Property

Respondent, therefore, must be declared to be the rightful owner of the property.

G.R. No. 151369

March 23, 2011

ANITA MONASTERIO-PE and the SPOUSES ROMULO TAN and EDITHA PE-TAN, Petitioners,
vs.
JOSE JUAN TONG, herein represented by his Attorney-in-Fact, JOSE Y. ONG, Respondent.

JOSE JUAN TONG is the registered owner of two parcels of land known as Lot Nos. 40 and 41 and covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. T-9699 and T-9161, together with the improvements thereon, located
at Barangay Kauswagan, City Proper, Iloilo City; herein petitioners are occupying the house standing on the said
parcels of land without any contract of lease nor are they paying any kind of rental and that their occupation thereof
is simply by mere tolerance of Tong; that in a letter dated December 1, 1999, Tong demanded that respondents
vacate the house they are occupying, but despite their receipt of the said letter they failed and refused to vacate the
same; Tong referred his complaint to the Lupon of Barangay Kauswagan, to no avail.3
In their Answer with Defenses and Counterclaim, herein petitioners alleged that Tong is not the real owner of the
disputed property, but is only a dummy of a certain alien named Ong Se Fu, who is not qualified to own the said lot
and, as such, Tong's ownership is null and void; petitioners are the true and lawful owners of the property in
question and by reason thereof they need not lease nor pay rentals to anybody; a case docketed as CA-G.R. CV No.
52676 (RTC Civil Case No. 20181) involving herein petitioner Pe and respondent is pending before the Court of
Appeals (CA) where the ownership of the subject property is being litigated; respondent should wait for the
resolution of the said action instead of filing the ejectment case; petitioners also claimed that there was, in fact, no
proper barangay conciliation as Tong was bent on filing the ejectment case before conciliation proceedings could be
validly made.4
MTCC rendered judgment in favor of herein respondent
[G.R. No. 143173. March 28, 2001]
SPS. PEDRO ONG AND VERONICA ONG, petitioners, vs. SOCORRO PAREL AND HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
DECISION
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
The instant petition for review on certiorari seeks the annulment of the decision of the respondent Court of
Appeals[1] dated December 14, 1999 affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court which reversed and set aside
the judgment of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch 15, for forcible entry, as well as the resolution dated
May 4, 2000 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.[2]
Spouses Pedro and Veronica Ong are the registered owners of Lot No.18, Block 2 of the subdivision plan II of
Rizal Park subdivision, situated in Sta Cruz, Manila covered by TCT No. 218597, having purchased the property
from the spouses Emilio Magbag and Norma B. Pascual in 1994. Adjacent to Lot No. 18 is Lot No.17 consisting of
about 109 sq. meters covered by TCT No. 125063 registered under the name of Visitacion Beltran, grandmother of
respondent Socorro Parel.
On May 25, 1995, the Ong spouses filed an action for forcible entry against defendant Parel before the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch 15, docketed as Civil Case No. 148332, alleging among other things that

