G.R. No.

154342
July 14, 2004
MIGHTY CORPORATION and LA CAMPANA FABRICA DE TABACO, INC., petitioner,
vs.
E. & J. GALLO WINERY and THE ANDRESONS GROUP, INC., respondents.
FACTS
Respondent Gallo Winery is a foreign corporation not doing business in the Philippines
but organized and existing under the laws of the State of California, United States of
America (U.S.), where all its wineries are located. Gallo Winery produces different
kinds of wines and brandy products and sells them in many countries under different
registered trademarks, including the GALLO and ERNEST & JULIO GALLO wine
trademarks.
Respondent domestic corporation, Andresons, has been Gallo Winerys exclusive wine
importer and distributor in the Philippines since 1991, selling these products in its
own name and for its own account.
Gallo Winerys GALLO wine trademark was registered in the principal register of the
Philippine Patent Office (now Intellectual Property Office) on November 16, 1971 under
Certificate of Registration No. 17021 which was renewed on November 16, 1991 for
another 20 years. Gallo Winery also applied for registration of its ERNEST & JULIO
GALLO wine trademark on October 11, 1990 under Application Serial No. 90101100073599-PN but the records do not disclose if it was ever approved by the Director of
Patents.
On the other hand, petitioners Mighty Corporation and La Campana and their sister
company, Tobacco Industries of the Philippines (Tobacco Industries), are engaged in the
cultivation, manufacture, distribution and sale of tobacco products for which they have
been using the GALLO cigarette trademark since 1973.
The Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) approved Tobacco Industries use of GALLO
100s cigarette mark on September 14, 1973 and GALLO filter cigarette mark on March
26, 1976, both for the manufacture and sale of its cigarette products. In 1976, Tobacco
Industries filed its manufacturers sworn statement as basis for BIRs collection of
specific tax on GALLO cigarettes.
On February 5, 1974, Tobacco Industries applied for, but eventually did not pursue,
the registration of the GALLO cigarette trademark in the principal register of the then
Philippine Patent Office.
In May 1984, Tobacco Industries assigned the GALLO cigarette trademark to La
Campana which, on July 16, 1985, applied for trademark registration in the Philippine
Patent Office. On July 17, 1985, the National Library issued Certificate of Copyright
Registration No. 5834 for La Campanas lifetime copyright claim over GALLO cigarette
labels.
Subsequently, La Campana authorized Mighty Corporation to manufacture and sell
cigarettes bearing the GALLO trademark. BIR approved Mighty Corporations use of
GALLO 100s cigarette brand, under licensing agreement with Tobacco Industries, on
May 18, 1988, and GALLO SPECIAL MENTHOL 100s cigarette brand on April 3, 1989.
Petitioners claim that GALLO cigarettes have been sold in the Philippines since 1973,
initially by Tobacco Industries, then by La Campana and finally by Mighty Corporation.
On the other hand, although the GALLO wine trademark was registered in the
Philippines in 1971, respondents claim that they first introduced and sold the GALLO
and ERNEST & JULIO GALLO wines in the Philippines circa 1974 within the then U.S.

military facilities only. By 1979, they had expanded their Philippine market through
authorized distributors and independent outlets.
Respondents claim that they first learned about the existence of GALLO cigarettes in
the latter part of 1992 when an Andresons employee saw such cigarettes on display
with GALLO wines in a Davao supermarket wine cellar section. Forthwith, respondents
sent a demand letter to petitioners asking them to stop using the GALLO trademark, to
no avail.
On March 12, 1993, respondents sued petitioners in the Makati RTC for trademark
and tradename infringement and unfair competition, with a prayer for damages and
preliminary injunction.
Respondents charged petitioners with violating Article 6 of the Paris Convention for the
Protection of Industrial Property (Paris Convention) and RA 166 (Trademark Law),
specifically, Sections 22 and 23 (for trademark infringement), 29 and 30 (for unfair
competition and false designation of origin) and 37 (for tradename infringement). They
claimed that petitioners adopted the GALLO trademark to ride on Gallo Winerys
GALLO and ERNEST & JULIO GALLO trademarks established reputation and
popularity, thus causing confusion, deception and mistake on the part of the
purchasing public who had always associated GALLO and ERNEST & JULIO GALLO
trademarks with Gallo Winerys wines. Respondents prayed for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction and ex parte restraining order, plus P2 million as actual and
compensatory damages, at least P500,000 as exemplary and moral damages, and at
least P500,000 as attorneys fees and litigation expenses.
In their answer, petitioners alleged, among other affirmative defenses, that: petitioners
GALLO cigarettes and Gallo Winerys wines were totally unrelated products; Gallo
Winerys GALLO trademark registration certificate covered wines only, not cigarettes;
GALLO cigarettes and GALLO wines were sold through different channels of trade;
GALLO cigarettes, sold at P4.60 for GALLO filters and P3 for GALLO menthols, were
low-cost items compared to Gallo Winerys high-priced luxury wines which cost
between P98 to P242.50; the target market of Gallo Winerys wines was the middle or
high-income bracket with at least P10,000 monthly income while GALLO cigarette
buyers were farmers, fishermen, laborers and other low-income workers; the dominant
feature of the GALLO cigarette mark was the rooster device with the manufacturers
name clearly indicated as MIGHTY CORPORATION while, in the case of Gallo Winerys
wines, it was the full names of the founders-owners ERNEST & JULIO GALLO or just
their surname GALLO; by their inaction and conduct, respondents were guilty of
laches and estoppel; and petitioners acted with honesty, justice and good faith in the
exercise of their right to manufacture and sell GALLO cigarettes.
RTC denied, for lack of merit, respondents prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction, holding that respondents GALLO trademark registration
certificate covered wines only, that respondents wines and petitioners cigarettes were
not related goods and respondents failed to prove material damage or great irreparable
injury as required by Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court.
RTC denied, for lack of merit, respondents motion for reconsideration.
After trial on the merits, however, the Makati RTC, held petitioners liable for, and
permanently enjoined them from, committing trademark infringement and unfair
competition with respect to the GALLO trademark.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the Makati RTC decision and subsequently denied
petitioners motion for reconsideration.
comrev2 mighty corporation vs e & j gallo winery Page 1 of 6

