CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CASES JULY 18, 2015

HECTOR TREAS V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

SERENO, J.:

Where life or liberty is affected by its proceedings, courts must keep strictly
within the limits of the law authorizing them to take jurisdiction and to try
the case and render judgment thereon.[1]
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking to annul and set aside the Court of Appeals
(CA) Decision dated 9 July 2010[2] and Resolution dated 4 January 2011.
Statement of the Facts and of the Case
The pertinent facts, as found by the CA, are as follows:

Sale with Assumption of Mortgage. Subsequently, Hector gave Elizabeth

Revenue Official Receipt Nos. 00084370 for P96,000.00 and 00084369 for
P24,000.00. However, when she consulted with the BIR, she was informed
that the receipts were fake. When confronted, Hector admitted to her that the
receipts were fake and that he used the P120,000.00 for his other
transactions. Elizabeth demanded the return of the money.
To settle his accounts, appellant Hector issued in favor of Elizabeth a Bank
of Commerce check No. 0042856 dated November 10, 2000 in the amount of
P120,000.00, deducting from P150,000.00 the P30,000.00 as attorneys fees.
When the check was deposited with the PCIBank, Makati Branch, the same
was dishonored for the reason that the account was closed. Notwithstanding
repeated formal and verbal demands, appellant failed to pay. Thus, the instant
case of Estafa was filed against him.[3]
On 29 October 2001, an Information was filed by the Office of the City
Prosecutor before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), both of Makati City. The
Information reads as follows:

P24,000.00- Documentary Stamp,

That on or about the 23rd day of December, 1999, in the City of Makati,
Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, received in trust from ELIZABETH
LUCIAJA the amount of P150,000.00 which money was given to her by her
aunt Margarita Alocilja, with the express obligation on the part of the
accused to use the said amount for expenses and fees in connection with the
purchase of a parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-109266, but the said
accused, once in possession of the said amount, with the intent to gain and
abuse of confidence, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
misappropriate, misapply and convert to his own personal use and benefit the
amount of P130,000.00 less attorneys fees and the said accused failed and
refused and still fails and refuses to do so, to the damage and prejudice of
complainant Elizabeth Luciaja and Margarita Alocilja in the aforementioned
amount of P130,000.00.

P10,000.00- Miscellaneous Expenses.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]

Thereafter, Elizabeth gave P150,000.00 to Hector who issued a

corresponding receipt dated December 22, 1999 and prepared [a] Deed of

During arraignment on 26 April 2002, petitioner, acting as his own counsel,

entered a plea of Not Guilty. Allegedly due to old age and poor health, and

Sometime in December 1999, Margarita Alocilja (Margarita) wanted to buy a

house-and-lot in Iloilo City covered by TCT No. 109266. It was then
mortgaged with Maybank. The bank manager Joselito Palma recommended
the appellant Hector Treas (Hector) to private complainant Elizabeth, who
was an employee and niece of Margarita, for advice regarding the transfer of
the title in the latters name. Hector informed Elizabeth that for the titling of
the property in the name of her aunt Margarita, the following expenses would
be incurred:
P20,000.00- Attorneys fees,
P90,000.00- Capital Gains Tax,

the fact that he lives in Iloilo City, petitioner was unable to attend the pretrial and trial of the case.

On 3 February 2011, petitioner filed his Petition for Review on Certiorari

before this Court, with the following assignment of errors:

On 8 January 2007, the RTC rendered a Decision[5] finding petitioner guilty

of the crime of Estafa under section 1, paragraph (b), of Article 315 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC), with the dispositive portion as follows:

1.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT AN
ACCUSED HAS TO PRESENT EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF THE
DEFENSE OF LACK OF JURISDICTION EVEN IF SUCH LACK OF
JURISDICTION APPEARS IN THE EVIDENCE OF THE
PROSECUTION

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is rendered finding

accused Hector Trenas guilty of the crime of Estafa with abuse of confidence
as penalized under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, and which offense
was committed in the manner described in the aforementioned information.
As a consequence of this judgment, accused Hector Trenas is sentenced to
suffer a penalty of Ten (10) Years and One (1) Day of Prision Mayor to
Seventeen (17) Years and Four (4) Months of Reclusion Temporal. Moreover,
he is ordered to indemnify private complainant Elizabeth Luciaja the amount
of P130,000.00 with interest at the legal rate of 12% per annum, reckoned
from the date this case was filed until the amount is fully paid.
SO ORDERED.[6]
We note at this point that petitioner has been variably called Treas and Trenas
in the pleadings and court issuances, but for consistency, we use the name
Treas, under which he was accused in the Information.
On 24 August 2007, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, [7] which
was denied by the RTC in a Resolution dated 2 July 2008. [8]
On 25 September 2008, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal before the RTC.
[9]
The appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 32177. On 9 July 2010, the
CA rendered a Decision[10] affirming that of the RTC. On 4 August 2010,
petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the CA in
a Resolution dated 4 January 2011.[11]
On 25 January 2011, petitioner filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File
Petition for Review on Certiorari[12] before this Court. He asked for a period
of 15 days within which to file a petition for review, and the Court granted
his motion in a Resolution dated 9 February 2011.

2.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT
DEMAND MADE BY A PERSON OTHER THAN THE AGGRIEVED
PARTY SATISFIES THE REQUIREMENT OF DEMAND TO
CONSTITUTE THE OFFENSE OF ESTAFA;[13]
On the first issue, petitioner asserts that nowhere in the evidence presented
by the prosecution does it show that 150,000 was given to and received by
petitioner in Makati City. Instead, the evidence shows that the Receipt issued
by petitioner for the money was dated 22 December 1999, without any
indication of the place where it was issued. Meanwhile, the Deed of Sale
with Assumption of Mortgage prepared by petitioner was signed and
notarized in Iloilo City, also on 22 December 1999. Petitioner claims that the
only logical conclusion is that the money was actually delivered to him in
Iloilo City, especially since his residence and office were situated there as
well. Absent any direct proof as to the place of delivery, one must rely on the
disputable presumption that things happened according to the ordinary course
of nature and the ordinary habits of life. The only time Makati City was
mentioned was with respect to the time when the check provided by
petitioner was dishonored by Equitable-PCI Bank in its De la Rosa-Rada
Branch in Makati. Petitioner asserts that the prosecution witness failed to
allege that any of the acts material to the crime of estafa had occurred in
Makati City. Thus, the trial court failed to acquire jurisdiction over the case.
Petitioner thus argues that an accused is not required to present evidence to
prove lack of jurisdiction, when such lack is already indicated in the
prosecution evidence.
As to the second issue, petitioner claims that the amount of P150,000
actually belongs to Margarita. Assuming there was misappropriation, it was

actually she not Elizabeth who was the offended party. Thus, the latters
demand does not satisfy the requirement of prior demand by the offended
party in the offense of estafa. Even assuming that the demand could have
been properly made by Elizabeth, the demand referred to the amount of
P120,000, instead of P150,000. Finally, there is no showing that the demand
was actually received by petitioner. The signature on the Registry Return
Receipt was not proven to be that of petitioners.
On 30 May 2011, this Court issued a Resolution directing the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) to file the latters Comment on the Petition. On 27
July 2011, the OSG filed a Motion for Extension, praying for an additional
period of 60 days within which to submit its Comment. This motion was
granted in a Resolution dated 12 September 2011. On 23 September 2011,
the OSG filed a Motion for Special Extension, requesting an additional
period of five days. On 29 September 2011, it filed its Comment on the
Petition.
In its Comment, the OSG asserts that the RTC did not err in convicting
petitioner as charged. The OSG notes that petitioner does not dispute the
factual findings of the trial court with respect to the delivery of P150,000 to
him, and that there was a relationship of trust and confidence between him
and Elizabeth. With respect to his claim that the Complaint should have been
filed in Iloilo City, his claim was not supported by any piece of evidence, as
he did not present any. Further, petitioner is, in effect, asking the Court to
weigh the credibility of the prosecution witness, Elizabeth. However, the trial
courts assessment of the credibility of a witness is entitled to great weight,
unless tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance,
which is not the case here.
With respect to the second issue, the OSG stresses that the defense of no
valid demand was not raised in the lower court. Nevertheless, the demand
letter sent to Elizabeth suffices, as she is also one of the complainants alleged
in the Information, as an agent of Margarita. Moreover, no proof was
adduced as to the genuineness of petitioners signature in the Registry Return
Receipt of the demand letter.
The OSG, however, submits that the Court may recommend petitioner for
executive clemency, in view of his advanced age and failing health.

The Courts Ruling

The Petition is impressed with merit.

Review of Factual Findings

While the Petition raises questions of law, the resolution of the Petition
requires a review of the factual findings of the lower courts and the evidence
upon which they are based.
As a rule, only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. In many instances, however, this Court has
laid down exceptions to this general rule, as follows:
(1) When the factual findings of the Court of Appeals and the trial court are
contradictory;
(2) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation,
surmises or conjectures;
(3) When the inference made by the Court of Appeals from its findings of
fact is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
(4) When there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts;
(5) When the appellate court, in making its findings, went beyond the issues
of the case, and such findings are contrary to the admissions of both
appellant and appellee;
(6) When the judgment of the Court of Appeals is premised on
misapprehension of facts;
(7) When the Court of Appeals failed to notice certain relevant facts which, if
properly considered, would justify a different conclusion;
(8) When the findings of fact are themselves conflicting;
(9) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of the specific
evidence on which they are based; and

(10) When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the
absence of evidence but such findings are contradicted by the evidence on
record.[14]
In this case, the findings of fact of the trial court and the CA on the issue of
the place of commission of the offense are conclusions without any citation
of the specific evidence on which they are based; they are grounded on
conclusions and conjectures.
The trial court, in its Decision, ruled on the commission of the offense
without any finding as to where it was committed:

City, it cannot preclude the fact that the P150,000.00 was delivered to him by
private complainant Luciaja in Makati City the following day. His reasoning
the money must have been delivered to him in Iloilo City because it was to
be used for paying the taxes with the BIR office in that city does not inspire
concurrence. The records show that he did not even pay the taxes because the
BIR receipts he gave to private complainant were fake documents. Thus, his
argumentation in this regard is too specious to consider favorably.[16]
For its part, the CA ruled on the issue of the trial courts jurisdiction in this
wise:

Based on the evidence presented by the prosecution through private

complainant Elizabeth Luciaja, the Court is convinced that accused Trenas
had committed the offense of Estafa by taking advantage of her trust so that
he could misappropriate for his own personal benefit the amount entrusted to
him for payment of the capital gains tax and documentary stamp tax.

It is a settled jurisprudence that the court will not entertain evidence unless it
is offered in evidence. It bears emphasis that Hector did not comment on the
formal offer of prosecutions evidence nor present any evidence on his behalf.
He failed to substantiate his allegations that he had received the amount of
P150,000.00 in Iloilo City. Hence, Hectors allegations cannot be given
evidentiary weight.

As clearly narrated by private complainant Luciaja, after accused Trenas had

obtained the amount of P150,000.00 from her, he gave her two receipts
purportedly issued by the Bureau of Internal Revenue, for the fraudulent
purpose of fooling her and making her believe that he had complied with his
duty to pay the aforementioned taxes. Eventually, private complainant
Luciaja discovered that said receipts were fabricated documents. [15]

Absent any showing of a fact or circumstance of weight and influence which

would appear to have been overlooked and, if considered, could affect the
outcome of the case, the factual findings and assessment on the credibility of
a witness made by the trial court remain binding on appellate tribunal. They
are entitled to great weight and respect and will not be disturbed on review.[17]

In his Motion for Reconsideration before the RTC, petitioner raised the
argument that it had no jurisdiction over the offense charged. The trial court
denied the motion, without citing any specific evidence upon which its
findings were based, and by relying on conjecture, thus:
That the said amount was given to [Treas] in Makati City was
incontrovertibly established by the prosecution. Accused Treas, on the other
hand, never appeared in Court to present countervailing evidence. It is only
now that he is suggesting another possible scenario, not based on the
evidence, but on mere what ifs. x x x
Besides, if this Court were to seriously assay his assertions, the same would
still not warrant a reversal of the assailed judgment. Even if the Deed of Sale
with Assumption of Mortgage was executed on 22 December 999 in Iloilo

The instant case is thus an exception allowing a review of the factual findings
of the lower courts.
Jurisdiction of the Trial Court
The overarching consideration in this case is the principle that, in criminal
cases, venue is jurisdictional. A court cannot exercise jurisdiction over a
person charged with an offense committed outside its limited territory. In Isip
v. People,[18] this Court explained:

The place where the crime was committed determines not only the venue of
the action but is an essential element of jurisdiction. It is a fundamental rule
that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases, the offense

should have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients should
have taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial
jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the court has jurisdiction
to take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed therein by the
accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged with an
offense allegedly committed outside of that limited territory.
Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined
by the allegations in the complaint or information. And once it is so shown,
the court may validly take cognizance of the case. However, if the evidence
adduced during the trial shows that the offense was committed somewhere
else, the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction. (Emphasis
supplied.)
In a criminal case, the prosecution must not only prove that the offense was
committed, it must also prove the identity of the accused and the fact that the
offense was committed within the jurisdiction of the court.
In Fukuzume v. People,[19] this Court dismissed a Complaint for estafa,
wherein the prosecution failed to prove that the essential elements of the
offense took place within the trial courts jurisdiction. The Court ruled:
More importantly, we find nothing in the direct or cross-examination of Yu to
establish that he gave any money to Fukuzume or transacted business with
him with respect to the subject aluminum scrap wires inside or within the
premises of the Intercontinental Hotel in Makati, or anywhere in Makati for
that matter. Venue in criminal cases is an essential element of jurisdiction. x x
x
In the present case, the criminal information against Fukuzume was filed
with and tried by the RTC of Makati. He was charged with estafa as defined
under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of
which are as follows: x x x
The crime was alleged in the Information as having been committed in
Makati. However, aside from the sworn statement executed by Yu on April
19, 1994, the prosecution presented no other evidence, testimonial or
documentary, to corroborate Yu's sworn statement or to prove that any of the
above-enumerated elements of the offense charged was committed in Makati.

Indeed, the prosecution failed to establish that any of the subsequent

payments made by Yu in the amounts of P50,000.00 on July 12, 1991,
P20,000.00 on July 22, 1991, P50,000.00 on October 14, 1991 and
P170,000.00 on October 18, 1991 was given in Makati. Neither was there
proof to show that the certifications purporting to prove that NAPOCOR has
in its custody the subject aluminum scrap wires and that Fukuzume is
authorized by Furukawa to sell the same were given by Fukuzume to Yu in
Makati. On the contrary, the testimony of Yu established that all the elements
of the offense charged had been committed in Paraaque, to wit: that on July
12, 1991, Yu went to the house of Fukuzume in Paraaque; that with the
intention of selling the subject aluminum scrap wires, the latter pretended
that he is a representative of Furukawa who is authorized to sell the said
scrap wires; that based on the false pretense of Fukuzume, Yu agreed to buy
the subject aluminum scrap wires; that Yu paid Fukuzume the initial amount
of P50,000.00; that as a result, Yu suffered damage. Stated differently, the
crime of estafa, as defined and penalized under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of
the Revised Penal Code, was consummated when Yu and Fukuzume met at
the latter's house in Paraaque and, by falsely pretending to sell aluminum
scrap wires, Fukuzume was able to induce Yu to part with his money.
xxx
From the foregoing, it is evident that the prosecution failed to prove that
Fukuzume committed the crime of estafa in Makati or that any of the
essential ingredients of the offense took place in the said city. Hence, the
judgment of the trial court convicting Fukuzume of the crime of estafa
should be set aside for want of jurisdiction, without prejudice, however, to
the filing of appropriate charges with the court of competent jurisdiction.
(Emphasis supplied)
In this case, the prosecution failed to show that the offense of estafa under
Section 1, paragraph (b) of Article 315 of the RPC was committed within the
jurisdiction of the RTC of Makati City.
That the offense was committed in Makati City was alleged in the
information as follows:

That on or about the 23rd day of December, 1999, in the City of Makati,
Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, received in trust from ELIZABETH
LUCIAJA the amount of P150,000.00 x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)[20]

that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by

the offender, or denial on his part of such receipt; (3) that such
misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and
(4) there is demand by the offended party to the offender.[22]

Ordinarily, this statement would have been sufficient to vest jurisdiction in

the RTC of Makati. However, the Affidavit of Complaint executed by
Elizabeth does not contain any allegation as to where the offense was
committed. It provides in part:

There is nothing in the documentary evidence offered by the

prosecution[23] that points to where the offense, or any of its elements, was
committed. A review of the testimony of Elizabeth also shows that there was
no mention of the place where the offense was allegedly committed:

4. THAT on 23 December 1999, [Elizabeth] personally entrusted to ATTY.

HECTOR TREAS the sum of P150,000.00 to be expended as agreed and
ATTY. HECTOR TREAS issued to me a receipt, a photo copy of which is
hereto attached as Annex B,

Q After the manager of Maybank referred Atty. Treas to you, what happened
next?

5. THAT despite my several follow-ups with ATTY. HECTOR TREAS, the

latter failed to transfer the title of aforesaid property to MRS. MARGARITA
ALOCILJA. He also failed to pay the capital gains tax, documentary stamps
and BIR-related expenses. What ATTY. HECTOR TREAS accomplished was
only the preparation of the Deed of Sale covering aforesaid property. A copy
of said Deed of Sale is hereto attached as Annex C,
6. THAT in view of my persistent follow-ups, ATTY. HECTOR
TREAS issued to me a check for refund of the sum given to him less the
attorneys fee of P20,000.00 and the sum of P10,000.00 allegedly paid to BIR
or in the net sum of P120,000.00. x x x
7. THAT when said check was deposited at EQUITABLE PCI BANK dela
Rosa-Rada Branch at Makati City, the same was dishonored by the drawee
bank for the reason: ACCOUNT CLOSED. x x x[21]
Aside from the lone allegation in the Information, no other evidence was
presented by the prosecution to prove that the offense or any of its elements
was committed in Makati City.
Under Article 315, par. 1 (b) of the RPC, the elements of estafa are as
follows: (1) that money, goods or other personal property is received by the
offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any other
obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same; (2)

A We have met and he explained to the expenses and what we will have to
and she will work for the Deed of Sale.
Q And did he quote any amount when you got to the expenses?
A Yes. I gave him ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND
Q What was the amount quoted to you?
A ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND.
Q Did he give a breakdown of this ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND?
A Yes, sir.
Q And what is the breakdown of this ONE HUNDRED FIFTY
THOUSAND?
A TWENTY THOUSAND is for his Attorneys fee, NINETY THOUSAND is
for the capital gain tax TWENTY FOUR THOUSAND is intended for
documentary sum (sic) and TEN THOUSAND PESOS is for other expenses
for BIR.
Q And did you give him this ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did he issue a receipt?

