G.R. No.

L-19550

June 19, 1967

HARRY S. STONEHILL, ROBERT P. BROOKS, JOHN J. BROOKS and KARL BECK, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JOSE W. DIOKNO, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF JUSTICE; JOSE LUKBAN, in his
capacity as Acting Director, National Bureau of Investigation; SPECIAL PROSECUTORS
PEDRO D. CENZON, EFREN I. PLANA and MANUEL VILLAREAL, JR. and ASST. FISCAL
MANASES G. REYES; JUDGE AMADO ROAN, Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE ROMAN
CANSINO, Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE HERMOGENES CALUAG, Court of First
Instance of Rizal-Quezon City Branch, and JUDGE DAMIAN JIMENEZ, Municipal Court of
Quezon City, respondents.
Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno and Meer, Meer and Meer and Juan T. David for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P. de Castro,
Assistant Solicitor General Frine C. Zaballero, Solicitor Camilo D. Quiason and Solicitor C. Padua
for respondents.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Upon application of the officers of the government named on the margin 1 hereinafter referred
to as Respondents-Prosecutors several judges2 hereinafter referred to as RespondentsJudges issued, on different dates,3 a total of 42 search warrants against petitioners
herein4 and/or the corporations of which they were officers, 5 directed to the any peace officer, to
search the persons above-named and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses and/or
residences, and to seize and take possession of the following personal property to wit:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals,
portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all
business transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss
statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers).
as "the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense," or
"used or intended to be used as the means of committing the offense," which is described in the
applications adverted to above as "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws,
Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code."
Alleging that the aforementioned search warrants are null and void, as contravening the
Constitution and the Rules of Court because, inter alia: (1) they do not describe with
particularity the documents, books and things to be seized; (2) cash money, not mentioned in
the warrants, were actually seized; (3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence against the
aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases filed against them; (4) the searches and seizures
were made in an illegal manner; and (5) the documents, papers and cash money seized were not
delivered to the courts that issued the warrants, to be disposed of in accordance with law on
March 20, 1962, said petitioners filed with the Supreme Court this original action for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamusand injunction, and prayed that, pending final disposition of the present
case, a writ of preliminary injunction be issued restraining Respondents-Prosecutors, their agents
and /or representatives from using the effects seized as aforementioned or any copies thereof, in
the deportation cases already adverted to, and that, in due course, thereafter, decision be
rendered quashing the contested search warrants and declaring the same null and void, and
commanding the respondents, their agents or representatives to return to petitioners herein, in
accordance with Section 3, Rule 67, of the Rules of Court, the documents, papers, things and
cash moneys seized or confiscated under the search warrants in question.
In their answer, respondents-prosecutors alleged, 6 (1) that the contested search warrants are
valid and have been issued in accordance with law; (2) that the defects of said warrants, if any,

were cured by petitioners' consent; and (3) that, in any event, the effects seized are admissible
in evidence against herein petitioners, regardless of the alleged illegality of the aforementioned
searches and seizures.
On March 22, 1962, this Court issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for in the petition.
However, by resolution dated June 29, 1962, the writ was partially lifted or dissolved, insofar as
the papers, documents and things seized from the offices of the corporations above mentioned
are concerned; but, the injunction was maintained as regards the papers, documents and things
found and seized in the residences of petitioners herein. 7
Thus, the documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in
question may be split into two (2) major groups, namely: (a) those found and seized in the offices
of the aforementioned corporations, and (b) those found and seized in the residences of
petitioners herein.
As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein have no cause of action to assail the
legality of the contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple
reason that said corporations have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the
personality of herein petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of the interest of
each of them in said corporations, and whatever the offices they hold therein may be. 8 Indeed, it
is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have
been impaired thereby,9 and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure ispurely
personal and cannot be availed of by third parties. 10 Consequently, petitioners herein may not
validly object to the use in evidence against them of the documents, papers and things seized
from the offices and premises of the corporations adverted to above, since the right to object to
the admission of said papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom the
seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against
them in their individual capacity. 11 Indeed, it has been held:
. . . that the Government's action in gaining possession of papers belonging to
the corporation did not relate to nor did it affect the personal defendants. If these papers
were unlawfully seized and thereby the constitutional rights of or any one were invaded,
they were the rights of the corporation and not the rights of the other defendants. Next, it
is clear that a question of the lawfulness of a seizure can be raised onlyby one whose
rights have been invaded. Certainly, such a seizure, if unlawful, could not affect the
constitutional rights of defendants whose property had not been seized or the privacy of
whose homes had not been disturbed; nor could they claim for themselves the benefits of
the Fourth Amendment, when its violation, if any, was with reference to the rights
of another. Remus vs. United States (C.C.A.)291 F. 501, 511. It follows, therefore, that the
question of the admissibility of the evidence based on an alleged unlawful search and
seizure does not extend to the personal defendants but
embraces only thecorporation whose property was taken. . . . (A Guckenheimer & Bros. Co.
vs. United States, [1925] 3 F. 2d. 786, 789, Emphasis supplied.)
With respect to the documents, papers and things seized in the residences of petitioners herein,
the aforementioned resolution of June 29, 1962, lifted the writ of preliminary injunction
previously issued by this Court, 12 thereby, in effect, restraining herein Respondents-Prosecutors
from using them in evidence against petitioners herein.
In connection with said documents, papers and things, two (2) important questions need be
settled, namely: (1) whether the search warrants in question, and the searches and seizures
made under the authority thereof, are valid or not, and (2) if the answer to the preceding
question is in the negative, whether said documents, papers and things may be used in evidence
against petitioners herein.1wph1.t

Petitioners maintain that the aforementioned search warrants are in the nature of general
warrants and that accordingly, the seizures effected upon the authority there of are null and
void. In this connection, the Constitution 13 provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but
upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that no
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set
forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized.
None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants. Indeed, the same
were issued upon applications stating that the natural and juridical person therein named had
committed a "violation of Central Ban Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code)
and Revised Penal Code." In other words, no specific offense had been alleged in said
applications. The averments thereof with respect to the offense committed were abstract. As a
consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the
existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that
the party against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or
committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws. As a matter of fact,
the applications involved in this case do not allege any specific acts performed by herein
petitioners. It would be the legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of a "violation
of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal
Code," as alleged in the aforementioned applications without reference to any determinate
provision of said laws or
To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out completely one of the
most fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the
domicile and the privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims
caprice or passion of peace officers. This is precisely the evil sought to be remedied by the
constitutional provision above quoted to outlaw the so-called general warrants. It is not
difficult to imagine what would happen, in times of keen political strife, when the party in power
feels that the minority is likely to wrest it, even though by legal means.
Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with the disputed search
warrants, that this Court deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of
Court 14 by providing in its counterpart, under the Revised Rules of Court 15 that "a search warrant
shall not issue but upon probable causein connection with one specific offense." Not satisfied
with this qualification, the Court added thereto a paragraph, directing that "no search warrant
shall issue for more than one specific offense."
The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for the contested search warrants
was compounded by the description therein made of the effects to be searched for and seized, to
wit:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence, receipts, ledgers,
portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all
business transactions including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and related profit
and loss statements.
Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all business
transactions of petitioners herein, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal.

