Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
Fleet performance
WISE
Main Adopted Solutions
and Tips
A320 Family
During the migration period, this PDF file is made available to you in order
to ensure continuity of the information delivered.
Disclaimer
The values and information provided in this service are supplied in good faith and are based on in-service
experience feedback obtained from operators of the concerned aircraft fleets. The recommendations based on
said values and information do not constitute a contractual commitment, warranty or guarantee whatsoever
but are for information and convenience only.
Page 2
AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
Table of content
AEVC upgrade to standard V06 amendment E
FCV 1303 reliability improvement
Outflow valve reliability improvement
Skin Air Inlet Valve Overhaul
Skin Air Outlet Valve Overhaul
FAP improvement
Handset improvement
Recent Solution: Introduce new latch and keeper for OHSC
Improved SDCU Power Supply card
Improved smoke detectors for avionics zone
Recent Solution: Introduce new smoke detectors for SDCU-based SDS
Yaw damper servo control standard upgrade
Improved SEC reliability
Page 3
AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
Table of content
Modify position of ventillation holes on ELAC racks
Preventive replacement of the radio PTT switch
Recent Solution: Introduce roller bearing on rod end rudder servocontrol
Recent Solution: Introduce roller bearing on rod end elevator servocontrol
New fuse for moisture ingress protection
Improved check-valve in HP/PTU manifold
Modified elbow union
Preventive replacement of Y PTU manifold
Preventive replacement of Y HP manifold
Upgrade of Eaton EDP
Alleviate fluid leak from manifold
Power Transfer Unit leakage reduction
Modification of automatic brake selector valve
Page 4
AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
Table of content
Preventive replacement of MLG door actuator hose
MLG Lock Stay Actuator Hose Upgrade
LED Navigation lights
Recent solution: Sealing of drain hole to prevent liquid contamination
Introduce the optional alignement improvement function on ADIRU
Introduce PTFE seals to avoid air leak
Forward and AFT cargo door proximity switches upgrade
Introduce improved cockpit door locking control unit
Install deflectors on IAE V2500 AFT Pylon Fairing
Cockpit window preventive maintenance
Install saddle clamp on CFM56-5B hydraulic line
Recent Solution: Introduction of New HPTACC Valve 329695-5
Page 5
AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
RECO-SA-21-01
Engine: ALL
ATA 4D: 2126 & 2615
System: AEVC
Impact:
A/C Availability,Maintenance
economics,Operations
Background:
Some operators have encountered cases of avionics ventilation system issues (VENT AVNCS SYSTEM FAULT, VENT SKIN VALVE FAULT ECAM
warning), leading to flight delays, cancellations but also to some aborted take-off or in-flight interruptions (due to the impossibility to pressurize
cabin). The AEVC (PN 87292325-0X) is one of the main root cause for such warnings. Furthermore, AEVC may also be at the origin of spurious
"AVIONICS SMOKE" warning, due to vibrations at RAM level, which is responsible for some in-flight interruptions (LAND ASAP cases).
Airbus recommendation:
Operators are recommended to upgrade AEVC units to standard V06 amendment E (as a minimum) and so to embody, according to current AEVC
standard, one or several of the following Thals VSB:
- VSB 87292325-21-008 to improve AEVC robustness with regards to electrical transient (for V04 units)
- VSB 87292325-21-011 (covered by SB 21-1147) as a final fix towards the spurious "avionics" smoke warnings (for V05 units)
- VSB 87292325-21-012 to improve the interface robustness between the AEVC and the Skin Air Valves (for V06 units, pre-amendment E)
AEVC V06 amendment E has been introduced in production for MSN > 2700 and VSB 87592325-21-012, issued in 2006, has already been embodied
on about 900 in-service aircraft with positive feedback.
Notes:
- The amount of the corresponding benefit mainly depends on the pre-mod AEVC standard. In other words, the reliability improvement will be more
important (in term of MTBUR increase for example) with -04 pre-mod AEVC standard than with -05 or -06 (pre-amendment E). Yet in all cases, due
to different kit price and manpower, the payback period is globally the same. The "cost / benefit analysis" presented here is relative to -05 pre-mod
AEVC standard.
- The cost/benefit analysis presented here does not include the cost corresponding to AEVC test after VSB embodiment
Page 6
AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
RECO-SA-21-01
Associated documentation:
TFU 21.26.00.020, SB 21-1147, TFU 21.26.00.019, VSB 87292325-21-011
General assumptions:
Page 7
AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
RECO-SA-21-01
Page 8
AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
Weight impact: 0 kg
RECO-SA-21-02
Engine: ALL
ATA 4D: 2151 & 2152
System: Flow Control Valve
Impact:
A/C Availability,Maintenance
economics,Operations
Background:
Some operators have encountered cases of AIR PACK 1(2) FAULT ECAM warning, or one PACK set to default HI FLOW. Such events, generally due
to FCV failure, lead to aircraft delays (to secure that FCV is in closed position for example) and cancellations (ETOPS flight for example) but also to
some cases of ground turn back and in-flight interruptions. Investigations have allowed to identify the valve position microswitch (FCV subcomponent) as the main root cause for FCV 1303A0000-02 & 1303A0000-03 failures.
Airbus recommendation:
VSB 1303-21-06 introduces a new FCV standard (PN 1303A0000-04), equipped with a different microswitch. This microswitch, made by Le Crouzet,
is already embodied on FCV 751 series (A320 family, MSN < 1000) and FCV 964 series (A340 family) with very low failure rate. This new FCV has
been introduced in production for MSN > 2500 and VSB 1303-21-06, issued in 2005, has already been embodied on more than 1000 aircraft with
positive feedback.
Note: this economic assessment has been considered on attrition as specified within the vendor technical documentation (ref. VSB 1303-21-06).
Page 9
AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
RECO-SA-21-02
Associated documentation:
TFU 21.51.51.009, VSB 1303-21-06
General assumptions:
Page 10
AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
RECO-SA-21-02
Page 11
AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
Weight impact: 0 kg
RECO-SA-21-03
Engine: ALL
ATA 4D: 2131
System: Outflow valve
Impact:
A/C Availability,Maintenance
economics,Operations
Background:
Some operators have encountered cases of CAB PR SYS 1(2) FAULT ECAM, CAB EXCESS CAB ALT ECAM warning or Cabin altitude oscillations,
leading generally to aircraft delays and cancellations but also to some cases of ground turn-back or in-flight interruptions. Majority of these issues
were observed after introduction of CPC-10, which performs a more sensitive monitoring of the outflow valve (Fault Code 81). Such events were
generally solved through outflow valve removal and replacement.