defendant Parel through strategy and stealth constructed an overhang and hollow block wall along the common
boundary of the parties adjoining lot, i.e., beyond Lot No. 17 owned by Parel and inside Lot No.18 owned by
plaintiffs spouses Ong, thereby illegally depriving plaintiffs of possession of the said portion of their lot; that
plaintiffs discovered respondents illegal possession of their lot on August 23, 1994 when they had the boundaries of
their lot resurveyed; that plaintiffs made various demands from the defendants to remove the constructions they
introduced in the said lot of the plaintiffs and vacate the same, the last of which demands having been made on
December 19, 1994.
Defendant Parel denied the material allegations of the complaint and alleged that the overhang and hollow
block wall had already been in existence since 1956 and that these structures are within the boundary of lot 17
owned by him.
The parties moved for an ocular inspection of the subject lot which was granted by the trial court. The trial
court designated the Branch Clerk of Court as Commissioner while defendant Parel employed the services of
Geodetic Engr. Mariano V. Flotildes who made the relocation survey on November 28, 1995 in the presence of both
parties. Thereafter, the Commissioner reported that defendants wall protrudes 1 meters into plaintiffs property and a
window sill overhangs by about meter deep into plaintiffs premises and the eaves of the main residential building
extends into the plaintiffs premises. The Geodetic Engineers Report, confirmed that the house of the defendant
encroached plaintiffs property by an area of 2.7 sq. m., and the adobe and hollow block wall by an area of 1.59 sq.
m., respectively, resulting to a total encroachment of 4.29 sq. m., more or less into the plaintiffs property.
On April 12, 1996, the Metropolitan Trial Court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs spouses Ong; the
dispositive portion reads:[3]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs and against the defendants
ordering: (a) the defendants and all persons claiming rights under her to remove the overhang constructions
measuring 2.70 sq. m. and the adobe block wall measuring 1.59 sq.m. respectively on lot 18 of the plaintiffs and to
peacefully surrender its possession to the plaintiffs; (b) ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiffs the sum of Ten
Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) as and by way of attorneys fees; plus the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Respondent Parel filed an appeal with the Regional Trial Court, docketed as Civil Case No. 96-78666. On
October 3, 1996, the regional trial court[4] dismissed the case for failure of the Ong spouses to prove prior physical
possession of the subject lot, the dispositive portion reads: [5]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. This case
is hereby DISMISSED, without prejudice to the filing of the appropriate actions, without costs.
SO ORDERED.
Spouses Ong moved for a reconsideration which was also denied in a resolution dated August 1, 1997.[6]
Aggrieved by the above decision, petitioners spouses Ong elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals by way
of a petition for review. The respondent Court of Appeals in a decision dated December 14, 1999 denied the
petition. The appellate court adopted the lower courts findings that the alleged encroachments were made by the late
Visitacion Beltran at a time when she still owned both lots or when she had all the right and the power to introduce
the improvements; thus the introduction of the said construction could not be equated with strategy and stealth
giving rise to forcible entry. It added that what is involved in a forcible entry case is merely the issue of material
possession or possession de facto which the petitioner miserably proved in their favor. It further pointed out that it
was admitted by the petitioners in their petition that this case involves a boundary dispute and not lot 18 in its
entirety, and the encroachment was discovered only upon a relocation survey of the property; such controversy could
not be threshed out in an ejectment suit in view of the summary nature of the action, and the MTC, accordingly, is

without jurisdiction to entertain the same. Petitioners moved for a reconsideration which was also denied in a
resolution dated May 4, 2000. Hence, this petition.
Petitioners assign the following issues for consideration:[7]
1. WHETHER OR NOT GAINING ENTRY WITHOUT THE KNOWLEDGE OR CONSENT OF THE OWNER
OR REMAINING RESIDENT OF ANOTHER WITHOUT PERMISSION IS DISPOSSESSION BY STEALTH;
2. WHETHER OR NOT ENTRY SECURED BY STRATEGY OR STEALTH BECOMES UNLAWFUL AND DE
FACTO POSSESSION COMMENCES ONLY UPON DEMAND;
3. WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS A DISTINCTION BETWEEN FORCIBLE ENTRY BY MEANS OF
STEALTH AND FORCIBLE ENTRY BY MEANS OF FORCE, INTIMIDATION OR THREAT;
4. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER CAN INVOKE SUPREME COURT RULINGS IN UNLAWFUL
DETAINER CASES;
5. WHETHER OR NOT THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT IS THE AUTHORIZED PARTY IN THE CASE OF COOWNERSHIP AS OBTAINED IN THIS CASE;
6. WHETHER OR NOT THE CHARACTER OF THE POSSESSION ACQUIRED IN BAD FAITH WAS
INHERITED BY THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT AND DID NOT CHANGE;
7. WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION OF THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS IS BASED ON
SPECULATION SURMISE OR CONJECTURE OR MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS.
Petitioners essentially allege that the act of entering and trespassing upon a parcel of land, or of constructing
improvements upon a parcel of land without the knowledge or permission of the person who owns or administers it
is an act of dispossession and usurpation of real property by means of strategy or stealth; that private respondent is a
usurper or encroacher who constructed a portion of her house and adobe and hollow block wall on the land of the
petitioners with no bona fide claim and without the consent of the owner.
The petition has no merit.
Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court requires that in actions for forcible entry the plaintiff is allegedly
deprived of the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth and that the
action is filed any time within one year from the time of such unlawful deprivation of possession. This requirement
implies that in such cases, the possession of the land by the defendant is unlawful from the beginning as he acquires
possession thereof by unlawful means. The plaintiff must allege and prove that he was in prior physical possession
of the property in litigation until he was deprived thereof by the defendant. The one year period within which to
bring an action for forcible entry is generally counted from the date of actual entry on the land, [8] except that when
entry was made through stealth, the one year period is counted from the time the plaintiff learned thereof. [9] If the
alleged dispossession did not occur by any of the means stated in section 1, Rule 70, the proper recourse is to file a
plenary action to recover possession with the regional trial court.[10]
In their complaint, petitioners Ong spouses aver that through stealth and strategy respondent constructed the
controversial overhang and hollow block wall along the common boundary of the parties adjoining lots
which encroached on petitioners Lot No. 18. Stealth is defined as any secret, sly, or clandestine act to avoid
discovery and to gain entrance into or remain within residence of another without permission. [11] However,
petitioners failed to establish that respondents encroached upon their property through stealth as it was not shown
when and how the alleged entry was made on the portion of their lot.