The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the petitioners and the aforementioned
corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the explicit command of our Bill of
Rights that the things to be seized be particularly described as well as tending to defeat its
major objective: the elimination of general warrants.
Relying upon Moncado vs. People's Court (80 Phil. 1), Respondents-Prosecutors maintain that,
even if the searches and seizures under consideration were unconstitutional, the documents,
papers and things thus seized are admissible in evidence against petitioners herein. Upon
mature deliberation, however, we are unanimously of the opinion that the position taken in the
Moncado case must be abandoned. Said position was in line with the American common law rule,
that the criminal should not be allowed to go free merely "because the constable has
blundered," 16 upon the theory that the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches
and seizures is protected by means other than the exclusion of evidence unlawfully
obtained, 17 such as the common-law action for damages against the searching officer, against
the party who procured the issuance of the search warrant and against those assisting in the
execution of an illegal search, their criminal punishment, resistance, without liability to an
unlawful seizure, and such other legal remedies as may be provided by other laws.
However, most common law jurisdictions have already given up this approach and eventually
adopted the exclusionary rule, realizing that this is the only practical means of enforcing the
constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. In the language of Judge
Learned Hand:
As we understand it, the reason for the exclusion of evidence competent as such, which
has been unlawfully acquired, is that exclusion is the only practical way of enforcing the
constitutional privilege. In earlier times the action of trespass against the offending official
may have been protection enough; but that is true no longer. Only in case the prosecution
which itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their wrong will
that wrong be repressed.18
In fact, over thirty (30) years before, the Federal Supreme Court had already declared:
If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence against
a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the 4th Amendment, declaring his rights
to be secure against such searches and seizures, is of no value, and, so far as those thus
placed are concerned, might as well be stricken from the Constitution. The efforts of the
courts and their officials to bring the guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are
not to be aided by the sacrifice of those great principles established by years of endeavor
and suffering which have resulted in their embodiment in the fundamental law of the
land.19
This view was, not only reiterated, but, also, broadened in subsequent decisions on the same
Federal Court. 20After reviewing previous decisions thereon, said Court held, in Mapp vs.
Ohio (supra.):
. . . Today we once again examine the Wolf's constitutional documentation of the right of
privacy free from unreasonable state intrusion, and after its dozen years on our books, are
led by it to close the only courtroom door remaining open to evidence secured by official
lawlessness in flagrant abuse of that basic right, reserved to all persons as a specific
guarantee against that very same unlawful conduct. We hold that all evidence obtained by
searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority,
inadmissible in a State.
Since the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy has been declared enforceable against the
States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth, it is enforceable against them by

the same sanction of exclusion as it used against the Federal Government. Were it
otherwise, then just as without the Weeks rule the assurance against unreasonable federal
searches and seizures would be "a form of words," valueless and underserving of mention
in a perpetual charter of inestimable human liberties, so too, without that rule the
freedom from state invasions of privacy would be so ephemeral and so neatly severed
from its conceptual nexus with the freedom from all brutish means of coercing evidence
as not to permit this Court's high regard as a freedom "implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty." At the time that the Court held in Wolf that the amendment was applicable to the
States through the Due Process Clause, the cases of this Court as we have seen, had
steadfastly held that as to federal officers the Fourth Amendment included the exclusion of
the evidence seized in violation of its provisions. Even Wolf "stoutly adhered" to that
proposition. The right to when conceded operatively enforceable against the States, was
not susceptible of destruction by avulsion of the sanction upon which its protection and
enjoyment had always been deemed dependent under the Boyd, Weeks and Silverthorne
Cases. Therefore, in extending the substantive protections of due process to all
constitutionally unreasonable searches state or federal it was logically and
constitutionally necessarily that the exclusion doctrine an essential part of the right to
privacy be also insisted upon as an essential ingredient of the right newly recognized by
the Wolf Case. In short, the admission of the new constitutional Right by Wolf could not
tolerate denial of its most important constitutional privilege, namely, the exclusion of the
evidence which an accused had been forced to give by reason of the unlawful seizure. To
hold otherwise is to grant the right but in reality to withhold its privilege and enjoyment.
Only last year the Court itself recognized that the purpose of the exclusionary rule to "is to
deter to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available
way by removing the incentive to disregard it" . . . .
The ignoble shortcut to conviction left open to the State tends to destroy the entire system
of constitutional restraints on which the liberties of the people rest. Having once
recognized that the right to privacy embodied in the Fourth Amendment is enforceable
against the States, and that the right to be secure against rude invasions of privacy by
state officers is, therefore constitutional in origin, we can no longer permit that right to
remain an empty promise. Because it is enforceable in the same manner and to like effect
as other basic rights secured by its Due Process Clause, we can no longer permit it to be
revocable at the whim of any police officer who, in the name of law enforcement itself,
chooses to suspend its enjoyment. Our decision, founded on reason and truth, gives to the
individual no more than that which the Constitution guarantees him to the police officer
no less than that to which honest law enforcement is entitled, and, to the courts, that
judicial integrity so necessary in the true administration of justice. (emphasis ours.)
Indeed, the non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the letter, but also, to the spirit of the
constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. To be sure, if the applicant
for a search warrant has competent evidence to establish probable cause of the commission of a
given crime by the party against whom the warrant is intended, then there is no reason why the
applicant should not comply with the requirements of the fundamental law. Upon the other hand,
if he has no such competent evidence, then it is not possible for the Judge to find that there is
probable cause, and, hence, no justification for the issuance of the warrant. The only possible
explanation (not justification) for its issuance is the necessity of fishing evidence of the
commission of a crime. But, then, this fishing expedition is indicative of the absence of evidence
to establish a probable cause.
Moreover, the theory that the criminal prosecution of those who secure an illegal search warrant
and/or make unreasonable searches or seizures would suffice to protect the constitutional
guarantee under consideration, overlooks the fact that violations thereof are, in general,
committed By agents of the party in power, for, certainly, those belonging to the minority could
not possibly abuse a power they do not have. Regardless of the handicap under which the

minority usually but, understandably finds itself in prosecuting agents of the majority, one
must not lose sight of the fact that the psychological and moral effect of the possibility 21 of
securing their conviction, is watered down by the pardoning power of the party for whose benefit
the illegality had been committed.
In their Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of the Resolution of this Court dated June 29,
1962, petitioners allege that Rooms Nos. 81 and 91 of Carmen Apartments, House No. 2008,
Dewey Boulevard, House No. 1436, Colorado Street, and Room No. 304 of the Army-Navy Club,
should be included among the premises considered in said Resolution as residences of herein
petitioners, Harry S. Stonehill, Robert P. Brook, John J. Brooks and Karl Beck, respectively, and
that, furthermore, the records, papers and other effects seized in the offices of the corporations
above referred to include personal belongings of said petitioners and other effects under their
exclusive possession and control, for the exclusion of which they have a standing under the
latest rulings of the federal courts of federal courts of the United States. 22
We note, however, that petitioners' theory, regarding their alleged possession of and control over
the aforementioned records, papers and effects, and the alleged "personal" nature thereof, has
Been Advanced, notin their petition or amended petition herein, but in the Motion for
Reconsideration and Amendment of the Resolution of June 29, 1962. In other words, said theory
would appear to be readjustment of that followed in said petitions, to suit the approach intimated
in the Resolution sought to be reconsidered and amended. Then, too, some of the affidavits or
copies of alleged affidavits attached to said motion for reconsideration, or submitted in support
thereof, contain either inconsistent allegations, or allegations inconsistent with the theory now
advanced by petitioners herein.
Upon the other hand, we are not satisfied that the allegations of said petitions said motion for
reconsideration, and the contents of the aforementioned affidavits and other papers submitted in
support of said motion, have sufficiently established the facts or conditions contemplated in the
cases relied upon by the petitioners; to warrant application of the views therein expressed,
should we agree thereto. At any rate, we do not deem it necessary to express our opinion
thereon, it being best to leave the matter open for determination in appropriate cases in the
future.
We hold, therefore, that the doctrine adopted in the Moncado case must be, as it is hereby,
abandoned; that the warrants for the search of three (3) residences of herein petitioners, as
specified in the Resolution of June 29, 1962, are null and void; that the searches and seizures
therein made are illegal; that the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued, in connection
with the documents, papers and other effects thus seized in said residences of herein petitioners
is hereby made permanent; that the writs prayed for are granted, insofar as the documents,
papers and other effects so seized in the aforementioned residences are concerned; that the
aforementioned motion for Reconsideration and Amendment should be, as it is hereby, denied;
and that the petition herein is dismissed and the writs prayed for denied, as regards the
documents, papers and other effects seized in the twenty-nine (29) places, offices and other
premises enumerated in the same Resolution, without special pronouncement as to costs.
It is so ordered.
Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar and Sanchez, JJ., concur.
CASTRO, J., concurring and dissenting:
From my analysis of the opinion written by Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion and from the import
of the deliberations of the Court on this case, I gather the following distinct conclusions:

