Agrarian Law Digests

Agrarian Law Case Digests
Stephanie Q. Dandal
18 July 2015
Daez v. CA
Facts: Petitioner Daez owned a 4.1685 hectare land in Meycauayan, Bulacan which was
being cultivated by the respondent farmers Soriente et al. The problem arose when the land
was subjected to the OLT pursuant to PD 27 as amended by LOI 474. Thus, the land was
transferred to the ownership of beneficiaries on December 9, 1980.
On May 31, 1981, private respondents made an affidavit under duress stating they
are not tenants but hired workers. Hence, Daez apllied for exemption of OLT claiming her
land is untenanted and the cancellation of the CLTs. (not majorly related to the topic)
In their Affidavit dated October 2, 1983, Eudosia Daez and her husband, Lope, declared
ownership over 41.8064 hectares of agricultural lands located in Meycauayan, Bulacan and
fourteen (14) hectares of riceland, sixteen (16) hectares of forestland, ten (10) hectares of
"batuhan" and 1.8064 hectares of residential lands in Penaranda, Nueva Ecija. Included in
their 41.8064-hectare landholding in Bulacan, was the subject 4,1685-hectare riceland in
Meycauayan.
DAR Undersecretary Jose C Medina:
Denying Eudosia Daezs application for exemption upon finding that her subject land
is covered under LOI No. 474, petitioner being owner of the aforesaid agricultural lands
exceeding seven (7) hectares.
DAR Secretary Benjamin T. Leong
Leong affirmed the assailed order upon finding private respondents to be bonafide tenants
of the subject land. Disregarded the affidavit of the farmers under duress.
Court of Appeals
Sustained the decision of both DAR secretaries
Supreme Court
Denied their prayers and sustained the decisions
Main Issue Related to our topic
Exemption of the 4.1685 riceland from coverage by P.D. No. 27 having been finally denied
her, Eudosia Daez next filed an application for retention of the same riceland, this time
under R.A. No. 6657.
DAR Regional Director
March 22, 1994, DAR Region III OIC-Director Eugenio B. Bernardo allowed Eudosia Daez to
retain the subject riceland but he denied the application of her eight (8) children to retain
three (3) hectares each for their failure to prove actual tillage of the land or direct
management thereof as required by law. They appealed to DAR Secretary.
DAR Secretary
Affirmed the decision of the regional director. Appealed to the Office of the President (OP).
Office of the President
Ruled in favor of Daez or her heirs and rendered judgment authorizing the retention
of the 4.1685 hectare of land. Still denied the application of the children. Hence the appeal
in CA.
Court of Appeals
Reversed and set aside the decision of the Office of the President.
Issue: WON Daez may retain the disputed 4.1685 hectares land
Held:
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Stephanie Q. Dandal
18 July 2015
Petitioner Daez has the right to retain the 4.1685 hectare land pursuant to her right of
retention under 6657. The decision of the Office of the President is reinstated.
Ratio:
Read Sec. 6 of R.A. No. 6657
Paez was denied the right to choose what she wants to retain.
THE TENANTS OF THE ESTATE OF DR. JOSE SISON, Represented by FERNANDO

CAYABYAB, petitioners, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, SECRETARY PHILIP ELLA
JUICO of the DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, AND THE HEIRS OF DR. JOSE
SISON, represented by MANUEL SISON, respondents.
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Stephanie Q. Dandal
18 July 2015
Facts: This is a petition for review of the decision dated March 29, 1990 of the Court of
Appeals upholding an order of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, Philip Ella Juico, setting
aside the previous orders of his predecessors who had issued certificates of land transfer to
the tenants of the rice and corn lands of the late Dr. Jose Sison without due regard for the
right of his legal heirs to retain ownership of their shares if they did not own more than
seven (7) hectares of rice or corn land.
Certificates of land transfer were issued by the Ministry of Agrarian Reform to the
petitioners, tenants of the Estate of Dr. Jose Sison, for their respective areas of cultivation.
the heirs of Dr. Sison protested to the then Minister of Agrarian Reform, Conrado Estrella,
who ordered that the certificates of land transfer be marked, "UNDER PROTEST."
Minister Estrella ordered an investigation of the case which revealed that the landholdings of
the late Dr. Jose Sison at Bayambang, Pangasinan, were subdivided among his heirs proindiviso under a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition dated April 2, 1966. Consequently, the acting
MAR District Officer of Lingayen, Pangasinan, recommended the cancellation of the
certificates of land transfer that had been issued to the petitioners-tenants. However, a
Reinvestigation Report, dated October 8, 1981 recommended that the landholdings be
included in the Operation Land Transfer.
Petition filed by Manuel Sison, as representative of all the Heirs of Dr. Sison, for exemption of
their landholdings from the coverage of Operation Land Transfer was denied. Motion for
reconsideration was denied as well.
After ordering a reinvestigation of the landholdings of the individual heirs, an order was
issued on September 7, 1988 by Secretary Juico, modifying the orders of his predecessors.
He ruled that the ricelands of Consuelo S. Nazareno and Peter Sison are exempt from the
Operation Land Transfer and that Elisa S. Reyes, Renato Sison, Jose Sison, Josefina S. Zulueta
and Jaime Sison, are entitled to retain not more than seven (7) hectares of their ricelands,
since they are not owners of more than seven (7) hectares of other lands, and that Alfredo
Sison and Manuel Sison are not entitled to retention or exemption of their ricelands from the
Operation Land Transfer because they each own more than seven (7) hectares of other
agricultural land.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Secretary of Agrarian Reform has the authority to cancel
certificates issues?
RULING:
Petitioners contention that the Secretary of Agrarian Reform had no mare authority or
jurisdiction to cancel the Certificates of Land Transfer after they had been issued to the
tenants-beneficiaries, is not correct. The issuance, recall or cancellation of certificates of
land transfer fall within the Secretarys administrative jurisdiction as implementor of P.D. 27.
Having found that certain heirs of Dr. Sison were entitled to retain their ricelands (which did
not exceed seven [7] hectares) and had been illegally denied that right, Secretary Juico
properly ordered the cancellation of the Certificates of Land Transfer which had been
erroneously issued to the petitioners.
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Stephanie Q. Dandal
18 July 2015
LUCIA RODRIGUEZ AND PRUDENCIA RODRIGUEZ, PETITIONERS, VS. TERESITA V.

SALVADOR, RESPONDENT.
Facts: Respondent alleged that she is the absolute owner of a parcel of land covered by
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-27140 issued by virtue of Free Patent No. (VII-5) 2646
in the name of the Heirs of Cristino Salvador represented by Teresita Salvador that
petitioners acquired possession of the subject land by mere tolerance of her predecessorsin-interest and that despite several verbal and written demands made by her, petitioners
refused to vacate the subject land.
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Stephanie Q. Dandal
18 July 2015
In their Answer petitioners interposed the defense of agricultural tenancy. Lucia claimed
that she and her deceased husband, Serapio, entered the subject land with the consent and
permission of respondent's predecessors-in-interest, siblings Cristino and Sana Salvador,
under the agreement that Lucia and Serapio would devote the property to agricultural
production and share the produce with the Salvador siblings. Since there is a tenancy
relationship between the parties, petitioners argued that it is the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) which has jurisdiction over the case and not the MTC.
The Metropolitan Trial Court dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The Regional
Trial Court remanded the case to the MTC for preliminary hearing to determine whether
tenancy relationship exists between the parties. Petitioners moved for reconsideration
arguing that the purpose of a preliminary hearing was served by the parties' submission of
their respective position papers and other supporting evidence. On June 23, 2004, the RTC
granted the reconsideration and affirmed the MTC Decision dated September 10, 2003. On
August 24, 2005, the CA rendered judgment in favor of respondent. It ruled that no tenancy
relationship exists between the parties because petitioners failed to prove that respondent
or her predecessors-in-interest consented to the tenancy relationship.
ISSUE: WHETHER X X X THE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN RULING THAT PETITIONERSDEFENDANTS ARE NOT TENANTS OF THE SUBJECT LAND
RULING:
Agricultural
does
not
exist
tenancy
in
the
instant
relationship
case.
Agricultural tenancy exists when all the following requisites are present: 1) the parties are
the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; 2) the subject matter of the relationship
is an agricultural land; 3) there is consent between the parties to the relationship; 4) the
purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; 5) there is personal
cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and 6) the harvest is shared
between landowner and tenant or agricultural lessee.
In this case, to prove that an agricultural tenancy relationship exists between the parties,
petitioners submitted as evidence the affidavits of petitioner Lucia and their neighbors. The
statements in the affidavits presented by the petitioners are not sufficient to prove the
existence
of
an
agricultural
tenancy.
As correctly found by the CA, the element of consent is lacking. Except for the self-serving
affidavit of Lucia, no other evidence was submitted to show that respondent's predecessorsin-interest consented to a tenancy relationship with petitioners. Self-serving statements,
however, will not suffice to prove consent of the landowner; independent evidence is
necessary.
Aside from consent, petitioners also failed to prove sharing of harvest. The affidavits of
petitioners' neighbors declaring that respondent and her predecessors-in-interest received
their share in the harvest are not sufficient. Petitioners should have presented receipts or
any other evidence to show that there was sharing of harvest and that there was an agreed
system of sharing between them and the landowners.
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Stephanie Q. Dandal
18 July 2015
Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation v Court of Appeals

Facts: Petitioner Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation was the registered owner of two
parcels of land with a total area of 254.6 hectares. According to petitioner, the parcels of
land are watersheds, which provide clean potable water to the Canlubang community.
Petitioner alleged that respondents usurped its rights over the property, thereby destroying
the ecosystem. Sometime in December 1985, respondents filed a civil case with the
Regional Trial Court seeking an easement of a right of way to and from Barangay Casile. By
way of counterclaim, however, petitioner sought the ejectment of private respondents. After
the filing of the ejectment cases, respondents petitioned the Department of Agrarian Reform
for the compulsory acquisition of the SRRDC property under the CARP.
The landholding of SRRDC was placed under compulsory acquisition. Petitioner objected to
the compulsory acquisition of the property contending that the area was not appropriate for
agricultural purposes. The area was rugged in terrain with slopes of 18% and above and that
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Stephanie Q. Dandal
18 July 2015
the occupants of the land were squatters, who were not entitled to any land as beneficiaries.
The DARAB ruled against the petitioner. On appeal the CA affirmed the decision of DARAB.
Issue: Whether or not the property in question is covered by CARP despite the fact that the
entire property formed part of a watershed area prior to the enactment of R. A. No. 6657
Ruling:
Watershed is one of those enumerated by CARP to be exempt from its coverage. We cannot
ignore the fact that the disputed parcels of land form a vital part of an area that need to be
protected for watershed purposes. The protection of watersheds ensures an adequate supply
of water for future generations and the control of flashfloods that not only damage property
but cause loss of lives. Protection of watersheds is an intergenerational responsibility that
needs to be answered now.
Roxas and Co., Inc. v. CA