ISSUE
Whether or not petitioners were liable for trademark infringement, unfair competition
and damages. (No)
RULING
THE TRADEMARK LAW AND THE PARIS CONVENTION ARE THE APPLICABLE
LAWS, NOT THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CODE
We note that respondents sued petitioners on March 12, 1993 for trademark
infringement and unfair competition committed during the effectivity of the Paris
Convention and the Trademark Law.
Yet, in the Makati RTC decision of November 26, 1998, petitioners were held liable not
only under the aforesaid governing laws but also under the IP Code which took effect
only on January 1, 1998,
The CA apparently did not notice the error and affirmed the Makati RTC decision.
We therefore hold that the courts a quo erred in retroactively applying the IP Code in
this case.
It is a fundamental principle that the validity and obligatory force of a law proceed
from the fact that it has first been promulgated. A law that is not yet effective cannot
be considered as conclusively known by the populace. To make a law binding even
before it takes effect may lead to the arbitrary exercise of the legislative power.
DISTINCTIONS
BETWEEN
TRADEMARK
INFRINGEMENT
AND
UNFAIR
COMPETITION
In Del Monte Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, we distinguished trademark infringement
from unfair competition:
(1) Infringement of trademark is the unauthorized use of a trademark, whereas unfair
competition is the passing off of one's goods as those of another.
(2) In infringement of trademark fraudulent intent is unnecessary, whereas in unfair
competition fraudulent intent is essential.
(3) In infringement of trademark the prior registration of the trademark is a
prerequisite to the action, whereas in unfair competition registration is not necessary.
Pertinent Provisions on Trademark Infringement under the Paris Convention and
the Trademark Law
Under Article 6 of the Paris Convention, the following are the elements of trademark
infringement:
(a) registration or use by another person of a trademark which is a reproduction,
imitation or translation liable to create confusion,
(b) of a mark considered by the competent authority of the country of registration or
use to be well-known in that country and is already the mark of a person entitled to
the benefits of the Paris Convention, and
(c) such trademark is used for identical or similar goods.
Under Sections 2, 2-A, 9-A, 20 and 22 of the Trademark Law therefore, the following
constitute the elements of trademark infringement:
(a) a trademark actually used in commerce in the Philippines and registered in the
principal register of the Philippine Patent Office
(b) is used by another person in connection with the sale, offering for sale, or
advertising of any goods, business or services or in connection with which such use is
likely to cause confusion or mistake or to deceive purchasers or others as to the source
or origin of such goods or services, or identity of such business; or such trademark is

reproduced, counterfeited, copied or colorably imitated by another person and such

reproduction, counterfeit, copy or colorable imitation is applied to labels, signs, prints,
packages, wrappers, receptacles or advertisements intended to be used upon or in
connection with such goods, business or services as to likely cause confusion or
mistake or to deceive purchasers,
(c) the trademark is used for identical or similar goods, and
(d) such act is done without the consent of the trademark registrant or assignee.
In summary, the Paris Convention protects well-known trademarks only (to be
determined by domestic authorities), while the Trademark Law protects all trademarks,
whether well-known or not, provided that they have been registered and are in actual
commercial use in the Philippines. Following universal acquiescence and comity, in
case of domestic legal disputes on any conflicting provisions between the Paris
Convention (which is an international agreement) and the Trademark law (which is a
municipal law) the latter will prevail.
Under both the Paris Convention and the Trademark Law, the protection of a registered
trademark is limited only to goods identical or similar to those in respect of which such
trademark is registered and only when there is likelihood of confusion. Under both
laws, the time element in commencing infringement cases is material in ascertaining
the registrants express or implied consent to anothers use of its trademark or a
colorable imitation thereof. This is why acquiescence, estoppel or laches may defeat the
registrants otherwise valid cause of action.
Hence, proof of all the elements of trademark infringement is a condition precedent to
any finding of liability.
THE ACTUAL COMMERCIAL USE IN THE PHILIPPINES OF GALLO CIGARETTE
TRADEMARK PRECEDED THAT OF GALLO WINE TRADEMARK.
By respondents own judicial admission, the GALLO wine trademark was registered in
the Philippines in November 1971 but the wine itself was first marketed and sold in the
country only in 1974 and only within the former U.S. military facilities, and outside
thereof, only in 1979. To prove commercial use of the GALLO wine trademark in the
Philippines, respondents presented sales invoice no. 29991 dated July 9, 1981.
On the other hand, by testimonial evidence supported by the BIR authorization letters,
forms and manufacturers sworn statement, it appears that petitioners and its
predecessor-in-interest, Tobacco Industries, have indeed been using and selling GALLO
cigarettes in the Philippines since 1973 or before July 9, 1981.
In Emerald Garment Manufacturing Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, we reiterated our
ruling of giving utmost importance to the actual commercial use of a trademark in
the Philippines prior to its registration, notwithstanding the provisions of the Paris
Convention.
Actual use in commerce in the Philippines is an essential prerequisite for the
acquisition of ownership over a trademark pursuant to Sec. 2 and 2-A of the
Philippine Trademark Law (R.A. No. 166) x x x
xxx xxx xxx
In other words, (a foreign corporation) may have the capacity to sue for
infringement irrespective of lack of business activity in the Philippines on
account of Section 21-A of the Trademark Law but the question of whether they
have an exclusive right over their symbol as to justify issuance of the
controversial writ will depend on actual use of their trademarks in the
comrev2 mighty corporation vs e & j gallo winery Page 2 of 6