1. All the search warrants served by the National Bureau of Investigation in this case are
general warrants and are therefore proscribed by, and in violation of, paragraph 3 of
section 1 of Article III (Bill of Rights) of the Constitution;
2. All the searches and seizures conducted under the authority of the said search warrants
were consequently illegal;
3. The non-exclusionary rule enunciated in Moncado vs. People, 80 Phil. 1, should be, and
is declared, abandoned;
4. The search warrants served at the three residences of the petitioners
are expressly declared null and void the searches and seizures therein made
are expressly declared illegal; and the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued
against the use of the documents, papers and effect seized in the said residences is made
permanent; and
5. Reasoning that the petitioners have not in their pleadings satisfactorily demonstrated
that they have legal standing to move for the suppression of the documents, papers and
effects seized in the places other than the three residences adverted to above, the opinion
written by the Chief Justice refrains fromexpressly declaring as null and void the such
warrants served at such other places and as illegal the searches and seizures made
therein, and leaves "the matter open for determination in appropriate cases in the future."
It is precisely the position taken by the Chief Justice summarized in the immediately preceding
paragraph (numbered 5) with which I am not in accord.
I do not share his reluctance or unwillingness to expressly declare, at this time, the nullity of the
search warrants served at places other than the three residences, and the illegibility of the
searches and seizures conducted under the authority thereof. In my view even the exacerbating
passions and prejudices inordinately generated by the environmental political and moral
developments of this case should not deter this Court from forthrightly laying down the law not
only for this case but as well for future cases and future generations. All the search warrants,
without exception, in this case are admittedly general, blanket and roving warrants and are
therefore admittedly and indisputably outlawed by the Constitution; and the searches and
seizures made were therefore unlawful. That the petitioners, let us assume in gratia argumente,
have no legal standing to ask for the suppression of the papers, things and effects seized from
places other than their residences, to my mind, cannot in any manner affect, alter or otherwise
modify the intrinsic nullity of the search warrants and the intrinsic illegality of the searches and
seizures made thereunder. Whether or not the petitioners possess legal standing the said
warrants are void and remain void, and the searches and seizures were illegal and remain illegal.
No inference can be drawn from the words of the Constitution that "legal standing" or the lack of
it is a determinant of the nullity or validity of a search warrant or of the lawfulness or illegality of
a search or seizure.
On the question of legal standing, I am of the conviction that, upon the pleadings submitted to
this Court the petitioners have the requisite legal standing to move for the suppression and
return of the documents, papers and effects that were seized from places other than their family
residences.
Our constitutional provision on searches and seizures was derived almost verbatim from the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. In the many years of judicial construction
and interpretation of the said constitutional provision, our courts have invariably regarded as
doctrinal the pronouncement made on the Fourth Amendment by federal courts, especially the
Federal Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals.

The U.S. doctrines and pertinent cases on standing to move for the suppression or return of
documents, papers and effects which are the fruits of an unlawful search and seizure, may be
summarized as follows; (a) ownership of documents, papers and effects gives "standing;" (b)
ownership and/or control or possession actual or constructive of premises searched gives
"standing"; and (c) the "aggrieved person" doctrine where the search warrant and the sworn
application for search warrant are "primarily" directed solely and exclusively against the
"aggrieved person," gives "standing."
An examination of the search warrants in this case will readily show that, excepting three, all
were directed against the petitioners personally. In some of them, the petitioners were named
personally, followed by the designation, "the President and/or General Manager" of the particular
corporation. The three warrants excepted named three corporate defendants. But the
"office/house/warehouse/premises" mentioned in the said three warrants were also the same
"office/house/warehouse/premises" declared to be owned by or under the control of the
petitioners in all the other search warrants directed against the petitioners and/or "the President
and/or General Manager" of the particular corporation. (see pages 5-24 of Petitioners' Reply of
April 2, 1962). The searches and seizures were to be made, and were actually made, in the
"office/house/warehouse/premises" owned by or under the control of the petitioners.
Ownership of matters seized gives "standing."
Ownership of the properties seized alone entitles the petitioners to bring a motion to return and
suppress, and gives them standing as persons aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure
regardless of their location at the time of seizure. Jones vs. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261
(1960) (narcotics stored in the apartment of a friend of the defendant); Henzel vs. United States,
296 F. 2d. 650, 652-53 (5th Cir. 1961), (personal and corporate papers of corporation of which
the defendant was president), United States vs. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951) (narcotics seized in
an apartment not belonging to the defendant); Pielow vs. United States, 8 F. 2d 492, 493 (9th Cir.
1925) (books seized from the defendant's sister but belonging to the defendant); Cf. Villano vs.
United States, 310 F. 2d 680, 683 (10th Cir. 1962) (papers seized in desk neither owned by nor in
exclusive possession of the defendant).
In a very recent case (decided by the U.S. Supreme Court on December 12, 1966), it was held
that under the constitutional provision against unlawful searches and seizures, a person places
himself or his property within a constitutionally protected area, be it his home or his office, his
hotel room or his automobile:
Where the argument falls is in its misapprehension of the fundamental nature and scope of
Fourth Amendment protection. What the Fourth Amendment protects is the security a man
relies upon when heplaces himself or his property within a constitutionally protected area,
be it his home or his office, his hotel room or his automobile. There he is protected from
unwarranted governmental intrusion. And when he puts some thing in his filing cabinet, in
his desk drawer, or in his pocket, he has the right to know it will be secure from an
unreasonable search or an unreasonable seizure. So it was that the Fourth Amendment
could not tolerate the warrantless search of the hotel room in Jeffers, the purloining of the
petitioner's private papers in Gouled, or the surreptitious electronic surveilance
in Silverman. Countless other cases which have come to this Court over the years have
involved a myriad of differing factual contexts in which the protections of the Fourth
Amendment have been appropriately invoked. No doubt, the future will bring countless
others. By nothing we say here do we either foresee or foreclose factual situations to
which the Fourth Amendment may be applicable. (Hoffa vs. U.S., 87 S. Ct. 408 (December
12, 1966). See also U.S. vs. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 72 S. Ct. 93 (November 13, 1951).
(Emphasis supplied).
Control of premises searched gives "standing."

Independent of ownership or other personal interest in the records and documents seized, the
petitioners have standing to move for return and suppression by virtue of their proprietary or
leasehold interest in many of the premises searched. These proprietary and leasehold interests
have been sufficiently set forth in their motion for reconsideration and need not be recounted
here, except to emphasize that the petitioners paid rent, directly or indirectly, for practically all
the premises searched (Room 91, 84 Carmen Apts; Room 304, Army & Navy Club; Premises
2008, Dewey Boulevard; 1436 Colorado Street); maintained personal offices within the corporate
offices (IBMC, USTC); had made improvements or furnished such offices; or had paid for the filing
cabinets in which the papers were stored (Room 204, Army & Navy Club); and individually, or
through their respective spouses, owned the controlling stock of the corporations involved. The
petitioners' proprietary interest in most, if not all, of the premises searched therefore
independently gives them standing to move for the return and suppression of the books, papers
and affects seized therefrom.
In Jones vs. United States, supra, the U.S. Supreme Court delineated the nature and extent of the
interest in the searched premises necessary to maintain a motion to suppress. After reviewing
what it considered to be the unduly technical standard of the then prevailing circuit court
decisions, the Supreme Court said (362 U.S. 266):
We do not lightly depart from this course of decisions by the lower courts. We are
persuaded, however, that it is unnecessarily and ill-advised to import into the law
surrounding the constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures
subtle distinctions, developed and refined by the common law in evolving the body of
private property law which, more than almost any other branch of law, has been shaped
by distinctions whose validity is largely historical. Even in the area from which they derive,
due consideration has led to the discarding of those distinctions in the homeland of the
common law. See Occupiers' Liability Act, 1957, 5 and 6 Eliz. 2, c. 31, carrying out Law
Reform Committee, Third Report, Cmd. 9305. Distinctions such as those between "lessee",
"licensee," "invitee," "guest," often only of gossamer strength, ought not be determinative
in fashioning procedures ultimately referable to constitutional safeguards. See
also Chapman vs. United States, 354 U.S. 610, 616-17 (1961).
It has never been held that a person with requisite interest in the premises searched must own
the property seized in order to have standing in a motion to return and suppress. In Alioto vs.
United States, 216 F. Supp. 48 (1963), a Bookkeeper for several corporations from whose
apartment the corporate records were seized successfully moved for their return. In United
States vs. Antonelli, Fireworks Co., 53 F. Supp. 870, 873 (W D. N. Y. 1943), the corporation's
president successfully moved for the return and suppression is to him of both personal and
corporate documents seized from his home during the course of an illegal search:
The lawful possession by Antonelli of documents and property, "either his own or the
corporation's was entitled to protection against unreasonable search and seizure. Under
the circumstances in the case at bar, the search and seizure were unreasonable and
unlawful. The motion for the return of seized article and the suppression of the evidence
so obtained should be granted. (Emphasis supplied).
Time was when only a person who had property in interest in either the place searched or the
articles seize had the necessary standing to invoke the protection of the exclusionary rule. But
in MacDonald vs. Unite States, 335 U.S. 461 (1948), Justice Robert Jackson joined by Justice Felix
Frankfurter, advanced the view that "even a guest may expect the shelter of the rooftree he is
under against criminal intrusion." This view finally became the official view of the U.S. Supreme
Court and was articulated in United States vs. Jeffers, 432 U.S 48 (1951). Nine years later, in
1960, in Jones vs. Unite States, 362 U.S. 257, 267, the U.S. Supreme Court went a step further.
Jones was a mere guest in the apartment unlawfully searched but the Court nonetheless declared
that the exclusionary rule protected him as well. The concept of "person aggrieved by an

