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G.R. No.

128280

April 4, 2001

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,


vs.
ALICIA A. CHUA, accused-appellant.
PARDO, J.:
Accused Alicia Chua has appealed from the decision1 of the Regional Trial Court, Manila, Branch V
finding her guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal recruitment committed in large scale and
sentencing her to life imprisonment and a fine of P100,000.00, and eight (8) counts of estafa
sentencing her to various penalties therefor.
On October 05, 1993, Assistant City Prosecutor Leocadio H. Ramos, Jr. of Manila filed with the
Regional Trial Court, Manila an information2 against accused Alicia A. Chua reading as follows:
Crim. Case No. 93-127418:
"That in or about and during the period comprised between October 29, 1992 and
January 19, 1993, inclusive, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused,
representing herself to have the capacity to contract, enlist and transport Filipino
workers for employment abroad, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, for a fee,
recruit and promise employment/job placement abroad to the following persons,
namely: DOMINGO F. TERCENIO, MARTIN B. BERMEJO, EVANGELINE F.
GAVINA, DANTE F. BALUIS, EDUARD V. ESTILLER, EDGAR B. ABONAL,
VIOLETA F. REGALADO, GLORIA J. RICAFRENTE and LONITO F. BALUIS, without
first having secured the required license or authority from the Department of Labor.
"Contrary to law."3
On the same date, the same prosecutor filed with the Regional Trial Court, Manila nine (9) other
informations against the accused for estafa:
Crim. Case No. 93-127419:
"The undersigned accuses ALICIA A. CHUA of the crime of estafa, committed as
follows: That on or about October 29, 1992, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the
said accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud
DOMINGO F. TERCENIO in the following manner, to wit: the said accused, by
means of false manifestations and fraudulent representation which she made to said
DOMINGO F. TERCENIO to the effect that she had the power and capacity to recruit
and employ said DOMINGO F. TERCENIO and could facilitate the processing of the
pertinent papers if given the necessary amount to meet the requirements thereof and
by-means of other similar deceits, induced and succeeded in inducing said
DOMINGO F. TERCENIO to give and deliver, as in fact he gave and delivered to said
accused the amount of P15,000.00 on the strength of said manifestations and
representations, said accused well knowing that the same were false and fraudulent
and were made solely to obtain as in fact she did obtain the amount of P15,000.00
which amount once in her possession with intent to defraud, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously misappropriated, misapplied and converted to her own personal use and

benefit, to the damage and prejudice of said DOMINGO F. TERCENIO in the


aforesaid amount of P15,000.00 Philippine Currency.
"CONTRARY TO LAW."4
Crim. Case No. 93-127420:
"That on or about November 21, 1992, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud MARTIN B.
BERMEJO in the following manner, to wit: the said accused, by means of false
manifestations and fraudulent representation which he/they/she made to said
MARTIN B. BERMEJO to the effect that she had the power and capacity to recruit
and employ MARTIN BERMEJO in Taiwan and could facilitate the processing of the
pertinent papers if given the necessary amount to meet the requirements thereof,
and by means of other similar deceits, induced and succeeded in inducing said
MARTIN B. BERMEJO to give and deliver, as in fact he gave and delivered to said
accused the amount of P15,000.00 on the strength of said manifestations and
representations, said accused well knowing that the same were false and fraudulent
and were made solely to obtain, as in fact she did obtain the amount of P15,000.00
which amount once in her possession with intent to defraud, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously misappropriated, misapplied and converted to her own personal use and
benefit to the damage and prejudice of said MARTIN B. BERMEJO in the aforesaid
amount of P15,000.00, Philippine Currency.
"CONTRARY TO LAW."5
Crim. Case No. 93-127421:
"That on or about November 6, 1992, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud EVANGELINE
F. GAVINA in the following manner, to wit: the said accused, by means of false
manifestations and fraudulent representation which he/they/she made to said
EVANGELINE F. GAVINA to the effect that she had the power and capacity to recruit
and employ EVANGELINE F. GAVINA and could facilitate the processing of the
pertinent papers if given the necessary amount to meet the requirements thereof,
and by means of other similar deceits induced and succeeded in inducing said
EVANGELINE F. GAVINA to give and deliver, as in fact she gave and delivered to
said accused the amount of P15,000.00 on the strength of said manifestations and
representations, said accused well knowing that the same were false and fraudulent
and were made solely, to obtain, as in fact she did obtain the amount of P15,000.00
which amount once in her possession with intent to defraud, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously misappropriated, misapplied and converted to her own personal use and
benefit to the damage and prejudice of said EVANGELINE P. GAVINA in the
aforesaid amount of P15,000.00, Philippine Currency.
1wphi1.nt

"CONTRARY TO LAW."6
Crim. Case No. 93-127422:
"That on or about December 10, 1992, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud DANTE F.
BALUIS in the following manner, to wit: the said accused, by means of false

manifestations and fraudulent representation which he/they/she made to said


DANTE F. BALUIS to the effect that she had the power and capacity to recruit and
employ DANTE F. BALUIS in Taiwan and could facilitate the processing of the
pertinent papers if given the necessary amount to meet the requirements thereof,
and by means of other similar deceits, induced and succeeded in inducing said
DANTE F. BALUIS to give and deliver, as in fact he gave and delivered to said
accused the amount of P11,000.00 on the strength of said manifestations and
representations, said accused well knowing that the same were false and fraudulent
and were made solely to obtain, as in fact she did obtain the amount of P11,000.00
which amount once in her possession with intent to defraud, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously misappropriated, misapplied and converted to her own personal use and
benefit to the damage and prejudice of said DANTE G. BALUIS in the aforesaid
amount of P11,000.00, Philippine Currency.
"CONTRARY TO LAW."7
Crim. Case No. 93-127423:
"That on or about November 24, 1992, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud EDUARD V.
ESTILLER in the following manner, to wit: the said accused, by means of false
manifestations and fraudulent representation which he/she/they made to said
EDUARD V. ESTILLER to the effect that she had the power and capacity to recruit
and employ EDUARD V.' ESTILLER in Taiwan and could facilitate the processing of
the pertinent papers if given the necessary amount to meet the requirements thereof,
and by means of other similar deceits, induced and succeeded in inducing said
EDUARD V. ESTILLER to give and deliver, as in fact he/she/they gave and delivered
to said accused the amount of P15,000.00 on the strength of said manifestations and
representations, said accused well knowing that the same were false and fraudulent
and were made solely, to obtain, as in fact she did obtain the amount of P15,000.00
which amount once in her possession, with intent to defraud, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously misappropriated, misapplied and converted to her own personal use and
benefit to the damage and prejudice of said EDUARD V. ESTILLER, in the aforesaid
amount P15,000.00 Philippine Currency.
"CONTRARY TO LAW."8
Crim. Case No. 93-127424:
"That on or about December 11, 1992, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused, did then and therein wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud EDGAR B.
ABONAL in the following manner, to wit: the said accused, by means of false
manifestations and fraudulent representation which he/she/they made to said
EDGAR B. ABONAL to the effect that she had the power and capacity to recruit and
employ EDGAR B. ABONAL in Taiwan and could facilitate the processing of the
pertinent papers if given the necessary amount to meet the requirements thereof,
and by means of other similar deceits, induced and succeeded in inducing said
EDGAR B. ABONAL to give and deliver, as in fact he/she/they gave and delivered to
said accused the amount of P15,000.00 on the strength of said manifestations and
representations, said accused well knowing that the same were false and fraudulent
and were made solely, to obtain, as in fact she did obtain the amount of P15,000.00
which amount once in her possession with intent to defraud, wilfully, unlawfully and

feloniously misappropriated, misapplied and converted to her own personal use and
benefit to the damage and prejudice of said EDGAR B. ABONAL in the aforesaid
amount P15,000.00 Philippine Currency.
"CONTRARY TO LAW."9
Crim. Case No. 93-127425:
"That on or about, December 10, 1992, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud VIOLETA F.
REGALADO in the following manner, to wit: the said accused, by means of false
manifestations and fraudulent representation which he/she/they made to said
VIOLETA F. REGALADO to the effect that she had the power and capacity to recruit
and employ VIOLETA F. REGALADO in Taiwan and could facilitate the processing of
the pertinent papers if given the necessary amount to meet the requirements thereof,
and by means of other similar deceits, induced and succeeded in inducing said
VIOLETA F. REGALADO to give and deliver, as in fact he/she/they gave and
delivered to said accused the amount of P15,000.00 on the strength of said
manifestations and representations, said accused well knowing that the same were
false and fraudulent and were made solely, to obtain, as in fact she did obtain the
amount of P15,000.00 which amount once in her possession, with intent to defraud,
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriated, misapplied and converted to her
own personal use and benefit to the damage and prejudice of said VIOLETA F.
REGALADO in the aforesaid amount P15,000.00 Philippine Currency.
"Contrary to law."10
Crim. Case No. 93-127426:
"That on or about January 19, 1993, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud GLORIA J.
RICAFRENTE in the following manner, to wit: the said accused, by means of false
manifestations and fraudulent representation which he/she/they made to said
GLORIA J. RICAFRENTE to the effect that she had the power and capacity to recruit
and employ GLORIA J. RICAFRENTE in Taiwan and could facilitate the processing
of the pertinent papers if given the necessary amount to meet the requirements
thereof, and by means of other similar deceits, induced and succeeded in inducing
said GLORIA J. RICAFRENTE to give and deliver, as in fact he/she/they gave and
delivered to said accused the amount of P15,000.00 on the strength of said
manifestations and representations, said accused well knowing that the same were
false and fraudulent and were made solely, to obtain, as in fact she did obtain the
amount of P15,000.00 which amount once in her possession, with intent to defraud,
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriated, misapplied and converted to her
own personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of said GLORIA J.
RICAFRENTE in the aforesaid amount of P15,000.00, Philippine Currency.
"CONTRARY TO LAW."11
Crim. Case No. 93-127427:
"That on or about October 29, 1992, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud LONITO F.

BALUIS in the following manner, to wit: the said accused, by means of false
manifestations and fraudulent representation which he/she/they made to said
LONITO F. BALUIS to the effect that she had the power and capacity to recruit and
employ LONITO F. BALUIS in Taiwan and could facilitate the processing of the
pertinent papers if given the necessary amount to meet the requirements thereof,
and by means of other similar deceits, induced and succeeded in inducing said
LONITO F. BALUIS to give and deliver, as in fact he/she/they gave and delivered to
said accused the amount of P15,000.00 on the strength of said manifestations and
representations, said accused well knowing that the same were false and fraudulent
and were made solely, to obtain, as in fact she did obtain the amount of P15,000.00
which amount once in her possession, with intent to defraud, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously misappropriated, misapplied and converted to her own personal use and
benefit to the damage and prejudice of said LONITO F. BALUIS in the aforesaid
amount P15,000.00, Philippine Currency.
"CONTRARY TO LAW."12
On November 8, 1993, the trial court arraigned the accused. She pleaded not guilty to each
case.13 Trial ensued. The cases were consolidated and tried jointly.
The facts are as follows:
In September 1992, accused. Chua received a facsimile message from Harmony Electronics
Company in Taiwan.14The message was written in Chinese characters except for the names of Toong Zenon Tumenlaco and Tercenio Domingo Fornaliza. Harmony asked her to call up To-ong and
Tercenio and tell them that they were needed in Taiwan. Accused Chua contacted To-ong and told
him the message.15
In October 1992, To-ong and Tercenio went to the office of accused Chua, and the latter told them
that she could send them to Taiwan upon payment of a placement fee of P15,000.00 each. She also
asked them to secure NBI clearances and medical certificates. 16 On October 29, 1992, Tercenio,
together with private complainant Lonito Baluis, went back to the office of accused Chua and
submitted the requirements. Tercenio and Lonito Baluis paid P15,000.00 each for which they were
issued a receipt bearing the name Man Tai Trading and General Services with accused Chua's
signature.17
Accused Chua assured Tercenio and Lonito Baluis that they would be able to leave for Taiwan soon.
Three months passed, but they were not deployed. Tercenio became apprehensive and told accused
Chua that he would withdraw his application and ask for refund of the placement fee. Accused Chua
repeatedly promised that she would give back the money to him, but she never did. After a few more
months, Tercenio could not anymore locate accused Chua. 18
Accused Chua used the same modus operandi on the other private complainants. After requiring
each complainant to pay a placement fee of P15,000.00 each, to secure NBI clearances and to
undergo medical examinations, she would go in hiding.
In time, complainants inquired from the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA) about
accused Chua's activities. The POEA issued a certification that accused Chua was not licensed to
recruit persons/workers for overseas employment. 19
On October 3, 1995, the trial court promulgated a decision, the dispositive portion 20 of which reads:

