NORKIS DISTRIBUTORS, INC. AND ALEX D. BUAT, Petitioners, vs DELFIN S.

DESCALLAR,Respondent.
G.R. No. 185255, March 14, 2012
FACTS:
Respondent Delfin S. Descallar was assigned at the Iligan City Branch of petitioner
Norkis Distributors, Inc., a distributor of Yamaha motorcycles. He became a regular
employee and was promoted as Branch Manager. He acted as branch administrator
and had supervision and control of all the employees. Respondent was also responsible
for sales and collection
In a memorandum, petitioners required respondent to explain in writing within 48 hrs
why he should not be penalized or terminated for being absent without official leave
(AWOL) or rendering under-time service on certain dates. Respondent explained that he
reported to the office on those dates, but he either went to the bank or followed-up on
prospects. As he was still within city limits, he did not file any official leave or travel
record.
Norkis conducted an investigation. Finding that respondent was not able to prove that
he was really in the branch or on official travel, petitioners suspended him for 15 days
without pay. According to petitioners, respondent admitted during the investigation that
he used company time for his personal affairs, but only for a few hours and not the
whole day.
While respondent was still suspended, Norkis also found that Respondent committed
some inappropriate and irregular acts such as unexplained low performance of his
branch, missing funds, unauthorized disbursement of funds, irregular transactions.
Petitioners terminated respondents services for loss of trust and confidence and gross
inefficiency. Respondent filed a complaint for illegal suspension and illegal dismissal. LA
favored respondent. Petitioners appealed to NLRC. NLRC reversed the LAs decision
and found respondent to have been validly dismissed. The NLRC, however, upheld the
LAs finding that petitioners are liable to respondent for unpaid wages. Respondent filed

MR. It was denied so he filed with the CA a petition for certiorari. CA reinstated with
modification the decision of the LA. Respondent filed a motion for clarification as to the
awards of separation pay and back wages while petitioners filed MR. CA issued a
Resolution stating that as regards respondents motion for clarification, the separation
pay and back wages shall be reckoned from the time respondent was illegally
suspended until finality of its earlier Decision. The CA likewise denied petitioners MR.
Hence, petitioners filed the present petition.
ISSUE:
Was the failure of respondent to reach his monthly sales quota a valid basis for loss of
trust and confidence?
RULING:
NO. Loss of trust and confidence as a ground for termination of an employee under
Article 282 of the Labor Code requires that the breach of trust be willful, meaning it must
be done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse. The basic
premise for dismissal on the ground of loss of confidence is that the employee
concerned holds a position of trust and confidence. It is the breach of this trust that
results in the employers loss of confidence in the employee.
Here, there is no question that as petitioners Branch Manager in Iligan City, respondent
was holding a position of trust and confidence. He was responsible for the
administration of the branch, and exercised supervision and control over all the
employees. He was also incharge of sales and collection.
In termination cases, the burden of proof rests upon the employer to show that the
dismissal is for a just and valid cause and failure to do so would necessarily mean that
the dismissal was illegal. The quantum of proof required in determining the legality of an
employees dismissal is only substantial evidence. CA correctly held that petitioners
failed to discharge this burden.

Failure to reach the monthly sales quota cannot be considered an intentional and
unjustified act of respondent amounting to a willful breach of trust on his part that would
call for his termination based on loss of confidence. This is not the willful breach of trust
and confidence contemplated in Article 282(c) of the Labor Code. Low sales
performance could be attributed to several factors which are beyond respondents
control. To be a valid ground for an employees dismissal, loss of trust and confidence
must be based on a willful breach. To repeat, a breach is willful if it is done intentionally,
knowingly and purposely, without justifiable excuse.
Petitioners having failed to establish by substantial evidence any valid ground for
terminating respondents services, we uphold the finding of the Labor Arbiter and the CA
that respondent was illegally dismissed.
An illegally dismissed employee is entitled to two reliefs: back wages and reinstatement.
The two reliefs provided are separate and distinct. In instances where reinstatement is
no longer feasible because of strained relations between the employee and the
employer, separation pay is granted. The normal consequences of respondents illegal
dismissal, then, are reinstatement without loss of seniority rights, and payment of back
wages computed from the time compensation was withheld from him up to the date of
actual reinstatement. Where reinstatement is no longer viable as an option, separation
pay equivalent to one month salary for every year of service should be awarded as an
alternative. The payment of separation pay is in addition to payment of back wages.
The CA merely clarified the period of payment of back wages and separation pay up to
the finality of its decision modifying the LAs decision. In view of the modification of
monetary awards in the Labor Arbiters decision, the time frame for the payment of back
wages and separation pay is accordingly modified to the finality of the CA decision.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED.

PRUDENTIAL VS. MAURICIO

PRUDENTIAL BANK (now Bank of the Philippine Islands), Petitioner, vs. ANTONIO S.A.
MAURICIO substituted by his legal heirs, MARIA FE, VOLTAIRE, ANTONIO, JR.,
ANTONILO, EARL JOHN, and FRANCISCO ROBERTO all surnamed MAURICIO,
Respondent. G.R. No. 183350; January 18, 2012
FACTS:
Respondent Mauricio was the Branch Manager of Prudential Banks Magallanes Branch
in Makati City when he was dismissed from employment.
Spouses Marcelo and Corazon Cruz (Spouses Cruz) opened a dollar savings account
(FXSD No. 221-6) with an initial cash deposit of US$500.00, in the Banks Magallanes
Branch. At that time, Mauricio was already its Branch Manager. Spouses Cruz also
executed Deeds of Real Estate Mortgage over their properties in San Juan in favor of
the bank.
An audit investigation was conducted in the Magallanes Branch. The reports of the audit
team showed that from March 1991 to August 1991, credits to FXSD No. 221-6
consisted mostly of dollar check deposits composed of U.S. Treasury Warrants
(USTWs), U.S. Postal Money Orders, Travellers Express and Amexco Money Orders.
Despite the fact that Spouses Cruz were not the payees of said instruments and neither
of them endorsed the same, Mauricio allowed immediate withdrawals against them.
Most of the proceeds of the encashments were then deposited to a peso savings
account, S/A No. 3396, also in the name of the Spouses Cruz.
The dollar checks were eventually returned by their drawee banks for having forged
endorsements, alterations to the stated amounts, or being drawn against insufficient
funds, among other reasons. Allegedly, upon receipt of the returned checks at the
Magallanes Branch, Mauricio debited FXSD No. 221-6, but such debits were made
against the uncollected deposits of the Spouses Cruz. Some of the returned checks and
USTWs were lodged to accounts receivable because the balance of FXSD No. 221-6
was not sufficient to cover the returned checks. Simultaneously, cash withdrawals were