unlawful search and seizure" was enlarged to include "anyone legitimately on premise where the
search occurs."
Shortly after the U.S. Supreme Court's Jones decision the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit held that the defendant organizer, sole stockholder and president of a corporation had
standing in a mail fraud prosecution against him to demand the return and suppression of
corporate property. Henzel vs. United States, 296 F 2d 650, 652 (5th Cir. 1961), supra. The court
conclude that the defendant had standing on two independent grounds: First he had a
sufficient interest in the property seized, and second he had an adequate interest in the
premises searched (just like in the case at bar). A postal inspector had unlawfully searched the
corporation' premises and had seized most of the corporation's book and records. Looking
to Jones, the court observed:
Jones clearly tells us, therefore, what is not required qualify one as a "person aggrieved by
an unlawful search and seizure." It tells us that appellant should not have been precluded
from objecting to the Postal Inspector's search and seizure of the corporation's books and
records merely because the appellant did not show ownership or possession of the books
and records or a substantial possessory interest in the invade premises . . . (Henzel vs.
United States, 296 F. 2d at 651). .
Henzel was soon followed by Villano vs. United States, 310 F. 2d 680, 683, (10th Cir. 1962).
In Villano, police officers seized two notebooks from a desk in the defendant's place of
employment; the defendant did not claim ownership of either; he asserted that several
employees (including himself) used the notebooks. The Court held that the employee had a
protected interest and that there also was an invasion of privacy.
Both Henzel andVillano considered also the fact that the search and seizure were "directed at"
the moving defendant. Henzel vs. United States, 296 F. 2d at 682; Villano vs. United States, 310
F. 2d at 683.
In a case in which an attorney closed his law office, placed his files in storage and went to Puerto
Rico, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit recognized his standing to move to quash as
unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution a grand
jury subpoena duces tecum directed to the custodian of his files. The Government contended
that the petitioner had no standing because the books and papers were physically in the
possession of the custodian, and because the subpoena was directed against the custodian. The
court rejected the contention, holding that
Schwimmer legally had such possession, control and unrelinquished personal rights in the
books and papers as not to enable the question of unreasonable search and seizure to be
escaped through the mere procedural device of compelling a third-party naked possessor
to produce and deliver them. Schwimmer vs. United States, 232 F. 2d 855, 861 (8th Cir.
1956).
Aggrieved person doctrine where the search warrant s primarily directed against said person
gives "standing."
The latest United States decision squarely in point is United States vs. Birrell, 242 F. Supp. 191
(1965, U.S.D.C. S.D.N.Y.). The defendant had stored with an attorney certain files and papers,
which attorney, by the name of Dunn, was not, at the time of the seizing of the records, Birrell's
attorney. * Dunn, in turn, had stored most of the records at his home in the country and on a
farm which, according to Dunn's affidavit, was under his (Dunn's) "control and management."
The papers turned out to be private, personal and business papers together with corporate books
and records of certain unnamed corporations in which Birrell did not even claim ownership. (All of
these type records were seized in the case at bar). Nevertheless, the search in Birrell was held
invalid by the court which held that even though Birrell did not own the premises where the

records were stored, he had "standing" to move for the return of all the papers and properties
seized. The court, relying on Jones vs. U.S.,supra; U.S. vs. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 53 F. Supp.
870, Aff'd 155 F. 2d 631: Henzel vs. U.S., supra; andSchwimmer vs. U.S., supra, pointed out that
It is overwhelmingly established that the searches here in question were directed solely
and exclusively against Birrell. The only person suggested in the papers as having violated
the law was Birrell. The first search warrant described the records as having been used "in
committing a violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1341, by the use of the
mails by one Lowell M. Birrell, . . ." The second search warrant was captioned: "United
States of America vs. Lowell M. Birrell. (p. 198)
Possession (actual or constructive), no less than ownership, gives standing to move to
suppress. Such was the rule even before Jones. (p. 199)
If, as thus indicated Birrell had at least constructive possession of the records stored with
Dunn, it matters not whether he had any interest in the premises searched. See
also Jeffers v. United States, 88 U.S. Appl. D.C. 58, 187 F. 2d 498 (1950), affirmed 432 U.S.
48, 72 S. Ct. 93, 96 L. Ed. 459 (1951).
The ruling in the Birrell case was reaffirmed on motion for reargument; the United States did not
appeal from this decision. The factual situation in Birrell is strikingly similar to the case of the
present petitioners; as in Birrell, many personal and corporate papers were seized from premises
not petitioners' family residences; as in Birrell,the searches were "PRIMARILY DIRECTED SOLETY
AND EXCLUSIVELY" against the petitioners. Still both types of documents were suppressed
in Birrell because of the illegal search. In the case at bar, the petitioners connection with the
premises raided is much closer than in Birrell.
Thus, the petitioners have full standing to move for the quashing of all the warrants regardless
whether these were directed against residences in the narrow sense of the word, as long as the
documents were personal papers of the petitioners or (to the extent that they were corporate
papers) were held by them in a personal capacity or under their personal control.
Prescinding a from the foregoing, this Court, at all events, should order the return to the
petitioners all personaland private papers and effects seized, no matter where these were seized,
whether from their residences or corporate offices or any other place or places.
The uncontradicted sworn statements of the petitioners in their, various pleadings submitted to
this Court indisputably show that amongst the things seized from the corporate offices and other
places were personal and private papers and effects belonging to the petitioners.
If there should be any categorization of the documents, papers and things which where the
objects of the unlawful searches and seizures, I submit that the grouping should be:
(a) personal or private papers of the petitioners were they were unlawfully seized, be it their
family residences offices, warehouses and/or premises owned and/or possessed (actually or
constructively) by them as shown in all the search and in the sworn applications filed in securing
the void search warrants and (b) purely corporate papers belonging to corporations. Under such
categorization or grouping, the determination of which unlawfully seized papers, documents and
things are personal/private of the petitioners or purely corporate papers will have to be left to the
lower courts which issued the void search warrants in ultimately effecting the suppression and/or
return of the said documents.
And as unequivocally indicated by the authorities above cited, the petitioners likewise have clear
legal standing to move for the suppression of purely corporate papers as "President and/or
General Manager" of the corporations involved as specifically mentioned in the void search
warrants.

Finally, I must articulate my persuasion that although the cases cited in my disquisition were
criminal prosecutions, the great clauses of the constitutional proscription on illegal searches and
seizures do not withhold the mantle of their protection from cases not criminal in origin or
nature.

G.R. No. L-64261 December 26, 1984

JOSE BURGOS, SR., JOSE BURGOS, JR., BAYANI SORIANO and J. BURGOS MEDIA
SERVICES, INC.,petitioners,
vs.
THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE CHIEF, PHILIPPINE
CONSTABULARY, THE CHIEF LEGAL OFFICER, PRESIDENTIAL SECURITY COMMAND, THE
JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL, ET AL., respondents.
Lorenzo M. Taada, Wigberto E. Taada, Martiniano Vivo, Augusto Sanchez, Joker P. Arroyo,
Jejomar Binay and Rene Saguisag for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.

