176 as claimed by petitioners.
In the present case, however, special circumstances exist to hold that Dominiques
Autobiography, though unsigned by him, substantially satisfies the requirement of the law.

First, Dominique died about two months prior to the childs birth. Second, the relevant
matters in the Autobiography, unquestionably handwritten by Dominique, correspond to the facts
culled from the testimonial evidence Jenie proffered. [20] Third, Jenies testimony
is corroborated by the Affidavit of Acknowledgment of Dominiques father Domingo Aquino and
testimony of his brother Joseph Butch Aquino whose hereditary rights could be affected by the
registration of the questioned recognition of the child. These circumstances indicating
Dominiques paternity of the child give life to his statements in his Autobiography that JENIE
DELA CRUZ is MY WIFE as WE FELL IN LOVE WITH EACH OTHER and NOW SHE IS
PREGNANT AND FOR THAT WE LIVE TOGETHER.
In Herrera v. Alba,[21] the Court summarized the laws, rules, and jurisprudence on
establishing filiation, discoursing in relevant part:

Laws, Rules, and Jurisprudence

Establishing Filiation
The relevant provisions of the Family Code provide as follows:
ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in
the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.
xxxx
ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the
following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final
judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a
private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be
proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate
child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
The Rules on Evidence include provisions on pedigree. The relevant sections
of Rule 130 provide:
SEC. 39. Act or declaration about pedigree. The act or declaration of a
person deceased, or unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of another person
related to him by birth or marriage, may be received in evidence where it occurred
before the controversy, and the relationship between the two persons is shown by
evidence other than such act or declaration. The word "pedigree" includes
relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when and the
places where these facts occurred, and the names of the relatives. It embraces also
facts of family history intimately connected with pedigree.
SEC. 40. Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree. The reputation
or tradition existing in a family previous to the controversy, in respect to the
pedigree of any one of its members, may be received in evidence if the witness
testifying thereon be also a member of the family, either by consanguinity or

affinity. Entries in family bibles or other family books or charts, engraving on

rings, family portraits and the like, may be received as evidence of pedigree.
This Court's rulings further specify what incriminating acts are acceptable
as evidence to establish filiation. In Pe Lim v. CA, a case petitioner often cites, we
stated that the issue of paternity still has to be resolved by such conventional
evidence as the relevant incriminating verbal and written acts by the putative
father. Under Article 278 of the New Civil Code, voluntary recognition by a
parent shall be made in the record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of
record, or in any authentic writing. To be effective, the claim of filiation must
be made by the putative father himself and the writing must be the writing of
the putative father. A notarial agreement to support a child whose filiation is
admitted by the putative father was considered acceptable evidence. Letters to the
mother vowing to be a good father to the child and pictures of the putative father
cuddling the child on various occasions, together with the certificate of live birth,
proved filiation. However, a student permanent record, a written consent to a
father's operation, or a marriage contract where the putative father gave consent,
cannot be taken as authentic writing. Standing alone, neither a certificate of
baptism nor family pictures are sufficient to establish filiation. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied.)

In the case at bar, there is no dispute that the earlier quoted statements in Dominiques
Autobiography have been made and written by him. Taken together with the other relevant facts
extant herein that Dominique, during his lifetime, and Jenie were living together as common-law
spouses for several months in 2005 at his parents house in Pulang-lupa, Dulumbayan, Teresa,
Rizal; she was pregnant when Dominique died on September 4, 2005; and about two months
after his death, Jenie gave birth to the child they sufficiently establish that the child of Jenie is
Dominiques.
In view of the pronouncements herein made, the Court sees it fit to adopt the following
rules respecting the requirement of affixing the signature of the acknowledging parent in any
private handwritten instrument wherein an admission of filiation of a legitimate or illegitimate
child is made:
1) Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of evidence submitted to
prove filiation, there should be strict compliance with the requirement that the same must be
signed by the acknowledging parent; and
2) Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other relevant and
competent evidence, it suffices that the claim of filiation therein be shown to have been made
and handwritten by the acknowledging parent as it is merely corroborative of such other
evidence.
Our laws instruct that the welfare of the child shall be the paramount consideration in
resolving questions affecting him.[22] Article 3(1) of the United Nations Convention on the
Rights of a Child of which the Philippines is a signatory is similarly emphatic:
Article 3
1. In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private
social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative
bodies, the best
interests of the child shall be a primary
consideration.[23] (Underscoring supplied)

