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Villavicencio v Lukban G.R. No. L-14639
The Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, for the best of all reasons, to
exterminate vice, ordered the segregated district for women of ill repute, which had
been permitted for a number of years in the city of Manila, closed. Between October
16 and October 25, 1918, the women were kept confined to their houses in the
district by the police.
The women( who were prostitutes) were given no opportunity to collect their
belongings, and apparently were under the impression that they were being taken
to a police station for an investigation. They had no knowledge that they were
destined for a life in Mindanao. They had not been asked if they wished to depart
from that region and had neither directly nor indirectly given their consent to the
deportation. The involuntary guests were received on board the steamers by a
representative of the Bureau of Labor and a detachment of Constabulary soldiers.
The two steamers with their unwilling passengers sailed for Davao during the night
of October 25.
Just about the time the Corregidor and the Negros were putting in to Davao, the
attorney for the relatives and friends of a considerable number of the deportees
presented an application for habeas corpus to a member of the Supreme Court.
Writ of Habeas Corpus - An order issued by a court to a person detaining another, to
produce the body of the prisoner at a certain time and place, and to show sufficient
cause for holding in custody the individual.- Habeas Corpus: to bring the body
City fiscal(for the respondent): Admitted certain facts relative to sequestration and
deportation, and prayed that the writ should not be granted because the petitioners
were not proper parties, because the action should have been begun in the Court of
First Instance for Davao, Department of Mindanao and Sulu, because the
respondents did not have any of the women under their custody or control, and
because their jurisdiction did not extend beyond the boundaries of the city of
According to an exhibit attached to the answer of the fiscal, the 170 women were
destined to be laborers, at good salaries, on the haciendas of Yigo and Governor
SC first order: The court awarded the writ that directed Justo Lukban, Mayor of the
city of Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the city of Manila, Francisco Sales,
governor of the province of Davao, and Feliciano Yigo, an hacendero of Davao, to
bring before the court the persons therein named, alleged to be deprived of their
None of the persons in whose behalf the writ was issued were produced in court by
the respondents.

Fiscal: offered certain affidavits showing that the women were contained with their
life in Mindanao and did not wish to return to Manila.
Sales: answered alleging that it was not possible to fulfill the order of the Supreme
Court because the women had never been under his control, because they were at
liberty in the Province of Davao, and because they had married or signed contracts
as laborers.
Yigo: answered alleging that he did not have any of the women under his control
and that therefore it was impossible for him to obey the mandate.
SC second order: Since respondents did had not complied nor explained their
failure to do so the 1st order, court directed that those of the women not in Manila
be brought before the court by respondents unless:
1.) women should, in written statements voluntarily made before the judge of first
instance of Davao or the clerk of that court, renounce the right, or
2.) the respondents should demonstrate some other legal motives that made
compliance impossible.
Issue: WON judiciary permit a government of the men instead of a government of
laws to be set up in the Philippine Islands.
By authority of what law did the Mayor and the Chief of Police presume to act in
deporting by duress these persons from Manila to another distant locality within the
Philippine Islands?
1.)Government of laws.
"No freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or be disseized of his freehold, or
liberties, or free customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or any other wise destroyed;
nor will we pass upon him nor condemn him, but by lawful judgment of his peers or
by the law of the land. We will sell to no man, we will not deny or defer to any man
either justice or right."
No official, no matter how high, is above the law.
"The law," said Justice Miller, delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court of the
United States, "is the only supreme power in our system of government, and every
man who by accepting office participates in its functions is only the more strongly
bound to submit to that supremacy, and to observe the limitations which it imposes
upon the exercise of the authority which it gives."
2.) There is no law or ordinance permitting/authorizing such Mayor and Chief of
police in deporting these women.
These women despite their being in a sense lepers of society are nevertheless not
chattels but Philippine citizens protected by the same constitutional guaranties as
are other citizens to change their domicile from Manila to another locality. On the
contrary, Philippine penal law specifically punishes any public officer who, not being