ESCOLIN, J.:
Assailed in this petition for certiorari prohibition and mandamus with preliminary mandatory and
prohibitory injunction is the validity of two [2] search warrants issued on December 7, 1982 by
respondent Judge Ernani Cruz-Pano, Executive Judge of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal
[Quezon City], under which the premises known as No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City, and
784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, business addresses of the
"Metropolitan Mail" and "We Forum" newspapers, respectively, were searched, and office and
printing machines, equipment, paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used in the
printing, publication and distribution of the said newspapers, as well as numerous papers,
documents, books and other written literature alleged to be in the possession and control of
petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of the "We Forum" newspaper, were seized.
Petitioners further pray that a writ of preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction be issued
for the return of the seized articles, and that respondents, "particularly the Chief Legal Officer,
Presidential Security Command, the Judge Advocate General, AFP, the City Fiscal of Quezon City,
their representatives, assistants, subalterns, subordinates, substitute or successors" be enjoined
from using the articles thus seized as evidence against petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. and the other
accused in Criminal Case No. Q- 022782 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
entitled People v. Jose Burgos, Jr. et al. 1
In our Resolution dated June 21, 1983, respondents were required to answer the petition. The
plea for preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction was set for hearing on June 28, 1983,
later reset to July 7, 1983, on motion of the Solicitor General in behalf of respondents.
At the hearing on July 7, 1983, the Solicitor General, while opposing petitioners' prayer for a writ
of preliminary mandatory injunction, manifested that respondents "will not use the
aforementioned articles as evidence in the aforementioned case until final resolution of the
legality of the seizure of the aforementioned articles. ..." 2 With this manifestation, the prayer for
preliminary prohibitory injunction was rendered moot and academic.
Respondents would have this Court dismiss the petition on the ground that petitioners had come
to this Court without having previously sought the quashal of the search warrants before
respondent judge. Indeed, petitioners, before impugning the validity of the warrants before this
Court, should have filed a motion to quash said warrants in the court that issued them. 3 But this
procedural flaw notwithstanding, we take cognizance of this petition in view of the seriousness
and urgency of the constitutional issues raised not to mention the public interest generated by
the search of the "We Forum" offices, which was televised in Channel 7 and widely publicized in
all metropolitan dailies. The existence of this special circumstance justifies this Court to exercise

its inherent power to suspend its rules. In the words of the revered Mr. Justice Abad Santos in the
case of C. Vda. de Ordoveza v. Raymundo, 4 "it is always in the power of the court [Supreme
Court] to suspend its rules or to except a particular case from its operation, whenever the
purposes of justice require it...".
Respondents likewise urge dismissal of the petition on ground of laches. Considerable stress is
laid on the fact that while said search warrants were issued on December 7, 1982, the instant
petition impugning the same was filed only on June 16, 1983 or after the lapse of a period of
more than six [6] months.
Laches is failure or negligence for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that
which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier. It is negligence or
omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party
entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. 5
Petitioners, in their Consolidated Reply, explained the reason for the delay in the filing of the
petition thus:
Respondents should not find fault, as they now do [p. 1, Answer, p. 3, Manifestation]
with the fact that the Petition was filed on June 16, 1983, more than half a year after
the petitioners' premises had been raided.
The climate of the times has given petitioners no other choice. If they had waited
this long to bring their case to court, it was because they tried at first to exhaust
other remedies. The events of the past eleven fill years had taught them that
everything in this country, from release of public funds to release of detained
persons from custody, has become a matter of executive benevolence or largesse
Hence, as soon as they could, petitioners, upon suggestion of persons close to the
President, like Fiscal Flaminiano, sent a letter to President Marcos, through counsel
Antonio Coronet asking the return at least of the printing equipment and vehicles.
And after such a letter had been sent, through Col. Balbino V. Diego, Chief
Intelligence and Legal Officer of the Presidential Security Command, they were
further encouraged to hope that the latter would yield the desired results.
After waiting in vain for five [5] months, petitioners finally decided to come to Court.
[pp. 123-124, Rollo]
Although the reason given by petitioners may not be flattering to our judicial system, We find no
ground to punish or chastise them for an error in judgment. On the contrary, the extrajudicial
efforts exerted by petitioners quite evidently negate the presumption that they had abandoned
their right to the possession of the seized property, thereby refuting the charge of laches against
them.
Respondents also submit the theory that since petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. had used and marked as
evidence some of the seized documents in Criminal Case No. Q- 022872, he is now estopped
from challenging the validity of the search warrants. We do not follow the logic of respondents.
These documents lawfully belong to petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. and he can do whatever he
pleases with them, within legal bounds. The fact that he has used them as evidence does not
and cannot in any way affect the validity or invalidity of the search warrants assailed in this
petition.
Several and diverse reasons have been advanced by petitioners to nullify the search warrants in
question.

1. Petitioners fault respondent judge for his alleged failure to conduct an examination under oath
or affirmation of the applicant and his witnesses, as mandated by the above-quoted
constitutional provision as wen as Sec. 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court . 6 This objection,
however, may properly be considered moot and academic, as petitioners themselves conceded
during the hearing on August 9, 1983, that an examination had indeed been conducted by
respondent judge of Col. Abadilla and his witnesses.
2. Search Warrants No. 20-82[a] and No. 20- 82[b] were used to search two distinct places: No.
19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon
City, respectively. Objection is interposed to the execution of Search Warrant No. 20-82[b] at the
latter address on the ground that the two search warrants pinpointed only one place where
petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. was allegedly keeping and concealing the articles listed therein, i.e.,
No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City. This assertion is based on that portion of Search Warrant
No. 20- 82[b] which states:
Which have been used, and are being used as instruments and means of
committing the crime of subversion penalized under P.D. 885 as amended and he is
keeping and concealing the same at 19 Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City.
The defect pointed out is obviously a typographical error. Precisely, two search warrants were
applied for and issued because the purpose and intent were to search two distinct premises. It
would be quite absurd and illogical for respondent judge to have issued two warrants intended
for one and the same place. Besides, the addresses of the places sought to be searched were
specifically set forth in the application, and since it was Col. Abadilla himself who headed the
team which executed the search warrants, the ambiguity that might have arisen by reason of the
typographical error is more apparent than real. The fact is that the place for which Search
Warrant No. 20- 82[b] was applied for was 728 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue,
Quezon City, which address appeared in the opening paragraph of the said warrant. 7 Obviously
this is the same place that respondent judge had in mind when he issued Warrant No. 20-82 [b].
In the determination of whether a search warrant describes the premises to be searched with
sufficient particularity, it has been held "that the executing officer's prior knowledge as to the
place intended in the warrant is relevant. This would seem to be especially true where the
executing officer is the affiant on whose affidavit the warrant had issued, and when he knows
that the judge who issued the warrant intended the building described in the affidavit, And it has
also been said that the executing officer may look to the affidavit in the official court file to
resolve an ambiguity in the warrant as to the place to be searched." 8
3. Another ground relied upon to annul the search warrants is the fact that although the warrants
were directed against Jose Burgos, Jr. alone, articles b belonging to his co-petitioners Jose Burgos,
Sr., Bayani Soriano and the J. Burgos Media Services, Inc. were seized.
Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, enumerates the personal properties that may be seized
under a search warrant, to wit:
Sec. 2. Personal Property to be seized. A search warrant may be issued for the
search and seizure of the following personal property:
[a] Property subject of the offense;
[b] Property stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the
offense; and
[c] Property used or intended to be used as the means of committing
an offense.

The above rule does not require that the property to be seized should be owned by the person
against whom the search warrant is directed. It may or may not be owned by him. In fact, under
subsection [b] of the above-quoted Section 2, one of the properties that may be seized is stolen
property. Necessarily, stolen property must be owned by one other than the person in whose
possession it may be at the time of the search and seizure. Ownership, therefore, is of no
consequence, and it is sufficient that the person against whom the warrant is directed has
control or possession of the property sought to be seized, as petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. was
alleged to have in relation to the articles and property seized under the warrants.
4. Neither is there merit in petitioners' assertion that real properties were seized under the
disputed warrants. Under Article 415[5] of the Civil Code of the Philippines, "machinery,
receptables, instruments or implements intended by the owner of the tenement for an industry
or works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land and which tend directly to
meet the needs of the said industry or works" are considered immovable property. In Davao
Sawmill Co. v. Castillo 9 where this legal provision was invoked, this Court ruled that machinery
which is movable by nature becomes immobilized when placed by the owner of the tenement,
property or plant, but not so when placed by a tenant, usufructuary, or any other person having
only a temporary right, unless such person acted as the agent of the owner.
In the case at bar, petitioners do not claim to be the owners of the land and/or building on which
the machineries were placed. This being the case, the machineries in question, while in fact
bolted to the ground remain movable property susceptible to seizure under a search warrant.
5. The questioned search warrants were issued by respondent judge upon application of Col.
Rolando N. Abadilla Intelligence Officer of the P.C. Metrocom. 10 The application was accompanied
by the Joint Affidavit of Alejandro M. Gutierrez and Pedro U. Tango, 11 members of the Metrocom
Intelligence and Security Group under Col. Abadilla which conducted a surveillance of the
premises prior to the filing of the application for the search warrants on December 7, 1982.
It is contended by petitioners, however, that the abovementioned documents could not have
provided sufficient basis for the finding of a probable cause upon which a warrant may validly
issue in accordance with Section 3, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution which provides:
SEC. 3. ... and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as
may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
We find petitioners' thesis impressed with merit. Probable cause for a search is defined as such
facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that
an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in
the place sought to be searched. And when the search warrant applied for is directed against a
newspaper publisher or editor in connection with the publication of subversive materials, as in
the case at bar, the application and/or its supporting affidavits must contain a specification,
stating with particularity the alleged subversive material he has published or is intending to
publish. Mere generalization will not suffice. Thus, the broad statement in Col. Abadilla's
application that petitioner "is in possession or has in his control printing equipment and other
paraphernalia, news publications and other documents which were used and are all continuously
being used as a means of committing the offense of subversion punishable under Presidential
Decree 885, as amended ..." 12 is a mere conclusion of law and does not satisfy the
requirements of probable cause. Bereft of such particulars as would justify a finding of the
existence of probable cause, said allegation cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a search
warrant and it was a grave error for respondent judge to have done so.

