Assess the view that Sino Japanese relations are more important than those with

USA in maintaining Chinas regional influence.

Chinas regional influence refers to her influence in the East Asia region that
includes countries like Japan, North Korea, South Korea and Taiwan. Though
geographically, USA is not in East Asia, its dominant influence is undeniable
especially in Japan, her closest ally in Asia and in the Taiwan issue, inextricably
linked to American interest vis--vis China. Sino-Japanese relations are more
important than those with USA in maintaining Chinas current regional influence in
East Asia. Sino-Japanese relations are equally important to the Sino-USA relations as
they have formed an important Triangular Sino-US-Japanese Relations.
Economically, the relationships among China, Japan and USA are symbiotically
intertwined as Japan and USA are the 2 nd and 3rd largest investors in China
respectively. Strategically, both Japan and USA have shared interests in the Taiwan
Strait. The synergy between cooperation with both the US and China with the
common Sino-Japanese strategic goal of East Asian stability in mind. Collectively,
these interests have been encapsulated in the strategic relationship of mutual
benefit.
Sino-japanese relations are more important than those with USA in maintaining
Chinas current regional influence in East Asia. The term strategic relationship of
mutual benefit has come to symbolize the improved relations between Japan and
China in the past year or so. Being shorthand for a mututally beneficial relationship
was first mentioned and agreed to by the leaders of the two countries as a key
concept in their future bilateral relations when Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe
visited Beijing in October 2006, and was given shape when Chinese Prime Minister
Wen Jia Bao visited Tokyo six months later. The common strategic interests
identified by Japan and China can be divided into 2 types: reciprocal and identical.
The former includes the 2 countries extending their support to each others peaceful
development, enhancing mututal trust and cultivating mutual understanding and
friendship between their 2 peoples. The latter although some may be identical only
in principle and differ in details-includes common development, peace and stability
in Northeast Asia, peaceful settlement of the nuclear issues on the Korean Peninsula
(especially its denuclearization), reform of the Security Council and the UN as a
whole, support for ASEANs larger role and promotion of regional cooperation in East
Asia. To pursue these common strategic interest, a series of dialogues and
exchanges, including summit meetings, took place in 2007: Prime Minister Abe met
Chinese President Hu Jin Tao on the sidelines of the G8 Summit in Heiligendamm,
Germany; Chinese Defense Minister Cao Gangchuan visited Japan; the new
Japanese prime minister Yasuo Fukuda met Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao during the
third East Asia Summit in Singapore; the Chinese missile destroyer Shenzhen made
a port call to Japan; and the first Japan-China high-level economic dialogue was
held in Beijing. Finally, when Mr. Fukuda visited Beijing at the end of last year, the
leaders of the 2 countries agreed on concrete plans to promote youth exchanges
and enhance cooperation in the areas of environment, energy and science and
technology although they were unable to reach a compromise on the pending issue
of gas exploration rights in the East China Sea. In 2009, however, under Asos
premiership, Japan and China agreed on a superficial understanding of mutual 50%