It is thus (t)he policy of the Family Code to liberalize the rule on the investigation of
the paternity and filiation of children, especially of illegitimate children x x x.[24]Too, (t)he State
as parens patriae affords special protection to children from abuse, exploitation and other
conditions prejudicial to their development.[25]

In the eyes of society, a child with an unknown father bears the stigma of dishonor. It is
to petitioner minor childs best interests to allow him to bear the surname of the now deceased
Dominique and enter it in his birth certificate.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The City Civil Registrar of Antipolo City is
DIRECTED to immediately enter the surname of the late Christian Dominique Sto.
Tomas Aquino as the surname of petitioner minor Christian dela Cruz in his Certificate of Live
Birth, and record the same in the Register of Births.
SO ORDERED.
#209
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 145527

May 28, 2002

AUGUSTUS CAEZAR R. GAN, petitioner,

vs.
HON. ANTONIO C. REYES, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of RTC-Br. 61, Baguio
City, ALBERT G. TOLENTINO, in his capacity as RTC Sheriff of Baguio City, and
FRANCHESKA JOY C. PONDEVIDA, assisted by BERNADETTE C.
PONDEVIDA, respondents.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
Quite apprehensive that she would not be able to send to school her three (3)-year old daughter
Francheska Joy S. Pondevida, Bernadette S. Pondevida wrote petitioner Augustus Caezar R.
Gan1 demanding support for their "love child." Petitioner, in his reply, denied paternity of the
child. An exasperated Bernadette thereafter instituted in behalf of her daughter a complaint
against petitioner for support with prayer for support pendente lite.2
Petitioner moved to dismiss on the ground that the complaint failed to state a cause of action. He
argued that since Francheska's certificate of birth indicated her father as "UNKNOWN," there
was no legal or factual basis for the claim of support. 3 His motion, however, was denied by the
trial court.4
Despite denial of his motion, petitioner failed to file his answer within the reglementary period.
Thus, on 19 January 2000 private respondent moved that petitioner be declared in default, which
motion was granted. In itsOrder declaring petitioner in default the trial court noted that
petitioner's Motion to Admit Answer was filed more than ninety (90) days after the expiration of
the reglementary period, and only after private respondent moved that petitioner be declared in
default. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was also denied. Hence, the court received the
evidence of private respondent ex parte.