Facts: Petitioner Roxas and Co. Is a corporation that owns 3 haciendas in Batangas, which
the government wishes to acquire under the Comprehensive Agrarian Law (CARL). Before
the effectivity of the law, the petitioner filed with the Department of Agrarian Reform a
voluntary offer to sell (VOS) Hacienda Caylaway pursuant to EO 229, which served as
guidelines to the comprehensive agrarian program.
The two other haciendasBanilad and Palicowere placed under compulsory acquisition by
the DAR in accordance with the CARL.
Hacienda Banilad and Palico
DAR sent invitations to Roxas and Co in order to discuss the results of the DAR investigation,
finding both Banilad and Palico qualified under the CARP. For Hacienda Palico, DAR sent a
letter of acquisition to Roxas and Co at their offices in Manila, while for Hacienda Banilad,
DAR addressed the notices to Jaime Pimintel, caretaker of the said hacienda. It was
petitioner Pimintel who attended all the proceedings regarding the two haciendas. Hence,
during trial, Roxas and Co claimed that they were not informed of the acquisition
proceedings on their two haciendas.
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Stephanie Q. Dandal
18 July 2015
DAR then opened a trust account in favor of petitioner Roxas and Co. These trust accounts
were replaced by DAR with cash and Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) bonds. Meanwhile,
petitioner Roxas applied for the conversion of the haciendas from agricultural to nonagricultural. Despite this, DAR proceeded with the acquisition of the two haciendas. It then
issued and distributed certificate of land ownership awards (CLOA) to farmer beneficiaries.
Hacianda Caylaway
Although Hacienda Caylaway was initially offered for sale to the government, Roxas and Co
sent a letter to DAR secretary withdrawing its offer. According to Roxas, the reclassification
of Caylaway from agricultural to non agricultural was authorized by the Sangguniang Bayan
of Nasugbu. Also, the municipality of Nasugbu where the haciendas are located had been
declared a tourist zone. Roxas also argued that the land is not suitable for agricultural
purposes.
DAR secretary denied Roxas withdrawal of his VOS. According to the secretary, the
withdrawal can only be based on specific grounds such as unsuitability of soil for agriculture,
slope of the lad is over 180 degrees and that the land is undeveloped.
Despite the denial of the withdrawal of the VOS, petitioner still filed an application for
conversion with the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB), which submitted the case to the
Secretary of DAR for resolution. The DAR secretary dismissed the case.
Roxas and Co went to the CA on app
eal. CA dismissed appeal claiming that petitioners failed to exhaust administrative remedies.
Issues:
1. WON the court can take cognizance of petitioners petition despite failure to exhaust
administrative remedies
2. WON acquisition proceedings against the petitioners were valid
3. WON the court can rule on whether the haciendas may be reclassified from
agricultural to non agricultural
Ruling:
1. Yes. Petitioners action falls under the exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies sine there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy
for the petitioners at this point. The CLOAs were already issued despite the fact that
there was no just compensation.
2. Acquisition proceedings against petitioners violated their right to due process. First,
there was an improper service of the Notice of Acquisition. Notices to corporations
should be served through their president, manager, secretary, cashier, agent, or any
of its directors or partners. Jaime Pimintel, to whom the notice was served, was
neither of those. Second, there was no notice of coverage, meaning, the parcels of
land were not properly identified before they were taken by the DAR. Under the law,
the land owner has the right to choose 5 hectares of land he wishes to retain. Upon
receiving the Notice of Acquisition, petitioner corporation had no idea which portions
of its estate were subject to compulsory acquisiton. Third, The CLOAs were issued to
farmer beneficiaries without just compensation. The law provides that the deposit
must be made only in cash or LBP bonds. DARs opening of a trust account in
petitioners name does not constitute payment. Even if later, DAR substituted the
trust account with cash and LBP bonds, such does not cure the lack of notice, which
still amounts to a violation of the petitioners right to due process.
3. Despite all this, the court has not jurisdiction to rule on the reclassification of land
from agricultural to non agricultural. DARs failure to observe due process does not
give the court the power to adjudicate over petitioners application for land
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Stephanie Q. Dandal
18 July 2015
conversion. DAR is charged with the mandate of approving applications for land
conversion. They have the tools and experience needed to evaluate such
applications; hence, they are the proper agency with which applications for land use
conversion are lodged. DAR should be given a chance to correct their defects with
regard to petitioners right to due process.
Petitioner dismissed.
Note: Pertinent section although not mentioned in the case is Sec. 20 of the LGC on power of
LGU to reclassify land. However, the code also provides that the CARL prevails over LGC
provisions.
Heirs of Jose Deleste v. Landbank of the Philippines

Facts:
The spouses Gregorio Nanaman (Gregorio) and Hilaria Tabuclin (Hilaria) were the
owners of a parcel of agricultural land located in Tambo, Iligan City. Said spouses were
childless, but Gregorio had a son named Virgilio Nanaman (Virgilio) by another woman.
When Gregorio died in 1945, Hilaria and Virgilio administered the subject property
and sold the subject property to Dr. Jose Deleste (Deleste) for PhP 16,000. The deed of sale
was notarized on February 17, 1954 and registered on March 2, 1954. Also, the tax
declaration in the name of Virgilio was canceled and a new tax declaration was issued in the
name of Deleste.
On May 15, 1954, Hilaria died. Gregorios brother, Juan Nanaman, was appointed as
special administrator of the estate of the deceased spouses. Subsequently, Edilberto Noel
(Noel) was appointed as the regular administrator of the joint estate. Noel, as the
administrator of the intestate estate of the deceased spouses, filed an action against
Deleste for the reversion of title over the subject property. The decision stated that the
subject property was the conjugal property of the late spouses Gregorio and Hilaria and that
the latter could only sell her one-half (1/2) share of the subject property to Deleste. As a
result, Deleste, who died in 1992, and the intestate estate of Gregorio were held to be the
co-owners of the subject property, each with a one-half (1/2) interest in it .
Thereafter, Presidential Decree No. (PD) 27 was issued. This law mandates that
tenanted rice and corn lands be brought under the Operation Land Transfer (OLT) Program
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Stephanie Q. Dandal
18 July 2015
and awarded to farmer-beneficiaries. Thus, the subject property was placed under the said
program.
However, only the heirs of Gregorio were identified by the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) as the landowners. Petitioners contend that DAR failed to notify them that it is
subjecting the subject property under the coverage of the agrarian reform program; hence,
their right to due process of law was violated
Eventually, on February 12, 1984, DAR issued Certificates of Land Transfer (CLTs) in
favor of private respondents who were tenants and actual cultivators of the subject property.
ISSUE: Whether or not the e failure of the administrative body to give written notice that
the property bought by the ascendant of the petitioner is subject to PD 27 a violation of the
heirs due process.
RULING:
YES. PD 27 is a statutory notice to all owners of agricultural lands devoted to rice
and/or corn production, implying that there was no need for an actual notice. The
importance of an actual notice in subjecting a property under the agrarian reform program
cannot be underrated, as non-compliance with it trods roughshod with the essential
requirements of administrative due process of law.
Since land acquisition under either Presidential Decree No. 27 and the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law govern the extraordinary method of expropriating
private property, the law must be strictly construed. Faithful compliance with legal
provisions, especially those which relate to the procedure for acquisition of expropriated
lands should therefore be observed. In the instant case, no proper notice was given to
Virginia A. Roa by the DAR. Neither did the DAR conduct an ocular inspection and
investigation. Hence, any act committed by the DAR or any of its agencies that results from
its failure to comply with the proper procedure for expropriation of land is a violation of
constitutional due process and should be deemed arbitrary, capricious, whimsical and
tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
In addition, DAR must have notified Deleste, being the landowner of the subject
property. It should be noted that the deed of sale executed by Hilaria in favor of Deleste
was registered on March 2, 1954, and such registration serves as a constructive notice to
the whole world that the subject property was already owned by Deleste by virtue of the
said deed of sale. DAR does not have the reason to feign ignorance of the transfer of
ownership over the subject property.
Moreover, DAR should have sent the notice to Deleste, and not to the Nanamans,
since the tax declaration in the name of Virgilio was already canceled and a new one issued
in the name of Deleste. Although tax declarations are not conclusive evidence of ownership,
they are nonetheless good indicia of possession in the concept of an owner, for no one in
his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or, at least,
constructive possession.
Petitioners right to due process of law was, indeed, violated when the DAR failed to
notify them that it is subjecting the subject property under the coverage of the agrarian
reform program.
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Stephanie Q. Dandal
18 July 2015
Hacienda Luisita Inc. (HLI) v. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC), et al.,
G.R. No. 171101, November 22, 2011
I.
THE FACTS
On July 5, 2011, the Supreme Court en banc voted unanimously (11-0) to

DISMISS/DENY the petition filed by HLI and AFFIRM with MODIFICATIONS the resolutions of
the PARC revoking HLIs Stock Distribution Plan (SDP) and placing the subject lands in
Hacienda Luisita under compulsory coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program (CARP) of the government.
The Court however did not order outright land distribution. Voting 6-5, the Court
noted that there are operative facts that occurred in the interim and which the Court cannot
validly ignore. Thus, the Court declared that the revocation of the SDP must, by application
of the operative fact principle, give way to the right of the original 6,296 qualified
farmworkers-beneficiaries (FWBs) to choose whether they want to remain as HLI
stockholders or [choose actual land distribution]. It thus ordered the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) to immediately schedule meetings with the said 6,296 FWBs and explain to
them the effects, consequences and legal or practical implications of their choice, after
which the FWBs will be asked to manifest, in secret voting, their choices in the ballot,
signing their signatures or placing their thumbmarks, as the case may be, over their printed
names.
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Stephanie Q. Dandal
18 July 2015
The parties thereafter filed their respective motions for reconsideration of the Court
decision.
II.
THE ISSUES
(1) Is the operative fact doctrine available in this case?

(2) Is Sec. 31 of RA 6657 unconstitutional?
(3) Cant the Court order that DARs compulsory acquisition of Hacienda Lusita cover the
full 6,443 hectares allegedly covered by RA 6657 and previously held by Tarlac Development
Corporation (Tadeco), and not just the 4,915.75 hectares covered by HLIs SDP?
(4) Is the date of the taking (for purposes of determining the just compensation payable to
HLI) November 21, 1989, when PARC approved HLIs SDP?
(5) Has the 10-year period prohibition on the transfer of awarded lands under RA 6657 lapsed
on May 10, 1999 (since Hacienda Luisita were placed under CARP coverage through the
SDOA scheme on May 11, 1989), and thus the qualified FWBs should now be allowed to sell
their land interests in Hacienda Luisita to third parties, whether they have fully paid for the
lands or not?
(6) THE CRUCIAL ISSUE: Should the ruling in the July 5, 2011 Decision that the qualified FWBs
be given an option to remain as stockholders of HLI be reconsidered?
III. THE RULING
[The Court PARTIALLY GRANTED the motions for reconsideration of respondents
PARC, et al. with respect to the option granted to the original farmworkers-beneficiaries
(FWBs) of Hacienda Luisita to remain with petitioner HLI, which option the Court
thereby RECALLED and SET ASIDE. It reconsidered its earlier decision that the qualified
FWBs should be given an option to remain as stockholders of HLI, and UNANIMOUSLY
directed immediate land distribution to the qualified FWBs.]
1.
YES, the operative fact doctrine is applicable in this case.