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, Alicia A. Chua is hereby found:


"1) Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Illegal Recruitment committed in large
scale in Criminal Case No. 93-127418 and is therefore sentenced to serve a penalty of life
imprisonment and a fine of P100,000.00;
"2) Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa in Criminal Case No. 93-127419
and is sentenced to serve indeterminate sentence of four (4) years of prision correccional
maximum, as minimum to six (6) years and eight (8) months of Prision Mayor minimum as
maximum, and to pay the complainant the sum of P15,000.00 plus legal interest from the
filing of the case until fully paid;
"3) Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa in Criminal Case No. 93-127420
and is sentenced to serve an indeterminate sentence of four (4) years of prision correccional
maximum as minimum to six (6) years and eight (8) months of prision mayor minimum as
maximum, and to pay the complainant the sum of P15,500.00 plus legal interest from the
filing of the case until fully paid;
"4) Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa in Criminal Case No. 93-127421
and is sentenced to serve an indeterminate sentence of four (4) years of prision correccional
maximum as minimum to six (6) years and eight (8) months of prision mayor minimum as
maximum, and to pay the complainant the sum of P15,500.00 plus legal interest from the
filing of the case until fully paid;
"5) Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa in Criminal Case No. 93-127422
and is therefore sentenced to serve an indeterminate sentence of six (6) months of Arresto
Mayor maximum, as minimum to two (2) years and eleven (11) months of prision
correccional medium, as maximum, and to pay the complainant the sum of P11,500.00 plus
legal interest from the filing of the case until fully paid;
"6) Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa in Criminal Case No. 93-127423
and is therefore sentenced to serve an indeterminate sentence of four (4) years of prision
correccional maximum, as minimum to six (6) years and eight (8) months of prision mayor
minimum, as maximum and to pay the complainant the sum of P15,500.00 plus legal interest
from the filing of the case until fully paid;
"7) Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa in Criminal Case No. 93-127425
and is therefore sentenced to serve an indeterminate sentence of four (4) years of prision
correccional maximum, as minimum to six (6) years and eight (8) months of prision mayor
minimum as maximum, and to pay the complainant the sum of P14,500.00 plus legal interest
from the filing of the case until fully paid;
"8) Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa in Criminal Case No. 93-127426
and is therefore sentenced to serve indeterminate sentence of four (4) years of prision
correccional maximum, as minimum to six (6) years and eight (8) months of prision mayor
minimum as maximum, and to pay the complainant the sum of P14,500.00 plus legal interest
from the filing of the case until fully paid;
"9) Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa in Criminal Case No. 93-127427
and is sentenced to serve indeterminate sentence of four (4) years of prision correccional
maximum, as minimum to six (6) years and eight (8) months of prision mayor minimum as

maximum, and to pay the complainant the sum of P15,000.00 plus legal interest from the
filing of the case until fully paid.
"As earlier stated, Criminal Case No. 93-127424 is dismissed for failure of the prosecution to
adduce evidence.
"SO ORDERED.
"Manila, September 20, 1995.

"(Sgd.) ZEUS C. ABROGAR


"Judge."

Hence, this appeal.21


In her brief, accused-appellant anchors her defense on the approval of her application for a license
to recruit on April 13, 1993, which, according to her, rendered her a genuine holder of authority. She
also claimed that she was denied her constitutional right to compulsory process. 22
On the other hand, the Solicitor General contends that appellant was a non-licensee and had no
authority to recruit anyone for overseas employment, and that she failed to proffer any compelling
reason to justify her request for the production of POEA records.23
We find the appeal devoid of merit.
Appellant interposes the defense that the approval of her application for a service contractor's
authority on April 13, 1993 should be given a retroactive effect as to make all her previous
recruitment activities valid. However, this issue was not raised in the trial court. She cannot now be
allowed to raise it for the first time on appeal without offending basic rules of fair play, justice and due
process.24
The records show that the license was not issued due to her failure to comply with post-licensing
requirements.25 It is the issuance of the license which makes the holder thereof authorized to perform
recruitment activities. The law specifically provides that "every license shall be valid for at least two
(2) years from the date of issuance unless sooner cancelled or revoked by the Secretary.26
Appellant herself admitted that she had no authority to recruit private complainants. thus:
ATTY. MONTERO (to witness):
Q:
Now what was the reply of Harmony Electronics Company when you questioned them
about the use of your company?
A:
They wrote back to me and they told me that "never mind, we only need Cenon Toong and Domingo Tersenio." But I told them that I am not in the position to employ these
people because I am not a licensed agency for that matter and they said that "I would
just send you an authority and show this to the pertaining government agency who could at
least send these two people."

Q:

So what did you do after that?

A:
I told them to send me something if I can do the way out of it, I will ask anybody from
my colleagues to do the hiring of these people.
Q:

Did you ask anybody from your colleagues to do the hiring of these two?

A:

I did but Alcamojar was not also licensed.

Q:

So what happened after that?

A:
I told Cenon because Cenon is much better to understand that, he looked for one
company who could just or whom I can transfer the authority that the Harmony Electronics
would be sending me, so I will just transfer the authority to any agency who could send them
back to Taiwan.27
Appellant cannot now claim that she was a genuine holder of authority from the Secretary of Labor
and Employment to recruit factory workers for Harmony Electronics Company based in Taiwan.
As to her claim of denial of the constitutional right to compulsory process, we find the same to be
without merit.
The 1973 and 1987 Constitutions expanded the right to compulsory process which now includes the
right to secure the production of evidence in one's behalf.28 By analogy, U.S. vs. Ramirez29 which laid
down the requisites for compelling the attendance of witnesses, may be applied to this expanded
concept. Thus, the movant must show: (a) that the evidence is really material; (b) that he is not guilty
of neglect in previously obtaining the production of such evidence; (c) that the evidence will be
available at the time desired; and (d) that no similar evidence could be obtained.
In the case at bar, the trial court correctly denied appellant's motion for the production of the records
which were the basis in issuing the POEA Certification dated February 3, 1994, 30 as the same would
not in any way alter the undisputed fact that appellant was not issued a license until then. 31
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the appealed decision in toto, with costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C .J ., Puno, Kapunan, Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

G.R. Nos. 117145-50 & 117447

March 28, 2000

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,


vs.
LEONIDA MERIS y PADILLA, accused-appellant.
KAPUNAN, J.:
This is an appeal from the Joint Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 1, convicting
accused-appellant Leonida Meris y Padilla of illegal recruitment in large-scale and six counts of
estafa. The dispositive portion of the decision1 reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, this court finds the accused, Leonida Meris y Padilla, GUILTY, beyond
reasonable doubt of six (6) counts of estafa in Criminal Cases Nos. 91-94192 to 91-94197,
and of illegal recruitment in large scale in Criminal Case No. 91-94198 and, as a
consequence thereof, sentences her as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. 91-94192, to suffer the indeterminate penalty of one (1) year, eight
(8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional as minimum to five (5) years,
five (5) months and eleven (11) months (sic) of prision correccional as maximum;
2. In Criminal Case No. 91-94193, to suffer the indeterminate penalty of one (1) year, eight
(8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional as minimum to five (5) years,
five (5) months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional as maximum;
3. In Criminal Case No. 91-94194, to suffer an indeterminate penalty of one (1) year, eight
(8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional as minimum to five (5) years,
five (5) months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional as maximum;
4. In Criminal Case No. 91-94195, to suffer an indeterminate penalty of one (1) year, eight
(8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional as minimum to five (5) years,
five (5) months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional as maximum;
5. In Criminal Case No. 91-94196, to suffer an indeterminate penalty of one (1) year, eight
(8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional as minimum to five (5) years,
five (5) months and eleven (11) days of prison correccional as maximum;
6. In Criminal Case No. 91-94197, to suffer an indeterminate penalty of one (1) year, eight
(8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional as minimum to five (5) years,
five (5) months and eleven (11) days of prison correccional as maximum;
7. In Criminal Case No. 91-94198, to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine
of P100,000.00.

Further, the accused shall indemnify the private complainants, Napoleon Ramos, Cristina
Nava, Margarita Nadal, Purita Conseja and Leo delos Santos, the sum of P30,000.00 each
and complainant Merlita Bombarda the amount of P20,000.00 with interest thereon at the
legal rate from the date of institution of these cases,i.e., April 29, 1991, until fully paid.
Costs against the accused in all the above-captioned cases.
SO ORDERED.
The above conviction stemmed from seven informations. The information in Criminal Case No. 9194192 reads:
That on or about and during the period comprised between January 12, 1991 and February
17, 1991, both dates inclusive, prior or subsequent thereto in the City of Manila, Philippines,
the said accused conspiring and confederating with three others whose true names,
identities and present whereabouts are still unknown, helping one another, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud NAPOLEON RAMOS y ESPEJO in the
following manner, to wit: the said accused, by means of false manifestations and fraudulent
representation which they made to said NAPOLEON E. RAMOS to the effect that they had
the power and capacity to recruit and employ him as Factory Worker in Hongkong and could
facilitate the processing of the pertinent papers if given the necessary amount to meet the
requirements thereof, and by means of other similar deceits, induced and succeeded in
inducing said NAPOLEON E. RAMOS to give and deliver, as in fact (he) gave and delivered
to said accused the amount of P30,000.00 on the strength of said manifestations and
representations, said accused well knowing that the same were false and fraudulent and
were made solely to obtain the amount of P30,000.00 which amount once in possession,
with intent to defraud he (sic) willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriated, misapplied
and converted to their own personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of said
NAPOLEON E. RAMOS, in the aforesaid amount of P30,000.00, Philippine Currency.
CONTRARY TO LAW.2
The information in Criminal Cases Nos. 91-94193, 91-94194, 91-94195, 91-94196 and 91-94197
likewise charged accused-appellant with Estafa and contain substantially the same allegations as
the above-quoted information, except as to the name of the complainants and the amounts
involved.3
The seventh information in Criminal Case No. 91-94198 charged accused-appellant with illegal
recruitment in large-scale, to wit:
That on or about and during the period comprised between December 21, 1990 and
February 17, 1991, inclusive, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring
and confederating together with others still unknown and helping one another, and
representing herself to have the capacity to contract, enlist and transport Filipino workers for
employment abroad, did then and there willfully and unlawfully, for a fee, recruit and promise
employment abroad to Leo D. delos Santos, Merlita L. Bombarda, Margarita R. madae (sic),

Purita A. Conceja, Cristina I. Nava and Napoleon E. Ramos, without first securing the
required license or authority from the Dept. of Labor.
Contrary to law.4
Criminal Case No. 91-94198 was originally filed before Branch 45 of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila where, upon arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty.5 The six other cases were
filed before Branch I of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, where accused-appellant, likewise,
entered a plea of "not guilty" to all the indictments. The cases were eventually consolidated and tried
jointly before Branch I.6
The evidence for the prosecution, as summarized by the trial court, is reproduced herein:
Napoleon Ramos, complainant in Criminal Cases Nos. 91-94192 and 91-94198, testified that
he was at the house of the accused on Estrada Street, Urdaneta, Pangasinan, in the evening
of January 9, 1991, between the hours of 7:00 and 8:00 o'clock. Also in the house were
Nadal, Conseja and Bombarda. The accused told the private complainants that she knew
someone in Manila who could help them secure employment in Hongkong; that if they are
interested she would take them to Manila on January 12, 1991, and that they should be
prepared to make an initial payment of P15,000.00 each, for their placement fees.
On the early morning of January 12, 1991, Ramos, Nadal, Conseja and Bombarda together
with the accused proceeded to Manila by bus. They went directly to a house on Lardizabal
Street, Sampaloc, Manila, where they were served breakfast. After a while, a woman arrived
and was introduced by the accused to the private complainants as Julie Micua. The
complainants were assured by Micua that she could get them overseas employment and
upon payment of their placement fees of P35,000.00 each, they would leave for Hongkong
within one month. Ramos, Nadal, Conseja and Bombarda made a downpayment of
P5,000.00 each to the accused and her husband. The corresponding receipts, however,
which were prepared by the accused, were in the name of and signed by Micua, Exhibits "E1," "L," "H, "D," and "C."
xxx

xxx

xxx

On January 14, 1991, Ramos went back to the House in Sampaloc, Manila, and handed to
the accused the sum of P15,000.00. As in the first payment, the accused prepared a receipt
in the name of Micua, who signed the same, Exhibit "E." On January 17, 1991, Ramos paid
the accused an additional sum of P10,000.00 and the latter prepared a receipt in the name
of Micua, who signed it, Exhibit "E-2." After Ramos failed to leave for Hongkong or secure
overseas employment for more than two months since January 1991, he became suspicious
and later realized that he and the other complainants had been hoodwinked.
On April 26, 1991, Ramos and the other five complainants went to Manila and lodged with
the Western Police District Command, Manila, criminal complaints for estafa and illegal
recruitment against the accused, which led to her immediate arrest, Exhibit "A" and "B."