Equally insufficient as basis for the determination of probable cause is the statement contained
in the joint affidavit of Alejandro M. Gutierrez and Pedro U. Tango, "that the evidence gathered
and collated by our unit clearly shows that the premises above- mentioned and the articles and
things above-described were used and are continuously being used for subversive activities in
conspiracy with, and to promote the objective of, illegal organizations such as the Light-a-Fire
Movement, Movement for Free Philippines, and April 6 Movement." 13
In mandating that "no warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the
judge, ... after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce; 14 the Constitution requires no less than personal knowledge by the complainant
or his witnesses of the facts upon which the issuance of a search warrant may be justified.
In Alvarez v. Court of First Instance, 15 this Court ruled that "the oath required must refer to the
truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the
purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit
and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable cause." As couched, the
quoted averment in said joint affidavit filed before respondent judge hardly meets the test of
sufficiency established by this Court in Alvarez case.
Another factor which makes the search warrants under consideration constitutionally
objectionable is that they are in the nature of general warrants. The search warrants describe the
articles sought to be seized in this wise:
1] All printing equipment, paraphernalia, paper, ink, photo (equipment, typewriters,
cabinets, tables, communications/recording equipment, tape recorders, dictaphone
and the like used and/or connected in the printing of the "WE FORUM" newspaper
and any and all documents communication, letters and facsimile of prints related to
the "WE FORUM" newspaper.
2] Subversive documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, and other publication to
promote the objectives and piurposes of the subversive organization known as
Movement for Free Philippines, Light-a-Fire Movement and April 6 Movement; and,
3] Motor vehicles used in the distribution/circulation of the "WE FORUM" and other
subversive materials and propaganda, more particularly,
1] Toyota-Corolla, colored yellow with Plate No. NKA 892;
2] DATSUN pick-up colored white with Plate No. NKV 969
3] A delivery truck with Plate No. NBS 524;
4] TOYOTA-TAMARAW, colored white with Plate No. PBP 665; and,
5] TOYOTA Hi-Lux, pick-up truck with Plate No. NGV 427 with marking
"Bagong Silang."
In Stanford v. State of Texas 16 the search warrant which authorized the search for "books,
records, pamphlets, cards, receipts, lists, memoranda, pictures, recordings and other written
instruments concerning the Communist Party in Texas," was declared void by the U.S. Supreme
Court for being too general. In like manner, directions to "seize any evidence in connectionwith
the violation of SDC 13-3703 or otherwise" have been held too general, and that portion of a
search warrant which authorized the seizure of any "paraphernalia which could be used to violate
Sec. 54-197 of the Connecticut General Statutes [the statute dealing with the crime of
conspiracy]" was held to be a general warrant, and therefore invalid. 17 The description of the

articles sought to be seized under the search warrants in question cannot be characterized
differently.
In the Stanford case, the U.S. Supreme Courts calls to mind a notable chapter in English history:
the era of disaccord between the Tudor Government and the English Press, when "Officers of the
Crown were given roving commissions to search where they pleased in order to suppress and
destroy the literature of dissent both Catholic and Puritan Reference herein to such historical
episode would not be relevant for it is not the policy of our government to suppress any
newspaper or publication that speaks with "the voice of non-conformity" but poses no clear and
imminent danger to state security.
As heretofore stated, the premises searched were the business and printing offices of the
"Metropolitan Mail" and the "We Forum newspapers. As a consequence of the search and seizure,
these premises were padlocked and sealed, with the further result that the printing and
publication of said newspapers were discontinued.
Such closure is in the nature of previous restraint or censorship abhorrent to the freedom of the
press guaranteed under the fundamental law, 18 and constitutes a virtual denial of petitioners'
freedom to express themselves in print. This state of being is patently anathematic to a
democratic framework where a free, alert and even militant press is essential for the political
enlightenment and growth of the citizenry.
Respondents would justify the continued sealing of the printing machines on the ground that
they have been sequestered under Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 885, as amended, which
authorizes "the sequestration of the property of any person, natural or artificial, engaged in
subversive activities against the government and its duly constituted authorities ... in accordance
with implementing rules and regulations as may be issued by the Secretary of National Defense."
It is doubtful however, if sequestration could validly be effected in view of the absence of any
implementing rules and regulations promulgated by the Minister of National Defense.
Besides, in the December 10, 1982 issue of the Daily Express, it was reported that no less than
President Marcos himself denied the request of the military authorities to sequester the property
seized from petitioners on December 7, 1982. Thus:
The President denied a request flied by government prosecutors for sequestration of
the WE FORUM newspaper and its printing presses, according to Information
Minister Gregorio S. Cendana.
On the basis of court orders, government agents went to the We Forum offices in
Quezon City and took a detailed inventory of the equipment and all materials in the
premises.
Cendaa said that because of the denial the newspaper and its equipment remain
at the disposal of the owners, subject to the discretion of the court. 19
That the property seized on December 7, 1982 had not been sequestered is further confirmed by
the reply of then Foreign Minister Carlos P. Romulo to the letter dated February 10, 1983 of U.S.
Congressman Tony P. Hall addressed to President Marcos, expressing alarm over the "WE FORUM
" case. 20 In this reply dated February 11, 1983, Minister Romulo stated:
2. Contrary to reports, President Marcos turned down the recommendation of our
authorities to close the paper's printing facilities and confiscate the equipment and
materials it uses. 21

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, Search Warrants Nos. 20-82[a] and 20-82[b] issued by respondent
judge on December 7, 1982 are hereby declared null and void and are accordingly set aside. The
prayer for a writ of mandatory injunction for the return of the seized articles is hereby granted
and all articles seized thereunder are hereby ordered released to petitioners. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 143944

July 11, 2002

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
BASHER BONGCARAWAN y MACARAMBON, accused-appellant.
PUNO, J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision1 dated December 27, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court of
Iligan City, Branch 06, in Criminal Case No. 06-7542, finding accused Basher Bongcarawan y
Macarambon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act
No. 64252 as amended, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and to
pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) without subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency.1wphi1.nt
Accused Basher Bongcarawan y Macarambon was charged in an Information which reads, thus:
"That on or about March 13, 1999, in the City of Iligan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, without authority of law, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, custody and control
eight (8) packs of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, a regulated drug commonly known as
Shabu, weighing approximately 400 grams, without the corresponding license or
prescription.
Contrary to and in violation of Section 16, Article III of RA 6425, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by RA 7659." 3
During the arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued.
Evidence for the prosecution shows that on March 11, 1999, an interisland passenger ship, M/V
Super Ferry 5, sailed from Manila to Iligan City. At about 3:00 a.m. on March 13, 1999, the vessel
was about to dock at the port of Iligan City when its security officer, Mark Diesmo, received a
complaint from passenger Lorena Canoy about her missing jewelry. Canoy suspected one of her
co-passengers at cabin no. 106 as the culprit. Diesmo and four (4) other members of the vessel
security force accompanied Canoy to search for the suspect whom they later found at the
economy section.4 The suspect was identified as the accused, Basher Bongcarawan. The accused
was informed of the complaint and was invited to go back to cabin no. 106. With his consent, he
was bodily searched, but no jewelry was found. He was then escorted by two (2) security agents
back to the economy section to get his baggage. The accused took a Samsonite suitcase and
brought this back to the cabin. When requested by the security, the accused opened the
suitcase, revealing a brown bag and small plastic packs containing white crystalline substance.
Suspecting the substance to be "shabu," the security personnel immediately reported the matter
to the ship captain and took pictures of the accused beside the suitcase and its contents. They
also called the Philippine Coast Guard for assistance. 5 At about 6:00 a.m., Lt. Robert Patrimonio,
YN Aurelio Estoque, CD2 Phoudinie Lantao and RM3 Merchardo De Guzman of the Philippine
Coast Guard arrived and took custody of the accused and the seized items--the Samsonite
suitcase, a brown bag6 and eight (8) small plastic packs of white crystalline substance. 7 When
asked about the contraband articles, the accused explained that he was just requested by a
certain Alican "Alex" Macapudi to bring the suitcase to the latter's brother in Iligan City. 8 The
accused and the seized items were later turned over by the coast guard to the Presidential AntiOrganized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF). Chief Inspector Graciano Mijares and his men brought the
accused to the PAOCTF Headquarters,9 while the packs of white crystalline substance were sent
to the NBI Regional Office in Cagayan de Oro City for laboratory examination. NBI Forensic
Chemist Nicanor Cruz later confirmed the substance to be methamphetamine hydrochloride,
commonly known as "shabu," weighing 399.3266 grams. 10