Philippines in line with Sections 2 and 2-A of the same law. It is thus incongruous
for petitioners to claim that when a foreign corporation not licensed to do business in
the Philippines files a complaint for infringement, the entity need not be actually using
the trademark in commerce in the Philippines. Such a foreign corporation may have
the personality to file a suit for infringement but it may not necessarily be entitled to
protection due to absence of actual use of the emblem in the local market.
xxx xxx xxx
The credibility placed on a certificate of registration of one's trademark, or its weight as
evidence of validity, ownership and exclusive use, is qualified. A registration
certificate serves merely as prima facie evidence. It is not conclusive but can
and may be rebutted by controverting evidence.
For lack of adequate proof of actual use of its trademark in the Philippines prior
to petitioner's use of its own mark and for failure to establish confusing
similarity between said trademarks, private respondent's action for infringement
must necessarily fail.
In view of the foregoing jurisprudence and respondents judicial admission that the
actual commercial use of the GALLO wine trademark was subsequent to its registration
in 1971 and to Tobacco Industries commercial use of the GALLO cigarette trademark
in 1973, we rule that, on this account, respondents never enjoyed the exclusive right to
use the GALLO wine trademark to the prejudice of Tobacco Industries and its
successors-in-interest, herein petitioners, either under the Trademark Law or the Paris
Convention.
Respondents GALLO trademark registration is limited to wines only
We also note that the GALLO trademark registration certificates in the Philippines and
in other countries expressly state that they cover wines only, without any evidence or
indication that registrant Gallo Winery expanded or intended to expand its business to
cigarettes.
Thus, by strict application of Section 20 of the Trademark Law, Gallo Winerys
exclusive right to use the GALLO trademark should be limited to wines, the only
product indicated in its registration certificates.
Yet, it is equally true that as aforesaid, the protective mantle of the Trademark
Law extends only to the goods used by the first user as specified in the
certificate of registration following the clear message conveyed by Section 20.
NO LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION, MISTAKE OR DECEIT AS TO THE IDENTITY OR
SOURCE OF PETITIONERS AND RESPONDENTS GOODS OR BUSINESS
A crucial issue in any trademark infringement case is the likelihood of confusion,
mistake or deceit as to the identity, source or origin of the goods or identity of the
business as a consequence of using a certain mark. Likelihood of confusion is
admittedly a relative term, to be determined rigidly according to the particular (and
sometimes peculiar) circumstances of each case.
There are two types of confusion in trademark infringement. The first is "confusion of
goods" when an otherwise prudent purchaser is induced to purchase one product in
the belief that he is purchasing another, in which case defendants goods are then
bought as the plaintiffs and its poor quality reflects badly on the plaintiffs reputation.
The other is "confusion of business" wherein the goods of the parties are different but
the defendants product can reasonably (though mistakenly) be assumed to originate

from the plaintiff, thus deceiving the public into believing that there is some
connection between the plaintiff and defendant which, in fact, does not exist.
In determining the likelihood of confusion, the Court must consider: [a] the
resemblance between the trademarks; [b] the similarity of the goods to which the
trademarks are attached; [c] the likely effect on the purchaser and [d] the registrants
express or implied consent and other fair and equitable considerations.
Petitioners and respondents both use "GALLO" in the labels of their respective cigarette
and wine products. But, as held in the following cases, the use of an identical mark
does not, by itself, lead to a legal conclusion that there is trademark infringement.
Whether a trademark causes confusion and is likely to deceive the public hinges on
"colorable imitation" which has been defined as "such similarity in form, content,
words, sound, meaning, special arrangement or general appearance of the
trademark or tradename in their overall presentation or in their essential and
substantive and distinctive parts as would likely mislead or confuse persons in
the ordinary course of purchasing the genuine article."
Jurisprudence has developed two tests in determining similarity and likelihood of
confusion in trademark resemblance:
The Dominancy Test focuses on the similarity of the prevalent features of the
competing trademarks which might cause confusion or deception, and thus
infringement. If the competing trademark contains the main, essential or dominant
features of another, and confusion or deception is likely to result, infringement takes
place. The question is whether the use of the marks involved is likely to cause
confusion or mistake in the mind of the public or deceive purchasers.
On the other hand, the Holistic Test requires that the entirety of the marks in
question be considered in resolving confusing similarity. Comparison of words is not
the only determining factor. The trademarks in their entirety as they appear in their
respective labels or hang tags must also be considered in relation to the goods to which
they are attached.
Applying the Dominancy and Holistic Tests, we find that the dominant feature of the
GALLO cigarette trademark is the device of a large rooster facing left, outlined in black
against a gold background. The roosters color is either green or red green for GALLO
menthols and red for GALLO filters. Directly below the large rooster device is the word
GALLO. The rooster device is given prominence in the GALLO cigarette packs in terms
of size and location on the labels.84
The GALLO mark appears to be a fanciful and arbitrary mark for the cigarettes as it
has no relation at all to the product but was chosen merely as a trademark due to the
fondness for fighting cocks of the son of petitioners president. Furthermore,
petitioners adopted GALLO, the Spanish word for rooster, as a cigarette trademark to
appeal to one of their target markets, the sabungeros (cockfight aficionados).85
Also, as admitted by respondents themselves, 86 on the side of the GALLO cigarette
packs are the words "MADE BY MIGHTY CORPORATION," thus clearly informing the
public as to the identity of the manufacturer of the cigarettes.
On the other hand, GALLO Winerys wine and brandy labels are diverse. In many of
them, the labels are embellished with sketches of buildings and trees, vineyards or a
bunch of grapes while in a few, one or two small roosters facing right or facing each
other (atop the EJG crest, surrounded by leaves or ribbons), with additional designs in
green, red and yellow colors, appear as minor features thereof. 87 Directly below or
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above these sketches is the entire printed name of the founder-owners, "ERNEST &
JULIO GALLO" or just their surname "GALLO," 88 which appears in different fonts,
sizes, styles and labels, unlike petitioners uniform casque-font bold-lettered GALLO
mark.
Moreover, on the labels of Gallo Winerys wines are printed the words "VINTED AND
BOTTLED BY ERNEST & JULIO GALLO, MODESTO, CALIFORNIA." 89
The many different features like color schemes, art works and other markings of both
products drown out the similarity between them the use of the word GALLO a
family surname for the Gallo Winerys wines and a Spanish word for rooster for
petitioners cigarettes.
WINES AND CIGARETTES ARE NOT IDENTICAL, SIMILAR, COMPETING OR
RELATED GOODS
Confusion of goods is evident where the litigants are actually in competition; but
confusion of business may arise between non-competing interests as well. 90
Thus, apart from the strict application of Section 20 of the Trademark Law and Article
6bis of the Paris Convention which proscribe trademark infringement not only of goods
specified in the certificate of registration but also of identical or similar goods, we have
also uniformly recognized and applied the modern concept of "related goods." 91 Simply
stated, when goods are so related that the public may be, or is actually, deceived and
misled that they come from the same maker or manufacturer, trademark infringement
occurs.92
In resolving whether goods are related,96 several factors come into play:
(a) the business (and its location) to which the goods belong
(b) the class of product to which the goods belong
(c) the product's quality, quantity, or size, including the nature of the package, wrapper
or container 97
(d) the nature and cost of the articles98
(e) the descriptive properties, physical attributes or essential characteristics with
reference to their form, composition, texture or quality
(f) the purpose of the goods99
(g) whether the article is bought for immediate consumption, 100 that is, day-to-day
household items101
(h) the fields of manufacture 102
(i) the conditions under which the article is usually purchased 103 and
(j) the channels of trade through which the goods flow, 104 how they are distributed,
marketed, displayed and sold.105
Hence, in the adjudication of trademark infringement, we give due regard to the goods
usual purchasers character, attitude, habits, age, training and education. 111
Applying these legal precepts to the present case, petitioners use of the GALLO
cigarette trademark is not likely to cause confusion or mistake, or to deceive the
"ordinarily intelligent buyer" of either wines or cigarettes or both as to the identity of
the goods, their source and origin, or identity of the business of petitioners and
respondents.
Obviously, wines and cigarettes are not identical or competing products. Neither do
they belong to the same class of goods. Respondents GALLO wines belong to Class 33
under Rule 84[a] Chapter III, Part II of the Rules of Practice in Trademark Cases while
petitioners GALLO cigarettes fall under Class 34.

