Chinas economic development could not have succeeded without political

reforms. Discuss.
After Chinas opening up in 1978, a new model of mixed economy that was
unprecedented in the world emerged. China proved to the world that capitalism
was able to exist without democratization whereas previously it was thought that
the two had to work hand in hand. Nevertheless, as the socio-economic condition
in China changed, gradually, democratization was carried out to some degree to
aid Chinas economic development. While political reforms were not the direct
cause of Chinas economic prosperity, it was instrumental in allowing reforms to
be continually carried out and hence give rise to prosperity. Hence, this essay
seeks to argue that Chinas economic development largely could not have
succeeded without political reforms as they were rudimentary in sustaining the
party rule and hence economic stability and growth.
As part of political reforms, ideological modifications by the party leaders were
necessary in preempting theoretical challenges to the inconsistencies of its
market reforms such that reforms could be accepted and the market could grow.
The adoption of new Party Statutes and State Constitution with modification to
the state ideology such as Deng's socialism with Chinese characteristics, Hu's
harmonious society, the scientific concept of development and the revival of
Confucianism were instrumental in shifting emphasis on to the task of economic
development from the role of "international class struggle" which was becoming
increasingly out of touch with the socio-economic needs of the country. Marketdriven economic development which was formed on the pretext of ideological
modification then permitted the economy to grow.
Still, ideological reforms, which foremost premise on the intention of sustaining
CCPs legitimacy, are of limited relevance to economic development. Ideological
reforms, however way it is tweak, never deviates from its emphasis on socialist
dictatorship which sole purpose is only to ensure that there is only one party as
the governing authority in China. More than assisting economic development, it
is to confer CCP with the rights to outlaw the existence of other political parties
and validates the omission of elections or democratic practices. Despite the
authoritative image that it helps to perpetuate by strengthening the ideological
grounding of CCP theological mandate which is not good for business, political
reforms are used to strengthen CCPs legitimacy at the expense of the economy.
Hence, political reforms may be of limited importance to economic development
of China as it is political in nature.
Structural and membership reforms, which were some form of political reforms,
were also necessary in reconciling political irrelevance of the CCP such that CCPs
legitimacy could be safeguarded and provide China with a strong and dominant
leadership in guiding economic growth. The concept of "Three Represents"
reorients and repositions CCP as not just the vanguard of the workers and
peasants, but the defender of the fundamental interests of the large majority of
the Chinese people such that technocrats and even private entrepreneur can
hold key position in the party membership. As opposed to the peasant-based
membership where most members did not have a clear idea how to restructure
the economy and bring prosperity to China, membership reforms show how
political reforms are closely linked to Chinas economic prosperity.
Nevertheless, even though structural and membership reforms provided China
with a strong and dominant leadership in guiding economic growth, forces of the

global economy still had to respond to the changes initiated by the government
before wealth could be raked in. Even with the establishment of SEZ and
subsequent development zones with preferential treatment for the numerous
existing foreign and Sino-foreign joint ventures that were mainly manned by local
officials, it was the prerogative of foreign companies to decide whether or not
they want to invest in China and the annual growth rate of around 8% only came
in the context of FDI and not government initiatives per se. Since 1978, wealth
generated by the FDI coastal regions received constituted more than half of the
nations GDP. Hence, rather than to political reforms which merely indirectly
supported the strong and dominant government leadership in economic reforms,
success was owned to overseas ventures that leveraged on Chinas open door
policy.
The process of institutionalization was also essential to resolve challenges to
economic development. For instance, to prevent abuse of power by officials to
accumulate their personal wealth, every CCP leader is limited to a fixed
leadership term of ten years and after that, the entire generation of leaders
would have to step down to be taken over by a new generation of leaders.
Retired elders are not to interfere in subsequent succession decisions so that
they would not be able to sway political decision in a way that favors them
economically. By professionalizing the PLA through increasing the military budget
so as to make it more technically competent and less politicized, corruption
cases where PLA officials engage in business are also minimized. The PLA is
separated from the party and the party is separated from the state. In this way,
the National People's Congress has been allowed progressively more autonomy
and is taking a more proactive role in opining their views on government policies,
serving as a check to how fiscal budget is spent. In this way, political reforms,
once again is tangibly related to economic development is it pick out elements
that may be a challenge to government organizations.
Nevertheless, even with institutional reforms, certain challenges to economic
development remained virulent. Most government efforts to curb corruption have
been sabotaged by inconsistent policy implementation and the absence of a
credible auditory body. Misuse of public fund amounts to tens of billions per year,
and is common even in municipalities like Shang Hai and Beijing where
enforcement is supposed to be the strictest. Not only has the push for Chinese
officials to declare assets been faced with resistance, even if pushed through,
impact will be little because officials can simply park their assets under the
names of their family members or trusted friends. For checks to be effective,
declaration of income and assets such as property has to be extended to all
citizens, yet China lacks a nationwide system for assets declaration because
personal income tax is patchy and coordination among provincial governments is
poor. The odds of corrupt officials going to jail are so low that many have seen it
as a high-return low-risk activity. Coupled with state-controlled media and heavy
censorship, the lack of transparency and accountability only perpetuates these
problems. As such, political reforms are of limited significance to economic
success.
In conclusion, political reforms were not the direct cause of Chinas economic
prosperity. However, it was instrumental in allowing reforms to be continually
carried out and hence give rise to prosperity. Therefore, Chinas economic
development largely could not have succeeded without political reforms as they
were rudimentary in sustaining the party rule and hence economic stability and
growth.