allowed even if S/A No. 3396 did not have sufficient balance to cover the withdrawals at
the time they were made.
Mauricio was directed to report for work at the Head Office immediately. The Prudential
Bank President issued a Memorandum to Mauricio furnishing him with a copy of the
audit teams report and directing him to report in writing within 72 hours from receipt of
the memorandum why the bank should not institute an action against him. The report
showed that the bank was exposed to losses amounting to $774,561.58.
While the investigation against Mauricio was ongoing, as conducted by a Hearing
Committee, the property subject of the Deeds of Real Estate Mortgage executed by the
Spouses Cruz was extrajudicially foreclosed by the Bank for. Spouses Cruz, however,
sought the annulment and/or declaration of nullity of foreclosure in a complaint or civil
case filed with RTC- Makati.
The Bank claimed that it sent the proper demand letters to the Spouses but to no avail.
Thus, it was constrained to foreclose the mortgaged property extrajudicially for the
settlement of the obligations of the Spouses Cruz including the returned USTWs,
checks and drafts. Later, while the investigation against Mauricio was still ongoing, the
Bank filed an Amended Answer to implead Mauricio in its counterclaim in the case filed
by the Spouses against the former, contending that he conspired and confederated with
the Spouses Cruz to commit the fraud.
The Hearing Committee of the Bank found that there was sufficient evidence to hold
Mauricio guilty of the charges against him. The Board of Directors issued Resolution
considering the recommendation of the Hearing Committee and the Board found
Antonio S.A. Mauricio to have violated Bank policies and regulations and committed
imprudent acts prejudicial to the interests of the Bank, resulting in monetary loss to the
Bank and giving rise to loss of trust and confidence. The services of Mr. Mauricio was
terminated and that his retirement benefits was forfeited.

Mauricio filed with the NLRC a complaint for illegal dismissal with prayer for back
wages, retirement and provident benefits, vacation and sick leave credits, and actual,
moral and exemplary damages, plus attorneys fees. While the illegal dismissal
complaint was pending, the Makati RTC rendered a Decision in favor of the Spouses
Cruz and Mauricio. It was affirmed by the CA and Supreme Court.
On the other hand, LA rendered a Decision holding that the Bank was justified in
terminating Mauricios employment. The LA ruled that even if Mauricio, as branch
manager, was clothed with discretion, he gravely abused it to the detriment and
prejudice of the Bank and that he was afforded procedural due process before he was
dismissed. However, LA ordered the bank to pay Mauricio his 13th month pay and sick
leaves earned and reimburse him his actual contributions to the provident fund, all with
legal interest at 12% per annum from date of the decision until actual payment and/or
finality of the decision.
Mauricio filed a partial appeal of the LAs decision with the NLRC, which, however,
affirmed the LAs decision. On appeal, CA set aside the NLRC decision and ruled in
favor of Mauricio. Bank filed the instant petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the acts of Mauricio with respect to the accounts of Spouses Cruz can be
considered as grounds for his termination due to loss of trust and confidence.
RULING:
Civil and labor cases require different quanta of proof the former requiring
preponderance of evidence while the latter only calls for substantial evidence. Despite
the dissimilarity, this does not spell closing our eyes to facts conclusively determined in
one proceeding when the determination of the very same facts are crucial in resolving
the issues in another proceeding pursuant to the doctrine of res judicata.

The present labor case is closely related to the civil case that was decided with finality.
In the civil case, the Banks counterclaim for actual and exemplary damages against
Mauricio was grounded on his alleged violations of office policies when he allowed the
encashment and/or withdrawal prior to clearing of numerous USTWs and dollar checks
and allegedly tried concealing from the Bank the fact that said instruments were
returned.
The RTC in the civil case ruled:
Further, this court finds that PRUDENTIALs branch manager MAURICIOs act of
allowing SPOUSES CRUZ to immediately withdraw the instruments is well within his
functions as a branch manager. A person occupying such position exercises a certain
degree of discretion with respect to the accommodations extended to certain valued
clients such as herein SPOUSES CRUZ. Having been recommended by the legal
counsel himself of PRUDENTIAL and in view of the fact that they have substantial
deposit with the same bank, it cannot be doubted that SPOUSES CRUZ were valued
clients.
The court also holds that MAURICIO was not in anyway prompted by any malicious
motive in approving the encashment and/or withdrawal.
The acts and omissions alleged by the Bank in the civil case as basis of its counterclaim
against Mauricio, are the very same acts and omissions which were used as grounds to
terminate his employment. Mauricio cannot be held to have abused the discretion he
was clothed with absent some semblance of parameters. In the absence of such
guidelines, the validity of Mauricios acts can be tested by determining whether they
were justified under the circumstances. In exercising his discretion to allow the
questioned withdrawals, Mauricio took into consideration the fact that the Spouses Cruz
have substantial deposit and security, and enjoyed a favorable credit standing with the
Bank. No malice can be inferred from Mauricios acts who tried to collect from the
Spouses Cruz and reported all the transactions to the head office; in fact, the Bank
never called his attention to any irregularity in the transactions but even continued to