Both the Makati RTC and the CA held that wines and cigarettes are related products
because: (1) "they are related forms of vice, harmful when taken in excess, and used for
pleasure and relaxation" and (2) "they are grouped or classified in the same section of
supermarkets and groceries."
We find these premises patently insufficient and too arbitrary to support the legal
conclusion that wines and cigarettes are related products within the contemplation of
the Trademark Law and the Paris Convention.
First, anything - not only wines and cigarettes can be used for pleasure and
relaxation and can be harmful when taken in excess.
Second, it is common knowledge that supermarkets sell an infinite variety of wholly
unrelated products and the goods here involved, wines and cigarettes, have nothing
whatsoever in common with respect to their essential characteristics, quality, quantity,
size, including the nature of their packages, wrappers or containers.
Accordingly, the U.S. patent office and courts have consistently held that the mere fact
that goods are sold in one store under the same roof does not automatically mean that
buyers are likely to be confused as to the goods respective sources, connections or
sponsorships. The fact that different products are available in the same store is an
insufficient standard, in and of itself, to warrant a finding of likelihood of confusion.
Wines and cigarettes are non-competing and are totally unrelated products not likely to
cause confusion vis--vis the goods or the business of the petitioners and respondents.
Wines are bottled and consumed by drinking while cigarettes are packed in cartons or
packages and smoked. There is a whale of a difference between their descriptive
properties, physical attributes or essential characteristics like form, composition,
texture and quality.
GALLO cigarettes are inexpensive items while GALLO wines are not. GALLO wines are
patronized by middle-to-high-income earners while GALLO cigarettes appeal only to
simple folks like farmers, fishermen, laborers and other low-income workers. 116 Indeed,
the big price difference of these two products is an important factor in proving that
they are in fact unrelated and that they travel in different channels of trade. There is a
distinct price segmentation based on vastly different social classes of purchasers. 117
GALLO cigarettes and GALLO wines are not sold through the same channels of trade.
GALLO cigarettes are Philippine-made and petitioners neither claim nor pass off their
goods as imported or emanating from Gallo Winery. GALLO cigarettes are distributed,
marketed and sold through ambulant and sidewalk vendors, small local sari-sari stores
and grocery stores in Philippine rural areas, mainly in Misamis Oriental, Pangasinan,
Bohol, and Cebu.118 On the other hand, GALLO wines are imported, distributed and
sold in the Philippines through Gallo Winerys exclusive contracts with a domestic
entity, which is currently Andresons. By respondents own testimonial evidence,
GALLO wines are sold in hotels, expensive bars and restaurants, and high-end grocery
stores and supermarkets, not through sari-sari stores or ambulant vendors.119
In short, tobacco and alcohol products may be considered related only in cases
involving special circumstances which exist only if a famous mark is involved and there
is a demonstrated intent to capitalize on it. Both of these are absent in the present case.
THE GALLO WINE TRADEMARK IS NOT A WELL-KNOWN MARK IN THE CONTEXT
OF THE PARIS CONVENTION IN THIS CASE SINCE WINES AND CIGARETTES ARE
NOT IDENTICAL OR SIMILAR GOODS

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First, the records bear out that most of the trademark registrations took place in the
late 1980s and the 1990s, that is, after Tobacco Industries use of the GALLO cigarette
trademark in 1973 and petitioners use of the same mark in 1984.
GALLO wines and GALLO cigarettes are neither the same, identical, similar nor related
goods, a requisite element under both the Trademark Law and the Paris Convention.
Second, the GALLO trademark cannot be considered a strong and distinct mark in the
Philippines. Respondents do not dispute the documentary evidence that aside from
Gallo Winerys GALLO trademark registration, the Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and
Technology Transfer also issued on September 4, 1992 Certificate of Registration No.
53356 under the Principal Register approving Productos Alimenticios Gallo, S.As April
19, 1990 application for GALLO trademark registration and use for its "noodles,
prepared food or canned noodles, ready or canned sauces for noodles, semolina, wheat
flour and bread crumbs, pastry, confectionery, ice cream, honey, molasses syrup,
yeast, baking powder, salt, mustard, vinegar, species and ice."122
Third and most important, pursuant to our ruling in Canon Kabushiki Kaisha vs. Court of
Appeals and NSR Rubber Corporation,123 "GALLO" cannot be considered a "well-known"
mark within the contemplation and protection of the Paris Convention in this case since
wines and cigarettes are not identical or similar goods:
Consent of the Registrant and Other air, Just and Equitable Considerations
Each trademark infringement case presents a unique problem which must be
answered by weighing the conflicting interests of the litigants. 124
Respondents claim that GALLO wines and GALLO cigarettes flow through the same
channels of trade, that is, retail trade. If respondents assertion is true, then both
goods co-existed peacefully for a considerable period of time. It took respondents
almost 20 years to know about the existence of GALLO cigarettes and sue petitioners
for trademark infringement. Given, on one hand, the long period of time that
petitioners were engaged in the manufacture, marketing, distribution and sale of
GALLO cigarettes and, on the other, respondents delay in enforcing their rights (not to
mention implied consent, acquiescence or negligence) we hold that equity, justice and
fairness require us to rule in favor of petitioners. The scales of conscience and reason
tip far more readily in favor of petitioners than respondents.
Moreover, there exists no evidence that petitioners employed malice, bad faith or fraud,
or that they intended to capitalize on respondents goodwill in adopting the GALLO
mark for their cigarettes which are totally unrelated to respondents GALLO wines.
Thus, we rule out trademark infringement on the part of petitioners.
PETITIONERS ARE ALSO NOT LIABLE FOR UNFAIR COMPETITION
Under Section 29 of the Trademark Law, any person who employs deception or any
other means contrary to good faith by which he passes off the goods manufactured by
him or in which he deals, or his business, or services for those of the one having
established such goodwill, or who commits any acts calculated to produce said result,
is guilty of unfair competition. It includes the following acts:
(a) Any person, who in selling his goods shall give them the general appearance of
goods of another manufacturer or dealer, either as to the goods themselves or in the
wrapping of the packages in which they are contained, or the devices or words thereon,
or in any other feature of their appearance, which would be likely to influence
purchasers to believe that the goods offered are those of a manufacturer or dealer
other than the actual manufacturer or dealer, or who otherwise clothes the goods with
such appearance as shall deceive the public and defraud another of his legitimate

