How far did the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe in 1989 cause the

collapse of USSR in 1991?

The collapse of USSR is defined as the establishment of the commonwealth
of independent states on 21 December 1991. While the August coup
damaged Gobachevs credibility beyond repair and sealed the fate of USSR
to cease in existence, it was the November 1990 Union Treaty that provoked
the hardliners to carry out the August Coup because they saw it as an
unacceptable sacrifice of the central authority and further evidence that
Gobachevs policies were undermining the dominance of CPSU. Hence, this
essay seeks to argue that the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe in
1989 fundamentally caused the collapse of USSR because it triggered the
wave of anti-communism within its own country by proving to republics
within USSR that the Kremlin had undoubtedly loosened control, which in
turn caused Gobachev to come up with the Union Treaty in hope to prevent
the secession of the republics.
The collapse of communism in Eastern Europe in 1989 directly gave rise to
the secessionist tendencies in USSR by emboldening the republic states to
the extent they dared to rebel against the central authority, leading to its
fall. The republics within USSR each had a long history of independence and
their aspiration for freedom was not destroyed, just suppressed under Soviet
rule with the threat of force. As such, when Gobachev at the UN speech in
1988 discarded the Brezhnev Doctrine, denounced the use of threat of force,
endorsed the principle of freedom of choice, and announced his plans to
withdraw 50000 troops from Eastern Europe, political dissenters countrywide
took it as a signal that the central authority was loosening its control.
Coupled with the power of example supplied by the collapse of communism
in Eastern Europe, a series of anti-communist movements within USSR itself
sparked off. In March 1990, Geogia and the three Baltic states, Latvia,
Estonia and Lithuania demanded for independence. Not long after, Ukraine
and Armenia joined. In bid to stem the secessionist tide, in December 1990,
Gobachev reshuffled his government to include several notorious hardliners,
thereby setting the platform for the outbreak of the August Coup. On the
other hand, trying to maintain his credibility as a liberal, he formulated the
Union Treaty. The result is that he alienated the hardliners because they saw
his concession to nationalism as a betrayal of the integrity of USSR. Since the
collapse of communism in Eastern Europe is the direct cause of secessionist
tendencies in USSR, it was therefore most instrumental in causing its fall.
Gobachevs domestic policies undercut the political power of the central
authority, bred mass discontent towards the central government, and thus
laid grounds for its ultimate dissolution. To purge the system that was
plagued with corruption and inefficiency, and to gather public support for his
reforms, not knowing that it would go beyond his control, in late 1986,
Gobachev introduced glasnost which entailed a series of political reforms and

made the systemic inefficiencies of USSR such as the 1986 Chernobyl

Incident very clear. To appease political discontent generated by the faltering
economy made worse by his market reforms, and in part also to shift power
away from the party, or more specifically away from opposition within his
own party so as to smoothen the process of his reforms, in June 1988,
Gobachev carried out democratization to replace the Supreme Soviet with
the new Congress of Peoples Deputies, two-third of whose members were
chosen directly through elections. Together with his other policies, although
the partys privileged position guaranteed by Article 6 of the Soviet
constitution was not abolished until 1990, they nevertheless effected a
fundamental shift in the balance of political power within the Soviet state.
More importantly, under the stimulus of these instruments he set in, public
opinion increasingly swayed towards Boris Yeltsin, the politician who wanted
full democracy and capitalism, such that by the time August Coup occurred,
there was no way he could restore his position and status, because the
majority of the public had lost their support for him.
However, the role of Gobachevs domestic policies is limited in causing the
fall of USSR in 1991 because it is insufficient to transform the political
discontent of the republics into secessionist tendencies, unlike the fall of
communism in Eastern Europe in 1989. As compared to the collapse of
communism in Eastern Europe in 1989 which verified for the republic states
that the Kremlin had undoubtedly loosened its control, thereby emboldening
them to follow suit and break away from USSR, Gobachevs domestic policies
were less significant because notwithstanding the political reforms it brought
about under glasnost which made systemic inefficiencies of the Soviets very
clear, which too, might have stimulated the republic states to break away,
there is a stark difference between political discontent and political courage
to break away, knowing well of the threat of force. Political discontent had
always been present ever since countries of sovereign status had
communism forcefully imposed on them. Gobachevs domestic policies
therefore, under the constraint of a moribund economy, merely worsened it.
Resentment towards the central authority, however great, is insufficient to
cause the republics to rise up to the central authority because the same
mechanism which had kept them obedient to the authority, in spite of their
deep-seated feelings of nationalism and their indignation, had not been
proven to have waned. Therefore, push comes to shove, it is still the collapse
of communism in Eastern Europe in 1989 that brought about a turning point
in the perception of the republics, that for a first time ever, they are
engendered with a mentality that they could break away, without being
crushed.
Reagans military buildup increased the feelings among hardliners that
Gobachev was losing control of the situation and that the dominance of the
USSR and CPSU was under threat, causing them to eventually launch the
August Coup. In response to Reagans military buildup, Gobachev was willing

to swallow a drastically asymmetrical reduction of thermal nuclear weapons

to put an end to the arms race, terms no old-line communist would have
complied. Whereas the US only had to destroy 293 launchers, USSR had to
destroy 851 launchers. On top of that, USSR had to accept a remarkably
intrusive monitoring system that included short notice, on-site inspections by
the other signatory to ensure compliance. Furthermore, in December 1988,
in his speech at the UN, Gobachev abandoned the concept of international
class struggle and announced his unilateral venture to reduced Soviet
troops by 500,000 in bid to revitalize arms control negotiations because the
US insistence on its ballistic missile plans had persistently obstructed the
adoption of START agreements.
However, the role of Reagans military buildup is limited in causing the fall of
USSR in 1991 because even though Gobachevs drastic concessions to the
US in terms of arms buildup and his refusal to continue with the ideological
conflict and superpower rivalry infused to the hardliners the feelings that
Gobachevs weakness was undermining the dominance of the USSR, it was
not as serious as him letting go of the satellite states because that caused
the demise of the Soviet empire, a tangible damage to USSR. Even if
concessions to Reagans military buildup by any chance is more significant
than the demise of the Soviet empire in angering he hardliners, no matter
what, the Union Treaty, the indisputable factor that angered the hardliners
the most which directly caused them to launch the Coup, is still a subsequent
product of the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe in 1989. Therefore,
the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe in 1989, is still the most
important factor that led to the fall of USSR in 1991.
In conclusion, the collapse of communism in 1989 was the fundamental
cause of the fall of USSR in 1991 because it unleashed a force of nationalism
which proved to be too much for Gobachev to contain. Although Gobachevs
domestic policies might have bred political discontent which in turn fuelled
the secessionist tendencies, the political courage to break away which
formed the premise of their secessionist tendencies was still supplied by the
collapse of communism in USSR. No doubt Gobachevs attempt to limit the
arms race in face of Reagans military buildup increasingly discredited
Gobachev in the eyes of the hardliners and eventually contributed to them
launching the August Coup, the Union Treaty which was a product of the
secessionist tendencies was nevertheless the direct cause of the August
Coup in 1991. Therefore, by and large, the collapse of communism in 1989
was still the root cause of the fall of USSR in 1991.