credit the account of the spouses for the value of the returned checks. Under the
circumstances, Mauricio indeed fully considered the interest of his employer before
approving the questioned transactions.
For a dismissal based on loss of trust and confidence to be valid, the breach of trust
must be willful, meaning it must be done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without
justifiable excuse. Loss of trust and confidence stems from a breach of trust founded on
dishonest, deceitful or fraudulent act. This is obviously not the case here.
Office Order No. 1596, one of the office orders allegedly violated by Mauricio, provides:
Approving officers shall exercise extreme caution in allowing deposit of, encashment or
withdrawals against foreign and out-of-town checks. Refund to the bank of the amount
involved shall be the personal responsibility and accountability of the officer who
authorized the deposit or encashment over the counter when the check should be
returned by the drawee bank for any reason whatsoever.
The above company directive is an explicit admission that Mauricio was clothed with
such discretion to enter into the questioned transactions as well as a forewarning that in
case the foreign and out-of-town checks were returned for whatever reason, the
approving officer, in this case, Mauricio, shall be personally responsible and
accountable. personal responsibility and accountability could only mean the
reimbursement of the value of any dishonored check but does not mean termination of
the approving officers employment for breaching the banks trust and confidence.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED.

COLEGIO VS. VILLAS

G.R. No. 137795 March 26, 2003
COLEGIO DE SAN JUAN DE LETRAN CALAMBA, petitioner,
vs.
BELEN P. VILLAS, respondent.
FACTS: respondent Belen Villas was employed by the petitioner School as high school
teacher in September 1985. On May 15, 1995, she applied for a study leave for six
months, from June to December 31, 1995. In a letter dated June 2, 1995, Mrs. Angelina
Quiatchon, principal of the high school department, told Villas that her request for study
leave was granted for one school year subject to the following conditions:
1. The requested study leave takes effect on June 5, 1995 and ends on March 31, 1996;
2. The requested study leave involves no remuneration on the part of the School;
3. The documents that justify the requested study leave should be submitted upon
return on April 1, 1996;
4. Faculty Manual Section 40 Special Provisions on the Granting of Leave of Absence
should be observed:
a. Once proven beyond reasonable doubt during the period of the approved leave of
absence that the faculty member shall engage himself in employment outside the
institution, the administration shall regard the faculty member on leave as resigned;
b. The maximum length of leave of absence that may be applied for by the faculty
member and granted by administration is twelve (12) months. If, at the lapse of the
period, the faculty member fails to return for work, the administration shall regard the
faculty member as resigned.
RESPONDENT ALLEGED: that she intended to utilize the first semester of her study
leave to finish her masteral degree at the Philippine Womens University (PWU).
Unfortunately, it did not push through so she took up an Old Testament course in a
school of religion and at the same time utilized her free hours selling insurance and

cookware to augment her familys income. However, during the second semester of her
study leave, she studied and passed 12 units of education subjects at the Golden Gate
Colleges in Batangas City. In response to the letters sent her by petitioner to justify her
study leave, she submitted a certification from Golden Gate Colleges and a letter
explaining why she took up an Old Testament course instead of enrolling in her masteral
class during the first semester.
President and Rector of the School, Fr. Ramonclaro G. Mendez, O. P., wrote her, stating
that her failure to enroll during the first semester was a violation of the conditions of the
study leave and that the reasons she advanced for failure to enroll during the first
semester were not acceptable and thus:
In the first place, prudence dictates that you should have ascertained first that you are
still eligible to study at PWU to finish your masteral degree before applying and securing
the approval of your leave by the School. In the second place, you should have
informed the School at once that you could not enroll in the first semester so that your
leave could have been adjusted for only one-half (1/2) year. Thirdly, your engaging in
some part-time business instead of studying in the first semester of your leave is
sufficient justification for the School to consider you as resigned under the Faculty
Manual. And lastly, your failure to study in the first semester of your study leave without
informing the School beforehand constitutes deception, to say the least, which is not a
good example to the other teachers.
Voluntary Arbitrator Mayuga who found that respondent was illegally dismissed. MR
denied. CA affirmed, Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: whether or not respondents alleged violation of the conditions of the study grant
constituted serious misconduct which justified her termination from petitioner School.
HELD: NO
Under the Labor Code, there are twin requirements to justify a valid dismissal from
employment: (a) the dismissal must be for any of the causes provided in Article 282 of

the Labor Code (substantive aspect) and (b) the employee must be given an opportunity
to be heard and to defend himself (procedural aspect).7 The procedural aspect requires
that the employee be given two written notices before she is terminated consisting of a
notice which apprises the employee of the particular acts/omissions for which the
dismissal is sought and the subsequent notice which informs the employee of the
employers decision to dismiss him.
In the case at bar, the requirements for both substantive and procedural aspects were
not satisfied.petitioner School argues that the conduct of respondent breached not only
the provisions of the study grant (which was a contractual obligation) but also the
Faculty Manual. Respondent was thus guilty of serious misconduct which was a ground
for termination.
Misconduct is improper or wrongful conduct. It is the transgression of some established
and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and
implies wrongful intent and not mere error of judgment.9 Under Article 282 of the Labor
Code, the misconduct, to be a just cause for termination, must be serious. This implies
that it must be of such grave and aggravated character and not merely trivial or
unimportant.
The alleged infractions of the respondent could hardly be considered serious
misconduct:
1. Her alleged failure to report for work EXACTLY on April 1, 1996 (respondent reported
on May 15, 1996) is not equivalent to failure to return for work, a sanctionable offense
under the Faculty Manual. Although we give credence to petitioners argument that a
private high school teacher still has work at the end of the schoolyear to assist in the
graduation preparations and in the beginning of the school year to assist in the
enrollment such tasks cannot be considered a teachers main duties, the failure to
perform which would be tantamount to dereliction of duty or abandonment.