A Yes, sir.
Q If shown to you a receipt issued by Atty. Treas for this ONE HUNDRED
FIFTY THOUSAND, will you be able to identify it?
A Yes, sir.
Q I am showing to you a document, madam witness, already identified
during the pre-trial as exhibit B. This appears to be a receipt dated December
22, 1999. Will you please go over this document and inform this court what
relation has this to the receipt which you said Atty. Treas issued to you?
A This is the receipt issued by Atty. Hector Treas.
Q Now, after the amount of ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND was
given to Atty. Treas by you, what happened next?
A We made several follow-ups but he failed to do his job. [24]
Although the prosecution alleged that the check issued by petitioner was
dishonored in a bank in Makati, such dishonor is not an element of the
offense of estafa under Article 315, par. 1 (b) of the RPC.
Indeed, other than the lone allegation in the information, there is nothing in
the prosecution evidence which even mentions that any of the elements of the
offense were committed in Makati. The rule is settled that an objection may
be raised based on the ground that the court lacks jurisdiction over the
offense charged, or it may be consideredmotu proprio by the court at any
stage of the proceedings or on appeal.[25] Moreover, jurisdiction over the
subject matter in a criminal case cannot be conferred upon the court by the
accused, by express waiver or otherwise. That jurisdiction is conferred by the
sovereign authority that organized the court and is given only by law in the
manner and form prescribed by law.[26]
It has been consistently held by this Court that it is unfair to require a
defendant or accused to undergo the ordeal and expense of a trial if the court
has no jurisdiction over the subject matter or offense or it is not the court of
proper venue.[27] Section 15 (a) of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure of 2000 provides that [s]ubject to existing laws, the criminal
action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or territory

where the offense was committed or where any of its essential ingredients
occurred. This fundamental principle is to ensure that the defendant is not
compelled to move to, and appear in, a different court from that of the
province where the crime was committed as it would cause him great
inconvenience in looking for his witnesses and other evidence in another
place.[28] This principle echoes more strongly in this case, where, due to
distance constraints, coupled with his advanced age and failing health,
petitioner was unable to present his defense in the charges against him.
There being no showing that the offense was committed within Makati, the
RTC of that city has no jurisdiction over the case. [29]
As such, there is no more need to discuss the other issue raised by petitioner.
At this juncture, this Court sees it fit to note that the Code of Professional
Responsibility strongly militates against the petitioners conduct in handling
the funds of his client. Rules 16.01 and 16.02 of the Code provides:
Rule 16.01 A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or
received for or from the client.
Rule 16.02 A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart
from his own and those others kept by him.
When a lawyer collects or receives money from his client for a particular
purpose (such as for filing fees, registration fees, transportation and office
expenses), he should promptly account to the client how the money was
spent.[30] If he does not use the money for its intended purpose, he must
immediately return it to the client. His failure either to render an accounting
or to return the money (if the intended purpose of the money does not
materialize) constitutes a blatant disregard of Rule 16.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.[31]
Moreover, a lawyer has the duty to deliver his client's funds or properties as
they fall due or upon demand.[32] His failure to return the client's money upon
demand gives rise to the presumption that he has misappropriated it for his
own use to the prejudice of and in violation of the trust reposed in him by the
client.[33] It is a gross violation of general morality as well as of professional

ethics; it impairs public confidence in the legal profession and deserves

punishment.[34]

Alexander A. Padilla for petitioners.

The Solicitor General for the People of the Philippines.

[35]

In Cuizon v. Macalino, this Court ruled that the issuance of checks which
were later dishonored for having been drawn against a closed account
indicates a lawyer's unfitness for the trust and confidence reposed on him,
shows lack of personal honesty and good moral character as to render him
unworthy of public confidence, and constitutes a ground for disciplinary
action.
This case is thus referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
the initiation of disciplinary proceedings against petitioner. In any case,
should there be a finding that petitioner has failed to account for the funds
received by him in trust, the recommendation should include an order to
immediately return the amount of 130,000 to his client, with the appropriate
rate of interest from the time of demand until full payment.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated 9 July
2010 and the Resolution dated 4 January 2011 issued by the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR No. 32177 are SET ASIDE on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction on the part of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 137, Makati City.
Criminal Case No. 01-2409 is DISMISSEDwithout prejudice. This case
is REFERRED to the IBP Board of Governors for investigation and
recommendation pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 104879 May 6, 1994

ELIZALDE MALALOAN and MARLON LUAREZ, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS; HON. ANTONIO J. FINEZA, in his capacity as
Presiding Judge, Branch 131, Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City;
HON. TIRSO D.C. VELASCO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge,
Branch 88, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City; and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.

REGALADO, J.:
Creative legal advocacy has provided this Court with another primae
impressionis case through the present petition wherein the parties have
formulated and now pose for resolution the following issue: Whether or not a
court may take cognizance of an application for a search warrant in
connection with an offense committed outside its territorial boundary and,
thereafter, issue the warrant to conduct a search on a place outside the court's
supposed territorial jurisdiction. 1
The factual background and judicial antecedents of this case are best taken
from the findings of respondent Court of Appeals 2 on which there does not
appear to be any dispute, to wit:
From the pleadings and supporting documents before the Court, it can be
gathered that on March 22, 1990, 1st Lt. Absalon V. Salboro of the
CAPCOM Northern Sector (now Central Sector) filed with the Regional
Trial Court of Kalookan City an application for search warrant. The search
warrant was sought for in connection with an alleged violation of P.D. 1866
(Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions) perpetrated at No. 25
Newport St., corner Marlboro St., Fairview, Quezon City. On March 23,
1990, respondent RTC Judge of Kalookan City issued Search Warrant No.
95-90. On the same day, at around 2:30 p.m., members of the CAPCOM,
armed with subject search warrant, proceeded to the situs of the offense
alluded to, where a labor seminar of the Ecumenical Institute for Labor
Education and Research (EILER) was then taking place. According to
CAPCOM's "Inventory of Property Seized," firearms, explosive materials
and subversive documents, among others, were seized and taken during the
search. And all the sixty-one (61) persons found within the premises searched
were brought to Camp Karingal, Quezon City but most of them were later
released, with the exception of the herein petitioners, EILER Instructors, who
were indicated for violation of P.D. 1866 in Criminal Case No. Q-90-11757

before Branch 88 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, presided over
by respondent Judge Tirso D.C. Velasco.
On July 10, 1990, petitioners presented a "Motion for Consolidation, Quashal
of Search Warrant and For the Suppression of All Illegally Acquired
Evidence" before the Quezon City court; and a "Supplemental Motion to the
Motion for Consolidation, Quashal of Search Warrant and Exclusion of
Evidence Illegally Obtained.
On September 21, 1990, the respondent Quezon City Judge issued the
challenged order, consolidating subject cases but denying the prayer for the
quashal of the search warrant under attack, the validity of which warrant was
upheld; opining that the same falls under the category of Writs and Processes,
within the contemplation of paragraph 3(b) of the Interim Rules and
Guidelines, and can be served not only within the territorial jurisdiction of
the issuing court but anywhere in the judicial region of the issuing court
(National Capital Judicial Region);. . .
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the said Order under challenge,
having been denied by the assailed Order of October 5, 1990, petitioners
have come to this Court via the instant petition, raising the sole issue:
WHETHER OR NOT A COURT MAY TAKE COGNIZANCE OF AN
APPLICATION FOR A SEARCH WARRANT IN CONNECTION WITH
AN OFFENSE ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED OUTSIDE ITS
TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION AND TO ISSUE A WARRANT TO
CONDUCT A SEARCH ON A PLACE LIKEWISE OUTSIDE ITS
TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION.
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent Court of Appeals rendered judgment, 3 in effect affirming that of
the trial court, by denying due course to the petition for certiorari and lifting
the temporary restraining order it had issued on November 29, 1990 in
connection therewith. This judgment of respondent court is now impugned in
and sought to be reversed through the present recourse before us.
We are not favorably impressed by the arguments adduced by petitioners in
support of their submissions. Their disquisitions postulate interpretative

theories contrary to the letter and intent of the rules on search warrants and
which could pose legal obstacles, if not dangerous doctrines, in the area of
law enforcement. Further, they fail to validly distinguish, hence they do not
convincingly delineate the difference, between the matter of (1) the court
which has the competence to issue a search warrant under a given set of
facts, and (2) the permissible jurisdictional range in the enforcement of such
search warrant vis-a-vis the court's territorial jurisdiction. These issues while
effectively cognate are essentially discrete since the resolution of one does
not necessarily affect or preempt the other. Accordingly, to avoid
compounding the seeming confusion, these questions shall be
discussedseriatim.
I
Petitioners invoke the jurisdictional rules in the institution of criminal actions
to invalidate the search warrant issued by the Regional Trial Court of
Kalookan City because it is directed toward the seizure of firearms and
ammunition allegedly cached illegally in Quezon City. This theory is sought
to be buttressed by the fact that the criminal case against petitioners for
violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 was subsequently filed in the latter
court. The application for the search warrant, it is claimed, was accordingly
filed in a court of improper venue and since venue in criminal actions
involves the territorial jurisdiction of the court, such warrant is void for
having been issued by a court without jurisdiction to do so.
The basic flaw in this reasoning is in erroneously equating the application for
and the obtention of a search warrant with the institution and prosecution of a
criminal action in a trial court. It would thus categorize what is only a special
criminal process, the power to issue which is inherent in all courts, as
equivalent to a criminal action, jurisdiction over which is reposed in specific
courts of indicated competence. It ignores the fact that the requisites,
procedure and purpose for the issuance of a search warrant are completely
different from those for the institution of a criminal action.
For, indeed, a warrant, such as a warrant of arrest or a search warrant, merely
constitutes process. 4 A search warrant is defined in our jurisdiction as an
order in writing issued in the name of the People of the Philippines signed by
a judge and directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search for

personal property and bring it before the court. 5 A search warrant is in the
nature of a criminal process akin to a writ of discovery. It is a special and
peculiar remedy, drastic in its nature, and made necessary because of a public
necessity. 6
In American jurisdictions, from which we have taken our jural concept and
provisions on search warrants, 7 such warrant is definitively considered
merely as a process, generally issued by a court in the exercise of its ancillary
jurisdiction, and not a criminal action to be entertained by a court pursuant to
its original jurisdiction. We emphasize this fact for purposes of both issues as
formulated in this opinion, with the catalogue of authorities herein.
Invariably, a judicial process is defined as a writ, warrant, subpoena, or other
formal writing issued by authority of law; also the means of accomplishing
an end, including judicial proceedings, 8 or all writs, warrants, summonses,
andorders of courts of justice or judicial officers. 9 It is likewise held to
include a writ, summons, or order issued in a judicial proceeding to acquire
jurisdiction of a person or his property, to expedite the cause or enforce the
judgment, 10 or a writ,warrant, mandate, or other process issuing from a court
of justice. 11
2. It is clear, therefore, that a search warrant is merely a judicial process
designed by the Rules to respond only to an incident in the main case, if one
has already been instituted, or in anticipation thereof. In the latter
contingency, as in the case at bar, it would involve some judicial
clairvoyance to require observance of the rules as to where a criminal case
may eventually be filed where, in the first place, no such action having as yet
been instituted, it may ultimately be filed in a territorial jurisdiction other
than that wherein the illegal articles sought to be seized are then located. This
is aside from the consideration that a criminal action may be filed in different
venues under the rules for delitos continuados or in those instances where
different trial courts have concurrent original jurisdiction over the same
criminal offense.
In fact, to illustrate the gravity of the problem which petitioners' implausible
position may create, we need not stray far from the provisions of Section 15,
Rule 110 of the Rules of Court on the venue of criminal actions and which
we quote:

Sec. 15. Place where action to be instituted.

(a) Subject to existing laws, in all criminal prosecutions the action shall be
instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or territory wherein the
offense was committed or any one of the essential ingredients thereof took
place.
(b) Where an offense is committed on a railroad train, in an aircraft, or any
other public or private vehicle while in the course of its trip, the criminal
action may be instituted and tried in the court of any municipality or territory
where such train, aircraft or other vehicle passed during such trip, including
the place of departure and arrival.
(c) Where an offense is committed on board a vessel in the course of its
voyage, the criminal action may be instituted and tried in the proper court of
the first port of entry or of any municipality or territory through which the
vessel passed during such voyage, subject to the generally accepted
principles of international law.
(d) Other crimes committed outside of the Philippines but punishable therein
under Article 2 of the Revised Penal Code shall be cognizable by the proper
court in which the charge is first filed. (14a)
It would be an exacting imposition upon the law enforcement authorities or
the prosecutorial agencies to unerringly determine where they should apply
for a search warrant in view of the uncertainties and possibilities as to the
ultimate venue of a case under the foregoing rules. It would be doubly so if
compliance with that requirement would be under pain of nullification of said
warrant should they file their application therefor in and obtain the same
from what may later turn out to be a court not within the ambit of the
aforequoted Section 15.
Our Rules of Court, whether of the 1940, 1964 or the present vintage, and,
for that matter, the Judiciary Act of 1948 12 or the recent Judiciary
Reorganization Act, 13 have never required the jurisdictional strictures that
the petitioners' thesis would seek to be inferentially drawn from the silence of
the reglementary provisions. On the contrary, we are of the view that said
statutory omission was both deliberate and significant. It cannot but mean
that the formulators of the Rules of Court, and even Congress itself, did not

consider it proper or correct, on considerations of national policy and the

pragmatics of experience, to clamp a legal manacle on those who would
ferret out the evidence of a crime. For us to now impose such conditions or
restrictions, under the guise of judicial interpretation, may instead be
reasonably construed as trenching on judicial legislation. It would be
tantamount to a judicial act of engrafting upon a law something that has been
omitted but which someone believes ought to have been embraced therein. 14
Concededly, the problem of venue would be relatively easier to resolve if a
criminal case has already been filed in a particular court and a search warrant
is needed to secure evidence to be presented therein. Obviously, the court
trying the criminal case may properly issue the warrant, upon proper
application and due compliance with the requisites therefor, since such
application would only be an incident in that case and which it can resolve in
the exercise of its ancillary jurisdiction. If the contraband articles are within
its territorial jurisdiction, there would appear to be no further complications.
The jurisdictional problem would resurrect, however, where such articles are
outside its territorial jurisdiction, which aspect will be addressed hereafter.
3. Coming back to the first issue now under consideration, petitioners, after
discoursing on the respective territorial jurisdictions of the thirteen Regional
Trial Courts which correspond to the thirteen judicial regions, 15invite our
attention to the fact that this Court, pursuant to its authority granted by
law, 16 has defined the territorial jurisdiction of each branch of a Regional
Trial Court 17 over which the particular branch concerned shall exercise its
authority. 18 From this, it is theorized that "only the branch of a Regional
Trial Court which has jurisdiction over the place to be searched could grant
an application for and issue a warrant to search that place." Support for such
position is sought to be drawn from issuances of this Court, that is, Circular
No. 13 issued on October 1, 1985, as amended by Circular No. 19 on August
4, 1987.
We reject that proposition. Firstly, it is evident that both circulars were not
intended to be of general application to all instances involving search
warrants and in all courts as would be the case if they had been adopted as
part of the Rules of Court. These circulars were issued by the Court to meet a
particular exigency, that is, as emergency guidelines on applications for
search warrants filed only in the courts of Metropolitan Manila and other

courts with multiple salas and only with respect to violations of the AntiSubversion Act, crimes against public order under the Revised Penal Code,
illegal possession of firearms and/or ammunitions, and violations of the
Dangerous Drugs Act. In other words, the aforesaid theory on the court's
jurisdiction to issue search warrants would not apply tosinglesala courts and other crimes. Accordingly, the rule sought by petitioners to
be adopted by the Court would actually result in a bifurcated procedure
which would be vulnerable to legal and constitutional objections.
For that matter, neither can we subscribe to petitioners' contention that
Administrative Order No. 3 of this Court, supposedly "defining the limits of
the territorial jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts," was the source of
thesubject matter jurisdiction of, as distinguished from the exercise of
jurisdiction by, the courts. As earlier observed, this administrative order was
issued pursuant to the provisions of Section 18 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,
the pertinent portion of which states:
Sec. 18. Authority to define territory appurtenant to each branch. The
Supreme Court shall define the territory over which a branch of the Regional
Trial Court shall exercise its authority. The territory thus defined shall be
deemed to be the territorial area of the branch concerned for purposes of
determining the venue of all writs, proceedings or actions, whether civil or
criminal, . . . . (Emphasis ours.)
Jurisdiction is conferred by substantive law, in this case Batas Pambansa Blg.
129, not by a procedural law and, much less, by an administrative order or
circular. The jurisdiction conferred by said Act on regional trial courts and
their judges is basically regional in scope. Thus, Section 17 thereof provides
that "(e)very Regional Trial Judge shall be appointed to a region which shall
be his permanent station," and he "may be assigned by the Supreme Court to
any branch or city or municipality within the same region as public interest
may require, and such assignment shall not be deemed an assignment to
another station . . ." which, otherwise, would necessitate a new appointment
for the judge.
In fine, Administrative Order No. 3 and, in like manner, Circulars Nos. 13
and 19, did not per se confer jurisdiction on the covered regional trial court
or its branches, such that non-observance thereof would nullify their judicial

acts. The administrative order merely defines the limits of

the administrative area within which a branch of the court may exercise its
authority pursuant to the jurisdiction conferred by Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
The circulars only allocated to the three executive judges the administrative
areas for which they may respectively issue search warrants under the
special circumstance contemplated therein, but likewise pursuant to
the jurisdiction vested in them by Batas Pambansa Blg, 129.
Secondly, and more importantly, we definitely cannot accept the conclusion
that the grant of power to the courts mentioned therein, to entertain and issue
search warrants where the place to be searched is within their territorial
jurisdiction, was intended to exclude other courts from exercising the same
power. It will readily be noted that Circular No. 19 was basically intended to
provide prompt action on applications for search warrants. Its predecessor,
Administrative Circular No. 13, had a number of requirements, principally a
raffle of the applications for search warrants, if they had been filed with the
executive judge, among the judges within his administrative area. Circular
No. 19 eliminated, by amendment, that required raffle and ordered instead
that such applications should immediately be "taken cognizance of and acted
upon by the Executive Judges of the Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial
Court, and Municipal Trial Court under whose jurisdiction the place to be
searched is located," or by their substitutes enumerated therein.
Evidently, that particular provision of Circular No. 19 was never intended to
confer exclusive jurisdiction on said executive judges. In view of the fact,
however, that they were themselves directed to personally act on the
applications, instead of farming out the same among the other judges as was
the previous practice, it was but necessary and practical to require them to so
act only on applications involving search of places located within their
respective territorial jurisdictions. The phrase above quoted was, therefore, in
the nature of an allocation in the assignment of applications among them, in
recognition of human capabilities and limitations, and not a mandate for the
exclusion of all other courts. In truth, Administrative Circular No. 13 even
specifically envisaged and anticipated the non-exclusionary nature of that
provision, thus:
4. If, in the implementation of the search warrant properties are seized
thereunder and the corresponding case is filed in court, said case shall be

distributed conformably with Circular No. 7 dated September 23, 1974, of

this Court, and thereupon tried and decided by the judge to whom it has been
assigned, and not necessarily by the judge who issued the search warrant.
(Emphasis supplied.)
It is, therefore, incorrect to say that only the court which has jurisdiction over
the criminal case can issue the search warrant, as would be the consequence
of petitioners' position that only the branch of the court with jurisdiction over
the place to be searched can issue a warrant to search the same. It may be
conceded, as a matter of policy, that where a criminal case is pending, the
court wherein it was filed, or the assigned branch thereof,
has primary jurisdiction to issue the search warrant; and where no such
criminal case has yet been filed, that the executive judges or their lawful
substitutes in the areas and for the offenses contemplated in Circular No. 19
shall have primary jurisdiction.
This should not, however, mean that a court whose territorial jurisdiction
does not embrace the place to be searched cannot issue a search warrant
therefor, where the obtention of that search warrant is necessitated and
justified by compelling considerations of urgency, subject, time and place.
Conversely, neither should a search warrant duly issued by a court which has
jurisdiction over a pending criminal case, or one issued by an executive judge
or his lawful substitute under the situations provided for by Circular No. 19,
be denied enforcement or nullified just because it was implemented outside
the court's territorial jurisdiction.
This brings us, accordingly, to the second issue on the permissible
jurisdictional range of enforcement of search warrants.
II
As stated in limine, the affiliated issue raised in this case is whether a branch
of a regional trial court has the authority to issue a warrant for the search of a
place outside its territorial jurisdiction. Petitioners insistently answer the
query in the negative. We hold otherwise.
1. We repeat what we have earlier stressed: No law or rule imposes such a
limitation on search warrants, in the same manner that no such restriction is
provided for warrants of arrest. Parenthetically, in certain states within the

American jurisdiction, there were limitations of the time wherein a warrant

of arrest could be enforced. In our jurisdiction, no period is provided for the
enforceability of warrants of arrest, and although within ten days from the
delivery of the warrant of arrest for execution a return thereon must be made
to the issuing judge, 19 said warrant does not become functus officio but is
enforceable indefinitely until the same is enforced or recalled. On the other
hand, the lifetime of a search warrant has been expressly set in our Rules at
ten days 20 but there is no provision as to the extent of the territory wherein it
may be enforced, provided it is implemented on and within the premises
specifically described therein which may or may not be within the territorial
jurisdiction of the issuing court.
We make the foregoing comparative advertence to emphasize the fact that
when the law or rules would provide conditions, qualifications or restrictions,
they so state. Absent specific mention thereof, and the same not being
inferable by necessary implication from the statutory provisions which are
presumed to be complete and expressive of the intendment of the framers, a
contrary interpretation on whatever pretext should not be countenanced.
A bit of legal history on this contestation will be helpful. The jurisdictional
rule heretofore was that writs and processes of the so-called inferior courts
could be enforced outside the province only with the approval of the former
court of first instance. 21 Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act, the
enforcement of such writs and processes no longer needs the approval of the
regional trial court. 22 On the other hand, while, formerly, writs and processes
of the then courts of first instance were enforceable throughout the
Philippines, 23 under the Interim or Transitional Rules and Guidelines,
certain specified writs issued by a regional trial court are now enforceable
only within its judicial region. In the interest of clarity and contrast, it is
necessary that said provision be set out in full:
3. Writs and processes.
(a) Writs of certiorari, prohibition mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus
and injunction issued by a regional trial court may be enforced in any part of
the region.