[The Court maintained its stance that the operative fact doctrine is applicable in this
case since, contrary to the suggestion of the minority, the doctrine is not limited only to
invalid or unconstitutional laws but also applies to decisions made by the President or the
administrative agencies that have the force and effect of laws. Prior to the nullification or
recall of said decisions, they may have produced acts and consequences that must be
respected. It is on this score that the operative fact doctrine should be applied to acts and
consequences that resulted from the implementation of the PARC Resolution approving the
SDP of HLI. The majority stressed that the application of the operative fact doctrine by the
Court in its July 5, 2011 decision was in fact favorable to the FWBs because not only were
they allowed to retain the benefits and homelots they received under the stock distribution
scheme, they were also given the option to choose for themselves whether they want to
remain as stockholders of HLI or not.]
2.
NO, Sec. 31 of RA 6657 NOT unconstitutional.

[The Court maintained that the Court is NOT compelled to rule on the
constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, reiterating that it was not raised at the earliest
opportunity and that the resolution thereof is not the lis mota of the case. Moreover, the
issue has been rendered moot and academic since SDO is no longer one of the modes of
acquisition under RA 9700. The majority clarified that in its July 5, 2011 decision, it made no
ruling in favor of the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, but found nonetheless that
there was no apparent grave violation of the Constitution that may justify the resolution of
the issue of constitutionality.]
3.
NO, the Court CANNOT order that DARs compulsory acquisition of Hacienda
Lusita cover the full 6,443 hectares and not just the 4,915.75 hectares covered by
HLIs SDP.
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Stephanie Q. Dandal
18 July 2015
[Since what is put in issue before the Court is the propriety of the revocation of the
SDP, which only involves 4,915.75 has. of agricultural land and not 6,443 has., then the
Court is constrained to rule only as regards the 4,915.75 has. of agricultural
land.Nonetheless, this should not prevent the DAR, under its mandate under the agrarian
reform law, from subsequently subjecting to agrarian reform other agricultural lands
originally held by Tadeco that were allegedly not transferred to HLI but were supposedly
covered by RA 6657.
However since the area to be awarded to each FWB in the July 5, 2011 Decision
appears too restrictive considering that there are roads, irrigation canals, and other
portions of the land that are considered commonly-owned by farmworkers, and these may
necessarily result in the decrease of the area size that may be awarded per FWB the Court
reconsiders its Decision and resolves to give the DAR leeway in adjusting the area that may
be awarded per FWB in case the number of actual qualified FWBs decreases. In order to
ensure the proper distribution of the agricultural lands of Hacienda Luisita per qualified
FWB, and considering that matters involving strictly the administrative implementation and
enforcement of agrarian reform laws are within the jurisdiction of the DAR, it is the latter
which shall determine the area with which each qualified FWB will be awarded.
On the other hand, the majority likewise reiterated its holding that the 500-hectare
portion of Hacienda Luisita that have been validly converted to industrial use and have been
acquired by intervenors Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) and Luisita Industrial
Park Corporation (LIPCO), as well as the separate 80.51-hectare SCTEX lot acquired by the
government, should be excluded from the coverage of the assailed PARC resolution. The
Court however ordered that the unused balance of the proceeds of the sale of the 500hectare converted land and of the 80.51-hectare land used for the SCTEX be distributed to
the FWBs.]
4.
YES, the date of taking is November 21, 1989, when PARC approved HLIs SDP.
[For the purpose of determining just compensation, the date of taking is November
21, 1989 (the date when PARC approved HLIs SDP) since this is the time that the FWBs
were considered to own and possess the agricultural lands in Hacienda Luisita. To be
precise, these lands became subject of the agrarian reform coverage through the stock
distribution scheme only upon the approval of the SDP, that is, on November 21, 1989. Such
approval is akin to a notice of coverage ordinarily issued under compulsory acquisition. On
the contention of the minority (Justice Sereno) that the date of the notice of coverage [after
PARCs revocation of the SDP], that is, January 2, 2006, is determinative of the just
compensation that HLI is entitled to receive, the Court majority noted that none of the cases
cited to justify this position involved the stock distribution scheme. Thus, said cases do not
squarely apply to the instant case. The foregoing notwithstanding, it bears stressing that
the DAR's land valuation is only preliminary and is not, by any means, final and conclusive
upon the landowner. The landowner can file an original action with the RTC acting as a
special agrarian court to determine just compensation. The court has the right to review
with finality the determination in the exercise of what is admittedly a judicial function.]
5.
NO, the 10-year period prohibition on the transfer of awarded lands under RA
6657 has NOT lapsed on May 10, 1999; thus, the qualified FWBs should NOT yet
be allowed to sell their land interests in Hacienda Luisita to third parties.
[Under RA 6657 and DAO 1, the awarded lands may only be transferred or conveyed
after 10 years from the issuance and registration of the emancipation patent (EP) or
certificate of land ownership award (CLOA). Considering that the EPs or CLOAs have not yet
been issued to the qualified FWBs in the instant case, the 10-year prohibitive period has not
even started. Significantly, the reckoning point is the issuance of the EP or CLOA, and not
the placing of the agricultural lands under CARP coverage. Moreover, should the FWBs be
immediately allowed the option to sell or convey their interest in the subject lands, then all
efforts at agrarian reform would be rendered nugatory, since, at the end of the day, these
lands will just be transferred to persons not entitled to land distribution under CARP.]
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6.
Stephanie Q. Dandal
18 July 2015
YES, the ruling in the July 5, 2011 Decision that the qualified FWBs be given an
option to remain as stockholders of HLI should be reconsidered.
[The Court reconsidered its earlier decision that the qualified FWBs should be given
an option to remain as stockholders of HLI, inasmuch as these qualified FWBs will never gain
control [over the subject lands] given the present proportion of shareholdings in HLI. The
Court noted that the share of the FWBs in the HLI capital stock is [just] 33.296%. Thus, even
if all the holders of this 33.296% unanimously vote to remain as HLI stockholders, which is
unlikely, control will never be in the hands of the FWBs. Control means the majority of [sic]
50% plus at least one share of the common shares and other voting shares. Applying the
formula to the HLI stockholdings, the number of shares that will constitute the majority is
295,112,101 shares (590,554,220 total HLI capital shares divided by 2 plus one [1] HLI
share). The 118,391,976.85 shares subject to the SDP approved by PARC substantially fall
short of the 295,112,101 shares needed by the FWBs to acquire control over HLI.]
Land Bank of the Philippines v. Dumlao

Facts:
The DUMLAOS were co-owners of a 32 hectare ricelands in Nueva Vizcaya which was
placed under OLT by virtue of PD27 (note that actual date of taking was not stated.)
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Stephanie Q. Dandal
18 July 2015
The DAR made a preliminary valuation on 16 hectares (2 lots) and payments were
made to the DUMLAOs by Landbank. The DUMLAOs filed a complaint before the RTC to
determine just compensation, and requested the appointment of 3 commissioners to make
the determination.
The DAR moved to dismiss claiming that the RTC does not have jurisdiction. The RTC
eventually recognized the case and ordered payment at 6,912.50 per hectare for one lot &
to follow the amount provided for in the Land Valuation Summary and Farmers Undertaking
for the other lot. The DUMLAOs was claiming market value of 109,000 per hectare.
The DUMLAOs appealed to the CA which ruled in their favor, which noted that the
time of taking was not certain. The CA held that after the passage of RA No. 6657, the
formula relative to valuation under PD No. 27 no longer applies.
Under PD 27 and EO No. 228, the formula for computing the Land Value (LV) or Price
Per Hectare (PPH) of rice and corn lands is: 2.5 x AGP x GSP = LV or PPH.
Under the CARL, it is provide:
Sec. 17.
Determination of Just Compensation.
In determining just
compensation, the cost of acquisition of the land, the current value of the like
properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner,
the tax declarations, and the assessment made by government assessors shall
be considered. The social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and
the farmworkers and by the Government to the property as well as the nonpayment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing institution on
the said land shall be considered as additional factors to determine its valuation.
ISSUE:
Which law should be followed to determine just compensation
Ruling:
(1) The just compensation due to respondents should be determined under the
provisions of RA No. 6657.
The Court has repeatedly held that if just compensation was not settled prior to the
passage of RA No. 6657, it should be computed in accordance with said law, although the
property was acquired under PD No. 27. The latter law, being the latest law in agrarian
reform, should control, as held in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Heirs of Angel T. Domingo.
Section 75 of RA 6657 clearly states that the provisions of PD 27 and EO 228 shall
only have a suppletory effect. Section 7 of the Act also provides
Sec. 7. Priorities. The DAR, in coordination with the PARC shall plan and program
the acquisition and distribution of all agricultural lands through a period of ten (10) years
from the effectivity of this Act. Lands shall be acquired and distributed as follows:
Phase One: Rice and Corn lands under P.D. 27; all idle or abandoned lands; all private
lands voluntarily offered by the owners for agrarian reform; x x x and all other lands owned
by the government devoted to or suitable for agriculture, which shall be acquired and
distributed immediately upon the effectivity of this Act, with the implementation to be
completed within a period of not more than four (4) years.
This demonstrates that RA 6657 includes PD 27 lands among the properties which
the DAR shall acquire and distribute to the landless.
DARs failure to determine the just compensation for a considerable length of time
makes it inequitable to follow the guidelines provided by PD No. 27 and EO No. 228. Hence,
RA No. 6657 should apply.
NOTE HOWEVER that the CAs act of setting just compensation in the amount
of P109,000.00 would have been a valid exercise of this judicial function, had it followed the
mandatory formula prescribed by RA No. 6657. However, the appellate court merely chose
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Stephanie Q. Dandal
18 July 2015
the lower of two (2) values specified by the commissioner as basis for determining just
compensation, namely: (a) P109,000.00 per hectare as the market value of first class
unirrigated rice land in the Municipality of Villaverde; and (b)P60.00 per square meter as
the zonal value of the land in other barangays in Villaverde.
This is likewise erroneous because it does not adhere to the formula provided by RA
No. 6657 under Section 17, as implemented through DAR Admin Order No. 6 (1992) - LV =
(CNI x 0.6) + (CS x 0.3) + (MV x 0.1),
where: LV
= Land Value
CNI
= Capitalized Net Income
CS
= Comparable Sales
MV
= Market Value per Tax Declaration
(2) The taking of the properties for the purpose of computing just compensation
should be reckoned from the date of issuance of emancipation patents.
The nature of the land at that time determines the just compensation to be paid.
(3) The DUMLAOs are entitled to payment of just compensation on their entire
landholdings covered by Operation Land Transfer, except for the five hectares
of retention area each of them are entitled to (RIGHT OF RETENTION).
The determination of just compensation is judicial in nature. The DARs land
valuation is only preliminary and is not, by any means, final and conclusive upon the
landowner or any other interested party. In the exercise of its functions, the courts still have
the final say on what the amount of just compensation will be.
A reading of Section 18 of RA No. 6657 shows that it is the courts, not the DAR, which
make the final determination of just compensation.
Also, to wait for the DAR valuation despite its unreasonable neglect and delay in
processing the four properties claimfolders is to violate the elementary rule that payment of
just compensation must be within a reasonable period from the taking of property.
While the DAR is vested with primary
jurisdiction to determine in a preliminary manner the amount of just compensation,
the circumstances of this case militate against the application of the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction.
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. HEIRS OF SPOUSES JORJA RIGORSORIANO AND MAGIN SORIANO, NAMELY: MARIVEL S. CARANDANG AND JOSEPH
SORIANO, Respondents.
Facts: Marivel Carandang and Joseph Soriano are the children of the late Sps. Jorja RigorSoriano and Magin Soriano, the owners of the two parcels of land located in Macabucod,
Aliaga, Nueva Ecija. The properties became subject to Operation Land Transfer (OLT) and
were valued by the Land Bank and the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) at
P10,000.00/hectare. Contending that such valuation was too low compared to existing
valuations of agricultural lands, the heirs commenced an action for just compensation. They
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Stephanie Q. Dandal
18 July 2015
asked that a final valuation of the properties be pegged at P1,800,000.00, based on