2. With regard to her alleged failure to enroll during the first semester, although we
agree with the President and Rector, Fr. Mendez, that respondent should have first
ascertained whether she was still eligible to study at the PWU before applying for a
study leave,17 such lapse was more of an error in judgment rather than an act of
serious misconduct. If respondent intended to use her study leave for other
unauthorized purposes, as petitioner would like us to believe, she would not have
enrolled at the Golden Gate Colleges during the second semester. Yet she did, as borne
out by the certification18 prepared by the Registrar of Golden Gate Colleges.
3. Respondent did not violate the prohibition on engaging in employment outside the
school as specified in her study leave grant and as provided in the Faculty Manual.
Section 40 (a) of the Manual. The prohibition against outside employment was enacted
to prevent the teacher from using the study leave period for unsanctioned purposes
since the School pays the teacher while pursuing further studies. That rationale was not
violated by respondent for the reason that her part-time activity of selling insurance and
cookware could not have prevented her in any way from studying and, more importantly,
she was not being paid by the School while on leave. How did the school expect her
and her family to survive without any income for one whole year?
Petitioner also failed to comply with the procedural requirements for a valid dismissal.
Petitioner failed to give respondent the first notice which should have informed the latter
of the formers intention to dismiss her. Petitioner argues that it complied with this
requirement as there were several exchanges of communication between the School
and respondent regarding the cause of her termination. However, we find that these
letters did not apprise respondent that her dismissal was being sought by petitioner
School as said letters only required respondent to submit proof of enrollment.
PETITION DENIED.
________________________
NOTES:

Examples of serious misconduct justifying termination, as held in some of our

decisions, include: sexual harassment (the managers act of fondling the hands,
massaging the shoulder and caressing the nape of a secretary);11 fighting within
company premises;12 uttering obscene, insulting or offensive words against a
superior;13 misrepresenting that a student is his nephew and pressuring and
intimidating a co-teacher to change that students failing grade to passing.
respondent is not entitled to the six-month study leave and vacation pay, the same
was expressly waived by complainant when she signed conforme to the letter dated
June 2, 1995 approving her study leave which states among others, to wit: 2. The
requested study leave involves no remuneration on the part of the school
VICENTE VS. CA
G.R. No. 175988 August 24, 2007
MA. FININA E. VICENTE, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Former Seventeenth Division and CINDERELLA
MARKETING CORPORATION, Respondents.
FACTS: Petitioner Finina E. Vicente was employed by respondent Cinderella Marketing
Corporation (Cinderella) as Management Coordinator in January 1990. Prior to her
resignation in February 2000, she held the position of Consignment Operations
Manager with a salary of P27,000.00 a month.5 She was tasked with the oversight,
supervision and management of the Consignment Department dealing directly with
Cinderellas consignors.
Petitioner alleged that it has been a practice among the employees of Cinderella to
obtain cash advances by charging the amount from the net sales of Cinderellas
suppliers/consignors. Request for cash advances are approved by Mr. TECSON (AVPFinance).
After some time, one of Cinderellas suppliers complained about the unauthorized
deductions from the net sales due them. Accordingly, an investigation was conducted
and upon initial review of respondents business records, it appears that petitioner was

among those involved in the irregular and fraudulent preparation and encashment of
respondents corporate checks amounting to at least P500,000.00.
Petitioner alleged that Mr. Tecson demanded her resignation on several occasions. On
February 15, 2000, Mr. Tecson allegedly told her MAG-RESIGN KANA AGAD KASI
MAIIPIT KAMI, in the presence of Lizz Villafuerte, the Accounting Manager.9 As a result
of this alleged force and intimidation, petitioner tendered her resignation letter.
Three (3) years after her resignation, petitioner filed a complaint against Cinderella
alleging that her severance from employment was involuntary amounting to constructive
dismissal. Cinderella denied the charge of constructive dismissal.
LA ruled in favour of petitioner; NLRC affirmed. MR denied;
CA reversed on stating that, totality of evidence on record showed that petitioner
voluntarily resigned from her employment; that the subsequent acts of petitioner belie
the claim of constructive dismissal; that after the alleged forced resignation, petitioner
attended the meetings concerning her involvement in the anomalous transactions and
even arranged for the settlement of her consequent liabilities as may be determined
during the investigation; that the belated filing of the complaint militates against
petitioner because it is hardly expected from an aggrieved employee to wait three years
before instituting the case. MR denied.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: WON petitioner was constructively dismissed by Cinderella (or was there
voluntary resignation on the part of petitioner?)
HELD: NO, respondent voluntarily resigned.
In termination cases, burden of proof rests upon the employer to show that the
dismissal is for a just and valid cause and failure to do so would necessarily mean that
the dismissal was illegal.19 In Mobile Protective & Detective Agency v. Ompad, the
Court ruled that should an employer interpose the defense of resignation, as in the

present case, it is still incumbent upon respondent company to prove that the employee
voluntarily resigned.
From the totality of evidence on record, it was clearly demonstrated that respondent
Cinderella has sufficiently discharged its burden to prove that petitioners resignation
was voluntary. In voluntary resignation, the employee is compelled by personal
reason(s) to disassociate himself from employment. It is done with the intention of
relinquishing an office, accompanied by the act of abandonment.21 To determine
whether the employee indeed intended to relinquish such employment, the act of the
employee before and after the alleged resignation must be considered.
Petitioner

relinquished

her

position

when

she

submitted

the

letters

ofresignation.The resignation letter submitted on February 15, 2000 confirmed the

earlier resignation letter she submitted on February 7, 2000. The resignation letter
contained words of gratitude which can hardly come from an employee forced to resign.
A careful scrutiny of the said letter shows that it bears the signature of petitioner
(contrary to what the LA stated). More importantly, petitioner admitted having submitted
the said letter, albeit, due to an alleged intimidation.
Subsequently, petitioner stopped reporting for work although she met with the officers of
the corporation to settle her accountabilities but never raised the alleged intimidation
employed on her. Also, though the complaint was filed within the 4-year prescriptive
period, its belated filing supports the contention of respondent that it was a
mere afterthought.24 Taken together, these circumstances are substantial proof that
petitioners resignation was voluntary.
Having submitted a resignation letter, it is then incumbent upon her to prove that the
resignation was not voluntary but was actually a case of constructive dismissal with
clear, positive, and convincing evidence.26 Petitioner failed to substantiate her claim of
constructive dismissal.
Bare allegations of constructive dismissal, when uncorroborated by the evidence on
record, cannot be given credence.
In St. Michael Academy v. National Labor Relations Commission,28 we ruled that mere
allegations of threat or force do not constitute substantial evidence to support a finding