On the other hand, Merlita Bombarda, complainant in Criminal Cases Nos. 91-94196 and 9194198, declared that in 1987, the accused offered to recruit her for overseas employment in
Japan, but she declined the offer, due to her singing engagement in Dagupan. Later, she
worked in Singapore. Upon her return to the Philippine in 1990, she again met the accused
in Urdaneta, Pangasinan. The accused told Bombarda that she knew of an agency recruiting
people for overseas employment as factory workers in Hongkong, in consideration of a
placement fee of P45,000,00.
In the evening of January 9, 1991, she was at the accused's house where she met the other
complainants, Nadal, Ramos, Delos Santos and Conseja. The accused discussed with them
the requirements for their overseas employment such as documentation, payment of
placement fees and their trip to Manila.
On the early morning of January 12, 1991, the complainants and the accused left by bus for
Manila. They were taken by the accused a house on Lardizabal Street, Sampaloc, Manila.
Bombarda was assured by Micua that she would be employed in Hongkong as a factory
worker with a monthly salary of H$4,000.00. She and the other complainants were asked by
Micua to sign blank contracts of employment. After signing the blank contracts, complainants
paid P5,000.00 each of the accused, who prepared the receipts that Micua signed. The
receipt issued to Bombarda was marked as Exhibit "D-2."
On January 17, she paid another P5,000.00 to the accused at the same house in Sampaloc,
Manila, Exhibit "D-1."
On February 17, she again paid P10,000.00 to the accused at the latter's house in Urdaneta,
Pangasinan, Exhibit "D," in the presence of Micua. She was told by the accused that she
(Bombarda) would leave for Hongkong within two months, but she waited in vain. Neither
was her money returned by the accused.
Leo delos Santos, complainant in Criminal Case Nos. 91-94197 and 91-94198, asserted that
he met the accused in Urdaneta, Pangasinan in October 1990. The accused persuaded him
to apply for overseas employment, by telling him that she knew a recruiter who could deploy
workers abroad. He was further advised by the accused to prepare P15,000.00 as initial
payment of his placement fee. On December 21, 1990, January 21 and February 17, 1991,
Delos Santos gave to the accused the respective sums of P8,000.00, P10,000.00 and
P12,000.00, Exhibit "F," "F-2," "F-3," and "F-4." The accused assured De los Santos that he
would leave for Hongkong and work thereat as a factory worker within two months, but his
projected trip never materialized. Neither was his money returned.
1wphi1.nt

When recalled to the witness stand by the prosecution as a witness for Margarita Nadal,
complainant in Criminal Cases Nos. 91-94194 and 91-94198, Napoleon Ramos declared
that Nadal was his neighbor in Urdaneta, Pangasinan; that on January 9, 1991, he was with
Nadal when she applied with the accused a the latter's house in Urdaneta, Pampanga, for
employment abroad; that he was present when Nadal handed to the accused the sum of
P5,000.00 in Sampaloc, Manila, and he saw the accused prepare a receipt therefor that was
signed by Micua, Exhibit "J;" that he was also present when Nadal gave an additional sum of

P10,000.00 to the accused at her residence on Estrada Street, Pangasinan, for which a
receipt was issued by the accused, Exhibit "J-3" that Nadal had gave (sic) to him other
receipts of payments she had made to the accused sums of P5,000 and P10,000.00,
Exhibits "J-1" and "J-2," but he was not present when these two payments were made, and
that Nadal was unable to testify, because she is now abroad.
The prosecution next presented Cristina Nava, complainant in Criminal Cases Nos. 9194193 and 91-94198, who testified that sometime in 1991, the accused went to her (Nava's)
house in San Nicholas, Villasis, Pangasinan, and offered to recruit her for overseas
employment in Hongkong. Nava told the accused that she would consult her husband about
the matter. A few weeks later, the accused again visited Nava and she (accused) succeeded
in convincing the reluctant Nava to accept the offer. The accused told Nava that her
placement fee would be P40,000.00 of which P30,000.00 was to be paid in advance and the
balance of P10,000.00 would be deducted from her salary. On different occasions, Nava
delivered to the accused various amounts totalling P30,000.00 as placement fee, Exhibit "G,"
"G-1," and "G-2." The accused assured Nava that she would leave for and work in Hongkong
within two months, but the promised employment turned out to be a dud. Despite repeated
demands from Nava, the accused has failed and refused to return the latter's money.
xxx

xxx

x x x7

Testifying in her own defense, accused-appellant denied the charges of engaging in recruitment
activities and of receiving money from complainants. She described herself as a public school
teacher living in Pangasinan with her four children and unemployed husband. Like the other
complainants, she claimed she was a victim of Julie Micua. She first met Micua on December 17,
1990, at the house of Lina Salcedo in Sampaloc, Manila. Micua was introduced to her as a recruiter
of overseas workers. Interested, she applied for a job abroad. Micua informed her that she would be
a factory worker and showed her a contract. Accused-appellant was required to submit her medical
certificate and passport and to make an advance payment of P5,000.00 as part of the P40,000.00
placement.8
When complainants learned that she had applied for overseas employment, they sought her helping
in going to the agency where she applied. Hence, on January 12, 1991, accused-appellant
accompanied the complainants to see Julie Micua who assured them that they would be leaving for
Hongkong within two or three months. They were also informed that their placement fee would be
P45,000.00. On that day, accused-appellant and complainants gave Julie Micua the amount of
P5,000.00. On February 17, 1991, accused-appellant gave Micua an additional P5,000.00.
According to her, complainants were all given corresponding receipts for their payments. The
receipts were issued and signed by Micua.
Accused-appellant got to know complainant Ramos when she was invited by his wife Marita to a
birthday party at the couple's residence. In that party, they talked about applying for a job abroad and
Marita convinced her husband to apply. It was Ramos who introduced accused-appellant to
complainant Nadal. Ramos convinced Nadal to apply for overseas employment. On the other hand,
accused-appellant's co-teacher, Isabel Valdez, brought complainant Delos Santos to accusedappellant's classroom and sought her assistance in applying for an overseas job through the agency

she was using. With respect to Merlita Bombarda, accused-appellant met her through her cousin
Nadal who also accompanied Merlita to accused-appellant's house to apply. Purita Conceja, who
was also introduced to accused-appellant, sought her help in applying for a job abroad through the
agency she was using. As regards complainant Cristina Nava, accused-appellant met her through
Cristina's husband who was a regular customer of her store. Accused-appellant claims she never
represented herself as having the capacity to deploy workers abroad. She only told them that she
could accompany them to the agency where she also applied.
According to accused-appellant, two months after they were unable to leave for abroad, she and the
complainants had a meeting. They discussed how they could recover their money. On April 26, 1991,
upon Nadal's invitation, she voluntarily joined the complainants in going to Manila. Their main
purpose was to look for Julie Micua. In Manila, they went to Blumentritt where they met Blas Santos,
a police officer whom Ramos knew. Accused-appellant saw Ramos collecting money from his
companions. Afterwards, they proceeded to the United Nations Police Headquarters. Santos
endorsed them to investigator Val Torres, who, in turn, typed the consolidated affidavits of
complainants. The money collected by Ramos was given to the investigator. The complaint filed by
the complainants included accused-appellant as one of the defendants. 9
Lina Salcedo corroborated accused-appellant's testimony. Salcedo testified that she owns the house
on 1333 Lardizabal St., Sampaloc, Manila. Also living there was a house boarder named Paz Alonzo
who had a friend named Julie Micua. Sometime in December 1990, Micua visited Paz at Salcedo's
boarding house when accused-appellant arrived. It was on this occasion that Julie Micua and
accused-appellant met for the first time and they discussed how to get employment in Hongkong.
After Christmas, accused-appellant returned Salcedo's house some companions. Salcedo saw the
members of the group giving money to Julie Micua for which the latter issued corresponding
receipts. It was Julia Micua who did all the explaining. Accused-appellant and her companions
returned to Salcedo's house on two other occasions. According to Salcedo, she was present when
all the transactions took place and she observed that Julie Micua never gave money or any
consideration to accused-appellant. 10 Lina Salcedo's testimony was corroborated on the witness
stand by her sister Violy Constantino. 11
On March 1, 1994, the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch I, rendered the decision now on
appeal before this Court. In justifying accused-appellant's conviction, the trial court gave full
credence to the testimonies of the complainants as they were "clear and straightforward" and "reflect
spontaneity and are replete with details, which conform to what appears from the other evidence on
record." It found that the complainants "positively identified the accused as the one who had
persuaded them to apply for overseas employment, accompanied them all the way from Pangasinan
to Manila, [and] personally received from them various sums as placement fees." Further, the trial
court found no improper motive on the part of the complainants, thus:
. . . it is hard to believe that the private complainants, who all reside in Urdaneta,
Pangasinan, would undergo the expense, rigor and inconvenience of a public trial if their
motive is not to bring to justice the person/s who had defrauded them. . . . 12