Administrative Order No. 61, Series of 1992 and R.A. No. 6657.
The RTC ordered Land Bank to pay the heirs the amount P1,227,571.10 as just
compensation.
Land Bank appealed to the CA. The CA denied the petition.
Hence, Land Bank appealed to the Supreme Court.
During the pendency of the appeal, both parties entered into an agreement re-evaluating
the cost of the parcels of land. Thus, Land Bank submitted a manifestation informing the
High Court that the parties have already filed their Joint Motion to Approve submitting their
Agreement dated November 29, 2012.
ISSUE: Whether or not the present appeal to the Supreme Court should be dismissed?
Ruling:
The appeal should be closed and terminated.
CIVIL LAW: compromise; contract
The Agreement was a compromise that the parties freely and voluntarily entered into for the
purpose of finally settling their dispute in this case. Under Art. 2028 of the Civil Code, a
compromise is a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid a
litigation or put an end to one already commenced. Accordingly, a compromise is either
judicial, if the objective is to put an end to a pending litigation, or extrajudicial, if the
objective is to avoid a litigation.
As a contract, a compromise is perfected by mutual consent. However, a judicial
compromise, while immediately binding between the parties upon its execution, is not
executory until it is approved by the court and reduced to a judgment. The validity of a
compromise is dependent upon its compliance with the requisites and principles of contracts
dictated by law. Also, the terms and conditions of a compromise must not be contrary to law,
morals, good customs, public policy and public order. A review of the terms of the
Agreement, indicates that it is a judicial compromise because the parties intended it to
terminate their pending litigation by fully settling their dispute.
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
SPOUSES PLACIDO ORILLA and CLARA DY ORILLA, respondents.
Facts:
Spouses Placido and Clara Orilla (respondents) were the owners of Lot No. 1, 11-12706,
situated in Bohol, containing an area of 23.3416 hectares and covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 18401. In the latter part of November 1996, the Department of Agrarian Reform
Provincial Agrarian Reform Office (DAR-PARO) of Bohol sent respondents a Notice of Land
Valuation and Acquisition dated November 15, 1996 informing them of the compulsory
acquisition of 21.1289 hectares of their landholdings pursuant to the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law (Republic Act [RA] 6657) for P371,154.99 as compensation based on
the valuation made by the Land Bank of the Philippines (petitioner).
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Stephanie Q. Dandal
18 July 2015
Respondents rejected the said valuation. Consequently, the Provincial Department of

Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (Provincial DARAB) conducted a summary hearing on
the amount of just compensation. Thereafter, the Provincial DARAB affirmed the valuation
made by the petitioner.
After trial on the merits, the SAC rendered a Decision which rendered fixing the just
compensation of the land of petitioner subject matter of the instant action at P7.00 per
square meter. Furthermore, respondents are hereby ordered to jointly and solidarily
indemnify the petitioners their expenses for attorneys fee and contract fee in the conduct of
the appraisal of the land by a duly licensed real estate appraiser Angelo G. Fajardo of which
petitioner shall submit a bill of costs therefor for the approval of the Court.
After trial on the merits, the SAC rendered a Decision dated November 20, 2000, the
dispositive portion of which reads
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered fixing the just compensation of the land of
petitioner subject matter of the instant action at P7.00 per square meter, as only
prayed for, which shall earn legal interest from the filing of the complaint until the
same shall have been fully paid. Furthermore, respondents are hereby ordered to
jointly and solidarily indemnify the petitioners their expenses for attorneys fee and
contract fee in the conduct of the appraisal of the land by a duly licensed real estate
appraiser Angelo G. Fajardo of which petitioner shall submit a bill of costs therefor for
the approval of the Court.
On March 13, 2001, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a special civil
action18 for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with prayer for
issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction. It questioned the
propriety of the SAC Order granting the execution pending appeal. Respondents and the
presiding judge of the SAC, as nominal party, filed their respective comments on the petition.
In its Decision dated July 29, 2002, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition on the
ground that the assailed SAC Order dated December 21, 2000 granting execution pending
appeal was consistent with justice, fairness, and equity, as respondents had been deprived
of the use and possession of their property pursuant to RA 6657 and are entitled to be
immediately compensated with the amount as determined by the SAC under the principle of
"prompt payment" of just compensation.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Court of Appeals Decision, but the same
was denied in a Resolution dated February 5, 2003. Hence, this appeal
ISSUE: THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT THE RESPONDENTS WERE
ENTITLED TO EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL OF THE COMPENSATION FIXED BY THE SAC
BASED ON THE PRINCIPLE OF PROMPT PAYMENT OF JUST COMPENSATION, EVEN THOUGH
THE PRINCIPLE OF PROMPT PAYMENT IS SATISFIED BY THE PAYMENT AND IMMEDIATE
RELEASE OF THE PROVISIONAL COMPENSATION UNDER SECTION 16(E) OF RA 6657, UPON
SUBMISSION OF THE LEGAL REQUIREMENTS, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE RULING OF THIS
HONORABLE COURT IN THE CASE OF "LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES V. COURT OF
APPEALS, PEDRO L. YAP, ET AL.," G.R. NO. 118712, OCTOBER 6, 1995 AND JULY 5, 1996, AND
NOT BY EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL OF THE COMPENSATION FIXED BY THE SAC.
RULING:
In this case, do good reasons exist to justify the grant by the SAC of the motion for execution
pending appeal? The answer is a resounding YES.
The expropriation of private property under RA 6657 is a revolutionary kind of expropriation,
being a means to obtain social justice by distributing land to the farmers, envisioning
freedom from the bondage to the land they actually till. As an exercise of police power, it
puts the landowner, not the government, in a situation where the odds are practically
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Stephanie Q. Dandal
18 July 2015
against him. He cannot resist it. His only consolation is that he can negotiate for the amount
of compensation to be paid for the property taken by the government. As expected, the
landowner will exercise this right to the hilt, subject to the limitation that he can only be
entitled to "just compensation." Clearly therefore, by rejecting and disputing the valuation of
the DAR, the landowner is merely exercising his right to seek just compensation.
In light of these circumstances, the SAC found that the valuation made by petitioner, and
affirmed by the DAR, was unjustly way below the fair valuation of the landholding at the time
of its taking by the DAR. The SAC, mindful also of the advanced age of respondents at the
time of the presentation of evidence for the determination of just compensation, deemed it
proper to grant their motion for execution pending appeal with the objective of ensuring
"prompt payment" of just compensation.
Contrary to the view of petitioner, "prompt payment" of just compensation is not satisfied by
the mere deposit with any accessible bank of the provisional compensation determined by it
or by the DAR, and its subsequent release to the landowner after compliance with the legal
requirements set by RA 6657.
Constitutionally, "just compensation" is the sum equivalent to the market value of the
property, broadly described as the price fixed by the seller in open market in the usual and
ordinary course of legal action and competition, or the fair value of the property as between
the one who receives and the one who desires to sell, it being fixed at the time of the actual
taking by the government. Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the
property taken from its owner by the expropriator. It has been repeatedly stressed by this
Court that the true measure is not the takers gain but the owners loss. The word "just" is
used to modify the meaning of the word "compensation" to convey the idea that the
equivalent to be given for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full, and ample.
Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals

Facts:
Private respondents are landowners whose landholdings were acquired by the DAR and
subjected to transfer schemes to qualified beneficiaries under the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law. Private respondents questioned the validity of DAR Administrative Order No. 6,
Series of 1992 and DAR Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1990, and sought to compel
the DAR to expedite the pending summary administrative proceedings to finally determine
the just compensation of their properties, and the Landbank to deposit in cash and bonds
the amounts respectively earmarked, reserved and deposited in trust accounts for private
respondents, and to allow them to withdraw the same.
Petitioner DAR maintained that Administrative Order No. 9 is a valid exercise of its rulemaking power pursuant to Section 49 of RA 6657. Moreover, the DAR maintained that the
issuance of the Certificate of Deposit by the Landbank was a substantial compliance with
Section 16(e) of RA 6657.
Issue: Whether or not the opening of trust accounts is a valid payment for just
compensation
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Stephanie Q. Dandal
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Ruling: It is very explicit from the provisions of RA 6657 that the deposit must be made
only in cash or in LBP bonds. Nowhere does it appear nor can it be inferred that the deposit
can be made in any other form. If it were the intention to include a trust account among the
valid modes of deposit that should have been made express, or at least, qualifying words
ought to have appeared from which it can be fairly deduced that a trust account is allowed.
In sum, there is no ambiguity in Section 16(e) of RA 6657 to warrant an expanded
construction of the term deposit.
Association of Small Landowners v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform
Facts:
These are four consolidated cases questioning the constitutionality of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Act (R.A. No. 6657 and related laws i.e., Agrarian Land Reform Code or R.A.
No. 3844).
Brief background: Article XIII of the Constitution on Social Justice and Human Rights includes
a call for the adoption by the State of an agrarian reform program. The State shall, by law,
undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular
farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the
case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. RA 3844 was enacted
in 1963. P.D. No. 27 was promulgated in 1972 to provide for the compulsory acquisition of
private lands for distribution among tenant-farmers and to specify maximum retention limits
for landowners. In 1987, President Corazon Aquino issued E.O. No. 228, declaring full land
ownership in favor of the beneficiaries of PD 27 and providing for the valuation of still
unvalued lands covered by the decree as well as the manner of their payment. In 1987, P.P.
No. 131, instituting a comprehensive agrarian reform program (CARP) was enacted; later,
E.O. No. 229, providing the mechanics for its (PP131s) implementation, was also enacted.
Afterwhich is the enactment of R.A. No. 6657, Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law in 1988.
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Stephanie Q. Dandal
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This law, while considerably changing the earlier mentioned enactments, nevertheless gives
them suppletory effect insofar as they are not inconsistent with its provisions.
[Two of the consolidated cases are discussed below]
G.R. No. 78742: (Association of Small Landowners vs Secretary)
The Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. sought exception from the land
distribution scheme provided for in R.A. 6657. The Association is comprised of landowners of
ricelands and cornlands whose landholdings do not exceed 7 hectares. They invoke that
since their landholdings are less than 7 hectares, they should not be forced to distribute
their land to their tenants under R.A. 6657 for they themselves have shown willingness to till
their own land. In short, they want to be exempted from agrarian reform program because
they claim to belong to a different class.
G.R. No. 79777: (Manaay vs Juico)
Nicolas Manaay questioned the validity of the agrarian reform laws (PD 27, EO 228, and 229)
on the ground that these laws already valuated their lands for the agrarian reform program
and that the specific amount must be determined by the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR). Manaay averred that this violated the principle in eminent domain which provides
that only courts can determine just compensation. This, for Manaay, also violated due
process for under the constitution, no property shall be taken for public use without just
compensation.
Manaay also questioned the provision which states that landowners may be paid for their
land in bonds and not necessarily in cash. Manaay averred that just compensation has
always been in the form of money and not in bonds.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not there was a violation of the equal protection clause.
2. Whether or not there is a violation of due process.
3. Whether or not just compensation, under the agrarian reform program, must be in terms
of cash.
Ruling:
1. No. The Association had not shown any proof that they belong to a different class exempt
from the agrarian reform program. Under the law, classification has been defined as the
grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain particulars and different from
each other in these same particulars. To be valid, it must conform to the
following requirements:
(1) it must be based on substantial distinctions;
(2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) it must apply equally to all the members of the class.
Equal protection simply means that all persons or things similarly situated must be treated
alike both as to the rights conferred and the liabilities imposed. The Association have not
shown that they belong to a different class and entitled to a different treatment. The
argument that not only landowners but also owners of other properties must be made to
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Stephanie Q. Dandal
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share the burden of implementing land reform must be rejected. There is a substantial
distinction between these two classes of owners that is clearly visible except to those who
will not see. There is no need to elaborate on this matter. In any event, the Congress is
allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification. Its decision is accorded
recognition and respect by the courts of justice except only where its discretion is abused to
the detriment of the Bill of Rights. In the contrary, it appears that Congress is right in
classifying small landowners as part of the agrarian reform program.
2. No. It is true that the determination of just compensation is a power lodged in the courts.
However, there is no law which prohibits administrative bodies like the DAR from
determining just compensation. In fact, just compensation can be that amount agreed upon
by the landowner and the government even without judicial intervention so long as both
parties agree. The DAR can determine just compensation through appraisers and if the
landowner agrees, then judicial intervention is not needed. What is contemplated by law
however is that, the just compensation determined by an administrative body is merely
preliminary. If the landowner does not agree with the finding of just compensation by an
administrative body, then it can go to court and the determination of the latter shall be the
final determination. This is even so provided by RA 6657:
Section 16 (f): Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the matter to the court
of proper jurisdiction for final determination of just compensation.
3. No. Money as [sole] payment for just compensation is merely a concept in traditional
exercise of eminent domain. The agrarian reform program is a revolutionary exercise of
eminent domain. The program will require billions of pesos in funds if all compensation have
to be made in cash if everything is in cash, then the government will not have sufficient
money hence, bonds, and other securities, i.e., shares of stocks, may be used for just
compensation.
HEIRS OF FRANCISCO R. TANTOCO, SR., MARIA R. TANTOCO, ZOSIMO TANTOTCO,