After finding that the claim of filiation and support was adequately proved, the trial court
rendered its Decision on 12 May 2000 ordering petitioner to recognize private respondent
Francheska Joy S. Pondevida as his illegitimate child and support her with P20,000.00 every
month to be paid on or before the 15th of each month starting 15 April 2000. Likewise petitioner
was ordered to pay Francheska Joy S. Pondevida the accumulated arrears ofP20,000.00 per
month from the day she was born, P50,000.00 as attorney's fees and P25,000.00 for expenses of
litigation, plus P20,000.00 on or before the 15th of every month from 15 May 2000 as
alimony pendente liteshould he desire to pursue further remedies against private respondent.5
Forthwith, private respondent moved for execution of the judgment of support, which the trial
court granted by issuing a writ of execution, citing as reason therefor private respondent's
immediate need for schooling.6Pursuant to the writ, the sheriff levied upon a motor vehicle, a
Honda City, with Plate No. UMT 884, registered in the name of "A.B. Leasing & Fin. Corp.,
Leased to: G & G Trading," and found within the premises of petitioner's warehouse in Caloocan
City.7
Meanwhile, petitioner appealed the Judgment to the Court of Appeals.8
On 9 June 2000 petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals
imputing grave abuse of discretion to the trial court for ordering the immediate execution of the
judgment. Petitioner averred that the writ of execution was issued despite the absence of a good
reason for immediate enforcement. Petitioner insisted that as the judgment sought to be executed
did not yet attain finality there should be an exceptional reason to warrant its execution. He
further alleged that the writ proceeded from an order of default and a judgment rendered by the
trial court in complete disregard of his "highly meritorious defense." Finally, petitioner
impugned the validity of the writ as he argued that it was issued without notice to him. Petitioner
stressed the fact that he received copy of the motion for immediate execution two (2)
weeks after its scheduled hearing.9
On 31 August 2000 the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition on the ratiocination that under
Sec. 4, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure judgments for support are immediately
executory and cannot be stayed by an appeal. Thus, it did not help petitioner any to argue that
there were no good reasons to support its immediate execution. The second challenge hurled
against the validity of the writ concerning the lack of notice and hearing was likewise dismissed
with the appeals court favoring substantial justice over technicalities. Lastly, petitioner's
justification for belatedly filing his answer, i.e., miscommunication with his lawyer, was
disregarded since it fell short of the statutory requirements of "fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable negligence."10
His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner came to us impugning the
dismissal of his petition for certiorari. Petitioner argues that under the rules a judgment for
support which is subject of an appeal cannot be executed absent any good reason for its
immediate execution. Petitioner likewise attacks the validity of the writ asserting that it was
issued in violation of his right to notice and hearing. Petitioner also seeks the setting aside of the
default order and the judgment rendered thereafter for the reason that should he be allowed to
prove his defense of adultery, the claim of support would be most likely denied. 11 Petitioner
claims that in an action by a child against his putative father, adultery of the child's mother
would be a valid defense to show that the child is a fruit of adulterous relations for, in such case,
it would not be the child of the defendant and therefore not entitled to support. Parenthetically,
how could he be allowed to prove the defense of adultery when it was not even hinted that he
was married to the mother of Francheska Joy. Petitioner consents to submit to Dioxyribonucleic
Acid (DNA) Testing to resolve the issue of paternity, which test he claims has a reputation for
accuracy.12
A careful review of the facts and circumstances of this case fails to persuade this Court to brand
the issuance of the writ of execution by the trial court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals with
the vice of grave abuse of discretion. There is no evidence indeed to justify the setting aside of
the writ on the ground that it was issued beyond the legitimate bounds of judicial discretion.
Section 4, Rule 39, of the Rules of Court clearly states that, unless ordered by the trial court,
judgments in actions for support are immediately executory and cannot be stayed by an appeal.
This is an exception to the general rule which provides that the taking of an appeal stays the