(b) All other processes, whether issued by a regional trial court or a

metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court or municipal circuit trial court
may be served anywhere in the Philippines, and, in the last three cases,
without a certification by the judge of the regional trial court. (Emphasis
ours.)
We feel that the foregoing provision is too clear to be further belabored or
enmeshed in unwarranted polemics. The rule enumerates the writs and
processes which, even if issued by a regional trial court, are enforceable only
within its judicial region. In contrast, it unqualifiedly provides that all other
writs and processes, regardless of which court issued the same, shall be
enforceable anywhere in the Philippines. As earlier demonstrated, a search
warrant is but a judicial process, not a criminal action. No legal provision,
statutory or reglementary, expressly or impliedly provides a jurisdictional or
territorial limit on its area of enforceability. On the contrary, the abovequoted provision of the interim Rules expressly authorizes its enforcement
anywhere in the country, since it is not among the processes specified in
paragraph (a) and there is no distinction or exception made regarding the
processes contemplated in
paragraph (b).
2. This is but a necessary and inevitable consequence of the nature and
purpose of a search warrant. The Court cannot be blind to the fact that it is
extremely difficult, as it undeniably is, to detect or elicit information
regarding the existence and location of illegally possessed or prohibited
articles. The Court is accordingly convinced that it should not make the
requisites for the apprehension of the culprits and the confiscation of such
illicit items, once detected, more onerous if not impossible by imposing
further niceties of procedure or substantive rules of jurisdiction through
decisional dicta. For that matter, we are unaware of any instance wherein a
search warrant was struck down on objections based on territorial
jurisdiction. In the landmark case of Stonehill, et al. vs. Diokno,et al., 24 the
searches in the corporate offices in Manila and the residences in Makati of
therein petitioners were conducted pursuant to search warrants issued by the
Quezon City and Pasig branches of the Court of First Instance of Rizal and
by the Municipal Courts of Manila and Quezon City, 25 but the same were

never challenged on jurisdictional grounds although they were subsequently

nullified for being general warrants.
3. A clarion call supposedly of libertarian import is further sounded by
petitioners, dubiously invoking the constitutional proscription against illegal
searches and seizures. We do not believe that the enforcement of a search
warrant issued by a court outside the territorial jurisdiction wherein the place
to be searched is located would create a constitutional question. Nor are we
swayed by the professed apprehension that the law enforcement authorities
may resort to what could be a permutation of forum shopping, by filing an
application for the warrant with a "friendly" court. It need merely be recalled
that a search warrant is only a process, not an action. Furthermore, the
constitutional mandate is translated into specifically enumerated safeguards
in Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure for the issuance of a
search warrant, 26 and all these have to be observed regardless of whatever
court in whichever region is importuned for or actually issues a search
warrant. Said requirements, together with the ten-day lifetime of the
warrant 27 would discourage resort to a court in another judicial region, not
only because of the distance but also the contingencies of travel and the
danger involved, unless there are really compelling reasons for the authorities
to do so. Besides, it does seem odd that such constitutional protests have not
been made against warrants of arrest which are enforceable indefinitely and
anywhere although they involve, not only property and privacy, but persons
and liberty.
On the other hand, it is a matter of judicial knowledge that the authorities
have to contend now and then with local and national criminal syndicates of
considerable power and influence, political or financial in nature, and so
pervasive as to render foolhardy any attempt to obtain a search warrant in the
very locale under their sphere of control. Nor should we overlook the fact
that to do so will necessitate the transportation of applicant's witnesses to and
their examination in said places, with the attendant risk, danger and expense.
Also, a further well-founded precaution, obviously born of experience and
verifiable data, is articulated by the court a quo, as quoted by respondent
court:
This court is of the further belief that the possible leakage of information
which is of utmost importance in the issuance of a search warrant is secured

(against) where the issuing magistrate within the region does not hold court
sessions in the city or municipality, within the region, where the place to be
searched is located. 28
The foregoing situations may also have obtained and were taken into account
in the foreign judicial pronouncement that, in the absence of statutory
restrictions, a justice of the peace in one district of the county may issue a
search warrant to be served in another district of the county and made
returnable before the justice of still another district or another court having
jurisdiction to deal with the matters involved. 29 In the present state of our
law on the matter, we find no such statutory restrictions both with respect to
the court which can issue the search warrant and the enforcement thereof
anywhere in the Philippines.
III
Concern is expressed over possible conflicts of jurisdiction (or, more
accurately, in the exercise of jurisdiction) where the criminal case is pending
in one court and the search warrant is issued by another court for the seizure
of personal property intended to be used as evidence in said criminal case.
This arrangement is not unknown or without precedent in our jurisdiction. In
fact, as hereinbefore noted, this very situation was anticipated in Circular No.
13 of this Court under the limited scenario contemplated therein.
Nonetheless, to put such presentiments to rest, we lay down the following
policy guidelines:
1. The court wherein the criminal case is pending shall have primary
jurisdiction to issue search warrants necessitated by and for purposes of said
case. An application for a search warrant may be filed with another court
only under extreme and compelling circumstances that the applicant must
prove to the satisfaction of the latter court which may or may not give due
course to the application depending on the validity of the justification offered
for not filing the same in the court with primary jurisdiction thereover.
2. When the latter court issues the search warrant, a motion to quash the same
may be filed in and shall be resolved by said court, without prejudice to any
proper recourse to the appropriate higher court by the party aggrieved by the
resolution of the issuing court. All grounds and objections then available,

existent or known shall be raised in the original or subsequent proceedings

for the quashal of the warrant, otherwise they shall be deemed waived.
3. Where no motion to quash the search warrant was filed in or resolved by
the issuing court, the interested party may move in the court where the
criminal case is pending for the suppression as evidence of the personal
property seized under the warrant if the same is offered therein for said
purpose. Since two separate courts with different participations are involved
in this situation, a motion to quash a search warrant and a motion to suppress
evidence are alternative and not cumulative remedies. In order to prevent
forum shopping, a motion to quash shall consequently be governed by the
omnibus motion rule, provided, however, that objections not available,
existent or known during the proceedings for the quashal of the warrant may
be raised in the hearing of the motion to suppress. The resolution of the court
on the motion to suppress shall likewise be subject to any proper remedy in
the appropriate higher court.
4. Where the court which issued the search warrant denies the motion to
quash the same and is not otherwise prevented from further proceeding
thereon, all personal property seized under the warrant shall forthwith be
transmitted by it to the court wherein the criminal case is pending, with the
necessary safeguards and documentation therefor.
5. These guidelines shall likewise be observed where the same criminal
offense is charged in different informations or complaints and filed in two or
more courts with concurrent original jurisdiction over the criminal action.
Where the issue of which court will try the case shall have been resolved,
such court shall be considered as vested with primary jurisdiction to act on
applications for search warrants incident to the criminal case.
WHEREFORE, on the foregoing premises, the instant petition is DENIED
and the assailed judgment of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 23533 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-25795

October 29, 1966

ANGELINA MEJIA LOPEZ, AURORA MEJIA VILLASOR, ROY P.

VILLASOR, petitioners,
vs.
THE CITY JUDGE, CESAR L. PARAS, TRINIDAD T. LAZATIN, and
TERRA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,respondents.
San Juan, Africa and Benedicto and Antonio C. Amor and Associates for
petitioners.
Quasha, Asperilla, Blanco, Zafra and Tayag for respondents.
DIZON, J.:
In the month of February 1964, petitioners Roy P. Villasor, as administrator
of the intestate estate of the spouses Manuel M. Mejia and Gloria Lazatin
(Special Proceedings No. 48181 of the Court of First Instance of Manila),
together with his co-petitioners Angelina Mejia Lopez and Aurora Mejia
Villasor and other heirs of said spouses, entered into a contract with
respondent Trinidad T. Lazatin for the development and subdivision of three
parcels of land belonging to said intestate estate. Subsequently Lazatin
transferred his rights under the contract to the Terra Development
Corporation. Months later, petitioners and other co-heirs filed an action in the
Court of First Instance of Quezon City (Civil Case No. Q-8344) for the
rescission of said contract for alleged gross and willful violation of its terms.
Thereafter, Lazatin and the Terra Development Corporation, in turn, filed
with the Fiscal's Office of the City of Angeles a complaint against petitioners
for an alleged violation of the provisions of Article 172 in relation to those of
Article 171, paragraph 4, of the Revised Penal Code. After conducting a
preliminary examination in connection therewith, the City Fiscal of Angeles
filed with the Court of said City an information charging petitioners with the
crime of falsification of a private document upon the allegation that they
made it appear in the contract mentioned heretofore that Aurora M. Villasor
was the "guardian" of the minor George L. Mejia and that Angelina M.
Lopez was similarly the "guardian" of the minor Alexander L. Mejia, when
in truth and in fact they knew that they were not the guardians of said minors
on the date of the execution of the document (Criminal Case No. C-2268).

Upon petition of the parties thus charged, the City Fiscal of Angeles
reinvestigated the case on March 7, 1965 to give them an opportunity to
present exculpatory evidence, and after the conclusion of the reinvestigation
the parties charged moved for the dismissal of the case mainly on the ground
that the City Court of Angeles had no jurisdiction over the offense because
the private document that contained the alleged false statement of fact was
signed by them outside the territorial limits of said city. As the resolution of
this motion to dismiss was delayed and in the meantime the City Court had
set Criminal Case No. C-2268 for arraignment, the defendants secured from
said court several postponements of the arraignment.
Finally, in view of the City Fiscal's continued failure to act on the motion to
dismiss the case, petitioners filed on November 26, 1965 with the City Court
a motion to quash upon the ground that said court had no jurisdiction over
the offense charged. The complainants in the case with the conformity of
the City Fiscal filed an opposition thereto, and on February 3, 1966 the
respondent judge denied said motion to quash and reset the arraignment of all
the defendants on March 5 of the same year. In view thereof, petitioners filed
the present action for certiorariand prohibition.
Upon the foregoing facts the only question to be resolved is whether or not
the City Court of Angeles City has jurisdiction to try and decide Criminal
Case No. C-2268 for alleged falsification of a private document by the
parties named in the information.
It is clear that petitioners are not charged with having used a falsified
document, in violation of the last paragraph of Article 172 of the Revised
Penal Code. The charge against them is that of having falsified a private
document by knowingly and willfully stating therein that Aurora M. Villasor
and Angelina M. Lopez were the "guardians" of their minor brothers George
and Alexander, respectively, when in fact they knew that, at the time they
made such written statement, it was Carolina M. de Castro who was the
judicial guardian of said minors.
It is settled law in criminal actions that the place where the criminal offense
was committed not only determines the venue of the action but is an essential
element of jurisdiction (U.S. vs. Pagdayuman 5 Phil. 265). Thus, under the
provisions of Section 86 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, municipal courts have

original jurisdiction only over criminal offenses committed within their

respective territorial jurisdiction.
In the present case, it is the claim of petitioners a claim supported by the
record that Angelina M. Lopez and Aurora M. Villasor signed the private
document wherein they are alleged to have made a false statement of fact, the
first within the territorial jurisdiction of Makati, and the second within the
territorial jurisdiction of Quezon City, both within the province of Rizal.
We now come to consider the question of when and where is the offense of
falsification of a private document deemed consummated or committed.
Upon this point, We have ruled clearly and definitely in U.S. vs. Infante, 36
Phil. 146, that the crime of falsification of a private document defined and
penalized by Article 304 of the Penal Code (now paragraph 2, Article 172 of
the Revised Penal Code) is consummated when such document is actually
falsified with the intent to prejudice a third person, whether such falsified
document is or is not thereafter put to the illegal use for which it was
intended.
Again in U.S. vs. Barretto, 36 Phil. p. 207, We said:
. . . The contention of counsel would seem to be that the information was
defective, in that it fails to set forth expressly the place where improper and
illegal use was made of the falsified document, an allegation which counsel
for appellant insists was absolutely essential for the proper determination of
the court clothed with jurisdiction over the alleged offense. But under the
definition of the crime of falsification of a private document as set forth in
Article 304 of the Penal Code, the offense is consummated at the time when
and at the place where the document is falsified to the prejudice of or with
the intent to prejudice a third person, and this whether the falsified document
is or is not put to the improper or illegal use for which it was intended. It is
evident, therefore, that the place where the crime is committed is the place
where the document is actually falsified, and that the improper or illegal use
of the document thereafter is in no wise a material or essential element of the
crime of falsification of a private document; . . . .
Applying the above ruling to the facts before Us, it would appear that if the
private document subject of the information was falsified by the persons

therein charged, the act of falsification the signing of the document and
the coetaneous intent to cause damage was committed and consummated
outside the territorial jurisdiction of the City of Angeles, and that whether the
falsified private document was thereafter put or not put to the illegal use for
which it was intended, or was signed by the other contracting party within
the territorial jurisdiction of the City of Angeles is in no wise a material or
essential element of the crime of falsification of the private document, nor
could it in any way change the fact that the act of falsification charged was
committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of Angeles City. Thus, that the
City Court of Angeles has, no jurisdiction over the offense charged is beyond
question.
Respondents, however, contend that the motion to quash filed by the
defendants necessarily assumes the truth of the allegation of the information
to the effect that the offense was committed within the territorial jurisdiction
of Angeles City and that they may not be allowed to disprove this at this
early stage of the proceedings. This is not exactly the law on the matter at
present. It was the law applicable to a demurrer now obsolete to an
information. The motion to quash now provided for in Rule 117 of the Rules
of Court is manifestly broader in scope than the demurrer, as it is not limited
to defects apparent upon the face of the complaint or information but extends
to issues arising out of extraneous facts, as shown by the circumstance that,
among the grounds for a motion to quash, Section 2 of said Rule provides for
former jeopardy or acquittal, extinction of criminal action or liability,
insanity of the accused etc., which necessarily involve questions of fact in the
determination of which a preliminary trial is required.
In the present case, the portion of the record of the reinvestigation which was
submitted to the respondent judge for consideration in connection with the
resolution of the motion to quash filed by the defendants shows beyond
question that the offense charged was committed far beyond the territorial
jurisdiction of Angeles City.
On the propriety of the writs prayed for, it may be said that, as a general rule,
a court of equity will not issue a writ of certiorari to annul an order of a lower
court denying a motion to quash, nor issue a writ of prohibition to prevent
said court from proceeding with the case after such denial, it being the rule
that upon such denial the defendant should enter his plea of not guilty and go

to trial and, if convicted, raise on appeal the same legal questions covered by
his motion to quash. In this as well as in other jurisdictions however, this is
no longer the hard and fast rule.
The writs of certiorari and prohibition, as extra-ordinary legal remedies, are,
in the ultimate analysis, intended to annul void proceedings; to prevent the
unlawful and oppressive exercise of legal authority and to provide for a fair
and orderly administration of justice. Thus, in Yu Kong Eng vs. Trinidad, 47
Phil. 385, We took cognizance of a petition for certiorari and prohibition
although the accused in the case could have appealed in due time from the
order complained of, our action in the premises being based on the public
welfare and the advancement of public policy. In Dimayuga vs. Fajardo, 43
Phil. 304, We also admitted a petition to restrain the prosecution of certain
chiropractors although, if convicted, they could have appealed. We gave due
course to their petition for the orderly administration of justice and to avoid
possible oppression by the strong arm of the law. And in Arevalo vs.
Nepomuceno, 63 Phil. 627, the petition for certiorari challenging the trial
court's action admitting an amended information was sustained despite the
availability of appeal at the proper time.
More recently, We said the following in Yap vs. the Hon. D. Lutero, etc., G.R.
No. L-12669, April 30, 1959:
Manifestly, the denial, by respondent herein, of the motion to quash the
information in case No. 16443, may not be characterized as "arbitrary" or
"despotic", or to be regarded as amounting to "lack of jurisdiction". The
proper procedure, in the event of denial of a motion to quash, is for the
accused, upon arraignment, to plead not guilty and reiterate his defense of
former jeopardy, and, in case of conviction, to appeal therefrom, upon the
ground that he has been twice put in jeopardy of punishment, either for the
same offense, or for the same act, as the case may be. However, were we to
require adherence to this pretense, the case at bar would have to be dismissed
and petitioner required to go through the inconvenience, not to say the mental
agony and torture, of submitting himself to trial on the merits in case No.
16443, apart from the expenses incidental thereto, despite the fact that his
trial and conviction therein would violate one of his constitutional rights, and
that, on appeal to this Court, we would, therefore, have to set aside the
judgment of conviction of the lower court. This would, obviously, be most

unfair and unjust. Under the circumstances obtaining in the present case, the
flaw in the procedure followed by petitioner herein may be overlooked, in the
interest of a more enlightened and substantial justice.
Indeed, the lack of jurisdiction of the City Court of Angeles over the criminal
offense charged being patent, it would be highly unfair to compel the parties
charged to undergo trial in said court and suffer all the embarrassment and
mental anguish that go with it.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that the offense
charged in the information filed in Criminal Case No. C-2268 of the City
Court of Angeles City is not within the jurisdiction of said court and that,
therefore, said court is hereby restrained and prohibited from further
proceedings therein. Costs against the private respondents.

ERLINDA ILUSORIO V. BILDNER

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Respondents Ma. Erlinda Bildner and Lily Raqueo were charged by Erlinda
K. Ilusorio (petitioner) before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Pasig
City with perjury arising from their filing, on behalf of Lakeridge
Development Corp. (LDC), of a petition in the Makati City Regional Trial
Court (RTC) for issuance of new owners duplicate copy of Certificate of
Condominium Title (CCT) No. 21578 covering a condominium unit in
Makati. The Information reads:
On or about November 4, 1999, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the accused, conspiring and confederating together and
mutually helping and aiding one another, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, feloniously and falsely subscribe and swear to a Petition for
Issuance of a New Owners Duplicate Copy of Condominium Certificate of
Title No. 21578 before Rafael Arsenio S. Dizon, a notary public in and for
Pasig City, duly appointed, qualified and acting as such, and in which
Petition said accused subscribed and swore to, among other things, facts

known to them to be untrue, that is: That the Petitioners claim that the title
was lost, which fact was material matter and required by law to be stated in
said Petition, when in truth and in fact as the said accused very well knew at
the time they swore to and signed the said petition for Issuance of a New
Owners Duplicate Copy of Condominium Certificate of Title No. 21578, that
said statement appearing in paragraph 4 of said Petition:
4. Pending registration of the mortgage document with the Registry of Deeds
of Makati City, the petitioners had their respective offices, renovated and by
reason thereof, documents were moved from their usual places and thereafter,
sometime in the early part of the second quarter of this year, when petitioners
were ready to have the mortgage documents registered, the said owners
duplicate copy of CCT No. 21578 could no longer be located at the places
where they may and should likely be found despite earnest and diligent
efforts of all the petitioners to locate the same;
was false and untrue because the said title was in the possession of the
complainant, Erlinda K. Ilusorio, and the above false statement was made in
order to obtain a New Owners Duplicate Copy of Condominium Certificate
of Title No. 21578, to the damage and prejudice of complainant Erlinda K.
Ilusorio.
Contrary to law.[1] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Three similarly worded Informations for perjury were also filed against
respondents Sylvia Ilusorio, Ma. Cristina Ilusorio and Aurora Montemayor
also before the Pasig City MeTC arising from their filing of three petitions,
also on behalf of LDC, before the Tagaytay City RTC for issuance of new
owners duplicate copy of Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. 17010,[2]
17011[3] and 17012[4] covering properties located in Tagaytay City.
As the purported corporate officers of LDC, respondents filed the abovementioned petitions for issuance of new owners duplicate copies of titles
over properties located in Makati City and Tagaytay City after the owners
copies thereof could no longer be found despite earnest and diligent efforts to
locate the same.
Petitioner, alleging that she, as bona fide chairman and president of LDC,[5]
has in her possession those titles, filed her opposition to respondents

petitions.[6] Respondents forthwith amended their respective petitions,[7] the

amendments reading, according to petitioner, as follows:

CCT must, pursuant to law, be kept at the corporations principal place of

business.