of forced resignation. We enumerated the requisites for intimidation to vitiate consent as

follows:
(1) that the intimidation caused the consent to be given; (2) that the threatened act be
unjust or unlawful; (3) that the threat be real or serious, there being evident
disproportion between the evil and the resistance which all men can offer, leading to the
choice of doing the act which is forced on the person to do as the lesser evil; and (4)
that it produces a well-grounded fear from the fact that the person from whom it comes
has the necessary means or ability to inflict the threatened injury to his person or
property. x x x
None of the above requisites was established by petitioner. Neither can we consider the
conduct of audits and other internal investigations as a form of harassment against
petitioner. Said investigation was legitimate and justified
Moreover, we note that petitioner is holding a managerial position with a salary of
P27,000.00 a month. Hence, she is not an ordinary employee with limited
understanding such that she would be easily maneuvered or coerced to resign against
her will.
PETITION DENIED.
__________
NOTES:
In administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof required is substantial evidence,
which is more than a mere scintilla of evidence, but such amount of relevant evidence
which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.
BARCENAS VS. NLRC
G.R. No. 87210 July 16, 1990
FILOMENA BARCENAS, petitioner,
vs.
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC), Rev. SIM DEE the

present Head Monk of the Manila Buddha Temple, MANUEL CHUA, in his capacity as
the President and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Poh Toh Buddhist
Association of the Philippines, Inc., and in his private capacity,respondents.
FACTS: The Buddhist Temple has hired petitioner who speaks the Chinese language as
secretary and interpreter. The head monk, Chua Se Su, had sexual relations with
petitioner, which resulted to the latter giving birth to a child. In May, 1982, of five months
before giving birth to the alleged son of Su on October 12, 1982, petitioner was sent
home to Bicol. Upon the death of Su in July, 1983, complainant remained and continued
in her job. In 1985, respondent Manuel Chua (Chua, for short) was elected President
and Chairman of the Board of the Poh Toh Buddhist Association of the Philippines, Inc.
and Rev. Sim Dee for short) was elected Head Buddhist Priest. Thereafter, Chua and
Dee discontinued payment of her monthly allowance and the additional P500.00
allowance effective 1983. Petitioner and her son were evicted forcibly from their
quarters in the temple by six police officers. She was brought first to the Police precinct
in Tondo and then brought to Aloha Hotel where she was compelled to sign a written
undertaking not to return to the Buddhist temple in consideration of the sum of
P10,000.00. Petitioner refused and Chua shouted threats against her and her son. Her
personal belongings including assorted jewelries were never returned by respondent
Chua.
Chua alleges that she was never an employee of the temple, but only attended to the
personal needs of the former head monk, hence was co-terminus with such.
LA ruled in favour of the petitioner. NLRC reversed.
ISSUE: WON petitioner is an employee of the temple
HELD:
Petitioner is an employee of the temple as secretary and interpreter.
Moreover, the work that petitioner performed in the temple could not be categorized as
mere domestic work. We find that petitioner, being proficient in the Chinese language,
attended to the visitors, mostly Chinese, who came to pray or seek advice before

Buddha for personal or business problems; arranged meetings between these visitors
and Su and supervised the preparation of the food for the temple visitors; acted as
tourist guide of foreign visitors; acted as liaison with some goverment offices; and made
the payment for the temples Meralco, MWSS and PLDT bills. Indeed, these tasks may
not be deemed activities of a household helper. They were essential and important to
the operation and religious functions of the temple.
In spite of this finding, her status as a regular employee ended upon her return to Bicol
in May, 1982 to await the birth of her love-child allegedly by Su. The records do not
show that petitioner filed any leave from work or that a leave was granted her. Neither
did she return to work after the birth of her child on October 12, 1982, whom she named
Robert Chua alias Chua Sim Tiong. The NLRC found that it was only in July, 1983 after
Su died that she went back to the Manila Buddhist Temple. Petitioners pleadings failed
to rebut this finding. Clearly, her return could not be deemed as a resumption of her old
position which she had already abandoned.
Thus, her return to the temple was no longer as an employee but rather as Sus
mistress who is bent on protecting the proprietary and hereditary rights of her son and
nephew. Finally, while petitioner contends that she continued to work in the temple after
Su died, there is, however, no proof that she was re-hired by the new Head Monk.
BACSIN VS. WAHIMAN
G.R. No. 146053, April 30, 2008
DIOSCORO F. BACSIN, petitioner,
vs.
EDUARDO O. WAHIMAN, respondent.
FACTS: Petitioner is a public school teacher of Pandan Elementary School. Respondent
Eduardo O. Wahiman is the father of AAA, an elementary school student of the
petitioner.
AAA claimed that on August 16, 1995, petitioner asked her to be at his office to do an
errand. Once inside, she saw him get a folder from one of the cartons on the floor near
his table, and place it on his table. He then asked her to come closer, and when she did,