execution of the judgment and that advance executions will only be allowed if there are urgent
reasons therefor. The aforesaid provision peremptorily calls for immediate execution of all
judgments for support and makes no distinction between those which are the subject of an appeal
and those which are not. To consider then petitioner's argument that there should be good
reasons for the advance execution of a judgment would violate the clear and explicit language of
the rule mandating immediate execution.
Petitioner is reminded that to the plain words of a legal provision we should make no further
explanation. Absoluta sententia expositore non indiget. Indeed, the interpretation which
petitioner attempts to foist upon us would only lead to absurdity, its acceptance negating the
plain meaning of the provision subject of the petition.
Petitioner would also have us annul the writ of execution on the ground that he was not notified
of its issuance. We are unable to accept such a plea for enough has been done by petitioner to
delay the execution of the writ. As the records show, in partial fulfillment of the writ of
execution petitioner surrendered a sedan which apparently was not his as it was later ordered
released to a third party who laid claim over the levied vehicle. 13 Also, petitioner filed before the
Court of Appeals a Motion for Leave to Deposit in Court Support Pendente Litepromising to
deposit the amount due as support every 15th of the month, but to date has not deposited any
amount in complete disavowal of his undertaking. 14 He was not even deterred from appealing
before us and needlessly taking up our time and energy by posing legal questions that can be
characterized, at best, as flimsy and trivial. We are thus not prepared to abrogate the writ of
execution issued in favor of private respondent for substantial justice would be better served if
petitioner be precluded from interposing another barrier to the immediate execution of the
support judgment.
We are not intimating that in every case the right to notice of hearing can be disregarded. That is
not so. It appears in this case that there has been too much temporizing in the execution of the
writ which must not be allowed to thwart the constitutional mandate for speedy disposition of
cases. As has been said, a technicality should be an aid to justice and not its great hindrance and
chief enemy.15 Truly, if the writ of execution would be voided on this ground alone, then
procedural rules which were primarily drafted to protect parties in the realm of constitutional
guarantees would acquire a new sanctity at the expense of equity and justice.
Lastly, we note that no useful purpose would be served if we dwell on petitioner's arguments
concerning the validity of the judgment by default and his insistence that he be subjected,
together with private respondent Bernadette C. Pondevida to DNA testing to settle the issue of
paternity. The futility of his arguments is very apparent. It is not for us at this instance to review
or revise the Decision rendered by the trial court for to do so would pre-empt the decision which
may be rendered by the Court of Appeals in the main case for support.
In all cases involving a child, his interest and welfare are always the paramount concerns. There
may be instances where, in view of the poverty of the child, it would be a travesty of justice to
refuse him support until the decision of the trial court attains finality while time continues to slip
away. An excerpt from the early case of De Leon v. Soriano16 is relevant, thus:
The money and property adjudged for support and education should and must be given
presently and without delay because if it had to wait the final judgment, the children may
in the meantime have suffered because of lack of food or have missed and lost years in
school because of lack of funds. One cannot delay the payment of such funds for support
and education for the reason that if paid long afterwards, however much the accumulated
amount, its payment cannot cure the evil and repair the damage caused. The children with
such belated payment for support and education cannot act as gluttons and eat
voraciously and unwisely, afterwards, to make up for the years of hunger and starvation.
Neither may they enrol in several classes and schools and take up numerous subjects all
at once to make up for the years they missed in school, due to non-payment of the funds
when needed.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the Decision sought to be reviewed, the instant
petition is DENIED. The 31 August 2000 Decision of the Court of Appeals dismissing the
Petition for Certiorari instituted by petitioner Augustus Caezar C. Gan and upholding the validity

of the 2 June 2000 Writ of Execution issued by the Regional Trial Court Br. 61, Baguio City,
in Civil Case No. 4234-R, is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
#221
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 140817

December 7, 2001

SABRINA ARTADI BONDAGJY, petitioner,

vs.
FOUZI ALI BONDAGJY, JUDGE BENSAUDI I. ARABANI, SR., in his capacity as
presiding judge of the 3rd Shari'a District Court, Shari'a Judicial District, Zamboanga
City, respondent.
PARDO, J.:
Is a wife, a Christian who converted to Islam before her marriage to a Muslim and converted
back to Catholicism upon their separation, still bound by the moral laws of Islam in the
determination of her fitness to be the custodian of her children?
We apply civil law in the best interest of the children.
The Facts
Respondent Fouzi (then 31 years of age) and Sabrina (then 20 years of age) were married on
February 3,1988, at the Manila Hotel, Ermita, Manila under Islamic rites. 1 On October 21, 1987,
or four (4) months before her marriage, Sabrina became a Muslim by conversion. However, the
conversion was not registered with the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines.
Out of their union, they begot two (2) children, namely, Abdulaziz, born on June 13, 1989, 2 and
Amouaje, born on September 29, 1990.3 The children were born in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.
At the time of their marriage, unknown to petitioner, respondent was still married to a Saudi
Arabian woman whom he later divorced.
After their marriage, the couple moved in with respondent's family in Makati City. In 1990, the
parties migrated and settled in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia where they lived for more than two years.
Sometime in December 1995, the children lived in the house of Sabrina's mother in 145 Tanguile
Street, Ayala Alabang. Fouzi alleged that he could not see his children until he got an order from
the court. Even with a court order, he could only see his children in school at De La Salle-Zobel,
Alabang, Muntinlupa City .
On December 15, 1996, Sabrina had the children baptized as Christians4 and their names
changed from Abdulaziz Bondagjy to Azziz Santiago Artadi and from Amouaje Bondagjy to
Amouage Selina Artadi.
Respondent alleged that on various occasions Sabrina was seen with different men at odd hours
in Manila,5 and that she would wear short skirts, sleeveless blouses, and bathing suits.6 Such
clothing are detestable under Islamic law on customs.
Fouzi claimed that Sabrina let their children sweep their neighbor's house for a fee of P40.00
after the children come home from school. Whenever Fouzi sees them in school, 7 the children