Airbus recommendation:
SB 21-1136 / VSB 20790-21-002 introduces a new outflow valve standard (PN 20790-02AC), with new electronic box software and potentiometer,
to reduce the risk of Fault Code 81 occurrences . This outflow valve standard has been introduced in production for MSN > 1800 and SB 21-1136,
issued in 2002, has already been embodied on more than 400 aircraft, with positive feedback.
Page 12
AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
RECO-SA-21-03
Associated documentation:
SB 21-1136, VSB 20790-21-002, TFU 21.31.51.015, SB 21-1132
General assumptions:
Page 13
AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
RECO-SA-21-03
Page 14
AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
Weight impact: 0 kg
RECO-SA-21-04
Engine: ALL
ATA 4D: 2126
System: Avionics Equipment Ventilation
Impact:
A/C Availability,Maintenance
economics,Operations
Background:
Operators have reported a repetitive "VENT AVNCS SYS FAULT" ECAM warning associated during takeoffs with "VENT SKIN VALVE FAULT"
indicating that the Skin Air valve (FIN 15HQ) is not fully closed.
Airbus recommendation:
Airbus recommends to apply at regular interval an overhaul of the Skin Air Inlet Valve and the Skin Air Outlet Valve at the same time.
Present analysis considers a 18 000 FH interval between overhauls for the only Skin Air Inlet valves (decorrelated from the Skin Air Outlet valves,
which overhaul is assessed through a separate analysis).
Page 15
AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
RECO-SA-21-04
Associated documentation:
SIL 210A2-21-520, SIL 210B00-21-520
General assumptions:
Page 16
AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
RECO-SA-21-04
Page 17
AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
RECO-SA-21-05
Engine: ALL
ATA 4D: 2126
System: Avionics Equipment Ventilation
Impact:
A/C Availability,Maintenance
economics,Operations
Background:
Operators have reported a repetitive "VENT AVNCS SYS FAULT" ECAM warning associated during takeoffs with "VENT SKIN VALVE FAULT"
indicating that the Skin Air valve (FIN 22HQ) is not fully closed.
Airbus recommendation:
Airbus recommends to apply at regular interval an overhaul of the Skin Air Inlet Valve and the Skin Air Outlet Valve at the same time.
Present analysis considers a 18 000 FH interval between overhauls for the only Skin Air Outlet valves (decorrelated from the Skin Air Inlet valves,
which overhaul is assessed through a separate analysis).
Page 18
AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
RECO-SA-21-05
Associated documentation:
SIL 300B00-21-520
General assumptions:
Page 19
AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
RECO-SA-21-05
Page 20
AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
RECO-SA-23-01
FAP improvement
Back to table of content
Engine: ALL
ATA 4D: 2373
System: CIDS
Impact:
A/C Availability,Maintenance economics
Background:
Operational experience has shown that Forward Attendant Panels (FAPs) with the P/N Z130H0XXX110 may freeze after a short power interruption.
A faulty FAP is not a "NO GO ITEM". In case of FAP freezing, the cabin crew cannot control the cabin lighting anymore. The lighting setting will
either stay as selected or will be switched automatically to 50% if the FAP loses communication with the CIDS director.
Airbus recommendation:
SB 23-1259 consists in performing a check of the FAP P/N and S/N to assess the applicability of the modification. When FAP P/N and S/N meet the
SB requirements, the modification is then FOC.
The present economic analysis applies to FAP which couple (P/N, S/N) is out of the SB range. Meaning that is considered the charged
implementation of Kid-Systeme's VSB Z130H-23-037.
Page 21
AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
RECO-SA-23-01
FAP improvement
Back to table of content
Benefit of the recommendation:
Implementation of Kid-Systeme's VSB Z130H-23-037 fixes the FAP freeze issue.
1) Improvement of the FAP MTBUR
2) Reduction of the number of Operational Interruptions
Associated documentation:
SB 23-1259, VSB Z130H-23-037
General assumptions:
Page 22
AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
RECO-SA-23-01
FAP improvement
Back to table of content
OI Rate reduction: 91%
Page 23
AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
Weight impact: 0 kg
RECO-SA-23-02
Handset improvement
Back to table of content
Engine: ALL
ATA 4D: 2373
System: Handset
Impact:
A/C Availability,Maintenance
economics,Operations
Background:
Some operators report low reliability of Holmberg & Becker Handsets. The reliability issues reported are as follows:
1) Handset brackets do not hold the handset enough securely and handset falls down.
2) Handset housings are not robust enough and break when they fall down on the Non Textile Floor.
3) The Holmberg handset cable D-Sub connector/pins attachment are unreliable and cable leads are often found damaged.
4) Holmberg general reliability issues: microphone, reed contact fail.
Airbus recommendation:
Upgrade handsets series:
89-01-07000 (with support bracket 98-01-07900)
89-01-07122 (with support bracket 98-01-07902)
ST3100-33-10 (with support bracket HC3100-33-10)
ST3100-23-10 (with support bracket HC3100-23-10)
with N40-1B series.
Note: The cost/benefit analysis presented here corresponds to the replacement of the handset on attrition basis.
Page 24
AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
RECO-SA-23-02
Handset improvement
Back to table of content
Benefit of the recommendation:
1) Operational reliability improvement
2) Component reliability improvement
3) The new standard is less expensive than the pre mod one (either becker or holmberg handset)
Associated documentation:
TFU 23.73.00.089, SIL 23-030:VSIL 7301-23-09, SB 25-1906, VSB 89-23-15
General assumptions:
Page 25
AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
RECO-SA-23-02
Handset improvement
Back to table of content
OI Rate reduction: 5%
Page 26
AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
Weight impact: 0 kg
RECO-SA-25-01
Engine: ALL
ATA 4D: 2524
System: Overhead stowage compartments
Impact:
A/C Availability,Maintenance
economics,Operations,Airline image
Background:
Some operators have reported a high rate of overhead stowage bin latches becoming unserviceable. The cause is a deflection of the overhead
bottom panel when the overhead stowage compartment is heavily loaded. This leads to difficulty in opening or closing the OHSC.
This results in several different types of damage to the keeper, latch hooks, handles or the edge protection.
Airbus recommendation:
Airbus recommends to install an improved latch and keeper for the OHSC.
Note: this economic assessment has been considered on a retrofit basis on A319. Similar results are observed on A320/A321.