On the other hand, respondents claim that the said structures were already existing on the lot at the time
petitioners brought the same from the Magbag spouses in 1994, was sustained by the lower court since petitioners
admitted in their petition that they discovered such encroachment only after a relocation survey on their lot on
August 23, 1994. We find no reason to disturb the respondent courts factual conclusion that the alleged
encroachments were made by the late Visitacion Beltran at a time when she still owned both lots nos. 17 and 18 or
when she had all the right and power to do so. Private respondent in her affidavit submitted before the court had
affirmed that her grandmother, Visitacion Beltran, was the registered owner of the parcel of land covered by TCT
No. 125163 (Lot No. 17) with improvements which include the window sill overhang and the old adobe wall which
were constructed as early as 1956 and these improvements are adjacent to the private alley from Elias Street which
has to be opened and maintained as long as there exists building thereon; that the maintenance of such alley was
made as an encumbrance in petitioners title (TCT No. 218597) when they bought the adjacent Lot no. 18. Petitioners
failed to present evidence to the contrary.
It becomes clear that this is not a proper case for forcible entry wherein one party unlawfully deprives another
of possession of the property subject of the litigation; it is a boundary dispute wherein the adobe wall, overhang and
window grill on the respondents side of the property encroach a total of 4.29 meters, more or less, upon the
petitioners side of the property. We affirm with approval of the observations of the Regional Trial Court, in this
wise:
Let it be emphasized that the matter subject of the present action is that portion only of Lot No. 18 allegedly
encroached by the defendant-appellant and not Lot 18 in its entirety.
While there was a finding of encroachment on Lot No. 18 as per the Commissioners Report and Engineers Report
dated December 27, 1995 and December 29, 1995, respectively, plaintiff-appellees failed to recount the
circumstances as to how and when defendant-appellant allegedly forcibly entered Lot No. 18.Neither was there any
evidence ever proffered by them to prove that defendant-appellant made or at least ordered the introduction of the
said improvements or construction. According to them, the Magbag spouses gave them the right to administer,
occupy and to have physical possession in the concept of an owner, Lot No. 18 on June 17, 1994 until the title to the
said lot was transferred to their names on October 28, 1994 and they have just discovered the encroachment on Lot
No. 18 only on August 23, 1994 when they had the boundaries of Lots Nos. 17 and 18 resurveyed. Defendantappellant, on the other hand, averred that the questioned improvements and constructions encroaching on Lot No. 18
were already there since 1956, and this averment was not controverted by the plaintiff-appellees at all. Thus, the
truth is that, when defendant-appellant acquired Lot No. 18, the adobe wall, overhang and window grill were already
there encroaching on Lot No. 18 as it was the late Salvacion (sic)[12] Beltran who built the same. In fact, even up to
the present, defendant-appellant is still in possession of the herein questioned premises which means that plaintiffappellees were never in possession of the same. The latter, therefore, cannot be said to be in prior physical
possession. The demand made on the defendant-appellant is here of no moment as it is a well-entrenched
jurisprudence that demand to vacate is not necessary in forcible entry cases (Menez vs. Militante, 41 Phil. 44).
Consequently, for failure of the plaintiff-appellees to circumstantiate prior physical possession on the herein subject
premises and the fact of entry on the same by the defendant-appellant by force, intimidation, violence or stealth, the
present action for forcible entry must exigently fail. Moreover, this Court notes that at the time the improvements
were made, the late Salvacion (sic) Beltran was still the registered owner of both Lots Nos. 17 and 18. Thus while it
may be true that defendant-appellant is now the administrator of Lot No. 17, defendant-appellant cannot be made to
answer for the encroachments on Lot No. 18 for the same were done by the late Salvacion (sic) Beltran who had all
the right and power to introduce the improvements as she was then the registered owner of both Lots Nos. 17 and 18
at the time the same were made. While plaintiff-appellees can recover possession of the herein questioned premises,
they cannot do so in the guise of an action for forcible entry. For where the complaint fails to specifically aver facts
constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as where it does not state how entry was effected or how and
when dispossession started, the action should either be ACCION PUBLICIANA or ACCION
REINVINDICATORIA for which the lower court has no jurisdiction (See Sarona, et al. vs. Villegas, et al., March
27, 1968, Banayos vs. Susana Realty, Inc. L-30336, June 30, 1976).