trade, or any subsequent vendor of such goods or any agent of any vendor engaged in
selling such goods with a like purpose;
(b) Any person who by any artifice, or device, or who employs any other means
calculated to induce the false belief that such person is offering the services of another
who has identified such services in the mind of the public;
(c) Any person who shall make any false statement in the course of trade or who shall
commit any other act contrary to good faith of a nature calculated to discredit the
goods, business or services of another.
The universal test question is whether the public is likely to be deceived. Nothing less
than conduct tending to pass off one mans goods or business as that of another
constitutes unfair competition. Actual or probable deception and confusion on the part
of customers by reason of defendants practices must always appear. 125 On this score,
we find that petitioners never attempted to pass off their cigarettes as those of
respondents. There is no evidence of bad faith or fraud imputable to petitioners in
using their GALLO cigarette mark.
All told, after applying all the tests provided by the governing laws as well as those
recognized by jurisprudence, we conclude that petitioners are not liable for trademark
infringement, unfair competition or damages.
WHEREFORE, finding the petition for review meritorious, the same is hereby
GRANTED. The questioned decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 65175 and the November 26, 1998 decision and the June 24, 1999 order of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 57 in Civil Case No. 93-850 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the complaint against petitioners DISMISSED.

ELIDAD KHO vs. CA

379 SCRA 410 Mercantile Law Intellectual

Property Law on Copyright Proper
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Subjects of Copyright
Elidad Kho is the owner of KEC Cosmetics
Laboratory and she was also the holder of
copyrights over Chin Chun Su and its Oval
Facial Cream Container/Case. She also
bought the patent rights over the Chin Chun
Su & Device and Chin Chun Su for medicated
cream from one Quintin Cheng, who was the
assignee of Shun Yi Factory a Taiwanese
factory actually manufacturing Chin Chun Su
products.
Kho filed a petition for injunction against
Summerville General Merchandising and
Company to enjoin the latter from
advertising and selling Chin Chun Su
products, in similar containers as that of Kho,
for this is misleading the public and causing
Kho to lose income; the petition is also to
enjoin Summerville from infringing upon
Khos copyrights.
Summerville in their defense alleged that
they are the exclusive and authorized
importer, re-packer and distributor of Chin
Chun Su products; that Shun Yi even
authorized Summerville to register its trade
name Chin Chun Su Medicated Cream with
the Philippine Patent Office; that Quintin
Cheng, from whom Kho acquired her patent

rights, had been terminated (her services) by

Shun Yi.
ISSUE: Whether or not Kho has the exclusive
right to use the trade name and its
container.
HELD: No. Kho has no right to support her
claim for the exclusive use of the subject
trade name and its container. The name and
container of a beauty cream product are
proper subjects of a trademark (not
copyright like what she registered for)
inasmuch as the same falls squarely within
its definition. In order to be entitled to
exclusively use the same in the sale of the
beauty cream product, the user must
sufficiently prove that she registered or used
it before anybody else did. Khos copyright
and patent registration of the name and
container would not guarantee her the right
to the exclusive use of the same for the
reason that they are not appropriate subjects
of the said intellectual rights. Consequently,
a preliminary injunction order cannot be
issued for the reason that the petitioner has
not proven that she has a clear right over
the said name and container to the exclusion
of others, not having proven that she has
comrev2 mighty corporation vs e & j gallo winery Page 6 of 6

registered a trademark thereto or used the

same before anyone did.

PEARL & DEAN vs. SHOEMART

409 SCRA 231 Mercantile Law Intellectual
Property Law on Copyright Copyrightable
Subject
Pearl & Dean (Phil), Inc. is a corporation
engaged in the manufacture of advertising
display units called light boxes. In January
1981, Pearl & Dean was able to acquire
copyrights over the designs of the display
units. In 1988, their trademark application
for Poster Ads was approved; they used
the same trademark to advertise their light
boxes.
In 1985, Pearl & Dean negotiated with
Shoemart, Inc. (SM) so that the former may
be contracted to install light boxes in the ad

spaces of SM. Eventually, SM rejected Pearl

& Deans proposal.
Two years later, Pearl & Dean received report
that light boxes, exactly the same as theirs,
were being used by SM in their ad spaces.
They demanded SM to stop using the light
boxes and at the same time asked for
damages amounting to P20 M. SM refused to
pay damages though they removed the light
boxes. Pearl & Dean eventually sued SM. SM
argued that it did not infringe on Pearl
& Deans trademark because Pearl & Deans
trademark is only applicable to envelopes
and stationeries and not to the type of ad
spaces owned by SM. SM also averred that
Poster Ads is a generic term hence it is not
subject to trademark registration. SM also
averred that the actual light boxes are not
copyrightable. The RTC ruled in favor of Pearl
& Dean. But the Court of Appeals ruled in
favor of SM.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals
is correct.
HELD: Yes. The light boxes cannot, by any
stretch of the imagination, be considered as
either
prints,
pictorial
illustrations,
advertising copies, labels, tags or box wraps,
to be properly classified as a copyrightable;
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what was copyrighted were the technical

drawings only, and not the light boxes
themselves. In other cases, it was held that
there is no copyright infringement when one
who, without being authorized, uses a
copyrighted architectural plan to construct a
structure. This is because the copyright
does
not
extend
to
the
structures
themselves.
On the trademark infringement allegation,
the words Poster Ads are a simple
contraction of the generic term poster
advertising. In the absence of any
convincing proof that Poster Ads has
acquired a secondary meaning in this
jurisdiction, Pearl & Deans exclusive right to
the use of Poster Ads is limited to what is
written in its certificate of registration,
namely, stationeries.