Accordingly, the trial court held that all the elements of Article 315, Paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal
Code were proven in the cases for estafa. In likewise finding accused-appellant guilty of illegal
recruitment in large scale, the trial court stated:
. . . this court is convinced beyond moral certainty that there was unity of action, purpose and
design between the accused and Julie Micua to recruit the private complainants for overseas
employment in Hongkong without first securing a license or an authority therefor from the
Philippine Overseas and Employment Agency. The accused took a direct and active
participation in the recruitment of the private complainants by referring and persuading them
to apply for deployment abroad, accompanying them all the way from Urdaneta, Pangasinan,
to Manila to refer them to Micua, who presented herself as a recruiter of worker(s) for
overseas employment, personally collecting and receiving from them various amounts for
their placement fees, and preparing the receipts therefor. 13
Hence, this appeal. Accused-appellant raises the following assignment of errors:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING THIS CASE ON THE GROUND OF
LACK OF JURISDICTION ON ITS PART OVER THE PERSON OF THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANT BY REASON OF THE FACT THAT THE WARRANTLESS ARREST OF THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS ILLEGAL.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT RECRUITED THE
PRIVATE COMPLAINANTS FOR DEPLOYMENT AS LAND WORKERS IN HONGKONG.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FIND (SIC) THAT ALL THE ESSENTIAL REQUISITES OF
ESTAFA AS DEFINED IN ARTICLE 315, REVISED PENAL CODE, ARE CONCURRENTLY
SATISFIED IN THIS CASE.
We find no valid grounds to reverse accused-appellant's conviction.
Accused-appellant's first assignment of error challenges the trial court's judgment on a jurisdictional
ground. She argues that her arrest without warrant was illegal and, therefore, following the settled
rule that the trial court does not acquire jurisdiction over the person of one who is illegally arrested,
the case should have been dismissed. 14 This contention is untenable.
Jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired either by arrest or voluntary appearance in
court. The record amply demonstrates that accused-appellant voluntarily appeared in court at her
arraignments, entered a plea of "not guilty" to all the charges against her, and later actively
participated in the trial. Hence, granting arguendo that accused-appellant's arrest was defective,
such is deemed cured upon her voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court. 15 It should be

stressed that the question of legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the
person of the accused. Consequently, if objections based on this ground are waived, the fact that the
arrest was illegal is not sufficient cause for setting aside an otherwise valid judgment. The
technicality cannot render the subsequent proceedings void and deprive the State of its right to
convict the guilty when all the facts on record point to the culpability of the accused. 16
The second and third assigned errors regarding accused-appellant's culpability for the crimes of
estafa and illegal-recruitment in large scale are closely interrelated, hence, shall be discussed jointly.
These alleged errors boil down to the issue of credibility.
All the complainants are one in saying that accused-appellant made representations that she knew
someone who could help them secure employment in Hongkong. Relying on these representations,
they applied for placement for employment abroad and paid various sums of money therefor.
Unfortunately, accused-appellant failed to comply with her promise of employment or restitute the
amounts she received from them.
For her part, accused-appellant claims that she merely helped complainants find an agency that
could secure for them employment overseas. She acted as a "good samaritan" by facilitating their
quest for a better economic status. She denied receiving the fees paid by complainants and asserts
hat it was Julie Micua who recruited complainants and collected the placement fees for overseas
employment. An examination of the records, however, reveals that accused-appellant is as culpable
as Julie Micua.
As to which of the contending claims should be believed is fundamentally an issue of credibility. Well
settled is the rule that the issue of credibility is the domain of the trial that had observed the
deportment and manner of the witnesses as they testified. The findings of facts of a trial court,
arrived at only after a hearing and evaluation of what can usually be expected to be conflicting
testimonies of witnesses certainly deserve respect by an appellant court. 17 We find no cogent reason
to depart from this time-honored doctrine.
Accused-appellant failed to show that complainants, who were mostly her townmates and some
even her relatives, were ill-motivated in filing the cases against her; hence, their testimonies merit
full faith and credit.
The Court finds unacceptable accused-appellant's claim that the complainants are "barking at the
wrong tree" and that they only turned their ire on her because the alleged real culprit, Julie Micua,
was nowhere to be found. 18Complainants would not run after her if she, too, were really a victim.
The lame defense consisting of accused-appellant's bare denial cannot overcome the prosecution's
positive evidence proving her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Moreover, compared to accusedappellant's evidence, which is mainly one of denial, the prosecution presented evidence showing her
positive acts of complicity with Julie Micua in recruiting complainants. The accordance of greater
probative value to evidence that is positive in nature than that which is negative in character is a
time-honored principle. Hence, the negative assertions of accused-appellant cannot prevail over the
positive testimony of the complainants. 19

The prosecution undoubtedly proved that accused-appellant, without license or authority, engaged in
recruitment and placement activities. This was done in collaboration with Julie Micua, when they
promised complainants employment in Hongkong. Art. 13, par. (b) of the Labor Code defines
recruitment and placement as "any act of canvassing enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing,
hiring or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for
employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not; Provided that any person or entity which, in
any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed
engaged in recruitment and placement."
In People v. Agustin, 20 therein appellant argued that she could not be convicted of illegal recruitment
because in introducing the complainants to the alleged recruitment recruiters, she merely acted "out
of the goodness of her heart."
In resolving said case, the Court ruled:
Hence, the inevitable query is whether or not appellant Agustin merely introduced
complainants to the Goce couple or her actions went beyond that. The testimonial evidence
hereon show that she indeed further committed acts constitutive of illegal recruitment. All
four prosecution witnesses testified that it was Agustin whom they initially approached
regarding their plans of working overseas. It was from her that they learned about the fees
they had to pay, as well as the papers that they had to submit. It was after they had talked to
her that they met the accused spouses who owned the placement agency.
As such, the Court concluded that appellant that appellant was an employee of the Goce spouses,
as she was actually making referrals to the agency. She was therefore, engaged in recruitment
activities.
The same factual circumstance obtains in this case. Although accused-appellant was not an
employee of the alleged illegal recruiter Julie Micua, the evidence show that she was the one who
approached complainants and prodded them to seek employment abroad. It was through her that
they met Julia Micua. This is clearly an act of referral. Worse, accused-appellant declared that she
was capable of placing them in jobs overseas. Suffice it to say that complainants' recruitment would
not have been consummated were it not for the direct participation of accused-appellant in the
recruitment process.
Art. 18, paragraph (a) of the Labor Code provides that:
Any recruitment activities, including the prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of
this Code, to be undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of authority shall be deemed
illegal and punishable under Article 39 of this Code.
Illegal recruitment is conducted in a large scale if perpetrated against three (3) or more persons
individually or as a group. This crime requires proof that the accused: (1) engaged in the recruitment
and placement of workers defined under Article 13 or in any of the prohibited activities under Article
34 of the Labor Code; (2) does not have a license or authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment

or and placement of workers; and (3) committed the infraction against three or more, persons,
individually or as a group. 21
All there three essential elements are present in the case at bar. As earlier discussed, accusedappellant recruited the six complainants. Further, the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration certified that neither accused-appellant nor Julie Micua is licensed to recruit workers
for overseas employment. 22
Accused-appellant's contention that she was a mere applicant and eventually a victim like
complainants holds no water. Note should be made of the fact that throughout the trial of the case,
no mention was made that accused-appellant exerted any effort to seek a refund for her money nor
did she file a case against Julie Micua, her alleged victimizer. Her only excuse was that at the time of
the filing of the complaint in Manila, she was confused and the investigating officer would not listen
to her side of the controversy.
Moreover, accused-appellant and her husband's acts of receiving almost all the payments of the
complainants and issuing receipts signed by Julie Micua contradict her claim of being a mere
applicant. There were even times that accused-appellant herself signed the receipts for the
placement fees. 23 Taken as a whole, the evidence shows that accused-appellant conspired and
actively participated in the deceitful plan adopted by her co-accused Julie Micua, Rico Cordova and
her own husband, Renato Meris, to hire without license or authority, gullible and naive applicants for
non-existent overseas jobs.
Likewise, we find that accused-appellant committed the crime of estafa under Article 315, paragraph
2 of the Revised Penal Code. This is committed by any person who defrauds another by using a
fictitious name, or falsely pretends to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit,
agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by means of similar deceits executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud. The offended party must have relied on the false
pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means of the accused-appellant and as a result thereof, the
offended party suffered damages. 24
1wphi1

Complainants parted with their money upon accused-appellant's prodding and enticement, and on
the false belief that she had the capacity to deploy them abroad. In the end, complainants were
neither able to leave nor get their money back.
A close scrutiny of the appealed decision warrants correction of the penalty imposed in each of the
estafa cases.
The pertinent provision of the Revised Penal Code is as follows:
Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means
mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:
1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its
minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000
pesos; and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph

shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10, 000 pesos;
but the total penalty which maybe imposed shall exceed twenty years. In such case, and in
connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the
other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed reclusion mayor or reclusion
temporal, at the case may be;
xxx

xxx

xxx

In People v. Gabres, 25 where the amount swindled ranged from P40,000 to P50,000, the Court said:
Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term of the penalty shall be "that
which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed" under the Revised
Penal Code, and the minimum shall be "within the range of the penalty next lower to that
prescribed" for the offense. The penalty next lower should be based on the penalty
prescribed by the Code for the offense, without first considering any modifying circumstance
attendant to the commission of the crime. The determination of the minimum penalty is left
law to the sound discretion of the court and it can be anywhere within the range of the
penalty next lower without any reference to the period into which it might be subdivided. The
modifying circumstances are considered only in the imposition of the maximum term of the
determinate sentence.
The fact that the amounts involved in the instant case exceed P22,000.00 should not be
considered in the initial determination of the indeterminate penalty; instead, the matter
should be so taken as analogous to modifying circumstances in the imposition of the
maximum term of the full indeterminate sentence. This interpretation of the law accords with
the rule that penal laws should be construed in favor of the accused. Since the penalty
prescribed by law for the estafa charge against accused-appellant is prision
correccionalmaximum to prision mayor minimum, the penalty next lower would be prision
correccional minimum to medium. Thus, the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence
should be anywhere within six (6) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2)
months while the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence should at least be six (6)
years and one (1) day because the amounts involved exceeded P22,000.00 plus an
additional one (1) year for each additional P10,000.00.
Here, the amounts involved are P20,000.00 in Criminal Case No. 91-94196 and P30,000.00 each in
Criminal Cases Nos. 91-94192, 91-94193, 91-94194, 91-94195 and 91-94197. The amounts in
excess of the P22,000.00 as provided for in the first paragraph of Article 315 of the Revised Penal
Code are less than P10,000.00, hence, do not warrant the imposition of an additional one-year
imprisonment. There being no proven modifying circumstances, the correct penalty in each of the six
(6) estafa cases should be the indeterminate penalty ranging from two (2) years and four (4) months
of a prision correccional as minimum to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum.
With respect to Criminal Case No. 91-94918, the trial court correctly imposed the penalty of life
imprisonment and fine of P100,000.00.
WHEREFORE, the decision in question is hereby AFFIRMED subject to the modification that in each
of the six (6) estafa cases, the indeterminate sentence that appellant Leonida Meris y Padilla must

serve is two (2) year and four (4) months of prision correccional as minimum to six (6) year and one
(1) day of prision mayor maximum. Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.

1wphi1.nt

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Pardo and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

[G.R. No. 132376. April 11, 2002]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,


ANGELES y CALMA, accused-appellant.

vs. SAMINA

DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Accused-appellant Samina Angeles y Calma was charged with four (4)


counts of estafa and one (1) count of illegal recruitment in the following
informations:[1]
Criminal Case No. 94-140585 (Estafa)
That on or about September 8, 1994 in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud MARIA
TOLOSA DE SARDEA Y TABLADA in the following manner to wit: the said
accused, by means of false manifestations and fraudulent representations
which she made to said Maria Tolosa de Sardea y Tablada to the effect that
she had the power and capacity to recruit and employ her as domestic helper
in Paris, France, and could facilitate the processing of the pertinent papers if
given the necessary amount to meet the requirements thereof, and by means

of other similar deceits, induced and succeeded in inducing said Maria Tolosa
de Sardea y Tablada to give and deliver, as in fact she gave and delivered to
said accused the amount of P107,000.00 on the strength of said
manifestations and representations, accused well knowing that the same were
false and fraudulent and were made solely, to obtain, as in fact she did obtain
the amount of P107,000.00 which amount once in her possession, with intent
to defraud, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriated, misapplied
and converted the same to her own personal use and benefit to the damage
and prejudice of said Maria Tolosa de Sardea y Tablada in the aforesaid sum
of P107,000.00 Philippine Currency.
Criminal Case No. 94-140486 (Estafa)
That on or about September 8, 1994 in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud
MARCELIANO T. TOLOSA in the following manner, to wit: the said accused,
by means of false manifestations and fraudulent representations which she
made to said MARCELIANO T. TOLOSA to the effect that she had the power
and capacity to recruit and employ him as contract worker in Paris, France
and could facilitate the processing of the pertinent papers if given the
necessary amount to meet the requirements thereof, and by means of other
similar deceits, induced and succeeded in inducing said Marceliano T. Tolosa
accused well knowing that the same were false and fraudulent and were
made solely, to obtain, as in fact she did obtain the amount of P190,000.00
which amount once in their possession, with intent to defraud, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously misappropriated, misapplied and converted the
same to her own personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of
said Marceliano T. Tolosa in the aforesaid sum of P190,000.00, Philippine
Currency.
Criminal Case No. 94-140487 (Estafa)
That on or about September 9, 1994 in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud
PRECILA P. OLPINDO in the following manner to wit: the said accused, by
means of false manifestations and fraudulent representations which she made
to said Precila P. Olpindo to the effect that she had the power and capacity to