Page 27
AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
RECO-SA-25-01
Associated documentation:
SB 25-1786, TFU 25.24.00.010, SIL 25-158
General assumptions:
Page 28
AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
RECO-SA-25-01
Page 29
AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
RECO-SA-26-02
Engine: ALL
ATA 4D: 2616 & 2617
System: SDCU
Impact:
A/C Availability,Maintenance
economics,Operations
Background:
Some operators have encountered cases of SMOKE LAV + CRG DET FAULT ECAM warning (with no access to SDCU menu via MCDU), leading
generally to aircraft delays and cancellations but also to some in-flight interruptions. Majority of these warnings are spurious ones, that can be
cleared by an SDCU reset on ground. Yet, in certain cases, smoke detector or SDCU is removed and replaced, giving an unconfirmed fault in shop
(high NFF rate for SDCU and Smoke detectors). The heating of SDCU power supply card is one of the main root cause for such spurious warning.
Note: Refer to RECO-SA-26-001 if access to SDCU menu is possible
Airbus recommendation:
VSB RAI2800-26-015 improves the design of SDCU Power Supply card in order to decrease its heating, which can be at the origin of spurious
warning occurrences. This VSB, issued in 2004, has not been introduced in production, as recent aircraft are no more equipped with SDCU, but has
been embodied on more than 300 in-service aircraft with positive feedback.
Page 30
AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
RECO-SA-26-02
Associated documentation:
General assumptions:
Page 31
AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
RECO-SA-26-02
Page 32
AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
Weight impact: 0 kg
RECO-SA-26-03
Engine: ALL
ATA 4D: 2615 & 2126
System: Smoke detectors
Impact:
A/C Availability,Maintenance
economics,Operations
Background:
Some operators have encountered cases of AVNCS SMOKE ECAM warning. These warning have mainly been reported on ground, leading generally
to aircraft delays or cancellations. However some warning have also been generated in flight, shortly after take-off, leading to in-flight-interruptions
(LAND ASAP). Majority of these warnings are spurious ones. The ionic smoke detectors (PN CG7G0), which are sensitive to high humidity and high
temperature conditions, is one of the main root causes for such spurious warning.
Airbus recommendation:
SB 26-1052 allows the installation of Optical Smoke Detectors (PN CGDU2000-00) instead of Ionic Smoke Detector in avionics compartment. These
improved smoke detectors have been introduced in production for MSN > 1500 and SB 26-1052, issued in 2000, has already been embodied on
about 400 in-service aircraft, with positive feedback.
Page 33
AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
RECO-SA-26-03
Associated documentation:
SB 26-1052, TFU 26.15.15.001
A318_A319_A320_A321 MPD 26-15-00-04-1
General assumptions:
Page 34
AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
RECO-SA-26-03
Page 35
AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
Weight impact: 0 kg
RECO-SA-26-04
Engine: ALL
ATA 4D: 2615 & 2616 & 2617
System: Smoke detectors
Impact:
A/C Availability,Maintenance
economics,Operations
Background:
Smoke detection issues on Long Range (LR) aircraft have been reported. Subsequent laboratory tests have shown that, under certain
circumstances, conducted Electro Magnetic Interferences (EMI) could lead to the disconnection of the Smoke Detectors (SD).
On Single Aisle (SA) aircraft, the disconnection of one or more SDs could lead to the ECAM warning SMOKE / SMOKE LAV / CRG DET FAULT
associated with class 1 maintenance message SMOKE DET LOOP.
New SD P/Ns have been introduced on LR aircraft to reduce disconnection occurrences in case of conducted EMI.
In addition, due to the obsolescence of the old P/Ns and the commonality of P/Ns between the LR and SA programs, the old P/Ns will be no longer
available for the SA program.
Airbus recommendation:
This Service Bulletin is published to advise all operators of A319, A320 and A321 aircraft of the issue of SIEMENS Service Bulletin No. PPAGPA-26004, which replaces the existing SDs with modified units. This increases the robustness of the smoke detectors against EMI to reduce the smoke
detection disconnection occurences.
Note:
- The cost/benefit analysis presented here corresponds to the modification implementation by retrofit mean.
- Last date to place a purchase order at the price mentionned in the Cost/Benefit analysis: end of October 2014
- The payback period takes into account OI rate and MTBUR improvement for both Smoke Detector and SDCU
Page 36
AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
RECO-SA-26-04
Associated documentation:
SB 26-1081, VSB PPAGPA-26-004
General assumptions:
Page 37
AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
RECO-SA-26-04
Page 38
AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
Weight impact: 0 Kg
RECO-SA-27-01
Engine: ALL
ATA 4D: 2726
System: Yaw Damper
Impact:
A/C Availability,Maintenance
economics,Operations
Background:
Some operators have encountered hydraulic leaks at yaw damper level (and more precisely at piston rod sealing level of the yaw damper servo
control) with servo control PN SC4700-3 or SC4700-4. Such events generate long delays, flight cancellations or even in-flight interruptions and may
lead to the loss of the hydraulic system (green or yellow).
Note that one yaw damper system may be inoperative according to MMEL 22.63.01, but with operational restrictions for landing (CAT 3 Single only).
Airbus recommendation:
SB 27-1147 allows the installation of SC-4700-5 standard yaw damper servo control. This actuator has been introduced in production for MSN >
2000 and SB 27-1147, issued in 2003, has already been embodied on around 1000 in-service aircraft, with positive feedback.
Notes:
- the cost/benefit analysis presented here is based on SC4700-3 pre-mod standard hypothesis (kit price, MTBUR...)
- the kit to upgrade units from SC4700-4 to SC4700-5 is Free Of Charge (FOC)
Page 39
AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
RECO-SA-27-01
Associated documentation:
TFU 27.26.00.010, TFU 27.26.51.001, SB 27-1139, SB 27-1147, VSB SC4700-27-26-02, VSB SC4700-27-04
A318_A319_A320_A321 MPD 272651-01-1
A318_A319_A320_A321 MMEL 22-63-01
General assumptions:
Page 40
AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
RECO-SA-27-01
Page 41
AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
Weight impact: 0 kg
RECO-SA-27-02
Engine: ALL
ATA 4D: 2794
System: SEC
Background:
Some operators have encountered cases of F/CTL SEC 1(2/3) FAULT warning, mainly on ground during electrical transients (engine start), leading
generally to aircraft delays or ground turn back. Investigations led with Thals have allowed identifying two main root causes at SEC computer level:
- Power Boost Fucntion
- S-RAM (S-RAM failure may appear in any flight phase and lead to F/CTL Spoiler fault)
These two issues, considered as quality issues, affect a certain batch of SEC computers:
- Power Boost Function: 1800 < MSN < 3900, SEC SN between Q00136009440 and Q00136016499
- S-RAM: 2500 < MSN < 3400, SEC SN between Q00136012084 and Q00136015015
Airbus recommendation:
VSB B372BAM-27-028 and B372BAM-27-030 improve drastically the reliability of the SEC through two hardware modifications (respectively
replacement of S-RAM and transistors). These VSB, issued respectively in 2008 / 2009, have been introduced in production on MSN > 3400 / 3900,
have been embodied on around 200 / 500 in-service SEC with positive feedback.