exploration rights. Thus, Sino-Jpanese relations are not only on the mend since
Koizumis 6 visits to the Yazukuni Shrine between 2001-2007, but also improving
steadfastly. However, it is important to note the cold fact that these developments
in dialogue and exchange level have yet resulted in any significant improvement in
how the Japanese and Chinese people see each other. According to a public opinion
poll conducted by the Japanese Cabinet Office in October 2007, 63% of the
respondents said they do not feel affinity towards Chinathe same level as 2years
ago. Similarly in China, there is no sign of any noticeable improvement in public
sentiment toward Japan. The ongoing confusion over a case of food poisoning, in
which Chinese-made frozen dumplings tainted with pesticide have sickened a
number of people in Japan, clearly shows how fragile mutual confidence is at the
grassroots level. More importantly, the common strategic interests list does not
exhaust all the strategic interests of Japan and China. There are some strategic
interests that cannot necessarily be shared by the 2countries. Calmly realizing this
fact and taking appropriate measures to deal with it is extremely important as Tokyo
and Beijing strive to build a strategic relationship of mutual trust. One of Chinas
strategic interests that is not included on the Common strategic interests list is
the unification of Taiwan. Some Japaneseand a greater number of Taiwanese
regard Chinas claim that Taiwan is part of China as conflicting with Japans strategic
interests. There is similar suspicion and fear in China as well. However, the strategic
interest of Japan and China here is not necessarily of a conflicting nature. The
Japanese government does not deny the importance of Taiwans reunification for
China. It only demands that this be pursued through peaceful means. As long as the
Chinese government seeks unification by a charm offensive and not be the threat
or use of force, it will not pose a challenge to Japans strategic interests. In 2007,
Sino-Japanese bilateral trade rose to a new record of $237 billion or 17.7% of total
Japanese external trade. For the first time, China surpassed the US as the number 1
trade partner of Japan. Explosive growth of Sino-Japanese trade is a two-way
phenomenon. From 1990 to 2007, while Chinas exports to Japan grew 14.9%
annually on average, Japanese exports to China grew even faster at 18.5% annual
rate. The rapid growth of the Chinese economy has been serving as a new growth
engine for the mature Japanese economy. The growth of exports to China has been
one of the critical factors driving the growth of the Japanese economy. Since 2002,
in terms of total bilateral trade, Japanese trade deficits with China actually
decreased to 8% of the total bilateral trade in 2007 from 33% in 1990. The
fluctuation of exchange rates between Yuan and Yen did not dominate the direction
of the trade deficit. In spite of having trade deficits with China since 1990, the
Japanese government has rarely applied protective measures against imports from
China. Sino-Japanese trade has evolved from inter-industry trade to intra-industry
trade. In 2007, about 70% of bilateral trade is intra-industry trade. In particular,
machinery and transportation related equipment has emerged to become the
largest export commodity for both countries. This change can also be seen in
Chinas domestic consumer market. In the 1980s, for example, Japanese
manufacturers of colour televisions exported their final products to Cina, and they
predominated in the local market. Most Japanese manufacturers had embarked on
local production of colour televisions in China such as Shanghai Sony, Dalian
Toshiba, Shangdong Matsushita(Panasonic), Shenzhen Huaqiang Sanyo, Nanjing
Sharp, and Fujian Hitachi dominated the Chinese market. The benefits derived are
mutual. While Japanese MNEs can utilize Chinas cheap and productive labour force
to strengthen their global competitiveness, Chinese firms can use the global

marketing networks and Japanese brand names to sell made-in-China products in

the global market. Japan is the second largest source of FDI in China. Japanese
cumulative FDI in China accounted for about 10% of Chinas FDI from 1990 to 2007.
China has replaced ASEAN-4 as the number one host of Japanese FDI in Asia. If the
Chinese economy continues to achieve high growth rates, it will serve as a critical
growth source for the Japanese economy. With rising oil prices and environmental
degradation, China will benefit substantially from the cooperation technologies with
Japan. However, many also blame Japans economic difficulties on the rise of China.
Many Japanese reflect this viewpoint, partly because they have lost confidence in
Japans economy, which used to be Japans strongest point, and partly because of
some jealousy over Chinas current economic success. There is concern about
increasing imports from China as well as Japans massive investments in China.
Both of them are seen as having led to the hollowing out of Japanese industries. A
wide range of Japanese industries, especially those long protected by the
government, perceive China to be an economic threat. These sentiments have
been organized into powerful political pressure which, in April 2001, for example,
induced the Japanese government to adopt measures against a few agricultural
Chinese imports. There is a tendency to attribute rising unemployment to the
hollowing out of industries in Japan, although the high unemployment rate merely
reflects the current economic slump in Japan. And Chinas colour television market
has been shared with major Chinese manufacturers such as Changhong, TCL, Konka,
Haixin, RGB, and Haier. Foreign subsidiary companies now try to supply
differentiated products such as large flat monitor televisions. Foreign companies
also supply some key components and parts of colour televisions. Chinas top
manufacturer of cathode-ray tubes is Caihong, a state-owned enterprise with
technology-sharing relationships with Japanese manufacturers such as Hitachi
Toshiba , and Asahi Glass. Other major CRT manufacturers are all foreign
companies, including Shenzhen Samsung; Biejing Panasonic; Shanghai Yongxin, a
Hong Kong affiliate company using Toshiba technology; Philips Huafei; Hitachi Saige
and LG lejin.
Sino-japanese relations are equally important to the Sino-USA relations as they have
formed an important Triangular Sino-US Japanese Relations. Changes and
readjustments in Sino-US-Japanese triangular relations are increasingly
interconnected. Such interactions are a reflection of increasingly tight relations
between the 3 countries, and an embodiment of the increased containment of the
strength and interests of the 2 on each other. We can analyze their
interconnectedness through an examination of: Sino-US, Sino-Japanese, and USJapanese relations. These 2 pairs of relationships interact. US japanese, Sino-US
and Sino-japanese relations. Changes in these three pairs of relations influence each
other. Good US-Japanese relations will have implications for Sino-US relations. If the
US and Japan join hands to counter China, Sino-Japanese and Sino-US relations will
deteriorate. Bad US-Japanese relations also bear upon Sino-US relations. Both China
and US may exert pressure upon japan by developing their bilateral relations.
Contradictions on specific problems, however, will not rupture US-Japanese
relations. Therefore, it is not very likely that US and China will join hands to confront
Japan. Sino-japanese, Sino-US and Japan-US relations. Changes and adjustments in
these 3 relationships are interconnected. Sino-japanese relations are a focus of US
attention. When Sino-Japanese ties are close, the US becomes alert and might force
Japan to loosen its ties to China. Sino-Japanese relations are thus constrained by