held her hand, then touched and fondled her breast. She stated that he fondled her
breast five times, and that she felt afraid. A classmate of hers, one Vincent B. Sorrabas,
claiming to have witnessed the incident, testified that the fondling incident did happen
just as AAA related it.
In his defense, petitioner claimed that the touching incident happened by accident, just
as he was handing AAA a lesson book.6 He further stated that the incident happened in
about two or three seconds, and that the girl left his office without any complaint.
CSC found petitioner guilty of Grave Misconduct (Acts of Sexual Harassment), and
dismissed him from the service. Specifically, the CSC found the petitioner to have
committed an act constituting sexual harassment, as defined in Sec. 3 of Republic Act
No. (RA) 7877, the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995.
CA determined that the issue revolved around petitioners right to due process, and
based on its finding that petitioner had the opportunity to be heard, found that there was
no violation of that right. The CA ruled that, even if petitioner was formally charged with
disgraceful and immoral conduct and misconduct, the CSC found that the allegations
and evidence sufficiently proved petitioners guilt of grave misconduct, punishable by
dismissal from the service.
Petitioner argues that the CSC cannot validly adjudge him guilty of an offense, such as
Grave Misconduct (Acts of Sexual Harassment), different from that specified in the
formal charge which was Misconduct. He further argues that the offense of
Misconduct does not include the graver offense of Grave Misconduct.
ISSUE: WON petitioner is guilty of Sexual Harassment
HELD: The formal charge, while not specifically mentioning RA 7877, The Anti-Sexual
Harassment Act of 1995, imputes on the petitioner acts covered and penalized by said
law.

Contrary to the argument of petitioner, the demand of a sexual favor need not be explicit
or stated. In Domingo v. Rayala, it was held, It is true that this provision calls for a
demand, request or requirement of a sexual favor. But it is not necessary that the
demand, request, or requirement of a sexual favor be articulated in a categorical oral or
written statement. It may be discerned, with equal certitude, from the acts of the
offender.
The CSC found, as did the CA, that even without an explicit demand from petitioner his
act of mashing the breast of AAA was sufficient to constitute sexual harassment.
Moreover, under Section 3 (b) (4) of RA 7877, sexual harassment in an education or
training environment is committed (w)hen the sexual advances result in an intimidating,
hostile or offensive environment for the student, trainee or apprentice. AAA even
testified that she felt fear at the time petitioner touched her.
In grave misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or
flagrant disregard of established rule must be manifest.14 The act of petitioner of
fondling one of his students is against a law, RA 7877, and is doubtless inexcusable.
The particular act of petitioner cannot in any way be construed as a case of simple
misconduct.
He is dismissed from service
Petitioner was not denied due process of law, contrary to his claims. The essence of
due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or, as applied to administrative
proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones side or an opportunity to seek for a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. It is clear that petitioner was
sufficiently informed of the basis of the charge against him, which was his act of
improperly touching one of his students. Thus informed, he defended himself from such
charge. The failure to designate the offense specifically and with precision is of no
moment in this administrative case.
YRASUEGUI VS. PAL
G.R. No. 168081, October 17, 2008
ARMANDO G. YRASUEGUI, petitioners,

vs.
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., respondents.
FACTS: THIS case portrays the peculiar story of an international flight steward who was
dismissed because of his failure to adhere to the weight standards of the airline
company.
The proper weight for a man of his height and body structure is from 147 to 166 pounds,
the ideal weight being 166 pounds, as mandated by the Cabin and Crew Administration
Manual of PAL.
In 1984, the weight problem started, which prompted PAL to send him to an extended
vacation until November 1985. He was allowed to return to work once he lost all the
excess weight. But the problem recurred. He again went on leave without pay from
October 17, 1988 to February 1989.
Despite the lapse of a ninety-day period given him to reach his ideal weight, petitioner
remained overweight. On January 3, 1990, he was informed of the PAL decision for him
to remain grounded until such time that he satisfactorily complies with the weight
standards. Again, he was directed to report every two weeks for weight checks, which
he failed to comply with.
On April 17, 1990, petitioner was formally warned that a repeated refusal to report for
weight check would be dealt with accordingly. He was given another set of weight check
dates, which he did not report to.

On November 13, 1992, PAL finally served petitioner a Notice of Administrative Charge
for violation of company standards on weight requirements. Petitioner insists that he is
being discriminated as those similarly situated were not treated the same.
On June 15, 1993, petitioner was formally informed by PAL that due to his inability to
attain his ideal weight, and considering the utmost leniency extended to him which

spanned a period covering a total of almost five (5) years, his services were considered
terminated effective immediately.
LABOR ARBITER: held that the weight standards of PAL are reasonable in view of the
nature of the job of petitioner. However, the weight standards need not be complied with
under pain of dismissal since his weight did not hamper the performance of his duties.
NLRC affirmed.
CA: the weight standards of PAL are reasonable. Thus, petitioner was legally dismissed
because he repeatedly failed to meet the prescribed weight standards. It is obvious that
the issue of discrimination was only invoked by petitioner for purposes of escaping the
result of his dismissal for being overweight.
ISSUE: WON he was validly dismissed.
HELD: YES
A reading of the weight standards of PAL would lead to no other conclusion than that
they constitute a continuing qualification of an employee in order to keep the job. The
dismissal of the employee would thus fall under Article 282(e) of the Labor Code.
In the case at bar, the evidence on record militates against petitioners claims that
obesity is a disease. That he was able to reduce his weight from 1984 to 1992 clearly
shows that it is possible for him to lose weight given the proper attitude, determination,
and self-discipline. Indeed, during the clarificatory hearing on December 8, 1992,
petitioner himself claimed that [t]he issue is could I bring my weight down to ideal
weight which is 172, then the answer is yes. I can do it now.
Petitioner has only himself to blame. He could have easily availed the assistance of the
company physician, per the advice of PAL.