recruit and employ her as contract worker in Canada and could facilitate the
processing of the pertinent papers if given the necessary amount to meet the
requirements thereof, and by means of other similar deceits, induced and
succeeded in inducing said Precila P. Olpindo to give and deliver, as in fact
she delivered to said accused the amount of $2,550.00 on the strength of said
manifestations and representations, said Precila P. Olpindo accused well
knowing that the same were false and fraudulent and were made solely, to
obtain, as in fact she did obtain the amount of $2,550.00 which amount once
in her possession, with intent to defraud, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
misappropriated, misapplied and converted the same to her own personal use
and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of said Precila P. Olpindo in the
aforesaid sum of $2,550.00 or its equivalent in Philippine Currency of
P61,200.00.
Criminal Case No. 94-140488 (Estafa)
That on or about the first week of September 1994 in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously defraud VILMA S. BRINA in the following manner to wit: the said
accused, by means of false manifestations and fraudulent representations
which she made to said Vilma S. Brina to the effect that she had the power
and capacity to recruit and employ her as contract worker in Canada and
could facilitate the processing of the pertinent papers if given the necessary
amount to meet the requirements thereof, and by means of other similar
deceits, induced and succeeded in inducing said Vilma S. Brina to give and
deliver, as in fact she gave and delivered to said accused the amount of
$2,550.00 on the strength of said manifestations and representations,
accused well knowing that the same were false and fraudulent and were
made solely, to obtain, as in fact she did obtain the amount of $2,550.00
which amount once in her possession, with intent to defraud, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously misappropriated, misapplied and converted the
same to her own personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of
said Vilma S. Brina in the aforesaid sum of $2,550.00 or its equivalent in
Philippine Currency of P61,200.00.
Criminal Case No. 94-140489 (Illegal Recruitment)

The undersigned accuses SAMINA ANGELES y CALMA of violation of Art. 38


(a) Pres. Decree No. 1412 amending certain provisions of Book 1, Pres.
Decree No. 442 otherwise known as the New Labor Code of the Philippines in
relation to Article 13 (b) and (c) of said Code, as further amended in a large
scale, as follows:
That sometime during the month of September 1994 in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused, representing herself to have the capacity to
contract, enlist and transport Filipino workers for employment abroad, did then
and there willfully and unlawfully for a fee, recruit and promise
employment/job placement abroad to the following persons:
1. Marceliano T. Tolosa
2. Precila P. Olpindo
3. Vilma S. Brina
4. Maria Tolosa de Sardea y Tablada
Without first having secured the required license or authority from the
Department of Labor and Employment.
The five (5) cases were consolidated and tried jointly by the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 50.
Maria Tolosa Sardea was working in Saudi Arabia when she received a
call from her sister, Priscilla Agoncillo, who was in Paris, France. Priscilla
advised Maria to return to the Philippines and await the arrival of her friend,
accused-appellant Samina Angeles, who will assist in processing her travel
and employment documents to Paris, France. Heeding her sisters advice,
Maria immediately returned to the Philippines.
Marceliano Tolosa who at that time was in the Philippines likewise
received instructions from his sister Priscilla to meet accused-appellant who
will also assist in the processing of his documents for Paris, France.

Maria and Marceliano eventually met accused-appellant in September


1994 at Expert Travel Agency on Mabini Street, Manila. During their meeting,
accused-appellant asked if they had the money required for the processing of
their documents. On September 8, 1994, Maria gave P107,000.00 to
accused-appellant at Expert Travel Agency. Subsequently, she gave another
P46,000.00 and US$1,500.00 as additional payments to accused-appellant.
Marceliano, on the other hand, initially gave P100,000.00 to accusedappellant but on September 28, 1994, he gave an additional P46,000.00 and
US$1,500.00 to accused-appellant at the United Coconut Planters Bank in
Makati.
Analyn Olpindo met accused-appellant in Belgium. At that time, Analyn
was working in Canada but she went to Belgium to visit her in-laws. After
meeting accused-appellant, Analyn Olpindo called up her sister, Precila
Olpindo, in the Philippines and told her to meet accused-appellant upon the
latters arrival in the Philippines because accused-appellant can help process
her documents for employment in Canada.
Precila Olpindo eventually met accused-appellant at the Expert Travel
Agency on September 7, 1994. Accused-appellant asked for the amount of
$4,500.00, but Precila was only able to give $2,500.00.
No evidence was adduced in relation to the complaint of Vilma Brina since
she did not testify in court.
Accused-appellant told Precila Olpindo and Vilma Brina that it was easier
to complete the processing of their papers if they start from Jakarta, Indonesia
rather than from Manila. Thus, on September 23, 1994, Precila Olpindo, Vilma
Brina and accused-appellant flew to Jakarta, Indonesia. However, accusedappellant returned to the Philippines after two days, leaving behind Precila
and Vilma. They waited for accused-appellant in Jakarta but the latter never
returned. Precila and Vilma eventually came home to the Philippines on
November 25, 1994.
When she arrived in the Philippines, Precila tried to get in touch with
accused-appellant at the Expert Travel Agency, but she could not reach

her. Meanwhile, Maria and Marceliano Tolosa also began looking for accusedappellant after she disappeared with their money.
Elisa Campanianos of the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency
presented a certification to the effect that accused-appellant was not duly
licensed to recruit workers here and abroad.
In her defense, accused-appellant averred that, contrary to the
prosecutions allegations, she never represented to the complainants that she
can provide them with work abroad. She insisted that she was a marketing
consultant and an international trade fair organizer. In June 1994, she went to
Paris, France to organize a trade fair. There she met Priscilla Agoncillo, a
domestic helper, and they became friends. Priscilla asked her to assist her
siblings, Maria and Marceliano, particularly in the processing of their travel
documents for France. Accused-appellant told Priscilla that she can only help
in the processing of travel documents and nothing more. It was Priscilla who
promised employment to Maria and Marceliano. She received money from
complainants not in the form of placement fees but for the cost of tickets, hotel
accommodations and other travel requirements.
According to accused-appellant, she met Analyn Olpindo in Belgium while
she was organizing a trade fair. They also became friends and it was Analyn
who asked her to help Precila. Just like in the case of Maria and Marceliano,
accused-appellant explained that her assistance shall only entail the
processing of Precilas travel documents to Canada.
After trial on the merits, the trial court found accused-appellant guilty of
illegal recruitment and four (4) counts of estafa and correspondingly
sentenced her as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the aforementioned premises the accused SAMINA
ANGELES is hereby declared:
In Criminal Case No. 94-140489 for the crime of Illegal Recruitment, GUILTY
(Art. 38 Labor Code) and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment and a fine of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00).

In Criminal Case No. 94-140485 for the crime of Estafa the accused is hereby
declared GUILTY and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of from twelve
(12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years. In addition the accused is
ordered to reimburse the amount of One hundred seven thousand pesos
(P107,000.00) to complainant Maria Tolosa de Sardea. With costs.
In Criminal Case No. 94-140486 for the crime of Estafa the accused is hereby
declared GUILTY and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of from twelve
(12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years. In addition the accused is
ordered to reimburse the amount of One hundred ninety thousand pesos
(P190,000.00) to complainant Marceliano T. Tolosa. With costs.
In Criminal Case No. 94-140487 for the crime of Estafa the accused is hereby
declared GUILTY and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of from twelve
(12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years. In addition the accused is
ordered to reimburse the amount of Two thousand five hundred fifty dollars
(US$2,550.00) or its equivalent in Philippine currency of Sixty one thousand
two hundred pesos (P61,200.00), to complainant Precila P. Olpindo. With
Costs.
In Criminal Case No. 94-140488 for the crime of Estafa the accused is hereby
declared GUILTY and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of from twelve
(12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years. In addition the accused is
ordered to reimburse the amount of Two thousand five hundred fifty dollars
(US$2,550.00) or its equivalent in Philippine Currency of Sixty one thousand
two hundred pesos (P61,200.00) to complainant Vilma S. Brina. With costs.[2]
Accused-appellant is now before us on appeal, arguing that the
prosecution failed to prove her guilt for estafa and illegal recruitment by proof
beyond reasonable doubt.
Accused-appellant points out that not one of the complainants testified on
what kind of jobs were promised to them, how much they would receive as
salaries, the length of their employment and even the names of their
employers, which are basic subjects a prospective employee would first
determine.

In sum, accused-appellant posits that the prosecution did not present a


single evidence to prove that she promised or offered any of the complainants
jobs abroad. Illegal recruitment is committed when two (2) elements concur: 1)
that the offender has no valid license or authority required by law to enable
one to lawfully engage in recruitment and placement of workers; and 2) that
the offender undertakes either any activity within the meaning of recruitment
and placement defined under Article 13(b), or any prohibited practices
enumerated under Article 34.[3]
Article 13(b), of the Labor Code provides, thus:
(b) Recruitment and placement refers to any act of canvassing, enlisting,
contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes
referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment locally or
abroad, whether for profit or not: Provided, that any person or entity which, in
any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons
shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.
To prove illegal recruitment, it must be shown that the accused-appellant
gave complainants the distinct impression that he had the power or ability to
send complainants abroad for work such that the latter were convinced to part
with their money in order to be employed. [4] To be engaged in the practice of
recruitment and placement, it is plain that there must at least be a promise or
offer of an employment from the person posing as a recruiter whether locally
or abroad.
In the case at bar, accused-appellant alleges that she never promised nor
offered any job to the complainants.
We agree.
A perusal of the records reveals that not one of the complainants testified
that accused-appellant lured them to part with their hard-earned money with
promises of jobs abroad. On the contrary, they were all consistent in saying
that their relatives abroad were the ones who contacted them and urged them
to meet accused-appellant who would assist them in processing their travel
documents. Accused-appellant did not have to make promises of employment

abroad as these were already done by complainants relatives. Thus, in the


cross-examination of Maria Tolosa de Cardena:
Atty. Dinglasan:
Q: And you would likewise agree that Priscilla informed you that she can find an employment
for you once you entered Paris, is that correct?
A: Yes, because according to her that is what Samina Angeles said to her.
Q: But during that time you would agree that you do not know personally or met in person
Samina Angeles?
A: Not yet sir.
Q: In fact, even when you arrived in the Philippines, and actually met in person Samina
Angeles, you did not know who is Samina Angeles and what her business was then that
time?
A: I recognized because my sister sent me a picture of Samina Angeles.
Q: So, it is clear that when you met Samina Angeles sometime on September 8, 1994, you
were already decided to go to Paris because you were then relying on the instruction
from the advice of Priscilla?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And that was the reason why you even terminated your employment contract in Saudi?
A: Yes, sir.[5]

Precila Olpindo, on cross-examination, admitted thus:


Q: You would like to confirm that before you and Samina met in the Philippines sometime in
September of 1995, you were already decided to leave for Canada as per advice of your
sister?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And you likewise agree madam witness that even before you met the accused sometime
in September of 1995, you were already directed and informed by your sister Ana as to
how much and she will pay the accused Samina for the facilitation of your travel in going
to Canada, is that correct?

