ERNESTO RAMAS UYPITCHING and RAMAS UYPITCHING SONS, INC.

, petitioners,
vs.
ERNESTO QUIAMCO, respondent.

Facts:
ERNESTO RAMAS UYPITCHING and RAMAS UYPITCHING SONS engaged in the selling of
motorcycle. The respondent filed a case against Davalan and Gabutero for civil aspect and for them to pay the
former they offered the motorcycle which was sold by the petitioner on installment basis to Davalan and later on
succeeded by Gabutero. Nine years after, the petitioner together with the policeman Uypitching went to the
establishment of the respondent and look for him to recover the motorcycle paced back and forth inside the
establishment uttering "Quiamco is a thief of a motorcycle but the respondent wasnt there. Unable to find
respondent, the policemen on petitioner Uypitchings instruction and over the clerks objection, took the
motorcycle.
Issue: Does the petitioner correctly exercise his right under Art 19 of the Civil Code?
Ruling:
No. Art. 19. Every person must in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties,
act with justice, give every one his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
Article 19, also known as the principle of abuse of right, prescribes that a person should not use his
right unjustly or contrary to honesty and good faith, otherwise he opens himself to liability. It seeks to preclude
the use of, or the tendency to use, a legal right (or duty) as a means to unjust ends . There is an abuse of right
when it is exercised solely to prejudice or injure another. The exercise of a right must be in accordance with
the purpose for which it was established and must not be excessive or unduly harsh; there must be no intention to
harm another. In this case, the manner by which the motorcycle was taken at the sellers instance was not only
attended by bad faith but also contrary to the procedure laid down by law. Considered in conjunction with the
defamatory statement, the sellers exercise of the right to recover the mortgaged vehicle was utterly prejudicial
and injurious to the buyer. Petition DISMISSED.
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:

Juan B. Dans, 76 years of age, together with his family, applied for a loan worth Php 500, 000 at the Development
Bank of the Philipppines on May 1987. The loan was approved by the bank dated August 4, 1987 but in the reduced amount
of Php 300, 000. Mr. Dans was advised by DBP to obtain a mortgage redemption insurance at DBP MRI pool. DBP
deducted the amount to be paid for MRI Premium that is worth Php 1476.00. The insurance of Mr. Dans, less the DBP
service fee of 10%, was credited by DBP to the savings account of DBP MRI-Pool. Accordingly, the DBP MRI Pool was
advised of the credit. On September 3, 1987, Mr. Dans died of cardiac arrest. DBP MRI notified DBP was not eligible for
the coverage of insurance for he was beyond the maximum age of 60. The wife, Candida, filed a complaint to the Regional
Trial Court Branch I Basilan against DBP and DBP MRI pool for Collection of Sum of Money with Damages. Prior to
that, DBP offered the administratrix (Mrs. Dans) a refund of the MRI payment but she refused for insisting that the family
of the deceased must receive the amount equivalent of the loan. DBP also offered and ex gratia for settlement worth Php 30,
000. Mrs. Dans refused to take the offer. The decision of the RTC rendered in favor of the family of the deceased and
against DBP. However, DBP appealed to the court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the DBP MRI Pool should be held liable on the ground that the contract was already perfected.

HELD:
No. DBP MRI Pool is not liable. Though the power to approve the insurance is lodged to the pool, the DBP MRI
Pool did not approve the application of the deceased. There was no perfected contract between the insurance pool and Mr.
Dans.
DBP was wearing two legal hats: as a lender and insurance agent. As an insurance agent, DBP made believed that
the family already fulfilled the requirements for the said insurance although DBP had a full knowledge that the application
would never be approved. DBP acted beyond the scope of its authority for accepting applications for MRI. If the third
person who contracted is unaware of the authority conferred by the principal on the agent and he has been deceived, the
latter is liable for damages. The limits of the agency carry with it the implication that a deception was perpetratedArticles
19-21OF THE Civil Code come into play.
However, DBP is not entitled to compensate the family of the deceased with the entire value of the insurance
policy. Speculative damages are too remote to be included in the cost of damages. Mr. Dans is entitled only to moral
damages. Such damages do not need a proof of pecuniary loss for assessment. The court granted only moral damages (Php
50, 000) plus attorney feess (Php 10, 000) and the reimbursement of the MRI fees with legal interest from the date of the
filing of the complaint until fully paid.

BEATRIZ P. WASSMER, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FRANCISCO X. VELEZ, defendant-appellant.

FACTS:
In 1954, Beatriz Wassmer and Francisco Velez arranged their marriage to be held on September 4 of the
same year. The bride-to-be has been devoted with all the preparations for their wedding. However, two days
before their marriage, Paking left a note that they must postpone the marriage for his mother was against it. A
day before their wedding, Paking wrote again that the wedding shall push through. Worse, Paking did not show
up on their wedding day causing Wassmer to be publicly humiliated.
The breach of promise to marry made by Velez prompted Wassmer to file a civil suit against the former.
Velez never filed an answer, thus, awarding moral and exemplary damages to Wassmer.
Velez appealed on the court and stated that he failed to attend the wedding day because of fortuitous events.
He also insisted that he cannot be civilly liable for there is no law that acts upon the breach of promise to marry.
He also contested the award of moral and exemplary damages.
ISSUE: Whether or not moral or exemplary damages may be awarded in a breach of promise to marry suit.
HELD:
YES. Wassmer is entitled for moral and exemplary damages. A mere breach of promise to marry is not an
actionable wrong. Howver, Wassmer has already made preparations for the wedding. Velezs failure to appear on
the wedding day is contrary to morals, good customs and public policy which is embodied on Article 21 of the
Civil Code. Under the law, the injured party is entitled to moral damages as well as to exemplary damages
because Velezs acted in wanton, reckless and oppressive manner (Article 2232) in breaching his promise to
marry Wassmer.