In view of the failure of the petitioners to allege, much less prove, with specificity that the respondents
unlawfully entered their portion of the lot either by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth this action for
forcible entry must necessarily fall. We declared in the case of Sarmiento vs. Court of Appeals:[13]
The jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the complaint. When the complaint fails to aver facts constitutive
of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as where it does not state how entry was effected or how and when
dispossession started, as in the case at bar, the remedy should either be an accion publicianaor an accion
reivindicatoria in the proper regional trial court.
If private respondent is indeed the owner of the premises subject of this suit and she was unlawfully deprived of the
real right of possession or the ownership thereof, she should present her claim before the regional trial court in
an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria, and not before the municipal trial court in a summary proceeding
of unlawful detainer or forcible entry. For even if one is the owner of the property, the possession thereof cannot be
wrested from another who had been in the physical or material possession of the same for more than one year by
resorting to a summary action for ejectment. This is especially true where his possession thereof was not obtained
through the means or held under the circumstances contemplated by the rules on summary ejectment.
We have held that in giving recognition to the action for forcible entry and unlawful detainer, the purpose of the law
is to protect the person who in fact has actual possession, and in case of a controverted proprietary right, the law
requires the parties to preserve the status quo until one or the other sees fit to invoke the decision of a court of
competent jurisdiction upon the question of ownership."
Petitioners contention that although they denominated their complaint as one for forcible entry based on the
ground of stealth, the allegations in the body of the complaint sufficiently established a cause of action for unlawful
detainer, does not persuade us. In unlawful detainer, one unlawfully withholds possession thereof after the expiration
or termination of his right to hold possession under any contract, express or implied. In the instant case, the
complaint does not allege that the possession of respondent ever changed from illegal to legal anytime from their
alleged illegal entry before plaintiffs made the demand to vacate.There was no averment in the complaint which
recites as a fact any overt act on the part of the petitioners which showed that they permitted or tolerated respondent
to occupy a portion of their property.
After a finding that the petitioners failed to make a case for ejectment, we find it unnecessary to dwell on the
other assignments of error.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed decision of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Panganiban, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.