The accused testified and proffered his own version. On March 11, 1999, at about 10:00 p.m., he
was in Quiapo, Manila where he met Alican "Alex" Macapudi, a neighbor who has a store in
Marawi City. He was requested by Macapudi to bring a Samsonite suitcase containing sunglasses
and watches to Iligan City, and to give it to Macapudi's brother at the Iligan port. He boarded the
M/V Super Ferry 5 on the same night, carrying a big luggage full of clothes, a small luggage or
"maleta" containing the sunglasses and brushes he bought from Manila, and the Samsonite
suitcase of Macapudi.11 He stayed at cabin no. 106. At about 4:00 a.m of March 13, 1999, as the
vessel was about to dock at the Iligan port, he took his baggage and positioned himself at the
economy section to be able to disembark ahead of the other passengers. There, he met a friend,
Ansari Ambor. While they were conversing, five (5) members of the vessel security force and a
woman whom he recognized as his co-passenger at cabin no. 106 came and told him that he was
suspected of stealing jewelry. He voluntarily went with the group back to cabin no. 106 where he
was frisked. Subsequently, he was asked to get his baggage, so he went back to the economy
section and took the big luggage and Macapudi's Samsonite suitcase. He left the small "maleta"
containing sunglasses and brushes for fear that they would be confiscated by the security
personnel. When requested, he voluntarily opened the big luggage, but refused to do the same
to the Samsonite suitcase which he claimed was not his and had a secret combination lock. The
security personnel forcibly opened the suitcase and found packs of white crystalline substance
inside which they suspected to be "shabu." They took pictures of him with the merchandise, and
asked him to sign a turn over receipt which was later given to the Philippine Coast Guard, then to
the PAOCTF.12
On December 27, 1999, the trial court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, the court finds the accused Basher Bongcarawan y Macarambon GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the offense of violation of Section 16, Art. III, R.A.
No. 6425 as amended by R.A. No. 7659 and hereby imposes upon him the penalty of
RECLUSION PERPETUA and a fine of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P500,000.00) PESOS,
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
Having been under preventive imprisonment since March 13, 1999 until the present, the
period of such preventive detention shall be credited in full in favor of the accused in the
service of his sentence.
The 399.3266 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu is hereby ordered
delivered to the National Bureau of Investigation for proper disposition.
SO ORDERED."13
Hence, this appeal where the accused raises the following assignment of errors:
"I.
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN SO HOLDING THAT THE DRUG CONFISCATED IS ADMISSIBLE
IN EVIDENCE AGAINST THE ACCUSED/APPELLANT.
II.
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN SO HOLDING THAT THE APPELLANT OWNED THE
CONFISCATED EVIDENCE AND THEREFORE ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE AGAINST HIM." 14
On the first assignment of error, the accused-appellant contends that the Samsonite suitcase
containing the methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu" was forcibly opened and searched
without his consent, and hence, in violation of his constitutional right against unreasonable
search and seizure. Any evidence acquired pursuant to such unlawful search and seizure, he

claims, is inadmissible in evidence against him. He also contends thatPeople v. Marti15 is not
applicable in this case because a vessel security personnel is deemed to perform the duties of a
policeman.
The contentions are devoid of merit.
The right against unreasonable search and seizure is a fundamental right protected by the
Constitution.16Evidence acquired in violation of this right shall be inadmissible for any purpose in
any proceeding.17 Whenever this right is challenged, an individual may choose between invoking
the constitutional protection or waiving his right by giving consent to the search and seizure. It
should be stressed, however, that protection is against transgression committed by the
government or its agent. As held by this Court in the case of People v. Marti,18 "[i]n the absence
of governmental interference, liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked against
the State."19 The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures applies as a
restraint directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of
the law. Thus, it could only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary
and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed. 20
In the case before us, the baggage of the accused-appellant was searched by the vessel security
personnel. It was only after they found "shabu" inside the suitcase that they called the Philippine
Coast Guard for assistance. The search and seizure of the suitcase and the contraband items was
therefore carried out without government intervention, and hence, the constitutional protection
against unreasonable search and seizure does not apply.
There is no merit in the contention of the accused-appellant that the search and seizure
performed by the vessel security personnel should be considered as one conducted by the police
authorities for like the latter, the former are armed and tasked to maintain peace and order. The
vessel security officer in the case at bar is a private employee and does not discharge any
governmental function. In contrast, police officers are agents of the state tasked with the
sovereign function of enforcement of the law. Historically and until now, it is against them and
other agents of the state that the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures may be
invoked.
On the second assignment of error, the accused-appellant contends that he is not the owner of
the Samsonite suitcase and he had no knowledge that the same contained "shabu." He submits
that without knowledge or intent to possess the dangerous drug, he cannot be convicted of the
crime charged.21
We are not persuaded.
In a prosecution for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the following facts must be proven
beyond reasonable doubt, viz: (1) that the accused is in possession of the object identified as a
prohibited or a regulated drug; (2) that such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) that the
accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug. 22 The first two elements were
sufficiently proven in this case, and were in fact undisputed. We are left with the third.
As early as 1910 in the case of United States v. Tan Misa,23 this Court has ruled that to
warrant conviction, the possession of dangerous drugs must be with knowledge of the accused,
or that animus possidendi existed together with the possession or control of such articles. 24 It has
been ruled, however, that possession of dangerous drugs constitutes prima facie evidence of
knowledge or animus possidendi sufficient to convict an accused in the absence of a satisfactory
explanation of such possession.25 Hence, the burden of evidence is shifted to the accused to
explain the absence of knowledge or animus possidendi.26

In this respect, the accused-appellant has utterly failed. His testimony, uncorroborated, selfserving and incredulous, was not given credence by the trial court. We find no reason to
disagree. Well-settled is the rule that in the absence of palpable error or grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the trial judge, the trial court's evaluation of the credibility of witnesses
will not be disturbed on appeal.27 Moreover, evidence must be credible in itself to deserve
credence and weight in law. In this case, the accused-appellant admits that when he was asked
to get his baggage, he knew it would be inspected. 28 Why he got the Samsonite suitcase
allegedly not owned by him and which had a combination lock known only to the owner remains
unclear. He also claims that he did not present his small "maleta" for inspection for fear that its
contents consisting of expensive sunglasses and brushes would be confiscated, 29 but he brought
the Samsonite suitcase which is not his and also contained expensive sunglasses, and even
watches.30
The things in possession of a person are presumed by law to be owned by him. 31 To overcome
this presumption, it is necessary to present clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. In this
case, the accused points to a certain Alican "Alex" Macapudi as the owner of the contraband, but
presented no evidence to support his claim. As aptly observed by the trial judge:
"First, who is Alex Macap[u]di aka Ali[c]an Macap[u]di? Does he really exist or simply a
figment of the imagination? He says that Alex Macap[u]di is a friend and a fellow
businessman who has a stall selling sunglasses in Marawi City. But no witnesses were
presented to prove that there is such a living, breathing, flesh and blood person named
Alex Macap[u]di who entrusted the Samsonite to the accused. Surely, if he does exist, he
has friends, fellow businessmen and acquaintances who could testify and support the
claim of the accused."32
Mere denial of ownership will not suffice especially if, as in the case at bar, it is the keystone of
the defense of the accused-appellant. Stories can easily be fabricated. It will take more than
bare-bone allegations to convince this Court that a courier of dangerous drugs is not its owner
and has no knowledge or intent to possess the same.1wphi1.nt
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, Branch 06, in Criminal Case
No. 06-7542, convicting accused-appellant Basher Bongcarawan of violation of Section 16, Article
III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua and to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, is AFFIRMED.
Costs against the accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 147607