would be happy to see him but they were afraid to ride in his car. Instead, they would ride the
jeepney in going home from school.
The Case
On March 11, 1996, respondent Fouzy Ali Bondagjy filed with the Shari'a District Court,
Marawi City, an actions8to obtain custody of his two minor children, Abdulaziz, 10 and
Amouaje, 9.
On June 6, 1996, petitioner filed her answer with motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction over the persons of the parties since both parties were residents of Manila and for
lack of cause of action. Petitioner likewise moved to transfer the venue to Zamboanga, which
was more accessible by plane.
On June 18, 1996, the Shari'a District Court granted petitioner's motion to transfer the venue to
Zamboanga.9
On June 27, 1996, respondent filed a reply10 and motion for a temporary restraining order against
petitioner.11He moved that petitioner desist from preventing him from exercising parental
authority over his minor children.
On July 12, 1996, the court granted the motion and issued a writ of preliminary injunction. 12
On August 12, 1996, the court ordered the parties to submit their memoranda on the issue of
jurisdiction.
On October 30, 1996, the court granted petitioner's motion to withdraw motion to dismiss on the
issue of jurisdiction and set the proceedings for pre-trial conference on November 14, 1996.
On November 14, 1996, respondent filed a motion to drop Joyce Artadi as defendant in the case
and the trial court issued an order:
"During the pre-trial conference held this morning, the parties made their respective offer
and counter proposals for amicable settlement. The plaintiff proposed (1) solidarity of the
family, and (2) alternate custody. The defendant advanced the proposal of reasonable
visitation of the father at their residence, for which the court will possibly fix the period
or time and schedule of visitations.
"With these proposals, both parties agreed to continue the pre-trial conference on
December 9, 1996.
"WHEREFORE, let the pre-trial conference be again held on December 9, 1996, at 9:00
o'clock in the morning."13
Meantime, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 256, Muntinlupa City14 an
action for nullity of marriage, custody and support, ordered the parties to maintain status
quo until further orders from said court.15
On March 2, 1999, petitioner filed another motion to dismiss16 on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case since P.D. No. 1083 is applicable only to
Muslims. On March 3, 1999, Fouzi filed an opposition to the motion to dismiss and argued that
at the inception of the case, both parties were Muslims, Fouzi by birth and Sabrina by
conversion.
On March 29, 1999, the court denied the motion to dismiss since P.D. No. 1083 had jurisdiction
over all cases of Muslims involving custody.17
On April 23, 1999, Sabrina filed a motion to reconsider the order of March 29, 1999 denying the
motion to dismiss.18
On June 22, 1999, the court denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration. Thus-