LolitaEscobarappliedwiththeBureauofPatentsforthe
registrationofthetrademarkBarbizon,allegingthatshehad
beenmanufacturingandsellingtheseproductssince1970.
privaterespondentBarbizonCorpopposedtheapplicationinIPC
No.686.TheBureaugrantedtheapplicationandacertificateof
registrationwasissuedforthetrademarkBarbizon.Escobar
laterassignedallherrightsandinterestoverthetrademarkto
petitionerMirpuri.In1979,EscobarfailedtofilewiththeBureau
theAffidavitofUseofthetrademark.Duetohisfailure,the
Bureaucancelledthecertificateofregistration.Escobarreapplied
andMirpurialsoappliedandthisapplicationwasalsoopposed
byprivaterespondentinIPCNo.2049,claimingthatitadopted
saidtrademarkin1933andhasbeenusingit.Itobtaineda
certificatefromtheUSPatentOfficein1934.Thenin1991,DTI
cancelledpetitionersregistrationanddeclaredprivate
respondenttheownerandprioruserofthebusinessname
BarbizonInternational.

ISSUE
Whetherornotthetreaty(ParisConvention)affords
protectiontoaforeigncorporationagainstaPhilippineapplicant
fortheregistrationofasimilartrademark.

MIRPURI vs. CA

HELD

FACTS
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TheCourtheldintheaffirmative.RA8293defines
trademarkasanyvisiblesigncapableofdistinguishinggoods.
TheParisConventionisamultilateraltreatythatseekstoprotect
industrialpropertyconsistingofpatents,utilitymodels,industrial
designs,trademarks,servicemarks,tradenamesandindications
ofsourceorappellationsoforigin,andatthesametimeaimsto
repressunfaircompetition.Inshort,foreignnationalsaretobe
giventhesametreatmentineachofthemembercountriesasthat
countrymakesavailabletoitsowncitizens.Nationalsofthe
variousmembernationsarethusassuredofacertainminimumof
internationalprotectionoftheirindustrialproperty.

ANA ANG vs. TORIBIO TEODORO

Facts:
Respondent Toribio Teodoro has continuously used
"Ang Tibay," both as a trade-mark and as a tradename, in the manufacture and sale of slippers,

shoes, and indoor baseballs since 1910. On

September 29, 1915, he formally registered it as
trade-mark and as trade-name on January 3, 1933.
Petitioner Ana Ang registered the same trade-mark
"Ang Tibay" for pants and shirts on April 11, 1932,
and established a factory for the manufacture of
said articles in the year 1937.
The Court of First Instance of Manila absolved the
defendant (Ms. Ang) on the grounds that the two
trademarks are dissimilar and are used on different
and non-competing goods; that there had been no
exclusive use of the trade-mark by the plaintiff; and
that there had been no fraud in the use of the said
trade-mark by the defendant because the goods on
which it is used are essentially different from those
of the plaintiff.
The Court of Appeals reversed said judgment,
directing the Director of Commerce to cancel the
registration of the trade-mark "Ang Tibay" in favor
of petitioner, and perpetually enjoining the latter
from using said trade-mark on goods manufactured
and sold by her.
Thus, this case, a petition for certiorari.
Issue:
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Are the goods or articles or which the two

trademarks are used similar or belong to the
same class of merchandise?
Ruling:

Yes, pants and shirts are goods closely similar

to shoes and slippers. They belong to the same
class of merchandise as shoes and slippers.
They are closely related goods.
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of
the Court of Appeals and added that although
two non-competing articles may be classified
under to different classes by the Patent Office
because they are deemed not to possess the
same descriptive properties, they would,
nevertheless, be held by the courts to belong to
the same class if the simultaneous use on them
of identical or closely similar trademarks would
be likely to cause confusion as to the origin, or
personal source, of the second users goods.
They would be considered as not falling under
the same class only if they are so dissimilar or
so foreign to each other as to make it unlikely
that the purchaser would think that the first user
made the second users goods.

ARCE SONS AND COMPANY vs. SELECTA BISCUIT

COMPANY,INC., ET AL.,
FACTS:
On August 31, 1955, Selecta Biscuit Company,
Inc., filed with the PhilippinePatent Office a petition for
the registration of the word"SELECTA" as trade-mark to
be use in its bakery products alleging that it is in actual
use thereof for not less than two months before said
date
and
that
"no
other persons,partnership,
corporation or association ... has the right to usesaid
comrev2 mighty corporation vs e & j gallo winery Page 10 of 6

trade-mark in the Philippines, either in the identical

form or in any such near resemblance thereto, as might
becalculated to deceive." Its petition was referred to an
examiner for study who found that the trade-mark
sought to be registered resembles the word "SELECTA"
used by the Acre and Sons and Company in its milk and
ice cream products so that its use by respondent will
cause confusion as to the origin of their respective
goods. Consequently, he recommended that the
application be refused.
The Patent Office ordered the publication of
the application for purposes of opposition. The Arce
Sons and Company then filed their opposition claiming
that the mark Selecta has already become identified
with the name of Ramon Arce and its business.
Moreover, that the mark was used continuously since
1933 while the respondent herein only used it during
1955.
ISSUE:
Is the word Selecta registrable?
HELD:
A 'trade-mark' is a distinctive mark of
authenticity through which the merchandise of a
particular producer
or
manufacturer
may
be
distinguished from that of others, and its sole function is
to designate distinctively the origin of theproducts to
which it is attached."
The word 'SELECTA', it is true, may be an ordinary
or common word in the sense that may be used
or employed by any onein promoting his business or
enterprise, but once adopted or coined in connection
with one's business as an emblem, signor device to
characterize its products, or as a badge of authenticity,
it may acquire a secondary meaning as to be exclusively
associated with its products and business. In this sense,
its used by another may lead to confusion in trade and

cause damage to its business. And this is the situation

of petitioner when it used the word 'SELECTA' as a
trade-mark. In this sense, the law gives its protection
and guarantees its used to the exclusion of all others
a (G. & C. Merriam Co. v.Saalfield, 198 F. 369, 373). And
it is also in the sense that the law postulates that "The
ownership or possession of a trade-mark, . . . shall be
recognized and protected in the same manner and to
the same extent, as are other property rights known to
the law," thereby giving to any person entitled to the
exclusive use of such trade-mark the right to recover
damages in a civil action from any person who
may have sold goods of similar kind bearing such
trademark.