A: Yes, sir.[6]

In the cross-examination of Marceliano Tolosa, thus:


Q: Now, would you agree that your sister is working in Paris?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And for how many years working in Paris?
A: Almost 5 years.
Q: And how much was she earning or receiving in Paris, France?
A: P20,000.00 or more, sir.
Q: And it was for this reason she advised your sister then in Saudi Arabia and you to also go
to Paris because she will be receiving more in Paris, correct?
A: She said when we follow to her office, sir.
Q: So what your sister told you if youre also interested to go to Paris you can avail of the help
of Samina Angeles, so you can also leave for Paris and join her, is that correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And that was the reason why your sister wrote you a letter and gave instruction to go to
accused sometime on September, 1994, is that correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Now you would agree with me Mr. Witness prior to that date September 8, 1994 you dont
know personally the person of Samina Angeles and do not know anything about the
nature of her business or personal circumstances, is that correct?
A: Yes, sir.[7]

Plainly, there is no testimony that accused-appellant offered complainants


jobs abroad. Hence, accused-appellant Samina Angeles cannot be lawfully
convicted of illegal recruitment.
Anent the four charges of estafa, Samina Angeles argues that the element
of deceit consisting in the false statement or fraudulent representation of the

accused made prior to or simultaneously with the delivery of the sums of


money is lacking in the instant case. She claims that she never deceived
complainants into believing that she had the authority and capability to send
them abroad for employment.
We are not persuaded.
Under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, the
elements of estafa are: (1) the accused has defrauded another by abuse of
confidence or by means of deceit and (2) damage or prejudice capable of
pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party or third person. Clearly,
these elements are present in this case.[8]
Although Samina Angeles did not deceive complainants into believing that
she could find employment for them abroad, nonetheless, she made them
believe that she was processing their travel documents for France and
Canada. They parted with their money believing that Samina Angeles would
use it to pay for their plane tickets, hotel accommodations and other travel
requirements. Upon receiving various amounts from complainants, Samina
Angeles used it for other purposes and then conveniently disappeared.
Complainants trusted Samina Angeles because she was referred to them
by their own relatives. She abused their confidence when she led them to
believe that she can process their travel documents abroad, thus inducing
them to part with their money. When they demanded from Samina their travel
documents, she failed to produce them. Likewise, she failed to return the
amounts entrusted to her.
Clearly, Samina Angeles defrauded complainants by falsely pretending to
possess the power and capacity to process their travel documents.
Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code imposes the penalty of prision
correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period, if
the amount of the fraud is over P12,000.00 but does not exceed P22,000.00;
if the amount exceeds P22,000.00, the penalty provided shall be imposed in
its
maximum
period,
adding
one
year
for
each
additional

P10,000.00. However, the total penalty which may be imposed shall not
exceed twenty years.[9]
In People v. Ordono,[10] it was held:
Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term of the penalty
shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly
imposed under the Revised Penal Code, and the minimum shall be within the
range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed for the offense. The penalty
next lower should be based on the penalty prescribed by the Code for the
offense, without first considering any modifying circumstance attendant to the
commission of the crime. The determination of the minimum penalty is left by
law to the sound discretion of the court and it can be anywhere within the
range of the penalty next lower without any reference to the periods into which
it might be subdivided. The modifying circumstances are considered only in
the imposition of the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence.
Thus, in Criminal Case No. 94-140485, Maria Tolosa testified that she
gave P107,000.00, P46,000.00 and US$1,500.00 to Samina Angeles. The
Information, however, alleged that Maria gave only P107,000.00. Samina
Angeles could therefore be held accountable for only that amount.
In Criminal Case No. 94-140486, Marceliano testified that he gave
P100,000.00, P46,000.00 and US$1,500.00 to Samina Angeles. The
Information however alleged that Marceliano gave only a total of P190,000.00;
hence that is the only amount that Samina Angeles could be held accountable
for.
In Criminal Case No. 94-140487, Precila testified that she gave
US$2,550.00 to Samina Angeles. The Information alleged that the equivalent
amount thereof in Philippine Currency is P61,200.00. Samina Angeles is
therefore criminally liable for P61,200.00.
Complainant Vilma Brina did not appear in court to testify. Thus, the
damage in the amount of $2,550.00 alleged in Criminal Case No. 94-140488
was not proved.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appealed Decision is


MODIFIED as follows:
(1) In Criminal Case No. 94-140485, accused-appellant Samina Angeles is
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa and sentenced
to suffer a prison term of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional, as minimum, to sixteen (16) years ofreclusion temporal, as
maximum, and is ORDERED to indemnify Maria Sardea the amount of
P107,000.00.
(2) In Criminal Case No. 94-140486, accused-appellant Samina Angeles is
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa and sentenced
to suffer a prison term of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional, as minimum, to twenty (20) years ofreclusion temporal, as
maximum, and is ORDERED to indemnify Marceliano Tolosa the amount of
P190,000.00.
(3) In Criminal Case No. 94-140487, accused-appellant Samina Angeles is
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa and sentenced
to suffer a prision term of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional, as minimum, to eleven (11) years ofprision mayor, as maximum,
and is ORDERED to indemnify Precila Olpindo the amount of P61,200.00.
(4) In Criminal Case No. 94-140488 for Estafa, accused-appellant Samina
Angeles is ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to prove her guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
(5) In Criminal Case No. 94-140489 for Illegal Recruitment, accused-appellant
Samina Angeles is ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to prove her guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Austria-Martinez,
JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 77279 April 15, 1988


MANUELA S. CATAN/M.S. CATAN PLACEMENT AGENCY, petitioners,
vs.
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT
ADMINISTRATION and FRANCISCO D. REYES, respondents.
Demetria Reyes, Merris & Associates for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for public respondents.
Bayani G. Diwa for private respondent.

CORTES, J.:
Petitioner, in this special civil action for certiorari, alleges grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
National Labor Relations Commission in an effort to nullify the latters resolution and thus free
petitioner from liability for the disability suffered by a Filipino worker it recruited to work in Saudi
Arabia. This Court, however, is not persuaded that such an abuse of discretion was committed. This
petition must fail.
The facts of the case are quite simple.
Petitioner, a duly licensed recruitment agency, as agent of Ali and Fahd Shabokshi Group, a Saudi
Arabian firm, recruited private respondent to work in Saudi Arabia as a steelman.
The term of the contract was for one year, from May 15,1981 to May 14, 1982. However, the contract
provided for its automatic renewal:
FIFTH: The validity of this Contract is for ONE YEAR commencing from the date the
SECOND PARTY assumes hill port. This Contract is renewable automatically if
neither of the PARTIES notifies the other PARTY of his wishes to terminate the

Contract by at least ONE MONTH prior to the expiration of the contractual period.
[Petition, pp. 6-7; Rollo, pp. 7-8].
The contract was automatically renewed when private respondent was not repatriated by his Saudi
employer but instead was assigned to work as a crusher plant operator. On March 30, 1983, while
he was working as a crusher plant operator, private respondent's right ankle was crushed under the
machine he was operating.
On May 15, 1983, after the expiration of the renewed term, private respondent returned to the
Philippines. His ankle was operated on at the Sta. Mesa Heights Medical Center for which he
incurred expenses.
On September 9, 1983, he returned to Saudi Arabia to resume his work. On May 15,1984, he was
repatriated.
Upon his return, he had his ankle treated for which he incurred further expenses.
On the basis of the provision in the employment contract that the employer shall compensate the
employee if he is injured or permanently disabled in the course of employment, private respondent
filed a claim, docketed as POEA Case No. 84-09847, against petitioner with respondent Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration. On April 10, 1986, the POEA rendered judgment in favor of
private respondent, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the complainant and against
the respondent, ordering the latter to pay to the complainant:
1. SEVEN THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED EIGHTY-FIVE PESOS and 60/100
(P7,985.60), Philippine currency, representing disability benefits;
2. TWENTY-FIVE THOUSAND NINETY-SIX Philippine pesos and 20/100 (29,096.20)
representing reimbursement for medical expenses;
3. Ten percent (10%) of the abovementioned amounts as and for attorney's fees.
[NLRC Resolution, p. 1; Rollo, p. 16].
On appeal, respondent NLRC affirmed the decision of the POEA in a resolution dated December 12,
1986.
Not satisfied with the resolution of the POEA, petitioner instituted the instant special civil action for
certiorari, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC.
1. Petitioner claims that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion when it ruled that petitioner was
liable to private respondent for disability benefits since at the time he was injured his original
employment contract, which petitioner facilitated, had already expired. Further, petitioner disclaims
liability on the ground that its agency agreement with the Saudi principal had already expired when
the injury was sustained.

There is no merit in petitioner's contention.


Private respondents contract of employment can not be said to have expired on May 14, 1982 as it
was automatically renewed since no notice of its termination was given by either or both of the
parties at least a month before its expiration, as so provided in the contract itself. Therefore, private
respondent's injury was sustained during the lifetime of the contract.
A private employment agency may be sued jointly and solidarily with its foreign principal for
violations of the recruitment agreement and the contracts of employment:
Sec. 10. Requirement before recruitment. Before recruiting any worker, the private
employment agency shall submit to the Bureau the following documents:
(a) A formal appointment or agency contract executed by a foreign-based employer
in favor of the license holder to recruit and hire personnel for the former ...
xxx xxx xxx
2. Power of the agency to sue and be sued jointly and solidarily with
the principal or foreign-based employer for any of the violations of the
recruitment agreement and the contracts of employment. [Section
10(a) (2) Rule V, Book I, Rules to Implement the Labor Code].
Thus, in the recent case of Ambraque International Placement & Services v. NLRC [G.R. No. 77970,
January 28,1988], the Court ruled that a recruitment agency was solidarily liable for the unpaid
salaries of a worker it recruited for employment in Saudi Arabia.
Even if indeed petitioner and the Saudi principal had already severed their agency agreement at the
time private respondent was injured, petitioner may still be sued for a violation of the employment
contract because no notice of the agency agreement's termination was given to the private
respondent:
Art 1921. If the agency has been entrusted for the purpose of contra with specified
persons, its revocation shall not prejudice the latter if they were not given notice
thereof. [Civil Code].
In this connection the NLRC elaborated:
Suffice it to state that albeit local respondent M. S. Catan Agency was at the time of
complainant's accident resulting in his permanent partial disability was (sic) no longer
the accredited agent of its foreign principal, foreign respondent herein, yet its
responsibility over the proper implementation of complainant's employment/service
contract and the welfare of complainant himself in the foreign job site, still existed,
the contract of employment in question not having expired yet. This must be so,
because the obligations covenanted in the recruitment agreement entered into by
and between the local agent and its foreign principal are not coterminus with the

term of such agreement so that if either or both of the parties decide to end the
agreement, the responsibilities of such parties towards the contracted employees
under the agreement do not at all end, but the same extends up to and until the
expiration of the employment contracts of the employees recruited and employed
pursuant to the said recruitment agreement. Otherwise, this will render nugatory the
very purpose for which the law governing the employment of workers for foreign jobs
abroad was enacted. [NLRC Resolution, p. 4; Rollo, p. 18]. (Emphasis supplied).
2. Petitioner contends that even if it is liable for disability benefits, the NLRC gravely abused its
discretion when it affirmed the award of medical expenses when the said expenses were the
consequence of private respondent's negligence in returning to work in Saudi Arabia when he knew
that he was not yet medically fit to do so.
Again, there is no merit in this contention.
No evidence was introduced to prove that private respondent was not medically fit to work when he
returned to Saudi Arabia. Exhibit "B", a certificate issued by Dr. Shafquat Niazi, the camp doctor, on
November 1, 1983, merely stated that private respondent was "unable to walk properly, moreover he
is still complaining [of] pain during walking and different lower limbs movement" [Annex "B", Reply;
Rollo, p. 51]. Nowhere does it say that he was not medically fit to work.
Further, since petitioner even assisted private respondent in returning to work in Saudi Arabia by
purchasing his ticket for him [Exhibit "E"; Annex "A", Reply to Respondents' Comments], it is as if
petitioner had certified his fitness to work. Thus, the NLRC found:
Furthermore, it has remained unrefuted by respondent that complainant's
subsequent departure or return to Saudi Arabia on September 9, 1983 was with the
full knowledge, consent and assistance of the former. As shown in Exhibit "E" of the
record, it was respondent who facilitated the travel papers of complainant. [NLRC
Resolution, p. 5; Rollo, p. 19].
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit, with costs
against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, (Chairman), Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Bidin, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 81510 March 14, 1990


HORTENCIA SALAZAR, petitioner,
vs.
HON. TOMAS D. ACHACOSO, in his capacity as Administrator of the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration, and FERDIE MARQUEZ, respondents.
Gutierrez & Alo Law Offices for petitioner.