4. On November 4, 1999, in the belief that the aforesaid owners duplicate

copy of CCT No. 21578 had been lost and can no longer be recovered, the
petitioners filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City a petition for
the cancellation and issuance of a new owners duplicate copy of CCT No.
21578 in lieu of the lost copy;

x x x x. (Underscoring in the original; emphasis supplied)

5. However, after the jurisdictional facts and evidence had been presented
before the said court, the above-named respondents, through their counsel,
filed their opposition to the petition on the ground that the said owners
duplicate copy of Condominium Certificate of Title No. 21578 allegedly is
not lost and is actually in their possession and, thereafter, in a subsequent
hearing held on February 10, 2000, said respondents, through counsel,
presented before this Honorable Court the duplicate copy of said CCT No.
21578;
6. The owners duplicate copy of CCT No. 21578, pursuant to law, should be
in the actual possession of the registered owner thereof and it is indubitable
that LAKERIDGE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION is the registered
owner entitled to the possession and control of the evidence of ownership of
all corporate properties;
7. The respondents have no authority nor legal basis to take and continue to
have possession of said CCT No. 21578, not one of them being a corporate
officer of LAKERIDGE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, the registered
owner of said property;
xxxx
9. The respondents, in the absence of any authority or right to take possession
of CCT No. 21578, should be ordered by this Honorable Court to surrender
the owners duplicate copy thereof, which they continue to hold without legal
and/or justifiable reasons, not only for the purpose of causing the registration
of the mortgage thereof in favor of the mortgagee/petitioner, Ma. Erlinda I.
Bildner, but also for the reason that it is the corporation, as owner of the
property, who [sic] is entitled to possession and control and therefore, said

Using as bases the contents of the original petitions filed in the Makati and
Tagaytay RTCs,[8] petitioner filed charges of falsification of public
documents and perjury against respondents before the Pasig City Prosecutors
Office.[9]
By Resolution of April 6, 2000, Investigating Prosecutor Edgardo Bautista,
with the imprimatur of the City Prosecutor, dismissed the falsification
charges but found probable cause to indict respondents for perjury.[10] Four
informations for perjury were accordingly filed before the MeTC Pasig, one
against respondents Ma. Erlinda I. Bildner and Lily F. Raquero; another
against respondents Sylvia K. Ilusorio, Maria Cristina A. Ilusorio and Aurora
Montemayor; still another against respondents Sylvia K. Ilusorio, Maria
Cristina A. Ilusorio and Aurora Montemayor; and the last against respondents
Sylvia K. Ilusorio, Maria Cristina Ilusorio and Aurora Montemayor, docketed
as Criminal Case Nos. 121496, 121497, 121498 and 121499, respectively.
After the consolidation of the Informations, respondents moved for their
quashal on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction due to improper venue, lack of
bases of the charges as the original petitions had already been withdrawn,
and privileged character of the pleadings.[11]
Branch 72 of the Pasig City MeTC, by Order[12] of June 13, 2001, ruled that
venue was properly laid, viz:
To determine the correct venue (territorial jurisdiction)[,] the vital point is the
allegations [sic] in the complaint or information of the situs of the offense
charged. If the complaint or information alleges that the crime was
committed in the place where the court has jurisdiction, then that court has
jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. (Colmenares vs. Villar, 33 SCRA
186). In other words, what is important is the allegation in the complaint that
the crime was committed in the place which is within the courts jurisdiction
(Mediante vs. Ortiz, 19 SCRA 832).

In the instant cases, the information [sic] allege that the offenses were
committed in Pasig City. Hence, pursuant to the aforecited doctrinal rulings,
this court has the venue or territorial jurisdiction over these cases.
(Underscoring supplied)
Nonetheless, finding that respondents petitions are privileged, the MeTC,
citing Flordelis v. Judge Himalalaon[13] and People v. Aquino, et al.,[14]
granted the Motions to Quash, viz:
However, the Court finds the third ground[-privileged character of the
pleadings] meritorious. In the case of Flordelis vs. Himalaloan, (84 SCRA
477) which is also a prosecution for Perjury, the Supreme Court held:
xxxx
Moreover, it is likewise clear that any statement contained in an appropriate
pleading filed in court that is relevant to the issues in the case to which it
relates is absolutely priveleged [sic] and it is the law that the same may not
be made the subject of a criminal prosecution. (People vs. Aquino, 18 SCRA
555.)
Similarly, the alleged perjurious statements in the instant cases are contained
in a Petition filed before the Regional Trial Courts of Makati and Tagaytay
Cities which are relevant to the case the same being for the issuance of a new
owners duplicate copy of a certificate of title alleged to be lost.
x x x x.
As the facts charged herein do not constitute an offense and/or the
information contains averments which, if true, would nonetheless constitute a
legal excuse or jurisdiction [sic], quashal of the Information[s] is thus in
order.
x x x x. (Underscoring in the original; emphasis supplied)
Reconsideration of the quashal of the Informations having been denied,[15]
petitioner appealed to the Pasig City RTC Branch 263 of which, by
Decision[16] of January 25, 2006, affirmed the ruling of the MeTC. After the
denial of her motion for reconsideration,[17] petitioner filed with this Court
the present petition for review on certiorari,[18] contending that:

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN RELYING ON THE CASES OF

FLORDELI[S] VS. HIMALALOAN (84 SCRA 477) AND PEOPLE VS.
AQUINO (18 SCRA 555) [IN HOLDING] THAT STATEMENTS MADE IN
PLEADINGS, EVEN IF PERJURIOUS OR FALSE, ARE ABSOLUTELY
PRIVILEGED AND NOT SUBJECT TO CRIMINAL PROSECUTION.
(Underscoring supplied)
Petitioner is of the view that People v. Aquino[19] cited by the RTC does not
apply in the present controversy as that case involved a libel case and there is
no authority which states that the rules on absolute privileged statements in
pleadings apply to both crimes of perjury and libel.[20]
Neither, petitioner posits, does the also cited case of Flordelis v.
Himalaloan[21] apply wherein the Court sustained the quashal of the therein
information for perjury as the answer to the complaint containing the alleged
false allegations did not have to be under oath.
In their Comment, respondents initially burrow into the petitions alleged
procedural crack by underscoring the apparent disregard by petitioner of the
established policy of judicial hierarchy of courts, pointing out that the
petition should have been first filed with the Court of Appeals.[22]
On the merits, respondents reiterate, in the main, the congruent rulings of the
MeTC and RTC that allegations made by the parties or their counsel in a
pleading are privileged in nature. Moreover, they contend that since they had
amended the original petitions, there were no more bases for the charges of
perjury.[23]
A word first on the procedural question raised by respondents. The present
petition is one for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
not a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65. Rule 41 of the Rules of
Court (APPEAL FROM THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS), Section 2(c)
provides that in all cases where only questions of law are raised, the appeal
shall be to the Supreme Court by petition for review in accordance with Rule
45.[24] Indubitably, the issue tendered in this case is a question of law,
hence, there is no violation of the principle of hierarchy of courts.

On the merits, the Court denies the petition on the ground that, contrary to
the lower courts ruling, venue of the Informations was improperly laid in
Pasig.
The allegations in each of the Informations indicate Pasig as the situs of the
offense charged where respondents petitions were notarized. Albeit the
Informations referred to the subscribed and sworn petitions of respondents as
bases of the charges, there is no mention therein that those petitions were
filed in Makati City and Tagaytay City. The Complaint-Affidavits,[25] which
initiated the criminal actions, reflect such jurisdictional details. Consider this
allegation:
6. On November 4, 1999, MA. ERLINDA I. BILDNER and LILY F.
RAQUENO allegedly representing LAKERIDGE filed a verified Petition for
Issuance of a New Owners Duplicate Copy of Condominium Certificate of
Title No. 21578 before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City x x x x,
(Emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)
as well as this:
06. On November 10, 1999, AURORA I. MONTEMAYOR, SYLVIA
ILUSORIO, and MA. CRISTINA A. ILUSORIO allegedly representing
LAKERIDGE filed three (3) verified Petitions for Issuance of a New Owners
Duplicate Copy of Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 17010, 17011 and 17012
before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Tagaytay City x x x x.
(Emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)
The allegation in each of the four similarly-worded Informations that perjury
was committed in Pasig is neither controlling nor sufficient to show that the
Pasig MeTC has jurisdiction over them. The purported perjurious petition
quoted in each of the Informations in fact indicates that, with respect to the
CCT of the Registry of Deeds of Makati the TCTs of the Registry of Deeds
of Tagaytay, venue of the criminal action arising therefrom is in Makati and
Tagaytay, respectively.
Perjury is committed as follows:
Article 183, Revised Penal Code.

False Testimony in other cases and perjury in solemn affirmations. The

penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its
minimum period shall be imposed upon any person who, knowingly making
untruthful statements and not being included in the provisions of the next
preceding articles, shall testify under oath, or make an affidavit, upon any
material matter before a competent person authorized to administer an oath in
cases in which the law so requires
x x x x[26] (Italics in the original; underscoring supplied)
There are thus four elements to be taken into account in determining whether
there is a prima facie case of perjury, viz:
(a) that the accused made a statement under oath or executed an affidavit
upon a material matter; (b) that the statement or affidavit was made before a
competent officer, authorized to receive and administer oath; (c) that in the
statement or affidavit, the accused made a willful and deliberate assertion of
a falsehood; and (d) that the sworn statement or affidavit containing the
falsity is required by law or made for a legal purpose.[27] (Citation omitted)
It is the deliberate making of untruthful statements upon any material matter,
however, before a competent person authorized to administer an oath in cases
in which the law so requires,[28] which is imperative in perjury[29]
Venue, in criminal cases, being jurisdictional,[30] the action for perjury must
be instituted and tried in the municipality or territory where the deliberate
making of an untruthful statement upon any matter was made, in this case, in
Makati and Tagaytay.[31]
It was in Makati and Tagaytay where the intent to assert an alleged falsehood
became manifest and where the alleged untruthful statement finds relevance
or materiality in deciding the issue of whether new owners duplicate copies
of the CCT and TCTs may issue.
Whether the perjurious statements contained in the four petitions were
subscribed and sworn in Pasig is immaterial, the gist of the offense of perjury
being the intentional giving of false statement. So United States v. Caet [32]
teaches, viz:

It is immaterial where the affidavit was subscribed and sworn, so long as it

appears from the information that the defendant, by means of such affidavit,
swore to and knowingly submitted false evidence, material to a point at issue
in a judicial proceeding pending in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo
Province. The gist of the offense charged is not the making of the affidavit in
Manila, but the intentional giving of false evidence in the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo Province by means of such affidavit.[33] (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

WHEREFORE, the petition is, on the ground that the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Pasig has no jurisdiction over the Informations for perjury against
respondents, DENIED.

While the Court finds that, contrary to the MeTC and RTC ruling, venue of
the Informations was improperly laid, and on that score the Court denies the
present petition as priorly stated, it is confronting the sole issue raised by
petitioner whether the questioned petitions of respondents are, as the MeTC
held and which the RTC affirmed, absolutely privileged on the basis of
Flordelis and Aquino.

We review in this Rule 45 petition, the decision[1] of the Regional Trial

Court, Branch 65, Makati City (RTC-Makati City) in Civil Case No. 091038. The petition seeks to reverse and set aside the RTC-Makati City
decision dismissing the petition for certiorari of petitioners Union Bank of
the Philippines (Union Bank) and Desi Tomas (collectively, the petitioners).
The RTC found that the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 63, Makati City
(MeTC-Makati City) did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in
denying the motion to quash the information for perjury filed by Tomas.

The issue had already been addressed by the Court in Choa v. People,[34] in
this wise:
Sison and Aquino both involve libel cases. In Sison, this Court categorically
stressed that the term "absolute privilege" (or "qualified privilege") has an
"established technical meaning, in connection with civil actions for libel and
slander." x x x x.
x x x x.
The Flordelis case is likewise not in point. There, Flordelis was charged with
perjury for having alleged false statements in his verified answer. This Court
held that no perjury could be committed by Flordelis because "an answer to a
complaint in an ordinary civil action need not be under oath," thus, "it is at
once apparent that one element of the crime of perjury is absent x x x,
namely, that the sworn statement complained of must be required by law."
[35] (Italics in the original; underscoring supplied)
Verily, both the MeTC and the RTC misappreciated this Courts rulings in
Flordelis and Aquino as respondents petitions-bases of the subject
Informations for perjury are required by law to be under oath.

UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES V. PEOPLE

BRION, J.:

The Antecedents
Tomas was charged in court for perjury under Article 183 of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC) for making a false narration in a Certificate against Forum
Shopping. The Information against her reads:
That on or about the 13th day of March 2000 in the City of Makati, Metro
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously make untruthful statements under oath upon a material matter
before a competent person authorized to administer oath which the law
requires to wit: said accused stated in the Verification/Certification/Affidavit
of merit of a complaint for sum of money with prayer for a writ of replevin
docketed as [Civil] Case No. 342-00 of the Metropolitan Trial Court[,] Pasay
City, that the Union Bank of the Philippines has not commenced any other
action or proceeding involving the same issues in another tribunal or agency,
accused knowing well that said material statement was false thereby making
a willful and deliberate assertion of falsehood.[2]

The accusation stemmed from petitioner Union Banks two (2) complaints for
sum of money with prayer for a writ of replevin against the spouses Eddie
and Eliza Tamondong and a John Doe. The first complaint, docketed as Civil
Case No. 98-0717, was filed before the RTC, Branch 109, Pasay City on
April 13, 1998. The second complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 342-000,
was filed on March 15, 2000 and raffled to the MeTC, Branch 47, Pasay City.
Both complaints showed that Tomas executed and signed the Certification
against Forum Shopping. Accordingly, she was charged of deliberately
violating Article 183 of the RPC by falsely declaring under oath in the
Certificate against Forum Shopping in the second complaint that she did not
commence any other action or proceeding involving the same issue in
another tribunal or agency.
Tomas filed a Motion to Quash,[3] citing two grounds. First, she argued that
the venue was improperly laid since it is the Pasay City court (where the
Certificate against Forum Shopping was submitted and used) and not the
MeTC-Makati City (where the Certificate against Forum Shopping was
subscribed) that has jurisdiction over the perjury case. Second, she argued
that the facts charged do not constitute an offense because: (a) the third
element of perjury the willful and deliberate assertion of falsehood was not
alleged with particularity without specifying what the other action or
proceeding commenced involving the same issues in another tribunal or
agency; (b) there was no other action or proceeding pending in another court
when the second complaint was filed; and (c) she was charged with perjury
by giving false testimony while the allegations in the Information make out
perjury by making a false affidavit.
The MeTC-Makati City denied the Motion to Quash, ruling that it has
jurisdiction over the case since the Certificate against Forum Shopping was
notarized in Makati City.[4] The MeTC-Makati City also ruled that the
allegations in the Information sufficiently charged Tomas with perjury.[5]
The MeTC-Makati City subsequently denied Tomas motion for
reconsideration.[6]
The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the RTC-Makati City to
annul and set aside the MeTC-Makati City orders on the ground of grave
abuse of discretion. The petitioners anchored their petition on the rulings in
United States v. Canet[7] and Ilusorio v. Bildner[8] which ruled that venue

and jurisdiction should be in the place where the false document was
presented.
The Assailed RTC Decision
In dismissing the petition for certiorari, the RTC-Makati City held:
[I]nsofar as the petitioners stance is concerned[,] the more recent case of [Sy
Tiong Shiou v. Sy] (GR Nos. 174168 & 179438, March 30, 2009) however,
reaffirms what has been the long standing view on the venue with respect to
perjury cases. In this particular case[,] the high court reiterated the rule that
the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the
municipality or territory where the offense was committed, or where any of
its essential ingredients occurred. It went on to declare that since the subject
document[,] the execution of which was the subject of the charge[,] was
subscribed and sworn to in Manila[,] then the court of the said territorial
jurisdiction was the proper venue of the criminal action[.]
xxxx
x x x Given the present state of jurisprudence on the matter, it is not amiss to
state that the city court of Makati City has jurisdiction to try and decide the
case for perjury inasmuch as the gist of the complaint itself which
constitute[s] the charge against the petitioner dwells solely on the act of
subscribing to a false certification. On the other hand, the charge against the
accused in the case of Ilusorio v. Bildner, et al., based on the complaintaffidavits therein[,] was not simply the execution of the questioned
documents but rather the introduction of the false evidence through the
subject documents before the court of Makati City.[9] (emphasis ours)
The RTC-Makati City ruled that the MeTC-Makati City did not commit
grave abuse of discretion since the order denying the Motion to Quash was
based on jurisprudence later than Ilusorio. The RTC-Makati City also
observed that the facts in Ilusorio are different from the facts of the present
case. Lastly, the RTC-Makati City ruled that the Rule 65 petition was
improper since the petitioners can later appeal the decision in the principal
case. The RTC-Makati City subsequently denied the petitioners motion for
reconsideration.[10]

The Petition
The petitioners pray that we reverse the RTC-Makati City decision and quash
the Information for perjury against Tomas. The petitioners contend that the
Ilusorio ruling is more applicable to the present facts than our ruling in Sy
Tiong Shiou v. Sy Chim.[11] They argued that the facts in Ilusorio showed
that the filing of the petitions in court containing the false statements was the
essential ingredient that consummated the perjury. In Sy Tiong, the
perjurious statements were made in a General Information Sheet (GIS) that
was submitted to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
Interestingly, Solicitor General Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz shared the petitioners
view. In his Manifestation and Motion in lieu of Comment (which we hereby
treat as the Comment to the petition), the Solicitor General also relied on
Ilusorio and opined that the lis mota in the crime of perjury is the deliberate
or intentional giving of false evidence in the court where the evidence is
material. The Solicitor General observed that the criminal intent to assert a
falsehood under oath only became manifest before the MeTC-Pasay City.
The Issue
The case presents to us the issue of what the proper venue of perjury under
Article 183 of the RPC should be Makati City, where the Certificate against
Forum Shopping was notarized, or Pasay City, where the Certification was
presented to the trial court.
The Courts Ruling
We deny the petition and hold that the MeTC-Makati City is the proper
venue and the proper court to take cognizance of the perjury case against the
petitioners.
Venue of Action and Criminal Jurisdiction
Venue is an essential element of jurisdiction in criminal cases. It determines
not only the place where the criminal action is to be instituted, but also the
court that has the jurisdiction to try and hear the case. The reason for this rule
is two-fold. First, the jurisdiction of trial courts is limited to well-defined
territories such that a trial court can only hear and try cases involving crimes

committed within its territorial jurisdiction.[12] Second, laying the venue in

the locus criminis is grounded on the necessity and justice of having an
accused on trial in the municipality of province where witnesses and other
facilities for his defense are available.[13]
Unlike in civil cases, a finding of improper venue in criminal cases carries
jurisdictional consequences. In determining the venue where the criminal
action is to be instituted and the court which has jurisdiction over it, Section
15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
(a) Subject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried
in the court or municipality or territory where the offense was committed or
where any of its essential ingredients occurred. [emphasis ours]
The above provision should be read in light of Section 10, Rule 110 of the
2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which states:
Place of commission of the offense. The complaint or information is
sufficient if it can be understood from its allegations that the offense was
committed or some of its essential ingredients occurred at some place within
the jurisdiction of the court, unless the particular place where it was
committed constitutes an essential element of the offense charged or is
necessary for its identification.
Both provisions categorically place the venue and jurisdiction over criminal
cases not only in the court where the offense was committed, but also where
any of its essential ingredients took place. In other words, the venue of action
and of jurisdiction are deemed sufficiently alleged where the Information
states that the offense was committed or some of its essential ingredients
occurred at a place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.
Information Charging Perjury
Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, contains
the requirement for a Certificate against Forum Shopping. The Certificate
against Forum Shopping can be made either by a statement under oath in the
complaint or initiatory pleading asserting a claim or relief; it may also be in a
sworn certification annexed to the complaint or initiatory pleading. In both
instances, the affiant is required to execute a statement under oath before a

duly commissioned notary public or any competent person authorized to

administer oath that: (a) he or she has not theretofore commenced any action
or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasijudicial agency and, to the best of his or her knowledge, no such other action
or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim,
a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he or she should
thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is
pending, he or she shall report that fact within five days therefrom to the
court wherein his or her aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been
filed. In relation to the crime of perjury, the material matter in a Certificate
against Forum Shopping is the truth of the required declarations which is
designed to guard against litigants pursuing simultaneous remedies in
different fora.[14]
In this case, Tomas is charged with the crime of perjury under Article 183 of
the RPC for making a false Certificate against Forum Shopping. The
elements of perjury under Article 183 are:
(a)
That the accused made a statement under oath or executed an
affidavit upon a material matter.
(b)
That the statement or affidavit was made before a competent
officer, authorized to receive and administer oath.
(c)
That in the statement or affidavit, the accused made a willful and
deliberate assertion of a falsehood.
(d)
That the sworn statement or affidavit containing the falsity is
required by law or made for a legal purpose.[15] (emphasis ours)
Where the jurisdiction of the court is being assailed in a criminal case on the
ground of improper venue, the allegations in the complaint and information
must be examined together with Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure. On this basis, we find that the allegations in the
Information sufficiently support a finding that the crime of perjury was
committed by Tomas within the territorial jurisdiction of the MeTC-Makati
City.