MARGARITA R. TANTOCO and PACITA R. TANTOCO, petitioners, vs. HON.
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD (DARAB), AGRARIAN
REFORM BENEFICIARIES ASSOCIATION OF SAN FRANCISCO, GEN. TRIAS, CAVITE,
REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR THE PROVINCE OF CAVITE and THE DAR REGION IV
DIRECTOR,
Facts:
Petitioner Francisco R. Tantoco, Sr. who died and was substituted by his heirs while this case
was still pending before the DARAB Adjudication Board for Region IV, and his co-petitioners,
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Stephanie Q. Dandal
18 July 2015
namely, Maria R. Tantoco, Zosimo Tantoco, Margarita R. Tantoco and Pacita R. Tantoco, were
the former owners of a vast track of land with an area of 106.5128 hectares, situated at San
Francisco, General Trias, Cavite and previously registered in their names under Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-33404 of the Registry of Deeds of Cavite.
At about that time, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) was already considering the
land in question for compulsory acquisition under the provisions of Republic Act No. 6657,
Francisco Tantoco, Sr., for and in his own behalf and in behalves of his co-petitioners,
declared the productive nature and agricultural suitability of the land in dispute and at the
same time offered the same to the DAR for acquisition under the Voluntary Offer To Sell
(VOS) scheme of the government's Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP).
Obviously welcomed by the DAR, the offer was immediately acted upon. Hence, after
processing the acquisition of the same 100 hectares under the VOS scheme of Republic Act
No. 6657, the DAR issued on August 30, 1993 a Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA)
in favor of private respondent Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Association (ARBA) of San
Francisco, General Trias, Cavite and its 53 members. In turn, on the basis of the same CLOA,
the respondent Register of Deeds of Cavite issued TCT No. CLOA-1424 in the name of ARBA
and its 53 members and accordingly cancelled the Tantocos' TCT No. T-402203.The Tantocos
filed their petition for cancellation of TCT N. CLOA-1424 and the reinstatement of their TCT
No. T-402203. Impleaded in the same petition as additional respondents are the Register of
Deeds for the Province of Cavite and the DAR Region IV Director.
The land in question is within the on-going industrial estate development site per land use
plan of the Municipality of General Trias, Cavite; that it has been planted to sugar and
declared as such for taxation purposes. In an Order dated September 1, 1986 of the then
Minister of Agrarian Reform Heherson Alvarez, the same land was declared outside of the
purview or ambit of Presidential Decree No. 27; that the property is within that portion of
Cavite that has been declared as an industrial zone in the CALABARZON area, reason for
which the price of real properties thereat has greatly appreciated, "so much so that almost
all persons, including owners, investors and farmers became interested, and even pseudoclaimants are speculating to make a windfall profit on whatever real property they could lay
their hands on"; that the approval of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law on June 10,
1988, coupled with the knowledge that the area has been declared part of the industrial
zone of Cavite, persons unknown to petitioners begun to claim to be tenants or farmholders
on said land, when in truth and in fact, petitioners never had any tenant/farmworker
thereon, and neither did the petitioners give their consent for anyone to farm the same
"which is suitable for sugarcane, residential or industrial purposes and not for rice or corn or
other industrial products"
Coupled with a prayer for a temporary restraining order and eventually a writ of preliminary
injunction to enjoin the respondents, particularly ARBA, "from negotiating, selling or
otherwise disposing of said land, or any part or portion thereof", the petition prays for a
judgment: (a) declaring TCT No. CLOA-1424 as null and void from the beginning and ordering
its cancellation; (b) reinstating the petitioners' TCT No. T-402203, or issuing a new title to
them; and (c) ordering the Register of Deeds of Cavite to effect said mandate, plus damages
and attorney's fees.
In its Answer, respondents ARBA denied the material allegations of the petition, and averred,
among other things, that the subject land is planted to several crops such as rice, corn,
bananas, vegetable, etc.; that the farmer-beneficiaries listed in TCT No. T-CLOA-1424 are
qualified beneficiaries as provided for in Section 22 of Republic Act No. 6657; that due
process the coverage under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of the land
in dispute.
Both the petitioners and respondent ARBA separately appealed to the DAR Adjudication
Board (DARAB) at Quezon City, where their respective recourses were consolidated and
docketed as DARAB Case No. 6385.
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Stephanie Q. Dandal
18 July 2015
In time, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, followed by a Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration and a Submission, to which a corresponding Opposition was interposed by
respondent ARBA.
Eventually, in its Resolution of September 6, 1999, the DARAB denied petitioners'
motions "for lack of merit", saying that "no new matters are adduced by the movants which
will warrant a reversal of the board's decision
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT DARAB ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION AND
WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT RENDERED THE QUESTIONED DECISION
DATED JULY 1, 1998, IN COMPLETE DISREGARD OF LAW AND UNDISPUTED FINDINGS OF
FACTS BY THE REGIONAL ADJUDICATOR IN HER DECISION DATED JUNE 17, 1997.
RULING:
NO.
The Court made a thorough review of the evidence on record and found nothing therein to
substantiate petitioners' posture. It may well happen, as it normally does, that a piece of
evidence may be viewed differently by different fora. Certainly, however, if an appellate
agency, like the DARAB, did not adopt in toto the finding of facts made by a subordinate
office, and even disagrees with them, more so when, as here, the disagreement is wellexplained, We are at loss to understand how grave abuse of discretion, as understood in law
and jurisprudence, may be imputed to the latter.
Finally, petitioners presently question the legal competence and authority of the four
(4) DARAB members who signed and promulgated the assailed decision. It is petitioners'
thesis that all four (4) of them are political appointees of former President Fidel V. Ramos. As
such, and pursuant to Executive Order No. 1, allegedly issued by the incumbent President
soon after assuming office on June 30, 1998, whereunder all political appointees of the
former President were deemed terminated from office, said members had ceased to be such
effective July 1, 1998. Prescinding therefrom, petitioners contend that the decision under
review which was promulgated on July 1, 1998, "is null and void" for lack of legal authority
on the part of the same four (4) DARAB members who signed and promulgated the decision.
As indicated below their respective names, DARAB members Lorenzo R. Reyes, Augusto P.
Quijano and Sergio B. Serrano are all Assistant Secretary in the Department of Agrarian
Reform, the first being at the same time Vice Chairman of DARAB, while the last two (2) are
members of the same Board, while member Artemio A. Adaza, Jr., was then the DAR
Undersecretary.
In the absence of a showing by the petitioners, and none has been made by them, that
the four (4) DARAB members are non-career officials, the challenge on their legal authority
to sign and promulgate the assailed decision must simply fall.
CENTRAL MINDANAO UNIVERSITY, petitioner, vs. DARAB, et.al., respondents

Facts:
The petitioner, the CMU, is an agricultural education institution owned and run by the
estate located in the town of Musuan, Bukidnon province. It started as a farm school at
Marilag, Bukidnon, in early 1910, in response to the public demand for an agricultural school
in Mindanao. In the early 1960's, it was converted into a college until it became what is now
known as the CMU, but still primarily an agricultural university. On January 16, 1958 the late
Carlos P. Garcia, issued Proclamation No. 467, withdrawing from sale or settlement and
reserving for the Mindanao Agricultural College, a site which would be the future campus of
what is now the CMU. A total land area comprising 3,080 hectares was surveyed and
registered and titled in the name of the petitioner.Several tribes belonging to cultural
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Stephanie Q. Dandal
18 July 2015
communities, opposed the petition claiming ownership of certain ancestral lands forming
part of the tribal reservations. Some of the claims were granted so that what was titled to
the present petitioner school was reduced from 3,401 hectares to 3,080 hectares.
In 1984, the CMU approved Resolution No. 160, adopting a livelihood program called
"Kilusang Sariling Sikap Program" under which the land resources of the University were
leased to its faculty and employees. This arrangement was covered by a written contract.
The faculty and staff combine themselves to groups of five members each, and the CMU
provided technical know-how, practical training and all kinds of assistance, to enable each
group to cultivate 4 to 5 hectares of land for the lowland rice projects. Each group pays the
CMU a service fee and also a land use participant's fee. It was expressly stipulated that no
landlord-tenant relationship existed between the CMU and the faculty and/or employees.
This particular program was conceived as a multi-disciplinary applied research extension and
productivity program to utilize available land, train people in modern agricultural technology
and at the same time give the faculty and staff opportunity within the confines of the CMU
reservation to earn additional income to augment their salaries.
Among the participants in this program were Alvin Obrique, Felix Guinanao, Joven
Caballero, Nestor Pulao, Danilo Vasquez, Aronio Pelayo and other complainants
(respondents). Obrique was a Physics Instructor at the CMU while the others were
employees in the lowland rice project.
In 1986, the agri-business project for the production of rice, corn and sugar cane known as
Agri-Business Management and Training Project was discontinued due to losses incurred
while carrying on the said project. Some CMU personnel, among whom were the
complainants, were laid-off when this project was discontinued. The CMU later launched a
self-help project called CMU-Income Enhancement Program (CMU-IEP) to develop unutilized
land resources, mobilize and promote the spirit of self-reliance, provide socio-economic and
technical training in actual field project implementation and augment the income of the
faculty and the staff. The one-year contracts expired on June 30, 1988. Some contracts were
renewed. Those whose contracts were not renewed were served with notices to vacate.
The non-renewal of the contracts, the discontinuance of the rice, corn and sugar can project,
the loss of jobs due to termination or separation from the service and the alleged
harassment by school authorities, all contributed to, and precipitated the filing of, the
complaint.
ISSUES:
1.)
Whether or not the DARAB has jurisdiction to hear and decide Case No. 005 for
Declaration of Status of Tenants and coverage of land under the CARP.
2.)
Whether or not respondent Court of Appeals committed serious errors and grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in dismissing the Petition for Review on
Certiorari and affirming the decision of DARAB.
Ruling:
DARAB JURISDICTION LIMITED ONLY TO MATTERS INVOLVING IMPLEMENTATION OF CARP.
Under Section 4 and Section 10 of R.A. 6657, it is crystal clear that the jurisdiction of the
DARAB is limited only to matters involving the implementation of the CARP. More specifically,
it is restricted to agrarian cases and controversies involving lands falling within the coverage
of the aforementioned program. It does not include those which are actually, directly and
exclusively used and found to be necessary for, among such purposes, school sites and
campuses for setting up experimental farm stations, research and pilot production centers,
etc.Consequently, the DARAB has no power to try, hear and adjudicate the case pending
before it involving a portion of the CMU's titled school site, as the portion of the CMU land
reservation ordered segregated is actually, directly and exclusively used and found by the
school to be necessary for its purposes.
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Stephanie Q. Dandal
18 July 2015
SEGREGATING SOME HECTARES OF LAND WITHOUT FINDING THAT COMPLAINANTS ARE