SARMIENTO, J.:
This concerns the validity of the power of the Secretary of Labor to issue warrants of arrest and
seizure under Article 38 of the Labor Code, prohibiting illegal recruitment.
The facts are as follows:
xxx xxx xxx

1. On October 21, 1987, Rosalie Tesoro of 177 Tupaz Street, Leveriza, Pasay City, in
a sworn statement filed with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
(POEA for brevity) charged petitioner Hortencia Salazar, viz:
04. T: Ano ba ang dahilan at ikaw ngayon ay narito at
nagbibigay ng salaysay.
S: Upang ireklamo sa dahilan ang aking PECC Card ay
ayaw ibigay sa akin ng dati kong manager. Horty
Salazar 615 R.O. Santos, Mandaluyong, Mla.
05. T: Kailan at saan naganap and ginawang
panloloko sa
iyo ng tao/mga taong inireklamo mo?
S. Sa bahay ni Horty Salazar.
06. T: Paano naman naganap ang pangyayari?
S. Pagkagaling ko sa Japan ipinatawag niya ako.
Kinuha
ang PECC Card ko at sinabing hahanapan ako ng
booking sa Japan. Mag 9 month's na ako sa Phils. ay
hindi pa niya ako napa-alis. So lumipat ako ng ibang
company pero ayaw niyang ibigay and PECC Card
ko.
2. On November 3, 1987, public respondent Atty. Ferdinand Marquez to whom said
complaint was assigned, sent to the petitioner the following telegram:
YOU ARE HEREBY DIRECTED TO APPEAR BEFORE FERDIE
MARQUEZ POEA ANTI ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT UNIT 6TH FLR.
POEA BLDG. EDSA COR. ORTIGAS AVE. MANDALUYONG MM ON
NOVEMBER 6, 1987 AT 10 AM RE CASE FILED AGAINST YOU.
FAIL NOT UNDER PENALTY OF LAW.
4. On the same day, having ascertained that the petitioner had no license to operate
a recruitment agency, public respondent Administrator Tomas D. Achacoso issued his
challenged CLOSURE AND SEIZURE ORDER NO. 1205 which reads:
HORTY SALAZAR
No. 615 R.O. Santos St.
Mandaluyong, Metro Manila
Pursuant to the powers vested in me under Presidential Decree No. 1920 and
Executive Order No. 1022, I hereby order the CLOSURE of your recruitment agency

being operated at No. 615 R.O. Santos St., Mandaluyong, Metro Manila and the
seizure of the documents and paraphernalia being used or intended to be used as
the means of committing illegal recruitment, it having verified that you have
(1) No valid license or authority from the Department of Labor and
Employment to recruit and deploy workers for overseas employment;
(2) Committed/are committing acts prohibited under Article 34 of the
New Labor Code in relation to Article 38 of the same code.
This ORDER is without prejudice to your criminal prosecution under
existing laws.
Done in the City of Manila, this 3th day of November, 1987.
5. On January 26, 1988 POEA Director on Licensing and Regulation Atty. Estelita B.
Espiritu issued an office order designating respondents Atty. Marquez, Atty. Jovencio
Abara and Atty. Ernesto Vistro as members of a team tasked to implement Closure
and Seizure Order No. 1205. Doing so, the group assisted by Mandaluyong
policemen and mediamen Lito Castillo of the People's Journal and Ernie Baluyot of
News Today proceeded to the residence of the petitioner at 615 R.O. Santos St.,
Mandaluyong, Metro Manila. There it was found that petitioner was operating
Hannalie Dance Studio. Before entering the place, the team served said Closure and
Seizure order on a certain Mrs. Flora Salazar who voluntarily allowed them entry into
the premises. Mrs. Flora Salazar informed the team that Hannalie Dance Studio was
accredited with Moreman Development (Phil.). However, when required to show
credentials, she was unable to produce any. Inside the studio, the team chanced
upon twelve talent performers practicing a dance number and saw about twenty
more waiting outside, The team confiscated assorted costumes which were duly
receipted for by Mrs. Asuncion Maguelan and witnessed by Mrs. Flora Salazar.
6. On January 28, 1988, petitioner filed with POEA the following letter:
Gentlemen:
On behalf of Ms. Horty Salazar of 615 R.O. Santos, Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, we
respectfully request that the personal properties seized at her residence last January
26, 1988 be immediately returned on the ground that said seizure was contrary to
law and against the will of the owner thereof. Among our reasons are the following:
1. Our client has not been given any prior notice or hearing, hence
the Closure and Seizure Order No. 1205 dated November 3, 1987
violates "due process of law" guaranteed under Sec. 1, Art. III, of the
Philippine Constitution.

2. Your acts also violate Sec. 2, Art. III of the Philippine Constitution
which guarantees right of the people "to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose."
3. The premises invaded by your Mr. Ferdi Marquez and five (5)
others (including 2 policemen) are the private residence of the
Salazar family, and the entry, search as well as the seizure of the
personal properties belonging to our client were without her consent
and were done with unreasonable force and intimidation, together
with grave abuse of the color of authority, and constitute robbery and
violation of domicile under Arts. 293 and 128 of the Revised Penal
Code.
Unless said personal properties worth around TEN THOUSAND
PESOS (P10,000.00) in all (and which were already due for shipment
to Japan) are returned within twenty-four (24) hours from your receipt
hereof, we shall feel free to take all legal action, civil and criminal, to
protect our client's interests.
We trust that you will give due attention to these important matters.
7. On February 2, 1988, before POEA could answer the letter, petitioner filed the
instant petition; on even date, POEA filed a criminal complaint against her with the
Pasig Provincial Fiscal, docketed as IS-88-836. 1
On February 2, 1988, the petitioner filed this suit for prohibition. Although the acts sought to be
barred are alreadyfait accompli, thereby making prohibition too late, we consider the petition as one
for certiorari in view of the grave public interest involved.
The Court finds that a lone issue confronts it: May the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (or the Secretary of Labor) validly issue warrants of search and seizure (or arrest)
under Article 38 of the Labor Code? It is also an issue squarely raised by the petitioner for the
Court's resolution.
Under the new Constitution, which states:
. . . no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to
be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. 2
it is only a judge who may issue warrants of search and arrest. 3 In one case, it was declared that
mayors may not exercise this power:
xxx xxx xxx

But it must be emphasized here and now that what has just been described is the
state of the law as it was in September, 1985. The law has since been altered. No
longer does the mayor have at this time the power to conduct preliminary
investigations, much less issue orders of arrest. Section 143 of the Local
Government Code, conferring this power on the mayor has been abrogated,
rendered functus officio by the 1987 Constitution which took effect on February 2,
1987, the date of its ratification by the Filipino people. Section 2, Article III of the
1987 Constitution pertinently provides that "no search warrant or warrant of arrest
shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the person or
things to be seized." The constitutional proscription has thereby been manifested that
thenceforth, the function of determining probable cause and issuing, on the basis
thereof, warrants of arrest or search warrants, may be validly exercised only by
judges, this being evidenced by the elimination in the present Constitution of the
phrase, "such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law" found in the
counterpart provision of said 1973 Constitution, who, aside from judges, might
conduct preliminary investigations and issue warrants of arrest or search warrants. 4
Neither may it be done by a mere prosecuting body:
We agree that the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force exercises, or was
meant to exercise, prosecutorial powers, and on that ground, it cannot be said to be
a neutral and detached "judge" to determine the existence of probable cause for
purposes of arrest or search. Unlike a magistrate, a prosecutor is naturally interested
in the success of his case. Although his office "is to see that justice is done and not
necessarily to secure the conviction of the person accused," he stands, invariably, as
the accused's adversary and his accuser. To permit him to issue search warrants and
indeed, warrants of arrest, is to make him both judge and jury in his own right, when
he is neither. That makes, to our mind and to that extent, Presidential Decree No.
1936 as amended by Presidential Decree No. 2002, unconstitutional. 5
Section 38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, as now written, was entered as an amendment by
Presidential Decrees Nos. 1920 and 2018 of the late President Ferdinand Marcos, to Presidential
Decree No. 1693, in the exercise of his legislative powers under Amendment No. 6 of the 1973
Constitution. Under the latter, the then Minister of Labor merely exercised recommendatory powers:
(c) The Minister of Labor or his duly authorized representative shall have the power
to recommend the arrest and detention of any person engaged in illegal
recruitment. 6
On May 1, 1984, Mr. Marcos promulgated Presidential Decree No. 1920, with the avowed purpose of
giving more teeth to the campaign against illegal recruitment. The Decree gave the Minister of Labor
arrest and closure powers:

(b) The Minister of Labor and Employment shall have the power to cause the arrest
and detention of such non-licensee or non-holder of authority if after proper
investigation it is determined that his activities constitute a danger to national security
and public order or will lead to further exploitation of job-seekers. The Minister shall
order the closure of companies, establishment and entities found to be engaged in
the recruitment of workers for overseas employment, without having been licensed or
authorized to do so. 7
On January 26, 1986, he, Mr. Marcos, promulgated Presidential Decree No. 2018, giving the Labor
Minister search and seizure powers as well:
(c) The Minister of Labor and Employment or his duly authorized representatives
shall have the power to cause the arrest and detention of such non-licensee or nonholder of authority if after investigation it is determined that his activities constitute a
danger to national security and public order or will lead to further exploitation of jobseekers. The Minister shall order the search of the office or premises and seizure of
documents, paraphernalia, properties and other implements used in illegal
recruitment activities and the closure of companies, establishment and entities found
to be engaged in the recruitment of workers for overseas employment, without
having been licensed or authorized to do so.8
The above has now been etched as Article 38, paragraph (c) of the Labor Code.
The decrees in question, it is well to note, stand as the dying vestiges of authoritarian rule in its
twilight moments.
We reiterate that the Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no longer issue search or arrest
warrants. Hence, the authorities must go through the judicial process. To that extent, we declare
Article 38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, unconstitutional and of no force and effect.
The Solicitor General's reliance on the case of Morano v. Vivo 9 is not well-taken. Vivo involved a
deportation case, governed by Section 69 of the defunct Revised Administrative Code and by Section 37
of the Immigration Law. We have ruled that in deportation cases, an arrest (of an undesirable alien)
ordered by the President or his duly authorized representatives, in order to carry out a final decision of
deportation is valid. 10 It is valid, however, because of the recognized supremacy of the Executive in
matters involving foreign affairs. We have held: 11
xxx xxx xxx
The State has the inherent power to deport undesirable aliens (Chuoco Tiaco vs.
Forbes, 228 U.S. 549, 57 L. Ed. 960, 40 Phil. 1122, 1125). That power may be
exercised by the Chief Executive "when he deems such action necessary for the
peace and domestic tranquility of the nation." Justice Johnson's opinion is that when
the Chief Executive finds that there are aliens whose continued presence in the
country is injurious to the public interest, "he may, even in the absence of express

law, deport them". (Forbes vs. Chuoco Tiaco and Crossfield, 16 Phil. 534, 568, 569;
In re McCulloch Dick, 38 Phil. 41).
The right of a country to expel or deport aliens because their continued presence is
detrimental to public welfare is absolute and unqualified (Tiu Chun Hai and Go Tam
vs. Commissioner of Immigration and the Director of NBI, 104 Phil. 949, 956). 12
The power of the President to order the arrest of aliens for deportation is, obviously, exceptional. It
(the power to order arrests) can not be made to extend to other cases, like the one at bar. Under the
Constitution, it is the sole domain of the courts.
Moreover, the search and seizure order in question, assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that it was
validly issued, is clearly in the nature of a general warrant:
Pursuant to the powers vested in me under Presidential Decree No. 1920 and
Executive Order No. 1022, I hereby order the CLOSURE of your recruitment agency
being operated at No. 615 R.O. Santos St., Mandaluyong, Metro Manila and the
seizure of the documents and paraphernalia being used or intended to be used as
the means of committing illegal recruitment, it having verified that you have
(1) No valid license or authority from the Department of Labor and
Employment to recruit and deploy workers for overseas employment;
(2) Committed/are committing acts prohibited under Article 34 of the
New Labor Code in relation to Article 38 of the same code.
This ORDER is without prejudice to your criminal prosecution under existing laws.