Note: different strategies are possible to emboby these VSB (on attrition vs. retrofit). Yet Airbus recommends operators to speed up the
embodiment progress through a retrofit campaign. The cost/benefit analysis presented here corresponds to this option, which means that the SEC
units is sent specifically to the shop to implement these two modifications (it is supposed that the SEC unit is in the batch of SEC units affected by
both issues: S-RAM & Power Boost). That also implies that a Return To Service test is to be done once VSB have been embodied, note that the
corresponding cost has been taken into account in the analysis.
Page 42
AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
RECO-SA-27-02
Associated documentation:
VSB B372BAM-27-028, VSB B372BAM-27-030, TFU 27.94.00.022
General assumptions:
Page 43
AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
RECO-SA-27-02
Page 44
AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
Weight impact: 0 kg
RECO-SA-27-03
Engine: ALL
ATA 4D: 2793
System: ELAC
Impact:
Maintenance economics
Background:
Several operators reported recurrent fault messages "ELACx-COM (or MON) OR WIRING FROM ACCLRM y" // "ELACx OR WIRING FROM B (or Y or
G) HYD PRESS XMTR y" in PFR.
The fault is not systematically reproduced during fault confirmation test "BITE test of the EFCS". Also the fault is usually cleared by ELAC
replacement. Very few cases of aircraft pitch up tendency in manual mode have also been reported.
Airbus recommendation:
Root cause is identified as pollution inside ELAC back assembly connectors. This pollution originates from aircraft environment. The SB 27-1209
recommends to modify the position of ventilation holes of ELAC racks to decrease air flow around ELAC back assembly.
Page 45
AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
RECO-SA-27-03
Associated documentation:
SB 27-1209
General assumptions:
Page 46
AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
RECO-SA-27-03
Page 47
AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
RECO-SA-27-04
Engine: ALL
ATA 4D: 2792
System: PTT switch
Impact:
A/C Availability,Maintenance
economics,Operations
Background:
Some airlines have reported an increase of radio Push To Talk (PTT) switch removals.
Airbus recommendation:
Airbus recommends a preventive replacement of the radio PTT switch at 8,000 FC through AMM tasks 27-92-41-000-010-A01 / AMM 27-92-41-400010-A01. This given interval may have to be adapted by operators according to their own experience.
The replacement of the radio PTT switch can be made using the original or alternate procedure. The alternate procedure allows to remove the radio
PTT switch without removal of the side stick control-handle. This alternative procedure uses splices. A saving of around 3 MH (1 MH instead of 4
MH) is expected when comparing original and alternate AMM tasks.
The cost analysis is computed for alternate procedure usage. For information the saving with the original procedure is 7%.
Page 48
AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
RECO-SA-27-04
Associated documentation:
TFU 27.92.00.002
A318_A319_A320_A321 AMM 27-92-41-000-010-A, AMM 27-92-41-400-010-A, AMM 27-92-41-000-010-A01, AMM 27-92-41-400-010-A01
General assumptions:
Page 49
AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
RECO-SA-27-04
Page 50
AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
RECO-SA-27-05
Engine: ALL
ATA 4D: 2724
System: Flight Controls - Rudder hydraulic
actuation
Economic interest: 2y < Payback period < 4y
Background:
Cases of rudder vibration reports have been received from customers. Rudder vibrations are caused by play developing at rudder and rudder Single
Chime (SC) attachment levels. Rudder servocontrol bearings are one of the contributors to this play.
In-service experiences demonstrated that rudder servocontrol rod end bearing (surface side) is more subject to wear.
Introduction of roller bearing (re-greaseable) on rudder servocontrol rod end has been decided in order to increase bearing wear robustness, to
reduce its wear and thus to prevent rudder vibration occurrences.
Airbus recommendation:
This Service Bulletin is published to advise all operators of A318/A319/A320/A321 aircraft of the issue of LIEBHERR-AEROSPACE Service Bulletin No.
810A-27-06.
It recommends replacing the current rod end fitted with self lubricating spherical bearing (Teflon coated bearing) by a new rod end fitted with a
roller bearing (FINs 1025 GM, 2025 GM and 3025 GM).
Note: The cost/benefit analysis presented here corresponds to the modification implementation by retrofit mean on A/C
Page 51
AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
RECO-SA-27-05
Associated documentation:
SB 27-1224, TFU 27.24.51.004, VSB 810A-27-06
General assumptions:
Page 52
AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
RECO-SA-27-05
Page 53
AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
RECO-SA-27-06
Engine: ALL
ATA 4D: 2734
System: Flight Controls - Elevator and
hydraulic actuation
Economic interest: Payback period < 2y
Background:
On elevator servo control, one case of rod end rupture and several rod ends cracks have been reported.
Investigations have shown that rod end cracks and rupture are caused by a particular bending effect.
Airbus recommendation:
Install new rods end with an integrated roller bearing replacing the old rods end fitted with a self-lubricating spherical bearing (Teflon coated
bearing) (FINs 34CE1, 34CE2, 34CE3 and 34CE4).
Note: SB to be accomplished on-wing to save shop recertification cost at VSB embodiment.
Page 54
AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
RECO-SA-27-06
Associated documentation:
SB 27-1223, TFU 27.34.00.017, SIL 27-164:AOT:27A1186, VSB 31075-27-22
A318_A319_A320_A321 AMM 27-34-51-000-009-A, AMM 27-34-51-400-006-A
General assumptions:
Page 55
AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
RECO-SA-27-06
Page 56
AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
RECO-SA-28-01
Engine: ALL
ATA 4D: 2842
System: FQI Fuse
Impact:
A/C Availability,Maintenance
economics,Operations
Background:
Some operators have encountered cases of degraded Fuel Quantity Indication (FQI) for LH(RH) inner and outer tank, and as a consequence
degraded Fuel On Board (FOB) indication. Such events generally lead to flight delays or cancellations but also to some in-flight interruptions.