TENANTS: GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION. Where the quasi-judicial body finds that the
complainants/petitioners are not entitled to the rights they are demanding, it is an erroneous
interpretation of authority for that quasi-judicial body to order private property to be
awarded to future beneficiaries. The order segregating 400 hectares of the CMU land was
issued on a finding that the complainants are not entitled as beneficiaries, and on an
erroneous assumption that the CMU land which is excluded or exempted under the law is
subject to the coverage of the CARP. Going beyond what was asked by the complainants who
were not entitled to the relief prayed for, constitutes a grave abuse of discretion because it
implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction.
NEITHER DARAB OR COURT OF APPEALS HAS RIGHT TO PASS UPON NEEDS OF SCHOOL. As
to the determination of when and what lands are found to be necessary for use by the CMU,
the school is in the best position to resolve and answer the question and pass upon the
problem of its needs in relation to its avowed objectives for which the land was given to it by
the State. Neither the DARAB nor the Court of Appeals has the right to substitute its
judgment or discretion on this matter, unless the evidentiary facts are so manifest as to
show that the CMU has no real need for the land.
The evidence is sufficient to sustain a finding of grave abuse of discretion by respondents
Court of Appeals and DAR Adjudication Board. The Court declared the decision of the DARAB
and the Court of Appeals as null and void and hereby orders that they be set aside, with
costs against the private respondents.
Department of Agrarian Reform v. Department of Education, Culture and Sports

Facts: Petition for review on certiorari to set aside decision of CA which denied petitioners
motion for reconsideration
Lot No.2509 and Lot No. 817-D consists of an aggregate area of 189.2462 hectares located
at Hacienda Fe, Escalante, Negros Occidental and Brgy. Gen. Luna, Sagay, Negros
Occidental, respectively. On October 21, 1921, these lands were donated by Esteban
Jalandoni to respondent DECS. Titles were transferred in the name of respondent DECS.
DECS leased the lands to Anglo Agricultural Corporation for 10 agricultural crop years,
commencing from crop year 1984-1985 to crop year 1993-1994. The contract of lease was
subsequently renewed for another 10 agricultural crop years, commencing from crop year
1995-1996 to crop year 2004-2005.
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Stephanie Q. Dandal
18 July 2015
June 10, 1993: Eugenio Alpar et.al, claim to be permanent and regular farm workers of the
subject lands, filed a petition for Compulsory Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) coverage with
the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) of Escalante.
After investigation, MARO Jacinto R. Piosa, sent a Notice of Coverage to respondent DECS,
stating that the lands are covered by CARP and inviting its representatives for a conference
with the farmer beneficiaries. Then, MARO Piosa submitted his report to OIC-PARO Stephen
M. Leonidas, who recommended to the DAR Regional Director the approval of the coverage
of the landholdings.
August 7, 1998: DAR Regional Director Andres approved the recommendation and directed
Provincial Agrarian Reform Office to facilitate acquisition and distribution of landholdings to
qualified beneficiaries.
DECS appealed the case to the Secretary of Agrarian Reform which affirmed the Order of the
Regional Director.
Aggrieved DECS filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which set aside the
decision of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform. Hence, the instant petition for review.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the subject properties are exempt from the coverage of Republic Act No.
6657/ Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1998 (CARL)NO
2. Whether or not the farmers are qualified beneficiaries of CARP--YES
The general policy under CARL is to cover as much lands suitable for agriculture as
possible. Section 4 of R.A. No. 6657 sets out the coverage of CARP. The program shall:
cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all public and
private agricultural lands as provided in Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order No. 229,
including other lands of the public domain suitable for agriculture.
Following lands are covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program:
(a)
All alienable and disposable lands of the public domain devoted to or

suitable for agriculture. No reclassification of forest or mineral lands to
agricultural lands shall be undertaken after the approval of this Act until
Congress, taking into account, ecological, developmental and equity
considerations, shall have determined by law, the specific limits of the public
domain;
(b)
All lands of the public domain in excess of the specific limits as

determined by Congress in the preceding paragraph;
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Stephanie Q. Dandal
18 July 2015
(c)
All other lands owned by the Government devoted to or suitable for

agriculture; and
(d)
All private lands devoted to or suitable for agriculture regardless of the

agricultural products raised or that can be raised thereon.
Section 3(c): agricultural land- land devoted to agricultural activity as defined in this
Act and not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land.
agriculture or agricultural activity- means the cultivation of the soil, planting of

crops, growing of fruit trees, raising of livestock, poultry or fish, including the harvesting of
such farm products, and other farm activities, and practices performed by a farmer in
conjunction with such farming operations done by persons whether natural or juridical.
The records of the case show that the subject properties were formerly private
agricultural lands owned by the late Esteban Jalandoni, and were donated to respondent
DECS. From that time until they were leased to Anglo Agricultural Corporation, the lands
continued to be agricultural primarily planted to sugarcane, albeit part of the public domain
being owned by an agency of the government. There is no legislative or presidential act,
before and after the enactment of R.A. No. 6657, classifying the said lands as mineral, forest,
residential, commercial or industrial land. Indubitably, the subject lands fall under the
classification of lands of the public domain devoted to or suitable for agriculture.
-DECS: sought exemption from CARP coverage on the ground that all the income derived
from its contract of lease with Anglo Agricultural Corporation were actually, directly and
exclusively used for educational purposes.
-DAR: the lands subject are not exempt from the CARP coverage because the same are not
actually, directly and exclusively used as school sites or campuses, as they are in fact leased
to Anglo Agricultural Corporation. Further, to be exempt from the coverage, it is the
land per se, not the income derived that must be actually, directly and exclusively used for
educational purposes.
Ruling:
I. We agree with the petitioner DAR that they are not exempted.
Section 10 of R.A. No. 6657 enumerates the types of lands which are exempted
from the coverage of CARP as well as the purposes of their exemption:
c)
Lands actually, directly and exclusively used and found to be necessary for national
defense, school sites and campuses, including experimental farm stations operated by
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Stephanie Q. Dandal
18 July 2015
public or private schools for educational purposes, , shall be exempt from the coverage of
this Act.
xxx
xxx
xxx
In order to be exempt from the coverage: 1) the land must be actually, directly, and
exclusively used and found to be necessary; and 2) the purpose is for school sites and
campuses, including experimental farm stations operated by public or private schools for
educational purposes.
The importance of the phrase actually, directly, and exclusively used and found to be
necessary cannot be understated. The words of the law are clear and unambiguous. The
plain meaning rule or verba legis is applicable. Where the words of a statute are clear,
plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without
attempted interpretation.
We are not unaware of our ruling in the case of Central Mindanao University v.
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board, wherein we declared the land subject
exempt from CARP coverage. However, DECS reliance is misplaced because the factual
circumstances are different in the case at bar.
1st, in the CMU case, the land involved was not alienable and disposable land of the
public domain because it was reserved by the late President Carlos P. Garcia under Proc. No.
476 for the use of Mindanao Agricultural College (now CMU). In this case, however, the
lands fall under the category of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain suitable
for agriculture.
2nd, in the CMU case, the land was actually, directly and exclusively used and found to
be necessary for school sites and campuses. Although a portion of it was being used by the
Philippine Packing Corporation (now Del Monte Phils., Inc.) under a Management and
Development Agreement, the undertaking was that the land shall be used by the Philippine
Packing Corporation as part of the CMU research program, with direct participation of faculty
and students. The retention of the land was found to be necessary for the present and
future educational needs. On the other hand, the lands in this case were
not actually and exclusively utilized as school sites and campuses. They were leased to
Anglo Agricultural Corporation, not for educational but business purposes. Also, it was the
income and not the lands that was directly used for the repairs and renovations of the
schools.
II. We disagree with the Court of Appeals finding that they were not qualified
beneficiaries.
The identification of actual and potential beneficiaries under CARP is vested in the Secretary
of Agrarian Reform pursuant to Section 15, R.A. No. 6657:
SECTION 15.
Registration of Beneficiaries. The DAR in coordination with the
Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC) as organized in this Act, shall register all
agricultural lessees, tenants and farmworkers who are qualified to be beneficiaries of the
CARP. These potential beneficiaries with the assistance of the BARC and the DAR shall
provide the following data:
(a)
names and members of their immediate farm household;
Page | 29

(b)
Stephanie Q. Dandal
18 July 2015
owners or administrators of the lands they work on and the length of

tenurial relationship;
(c)
location and area of the land they work;
(d)
crops planted; and
(e)
their share in the harvest or amount of rental paid or wages received.
A copy of the registry or list of all potential CARP beneficiaries in the barangay shall be
posted in the barangay hall, school or other public buildings in the barangay where it shall
be open to inspection by the public at all reasonable hours.
In the case at bar, the BARC certified that the farmers were potential CARP beneficiaries
of the subject properties. Further, on November 23, 1994, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform
through the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) issued a Notice of Coverage placing
the subject properties under CARP. Since the identification and selection of CARP
beneficiaries are matters involving strictly the administrative implementation of the CARP, it
behooves the courts to exercise great caution in substituting its own determination of the
issue, unless there is grave abuse of discretion committed by the administrative agency. In
this case, there was none.
The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) is the bastion of social justice of
poor landless farmers, the mechanism designed to redistribute to the underprivileged the
natural right to toil the earth, and to liberate them from oppressive tenancy. The objective
of the State is that: landless farmers and farmworkers will receive the highest consideration
to promote social justice and to move the nation toward sound rural development and
industrialization.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of

the Court of Appeals dated October 29, 2002, in CA-G.R. SP No. 64378 is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The decision dated August 30, 2000 of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform placing
the subject lands under CARP coverage, is REINSTATED.
Milestone Farms, Petitioner v. Office of the President, Respondent