The first element of the crime of perjury, the execution of the subject
Certificate against Forum Shopping was alleged in the Information to have
been committed in Makati City. Likewise, the second and fourth elements,
requiring the Certificate against Forum Shopping to be under oath before a
notary public, were also sufficiently alleged in the Information to have been
made in Makati City:
That on or about the 13th day of March 2000 in the City of Makati, Metro
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously make untruthful statements under oath upon a material matter
before a competent person authorized to administer oath which the law
requires to wit: said accused stated in the Verification/Certification/Affidavit
x x x.[16]
We also find that the third element of willful and deliberate falsehood was
also sufficiently alleged to have been committed in Makati City, not Pasay
City, as indicated in the last portion of the Information:
[S]aid accused stated in the Verification/Certification/Affidavit of merit of a
complaint for sum of money with prayer for a writ of replevin docketed as
[Civil] Case No. 342-00 of the Metropolitan Trial Court[,] Pasay City, that
the Union Bank of the Philippines has not commenced any other action or
proceeding involving the same issues in another tribunal or agency, accused
knowing well that said material statement was false thereby making a willful
and deliberate assertion of falsehood.[17] (underscoring ours)
Tomas deliberate and intentional assertion of falsehood was allegedly shown
when she made the false declarations in the Certificate against Forum
Shopping before a notary public in Makati City, despite her knowledge that
the material statements she subscribed and swore to were not true. Thus,
Makati City is the proper venue and MeTC-Makati City is the proper court to
try the perjury case against Tomas, pursuant to Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the
2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure as all the essential elements
constituting the crime of perjury were committed within the territorial
jurisdiction of Makati City, not Pasay City.
Referral to the En Banc

The present case was referred to the En Banc primarily to address the
seeming conflict between the division rulings of the Court in the Ilusorio
case that is cited as basis of this petition, and the Sy Tiong case that was the
basis of the assailed RTC-Makati City ruling.

Perjury is an obstruction of justice; its perpetration well may affect the

dearest concerns of the parties before a tribunal. Deliberate material
falsification under oath constitutes the crime of perjury, and the crime is
complete when a witness' statement has once been made.

The Cited Ilusorio and Sy Tiong Cases

The Crime of Perjury: A Background

The subject matter of the perjury charge in Ilusorio involved false statements
contained in verified petitions filed with the court for the issuance of a new
owners duplicate copies of certificates of title. The verified petitions
containing the false statements were subscribed and sworn to in Pasig City,
but were filed in Makati City and Tagaytay City. The question posed was:
which court (Pasig City, Makati City and/or Tagaytay City) had jurisdiction
to try and hear the perjury cases?

To have a better appreciation of the issue facing the Court, a look at the
historical background of how the crime of perjury (specifically, Article 183
of the RPC) evolved in our jurisdiction.

We ruled that the venues of the action were in Makati City and Tagaytay
City, the places where the verified petitions were filed. The Court reasoned
out that it was only upon filing that the intent to assert an alleged falsehood
became manifest and where the alleged untruthful statement found relevance
or materiality. We cited as jurisprudential authority the case of United States.
v. Caet[18] which ruled:
It is immaterial where the affidavit was subscribed and sworn, so long as it
appears from the information that the defendant, by means of such affidavit,
"swore to" and knowingly submitted false evidence, material to a point at
issue in a judicial proceeding pending in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo
Province. The gist of the offense charged is not the making of the affidavit in
Manila, but the intentional giving of false evidence in the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo Province by means of such affidavit. [emphasis and
underscoring deleted]
In Sy Tiong, the perjured statements were made in a GIS which was
subscribed and sworn to in Manila. We ruled that the proper venue for the
perjury charges was in Manila where the GIS was subscribed and sworn to.
We held that the perjury was consummated in Manila where the false
statement was made. As supporting jurisprudence, we cited the case of
Villanueva v. Secretary of Justice[19] that, in turn, cited an American case
entitled U.S. v. Norris.[20] We ruled in Villanueva that

The RPC penalizes three forms of false testimonies. The first is false
testimony for and against the defendant in a criminal case (Articles 180 and
181, RPC); the second is false testimony in a civil case (Article 182, RPC);
and the third is false testimony in other cases (Article 183, RPC). Based on
the Information filed, the present case involves the making of an untruthful
statement in an affidavit on a material matter.
These RPC provisions, however, are not really the bases of the rulings cited
by the parties in their respective arguments. The cited Ilusorio ruling,
although issued by this Court in 2008, harked back to the case of Caet which
was decided in 1915, i.e., before the present RPC took effect.[21] Sy Tiong,
on the other hand, is a 2009 ruling that cited Villanueva, a 2005 case that in
turn cited United States v. Norris, a 1937 American case. Significantly, unlike
Canet, Sy Tiong is entirely based on rulings rendered after the present RPC
took effect.[22]
The perjurious act in Caet consisted of an information charging perjury
through the presentation in court of a motion accompanied by a false sworn
affidavit. At the time the Caet ruling was rendered, the prevailing law on
perjury and the rules on prosecution of criminal offenses were found in
Section 3, Act No. 1697 of the Philippine Commission, and in Subsection 4,
Section 6 of General Order No. 58[23] for the procedural aspect.
Section 3 of Act No. 1697 reads:
Sec. 3. Any person who, having taken oath before a competent tribunal,
officer, or person, in any case in which a law of the Philippine Islands
authorizes an oath to be administered, that he will testify, declare, depose, or

certify truly, or that any written testimony, declaration, disposition, or

certificate by him subscribed is true, willfully and contrary to such oath states
or subscribes any material matter which he does not believe to be true, is
guilty of perjury, and shall be punished by a fine of not more than two
thousand pesos and by imprisonment for not more than five years; and shall
moreover, thereafter be incapable of holding any public office or of giving
testimony in any court of the Philippine Islands until such time as the
judgment against him is reversed.
This law was copied, with the necessary changes, from Sections 5392[24]
and 5393[25] of the Revised Statutes of the United States.[26] Act No. 1697
was intended to make the mere execution of a false affidavit punishable in
our jurisdiction.[27]
In turn, Subsection 4, Section 6 of General Order No. 58 provided that the
venue shall be the court of the place where the crime was committed.
As applied and interpreted by the Court in Caet, perjury was committed by
the act of representing a false document in a judicial proceeding.[28] The
venue of action was held by the Court to be at the place where the false
document was presented since the presentation was the act that consummated
the crime.
The annotation of Justices Aquino and Grio-Aquino in their textbook on the
RPC[29] interestingly explains the history of the perjury provisions of the
present RPC and traces as well the linkage between Act No. 1697 and the
present Code. To quote these authors:[30]
Art. 180 was taken from art. 318 of the Old Penal Code and art. 154 of Del
Pans Proposed Correctional Code, while art. 181 was taken from art. 319 of
the old Penal Code and Art. 157 of Del Pans Proposed Correctional Code.
Said arts. 318 and 319, together with art. 321 of the old Penal Code, were
impliedly repealed by Act 1697, the Perjury Law, passed on August 23, 1907,
which in turn was expressly repealed by the Administrative Code of 1916,
Act 2657. In view of the express repeal of Act 1697, arts. 318 and 321 of the
old Penal Code were deemed revived. However, Act 2718 expressly revived
secs. 3 and 4 of the Perjury Law. Art. 367 of the Revised Penal Code
repealed Act Nos. 1697 and 2718.

It should be noted that perjury under Acts 1697 and 2718 includes false
testimony, whereas, under the Revised Penal Code, false testimony includes
perjury. Our law on false testimony is of Spanish origin, but our law on
perjury (art. 183 taken from sec. 3 of Act 1697) is derived from American
statutes. The provisions of the old Penal Code on false testimony embrace
perjury committed in court or in some contentious proceeding, while perjury
as defined in Act 1697 includes the making of a false affidavit. The
provisions of the Revised Penal Code on false testimony are more severe and
strict than those of Act 1697 on perjury. [italics ours]
With this background, it can be appreciated that Article 183 of the RPC
which provides:
The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional
in its minimum period shall be imposed upon any person, who knowingly
makes untruthful statements and not being included in the provisions of the
next preceding articles, shall testify under oath, or make an affidavit, upon
any material matter before a competent person authorized to administer an
oath in cases in which the law so requires. [emphasis supplied; emphases
ours]
in fact refers to either of two punishable acts (1) falsely testifying under oath
in a proceeding other than a criminal or civil case; and (2) making a false
affidavit before a person authorized to administer an oath on any material
matter where the law requires an oath.
As above discussed, Sy Tiong decided under Article 183 of the RPC
essentially involved perjured statements made in a GIS that was subscribed
and sworn to in Manila and submitted to the SEC in Mandaluyong City.
Thus, the case involved the making of an affidavit, not an actual testimony in
a proceeding that is neither criminal nor civil. From this perspective, the situs
of the oath, i.e., the place where the oath was taken, is the place where the
offense was committed. By implication, the proper venue would have been
the City of Mandaluyong the site of the SEC had the charge involved an
actual testimony made before the SEC.
In contrast, Caet involved the presentation in court of a motion supported and
accompanied by an affidavit that contained a falsity. With Section 3 of Act

No. 1697 as basis, the issue related to the submission of the affidavit in a
judicial proceeding. This came at a time when Act No. 1697 was the perjury
law, and made no distinction between judicial and other proceedings, and at
the same time separately penalized the making of false statements under oath
(unlike the present RPC which separately deals with false testimony in
criminal, civil and other proceedings, while at the same time also penalizing
the making of false affidavits). Understandably, the venue should be the
place where the submission was made to the court or the situs of the court; it
could not have been the place where the affidavit was sworn to simply
because this was not the offense charged in the Information.
The case of Ilusorio cited the Caet case as its authority, in a situation where
the sworn petitions filed in court for the issuance of duplicate certificates of
title (that were allegedly lost) were the cited sworn statements to support the
charge of perjury for the falsities stated in the sworn petitions. The Court
ruled that the proper venue should be the Cities of Makati and Tagaytay
because it was in the courts of these cities where the intent to assert an
alleged falsehood became manifest and where the alleged untruthful
statement finds relevance or materiality in deciding the issue of whether new
owners duplicate copies of the [Certificate of Condominium Title] and
[Transfer Certificates of Title] may issue.[31] To the Court, whether the
perjurious statements contained in the four petitions were subscribed and
sworn in Pasig is immaterial, the gist of the offense of perjury being the
intentional giving of false statement,[32] citing Caet as authority for its
statement.
The statement in Ilusorio may have partly led to the present confusion on
venue because of its very categorical tenor in pointing to the considerations
to be made in the determination of venue; it leaves the impression that the
place where the oath was taken is not at all a material consideration,
forgetting that Article 183 of the RPC clearly speaks of two situations while
Article 182 of the RPC likewise applies to false testimony in civil cases.

The Ilusorio statement would have made perfect sense had the basis for the
charge been Article 182 of the RPC, on the assumption that the petition itself
constitutes a false testimony in a civil case. The Caet ruling would then have
been completely applicable as the sworn statement is used in a civil case,
although no such distinction was made under Caet because the applicable law
at the time (Act No. 1697) did not make any distinction.
If Article 183 of the RPC were to be used, as what in fact appears in the
Ilusorio ruling, then only that portion of the article, referring to the making of
an affidavit, would have been applicable as the other portion refers to false
testimony in other proceedings which a judicial petition for the issuance of a
new owners duplicate copy of a Certificate of Condominium Title is not
because it is a civil proceeding in court. As a perjury based on the making of
a false affidavit, what assumes materiality is the site where the oath was
taken as this is the place where the oath was made, in this case, Pasig City.
Procedurally, the rule on venue of criminal cases has been subject to various
changes from the time General Order No. 58 was replaced by Rules 106 to
122 of the Rules of Court on July 1, 1940. Section 14, Rule 106 of the Rules
of Court provided for the rule on venue of criminal actions and it expressly
included, as proper venue, the place where any one of the essential
ingredients of the crime took place. This change was followed by the passage
of the 1964 Rules of Criminal Procedure,[33] the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure,[34] and the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which all
adopted the 1940 Rules of Criminal Procedures expanded venue of criminal
actions. Thus, the venue of criminal cases is not only in the place where the
offense was committed, but also where any of its essential ingredients took
place.
In the present case, the Certification against Forum Shopping was made
integral parts of two complaints for sum of money with prayer for a writ of
replevin against the respondent spouses Eddie Tamondong and Eliza B.
Tamondong, who, in turn, filed a complaint-affidavit against Tomas for
violation of Article 183 of the RPC. As alleged in the Information that
followed, the criminal act charged was for the execution by Tomas of an
affidavit that contained a falsity.

Under the circumstances, Article 183 of the RPC is indeed the applicable
provision; thus, jurisdiction and venue should be determined on the basis of
this article which penalizes one who make[s] an affidavit, upon any material
matter before a competent person authorized to administer an oath in cases in
which the law so requires. The constitutive act of the offense is the making of
an affidavit; thus, the criminal act is consummated when the statement
containing a falsity is subscribed and sworn before a duly authorized person.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

Based on these considerations, we hold that our ruling in Sy Tiong is more in

accord with Article 183 of the RPC and Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. To reiterate for the guidance of the Bar
and the Bench, the crime of perjury committed through the making of a false
affidavit under Article 183 of the RPC is committed at the time the affiant
subscribes and swears to his or her affidavit since it is at that time that all the
elements of the crime of perjury are executed. When the crime is committed
through false testimony under oath in a proceeding that is neither criminal
nor civil, venue is at the place where the testimony under oath is given. If in
lieu of or as supplement to the actual testimony made in a proceeding that is
neither criminal nor civil, a written sworn statement is submitted, venue may
either be at the place where the sworn statement is submitted or where the
oath was taken as the taking of the oath and the submission are both material
ingredients of the crime committed. In all cases, determination of venue shall
be based on the acts alleged in the Information to be constitutive of the crime
committed.

Respondent-accused, Manuel Parulan, is an authorized wholesale dealer of

petitioner San Miguel Corporation (SMC, for short) in Bulacan.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DENY the petition for lack

of merit. Costs against the petitioners.

The two cases were tried jointly, the witnesses for both prosecution and
defense being the same for the two suits.

G.R. Nos. L-74053-54 January 20, 1988

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and SAN MIGUEL
CORPORATION, petitioners,
vs.
NATHANIEL M. GROSPE, Presiding Judge, Branch 44, Regional Trial
Court of Pampanga and MANUEL PARULAN, respondents.

A special civil action for certiorari seeking to set aside the Decision of
respondent Presiding Judge of Branch 44, Regional Trial Court of Pampanga,
dismissing Criminal Case No. 2800 for Violation of B.P. Blg. 22, and
Criminal Case No. 2813 for Estafa, for being "bereft of jurisdiction to pass
judgment on the accused on the basis of the merits of these cases."

In Criminal Case No. 2800 of the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga, he was
charged with Violation of the Bouncing Checks Law (B.P. Blg. 22 for having
issued a check on 13 June 1983 for P86,071.20) in favor of SMC but which
was dishonored for having been drawn against 'insufficient funds and, in
spite of repeated demands, for having failed and refused to make good said
check to the damage and prejudice of SMC.
In Criminal Case No. 2813 of the same Court, Respondent-accused was
charged with Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal
Code for having made out a check on 18 June 1983 in the sum of P11,918.80
in favor of SMC in payment of beer he had purchased, but which check was
refused payment for "insufficient funds" and, in spite of repeated demands,
for having failed and refused to redeem said check to the damage and
prejudice of SMC.

Based on the facts and the evidence, Respondent Judge arrived at the
following "Findings and Resolution:"
From the welter of evidence adduced in these two , this Court is convinced
that the two checks involved herein were issued and signed by the accused in
connection with the beer purchases made by him on various occasions at the
Guiguinto, sales office of SMC at Guiguinto, Bulacan and which checks he
handed and delivered to the sales Supervisor of SMC, Mr. Ruben Cornelio,
who holds office in that municipality. The Court finds it rather difficult to
believe the claim and testimony of the accused that these checks which he

admittedly signed and which he delivered to Mr. Cornelio in blank were

filled up without his knowledge particularly the amounts appearing therein
which in the case of the check involved in Criminal Case No. 2800 amounted
to P86,071.20, and, in the case of the check involved in Criminal Case No.
2813, amounted to Pl1,918.80. The accused had been engaged in business for
some time involving amounts that are quite considerable, and it is hard to
believe that he will agree to this kind of arrangement which placed or
exposed him to too much risks and uncertainties.

funds in his bank, the Planters Development Bank, at Santa Maria, Bulacan,
only to turn out later on that this was not so.

But even as this Court is convinced that the accused had issued these checks
to the representative of SMC on the occasions testified to in these cases by
the witnesses for the prosecution which two checks were subsequently
dishonored due to lack of funds resulting in damage to SMC, the offended
party herein, this Court, after considering the totality of the evidence and the
circumstances that attended the issuance of these two checks until they were
both dishonored by the drawee bank, the Planters Development Bank, at
Santa Maria, Bulacan, has come to the conclusion that it is bereft of
jurisdiction to pass judgment on the accused on the basis of the merits of
these cases.

The other element of damage pertaining to the offenses charged in these

cases was inflicted on the offended party, the SMC, right at the moment the
checks issued by the accused were dishonored by the Planters Development
Bank, the drawee bank, at Santa Maria, Bulacan which received them from
the BPI, San Fernando, Pampanga branch for clearing purposes. The
argument advanced by the prosecution in its memorandum filed herein that
the two checks were deposited by SMC at the BPI, San Fernando, Branch,
San Fernando, Pampanga, where it maintained its accounts after receiving
these checks from its Guiguinto Sales Office which bank later on made the
corresponding deductions from the account of SMC in the amounts covered
by the dishonored checks upon receiving information that the checks so
issued by the accused had been dishonored by the drawee bank at Santa
Maria, Bulacan, is inconsequential. As earlier stated, the element of damage
was inflicted on the offended party herein right at the moment and at the
place where the checks issued in its favor were dishonored which is in Santa
Maria, Bulacan.

which he reasoned out, thus:

Respondent Judge then decreed:

Deceit and damage are the two essential elements that make up the offenses
involving dishonored checks. And in order that this Court may have
jurisdiction to try these cases, it must be established that both or any one of
these elements composing the offenses charged must occur or take place
within the area over which this Court has territorial jurisdiction. Here,
however, it is clear that none of these elements took place or occurred within
the jurisdictional area of this Court.

WHEREFORE, and in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby

rendered dismissing these cases for lack of jurisdiction.