Malfunction of the fused connector (PN F561626PZ922Y) has been identified as the root cause of this issue.
Note: Departure is authorized in such scenario, as per MMEL 28-40-06, but loss of accuracy needs to be taken into account for the fuel planning, as
indicated in FCOM 3.04.28.
Airbus recommendation:
SB 28-1143 introduces a new fused plug connector and a new fuse, in order to obtain an improved insulation resistance and resistance to moisture
ingress. This modification has been introduced in production for MSN > 2550 and SB 28-1143, issued in 2005, has already been embodied on about
250 in-service aircraft with positive feedback.
Page 57
AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
RECO-SA-28-01
Associated documentation:
SB 28-1143, TFU 28.42.00.039
A318_A319_A320_A321 TSM 28.42.00.810.873
A318_A319_A320_A321 MMEL 28-40-06, FCOM 3.04.28
General assumptions:
Page 58
AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
RECO-SA-28-01
Page 59
AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
Weight impact: 0 kg
RECO-SA-29-01
Engine: ALL
ATA 4D: 2911 & 2913 & 2923 & 2924
System: HP/PTU Check Valve
Impact:
A/C Availability,Maintenance
economics,Operations
Background:
Some operators have reported cases of hydraulic leakage at check valves of the PTU manifold / HP main manifold with PN ZCV66 and ZCV67. Such
leaks may potentially lead to HYD G(Y/B) RSVR LO LVL or HYD G(Y/B) RSVR LO AIR PR or HYD G(Y) RSVR OVHT ECAM warning and to hydraulic
system loss (green or yellow). Investigations have shown that these leakages were caused by a missing retainer ring, leading to a loosening of the
check valve cap and a damage of the O-ring seal subsequently.
Airbus recommendation:
SB 29-1107 introduces improved check valves PN ZCV66-1 and PN ZCV67-1 with a new cap. These check valves have been introduced in production
for MSN > 1000 and SB 29-1107, issued in 2003, has already been embodied on 160 aircraft with positive feedback.
Page 60
AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
RECO-SA-29-01
Associated documentation:
SB 29-1107, SB 29-1109
General assumptions:
Page 61
AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
RECO-SA-29-01
Page 62
AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
Weight impact: 0 kg
RECO-SA-29-02
Engine: ALL
ATA 4D: 2911 & 2913
System: Elbow union
Impact:
A/C Availability,Maintenance
economics,Operations
Background:
Some operators have reported cases of hydraulic leakage in tail area, close to bulkhead. These leakages, caused by cracked elbow union in the
green and yellow return lines, are generally found on ground during aircraft check, leading to long delays or cancellations.
Airbus recommendation:
SB 29-1110 replaces the aluminium elbow union by a reinforced elbow union made out of steel. Based on in-service reported events, the majority of
the hydraulic leakages have been experienced on aircraft with MSN higher than MSN 1100, so that Airbus does not consider elbow replacements as
necessary on aircraft below MSN 1100. This modification has been introduced in production for MSN > 1950 and SB 29-1110, issued in 2004, has
already been embodied on about 280 in-service aircraft with positive feedback.
Page 63
AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
RECO-SA-29-02
Associated documentation:
SB 29-1110, TFU 29.00.00.033, SIL 29-063
General assumptions:
Page 64
AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
RECO-SA-29-02
Page 65
AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
Weight impact: 0 kg
RECO-SA-29-03
Engine: ALL
ATA 4D: 2913
System: Yellow PTU Manifold
Impact:
A/C Availability,Maintenance
economics,Operations
Background:
Some operators have reported cases of heavy hydraulic leakage from the Yellow Power Transfer Unit (PTU) Manifold, generally resulting in long
delays or cancellations. These events are due to a fatigue crack of the PTU Manifold housing, that typically occurs after 15000 FC. This reliability
issue is known to be one of the top drivers of hydraulic leakage for aircraft having a MSN < 972. The Yellow PTU Manifold is more impacted by this
fatigue phenomenon because it is subject to additional cycles due to the operation of the cargo doors.
Airbus recommendation:
Airbus recommends operators still equipped with PTU Manifold P/N D2907019, to perform a preventive replacement of the Yellow PTU Manifold FIN 3013 GM - (by the same P/N) before 15000 FC. This preventive maintenance strategy has already been applied by several operators with good
results. Alternatively, operators may choose to embody SB 29-1113, which requires the installation of an improved PTU Manifold P/N 1556A9900-01
(post-mod. 27490) with enhanced fatigue endurance properties.
Page 66
AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
RECO-SA-29-03
Associated documentation:
SB 29-1113, SIL 29-080, SIL 29-063
General assumptions:
Page 67
AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
RECO-SA-29-03
Page 68
AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
Weight impact: 0 kg
RECO-SA-29-04
Engine: ALL
ATA 4D: 2913
System: Yellow HP Manifold
Impact:
A/C Availability,Maintenance
economics,Operations
Background:
Some operators have reported cases of heavy hydraulic leakage from the Yellow High Pressure (HP) Manifold, generally resulting in long delays or
cancellations. These events are due to a fatigue crack of the HP Manifold housing, that typically occurs after 20000 FC. This reliability issue is known
to be one of the top drivers of hydraulic leakage for aircraft having a MSN < 972. The Yellow HP Manifold is more impacted by this fatigue
phenomenon because it is subject to additional cycles due to the operation of the cargo doors.
Airbus recommendation:
Airbus recommends operators still equipped with HP Manifold P/N D29070185 series, to perform a preventive replacement of the Yellow HP
Manifold - FIN 3011 GM - (by the same P/N) before 20000 FC. This preventive maintenance strategy has already been applied by several operators
with good results. Alternatively, operators may choose to install manifold P/N 1553A0000-01 (post-mod. 27490) with enhanced fatigue endurance
properties.