13

We have held that a warrant must identify clearly the things to be seized, otherwise, it is null and
void, thus:
xxx xxx xxx
Another factor which makes the search warrants under consideration constitutionally
objectionable is that they are in the nature of general warrants. The search warrants
describe the articles sought to be seized in this wise:
1) All printing equipment, paraphernalia, paper, ink, photo equipment,
typewriters, cabinets, tables, communications/ recording equipment,
tape recorders, dictaphone and the like used and/or connected in the
printing of the "WE FORUM" newspaper and any and all
documents/communications, letters and facsimile of prints related to
the "WE FORUM" newspaper.
2) Subversive documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, and other
publications to promote the objectives and purposes of the

subversive organizations known as Movement for Free Philippines,


Light-a-Fire Movement and April 6 Movement; and
3) Motor vehicles used in the distribution/circulation of the "WE
FORUM" and other subversive materials and propaganda, more
particularly,
1) Toyota-Corolla, colored yellow with Plate No. NKA 892;
2) DATSUN, pick-up colored white with Plate No. NKV 969;
3) A delivery truck with Plate No. NBS 542;
4) TOYOTA-TAMARAW, colored white with Plate No. PBP 665; and
5) TOYOTA Hi-Lux, pick-up truck with Plate No. NGV 472 with
marking "Bagong Silang."
In Stanford v. State of Texas, the search warrant which authorized the search for
"books, records, pamphlets, cards, receipts, lists, memoranda, pictures, recordings
and other written instruments concerning the Communist Parties of Texas, and the
operations of the Community Party in Texas," was declared void by the U.S.
Supreme Court for being too general. In like manner, directions to "seize any
evidence in connection with the violation of SDC 13-3703 or otherwise" have been
held too general, and that portion of a search warrant which authorized the seizure of
any "paraphernalia which could be used to violate Sec. 54-197 of the Connecticut
General Statutes (the statute dealing with the crime of conspiracy)" was held to be a
general warrant, and therefore invalid. The description of the articles sought to be
seized under the search warrants in question cannot be characterized differently.
In the Stanford case, the U.S. Supreme court calls to mind a notable chapter in
English history; the era of disaccord between the Tudor Government and the English
Press, when "Officers of the Crown were given roving commissions to search where
they pleased in order to suppress and destroy the literature of dissent both Catholic
and Puritan." Reference herein to such historical episode would not be relevant for it
is not the policy of our government to suppress any newspaper or publication that
speaks with "the voice of non-conformity" but poses no clear and imminent danger to
state security. 14
For the guidance of the bench and the bar, we reaffirm the following principles:
1. Under Article III, Section 2, of the l987 Constitution, it is only judges, and no other,
who may issue warrants of arrest and search:

2. The exception is in cases of deportation of illegal and undesirable aliens, whom


the President or the Commissioner of Immigration may order arrested, following a
final order of deportation, for the purpose of deportation.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Article 38, paragraph (c) of the Labor Code is declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL and null and void. The respondents are ORDERED to return all materials
seized as a result of the implementation of Search and Seizure Order No. 1205.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla,
Bidin, Cortes, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 93666

April 22, 1991

GENERAL MILLING CORPORATION and EARL TIMOTHY CONE, petitioners,


vs.
HON. RUBEN D. TORRES, in his capacity as Secretary of Labor and Employment, HON.
BIENVENIDO E. LAGUESMA, in his capacity as Acting Secretary of Labor and Employment,
and BASKETBALL COACHES ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Sobrevinas, Diaz, Hayudini & Bodegon Law Office for petitioners.
Rodrigo, Cuevas & De Borja for respondent BCAP.

RESOLUTION
FELICIANO, J.:
On 1 May 1989, the National Capital Region of the Department of Labor and Employment issued
Alien Employment Permit No. M-0689-3-535 in favor of petitioner Earl Timothy Cone, a United
States citizen, as sports consultant and assistant coach for petitioner General Milling Corporation
("GMC").
On 27 December 1989, petitioners GMC and Cone entered into a contract of employment whereby
the latter undertook to coach GMC's basketball team.

On 15 January 1990, the Board of Special Inquiry of the Commission on Immigration and
Deportation approved petitioner Cone's application for a change of admission status from temporary
visitor to pre-arranged employee.
On 9 February 1990, petitioner GMC requested renewal of petitioner Cone's alien employment
permit. GMC also requested that it be allowed to employ Cone as full-fledged coach. The DOLE
Regional Director, Luna Piezas, granted the request on 15 February 1990.
On 18 February 1990, Alien Employment Permit No. M-02903-881, valid until 25 December 1990,
was issued.
Private respondent Basketball Coaches Association of the Philippines ("BCAP") appealed the
issuance of said alien employment permit to the respondent Secretary of Labor who, on 23 April
1990, issued a decision ordering cancellation of petitioner Cone's employment permit on the ground
that there was no showing that there is no person in the Philippines who is competent, able and
willing to perform the services required nor that the hiring of petitioner Cone would redound to the
national interest.
Petitioner GMC filed a Motion for Reconsideration and two (2) Supplemental Motions for
Reconsideration but said Motions were denied by Acting Secretary of Labor Bienvenido E.
Laguesma in an Order dated 8 June 1990.
Petitioners are now before the Court on a Petition for Certiorari, dated 14 June 1990, alleging that:
1. respondent Secretary of Labor gravely abused his discretion when he revoked petitioner
Cone's alien employment permit; and
2. Section 6 (c), Rule XIV, Book I of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code is null
and void as it is in violation of the enabling law as the Labor Code does not empower
respondent Secretary to determine if the employment of an alien would redound to national
interest.
Deliberating on the present Petition for Certiorari, the Court considers that petitioners have failed to
show any grave abuse of discretion or any act without or in excess of jurisdiction on the part of
respondent Secretary of Labor in rendering his decision, dated 23 April 1990, revoking petitioner
Cone's Alien Employment Permit.
The alleged failure to notify petitioners of the appeal filed by private respondent BCAP was cured
when petitioners were allowed to file their Motion for Reconsideration before respondent Secretary
of Labor.
1

Petitioner GMC's claim that hiring of a foreign coach is an employer's prerogative has no legal basis
at all. Under Article 40 of the Labor Code, an employer seeking employment of an alien must first
obtain an employment permit from the Department of Labor. Petitioner GMC's right to choose whom
to employ is, of course, limited by the statutory requirement of an alien employment permit.
Petitioners will not find solace in the equal protection clause of the Constitution. As pointed out by
the Solicitor-General, no comparison can be made between petitioner Cone and Mr. Norman Black
as the latter is "a long time resident of the country," and thus, not subject to the provisions of Article
40 of the Labor Code which apply only to "non-resident aliens." In any case, the term "non-resident

alien" and its obverse "resident alien," here must be given their technical connotation under our law
on immigration.
Neither can petitioners validly claim that implementation of respondent Secretary's decision would
amount to an impairment of the obligations of contracts. The provisions of the Labor Code and its
Implementing Rules and Regulations requiring alien employment permits were in existence long
before petitioners entered into their contract of employment. It is firmly settled that provisions of
applicable laws, especially provisions relating to matters affected with public policy, are deemed
written into contracts. Private parties cannot constitutionally contract away the otherwise applicable
provisions of law.
2

Petitioners' contention that respondent Secretary of Labor should have deferred to the findings of
Commission on Immigration and Deportation as to the necessity of employing petitioner Cone, is,
again, bereft of legal basis. The Labor Code itself specifically empowers respondent Secretary to
make a determination as to the availability of the services of a "person in the Philippines who is
competent, able and willing at the time of application to perform the services for which an alien is
desired."
3

In short, the Department of Labor is the agency vested with jurisdiction to determine the question of
availability of local workers. The constitutional validity of legal provisions granting such jurisdiction
and authority and requiring proof of non-availability of local nationals able to carry out the duties of
the position involved, cannot be seriously questioned.
Petitioners apparently also question the validity of the Implementing Rules and Regulations,
specifically Section 6 (c), Rule XIV, Book I of the Implementing Rules, as imposing a condition not
found in the Labor Code itself. Section 6 (c), Rule XIV, Book I of the Implementing Rules, provides
as follows:
Section 6. Issuance of Employment Permit the Secretary of Labor may issue an
employment permit to the applicant based on:
a) Compliance by the applicant and his employer with the requirements of Section 2 hereof;
b) Report of the Bureau Director as to the availability or non-availability of any person in the
Philippines who is competent and willing to do the job for which the services of the applicant
are desired.
(c) His assessment as to whether or not the employment of the applicant will redound to the
national interest;
(d) Admissibility of the alien as certified by the Commission on Immigration and Deportation;
(e) The recommendation of the Board of Investments or other appropriate government
agencies if the applicant will be employed in preferred areas of investments or in accordance
with the imperative of economic development;
xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
Article 40 of the Labor Code reads as follows:

xxx

xxx

Art. 40. Employment per unit of non-resident aliens. Any alien seeking admission to the
Philippines for employment purposes and any domestic or foreign employer who desires to
engage an alien for employment in the Philippines shall obtain an employment permit from
the Department of Labor.
The employment permit may be issued to a non-resident alien or to the applicant employer
after a determination of the non-availability of a person in the Philippines who is competent,
able and willing at the time of application to perform the services for which the alien is
desired.
For an enterprise registered in preferred areas of investments, said employment permit may
be issued upon recommendation of the government agency charged with the supervision of
said registered enterprise. (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioners apparently suggest that the Secretary of Labor is not authorized to take into account the
question of whether or not employment of an alien applicant would "redound to the national interest"
because Article 40 does not explicitly refer to such assessment. This argument (which seems
impliedly to concede that the relationship of basketball coaching and the national interest is tenuous
and unreal) is not persuasive. In the first place, the second paragraph of Article 40 says: "[t]he
employment permit may be issued to a non-resident alien or to the applicant employer after a
determination of the non-availability of a person in the Philippines who is competent, able and willing
at the time of application to perform the services for which the alien is desired." The permissive
language employed in the Labor Code indicates that the authority granted involves the exercise of
discretion on the part of the issuing authority. In the second place, Article 12 of the Labor Code sets
forth a statement of objectives that the Secretary of Labor should, and indeed must, take into
account in exercising his authority and jurisdiction granted by the Labor Code,
Art. 12. Statement of Objectives. It is the policy of the State:
a) To promote and maintain a state of full employment through improved manpower training,
allocation and utilization;
xxx

xxx

xxx

c) To facilitate a free choice of available employment by persons seeking work in conformity


with the national interest;
d) To facilitate and regulate the movement of workers in conformity with the national interest;
e) To regulate the employment of aliens, including the establishment of a registration and/or
work permit system;
xxx

xxx

xxx

Thus, we find petitioners' arguments on the above points of constitutional law too insubstantial to
require further consideration.
1avvphi1

Petitioners have very recently manifested to this Court that public respondent Secretary of Labor has
reversed his earlier decision and has issued an Employment Permit to petitioner Cone. Petitioners
seek to withdraw their Petition for Certiorari on the ground that it has become moot and academic.

While ordinarily this Court would dismiss a petition that clearly appears to have become moot and
academic, the circumstances of this case and the nature of the questions raised by petitioners are
such that we do not feel justified in leaving those questions unanswered.
4

Moreover, assuming that an alien employment permit has in fact been issued to petitioner Cone, the
basis of the reversal by the Secretary of Labor of his earlier decision does not appear in the record.
If such reversal is based on some view of constitutional law or labor law different from those here set
out, then such employment permit, if one has been issued, would appear open to serious legal
objections.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the Petition for certiorari for lack of merit. Costs
against petitioners.
Fernan, C.J., Bidin and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
Gutierrez, Jr., J., in the result.

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