Facts:
Among the pertinent secondary purposes of Milestone Farms are 1) to engage in the raising
of cattle, pigs, and other livestock; 2) to breed, raise, and sell poultry; and 3) to import
cattle, pigs, and other livestock, and animal food necessary for the raising of said cattle,
pigs, and other livestock
On June 10, 1988, CARL took effect. In May 1993, petitioner applied for the
exemption/exclusion of its 316.0422-hectare property pursuant to the aforementioned ruling
of this Court in Luz Farms.
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Stephanie Q. Dandal
18 July 2015
Meanwhile, on December 27, 1993, DAR issued AO No. 9, Series of 1993, setting forth rules
and regulations to govern the exclusion of agricultural lands used for livestock, poultry, and
swine raising from CARP coverage.
Milestone re-documented its application pursuant to said AO. DARs Land Use Conversion
and Exemption Committee (LUCEC) conducted an ocular inspection on petitioners property
and recommended the exemption of petitioners 316.0422-hectare property from the
coverage of CARP.
DAR Regional Director Dalugdug adopted LUCECs recommendation
The Pinugay Farmers, represented by Balajadia, moved for the reconsideration of the said
Order, but the same was denied by Director Dalugdug. Hence, they filed an appeal with DAR
Secretary. Subsequently, Milestone filed a complaint for Forcible Entry against Balajadia and
company before the MCTC. MCTC ruled in favor of Milestone
RTC reversed the decision of MCTC
CA ruled in favor of Milestone
DAR Secretary Garilao issued an Order exempting from CARP only 240.9776 hectares of the
316.0422 hectares previously exempted by Director Dalugdug, and declaring 75.0646
hectares of the property to be covered by CARP.
Office of the President primarily reinstated the decision of Director Dalugdug but when the
farmers filed a motion for reconsideration, Office of the President reinstated the decision of
Director Garilao.
CA primarily ruled in favor of Milestone in exempting the entire property from the coverage
of CARP. However, six months earlier, without the knowledge of the CA as the parties did
not inform the appellate court then DAR Secretary Villa issued DAR conversion order
granting petitioners application to convert portions of the 316.0422-hectare property from
agricultural to residential and golf courses use. The portions converted was with a total area
of 153.3049 hectares. With this Conversion Order, the area of the property subject of the
controversy was effectively reduced to 162.7373 hectares.
With the CA now made aware of these developments, particularly Secretary Villas
Conversion Order, CA had to acknowledge that the property subject of the controversy
would now be limited to the remaining 162.7373 hectares. CA, in its amended decision,
states that the subject landholding from the coverage of CARP is hereby lifted, and the
162.7373 hectare-agricultural portion thereof is hereby declared covered by the CARP.
ISSUE: Whether or not Milestones property should be exempted from the coverage of CARP
Ruling:
No.
When CA made its decision, DAR AO No. 9 was not yet declared unconstitutional by the
Supreme Court. Thus, it could not be said that the CA erred or gravely abused its discretion
in respecting the mandate of DAR A.O. No. 9, which was then subsisting and in full force and
effect.
As correctly held by respondent OP, the CA correctly held that the subject property is not
exempt from the coverage of the CARP, as substantial pieces of evidence show that the said
property is not exclusively devoted to livestock, swine, and/or poultry raising.
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Stephanie Q. Dandal
18 July 2015
LUZ FARMS, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF

AGRARIAN REFORM, respondent.
Facts:
On June 10, 1988, the President of the Philippines approved R.A. No. 6657, which includes
the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage (Rollo, p. 80).
On January 2, 1989, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform promulgated the Guidelines and
Procedures Implementing Production and Profit Sharing as embodied in Sections 13 and 32
of R.A. No. 6657 (Rollo, p. 80).
On January 9, 1989, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform promulgated its Rules and
Regulations implementing Section 11 of R.A. No. 6657 (Commercial Farms). (Rollo, p. 81).
Luz Farms, petitioner in this case, is a corporation engaged in the livestock and poultry
business and together with others in the same business allegedly stands to be adversely
affected by the enforcement of Section 3(b), Section 11, Section 13, Section 16(d) and 17
and Section 32 of R.A. No. 6657 otherwise known as Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
and of the Guidelines and Procedures Implementing Production and Profit Sharing under R.A.
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Stephanie Q. Dandal
18 July 2015
No. 6657 promulgated on January 2, 1989 and the Rules and Regulations Implementing
Section 11 thereof as promulgated by the DAR on January 9, 1989 (Rollo, pp. 2-36).
Hence, this petition praying that aforesaid laws, guidelines and rules be declared
unconstitutional. Meanwhile, it is also prayed that a writ of preliminary injunction or
restraining order be issued enjoining public respondents from enforcing the same, insofar as
they are made to apply to Luz Farms and other livestock and poultry raisers.
This Court in its Resolution dated July 4, 1939 resolved to deny, among others, Luz
Farms' prayer for the issuance of a preliminary injunction in its Manifestation dated May 26,
and 31, 1989. (Rollo, p. 98).
Later, however, this Court in its Resolution dated August 24, 1989 resolved to grant
said Motion for Reconsideration regarding the injunctive relief, after the filing and approval
by this Court of an injunction bond in the amount of P100,000.00. This Court also gave due
course to the petition and required the parties to file their respective memoranda (Rollo, p.
119).
The petitioner filed its Memorandum on September 6, 1989 (Rollo, pp. 131-168).
On December 22, 1989, the Solicitor General adopted his Comment to the petition as
his Memorandum
ISSUE: The main issue in this petition is the constitutionality of Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and 32
of R.A. No. 6657 (the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988), insofar as the said law
includes the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage as well as the
Implementing Rules and Guidelines promulgated in accordance therewith.
RULING:
The petition is impressed with merit.
The question raised is one of constitutional construction. The primary task in
constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the
purpose of the framers in the adoption of the Constitution
It is generally held that, in construing constitutional provisions which are ambiguous or of
doubtful meaning, the courts may consider the debates in the constitutional convention as
throwing light on the intent of the framers of the Constitution. It is true that the intent of the
convention is not controlling by itself, but as its proceeding was preliminary to the adoption
by the people of the Constitution the understanding of the convention as to what was meant
by the terms of the constitutional provision which was the subject of the deliberation, goes a
long way toward explaining the understanding of the people when they ratified it.
It is evident from the foregoing discussion that Section II of R.A. 6657 which includes "private
agricultural lands devoted to commercial livestock, poultry and swine raising" in the
definition of "commercial farms" is invalid, to the extent that the aforecited agro-industrial
activities are made to be covered by the agrarian reform program of the State.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and
32 of R.A. No. 6657 insofar as the inclusion of the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its
coverage as well as the Implementing Rules and Guidelines promulgated in accordance
therewith, are hereby DECLARED null and void for being unconstitutional and the writ of
preliminary injunction issued is hereby MADE permanent.
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Stephanie Q. Dandal
18 July 2015
NAPOLEON MAGNO, Petitioner v. GONZALO FRANCISCO and

REGINA VDA. DE LAZARO, Respondents.
Facts:
Petitioner acquired the lot through a Deed of Sale executed by Talens on 28 July 1972, but
the sale was only registered on 3 September 1986. At the time of the sale, Gonzalo
Francisco and Manuel Lazaro tenanted the land and their separate areas of tillage were 2.8
and 2.5 hectares, respectively.
Petitioner entered into a written contract of agricultural leasehold with Manuel Lazaro on 5
October 1972 and with Gonzalo Francisco on 7 August 1980. In the leasehold contract,
Manuel Lazaro was obliged to pay a lease rental of 35 cavans during the regular season, and
20 cavans during dayatan cropping season. Gonzalo Francisco, on the other hand, was
required to pay a lease rental of 35 cavans during the regular season and 25 cavans during
the cropping season.
On 19 May 1993, petitioner filed with PARAD of Cabanatuan City a complaint
for ejectment and collection of lease rentals against respondents. At the time of filing of the
complaint, respondent Francisco and respondent Lazaro were already in arrears of
155 cavans and 145 cavans, respectively.
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Stephanie Q. Dandal
18 July 2015
Respondents sought the dismissal of the complaint invoking the following arguments:
1.
The leasehold contracts are without force and effect since the lot was under the
Operation Land Transfer (OLT) program pursuant to Presidential Decree No. (PD)
27. The sale executed by Talens was merely designed to exclude the land from
OLT coverage.
2.
Since the lot value, as determined and approved by the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR), has been paid, the collection of lease rentals is now moot.
3.
Respondents are now considered

landholdings and cannot be ejected.
owners-cultivators
of
their
respective
On 22 December 1993, the PARAD of Cabanatuan City dismissed the case for lack of merit.
On appeal, the DARAB rendered a Decision dated 8 January 2004, the dispositive portion of
which states:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, the decision
appealed from is hereby SET ASIDE and a NEW DECISION is hereby rendered:
1.
Finding and declaring the Deed of Absolute sale binding upon

respondents Gonzalo Francisco and Regina vda. De Lazaro;
2.
Maintaining the agricultural leasehold relationship between
landowner-petitioner Napoleon Magno and respondents-lessees
Gonzalo Francisco and Regina vda. De Lazaro; accordingly,
declaring the Contracts of Agricultural Leasehold respectively
entered into by and between the said parties still subsisting and in
full force and effect;
3.
Ordering respondents Gonzalo Francisco and Regina vda.
De Lazaro to pay severally their lease rentals in arrears covering
the period from the regular season of (April) 1991 up to and until
the final restoration or proper reinstatement of the lease contracts
in question.
Respondents filed a petition for review with the CA assailing the DARABs decision.
The CA set aside the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Boards (DARAB) Decision
dated 8 January 2004 and reinstated the Decision dated 22 December 1993 of the Provincial
Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) of Cabanatuan City. The PARAD dismissed petitioners
action for collection of lease rentals and ejectment againstGonzalo Francisco and
Regina Vda. De Lazaro (respondents).
Issue: Whether unregistered EPs issued to agricultural lessees which appear to be irregular
on their face can defeat the land owners rights to agricultural leasehold rentals.
Ruling:
Petition Granted. CA set aside.
It is undisputed that petitioner and respondents have an established tenancy relationship,
such that the complaint for collection of back rentals and ejectment is classified as an
agrarian dispute and under the jurisdiction of the PARAD and thereafter by the DARAB.
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Stephanie Q. Dandal
18 July 2015
However, in view of the conflicting claims where petitioner asserted ownership over the lot
and respondents emphasized that the lot is subject to OLT coverage, there is a need to
ascertain if the lot is under the agrarian reform program. Since the classification and
identification of landholdings for coverage under the agrarian reform program are Agrarian
Law Implementation cases, the DAR Secretary should first resolve this issue. In Sta. Ana
v. Carpo, we held:
Verily, there is an established tenancy relationship between petitioner and
respondents in this case. An action for Ejectment for Non-Payment of lease
rentals is clearly an agrarian dispute, cognizable at the initial stage by the
PARAD and thereafter by the DARAB. But issues with respect to the
retention rights of the respondents as landowners and the
exclusion/exemption of the subject land from the coverage of
agrarian reform are issues not cognizable by the PARAD and the
DARAB, but by the DAR Secretary because, as aforementioned, the
same are Agrarian Law Implementation (ALI) Cases. (Boldfacing
supplied)
Therefore, the PARAD of Cabanatuan City had no authority to render a decision declaring the
lot under OLT coverage. In fact, when the case was appealed, the DARAB acknowledged that
it had no jurisdiction on the OLT coverage. In an Order dated 10 October 2002, the DARAB
suspended the case proceedings until the submission of the result of the administrative
determination of the lot and thus submitted the entire records to the DAR Secretary.
Respondents themselves admitted in their Memorandum that the DAR has not submitted the
result of its administrative determination of the lot to the DARAB. It is therefore essential
that the DAR Secretary should first resolve the issue on the lots inclusion or exclusion from
OLT coverage before a final determination of this case can be had.
Proof necessary for the resolution of the issues on OLT coverage and petitioners right of
retention should be introduced in the proper forum. The Office of the DAR Secretary is in a
better position to resolve these issues being the agency lodged with such authority since it
has the necessary expertise on the matter.
We sustain the DARABs ruling declaring the Contracts of Agricultural Leasehold entered into
by petitioner and respondents still subsisting and in full force and effect. We modify
the DARABs ruling ordering respondents to pay severally their lease rentals in arrears
covering the period from the regular season of April 1991 until the final determination on the
OLT coverage of the lot.
ALANGILAN REALTY & DVT CORP vs. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