In fine, We hold that the obesity of petitioner, when placed in the context of his work as
flight attendant, becomes an analogous cause under Article 282(e) of the Labor Code
that justifies his dismissal from the service. His obesity may not be unintended, but is
nonetheless voluntary. As the CA correctly puts it, [v]oluntariness basically means that
the just cause is solely attributable to the employee without any external force
influencing or controlling his actions. This element runs through all just causes under
Article 282, whether they be in the nature of a wrongful action or omission. Gross and
habitual neglect, a recognized just cause, is considered voluntary although it lacks the
element of intent found in Article 282(a), (c), and (d).
NOTES:
The dismissal of petitioner can be predicated on the bona fide occupational qualification
defense. Employment in particular jobs may not be limited to persons of a particular
sex, religion, or national origin unless the employer can show that sex, religion, or
national origin is an actual qualification for performing the job. The qualification is called
a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ). In short, the test of reasonableness of
the company policy is used because it is parallel to BFOQ. BFOQ is valid provided it
reflects an inherent quality reasonably necessary for satisfactory job performance.
The business of PAL is air transportation. As such, it has committed itself to safely
transport its passengers. In order to achieve this, it must necessarily rely on its
employees, most particularly the cabin flight deck crew who are on board the aircraft.
The weight standards of PAL should be viewed as imposing strict norms of discipline
upon its employees.
The primary objective of PAL in the imposition of the weight standards for cabin crew is
flight safety.
Separation pay, however, should be awarded in favor of the employee as an act of
social justice or based on equity. This is so because his dismissal is not for serious
misconduct. Neither is it reflective of his moral character.

SABEROLA VS. SUAREZ

G.R. No. 151227 July 14, 2008
GREGORIO S. SABEROLA, Petitioner,
vs.
RONALD SUAREZ and RAYMUNDO LIRASAN, JR., Respondents.
FACTS: Case is for illegal dismissal with money claims filed by respondents against
petitioner. Latter is the owner and manager of G.S. Saberola Electrical Services, a firm
engaged in the construction business specializing in installing electrical devices in
subdivision homes and in commercial and non-commercial buildings. Respondents
were employed by petitioner as electricians. They worked from Monday to Saturday
and, occasionally, on Sundays, with a daily wage of P110.00.
Petitioner averred that respondents were part-time project employees and were
employed only when there were electrical jobs to be done in a particular housing unit
contracted by petitioner. He maintained that the services of respondents as project
employees were coterminous with each project. As project employees, the time of
rendition of their services was not fixed. Thus, there was no practical way of determining
the appropriate compensation of the value of respondents accomplishment, as their
work assignment varied depending on the needs of a specific project.
LABOR ARBITER: they are project employees, not entitled to benefits
NLRC: affirmed, but said they were illegally dismissed
CA: affirmed
ISSUE: What is their status? And were they illegally dismissed?
HELD: Project employees (BUT were illegally dismissed)
Petitioner, as an electrical contractor, depends for his business on the contracts that he
is able to obtain from real estate developers and builders of buildings. Thus, the work
provided by petitioner depends on the availability of such contracts or projects. The
duration of the employment of his work force is not permanent but coterminous with the

projects to which the workers are assigned. Viewed in this context, the respondents are
considered as project employees of petitioner.
A project employee is one whose employment has been fixed for a specific project or
undertaking, the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of
the engagement of the employee or where the work or service to be performed is
seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season.
However, respondents, even if working as project employees, enjoy security of tenure.
Nonetheless, when a project employee is dismissed, such dismissal must still comply
with the substantive and procedural requirements of due process. Termination of his
employment must be for a lawful cause and must be done in a manner which affords
him the proper notice and hearing.
A project employee must be furnished a written notice of his impending dismissal and
must be given the opportunity to dispute the legality of his removal. In termination
cases, the burden of proof rests on the employer to show that the dismissal was for a
just or authorized cause. Employers who hire project employees are mandated to state
and prove the actual basis for the employees dismissal once its veracity is challenged.
Petitioner failed to present any evidence to disprove the claim of illegal dismissal. No
evidence was presented by petitioner to show the termination of the project which would
justify the cessation of the work of respondents. Neither was there proof that petitioner
complied with the substantive and procedural requirements of due process.
RBC VS. BALUYOT
G.R. No. 172670, January 20, 2009
RBC CABLE MASTER SYSTEM AND/OR EVELYN CINENSE, Petitioners,
vs.
MARCIAL BALUYOT, Respondent.

FACTS: Herein petitioner RBC Cable Master System (petitioner RBC) is a cable firm
engaged in the business of providing home cable service. Sometime in March 1996,
petitioner RBC hired herein private respondent Marcial Baluyot as a Lineman.
In the middle part of the year 2000, private respondent learned that his outstanding loan
from cash advances accumulated to P18,000.00. The cash advances he made [were]
pursuant to a long time practice for the employees of petitioner RBC to advance
amounts of money in the form of cash vales with the condition that the same be
deducted from their monthly salaries on a staggered or periodic basis. Respondent
alleged that he delivered his motorcycle as a security for said loans. But petitioner avers
that such motorcycle was actually leased, which lease only ceased when respondent no
longer owned said vehicle because of non-payment of its financing.
On February 1, 2001, when private respondent reported for work, he was informed that
no blank official receipts could be issued to him for his collection job for that day or for a
month because he is being suspended. Thus, for one month, he did not report for work
and when he reported back to duty, he was told by petitioner RBC that he is now out of
job and is considered terminated.
Petitioner RBC denied dismissing private respondent by contending that it was private
respondent who abandoned his work when, sometime in March 2001, he left without
any notice and never returned back for work. They also alleged that respondent
committed several infractions such as misappropriations and falsification of documents.
LABOR ARBITER ruled that private respondent abandoned his job and committed acts
of dishonesty such as theft of company funds and property.
NLRC ruled that private respondent did not abandon his job but was illegally dismissed.
ISSUE: WON respondent was illegally dismissed
HELD: YES
After respondent was punished with suspension by petitioners, he was admitted back to
work on the condition that he will not repeat the same violations and he will pay back