Sino-US relations: the US will not allow Sino-Japanese relations to influence Sino-US
relations. Japan will certainly heed US pressure, since it will not allow relations with
China to harm its ties with the US. It is important to note that such interrelations in
Sino-US-Japanese relations have an impact far exceeding the 3 countries
themselves, exerting influence upon the Asia-Pacific and even the world as a whole.
Such conditions give rise to chain reactions among a series of relationships. This
reveals the importance of Sino-US-Japanese relations. The above analysis indicates
that, despite differences of interest and differing policy-making orientations, the
possibility of confrontation or antagonism in Sino-US-Japanese relations is relatively
low. The three countries share a wide common space of policy choice: policies
acceptable to all three countries. This is the foundation for the development of
stable and normal relations. Continued development in this direction will be good
news for all three countries as well as the Asia-Pacific region as a whole. However,
there are changes in the Sino-US-Japanese relations that have caused some new
remarkable features: The strengths of the 3 parties are not balanced. China is
relatively weak, but its strength is increasing. The 3 parties are not at odds with
each other and they have not formed a united bloc to oppose external forces. The
basis of triangular relations is largely Asia-Pacific regional affairs. These 3 features
determine both the nature of changes in Sino-US-Japanese relations and the scope
of their influence. It is not necessary that the triangular relationships are in
opposing directions. As a superpower, the US has a greater ability to choose its
policies than other countries. A variety of restraints prevents the US from doing
whatever it likes, however. The US ahs the following options in handling relations
with China and Japan: Joining with japan to establish a common front to contain
China. This will result in antagonism between both China and the US and China and
Japan. The problem is that the US and Japan are not sufficiently unified for the US to
undertake such a containment strategy. The US would have to monilise other
countries to participate, organizing a huge, united front to contain China. Since
neither Japan nor other countries would participate wholeheartedly, organizing such
as united front would be extremely difficult. Conflict with China is not, furthermore,
in the interests of the US. For this reason, in ordinary conditions the US will not
make such a choice. Joining China to contain Japan. This will only occur if Japan
distances herself from the US, US-Japanese relations deteriorate completely and
Japan and the US become antagonistic towards each other. Although there are many
contradictions in the US-Japan Alliance, the foundation of their relationship is solid.
The maintenance of their union is very important to both the US and Japan. In
ordinary conditions, therefore, the US will not choose such a policy, simultaneously,
developing relations with both China and Japan. The US would seek to both maintain
the US-Japan Alliance and develop strategic relations with China, pulling her into
the network and using relations with China to check Japan. The US would be in the
central and dominant position. Importantly, this choice may, furthermore, be
acceptable to both China and Japan. Considering Americas interests and viable
options, more and more people approve of this choice. This choice would not only
benefit the US, China and Japan but also other countries of the Asia-Pacific. This
structure of relations would thus be characterized by the creation of stability. Japan
is a big power, an economic giant. In choosing its foreign policy, however, Japan is
severely restricted. The most important restraint is that, as an instigator of the
Second World War, Japan must reflect on its aggressive war and prohibit
remilitarization. Japan must develop cordial relations with the targets of its past
aggression, demonstrating to the world that it will not become a military power.