Page 69
AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
RECO-SA-29-04
Associated documentation:
SIL 29-080, SIL 29-063
General assumptions:
Page 70
AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
RECO-SA-29-04
Page 71
AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
Weight impact: 0 kg
RECO-SA-29-05
Engine: ALL
ATA 4D: 2911 & 2913
System: Engine Driven Pump (EDP)
Impact:
A/C Availability,Maintenance
economics,Operations
Background:
Some operators, equipped with Eaton EDP, have reported cases of hydraulic leakages at EDP level, and more precisely at the parting line interface
between the adapter and the housing of the hydraulic pump. Such reliability issue is known to be one of the top drivers of hydraulic leak at fleet
level. These EDP leaks are generally discovered on ground during aircraft check (leading to long delays or cancellations), but can also be detected in
flight, through ECAM warning and loss of the hydraulic system (yellow or green).
Airbus recommendation:
SB 29-1123 / VSB 887673-29-06 introduces a modified hydraulic pump with the new PN 3031863-001 (also called PV3-240-10D). This modification
has been introduced in production for MSN > 3000 and SB 29-1123, issued in 2005, has already been embodied on more than 1000 in-service
aircraft with positive feedback.
Note: the cost/benefit analysis presented here corresponds to the EMP upgraded on attrition. The additionnal cost of this upgrade is the difference
between the repair price including the embodiment of this SB and the typical repair price.
Page 72
AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
RECO-SA-29-05
Associated documentation:
SB 29-1123, TFU 29.10.00.026, VSB 887673-29-06
General assumptions:
Page 73
AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
RECO-SA-29-05
Page 74
AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
Weight impact: 0 kg
RECO-SA-29-06
Engine: ALL
ATA 4D: 2913
System: Plug for alternate brake manifold
Impact:
A/C Availability,Maintenance
economics,Operations
Background:
Some operators have reported that a hydraulic leak from a blanking plug and bleeder on a hydraulic manifold assembly at the Over Wing Panel
(OWP) has been detected. Continual loss of hydraulic fluid from the blanking plug and bleeder could lead to a total loss of Yellow System Hydraulics.
Airbus recommendation:
This Service Bulletin details instructions to install a new manifold blanking plug and bleeder and fixing bolt with holes for wire locking for aircraft
that are post modification No 26925P4576. Accomplishment of this Service Bulletin will alleviate potential hydraulic fluid leakage from the manifold
of the Yellow System Hydraulics.
Page 75
AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
RECO-SA-29-06
Associated documentation:
SB 29-1142
General assumptions:
Page 76
AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
RECO-SA-29-06
Page 77
AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
Weight impact: 0 kg
RECO-SA-29-07
Engine: ALL
ATA 4D: 2913
System: PTU
Background:
For both the 4101002-9 and -11 configuration PTU's, the seal assemblies installed on the inlet transfer tubes between the variable port housing and
manifold valve housing have experienced fretting damage, which creates an external leak path. Existing inlet transfer tube seal assemblies have
experienced elastomer nibbling. The existing aluminum grounding lug could be easily damaged during handling. For the -11 configuration PTU only,
some control piston guides have lost torque during operation, allowing for the extrusion of the seal assembly. The resulting internal leak path
prevents proper compensator control leading to unstable system pressures.
Airbus recommendation:
Airbus recommends operators still equipped with Power Transfer Units 4101002-9 series 6 or 7, or with Power Transfer Units -11 series 2 or 3 to
perform Triumph Actuation Systems SB 4101002-29-00038 on worn units. Indeed, reliability improvements (leakage reduction) were noted on
upgraded Power Transfer Units In Service.
Note:
- SB applicable to PTU -9 series 6 & 7 OR PTU -9 serie 5 with SB 4101002-29-00037 concurrent requirement
- SB applicable to PTU -11 series 2 & 3 OR PTU -11 serie 1 with SB 4101002-29-00037 concurrent requirement
- this economic assessment has been considered on attrition.
Page 78
AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
RECO-SA-29-07
Associated documentation:
VSB 4101002-29-00038
General assumptions:
Page 79
AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
RECO-SA-29-07
Page 80
AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
RECO-SA-32-01
Engine: ALL
ATA 4D: 3242
System: Automatic brake selector valve
Impact:
A/C Availability,Maintenance
economics,Operations
Background:
Some operators have experienced cases of hydraulic leak from a connection piece (port E) of the automatic brake selector valve (FIN 2576GM). In
fact, such leak are caused by difficulties during assembly and maintenance of this valve, leading to possible damage of the union. Such leaks are
generally found on ground during aircraft check, leading to long delays or cancellations, but can also occur in flight with potential loss of the yellow
hydraulic system and IFTB / Diversions.
This issue affects 790 < MSN < 1900 as:
- aircraft with MSN < 790 (pre mod 26409) were equipped with a different type of system
- automatic brake selector valve was suppressed on MSN > 1900
Airbus recommendation:
SB 29-1102 replaces the hydraulic connection (port E) of the automatic brake selector valve by a new unit with an enlarged hexagon, in order to
facilitate assembly and maintenance. This modification has already been embodied on more than 700 aircraft with good feedback.
Note that a 15% discount (taken into account in presented cost/benefit analysis) is offered by Airbus on kit price until end of 2012
Page 81
AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
RECO-SA-32-01
Associated documentation:
SB 29-1102
General assumptions:
Page 82
AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
RECO-SA-32-01
Page 83
AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
Weight impact: 0 kg
RECO-SA-32-02
Engine: ALL
ATA 4D: 3231
System: MLG door actuator hose
Impact:
A/C Availability,Maintenance
economics,Operations
Background:
Some operators have reported cases of hydraulic leakage of the Green Hydraulic System due to the rupture of the Main Landing Gear (MLG) door
actuator hoses post mod. 32954 standard. These hoses were introduced in service via Airbus SB 32-1260. This issue has significant operational
impact in terms of delays and cancellations; a few cases of in-flight turn back have also been reported following the loss of the Green Hydraulic
System during flight. Investigations have revealed that the leakage of the MLG hoses is caused by a fatigue fracture of the metallic hose braid which
in turn leads to damage of the hose's Teflon tube. It has been observed from in-service experience that leakage may occur starting at 6000 FC,
and with an average for the reported events of 8500 FC.
Airbus recommendation:
Airbus recommends operators still equipped with MLG Hose configuration post. mod 32954 or having embodied Airbus SB 32-1260 to perform a
preventive replacement of the hoses FIN 2765GM, 2766GM, 2767GM, 2768GM GM at 6000 FC. This preventive maintenance strategy requires a
relatively low investment, both in terms of labour and material costs, and has already been applied by several operators with good results.
Alternatively operators may choose to embody SB 32-1371 which introduces an improved MLG door actuator hose installation with increased fatigue
resistance.