As gleaned from the evidence, the two checks involved herein were issued by
the accused at Guiguinto, Bulacan. They were delivered and handed to
Supervisor Ruben Cornelio of San Miguel Corporation in his capacity as the
representative of the company holding office in that municipality where the
transactions of the accused with SMC took place. It was before Supervisor
Cornelio at Guiguinto, Bulacan that false assurances were made by the
accused that the checks issued by him were good and backed by sufficient

Respondent-accused adopts the contrary proposition and argues that the order
of dismissal was, in effect, an acquittal not reviewable by certiorari, and that
to set the order aside after plea and trial on the merits, would subject
Respondent-accused to double jeopardy.

The bail bond posted by the accused in these cases are ordered cancelled.
This Petition for certiorari challenges the dismissal of the two criminal cases
on the ground that they were issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack of jurisdiction.

Upon the attendant facts and circumstances we uphold the Petition.

The principal ground relied upon by Respondent Judge in dismissing the

criminal cases is that deceit and damage, the two essential elements that
make up the offenses involving dishonored checks, did not occur within the
territorial jurisdiction of his Court in Pampanga, but rather in Bulacan where
false assurances were given by Respondent-accused and where the checks he
had issued were dishonored. The People maintain, on the other hand, that
jurisdiction is properly vested in the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga.
At the outset, it should be pointed out, as the Solicitor General has aptly
called attention to, that there are two dishonored checks involved, each the
subject of different penal laws and with different basic elements: (1) On June
13, 1983, Respondent-accused issued Planters Development Bank (Santa
Maria, Bulacan Branch) [PDB] Check No. 19040865 in the sum of
P86,071.20 in favor of SMC, which was received by the SMC Supervisor at
Guiguinto, Bulacan. The check was forwarded to the SMC Regional Office
at San Fernando, Pampanga, where it was delivered to and received by the
SMC Finance Officer, who then deposited the check with the Bank of the
Philippine Islands (BPI), San Fernando Branch, which is the SMC depository
bank. On July 8,1983, the SMC depository bank received a notice of
dishonor of the said check for "insufficiency of funds" from the PDB, the
drawee bank in Santa Maria, Bulacan. This dishonored check is the subject of
the charge of Violation of the Bouncing Checks Law (BP Blg. 22) in
Criminal Case No. 2800 of the lower Court (hereafter, the Bouncing Checks
Case).

(2) On June 18, 1983, Respondent-accused likewise issued PDB Check No.
19040872 in the amount of P11,918.80 in favor of SMC, which was received
also by the SMC Supervisor at Guiguinto, Bulacan, as direct payment for the
spot sale of beer. That check was similarly forwarded by the SMC Supervisor
to the SMC Regional Office in San Fernando, Pampanga, where it was
delivered to the Finance Officer thereat and who, in turn deposited the check
with the SMC depository bank in San Fernando, Pampanga. On July 8,1983,
the SMC depository bank received a notice of dishonor for "insufficiency of
funds" from the drawee bank, the PDB, in Santa Maria, Bulacan. This
dishonored check is the subject of the prosecution for Estafa by postdating or
issuing a bad check under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal
Code in Criminal Case No, 2813 of the lower Court (briefly, the Estafa
Case).
In the crime of Estafa by postdating or issuing a bad check, deceit and
damage are essential elements of the offense (U.S. vs. Rivera, 23 Phil. 383390) and have to be established with satisfactory proof to warrant conviction.
For Violation of the Bouncing Checks Law, on the other hand, the elements
of deceit and damage are not essential nor required. An essential element of
that offense is knowledge on the part of the maker or drawer of the check of
the insufficiency of his funds (Lozano vs. Hon. Martinez, Nos. L-63419, etc.,
December 18, 1986; 146 SCRA 323; Dingle vs. IAC, G.R. No. 75243, March
16, 1987,148 SCRA 595). The Anti-Bouncing Checks Law makes the mere
act of issuing a worthless check a special offense punishable thereunder
(Cruz vs. IAC, No. I,66327, May 28,1984,129 SCRA 490. Malice and intent
in issuing the worthless check are immaterial, the offense being malum
prohibitum (Que vs. People of the Philippines, et. al., G.R. Nos. 75217-18,
September 21, 1987). The gravamen of the offense is the issuance of a check,
not the non-payment of an obligation (Lozano vs. Hon. Martinez, supra).
A. With the distinction clarified, the threshold question is whether or not
venue was sufficiently conferred in the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga in
the two cases.
Section 14(a) of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court, which has been
carried over in Section 15(a) of Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure, specifically provides:

SEC. 14. Place where action is to be instituted

(a) In all criminal prosecutions the action shall be instituted and tried in the
court of the municipality or province wherein the offense was committed or
any one of the essential ingredients thereof took place.
In other words, a person charged with a transitory crime may be validly tried
in any municipality or province where the offense was in part committed. In
transitory or continuing offenses in which some acts material and essential to
the crime and requisite to its consummation occur in one province and some
in another, the Court of either province has jurisdiction to try the case, it
being understood that the first Court taking cognizance of the Case will
exclude the others (Tuzon vs. Cruz. No. L-27410, August 28, 1975, 66 SCRA
235). However, if an the acts material and essential to the crime and requisite
of its consummation occurred in one municipality or territory, the Court of
that municipality or territory has the sole jurisdiction to try the case (People
vs. Yabut, L-42902, April 29, 1977, 76 SCRA 624).
Estafa by postdating or issuing a bad check, may be a transitory or
continuing offense. Its basic elements of deceit and damage may arise
independently in separate places (People vs. Yabut, supra). In this case,
deceit took place in San Fernando, Pampanga, while the damage was
inflicted in Bulacan where the cheek was dishonored by the drawee bank in
that place (See People vs. Yabut, supra). Jurisdiction may, therefore, be
entertained by either the Bulacan Court or the Pampanga Court.
For while the subject check was issued in Guiguinto, Bulacan, it was not
completely drawn thereat, but in San Fernando, Pampanga, where it was
uttered and delivered. "What is of decisive importance is the delivery thereat
The delivery of the instrument is the final act essential to its consummation
as an obligation" (People vs. Larue, 83 P. 2d 725, cited in People vs.
Yabut, supra). For although the check was received by the SMC Sales
Supervisor at Guiguinto, Bulacan, that was not the delivery in contemplation
of law to the payee, SMC. Said supervisor was not the person who could take
the check as a holder, that is, as a payee or indorsee thereof, with the intent to
transfer title thereto. The rule is that the issuance as well as the delivery of
the check must be to a person who takes it as a holder, which means "the
payee or indorsee of a bill or note, who is in possession of it, or the bearer,

thereof" (Sec. 190, Negotiable Instruments Law, cited in People vs.

Yabut, supra.) Thus, said representative had to forward the check to the SMC
Regional Office in San Fernando, Pampanga, which was delivered to the
Finance Officer thereat who, in turn, deposited it at the SMC depository bank
in San Fernando, Pampanga. The element of deceit, therefore, took place in
San Fernando, Pampanga, where the rubber check was legally issued and
delivered so that jurisdiction could properly be laid upon the Court in that
locality.
The estafa charged in the two informations involved in the case before Us
appears to be transitory or continuing in nature. Deceit has taken place in
Malolos, Bulacan, while the damage in Caloocan City, where the checks
were dishonored by the drawee banks there. Jurisdiction can, therefore, be
entertained by either the Malolos court or the Caloocan court. While the
subject checks were written, signed, or dated in Caloocan City, they were not
completely made or drawn there, but in Malolos, Bulacan, where they were
uttered and delivered. That is the place of business and residence of the
payee. The place where the bills were written, signed or dated does not
necessarily fix or determine the place where they were executed. What is of
decisive importance is the delivery thereof. The delivery of the instrument is
the final act essential to its consummation as an obligation (People vs. Larue,
83 P. 2d 725). An undelivered bill or note is inoperative. Until delivery, the
contract is revocable (Ogden, Negotiable Instruments, 5th ed., at 107). And
the issuance as well as the delivery of the check must be to a person who
takes it as a holder, which means "(t)he payee or indorsee of a bill or note,
who is in possession of it, or the bearer thereof" (Sec. 190, Negotiable
Instruments Law). Delivery of the check signifies transfer of possession,
whether actual or constructive, from one person to another with intent to
transfer title thereto (Bailey, Brady on Bank Checks, 3rd ed. at 57-59; Sec.
190, Negotiable Instruments Law). Thus, the penalizing clause of the
provision of Art. 315, par. 2(d) states: "By postdating a check, or issuing a
check in payment of an obligation when the offender had no funds in the
bank, or his funds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the amount
of the check," Clearly, therefore, the element of deceit thru the issuance and
delivery of the worthless checks to the complainant took place in Malolos,
Bulacan, conferring upon a court in that locality jurisdiction to try the case.

In respect of the Bouncing Checks Case, the offense also appears to be

continuing in nature. It is true that the offense is committed by the very fact
of its performance (Colmenares vs. Villar, No. L-27126, May 29, 1970, 33
SCRA 186); and that the Bouncing Checks Law penalizes not only the fact of
dishonor of a check but also the act of making or drawing and issuance of a
bouncing check (People vs. Hon. Veridiano, II, No. L-62243, 132 SCRA
523). The case, therefore, could have been filed also in Bulacan. As held
in Que vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. Nos. 75217-18, September 11,
1987 "the determinative factor (in determining venue) is the place of the
issuance of the check". However, it is likewise true that knowledge on the
part of the maker or drawer of the check of the insufficiency of his funds,
which is an essential ingredient of the offense is by itself a continuing
eventuality, whether the accused be within one territory or another (People
vs. Hon. Manzanilla, G.R. Nos. 66003-04, December 11, 1987). Accordingly,
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offense also lies in the Regional Trial
Court of Pampanga.

cases. Where an order dismissing a criminal case is not a decision on the

merits, it cannot bar as res judicata a subsequent case based on the same
offense (People vs. Bellosillo, No. L-18512, December 27, 1963, 9 SCRA
835, 837).

And, as pointed out in the Manzanilla case, jurisdiction or venue is

determined by the allegations in the Information, which are controlling
(Arches vs. Bellosillo, 81 Phil. 190, 193, cited in Tuzon vs. Cruz, No. L27410, August 28, 1975, 66 SCRA 235). The Information filed herein
specifically alleges that the crime was committed in San Fernando,
Pampanga, and, therefore, within the jurisdiction of the Court below.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of Respondent Judge of February 17, 1986 is

hereby set aside and he is hereby ordered to reassume jurisdiction over
Criminal Cases Nos. 2800 and 2813 of his Court and to render judgment of
either conviction or acquittal in accordance with the evidence already
adduced during the joint trial of said two cases.

B. The dismissal of the subject criminal cases by Respondent Judge,

predicated on his lack of jurisdiction, is correctable by Certiorari. The error
committed is one of jurisdiction and not an error of judgment on the merits.
Well-settled is the rule that questions covering jurisdictional matters may be
averred in a petition for certiorari, inclusive of matters of grave abuse of
discretion, which are equivalent to lack of jurisdiction (City of Davao vs.
Dept. of Labor, No. L-19488, January 30, 1965, 13 SCRA 111, 115). An error
of jurisdiction renders whatever order of the Trial Court nun and void.
C. The present petition for certiorari seeking to set aside the void Decision of
Respondent Judge does not place Respondent-accused in double jeopardy for
the same offense. It will be recalled that the questioned judgment was not an
adjudication on the merits. It was a dismissal upon Respondent Judge's
erroneous conclusion that his Court had no "territorial jurisdiction" over the

The dismissal being null and void the proceedings before the Trial Court may
not be said to have been lawfully terminated. There is therefore, no second
proceeding which would subject the accused to double jeopardy.
Since the order of dismissal was without authority and, therefore, null and
void, the proceedings before the Municipal Court have not been lawfully
terminated. Accordingly, there is no second proceeding to speak of and no
double jeopardy. A continuation of the proceedings against the accused for
serious physical injuries is in order. (People vs. Mogol, 131 SCRA 306, 308).
In sum, Respondent Judge had jurisdiction to try and decide the subject
criminal case, venue having been properly laid.

MANUEL ISIP V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court, which seeks to set aside the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals
dated 26 October 2004 in CA-G.R. CR No. 21275 entitled, People of the
Philippines v. Manuel S. Isip and Marietta M. Isip to the extent that it
affirmed with modifications petitioner Manuel S. Isips conviction for Estafa
in Criminal Case No. 136-84 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
XVII, Cavite City, and its Amended Decision[2] dated 26 October 2005
denying his Partial Motion for Reconsideration.

The antecedents are the following:

Petitioner was charged with Estafa in Criminal Case No. 136-84 before
Branch XVII of the RTC of Cavite City, under the following information:
That on or about March 7, 1984, in the City of Cavite, Republic of the
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, received from Leonardo A. Jose one (1) seven carat diamond
(mens ring), valued at P200,000.00, for the purpose of selling the same on
commission basis and to deliver the proceeds of the sale thereof or return the
jewelry if not sold, on or before March 15, 1984, but the herein accused once
in possession of the above-described articles, with intent to defraud and with
grave abuse of confidence, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously misappropriate, misapply and convert the same to his own
personal use and benefit and notwithstanding repeated demands made by
Leonardo A. Jose for the return of the jewelry or the delivery of the proceeds
of the sale thereof, failed to do so, to the damage and prejudice of the
aforesaid Leonardo A. Jose in the abovestated amount ofP200,000.00,
Philippine Currency.[3]
Petitioners wife, Marietta M. Isip, was indicted before the same court for
seven counts of Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, otherwise known as
the Bouncing Checks Law.The cases were docketed as Criminal Cases No.
146-84, 147-84, 148-84, 149-84, 155-84, 156-84 and 157-84. The accusatory
portion of the information in Criminal Case No. 146-84 reads:
That on or about March 27, 1984, in the City of Cavite, Republic of the
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, knowing fully well that her account with the bank is
insufficient, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and
knowingly issue Pacific Banking Corporation Check No. 518672 in the
amount ofP562,000.00, in payment for assorted pieces of jewelry, received
from Leonardo A. Jose, which check upon presentation with the drawee bank
for payment was dishonored for insufficiency of funds and notwithstanding
repeated demands made by Leonardo A. Jose for the redemption of the said
check, accused refused and still refuses to do so, to the damage and prejudice
of the aforesaid Leonardo A. Jose in the above-stated amount
of P562,000.00, Philippine Currency.

The six other Informations are similarly worded except for the date when the
offense was committed, the number and amount of the check. The pertinent
data in the other informations are as follows:

Crim. Case No.

Date of Commission

No. of Check

Amount of

147-84

17 March 1984

518644

P50,000.00

148-84

30 March 1984

518645

P50,000.00

149-84

12 March 1984

030086[5]

P150,000.0

155-84

25 March 1984

518674

P95,000.00

156-84

29 March 1984

518646

P90,000.00

157-84

1 April 1984

518669

P25,000.00

The spouses Isip were likewise charged before the same court with five (5)
counts of Estafa. The cases were docketed as Criminal Cases No. 256-84,
257-84, 260-84, 261-84 and 378-84. The Estafa charged in Crim. Case No.
256-84 was allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about March 20, 1984, in the City of Cavite, Republic of the
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping one
another, received from one Leonardo A. Jose the following pieces of jewelry,
to wit: one (1) set dome shape ring and earrings valued atP120,000.00, with
the obligation of selling the same on commission basis and deliver the
proceeds of the sale thereof or return them if not sold, on or before March 21,
1984, but the herein accused, once in possession of the said jewelry by means
of false pretenses, with intent to defraud and with grave abuse of confidence,
did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate,
misapply and convert them to their own personal use and benefit and paid the
same with Check Nos. 518646 and 518669, dated March 29, 1984 and April

1, 1984, respectively, in the amount of P90,000 and P25,000, respectively,

which upon presentation with the bank was dishonored for insufficiency of
funds and notwithstanding repeated demands made by Leonardo A. Jose for
the redemption of the said check, failed to do so, to his damage and prejudice
in the abovestated amount of P120,000.00, Philippine Currency.[6]
Except for the description and value of the pieces of jewelry involved, date
of receipt and agreed date of return, and the number, date and amount of the
checks issued in payment thereof, the four other informations are similarly
worded. The specifics thereof are as follows:
Crim. Case
No.

Value of
Jewelry

Date of
Receipt

Agreed Date
of Return

P150,000

03-07-84

03-30-84

257-84

P95,000

03-20-84

03-27-84

260-84

P562,000

03-20-84

03-27-84

261-84

P200,000

02-03-84

378-84

Check No./Date

030086/03-12-84
518647/03-25-84
518672/03-27-84
518644/03-17-84
518645/03-30-84

When arraigned on the charges, petitioner and Marietta Isip pleaded not
guilty. There being only one complainant in all the cases, joint trial of the
cases followed.
The versions of the prosecution and the defense, as taken by the Court of
Appeals in the parties respective briefs, are the following:
i) Prosecution Version.
Sometime in 1982, appellant spouses Manuel and Marietta Isip were
introduced to complainant Atty. Leonardo Jose. The introduction was made
by complainants father, Nemesio, business associate of the Isips. Nemesio

and the Isips were then engaged in the buy and sell of pledged and
unredeemed jewelry pawned by gambling habitus (pp. 8-16, tsn, June 8,
1993).
Needing a bigger capital to finance the growing operation, the Isips
convinced complainant to be their capitalist, a proposition to which
complainant acceded to (p. 14, ibid).
Thus, the operation went smoothly that was before February, 1984 (pp. 1418, tsn, ibid).
On February 3, 1984, at complainants residence in Caridad, Cavite City,
appellant spouses received from complainant a 6 carat mens ring valued
at P200,000.00 with the condition that they are going to sell said jewelry x x
x on commission basis for P200,000.00 and if they are not able to sell the
same, they have to return the ring if sold on or before March 3, 1984 (p. 8,
tsn, October 15, 1993).
On March 3, 1984, the Isips did not return the ring or the proceeds
thereof. Instead, Marietta Isip issued two (2) personal checks dated March 17
and 30, 1984, respectively, for P50,000.00 each as partial payment for the
jewelry. The receipt of the jewelry was acknowledged by Marietta Isip with
Manuel acting as a witness (pp. 9-11, tsn, ibid).
This particular mens ring is the subject of Criminal Case No. 378-84 for
Estafa while Check Nos. 518644 and 518645 (Pacific Banking Corp.) dated
March 17 and 30, respectively, are the subject of Criminal Case Nos. 147-84
and 148-84.
In the morning of March 7, 1984, the Isip couple went again to complainants
residence in Caridad, Cavite City where complainant delivered one (1)
Choker Pearl with 35 pieces of south sea pearls with diamond
worth P150,000.00. The condition was that the proceeds be turned over to
complainant on or before March 30, 1984 (pp. 27-29, tsn, ibid). March 30,
1984 came, but instead of turning over the proceeds or return the Choker
Pearl, Mrs. Isip issued a check dated March 12, 1984 for P150,000.00
(RCBC check No. 030086) as payment (p. 34, ibid).

This is the subject of Criminal Case No. 254-84 for Estafa against the
spouses and Criminal Case No. 149-84 for violation of BP 22 against
Marietta Isip.
In the afternoon of the same day, Mr. Manuel Isip went to complainants
residence in Cavite City and got from the latter a mens ring (7 carats)
worth P200,000.00. Mr. Isip signed a receipt with the condition that he return
the ring or deliver the proceeds, if sold, on or before March 15, 1984. March
15, 1984 came, but Mr. Isip sought an extension which fell due on April 7,
1984. April 7, 1984 came and went by, but Mr. Isip defaulted (pp. 41-46, tsn,
ibid). The above is the subject matter of Criminal Case No. 136-84 for Estafa
against Manuel Isip.

Again, in the early evening of March 20, 1984, the Isips went to complainant
informing him that Balikbayan doctors are having a convention in Vigan,
Ilocos Sur saying that, that was the most opportune time to sell
jewelries. Assorted pieces of jewelry were delivered to Mrs. Isip as reflected
in a receipt duly signed by her (Exhibit O) acknowledging the value thereof
to the tune ofP562,000.00.
Exhibit O contained the promise that the jewelry or proceeds thereof will be
delivered on March 27, 1984. Inspite of the promise contained in Exhibit O,
Mrs. Isip issued a postdated check (Check No. 51867) dated March 27, 1984
in the amount of P562,000.00 as payment for the assorted pieces of jewelry
(pp. 8-12, tsn, October 22, 1993).