Japan has the following alternatives in its relations with the US and China. To
support or encourage the US, to contain China. This will necessarily lead to
deterioration of Sino-Japanese relations. Although Japan is worried about Chinas
rising strength, confrontation with China is not in japans interest. Japans
ultra-rightist forces may take China as an enemy, but strategically, confrontation
with China is dangerous. Under ordinary conditions, Japan will not make this choice.
Joining with China to lead regional affairs and stand up to the US as an equal. This
risks breaking the US-Japanese Alliance. It is thus unacceptable to both Japan and
the US. China and Japans differing positions and interests also, furthermore, reduce
this possibility. Maintaining the US-Japan Alliance while developing stable relations
with China. The critical issue here is how Japan utilizes its alliance with the US to
confront China, the foundation of Sino-Japanese relations will be undermined. If
Japan instead treats its alliance with the US simply as a support as it engages with
China, Sino-Japanese Alliance in its dealings with China, Sino-Japanese friendship
will increase. Japan cannot break off relations with the US, but Japan cannot ignore
China either. This is the space within which Japan can formulate its US and China
policies and the limited within which its policies can vary. China is a developing
country increasing in strength, but is constricted by a number of factors. China has
to feed more than 1billion people, and does not have spare strength to contend with
great powers. China needs to develop and requires a good developmental
environment. This determines Chinas fundamental interests and its orientation in
policy-making. In choosing its US and Japan policies, China has the following
options: allying with the US to confront Japan. This would only become possible
under special circumstances: if Jpan cut itself off from the US, remilitarized, and
confronted the US and China. Under ordinary conditions, the US will not accept such
as situation, and China has no need to make such choice. Joining Japan to oppose
the US confrontation with the US is not in the interest of China, so China will not
make this choice. Japan also will not accept it. There is thus no possibility of this
occurring. Confronting the US and Japan. This is the most dangerous situation for
China so should be the choice avoided the most. There are wide differences in
structure and interest between China, the US and Japan. Chinas policy-making
should be aimed at easing and resolving such differences, not enlarging them to the
point of confrontation. Simultaneously developing relations with the US and Japan
confronting neither. China would develop constructive relations with the US on the
basis of real interests. If the US is seeking to increase engagement with China why
shouldnt China increase its engagement with the US? If the premise of Chinese
behavior is averting confrontation with great powers, there will be no basis for the
US to choose confrontation with China. Developing stable and friendly relations with
Japan is in the interests of both China and Japan. China will be alert against a
Japanese shift to the right and remilitarization. Chinas challenge will be to accept,
tolerate and develop relations with a Japan that is expanding its political role and
increasing its military strength. The key to Chinas relations with the US and Japan is
the maintenance of long term stability. This is of special importance to China. The
above analysis indicates that despite differences of interest and differing policymaking orientations, the possibility of confrontation or antagonism in Sino-USJapanese relations is relatively low. The three countries share a wide common
space of policy choice: policies acceptable to all 3 countries. This is the foundation
for the development of stable and normal relations. Continued development in this
direction will be good news for all three countries as well as the Asia Pacific region
as a whole.

In conclusion, despite differences of interests and differing policy-making

orientations, the possibility of confrontation or antagonism in Sino-US-Japanese
relations is relatively low. The three countries share a wide common space of
policy choice: policies acceptable to all 3 countries. This is the foundation for the
development of stable and normal relations. This is the foundation for the
development of stable and normal relations. Continued development in this
direction will be good news for all three countries as well as the Asia-Pacific region
as a whole. The key to Chinas relations with the US and Japan is the maintenance of
long-term stability. Therefore, it is not a question of Sino-Japanese relations being
more important than Chinas relations with USA. Rather, the tripartite and symbiotic
relations among the three countries are inseparable if China wants to maintain its
regional influence and aspires to be a global power.