How far do you think political reforms in China since 1978 have strengthened the CCP's position

in China today?
Due to the multiple challenges that have severely affected CCP's legitimacy to govern since the opening
up of China in 1978, CCP has been transforming itself through political reforms to strengthen its
position. While there are still many who are discontented with the political reforms as many socio
political problems continue to exist, CCP today has been largely successful at keeping itself entrenched
in power. Hence, this essay seeks to argue that political reforms have strengthened CCP's position
greatly because socio-political problems, while they exist, have not been severe to the extent that they
are able to threaten the political stability of the regime. As long as political reforms continue to keep the
degree of severity of these challenges in check, CCP's privileged position would be secured.
Ideological modification by the party leaders has preempted theoretical challenges to the
inconsistencies of its market reforms. The adoption of new Party Statutes and State Constitution with
modification to the state ideology such as Deng's socialism with Chinese characteristics, Hu's
harmonious society, the scientific concept of development and the revival of Confucianism has placed a
greater emphasis on the task of economic development while the downplaying of the role of
"international class struggle" as the latter becomes increasingly out of touch with the socio-economic
needs of the country. State-directed economic development and high-growth rate which is formed on
the basis of political stability thus safeguard CCP's rule as a centralized and strong party.
Political irrelevance of the CCP in a modern economic setting is reconciled by the party's structural
and membership reforms. The concept of "Three Represents" reorients and repositions CCP as not
just the vanguard of the workers and peasants, but the defender of the fundamental interests of
the large majority of the Chinese people. This justifies the reduction in the peasants' and workers'
share of the party membership, the heavy representation of technocrats in key party and state
positions and even the inclusion of private entrepreneurs in party membership. Whereas the
ability to shift between changing political lines and personal loyalty to the top leader is imperative
for career advancement during Mao's era, with Deng Xiao Ping's four-way transformation which
advocates for younger, more educated, more technically specialized and revolutionary party
members, the new criterion of meritocracy determines that only the most competent and relevant
candidates are given important positions. Promotional criteria are based on the administrative skill,
technical knowledge, educational background, and Party loyalty. The change in composition of CCP
membership means that the party has adapted to the new socio-economic needs of the country,
thereby keeping it relevant.
CCP has embarked on the process of institutionalization to resolve challenges stemmed from
corruption and power abuse by its officials. Every CCP leader is limited to a fixed leadership term of
ten years and after that, the entire generation of leaders would have to step down to be taken
over by a new generation of leaders. Retired elders are not to interfere in subsequent succession
decisions. CCP has also professionalized the PLA by increasing the military budget to make it more
technically competent and less politicized so as to curb corruption. The PLA is separated from the
party and the party is separated from the state. In this way, the National People's Congress has
been allowed progressively more autonomy and is taking a more proactive role in opining their views
on government policies.
Meanwhile CCP has hoped to appease the demands of a more vocal and critical populace with reforms
towards greater democratization and populism. By improving its relations with the people and by
enhancing the image of the party as a people-friendly government, CCP seeks to strengthen its political
support base. As such, Hu Jing Tao and Wen Jia Bao have created their own fan page and have arrived
at

the aftermath of major natural disasters like the 2008 Sichuan Earthquake to portray their people-caring
image. Open debate on national policies and meet-the-people sessions by local officials are also
organized. The establishment of institutions for political participation appeals to the public and
strengthens CCP's legitimacy. Village elections are held at local level and more autonomy have been
granted in setting policies. The Administrative Procedure Law authorizes private law suits against
administrative organs on the grounds of infringement of their rights. Even though the media are still
owned by CCP, they have become more commercialized, more market-driven and less politicized. The
introduction of village committees and village assemblies enforces greater responsibility on local CCP
bosses to develop the rural areas. Village CCP party secretaries have to share power with the village
committees. The impact of diversification of political power in the rural areas remains to be seen as the
local CCP leaders still hold onto leadership. Important decisions are made based on collective
leadership.
Despite institutional reforms, structural challenges to the party's rule such as corruption and the lack
of rule of law remained virulent. Most government efforts to curb corruption have been sabotaged
by inconsistent policy implementation and the absence of a credible auditory body. Misuse of public
funds amounts to tens of billions per year, and is common even in municipalities like Shang Hai and
Beijing where enforcement is supposed to be the strictest. Not only has the push for Chinese officials
to declare assets been faced with resistance, even if pushed through, impact will be little because
officials can simply park their assets under the names of their family members or trusted friends. For
checks to be effective, declaration of income and assets such as property has to be extended to all
citizens, yet China lacks a nationwide system for assets declaration because personal income
tax is patchy and coordination among provincial governments is poor. The odds of corrupt officials
going to jail are so low that many have seen it as a high-return low-risk activity. Members of the
public want to join the party only because of the privileges it confers, such as better information,
schooling and job opportunity, not because they genuinely want to serve the people. Businessmen
who have established close links with the government and the party get to access state bank loans
and tap into the network of officials who control the land and government contracts. The result of all
these is the formation of a society with structured inequality and widening income gap between the
rich and the poor, the privileged and the unprivileged, leaving workers, peasants and the average
Chinese without a sense of social solidarity. Coupled with state-controlled media and heavy
censorship, the lack of transparency and accountability only perpetuates these problems.
CCP's half-hearted shift towards a more democratized and consultative form of governance has failed to
pacify an increasingly demanding populace. Even though there are 150 members in the Standing
Committee of National People's Congress, the real power in decision-making has always been
concentrated almost fully in the hands of the Central Politburo of the CCP. In 2008, the number of
ministries and top state agencies was slashed by a quarter through mergers and redistribution of
responsibilities to other industries, making power once again centralized. Major overhaul of the party's
role is resisted and cadres baulked at the idea of curtailment of their power. The Four Basic Principles
enshrined in the state constitution ensure that CCP will always remain as the only political power in
China, opening up a gateway for the abuse of power, and room for corruption. Even though there are
offices for citizen complaints in Party and government agencies such as the letters-and-visits
department, group-based inputs are frowned upon by CCP as it is seen as a challenge to the state, thus
showing that administrative reforms are only meant to serve the pragmatic purposes of enhancing the
party's legitimacy to govern and to streamline the Chinese bureaucracy for the new economy. Only
complaints against specific local-level agencies of official are focused on. Aggression against the party is

generally diffused. Ultimately, the party still values political stability and is determined to perpetuate
its authoritarian regime.
Unpopular practices of the CCP like censorship and detention without trial must be revised as the
people have become more vocal at asserting their own rights. Up till today, the party still oversees
many aspects of the people's life-what they learn at school, what they watch on TV, their jobs,
housing and even the number of children they are allowed to have. The party is also obsessive
about control, regularly displaying itself capable of great brutality in suppressing dissent or any
challenge to its authority. Together with the influx of modern and foreign ideas such as freedom of
expression and human rights, the better-informed populace has become more vocal and critical of
the government.
In conclusion, political reforms have been largely successful at strengthening CCP's position
because it has allowed CCP to continue to be a strong and centralized monolithic party even though
it has already deviated away from communism. While there are still people who are dissatisfied
with the political reforms, unhappiness are directed at the problems political reforms have failed to
resolve, not the party per se. Therefore, to a large extent, Iagree that political reforms have
strengthened CCP's position.