expressly authorized by law or regulation, compels any person to change his

Mayor Lukban was primarily responsible for the unlawful deportation, who ordered
the police to accomplish the same, who made arrangements for the steamers and
the constabulary, who conducted the negotiations with the Bureau of Labor, and
who later, as the head of the city government, had it within his power to facilitate
the return of the unfortunate women to Manila.
His intention to suppress the social evil was commendable. His methods were
unlawful. His regard for the writ of habeas corpus issued by the court was only
tardily and reluctantly acknowledged.
The respondents Hohmann, Rodriguez, Ordax, Joaquin, Yigo, and Diaz are found
not to be in contempt of court. Respondent Lukban is found in contempt of court
and shall pay into the office of the clerk of the Supreme Court within five days the
sum of one hundred pesos (P100).

Kuroda v Jalandoni 83 PHIL 171

Shigenori Kuroda, formerly a Lieutenant-General of the Japanese Imperial Army and
Commanding General of the Japanese Imperial Forces in The Philippines during a
period covering 19433 and 19444 who is now charged before a military Commission
convened by the Chief of Staff of the Armed forces of the Philippines with having
unlawfully disregarded and failed "to discharge his duties as such command,
permitting them to commit brutal atrocities and other high crimes against noncombatant civilians and prisoners of the Imperial Japanese Forces in violation of the
laws and customs of war".
Thus, comes before this Court seeking to establish the illegality of Executive Order
No. 68 of the President of the Philippines.
The petitioner interposed 3 arguments:
1.) "That Executive Order No. 68 is illegal on the ground that it violates not only the
provision of our constitutional law but also our local laws to say nothing of the fact
(that) the Philippines is not a signatory nor an adherent to the Hague Convention on
Rules and Regulations covering Land Warfare and therefore petitioners is charged of
'crimes' not based on law, national and international."
2.) Petitioner argues that respondent Military Commission has no Jurisdiction to try
petitioner for acts committed in violation of the Hague Convention and the Geneva
Convention because the Philippines is not a signatory to the first and signed the
second only in 1947.
2.) Petitioner challenges the participation of two American attorneys namely Melville
S. Hussey and Robert Port in the prosecution of his case on the ground that said
attorney's are not qualified to practice law in Philippines in accordance with our

Rules of court and the appointment of said attorneys as prosecutors is violative of

our national sovereignty.
Issue: WON of Executive Order No. 68 is valid and constitutional.

Held: EO 68 is valid and constitutional. Petition denied.

Article 2 of our Constitution provides in its section 3, that The Philippines
renounces war as an instrument of national policy and adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the of the nation.
In accordance with the generally accepted principle of international law of the
present day including the Hague Convention the Geneva Convention and significant
precedents of international jurisprudence established by the United Nation all those
person military or civilian who have been guilty of planning preparing or waging a
war of aggression and of the commission of crimes and offenses consequential and
incidental thereto in violation of the laws and customs of war, of humanity and
civilization are held accountable therefor. Consequently in the promulgation and
enforcement of Execution Order No. 68 the President of the Philippines has acted in
conformity with the generally accepted and policies of international law which are
part of the our Constitution.
Such rule and principles therefore form part of the law of our nation even if the
Philippines was not a signatory to the conventions embodying them for our
Constitution has been deliberately general and extensive in its scope and is not
confined to the recognition of rule and principle of international law as continued inn
treaties to which our government may have been or shall be a signatory.
Argument #3
Respondent Military Commission is a special military tribunal governed by a special
law and not by the Rules of court which govern ordinary civil court.
There is nothing in said executive order which requires that counsel appearing
before said commission must be attorneys qualified to practice law in the
Philippines in accordance with the Rules of Court. In facts it is common in military
tribunals that counsel for the parties are usually military personnel who are neither
attorneys nor even possessed of legal training.
The appointment of the two American attorneys is not violative of our national
sovereignty. It is only fair and proper that the U.S which has submitted the
vindication of crimes against her government and her people to a tribunal of our
nation should be allowed representation in the trial of those very crimes. The lest
that we could do in the spirit of comity is to allow this representation in said trial.