Page 84
AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
RECO-SA-32-02
Associated documentation:
SB 32-1371, TFU 32.31.35.003
General assumptions:
Spare price: 90 $
Repair costs: N/A
Test cost: N/A
Typical NFF rate: 0%
Page 85
AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
RECO-SA-32-02
Page 86
AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
Weight impact: 0 kg
RECO-SA-32-03
Engine: ALL
ATA 4D: 3211
System: Landing Gear
Impact:
A/C Availability,Maintenance economics
Background:
Some operators have reported several swivel joint ruptures, due to stress corrosion, of the lock stay actuator-hoses on the Main Landing Gear
(MLG). It may lead to the loss of the green hydraulic system.
The EATON hoses have a swivel joint manufactured from 440C stainless steel. This material has been identified as having a low resistance to stress
corrosion.
Airbus recommendation:
Airbus recommends the emodiment of the SB A320-32-1364 and VSB 200-32-300 for A318, A319 and A320 aircrafts and VSB 201-32-52 for A321
aircrafts.
It introduces a new flexible hose to help prevent the loss of the green hydraulic system.
Page 87
AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
RECO-SA-32-03
Associated documentation:
SB 32-1364, VSB 200-32-300, VSB 201-32-52
A318_A319_A320_A321 AMM 20-21-12, AMM 32-11-22
General assumptions:
Page 88
AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
RECO-SA-32-03
Page 89
AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
Weight impact: 0 kg
RECO-SA-33-01
Engine: ALL
ATA 4D: 3341
System: Exterior lights
Impact:
A/C Availability,Maintenance economics
Background:
Introduction of new LED technology.
Airbus recommendation:
In order to achieve a significant lifetime improvement, it was decided to introduce the new Light Emitting Diode (LED) technology for the wingtip
Navigation (NAV) lights on A320 aircraft instead of halogen filament lamps.
The new LED lights are compatible with A/C fitted with any of the dual or single nav light system.
Page 90
AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
RECO-SA-33-01
Associated documentation:
SB 33-1062
General assumptions:
Page 91
AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
RECO-SA-33-01
Page 92
AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
RECO-SA-33-02
Engine: ALL
ATA 4D: 3340
System: RTO Lights
Impact:
A/C Availability,Maintenance
economics,Operations
Background:
Some operator have reported, especially during cold weather operations, damage on the transformer and the connector pins of the equipment. It is
due to liquid ingress into the runway turn off light.
Airbus recommendation:
Airbus recommends operators equipped with Zodiac Runway Turnoff lights to perform the sealing of drain hole to prevent liquid contamination.
Note: this economic assessment has been considered on a retrofit basis.
Page 93
AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
RECO-SA-33-02
Associated documentation:
VSB 4236534-33-003, VSB 8000281-33-002, VSB 8000306-33-002, SIL 33-049, SIL 33-030
General assumptions:
Page 94
AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
RECO-SA-33-02
Page 95
AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
RECO-SA-34-01
Engine: ALL
ATA 4D: 3414
System: ADIRU
Background:
This SB has been issued further to an operator's request. Some In Service Operational events have been reported to Airbus (delays mostly and a
few cancellations).
Technical data from the fleet In Service shows that the optional alignement improvement function on ADIRUs able to be fitted with is extremely
efficient.
Airbus recommendation:
Airbus recommends to perform SB 34-1346 which proposes to activate the ADIRU optional improved alignment function on ADIRUs able to receive
the kit with no extra costs.
This modification has been introduced in production (> MSN 2277) with a proven operational reliability performance. In Service Aircraft performing
this SB will as a consequence reach MOD33240 performance.
Note: This economic assessment considers Retrofit policy and SB 34-1350 or 34-1332 already implemented.
Page 96
AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
RECO-SA-34-01
Associated documentation:
SB 34-1346
General assumptions:
Page 97
AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
RECO-SA-34-01
Page 98
AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
RECO-SA-36-01
Engine: ALL
ATA 4D: 3611 & 3622 & 2152
System: Seals for Bleed Air System
Impact:
A/C Availability,Maintenance
economics,Operations
Background:
Some operators have reported cases of air leak with the following ECAM warnings:
- AIR R (L) WING LEAK
- AIR ENG 1 (2) BLEED LEAK
- AIR APU BLEED LEAK
leading to long (as trouble-shooting is known to be complex) delays, cancellations and even few in-flight interruptions.
Experience has shown that the seals made of silicon could lose their sealing qualities after some time in service, which could explain air leakages in
various areas of the aircraft (e.g. pipe between ACM and heat exchanger, pipe in the pylon, pipe in the leading edge...).
Airbus recommendation:
SB 21-1165 (for several ATA 21/36 sub-systems), 21-1153 (for pack system), 36-1043 (for bleed system except wing area) and 36-1050 (for wing
area of the bleed system) allow to replace silicon seals by PTFE seals (PN ABS1040; ABS5800), which have no life limit. These modifications has
been introduced in production. Note that, as the number of man-hours to change the seal is relatively important (around 100 Man-Hours per aircraft
for the four SB), it is recommended to embody these modifications at next MPD opportunity (Tasks 215200-07-1 & 361100-05-1 to replace seals).
Present analysis considers this embodiment assumption.
Note: Airbus recommends also operators to consult SIL 36-036 revision 8 which provides a synthesis about recommended bleed duct seals and
target replacement locations.
Page 99
AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
RECO-SA-36-01
Associated documentation:
TFU 36.22.00.009, SB 21-1153, VSB 1802A-21-03, SB 21-1165, SB 36-1043, SB 36-1050, SIL 21-039, SIL 36-036, SIL 36-047
A318_A319_A320_A321 TSM 36-22-00-810-8XX, MPD 21-52-00-07, MPD 36-11-00-05-1, MPD 36-11-00-06-1, MPD 36-11-00-07-1
General assumptions:
Page 100
AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
RECO-SA-36-01
Page 101
AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
RECO-SA-52-01
Engine: ALL
ATA 4D: 5230
System: Cargo Door Proximity Sensor
Impact:
A/C Availability,Maintenance
economics,Operations
Background:
Several cases of in-flight cargo door warnings have been reported to Airbus. Most of these events led to operational interruption such as aborted
take-off or in-flight turn back. The warnings affect both forward and aft cargo doors.