Facts:
Petitioner is the owner/developer of a 17.4892-hectare land in Batangas City (Alangilan
landholding). On August 7, 1996, petitioner filed an Application and/or Petition for
Exclusion/Exemption from CARP Coverage of the Alangilan landholding with MARO-DAR. It
averred that, in 1982, the Sangguniang Bayan of Batangas City classified the subject
landholding as reserved for residential under a zoning ordinance, which was approved by the
Human Settlement Regulatory Commission. It further alleged that, on May 17, 1994, the
Sangguniang Panglungsod of Batangas City approved the City Zoning Map and Batangas
Comprehensive Zoning and Land Use Ordinance, reclassifying the landholding as residential.
Petitioner thus claimed exemption of its landholding from the coverage of the CARP.
On May 6, 1997, then DAR denied petitioners application for exemption. The DAR Secretary
noted that the Alangilan landholding remained agricultural, reserved for residential. It was
classified as residential only on December 12, 1994 under Sangguniang Panlalawigan
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Stephanie Q. Dandal
18 July 2015
Resolution No. 709, series of 1994. Clearly, the subject landholding was still agricultural at
the time of the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6657. The qualifying phrase reserved for
residential means that the property is still classified as agricultural, and is covered by the
CARP.
On appeal, the Office of the President (OP) affirmed the decision of the DAR Secretary.
Petitioner went up to the CA via a petition for review on certiorari, assailing the OP decision
but CA dismissed the petition. The CA noted the report of MARO, Provincial Agrarian Reform
Office (PARO), and Regional Agrarian Reform Office (RARO) that the Alangilan landholding
was devoted to agricultural activities prior to the effectivity of the CARP on June 15, 1988
and even thereafter. Hence, this appeal by petitioner.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners Alangilan landholding is subject to the coverage of CARP,
notwithstanding that the property has been converted to non-agricultural uses by the zoning
ordinance of the city of Batangas prior to the law.
Ruling:
It is beyond cavil that the Alangilan landholding was classified as agricultural, reserved for
residential in 1982, and was reclassified as residential in 1994. However, contrary to
petitioners assertion, the term reserved for residential does not change the nature of the
land from agricultural to non-agricultural. As aptly explained by the DAR Secretary, the term
reserved for residential simply reflects the intended land use. It does not denote that the
property has already been reclassified as residential, because the phrase reserved for
residential is not a land classification category. Indubitably, at the time of the effectivity of
the CARL in 1988, the subject landholding was still agricultural. This was bolstered by the
fact that the Sangguniang Panlalawigan had to pass an Ordinance in 1994, reclassifying the
landholding as residentia. If, indeed, the landholding had already been earmarked for
residential use in 1982, as petitioner claims, then there would have been no necessity for
the passage of the 1994 Ordinance.
In this case, however, petitioner failed to establish that the subject landholding had already
been converted into residential use prior to June 15, 1988. The court noted that the subject
landholding was still being utilized for agricultural activities at the time of the filing of the
application for exemption. The ocular inspection, jointly conducted by the MARO, PARO and
RARO, disclosed that the landholding was planted with mangoes and coconuts.
Finally, it is well settled that factual findings of administrative agencies are generally
accorded respect and even finality by this Court, if such findings are supported by
substantial evidence. The factual findings of the DAR Secretary, who, by reason of his official
position, has acquired expertise in specific matters within his jurisdiction, deserve full
respect and, without justifiable reason, ought not to be altered, modified, or reversed. In this
case, petitioner utterly failed to show justifiable reason to warrant the reversal of the
decision of the DAR Secretary, as affirmed by the OP and the CA.
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Stephanie Q. Dandal
18 July 2015
Romanita Concha et, al. vs. Paulino Rubio et, al.

G.R. No. 162446 March 29, 2010
Facts:
The subject landholding was placed under the Compulsory Acquisition Scheme of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of the government. The Municipal Agrarian
Reform Officer (MARO), named as beneficiaries the herein petitioners. Respondents filed a
complaint for declaration of their tenancy and their identification as beneficiaries and for
disqualification of the petitioners to become beneficiaries over the subject landholding. They
alleged that they are the tenants thereof and have not relinquished their rights over the
same, as they returned the monetary awards given by the landowners. Meanwhile, The
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) approved the landowners application for conversion,
subject to the following conditions: The farmer-beneficiary, if any, shall be paid disturbance
compensation pursuant to R.A. 3844 as amended by R.A. 6389; the remaining 18.5006
hectares shall be covered by CARP under compulsory acquisition and the same be
distributed to qualified farmer-beneficiaries.
In relation to paragraph 2 thereof, the MARO pursued the coverage of the remaining
18.5006. The petitioners herein were identified as qualified farmer-beneficiaries where three
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Stephanie Q. Dandal
18 July 2015
Certificates of Land Ownership Awards (CLOA) were issued in their favor. Respondents, on
the other hand, were paid of their disturbance compensation. They now, however, question
the validity and legality of the institution of the petitioners as beneficiaries over the subject
landholding. The PARAD ruled that respondents had waived their rights as tenants and as
farmer-beneficiaries of the Department of Agrarian Reform program, as evidenced by
their Sinumpaang Salaysay. In addition, the PARAD ruled that it had no authority to rule on
the selection of farmer-beneficiaries, as the same was a purely administrative matter under
the jurisdiction of the DAR. However, the DARAB set aside said decision and ordered to issue
new Certificates of Land Ownership Award in favor of respondents. CA affirms said decision.
Petitioners argue that the DARAB is not clothed with the power or authority to resolve the
issue involving the identification and selection of qualified farmer-beneficiaries since the
same is an Agrarian Law Implementation case, thus, an administrative function falling within
the jurisdiction of the DAR Secretary.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) is
clothed with jurisdiction to resolve the issue involving the identification and selection of
qualified farmer-beneficiaries of a land covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program (CARP).
Ruling:
This Court was categorical in ruling that the identification and selection of CARP
beneficiaries are matters involving strictly the administrative implementation of the CARP, a
matter exclusively cognizable by the Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform, and
beyond the jurisdiction of the DARAB. Based on the foregoing, the conclusion is certain that
the DARAB had no jurisdiction to identify who between the parties should be recognized as
the beneficiaries of the land in dispute, as it was a purely administrative function of the DAR.
The PARAD was, thus, correct when it declared that it had no jurisdiction to resolve the
dispute. As earlier stated no other agency of government is empowered or authorized by law
in the selection and designation of farmer beneficiaries except the DAR being purely an
administrative function. The Adjudication Board is not clothed with power and authority to
rule on the selection of farmer beneficiaries. To do so would be an ultra vires act of said
Board, being administrative in character. Thus, the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officers
(MARO) decision not to include respondents as farmer-beneficiaries must be accorded
respect in the absence of abuse of discretion. It bears stressing that it is the MARO or the
Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) who, together with the Barangay Agrarian Reform
Committee, screens and selects the possible agrarian beneficiaries.
The Adjudicator found DAR to have legal and valid reasons in the exclusion of
plaintiffs as farmer-beneficiaries based on their sworn statement which waived and
renounced their rights as tenants and farmer- beneficiaries of the program. This was based
on the fact that plaintiffs were awarded individual homelots and paid disturbance
compensation by the landowner. In any case, it must be stressed that a tenant of a parcel of
land, which is later declared to be under the coverage of CARP, is not automatically chosen
nor does he have absolute entitlement to be identified as the farmer-beneficiary. The finding
of the MARO declaring petitioners as beneficiaries of the land in dispute must, therefore, be
accorded respect. It should also be equally binding on the DARAB for the simple reason that
the latter has no appellate jurisdiction over the former. The DARAB cannot review, much less
reverse, the administrative findings of DAR. In the case at bar, the DARAB has overstepped
its legal boundaries in taking cognizance of the controversy between petitioners and
respondents in deciding who should be declared the farmer-beneficiaries over the land in
dispute.
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Stephanie Q. Dandal
18 July 2015
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THE TENANTS OF THE ESTATE OF DR. JOSE SISON, Represented by FERNANDO

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LUCIA RODRIGUEZ AND PRUDENCIA RODRIGUEZ, PETITIONERS, VS. TERESITA V.

Agrarian Law Case Digests

Agrarian Law Case Digests

Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation v Court of Appeals

Agrarian Law Case Digests

Roxas and Co., Inc. v. CA

Agrarian Law Case Digests

Agrarian Law Case Digests

Heirs of Jose Deleste v. Landbank of the Philippines

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Agrarian Law Case Digests

On July 5, 2011, the Supreme Court en banc voted unanimously (11-0) to

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(1) Is the operative fact doctrine available in this case?

YES, the operative fact doctrine is applicable in this case.

NO, Sec. 31 of RA 6657 NOT unconstitutional.

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Agrarian Law Case Digests

Land Bank of the Philippines v. Dumlao

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Agrarian Law Case Digests

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asked that a final valuation of the properties be pegged at P1,800,000.00, based on

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

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Respondents rejected the said valuation. Consequently, the Provincial Department of

Agrarian Law Case Digests

Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals

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Association of Small Landowners v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform

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HEIRS OF FRANCISCO R. TANTOCO, SR., MARIA R. TANTOCO, ZOSIMO TANTOTCO,

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CENTRAL MINDANAO UNIVERSITY, petitioner, vs. DARAB, et.al., respondents

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Agrarian Law Case Digests

SEGREGATING SOME HECTARES OF LAND WITHOUT FINDING THAT COMPLAINANTS ARE

Department of Agrarian Reform v. Department of Education, Culture and Sports

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Following lands are covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program:

All alienable and disposable lands of the public domain devoted to or

All lands of the public domain in excess of the specific limits as

Agrarian Law Case Digests

All other lands owned by the Government devoted to or suitable for

All private lands devoted to or suitable for agriculture regardless of the

agriculture or agricultural activity- means the cultivation of the soil, planting of

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names and members of their immediate farm household;

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owners or administrators of the lands they work on and the length of

location and area of the land they work;

crops planted; and

their share in the harvest or amount of rental paid or wages received.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of

Milestone Farms, Petitioner v. Office of the President, Respondent

Agrarian Law Case Digests

Agrarian Law Case Digests