"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing reasons, the motion for reconsideration of the
defendant-movant is hereby ordered DENIED; Defendant is further ordered to comply
with the order of this Court dated July 12, 1996, to allow plaintiff to exercise his right of
parental authority over their minor children with that of the defendant in accordance with
article 71, of P.D. 1083, the Code of Muslim Personal Laws.
"Let the continuation of this case be set on July 15, 1999 at 8:30 in the morning." 19
On July 15, 1999, the trial court decided to move forward to the next stage of the case and
allowed respondent Fouzi to present evidence ex-parte.
On August 18, 1999, the court issued an Order20 giving respondent fifteen (15) days to submit
his formal offer of evidence and fifteen (15) days from receipt of transcript of stenographic notes
to submit memorandum.
The Shari'a District Court's Decision
On November 16, 1999, the Shari'a Court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
"WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, judgment is hereby rendered:
(a) Awarding the custody of the minors Abdulaziz Artadi Bondagjy and Amouaje Artadi
Bondagjy in favor of their natural father, petitioner Fouzi Ali Bondagjy; and for this
purpose ordering the respondent Sabrina Artadi Bodagjy or any person having the care of
said minors in her stead or behalf, to turn over, relinguish and surrender the custody of
said minors to their natural father, the petitioner in this case Fouzi Ali Bondagjy;
(b) Ordering the petitioner Fouzi Ali Bondagjy to ensure that the said minors are
provided with reasonable support according to his means and in keeping with the
standard of his family, and, a suitable home conducive to their physical,
(c) mental and moral development; and, with his knowledge and under reasonable
circumstances allow the respondent and natural mother of the said minors Mrs. Sabrina
Artadi Bondagjy to visit her minor children Abdulaziz Artadi Bondagjy and Amouje
Artadi Bondagjy."21
Hence, this petition.22
The Court's Ruling
The Shari'a District Court held that P.D. No. 1083 on Custody and Guardianship does not apply
to this case because the spouses were not yet divorced.
However, the Shari' a District Court found petitioner unworthy to care for her children. Thus "A married woman, and a mother to growing children, should live a life that the
community in which she lives considers morally upright, and in a manner that her
growing minor children will not be socially and morally affected and prejudiced. It is sad
to note that respondent has failed to observe that which is expected of a married woman
and a mother by the society in which she lives. xxx The evidence of this case shows the
extent of the moral depravity of the respondent, and the kind of concern for the welfare of
her minor children which on the basis thereof this Court finds respondent unfit with the
custody of her minor children.
"xxx Under the general principles of Muslim law, the Muslim mother may be legally
disentitled to the custody of her minor children by reason of 'wickedness' when such
wickedness is injurious to the mind of the child, such as when she engages in 'zina' (illicit
sexual relation); or when she is unworthy as a mother; and, a woman is not worthy to be
trusted with the custody of the child who is continually going out and leaving the child
hungry .(A. Baillie, Muhammadan Law, p. 435; citing Dar-ul-Muktar, p. 280)."23

On the other hand, the Shari'a Court found that respondent Fouzi was capable both personally
and financially to look after the best interest of his minor children.24
"When he was asked during the direct examination the question that, 'if ever this
Honorable Court will grant you custody of your children will you be able to house and
give support to your children?' He answered, "Of course, even up to now I am giving
support to my children; And my comment is that the father should give everything the
needs of the family and now whatever the children needs even in school, considering the
past, I have to love them, I have to care for my children. In school, even when they see
something they love and like, I buy it for them. Or sometime (sic) I send my staff and
bring something for them in their house. It is very hard, in school in front of other parents
my son would still climb on my shoulder. I want to see them happy. I have pictures of my
children with me, taken only last week."25
As a rule, factual findings of the lower courts are final and binding upon the parties. 26 The Court
is not expected or required to examine or contrast the oral and documentary evidence submitted
by the parties.27 However, although this Court is not a trier of facts, it has the authority to review
or reverse the factual findings of the lower courts if we find that these do not conform to the
evidence on record.28
In Reyes vs. Court of Appeals,29 the Court held that the exceptions to the rule that factual
findings of the trial court are final and. conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal are the
following: (1) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (2) when
there is a grave abuse of discretion; (3) when the finding is grounded entirely on speculations,
surmises or conjectures; (4) when the judgment of the Court of Appeals is based on
misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; ( 6) when the Court of
Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to
the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are
contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation
of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the Court of Appeals manifestly
overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered,
would justify a different conclusion, and (10) when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals
are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on
record.1wphi1.nt
Fitness as a Mother
The burden is upon respondent to prove that petitioner is not worthy to have custody of her
children. We find that the evidence presented by the respondent was not sufficient to establish
her unfitness according to Muslim law or the Family Code.
In Pilipinas Shell Corp. vs. Court of Appeals (April 20, 2001, G. R. No. 114923), we said that in
the hierarchy of evidentiary values, proof beyond reasonable doubt is at the highest level,
followed by clear and convincing evidence, preponderance of evidence and substantial evidence,
in that order.30
The standard in the determination of sufficiency of proof, however, is not restricted to Muslim
laws. The Family Code shall be taken into consideration in deciding whether a non-Muslim
woman is incompetent. What determines her capacity is the standard laid down by the Family
Code now that she is not a Muslim.
Indeed, what determines the fitness of any parent is the ability to see to the physical, educational,
social and moral welfare of the children, 31 and the ability to give them a healthy environment as
well as physical and financial support taking into consideration the respective resources and
social and moral situations of the parents.
The record shows that petitioner is equally financially capable of providing for all the needs of
her children. The children went to school at De La Salle Zobel School, Muntinlupa City with
their tuition paid by petitioner according to the school's certification. 32
Parental Authority and Custody