On March 20, 1984, the Isips went again to Cavite City and got from
complainant one (1) Dome shaped ring with matching earring with diamonds
valued at P120,000.00. As with their previous agreement, the item was to be
returned or the proceeds of the sale be delivered on March 21, 1984 (pp. 4852, tsn, ibid). The following morning, however, Mrs. Isip issued two (2)
personal checks (Check Nos. 518646 and 518669 dated March 29, 1984
for P90,000.00 and P25,000.00, respectively) in payment for the Dome
shaped ring (p. 53, tsn, ibid).

This is the subject matter of Criminal Case No. 261-84 for Estafa against the
couple and Criminal Case No. 146-84 against Marietta Isip for Violation of
BP 22.

This is the subject of Criminal Case No. 256084 for Estafa against the
spouses Isip and Criminal Case Nos. 156-84 and and (sic) 157-84 for
Violation of BP 22 against Marietta Isip.

ii) Defense Version.

At noontime on the same day, the Isip couple went back to the residence of
complainant and got from him one (1) collar heart shaped necklace and one
(1) baguette necklace worth P95,000.00 (p. 60, tsn, ibid). As agreed upon,
Marietta Isip signed a receipt with the condition that the jewelry or the
proceeds thereof be delivered to complainant on March 27, 1984. The Isips
defaulted and instead, Mrs. Isip issued a check (Check No. 518647)
dated March 27, 1984 in the amount of P90,000.00 (pp. 3-5, tsn, October 22,
1993).
The subject pieces of jewelry are the subject of Criminal Case No. 260-84 for
Estafa against the Isip couple and Criminal Case No. 155-84 for Violation of
BP 22 against Marietta Isip.

All of the checks covered by the above transactions were deposited on April
6, 1984 (p. 14, tsn, ibid), but all of them bounced for being drawn against
insufficient funds. Demand letters sent to the couple proved futile (pp. 15-20,
ibid).

During all the times material to these cases, complainant Leonardo Jose, who
had his residence at Room 411, 4th Floor, Plaza Towers Condominium on
(sic) 3375 Guerrero Street, Ermita, Manila, but claims he had his ancestral
home at 506 P. Burgos Street, Caridad, Cavite, was an employee of the
Bureau of Customs, having been so since 1964 (Tr., 6/8/93, 7). Upon the
other hand, appellants Manuel S. Isip (Manuel hereafter) and Marietta M.
Isip (Marietta hereafter) are spouses, residents at 3635 M. Arellano Street,
Bacood, Sta. Mesa, Manila (Tr., 8/29/93, 4) and engaged in various business
undertakings in Pampanga, Nueva Ecija, Baguio City, Olongapo City and
Bataan (Tr., Idem, 9; Tr., 10/2/95, 13) appellant Manuel, in the brokerage and
trucking business; while appellant Marietta, in that of selling jewelry and
financing, as well as in PX goods, real estate and cars, which she started
when she was still single (Tr., Idem, 9-10; Tr., 10/2/95, 12). In 1982, at the
casino in Olongapo City, appellant Marietta started obtaining jewelry from

losing or financially-strapped players which she repledged as security for

financing she obtained from one Nemesio Jose, father of complainant
Leonardo Jose (Tr., Idem, 11-12; Tr., Idem, 14). After about a year, when
Nemesio Jose ran short of capital, he referred appellants to his son,
complainant Leonardo Jose, with address at the Plaza Towers Condominium
aforesaid for needed financing (Tr., Idem, 13-14; Tr., Idem, 1719). Beginning early 1983, at complainants residence at Plaza Tower
Condominium in Manila, appellant Marietta, accompanied by her husband
who participated only as a witness, started having transactions with
complainant who, on different dates in February, March and April, 1984,
extended various amounts to her for which appellant Marietta pledged
jewelry which, in turn, were agreed between her and complainant to be sold
on commission and to turn over the proceeds thereof or return the jewelry to
complainant (Tr., Idem, 16-18). In the course of the transactions, appellant
Marietta had issued several checks to complainant as guarantee for the
payment of the subject jewelry which have either been paid or redeemed, had
returned the unsold jewelry to complainant and had conveyed, by way of
payment for other jewelry, some personal properties, like brass and antics,
and real properties in Balanga, Bataan and Mabalacat, Pampanga, to
complainant who caused the same to be registered in the names of his son,
Christian Jose, and his wife, Zenaida Jose (Exhibits 1, 2, 2-A, 3, 4, 5, 6, 6-A,
7, 7-A), with the result that all the obligations of appellants to complainant
have already been paid for or offset (Tr., Idem, 23; Tr., Idem, 24, 34-36, 3739; Tr., 3/4/96, 7-8). Also, all the checks that appellant Marietta issued which
were initially dishonored have already been (sic) (Tr., 10/2/95, 25-30;
Tr., 3/4/96, 8-9). In fact, complainant caused the dismissal of some cases he
filed against appellants. Complainant however failed to return some of the
redeemed and/or paid checks issued to him by appellant Marietta on the
pretext that he did not bring them (Tr., 3/4/96, 20). Inasmuch as appellant
Marietta incurred some default in payment and complainant suspected that
she would not be able to redeem the checks or pay for the pledged jewelry,
complainant demanded that appellants sign certain documents to avoid any
misunderstanding, with threat of prosecution before the Cavite courts if they
do not comply (Tr., Idem, 19-20; Tr., 3/4/96, 5-6). So, in order to maintain
good relations with complainant, appellant Marietta signed the document
acknowledging obligations to him in one sitting, which appellant Manuel
witnessed (Tr., Idem, 21-22). Later, appellants learned that, although all the

transactions were entered into in Manila, complainant filed the cases herein
before the Cavite Regional Trial Court (Tr., Idem, 23-24).[7]
On November 25, 1996, the trial court rendered its decision, the dispositive
portion thereof reading:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds the accused Dra.
Marietta M. Isip guilty beyond reasonable doubt of a (sic) violation of B.P.
22 in Crim. Cases Nos. 146-84, 147-84, 148-84, 149-84, 155-84, 156-84 and
157-84 and she is hereby sentenced to undergo imprisonment of One (1) year
of prision correctional (sic) in each case; and of Estafa in the following Crim.
Cases: No. 256-84 where she is sentenced to undergo imprisonment of, from
Twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to Twenty (20) years of
reclusion temporal, as maximum, and to indemnify the complainant Atty.
Leonardo Jose the amount of P120,000.00 for the value of the articles
misappropriated; Crim. Case No. 257-84 where she is sentenced to undergo
imprisonment of, from Twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to
Twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and to indemnify the
complainant Atty. Leonardo Jose the amount of P150,000.00; Crim. Case No.
260-84 where she is sentenced to undergo imprisonment of, from Eight (8)
years and One (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to Seventeen (17)
years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and to indemnify the complainant
Atty. Leonardo Jose the amount of P95,000.00; Crim. Case No. 261-84
where she is sentenced to undergo imprisonment of, from Twelve (12) years
and One (1) day of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to Twenty (20) years of
reclusion temporal, as maximum, and to indemnify the complainant Atty.
Leonardo Jose the amount of P562,000.00; Crim. Case No. 378-84 where she
is sentenced to undergo imprisonment of, from Twelve (12) years and One
(1) day of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to Twenty (20) years of reclusion
temporal, as maximum, and to indemnify the complainant Atty. Leonardo
Jose the amount of P200,000.00 and to pay the costs.
Likewise, accused Manuel Isip is acquitted in Crim. Cases Nos. 256-84, 25784, 260-84, 261-84 and 378-84. However, in Crim. Case No. 136-84, he is
hereby found guilty of Estafa and he is hereby sentenced to undergo
imprisonment of, from Twelve (12) years and One (1) day of reclusion
temporal, as minimum, to Twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as

maximum, to indemnify the complainant Atty. Leonardo Jose in the amount

of P200,000.00 value of the jewelry misappropriated, and to pay the costs. [8]
In ruling the way it did, the RTC found that the transactions involved in these
cases were sufficiently shown to have taken place at complainant Atty.
Leonardo Joses ancestral house in Cavite City when the latter was on leave
of absence from the Bureau of Customs where he was connected. It said the
defense failed to substantially prove its allegations that the transactions
occurred in Manila, particularly in the Towers Condominium, and that
complainant is a resident of Bigasan, Makati. It added that the testimony of
Marietta Isip that the money with which the complainant initially agreed to
finance their transactions was withdrawn from the Sandigan Finance
in Cavite City further refuted the defenses claim that the transactions
happened in Manila. The trial court likewise found the defenses contention,
that the obligations were already paid and set-off with the turnover to
complainant of personal and real properties, to be untenable for it is contrary
to human nature to demand payment when the same had already been made
and the alleged set-offs were for other cases which were settled amicably and
subsequently dismissed upon motion of the City Prosecutors Office at the
instance of the complainant.
The trial court was convinced that accused Marietta Isip misappropriated the
pieces of jewelry involved in Criminal Cases No. 256-84, 257-84, 260-84,
261-84 and 378-84 and violated Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 when she issued the
checks mentioned in Criminal Cases No. 146-84, 147-84, 148-84, 149-84,
155-84, 156-84 and 157-84. As to petitioner, the trial court acquitted him in
Criminal Cases No. 256-84, 257-84, 260-84, 261-84 and 378-84 finding him
to have acted as a mere witness when he signed the receipts involved in said
cases, but found him liable in Criminal Case No. 136-84 for misappropriating
a 7-carat diamond mens ring which he secured from the complainant.
Aggrieved, petitioner and spouse appealed to the Court of Appeals assigning
the following as errors:

DISMISSING THE SAME UPON THE GROUND THAT NONE OF THE

ESSENTIAL INGREDIENTS OF THE OFFENSES CHARGED THEREIN
WAS COMMITTED WITH (SIC) ITS TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION.
- II THE TRIAL COURT, ASSUMING IT HAD JURISDICTION OVER THE
CASES BELOW, ERRD IN NOT HOLDING THAT NO CRIMINAL
LIABILITY UNDER BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 22 WAS INCURRED BY
APPELLANT MARIETTA M. ISIP FOR THE ISSUANCE OF THE
SUBJECT CHECKS INASMUCH AS SAID CHECKS WERE ISSUED AS
MERE GUARANTY FOR OBLIGATIONS INCURRED.
- III THE TRIAL COURT, ASSUMING ANY INCIPIENT LIABILITY FOR
THE CRIME OF ESTAFA HAD BEEN INCURRED BY APPELLANTS IN
THE PREMISES, ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT SUCH INCIPIENT
LIABILITY HAD BEEN EXTINGUISHED BY
PAYMENTS/REDEMPTIONS MADE AND/OR NOVATION ENTERED
INTO BETWEEN COMPLAINANT AND SAID APPELLANTS.
- IV THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING APPELLANTS MANUEL S.
ISIP AND MARIETTA M. ISIP GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT OF THE CRIMES OF ESTAFA AND VIOLATION OF BATAS
PAMBANSA BLG. 22 RESPECTFULLY IMPUTED UPON THEM AND
IN NOT ACQUITTING THEM UPON THE GROUND THAT THEIR
GUILT THEREOF, OR OF ANY CRIME FOR THAT MATTER, HAD NOT
BEEN ESTABLISHED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT AND/OR
THAT THE LIABILITY INCURRED BY THEM, IF ANY, IS MERELY
CIVIL.[9]

-I-

Before the Court of Appeals could have decided the case, Marietta Isip died
thereby extinguishing her criminal and civil liability, if any.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN TAKING COGNIZANCE OF AND

DECIDING THE CASES AGAINST APPELLANTS AND IN NOT

In a decision promulgated 26 October 2004, the Court of Appeals disposed of

the case as follows:

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of

the Regional Trial Court of Cavite City (Branch XVII)
1. In Crim. Case No. 136-84 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS that
the sentence imposed on accused-appellant Manuel S. Isip shall be two (2)
years of prision correccional, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion
temporal, as maximum, and that the sum of P200,000.00 he was ordered to
pay to Leonardo A. Jose shall bear interest at the legal rate from filing of the
information until fully paid;
2. In Crim. Cases Nos. 146-84, 147-84, 148-84, 149-84, 155-84, 156-84 and
157-84 is REVERSED and accused-appellant Marietta M. Isip ACQUITTED
of the crimes charged; and
3.
In Crim. Cases Nos. 256-84, 257-84, 260-84, 261-84 and 37884 is REVERSED and accused-appellants Manuel S. Isip and Marietta M.
Isip ACQUITTED of the crimes charged, but ordering them to pay to
Leonardo A. Jose, jointly and severally, the sums
of P120,000.00, P150,000.00, P95,000.00, P562,000.00 and P200,000.00
representing the amounts involved in said cases, plus interest thereon at the
legal rate from filing of the information until fully paid. [10]
The Court of Appeals upheld the lower courts finding that the venue was
properly laid and that the checks were delivered by the two accused and/or
that the transactions transpired at complainants ancestral home
in Cavite City, and that, consequently, the offenses charged took place within
its territorial jurisdiction. With respect to the seven counts of violation of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, the appellate court acquitted Marietta Isip of the
charges on the ground that since the checks involved were issued prior to 8
August 1984, the dishonor thereof did not give rise to a criminal liability
pursuant to Ministry Circular No. 4 of the Ministry of Justice.
As to the Estafa cases (Criminal Cases No. 256-84, 257-84, 260-84, 261-84
and 378-84), the Court of Appeals ruled that since the checks issued by
Marietta Isip as payment for the pieces of jewelry were dishonored, there was
no payment to speak of. It also found the defenses claim of
redemption/dacion en pago that real and personal properties were conveyed
to complainant who executed affidavits of desistance and caused the

dismissal of some of the cases to be unmeritorious. However, the appellate

court ruled that though novation does not extinguish criminal liability, it may
prevent the rise of such liability as long at it occurs prior to the filing of the
criminal information in court.In these five cases, it ruled that there was
novation because complainant accepted the checks issued by Marietta Isip as
payment for the pieces of jewelry involved in said cases.Consequently, the
Court of Appeals acquitted Marietta and petitioner,[11] but held them liable to
complainant for the value of the jewelry involved.
As regards Criminal Case No. 136-84 for estafa against petitioner, the
appellate court affirmed the trial courts ruling of conviction. It found
petitioners claims that he did not receive the jewelry
worth P200,000.00 mentioned in the information; that the receipt he issued
for said jewelry was among those documents which were forced upon him to
sign under threat of criminal prosecution; and that he signed the same to
preserve his friendship with complainant, to be not persuasive.
On 17 November 2004, petitioner, for himself and in representation of his
deceased wife, Marietta Isip, filed a Partial Motion for Reconsideration
insofar as it affirmed his conviction in Criminal Case No. 136-84 and
adjudged him civilly liable, jointly and severally, with Marietta Isip in
Criminal Cases No. 256-84, 257-84, 260-84, 261-84 and 378-84.[12]
On 26 October 2005, the Court of Appeals, taking into account the death of
Marietta M. Isip prior to the promulgation of its decision, rendered an
Amended Decision with the following dispositive portion:
WHEREFORE, the decision dated October 26, 2004 is AMENDED in
respect to par. 3 of the dispositive portion thereof which shall now read as
follows:
3. In Crim. Cases Nos. 256-84, 257-84, 260-84, 261-84 and 378-84 is
REVERSED, accused-appellants Manuel S. Isip and Marietta M. Isip
ACQUITTED of the crimes charged and the civil aspect of those cases
DISMISSED.
Petitioner is now before us appealing his conviction in Criminal Case No.
136-84. He raises the following issues:

First WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION

OVER THE OFFENSE IMPUTED TO PETITIONER AND FOR WHICH
HE WAS CONVICTED;
Second WHETHER THE EVIDENCE SUFFICIENTLY SHOWS THAT
PETITIONER RECEIVED THE SUBJECT OF SAID OFFENSE OR THAT
HE RECEIVED IT IN CAVITE CITY; and
Third, WHETHER THE INCIPIENT CRIMINAL LIABILITY ARISING
FROM SAID OFFENSE, IS (sic) ANY, WAS EXTINGUISHED BY
NOVATION.
On the first issue, petitioner maintains that the RTC had no jurisdiction over
the estafa charge in Criminal Case No. 136-84 and it is pure speculation and
conjectural, if not altogether improbable or manifestly absurd, to suppose
that any of the essential elements of the Estafa charged in Criminal Case No.
136-84 took place in Cavite City. First, he states that the residence of the
parties is immaterial and that it is the situs of the transaction that counts. He
argues that it is non sequitur that simply because complainant had an alleged
ancestral house in Caridad, Cavite, complainant actually lived there and had
the transactions there with him when he and his late wife were actual
residents of Manila.Mere convenience suggests that their transaction was
entered into in Manila. He adds that the source of the fund used to finance
the transactions is likewise inconsequential because it is where the subject
item was delivered and received by petitioner and/or where it was to be
accounted for that determines venue where Estafa, if any, may be charged
and tried. Second, he further argues that it does not follow that because
complainant may have been on leave from the Bureau of Customs, the
transactions were necessarily entered into during that leave and
in Cavite City. He asserts that there is no competent proof showing that
during his leave of absence, he stayed in Cavite City; and that the
transactions involved, including the subject of Criminal Case 136-84
covering roughly the period from February to April 1984, coincided with his
alleged leave.
The concept of venue of actions in criminal cases, unlike in civil cases, is
jurisdictional.[14] The place where the crime was committed determines not
only the venue of the action but is an essential element of jurisdiction. [15] It is

a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in

criminal cases, the offense should have been committed or any one of its
essential ingredients should have taken place within the territorial jurisdiction
of the court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the
court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly
committed therein by the accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a
person charged with an offense allegedly committed outside of that
limited territory. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal
case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. And
once it is so shown, the court may validly take cognizance of the
case. However, if the evidence adduced during the trial shows that the
offense was committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action
for want of jurisdiction.[16]
In the case at bar, we, like the RTC and the Court of Appeals, are convinced
that the venue was properly laid in the RTC of Cavite City. The complainant
had sufficiently shown that the transaction covered by Criminal Case No.
136-84 took place in his ancestral home in Cavite City when he was on
approved leave of absence[17] from the Bureau of Customs. Since it has been
shown that venue was properly laid, it is now petitioners task to prove
otherwise, for it is his claim that the transaction involved was entered into
inManila. The age-old but familiar rule that he who alleges must prove his
allegations applies.[18]
In the instant case, petitioner failed to establish by sufficient and competent
evidence that the transaction happened in Manila. Petitioner argues that since
he and his late wife actually resided in Manila, convenience alone unerringly
suggests that the transaction was entered into in Manila. We are not
persuaded. The fact that Cavite City is a bit far from Manila does not
necessarily mean that the transaction cannot or did not happen
there. Distance will not prevent any person from going to a distant place
where he can procure goods that he can sell so that he can earn a living. This
is true in the case at bar. It is not improbable or impossible for petitioner and
his wife to have gone, not once, but twice in one day, to Cavite City if that is
the number of times they received pieces of jewelry from
complainant. Moreover, the fact that the checks issued by petitioners late
wife in all the transactions with complainant were drawn against accounts

with banks in Manila or Makati likewise cannot lead to the conclusion that
the transactions were not entered into in Cavite City.
It is axiomatic that when it comes to credibility, the trial courts assessment
deserves great weight, and is even conclusive and binding, if not tainted with
arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and
influence. The reason is obvious. Having the full opportunity to observe
directly the witnesses deportment and manner of testifying, the trial court is
in a better position than the appellate court to evaluate properly testimonial
evidence.[19] It is to be pointed out that the findings of fact of the trial court
have been affirmed by the Court of Appeals. It is settled that when the trial
courts findings have been affirmed by the appellate court, said findings are
generally conclusive and binding upon this Court.[20] In the case at bar, we
find no compelling reason to reverse the findings of the trial court, as
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, and to apply the exception. We so hold that
there is sufficient evidence to show that the particular transaction took place
in Cavite City.
On the second issue, petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals holding
that the ring subject of Crim. Case No. 136-84 was delivered to and received
by petitioner is seriously flawed. He argues that assuming he signed the
receipt evidencing delivery of the ring, not due to the threat of prosecution
but merely to preserve his friendship with complainant, the fact remains that
there is no showing that the ring was actually delivered to him. Petitioner
insists there is no competent evidence that the ring subject of Criminal Case
No. 136-84 was ever actually received by, or delivered to, him.
We find his contentions untenable. The finding of the Court of Appeals that
petitioner received the ring subject of Criminal Case No. 136-84 is supported
by the evidence on record. The acknowledgment receipt[21] executed by
petitioner is very clear evidence that he received the ring in
question. Petitioners claim that he did not receive any ring and merely
executed said receipt in order to preserve his friendship with the complainant
deserves scant consideration.
Petitioner, an astute businessman as he is, knows the significance, import and
obligation of what he executed and signed. The following disputable
presumptions weigh heavily against petitioner, namely: (a) That a person

intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary act; (b) That a person
takes ordinary care of his concerns; (c) That private transactions have been
fair and regular; and (d) That the ordinary course of business has been
followed [22] Thus, it is presumed that one does not sign a document without
first informing himself of its contents and consequences. We know that
petitioner understood fully well the ramification of the acknowledgment
receipt he executed. It devolves upon him then to overcome these
presumptions. We, however, find that he failed to do so. Aside from his selfserving allegation that he signed the receipt to preserve his friendship with
complainant, there is no competent evidence that would rebut said
presumptions. It is clear from the evidence that petitioner signed the
acknowledgment receipt when he received the ring from complainant
in Cavite City.
Petitioners argument that he did not receive the subject ring [23] is further
belied by the testimony of his wife when the latter testified that said ring was
borrowed by him on 7 March 1984.[24] In all, the delivery of the ring and the
transaction regarding the same occurred in Cavite City.
Anent the third issue, petitioner argues that, assuming gratia argumenti that
any criminal liability was incurred by petitioner respecting the ring subject of
Criminal Case No. 136-84, the same was incipient, at best, and was
effectively extinguished by novation. The personal and real properties
delivered/conveyed to complainant were more than sufficient to cover or
offset whatever balance remained of the obligations incurred as shown by the
fact that complainant executed Affidavits of Desistance and caused the
dismissal of some of the cases filed. He maintains that the Court of Appeals
did not apply the rule of novation as regards the ring subject of Criminal
Case No. 136-84 because it rejected his denial of receipt of said ring and his
claim that he signed the receipt supposedly covering the same under threat of
prosecution and merely to preserve their good relations. He claims the Court
should not have denied the application of the rule of novation on said case
because the rejected initial claim (that he did not receive the ring and that he
signed the receipt to preserve their good relations) was but an alternative
defense and its rejection is not a reason to deny the application of the
novation rule in said case.