MCDONALDS CORP vs. LC BIG MAK

Petitioner McDonald's Corporation ("McDonald's") is a US
comrev2 mighty corporation vs e & j gallo winery Page 11 of 6

corporation that operates a global chain of fast-food

restaurants, with Petitioner McGeorge Food Industries
("McGeorge"), as the Philippine franchisee.
McDonald's owns the "Big Mac" mark for its "double-decker
hamburger sandwich." with the US Trademark Registry on
16 October 1979.

liable for trademark infringement and unfair competition.

CA reversed RTC's decision on appeal.
1ST ISSUE:W/N respondent corporation is liable for
trademark infringement and unfair competition.

Having received no reply, petitioners sued L.C. Big Mak

Burger, Inc. and its directors before Makati RTC Branch
137 ("RTC"), for trademark infringement and unfair
competition.

Ruling: Yes
Section 22 of Republic Act No. 166, as amended, defines
trademark infringement as follows:
Infringement, what constitutes. - Any person who [1] shall
use, without the consent of the registrant, any reproduction,
counterfeit, copy or colorable imitation of any registered
mark or trade-name in connection with the sale, offering for
sale, or advertising of any goods, business or services on
or in connection with which such use is likely to cause
confusion or mistake or to deceive purchasers or others as
to the source or origin of such goods or services, or identity
of such business; or [2] reproduce, counterfeit, copy, or
colorably imitate any such mark or trade-name and apply
such reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation
to labels, signs, prints, packages, wrappers, receptacles or
advertisements intended to be used upon or in connection
with such goods, business or services, shall be liable to a
civil action by the registrant for any or all of the remedies
herein provided.
To establish trademark infringement, the following elements
must be shown: (1) the validity of plaintiff's mark; (2) the
plaintiff's ownership of the mark; and (3) the use of the
mark or its colorable imitation by the alleged infringer
results in "likelihood of confusion." Of these, it is the
element of likelihood of confusion that is the gravamen of
trademark infringement.

RTC rendered a Decision finding respondent corporation

1st element:

Based on this Home Registration, McDonald's applied for

the registration of the same mark in the Principal Register
of the then Philippine Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and
Technology ("PBPTT") (now IPO). On 18 July 1985, the
PBPTT allowed registration of the "Big Mac."
Respondent L.C. Big Mak Burger, Inc. is a domestic
corporation which operates fast-food outlets and snack
vans in Metro Manila and nearby provinces. Respondent
corporation's menu includes hamburger sandwiches and
other food items.
On 21 October 1988, respondent corporation applied with
the PBPTT for the registration of the "Big Mak" mark for its
hamburger sandwiches, which was opposed by
McDonald's. McDonald's also informed LC Big Mak
chairman of its exclusive right to the "Big Mac" mark and
requested him to desist from using the "Big Mac" mark or
any similar mark.

comrev2 mighty corporation vs e & j gallo winery Page 12 of 6

A mark is valid if it is distinctive and not merely generic and

descriptive.
The "Big Mac" mark, which should be treated in its entirety
and not dissected word for word, is neither generic nor
descriptive. Generic marks are commonly used as the
name or description of a kind of goods, such as "Lite" for
beer. Descriptive marks, on the other hand, convey the
characteristics, functions, qualities or ingredients of a
product to one who has never seen it or does not know it
exists, such as "Arthriticare" for arthritis medication. On the
contrary, "Big Mac" falls under the class of fanciful or
arbitrary marks as it bears no logical relation to the actual
characteristics of the product it represents. As such, it is
highly distinctive and thus valid.
2nd element:
Petitioners have duly established McDonald's exclusive
ownership of the "Big Mac" mark. Prior valid registrants of
the said mark had already assigned his rights to
McDonald's.
3rd element:
Section 22 covers two types of confusion arising from the
use of similar or colorable imitation marks, namely,
confusion of goods (confusion in which the ordinarily
prudent purchaser would be induced to purchase one
product in the belief that he was purchasing the other) and
confusion of business (though the goods of the parties are
different, the defendant's product is such as might
reasonably be assumed to originate with the plaintiff, and

the public would then be deceived either into that belief or

into the belief that there is some connection between the
plaintiff and defendant which, in fact, does not exist).
There is confusion of goods in this case since respondents
used the "Big Mak" mark on the same goods, i.e.
hamburger sandwiches, that petitioners' "Big Mac" mark is
used.
There is also confusion of business due to Respondents'
use of the "Big Mak" mark in the sale of hamburgers, the
same business that petitioners are engaged in, also results
in confusion of business. The registered trademark owner
may use his mark on the same or similar products, in
different segments of the market, and at different price
levels depending on variations of the products for specific
segments of the market. The registered trademark owner
enjoys protection in product and market areas that are the
normal potential expansion of his business.
Furthermore, In determining likelihood of confusion, the SC
has relied on the dominancy test (similarity of the prevalent
features of the competing trademarks that might cause
confusion) over the holistic test (consideration of the
entirety of the marks as applied to the products, including
the labels and packaging).
Applying the dominancy test, Respondents' use of the "Big
Mak" mark results in likelihood of confusion. Aurally the two
marks are the same, with the first word of both marks
phonetically the same, and the second word of both marks
also phonetically the same. Visually, the two marks have
both two words and six letters, with the first word of both
marks having the same letters and the second word having
comrev2 mighty corporation vs e & j gallo winery Page 13 of 6

the same first two letters.