AYALA INC VS. RAY BURTON CORP

GR No. 163075
January 23, 2006

FACTS: On December 22, 1995, Ayala Inc. and Ray Burton Corp. entered into a contract denominated as a
Contract to Sell, with a Side Agreement of even date. In these contracts, petitioner agreed to sell to respondent a
parcel of land situated at Muntinlupa City. The purchase price of the land is payable as follows:
On contract date: 26%, inclusive of option money
Not later than 1-6-96: 4%
In consecutive quarterly installments for a period of 5 years: 70%
Respondent paid thirty (30%) down payment and the quarterly amortization. However in 1998, respondent notified
petitioner in writing that it will no longer continue to pay due to the adverse effects of the economic crisis to its
business. Respondent then asked for the immediate cancellation of the contract and for a refund of its previous
payments as provided in the contract.
Petitioner refused to cancel the contract to sell. Instead, it filed with the RTC Makati City, a complaint for specific
performance against respondent, demanding from the latter the payment of the remaining unpaid quarterly
installments inclusive of interest and penalties.
Respondent, in its answer, denied any further obligation to petitioner, asserting that it (respondent) notified the latter
of its inability to pay the remaining installments. Respondent invoked the provisions of paragraphs 3 and 3.1 of the
contract to sell providing for the refund to it of the amounts paid, less interest and the sum of 25% of all sums paid
as liquidated damages.
The trial court rendered a Decision in favor of Ayala and holding that respondent transgressed the law in obvious
bad faith. It ordered the defendant ordered to pay Ayala the unpaid balance, interest agreed upon, and penalties.
Defendant is further ordered to pay plaintiff for attorneys fees and the costs of suit. Upon full payment of the
aforementioned amounts by defendant, plaintiff shall, as it is hereby ordered, execute the appropriate deed of
absolute sale conveying and transferring full title and ownership of the parcel of land subject of the sale to and in
favor of defendant.
On appeal, the CA rendered a Decision reversing the trial courts Decision. Hence, the instant petition for review on
certiorari.
ISSUE:
1. WON respondents non-payment of the balance of the purchase price gave rise to a cause of action on the part of
petitioner to demand full payment of the purchase price; and
2. WON Ayala should refund respondent the amount the latter paid under the contract to sell.
HELD: The petition is denied. The CA decision is affirmed.
At the outset, it is significant to note that petitioner does not dispute that its December 22, 1995 transaction with
respondent is a contract to sell. Also, the questioned agreement clearly indicates that it is a contract to sell, not a
contract of sale. Paragraph 4 of the contract provides:
4. TITLE AND OWNERSHIP OF THE PROPERTY. The title to the property shall transfer to the PURCHASER
upon payment of the balance of the Purchase Price and all expenses, penalties and other costs which shall be due and
payable hereunder or which may have accrued thereto. Thereupon, the SELLER shall execute a Deed of Absolute
Sale in favor of the PURCHASER conveying all the SELLERS rights, title and interest in and to the Property to the
PURCHASER

1. NO. Considering that the parties transaction is a contract to sell, can petitioner, as seller, demand specific
performance from respondent, as buyer?
Blacks Law Dictionary defined specific performance as (t)he remedy of requiring exact performance of a contract
in the specific form in which it was made, or according to the precise terms agreed upon. The actual accomplishment
of a contract by a party bound to fulfill it.
Evidently, before the remedy of specific performance may be availed of, there must be a breach of the contract.
Under a contract to sell, the title of the thing to be sold is retained by the selleruntil the purchaser makes full
payment of the agreed purchase price. The non-fulfillment by the respondent of his obligation to pay, which is a
suspensive condition to the obligation of the petitioners to sell and deliver the title to the property, rendered the
contract to sell ineffective and without force and effect; failure of which is not really a breach, serious or otherwise,
but an event that prevents the obligation of the petitioners to convey title from arising, in accordance with Article
1184 of the Civil Code .
The parties stand as if the conditional obligation had never existed. Article 1191 of the New Civil Code will not
apply because it presupposes an obligation already extant. There can be no rescission of an obligation that is still
non-existing, the suspensive condition not having happened Thus, a cause of action for specific performance does
not arise.
Here, the provisions of the contract to sell categorically indicate that respondents default in the payment of the
purchase price is considered merely as an event, the happening of which gives rise to the respective obligations of
the parties mentioned therein, thus:

3. EVENT OF DEFAULT. The following event shall constitute an Event of Default under this contract: the
PURCHASER fails to pay any installment on the balance, for any reason not attributable to the SELLER, on the
date it is due, provided, however, that the SELLER shall have the right to charge the PURCHASER a late penalty
interest on the said unpaid interest at the rate of 2% per month computed from the date the amount became due and
payable until full payment thereof.