Airbus recommendation:
The purpose of this SIL is to inform A319/A320/A321 operators about the possible identified causes for a cargo door warning and provide further
recommendations regarding trouble-shooting and preventive actions. Of all the recommendations given, the most intresting from an economics
perspective is an upgrade of the cargo door proximity switches (Aft and forward proximity switches: 28WV (34WV) / 30WV (32WV)). Therefore, in
the frame of this WISE Main Adopted Solution and Tips, only this part of the SIL has been put forward for promotion.
Page 102
AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
RECO-SA-52-01
Associated documentation:
SIL 52-055
General assumptions:
Page 103
AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
RECO-SA-52-01
Page 104
AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
Weight impact: 0 kg
RECO-SA-52-02
Engine: ALL
ATA 4D: 5251
System: Pessanger Compartment Fixed
Interiior Doors
Economic interest: 2y < Payback period < 4y
Background:
The electrical strikes with thermal protection based on Polymer Positive Temperature Coefficient (PPTC) for the electrical cockpit door locking
system require updating to maintain reliability.
Airbus recommendation:
Update the software of the respective Cockpit Door Locking Control Unit (CDLCU). FIN 24MQ (SB CONF2) and FIN 28MQ if a 2nd back-up unit is
installed (SB CONF1).
Note: This economic assessment considers Retrofit policy.
Page 105
AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
RECO-SA-52-02
Associated documentation:
SB 52-1146, VSB AR4709-25-06, TFU 52.51.00.003
General assumptions:
Page 106
AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
RECO-SA-52-02
Page 107
AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
RECO-SA-54-01
Engine: IAE-V2500
ATA 4D: 5400
System: AFT Pylon Fairing
Impact:
A/C Availability,Maintenance
economics,Operations
Background:
Damaged surface protection and corrosion have been reported on the V2500 engine pylon aft fixed fairing skin panels.
Airbus recommendation:
In the case of extensive corrosion, the replacement of the panel or the installation of a doubler may be required. This Service Bulletin details
instructions to install deflectors Inconel 625 on the aft lower fairing in order to deviate the engine exhaust gas. Accomplishment of this Service
Bulletin will prevent chemical degradation of the paint scheme and further corrosion.
Page 108
AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
RECO-SA-54-01
Associated documentation:
SB 54-1020, SB IT 11-0004
General assumptions:
Page 109
AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
RECO-SA-54-01
Page 110
AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
RECO-SA-56-01
Engine: ALL
ATA 4D: 5610
System: Cockpit window
Impact:
A/C Availability,Maintenance
economics,Operations
Background:
Cockpit window event/issue can have an impact on aircraft dispatch reliability.
There is no hard life limit for cockpit window installed on an aircraft. Nevertheless, Airbus would like to highlight that a cockpit window has to be
replaced several times during the life of an aircraft. A damage on a cockpit window leading to a replacement can have many different origin: FOD
(Foreign Object Damage), ageing, manufacturing defect, moisture ingress, delamination, overheating, electrical trouble, etc.
Airbus recommendation:
One of the origins of the in-service issues can be linked with the non-respect of the scheduled maintenance. Airbus scheduled maintenance
recommendations are reminded in SIL 56-022:
- SIL 56-017: List of the scheduled maintenance given in the MPD.
- AMM 56-10: Allowable damage limitations.
- AMM 56-11: Distinction between heating film cracking/middle ply cracking/ outer ply cracking.
- Vendor CMM: Weather seal condition.
Present analysis determines the benefits of performing recommended maintenance against not performing this maintenance.
Page 111
AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
RECO-SA-56-01
Associated documentation:
SIL 56-022
A318_A319_A320_A321 AMM 56-10, MPD 561000-01-1, MPD 561000-02-1, MPD 561200-01-1
FOT SE 999.0044/11
General assumptions:
Page 112
AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
RECO-SA-56-01
Page 113
AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
RECO-SA-70-01
Engine: CFM56-5B
ATA 4D: 7000
System: Standard practice - Engine
Impact:
Maintenance economics
Background:
During check, hydraulic lines clamps failure might be detected.
Airbus recommendation:
The Service Bulletin (SB 70-1001) recommends replacing the 9 oclock "P" clamp (PN C10GT3-12) by 9 oclock "saddle" clamp (PN NAS1716C12K).
This new clamp requests a modification of the channel bracket to include an additional hole (9 oclock: fan zone, left side).
The SB is applicable to CFM56-5B A318/A319/A320/A321 Engine Build-Up Units (EBU) prior to S/N 9921001 (except EBU serial numbers 9915001,
9916001 and 9916002). It corresponds to MSN rank between 0434 and 4006.
The economical analysis corresponds to the cost of the SB application and to the removal of the 9 o'clock "P" clamp replacement task during check.
Page 114
AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
RECO-SA-70-01
Associated documentation:
SB 70-1001, VSB RA32029-14
General assumptions:
Spare price: 21 $
Repair costs: N/A
Test cost: N/A
Typical NFF rate: N/A
Page 115
AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
RECO-SA-70-01
Page 116
AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
Weight impact: 0 kg
RECO-SA-75-01
Engine: CFM56-5B
ATA 4D: 7521
System: ENGINE AIR - HPT Air Clearance
Control Valve
Economic interest: Payback period < 2y
Background:
Large overboard fuel leakage has been reported from HPTACC valves having accumulated between 3000 and 5000 hours. The primary and
secondary seals from HPTACC valves on the actuator rod wear out, permiting the leakage into the overboard drain.
Airbus recommendation:
CFM recommends to introduce the new improved HPTACC valve P/N 329695-5 when the old one is routed for repair.
Note: this economic assessment has been considered on attrition basis.
Page 117
AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
RECO-SA-75-01
Associated documentation:
VSB 75-0041
General assumptions:
Labour on-A/C: 0 MH on AC
Labour off-A/C: 8 MH per AC
Number of kits: 2 seals per VLV
Kit price: Free of charge
Other investment: None
Page 118
AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
RECO-SA-75-01
Page 119
AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
Airbus S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document. This document and all information contained herein is the sole property of AIRBUS. No intellectual property rights are granted by the delivery of this document or the disclosure of
its content. This document shall not be reproduced or disclosed to a third party without the express written consent of AIRBUS S.A.S. This document and its content shall not be used for any purpose other than that for which it is supplied. The statements
made herein do not constitute an offer. They are based on the mentioned assumptions and are expressed in good faith. Where the supporting grounds for these statements are not shown, AIRBUS S.A.S. will be pleased to explain the basis thereof.
AIRBUS, its logo, A300, A310, A318, A319, A320, A321, A330, A340, A350, A380, A400M are registered trademarks.
Page 120
AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.