Lastly, since Section 22 only requires the less stringent
standard of "likelihood of confusion," Petitioners' failure to
present proof of actual confusion does not negate their
claim of trademark infringement.
2ND ISSUE: W/N Respondents committed Unfair
Competition
Ruling: Yes.
Section 29 ("Section 29")73 of RA 166 defines unfair
competition, thus:
Any person who will employ deception or any other means
contrary to good faith by which he shall pass off the goods
manufactured by him or in which he deals, or his business,
or services for those of the one having established such
goodwill, or who shall commit any acts calculated to
produce said result, shall be guilty of unfair competition,
and shall be subject to an action therefor.
The essential elements of an action for unfair competition
are (1) confusing similarity in the general appearance of
the goods, and (2) intent to deceive the public and defraud
a competitor.
In the case at bar, Respondents have applied on their
plastic wrappers and bags almost the same words that
petitioners use on their styrofoam box. Further,
Respondents' goods are hamburgers which are also the
goods of petitioners. Moreover, there is actually no notice
to the public that the "Big Mak" hamburgers are products of
"L.C. Big Mak Burger, Inc." This clearly shows respondents'
intent to deceive the public.

SOCIETE DES PRODUITS NESTLE vs. CA

In 1984, CFC Corporation filed with the

Bureau
of
Patents,
Trademarks,
and
Technology Transfers an application for the
registration of its trademark Flavor Master
an instant coffee. Nestle opposed the
application as it alleged that Flavor Master
is confusingly similar to Nestle coffee
products like Master Blend and Master Roast.
Nestle alleged that in promoting their
products, the word Master has been used so
frequently so much so that when one hears
the word Master it connotes to a Nestle
product. They provided as examples the fact
that theyve been using Robert Jaworski and
Ric Puno Jr. as their commercial advertisers;
and that in those commercials Jaworski is a
comrev2 mighty corporation vs e & j gallo winery Page 14 of 6

master of basketball and that Puno is a

master of talk shows; that the brand of
coffee equitable or fit to them is Master
Blend and Master Roast. CFC Corporation on
the other hand alleged that the word
Master is a generic and a descriptive term,
hence not subject to trademark. The Director
of Patents ruled in favor of Nestle but the
Court of Appeals, using the Holistic Test,
reversed the said decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals
is correct.
HELD: No. The proper test that should have
been used is the Dominancy Test. The
application of the totality or holistic test is
improper since the ordinary purchaser would
not be inclined to notice the specific
features,
similarities
or
dissimilarities,
considering that the product is an
inexpensive and common household item.
The use of the word Master by Nestle in its
products and commercials has made Nestle
acquire a connotation that if its a Master
product it is a Nestle product. As such, the
use by CFC of the term MASTER in the
trademark for its coffee product FLAVOR
MASTER is likely to cause confusion or
mistake or even to deceive the ordinary

purchasers.
In addition, the word MASTER is neither a
generic nor a descriptive term. As such, said
term can not be invalidated as a trademark
and, therefore, may be legally protected.
Generic terms are those which constitute
the common descriptive name of an article
or substance, or comprise the genus of
which the particular product is a species, or
are commonly used as the name or
description of a kind of goods, or imply
reference to every member of a genus and
the exclusion of individuating characters, or
refer to the basic nature of the wares or
services provided rather than to the more
idiosyncratic characteristics of a particular
product, and are not legally protectable.
On the other hand, a term is descriptive and
therefore invalid as a trademark if, as
understood in its normal and natural sense,
it forthwith conveys the characteristics,
functions, qualities or ingredients of a
product to one who has never seen it and
does not know what it is, or if it forthwith
conveys an immediate idea of the
ingredients, qualities or characteristics of the
goods, or if it clearly denotes what goods or
services are provided in such a way that the
comrev2 mighty corporation vs e & j gallo winery Page 15 of 6

consumer does not have to exercise powers

of perception or imagination.
Rather, the term MASTER is a suggestive
term brought about by the advertising
scheme of Nestle. Suggestive terms are
those which, in the phraseology of one court,
require imagination, thought and perception
to reach a conclusion as to the nature of the
goods. Such terms, which subtly connote
something about the product, are eligible
for protection in the absence of secondary
meaning. While suggestive marks are
capable of shedding some light upon
certain characteristics of the goods or
services in dispute, they nevertheless
involve an element of incongruity,
figurativeness, or imaginative effort on
the part of the observer.

FACTS:
Montres Rolex S.A. and Rolex Centre Phil., Limited,
owners/proprietors of Rolex and Crown Device, filed
against 246 Corporation the instant suit for trademark
infringement and damages with prayer for the issuance
of a restraining order or writ of preliminary
injunctionbefore the RTC of QC
o July 1996: 246 adopted and , since then, has been
using without authority the mark Rolex in its business
name Rolex Music Lounge as well as in its
newspaper advertisements as Rolex Music Lounge,
KTV, Disco & Party Club.
246 answered special affirmative defences: no
confusion would arise from the use by petitioner of the
mark Rolex considering that its entertainment
business is totally unrelated to the items catered by
respondents such as watches, clocks, bracelets and
parts thereof
RTC: quashed the subpoena ad testificandum and
denied petitioners motion for preliminary hearing on
affirmative defenses with motion to dismiss
CA: affirmed
ISSUE: W/N RTC performed a grave abuse of
discretion

246 CORP vs. DAWAY

HELD: NO. petition denied. RTC affirmed

The issue of whether or not a trademark
infringement exists, is a question of fact that could best
be determined by the trial court.
Section 123.1(f) of the Intellectual Property Code
comrev2 mighty corporation vs e & j gallo winery Page 16 of 6

(Republic Act No. 8293)

o (f)
Is identical with, or confusingly similar to, or
constitutes a translation of a mark considered wellknown in accordance with the preceding paragraph,
which is registered in the Philippines with respect to
goods or services which are not similar to those with
respect to which registration is applied for: Provided,
That use of the mark in relation to those goods or
services would indicate a connection between those
goods or services, and the owner of the registered
mark: Provided, further, That the interest of the owner
of the registered mark are likely to be damaged by
such use
Section 123.1(f) is clearly in point because the
Music Lounge of petitioner is entirely unrelated to
respondents business involving watches, clocks,
bracelets, etc. However, the Court cannot yet resolve
the merits of the present controversy considering that
the requisites for the application of Section 123.1(f),
which constitute the kernel issue at bar, clearly require
determination facts of which need to be resolved at the
trial court. The existence or absence of these
requisites should be addressed in a full blown hearing
and not on a mere preliminary hearing. The
respondent must be given ample opportunity to prove
its claim, and the petitioner to debunk the same.

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