We agree with the Court of Appeals that novation[25] cannot be applied in

Criminal Case No. 136-84. The claim of petitioner that the personal and real
properties conveyed to complainant and/or to his family were more than
sufficient to cover or offset whatever balance remained of the obligations
incurred has no basis. If it were true that the properties delivered to
complainant were sufficient, the latter would have caused the dismissal of all,
not some as in this instance, the cases against petitioner and his late
wife.This, complainant did not do for the simple reason that the properties
conveyed to him were not enough to cover all the obligations incurred by
petitioner and his deceased wife.Complainant testified that the properties he
received were in settlement of cases other than the cases being tried herein.
[26]
In particular, he said that petitioner and his spouse settled eight cases
which were subsequently dismissed when they delivered properties as
payment.[27] It follows then that the obligations incurred by petitioner and his
spouse were not yet settled when the criminal cases herein tried were filed.
His contention, that the Court of Appeals did not apply the rule of novation in
Criminal Case No. 136-84 because it rejected or did not believe his
(alternative) defense of denial, is untenable. The main reason why the Court
of Appeals did not apply novation in said case was that not all the elements
of novation are present. For novation to take place, four essential requisites
have to be met, namely, (1) a previous valid obligation; (2) an agreement of
all parties concerned to a new contract; (3) the extinguishment of the old
obligation; and (4) the birth of a valid new obligation. In Criminal Case No.
136-84, only the first element is extant. What distinguishes this case from
Criminal Cases No. 256-84, 257-84, 260-84, 261-84 and 378-84, where the
Court of Appeals applied the rule of novation, was that there were checks
issued as payment, though subsequently dishonored, for the pieces of jewelry
involved. In Criminal Case No. 136-84, it is very clear that neither petitioner
nor his wife issued any check as payment for the subject ring that could have
extinguished his old obligation and brought to life a new obligation.
From the allegations of the information in Criminal Case No. 136-84, it is
clear that petitioner was charged with Estafa under Article 315, paragraph
1(b), of the Revised Penal Code. The elements of estafa with abuse of
confidence are: (1) the offender receives the money, goods or other personal
property in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any other

obligation involving the duty to deliver, or to return, the same; (2) the
offender misappropriates or converts such money or property or denies
receiving such money or property; (3) the misappropriation or conversion or
denial is to the prejudice of another; and (4) the offended party demands that
the offender return the money or property.[28] All these are present in this
case. Petitioner received from complainant a seven-carat diamond (mens
ring), valued at P200,000.00, for the purpose of selling the same on
commission basis and to deliver the proceeds of the sale thereof or return the
jewelry if not sold. Petitioner misappropriated or converted said ring for his
own benefit and even denied receiving the same. Despite repeated demands
from complainant, petitioner failed to return the ring or the proceeds of the
sale thereof causing damage and prejudice to complainant in the amount
of P200,000.00.
As to the penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals on petitioner, we find the
same to be in order.
WHEREFORE, the decision and amended decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. No. 21275 dated 26 October 2004 dated 26 October 2005,
respectively, are AFFIRMED.

G.R. No. 116688 August 30, 1996

WENEFREDO CALME, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, former 10th Division with HON. ANTONIO M.
MARTINEZ as chairman and HON. CANCIO C. GARCIA and HON.
RAMON MABUTAS as members, respondents.

KAPUNAN, J.:p
Petitioner Wenefredo Calme appeals from the decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 28883 dated 10 December 1993 and its
resolution dated 14 July 1994 upholding the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial

Court, Branch 12, Oroquieta City over the information for murder filed
against him (Calme).
Petitioner and four other persons were accused of killing Edgardo Bernal by
allegedly throwing him overboard the M/V "Cebu City," an interisland
passenger ship owned and operated by William Lines, Inc., while the vessel
was sailing from Ozamis City to Cebu City on the night of 12 May 1991.
Petitioner impugned the Oroquieta RTC's jurisdiction over the offense
charged through a motion to quash which, however, was denied by Judge
Celso Conol of RTC, Branch 12, Oroquieta City. Petitioner Calme's petition
for certiorari and prohibition was denied due course and dismissed by the
Court of Appeals in its decision dated 10 December 1993. Petitioner's motion
for reconsideration of said decision was denied in the Court of Appeals's
resolution 14 July 1994. Hence, the present appeal wherein the only issue for
resolution is whether or not the Oroquieta court has jurisdiction over the
offense charged against petitioner.
Petitioner asserts that, although the alleged crime took place while the vessel
was in transit, the general rule laid down in par. (a) of Sec. 15 (now Section
14), Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court is the applicable provision in
determining the proper venue and jurisdiction and not Sec. 15(c) (now
Section 14) thereof since the exact location where the alleged crime occurred
was known. 1
Petitioner thus claims that the proper venue is Siquijor because, according to
the Marine Protest filed by the vessel's captain, Elmer Magallanes, the ship
was 8.0 miles off Minalonan Point, Siquijor Island, when he (Capt.
Magallanes) received the report that "a passenger jumped overboard." 2
Petitioner's contention is unmeritorious. The exact location where the alleged
offense was committed was not duly established. The Marine protest simply
adverted that the vessel was within the waters of Siquijor Island when the
captain was informed 3 of the incident, which does not necessarily prove that
the alleged murder took place in the same area. In any case, where the crime
was actually committed is immaterial since it is undisputed that it occurred
while the vessel was in transit. "In transit" simply means "on the way or
passage; while passing from one person or place to another. In the course of
transportation." 4 Hence, undoubtedly, the applicable provision is par. (c) of

Sec. 15 (now Section 14), Rule 110 which provides that "(w)here an offense
is committed on board a vessel in the course of its voyage, the criminal
action may be instituted and tried in the proper court of the first port of entry
or of any municipality or territory through which the vessel passed during
such voyage subject to the generally accepted principles of international
law."
Petitioner further contends that even if Sec. 15(c), Rule 110 governs,
Oroquieta City would still be excluded as a proper venue because the
reckoning point for determining the venue under the aforementioned
paragraph is the first port of entry or the municipalities/territories through
which the ship passed after the discovery of the crime, relying on Act No.
400. 5
We disagree. Obviously, Act No. 400 was amended by Sec. 15(c), Rule 110
of the Revised Rules of Court in that under the former law, jurisdiction was
conferred to the CFI of any province into which the ship or water craft upon
which the crime or offense was committed shall come after the commission
thereof, while the present rule provides that jurisdiction is vested "in the
proper court of the first port of entry or of any municipality or territory
through which the vessel passed during such voyage . . . ." This is the
applicable provision and since it does not contain any qualification, we do
not qualify the same. We fully concur with the findings of the Court of
Appeals, thus:
To support his arguments, petitioner relies on Act 400, which according to
him is the spirit behind the present Sec. 15(c), Rule 110. The said Act
specifically provides, among other things, that for crimes committed within
the navigable waters of the Philippine Archipelago, on board a ship or water
craft of Philippine registry, jurisdiction may be exercised by the Court of
First Instance in any province in which the vessel shall come after the
commission of the crime.
Petitioner's reliance on Act 400 is erroneous. The provision of said Act
vesting jurisdiction in the province where the vessel shall come after the
commission of the crime is not carried in the present Rule.
xxx xxx xxx

It is a basic rule in statutory construction that where the provisions of the law
or rule is clear and unequivocal, its meaning must be determined from the
language employed. It must be given its literal meaning and applied without
attempted interpretation (Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corp. vs. NLRC,
206 SCRA [7]01; Pascual vs. Pascual-Bautista, 207 SCRA 561).
The words of Sec. 15(c) being clear, there is no reason to rely on Act 400 in
determining its true meaning, regardless of whether said Act was indeed the
moving spirit behind it. In fact, it does not seem that
the provision of Act 400 was carried into the present rule, as it is now
worded. 6
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition for review is hereby
DENIED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. DANILO

PANLILIO y FRANCISCO, defendant-appellant.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
Danilo Panlilio y Francisco was charged before the Regional Trial Court of
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, with kidnapping under Art. 267 of the Revised
Penal Code (Crim. Case No. 235 1-V-93) and violation of P.D. 532 known as
the Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974 (Crim. Case No.
2352-V-93). In the first case, the Information alleged that on or about 17
March 1993 in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, the accused kidnapped Leah Marie
Jordan y Villato and detained her for more than an hour. In the second case,
the Information alleged that on the same occasion, with intent to gain and by
means of force and intimidation, the accused took a pair of gold earrings
worth P700.00 from the same complaining witness while they were walking
along St. Jude St., Malinta, Valenzuela, a public highway.
Ranged against the denial and alibi of the accused, the trial court found the
testimony of Leah Marie positive and convincing hence its joint decision
of 15 June 1993 convicting the accused in both cases as charged. In the

kidnapping case the accused was sentenced to reclusion perpetua and to pay
the costs, while in the highway robbery he was sentenced to an indeterminate
prison term from ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
minimum to thirteen (13) years and two (2) months of reclusion temporal as
maximum, with the accessory penalties prescribed by law, to pay
complainant the value of the pair of earrings and to pay the costs. [1]
The evidence shows that at about eleven-forty in the morning of 17 March
1993 Leah Marie Jordan y Villato, a 10-year old student, was waiting for her
younger sister outside the premises of St. Jude School in Malinta,
Valenzuela. There she was approached by Danilo Panlilio who inquired if she
knew a certain Aling Rosa. After she replied that she did not know her and
that she was only there to fetch her younger sister, Danilo suddenly poked a
knife, which was concealed inside a hat, at the right side of her neck, handed
her an empty cigarette pack with a note and ordered her to give it to Aling
Ester. When she told him that she did not know where to find Aling Ester, he
said that he would lead her to the place where Aling Ester could be found.
While Danilo and Leah Marie were walking side by side the former
continued to poke his knife at the latters neck. He told her to be quiet
otherwise he would kill her. Then they both boarded a passenger jeepney
with the knife still effectively serving as a contrivance to keep her
mute. Aside from the driver they were the only passengers on board the
jeepney. While in the jeepney Danilo forcibly took Leah Maries pair of
earrings.
Upon reaching Navotas Danilo and Leah Marie alighted from the
jeepney. He dragged her towards a vacant lot where, according to him, every
girl he brought there was made to choose between rape and death. Upon
hearing this, she struggled hard to free herself from his hold. Luckily, at this
juncture, she saw policemen coming towards their direction so she shouted
for help. One of the policemen fired a warning shot which prompted Danilo
to run away. The policemen pursued him until they caught up with him and
brought him together with Leah Marie to the Navotas Police Station for
investigation.
Meanwhile, policemen from Valenzuela went to the house of Leah and
informed her parents that their daughter was in the Navotas Police

Station. The couple then rushed to the Station where they saw Leah and
brought her to the Valenzuela Police Station to file a complaint against
Panlilio. The mother of Leah noticed that the earrings of Leah were
missing. When asked about her earrings Leah told her mother that Panlilio
forcibly took them from her.
The version of the appellant is that on the day of the incident he left his
residence at Barrio Magdaragat, Tondo, Manila, at past ten oclock in the
morning to go to Waywan Missionary atSan Rafael Village,
Tondo, Manila. However he defecated first on a vacant lot in Navotas before
proceeding. Then he saw a young girl in the area and warned her not to pass
through the garbage because she might sink. It was at this point when
policemen arrived and readily accused him of being the rapist in the area.
The accused contends in this appeal that the trial court erred (1) in not
dismissing the case for highway robbery on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction; and, (2) in finding that for the crimes charged his guilt has been
proved beyond reasonable doubt.
Appellant argues that the robbery, according to the complaining witness
herself, was perpetrated in Navotas[2] so that the Regional Trial Court of
Valenzuela has no jurisdiction over the case. He also claims that the
prosecution failed to present evidence that she indeed owned any pair of
earrings. It is his thesis that it is simply incredible that a knife was
continually poked at her neck all the way from St. Jude School in Malinta to
Navotas for an hour or so without anyone noticing, otherwise, she could have
shouted and asked for help; but she did not.Furthermore, he claims that Leah
Marie could have only been coached into testifying that she was alone
outside the school premises in a feeble attempt to explain the puzzling
situation that nobody came to her rescue when he allegedly abducted her at
knifepoint in broad daylight during school dismissal time when parents,
guardians and others usually converge to fetch their children or wards. Under
the circumstances, we are urged to consider as more credible the version of
the defense. Section 2, par. (e), of P.D. 532 defines the crime of highway
robbery/brigandage as the seizure of any person for ransom, extortion or
other unlawful purposes, or the taking away of the property of another by

means of violence against or intimidation of person or force upon things or

other unlawful means, committed by any person on any Philippine Highway,
and under Sec. 2, par. (c), of the same decree, Philippine Highway is any
road, street, passage, highway and bridge or other parts thereof or railway or
railroad within the Philippines used by persons, or vehicles, or locomotives
or trains for the movement or circulation of persons or transportation of
goods, articles, or property of both. We correlate these provisions with Sec.
15, par. (b), of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court which provides that [w]here an
offense is committed on a railroad train, in an aircraft, or in any other public
or private vehicle while in the course of its trip,the criminal action may be
instituted and tried in the court of any municipality or territory where such
train, aircraft or other vehicle passed during such trip, including the place of
departure and arrival (italics supplied). With the foregoing as guideposts we
are now asked: Did the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela have jurisdiction
over the highway robbery?
In her direct examination the complaining witness testified that when she and
the accused alighted from the jeepney in Navotas he forcibly took her pair of
earrings.[3] However, during the cross-examination she changed her testimony
thus Q. So you want to impress to the Court that even in front of St. Jude he
already asked you to remove your earrings?
A. Not yet. When we were already aboard the jeep, that was the time when
he told me to remove my earrings.[4] (italics supplied).
But thereafter she clung to the same statement for the entire course of her
cross-examination which appears to be her correct narration of events Q. And it was there that while you were already in the vacant lot that the
accused told you to remove your earrings, is that it?
A. We were not yet there.
Q. Where were you?
A. When we boarded the jeep, he instructed me to remove my earrings.
[5]
(italics supplied).

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

Q. And it was there in the Navotas area when he told you to remove your
earrings?

Q. When you were already traveling from the place, is (sic) that in
Valenzuela where you boarded the jeep?

A. I do not know, sir.

A. I do not know, sir.[11]

Q. Where?

Neither did Leah Marie mention the place or places where their vehicle
passed. We could have relied on the evidence that St. Jude School is in
Malinta, Valenzuela, in order to establish the fact that they also boarded the
jeepney in Valenzuela. Yet, her other testimony is damaging -

A. From the time we boarded the jeep.

Q. That was the time when you removed your earrings and gave it to him?
A.. Yes, sir.[6] (italics supplied).
The most candid witnesses oftentimes make mistakes and fall into confused
and inconsistent statements, but such honest lapses do not necessarily affect
their credibility.[7] More importantly, ample margin of error and
understanding should be accorded to young witnesses who much more than
adults would be gripped with tension due to the novelty of testifying before a
court.[8]
But the testimony of complainant that upon boarding the jeepney the accused
ordered her to remove her earrings and give them to him is material in
determining whether the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela had jurisdiction
over the highway robbery. Was Valenzuela their place of departure or the
municipality where their jeepney passed during the trip? Here lies the
problem. The complainant was uncertain of their place of departure Q. If you will be requested to point to the place where you boarded, you
could point the place where you boarded the jeepney?
A. No, sir, I cannot. I do not know that place because I was (just) instructed
to board.[9]

Q. So you want to impress that from St. Jude you were led by the accused to
a place where there was a passenger jeepney?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. You walked or you took a tricycle because that is the means of
transportation available in the place?
A. We did not board a tricycle. We just walked.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. And from St. Jude, how long did it take you to walk or negotiate the
distance?
A. A long time because, as a matter of fact, I got tired. [12]
From the foregoing, it would seem that the prosecution failed to establish the
precise place where the highway robbery was supposedly committed other
than Navotas. Hence, we agree with the defense that the Regional Trial Court
of Valenzuela had no jurisdiction over the offense of highway robbery,
although based on a different ground.

Q. You want to impress the Court that you boarded a passenger jeepney and
you do not know the place where you boarded the jeep?

As regards the charge of kidnapping, Art. 267 of the Revised Penal Code
provides -Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. - Any private
individual who shall kidnap or detain another, or in any other manner deprive
him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death:

A. No, sir.[10]

1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than five days.

xxx xxx xxx

2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.

3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person
kidnapped or detained; or if threats to kill him shall have been made.
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, female or a public
officer.
The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed
for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person, even
if none of the circumstances abovementioned were present in the commission
of the offense.
The poking by appellant of a knife at the complainant could have indeed
passed unnoticed because, as mentioned distinctly in her testimony, the knife
was concealed in a hat,[13] and that she did not shout for help because all
along he was poking his knife at her[14] and telling her not to resist or shout
otherwise she would be killed.[15]
The testimony of Leah Marie that she was alone in the vicinity
of St. Jude School waiting for her sister is not hard to believe. It is highly

probable that she arrived there too early or way beyond dismissal
time. Anyway, it is clear that the arguments raised by accused-appellant
pertain to the credibility of the complainant, and the appraisal by the trial
court of her credibility is entitled to great respect from the appellate courts
which do not deal with live witnesses but only with the cold pages of a
written record.[16] Hence the appellants denial and alibi were properly
rejected by the court a quo.
They were inherently weak and could not prevail over the positive testimony
of complainant that the accused detained her and took her earrings against
her will.[17]
WHEREFORE, the decision finding the accused-appellant Danilo Panlilio y
Francisco guilty of kidnapping in Crim. Case No. 2351-V-93 and imposing
upon him a prison term ofreclusion perpetua, and to pay the costs, is
AFFIRMED.
As regards Crim. Case No. 2352-V-93 for highway robbery, the case is
DISMISSED on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court
of Valenzuela, without prejudice to its refiling with the court of proper
jurisdiction.