The welfare of the minors is the controlling consideration on the issue. 33

In ascertaining the welfare and best interest of the children, courts are mandated by the Family
Code to take into account all relevant considerations. 34
Article 211 of the Family Code provides that the father and mother shall jointly exercise parental
authority over the persons of their common children"
Similarly, P. D. No. 1083 is clear that where the parents are not divorced or legally separated, the
father and mother shall jointly exercise just and reasonable parental authority and fulfill their
responsibility over their legitimate children.
In Sagala-Eslao v. Court of Appeals,35 we stated:
"xxx [Parental authority] is a mass of rights and obligations which the law grants to
parents for the purpose of the children's physical preservation and development, as well
as the cultivation of their intellect and the education of their heart and senses. 36 As
regards parental authority, 'there is no power, but a task; no complex of rights, but a sum
of duties; no sovereignty but a sacred trust for the welfare of the minor. 37
"xxx
"The father and mother, being the natural guardians of unemancipated children, are
dutybound and entitled to keep them in their custody and company. 38
We do not doubt the capacity and love of both parties for their children, such that they both want
to have them in their custody.
Either parent may lose parental authority over the child only for a valid reason. In cases where
both parties cannot have custody because of their voluntary separation, we take into
consideration the circumstances that would lead us to believe which parent can better take care
of the children. Although we see the need for the children to have both a mother and a father, we
believe that petitioner has more capacity and time to see to the children's needs. Respondent is a
businessman whose work requires that he go abroad or be in different places most of the time.
Under P.D. No. 603, the custody of the minor children, absent a compelling reason to the
contrary, is given to the mother. 39
However, the award of custody to the wife does not deprive" the husband of parental authority.
In the case ofSilva v. Court of Appeals,40 we said that:
"Parents have the natural right, as well as the moral and legal duty, to care for their
children, see to their upbringing and safeguard their best interest and welfare. This
authority and responsibility may not be unduly denied the parents; neither may it be
renounced by them. Even when the parents are estranged and their affection for each
other is lost, the attachment and feeling for their offsprings invariably remain unchanged.
Neither the law nor the courts allow this affinity to suffer absent, of course, any real,
grave and imminent threat to the well-being of the child."
Thus, we grant visitorial rights to respondent as his Constitutionally protected natural and
primary right.41
The Fallo
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision in Spl. Proc. No. 13-96 is
hereby SET ASIDE. Petitioner SABRINA ARTADI BONDAGJY shall have custody over
minors Abdulaziz, and Amouaje Bondagjy, until the children reach majority age. Both spouses
shall have joint responsibility over all expenses of rearing the children.
The father, FOUZI ALl BONDAGJY, shall have visitorial rights at least once a week and may
take the children out only with the written consent of the mother.
No costs. 1wphi1.nt

SO ORDERED.