the sums he owed. This proved that petitioners had condoned the infractions previously
committed by the respondent.
To constitute abandonment, two elements must concur:
(1) the failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason, and
(2) a clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship, with the second
element as the more determinative factor and being manifested by some overt acts.
Mere absence is not sufficient. The employer has the burden of proof to show a
deliberate and unjustified refusal of the employee to resume his employment without
any intention of returning.
In the case at bar, the charge of abandonment is belied by the following circumstances:
First, the high improbability of private respondent to intentionally abandon his work
considering that he had already served a penalty of suspension for his infractions and
violations as well as the petitioners tacit condonation of the infractions he committed, by
permitting him to go back to work and by asking him to execute a promissory note. It is
incongruent to human nature, that after having ironed things out with his employer, an
employee would just not report for work for no apparent reason. Secondly, there was no
proof that petitioner sent private respondent a notice of termination on the ground of
abandonment, if indeed it is true that he really failed to go back to work. Section 2, Rule
XVI, Book V, Rules and regulations implementing the Labor Code provides that any
employer who seeks to dismiss a worker shall furnish him a written notice stating the
particular act or omission constituting the ground for his dismissal. In cases of
abandonment of work, the notice shall be served at the workers last known address.
For this reason, We are constrained to give credence to private respondents assertion
that he attempted to report back to work but he was just asked to leave as he was
considered terminated. And lastly, private respondents filing of a case for illegal
dismissal with the labor arbiter negates abandonment. As held by the Supreme Court, a
charge of abandonment is totally inconsistent with the immediate filing of a complaint for
illegal dismissal, more so when it includes a prayer for reinstatement.

Finally, an employee who is illegally dismissed is entitled to the twin reliefs of full
backwages and reinstatement. If reinstatement is not viable, separation pay is awarded
to the employee. In awarding separation pay to an illegally dismissed employee, in lieu
of reinstatement, the amount to be awarded shall be equivalent to one (1) month salary
for every year of service.
LEYTE GEOTHERMAL VS. PNOC
G.R. No. 170351, March 30, 2011
LEYTE GEOTHERMAL POWER PROGRESSIVE EMPLOYEES UNION ALU TUCP,
Petitioner,
vs.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL OIL COMPANY ENERGY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
Respondent.
FACTS: Respondent is a GOCC while petitioner is a legitimate labor organization.
Among [respondents] geothermal projects is the Leyte Geothermal Power Project
located at the Greater Tongonan Geothermal Reservation in Leyte. Thus, the
[respondent] hired and employed hundreds of employees on a contractual basis,
whereby, their employment was only good up to the completion or termination of the
project and would automatically expire upon the completion of such project.
Majority of the employees hired by [respondent] in its Leyte Geothermal Power Projects
had become members of petitioner. In view of that circumstance, the petitioner
demands from the [respondent] for recognition of it as the collective bargaining agent of
said employees and for a CBA negotiation with it. However, the [respondent] did not
heed such demands of the petitioner. Sometime in 1998 when the project was about to
be completed, the [respondent] proceeded to serve Notices of Termination of
Employment upon the employees who are members of the petitioner.
On December 28, 1998, the petitioner filed a Notice of Strike with DOLE against the
[respondent] on the ground of purported commission by the latter of unfair labor practice
for refusal to bargain collectively, union busting and mass termination. On the same
day,

the

petitioner

declared

strike

and

staged

such

strike.

Secretary of Labor intervened and ordered all workers to return to work. However,

petitioner

did

not

abide.

NLRC: ruled that the employees are PROJECT EMPLOYEES, and the strike as
ILLEGAL
Petitioner Union contends that its officers and members performed activities that were
usually necessary and desirable to respondents usual business.
ISSUE: WON they are project employees
HELD: They are PROJECT EMPLOYEES
Article 280 of the Labor Code contemplates four (4) kinds of employees:
(a) regular employees or those who have been engaged to perform activities which are
usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer;
(b) project employees or those whose employment has been fixed for a specific project
or undertaking[,] the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time
of the engagement of the employee;
(c) seasonal employees or those who work or perform services which are seasonal in
nature, and the employment is for the duration of the season; and
(d) casual employees or those who are not regular, project, or seasonal employees.
Jurisprudence has added a fifth kind a fixed-term employee.
By entering into such a contract, an employee is deemed to understand that his
employment is coterminous with the project. He may not expect to be employed
continuously beyond the completion of the project. It is of judicial notice that project
employees engaged for manual services or those for special skills like those of
carpenters or masons, are, as a rule, unschooled. However, this fact alone is not a valid
reason for bestowing special treatment on them or for invalidating a contract of
employment. Project employment contracts are not lopsided agreements in favor of only
one party thereto. The employers interest is equally important as that of the

employee[s] for theirs is the interest that propels economic activity. While it may be true
that it is the employer who drafts project employment contracts with its business interest
as overriding consideration, such contracts do not, of necessity, prejudice the employee.
Neither is the employee left helpless by a prejudicial employment contract. After all,
under the law, the interest of the worker is paramount.
Unions own admission, both parties had executed the contracts freely and voluntarily
without force, duress or acts tending to vitiate the worker[s] consent. Thus, we see no
reason not to honor and give effect to the terms and conditions stipulated therein.
The litmus test to determine whether an individual is a project employee lies in setting a
fixed period of employment involving a specific undertaking which completion or
termination has been determined at the time of the particular employees engagement.
NOTES:
WHAT IS A PROJECT? In the realm of business and industry, we note that project
could refer to one or the other of at least two (2) distinguishable types of activities.
Firstly, a project could refer to a particular job or undertaking that is within the regular or
usual business of the employer company, but which is distinct and separate, and
identifiable as such, from the other undertakings of the company. Such job or
undertaking begins and ends at determined or determinable times. The typical example
of this first type of project is a particular construction job or project of a construction
company. A construction company ordinarily carries out two or more [distinct] identifiable
construction projects: e.g., a twenty-five-storey hotel in Makati; a residential
condominium building in Baguio City; and a domestic air terminal in Iloilo City.
Employees who are hired for the carrying out of one of these separate projects, the
scope and duration of which has been determined and made known to the employees
at the time of employment, are properly treated as project employees, and their
services may be lawfully terminated at completion of the project.

The term project could also refer to, secondly, a particular job or undertaking that is
not within the regular business of the corporation. Such a job or undertaking must also
be identifiably separate and distinct from the ordinary or regular business operations of
the employer. The job or undertaking also begins and ends at determined or
determinable times.