3.1. If the Event of Default shall have occurred, then at any time thereafter, if any such event shall then be
continuing for a period of six (6) months, the SELLER shall have the right to cancel this Contract without need of
court declaration to that effect by giving the PURCHASER a written notice of cancellation sent to the address of the
PURCHASER as specified herein by registered mail or personal delivery. Thereafter, the SELLER shall return to
the PURCHASER the aggregate amount that the SELLER shall have received as of the cancellation of this Contract,
less: (i) penalties accrued as of the date of such cancellation, (ii) an amount equivalent to twenty five
percent (25%) of the total amount paid as liquidated damages, and (iii) any unpaid charges and dues on the Property.
Any amount to be refunded to the PURCHASER shall be collected by the PURCHASER at the office of the
SELLER. Upon notice to the PURCHASER of such cancellation, the SELLER shall be free to dispose of the
Property covered hereby as if this Contract had not been executed. Notice to the PURCHASER sent by registered
mail or by personal delivery to its address stated in this Contract shall be considered as sufficient compliance with
all requirements of notice for purposes of this Contract.14

Therefore, in the event of respondents default in payment, petitioner, under the above provisions of the contract, has
the right to retain an amount equivalent to 25% of the total payments. As stated by the CA, petitioner having been
informed in writing by respondent of its intention not to proceed with the contract prior to incurring delay in

payment of succeeding installments, the provisions in the contract relative to penalties and interest find no
application.
2. YES. The CA is correct that with respect to the award of interest, petitioner is liable to pay interest of 12% per
annum upon the net refundable amount due from the time respondent made the extrajudicial demand upon it to
refund payment under the Contract to Sell, pursuant to our ruling in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals.

Eliseo Fajardo Jr., vs Freedom to Build Inc.

G. R. No. 134692 August 1, 2000
Facts: Freedom to Build Inc., an owner-developer and seller of low-cost housing sold to petitioner-spouses a house
and lot in the De La Costa Homes, in Barangka, Marikina, Metro Manila. The Contract to sell executed between the
parties, contained a Restrictive Covenant providing certain prohibitions, to wit:
Easements. For the good of the entire community, the homeowner must observe a two-meter easement in front. No
structure of any kind (store, garage, bodega, etc.) may be built on the front easement.
Upward expansion. A second storey is not prohibited. But the second storey expansion must be placed above the
back portion of the house and should not extend forward beyond the apex of the original building.
Front expansion: 2nd Storey: No unit may be extended in the front beyond the line as designed and implemented
by the developer in the 60 sq. m. unit. In other words, the 2nd floor expansion, in front, is 6 meters back from the
front property line and 4 meters back from the front wall of the house, just as provided in the 60 sq. m. units.
The above restrictions were also contained in Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-115384 covering the lot issued in
the name of petitioner-spouses.
The controversy arose when the petitioners despite repeated demand from the respondent, extended the roof of their
house to the property line and expanded the second floor of their house to a point directly above the original front
wall. Respondent filed before the RTC an action to demolish the unauthorized structures.
The RTC rendered a judgment against the petitioner ordering them to immediately demolish and remove the
extension of their expanded housing unit that exceeds the limitations imposed by the Restrictive Covenant,
otherwise the Branch Sheriff of this Court will execute the this decision at the expense of the defendants.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence, this petition for review.
Issue: Whether or not the for the lack of a specific provision, prescribing the penalty of the demolition in the
Restrictive Covenant in the event of the breach thereof, the prayer of the respondent to demolish the structure
should fail.
Ruling:
The Court held that the argument of the petitioner-spouses has no merit; Article 1168 of the New Civil Code states
that: When the obligation consists in not doing and the obligor does what has been forbidden him, it shall be
undone at his expense.
This Court is not unaware of its ruling in Ayala Corporation vs. Ray Burton Development Corporation, which has
merely adjudged the payment of damages in lieu of demolition. In the aforementioned case, however, the elaborate
mathematical formula for the determination of compensatory damages which takes into account the current

construction cost index during the immediately preceding 5 years based on the weighted average of wholesale price
and wage indices of the National Census and Statistics Office and the Bureau of Labor Statistics is explicitly
provided for in the Deed of Restrictions entered into by the parties. This unique and peculiar circumstance, among
other strong justifications therein mentioned, is not extant in the case at bar.
In sum, the Court holds that since the extension constructed exceeds the floor area limits of the Restrictive
Covenant, petitioner spouses can be required to demolish the structure to the extent that it exceeds the prescribed
floor area limits.
Wherefore, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
ACCESSION CASES