January 22, 2004

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
BENHUR MAMARIL, appellant.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Lingayen, Pangasinan, Branch 39, in Criminal Case No. L-5963, finding appellant Benhur Mamaril
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 8 1 of Republic Act (RA) No. 6425, as
amended by RA No. 7659.
The Information filed against appellant reads:
That on or about the 1st day of February, 1999 and sometime prior thereto, in the
municipality of Lingayen, province of Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, willfully, unlawfully and criminally [did]
keep and possess crushed marijuana leaves contained in seventy eight (78) sachets with a
total weight of two hundred thirty six and eighty three hundredth (236.83) grams and two
(2) bricks of marijuana fruiting tops weighing one thousand six hundred grams, each brick
weighing eight hundred (800) grams, with a total weight of one thousand eight hundred
thirty six and eighty three hundredth (1,836.83) grams, a prohibited drug, without
authority to possess the same.
CONTRARY to Sec. 8 of R.A. 6425, as amended by R.A. 7659, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.2
When arraigned on October 8, 1999, appellant pleaded not guilty. 3 At the pre-trial conference
held on October 18, 1999, the parties admitted the following facts:
1. That the search was made in the house and premises of the parents of the accused
where he (accused) also lives, at Ramos St., Lingayen, Pangasinan, on February 1, 1999 at
about 2:30 o clock in the afternoon;
2. That the search was conducted by the elements of the PNP particularly SPO4 Faustino
Ferrer, SPO1 Alfredo Rico and others;
3. That the policemen brought along with them a camera;
4. That the accused was in the balcony of the house when it was searched;
5. The existence of the report of physical science report No. (DT-077-99) issued by the PNP
Crime Laboratory through Chemist Theresa Ann Bugayong Cid;
6. That accused was subjected to urine sample laboratory on February 2, 1999. 4
Thereafter, trial ensued.
The Prosecutions Evidence

On January 25, 1999, the Intelligence Section PNCO of the Lingayen Police Station, represented
by SPO2 Chito S. Esmenda, applied5 before the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan,
Branch 39, for a search warrant authorizing the search for marijuana, a prohibited drug, at the
family residence of appellant Benhur Mamaril, situated at Ramos Street, Poblacion, Lingayen,
Pangasinan. On said date, then presiding Executive Judge Eugenio G. Ramos (now retired) issued
Search Warrant No. 99-51.6
On February 1, 1999, at about 2:30 p.m., the Chief of Police of the Lingayen Police Station, SPO3
Alfredo Rico, SPO4 Faustino Ferrer, Jr. and other police officers went to the residence of appellant
and implemented Search Warrant No. 99-51. When they arrived at appellants house, they saw
appellants mother under the house. They asked her where appellant was, and she told them
that appellant was in the house, upstairs. When they went upstairs, they saw appellant coming
out of the room. Upon seeing the policemen, appellant turned back and tried to run towards the
back door. SPO3 Rico told appellant to stop, which appellant did. SPO3 Rico informed appellant
that they had a search warrant to search the house premises. They showed appellant and his
mother the search warrant. Appellant looked at the search warrant and did not say anything.
Thereafter, the policemen searched the house. The search was witnessed by two members of the
barangay council in said area, namely, Barangay Kagawad Leonardo Ramos and Barangay Tanod
Valentino Quintos, whom the police brought with them. 7
The searching team confiscated the following: (1) fifty-five (55) heat-sealed plastic sachets
containing suspected marijuana leaves, which were found in a buri bag ("bayong") under
appellants house; (2) three heat-sealed plastic sachets containing suspected marijuana leaves
and seeds contained in an eye-glass case; (3) twenty-two (22) heat-sealed plastic sachets
containing suspected marijuana leaves and seeds taken under a pillow placed on a monobloc
chair; and (4) two (2) bricks of suspected marijuana contained inside a white and gray bag found
inside the closet of appellants room. SPO3 Alfredo Rico took pictures 8 of the confiscated items
and prepared a receipt9 of the property seized. SPO4 Faustino Ferrer, Jr. prepared a
certification10 that the house was properly searched, which was signed by appellant and the
barangay officials who witnessed the search. After the search, the police officers brought
appellant and the confiscated articles to the Lingayen Police Station and turned them over to the
desk officer.11
The next day, on February 2, 1999, police officers Alfredo Rico, Alberto Santiago and Rodolfo
Madrid brought the confiscated articles to the Crime Laboratory at Camp Florendo, San Fernando,
La Union for examination. Appellant was also brought there for a drug test. 12
Police Superintendent Ma. Theresa Ann Bugayong Cid, forensic chemist and head of the PNP
Crime Laboratory, Regional Office I, Camp Florendo, Parian, San Fernando City, La Union, testified
that on February 2, 1999, she received from the Chief of Police of Lingayen, Pangasinan, a
request13 for a drug test on the person of appellant Benhur Mamaril and a laboratory examination
of the confiscated specimens.14 After weighing the specimens and testing the same, Police
Superintendent Cid issued a report15 finding the specimens16 to be "POSITIVE to the test for the
presence of marijuana x x x."17
Moreover, Police Superintendent Cid affirmed the findings in her report 18 that the examination
conducted on the urine sample of appellant was positive for the presence of methamphetamine
hydrochloride known as "shabu."19
After the prosecution formally offered its testimonial and documentary exhibits on March 5, 2000,
appellant, through his counsel, filed a motion with memorandum 20 contending that: (1) the
exhibits of the prosecution are inadmissible in evidence under Section 2 and Section 3 (2) of
Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution as the search warrant, by virtue of which said
exhibits were seized, was illegally issued, considering that the judges examination of the
complainant and his two witnesses was not in writing; and (2) said search warrant was illegally or

improperly implemented. Appellant prayed that all the exhibits of the prosecution be excluded as
evidence or in the alternative, that the resolution of the admissibility of the same be deferred
until such time that he has completed the presentation of his evidence in chief. On August 25,
2000, the prosecution opposed the motion, and the trial court denied appellants motion. 21
The Defenses Evidence
Appellant Benhur Mamaril, 31, single, laborer, denied that he was residing at his parents house
at Ramos Street, Lingayen, Pangasinan since he has been residing at a rented house at Barangay
Matic-matic, Sta. Barabara, Pangasinan since December 18, 1998. Appellant declared that on
February 1, 1999, it was his brother and the latters family who were residing with his mother at
Ramos Street, but on said day, his brother and family were not in the house since they were at
the fishpond.22
Appellant testified that on February 1, 1999, he was at his parents house at Ramos Street,
Lingayen, Pangasinan, because he and his live-in partner visited his mother on said day and
arrived there at 10:00 a.m. At about 2:00 p.m. of February 1, 1999, while appellant was at the
back of his parents house, about seven to nine policemen, in civilian clothes, arrived. The
policemen asked appellant to go upstairs and they immediately handcuffed him and brought him
to the balcony of the house. He stayed at the balcony until the search was finished after more
than 30 minutes. Thereafter, he was brought to the clinic of one Dr. Felix and a medical
examination was conducted on him. Then he was brought to the municipal hall. 23
Appellant testified that he saw the buri bag, the eye-glass case, and the gray and white bag
containing suspected marijuana for the first time on the day of the search when he was at the
balcony of their house. He also testified that he saw the Receipt of Property Seized for the first
time while he was testifying in court. He admitted that the signature on the certification that the
house was properly searched was his. 24
Moreover, appellant testified that in the early morning of February 2, 1999, he was brought to
the PNP Crime Laboratory in San Fernando, La Union where he gave his urine sample. Appellant
insinuated that the confiscated items were only planted because he had a misunderstanding with
some policemen in Lingayen. However, he admitted that the policemen who searched his
parents house did not threaten or harm him in any way and he had no misunderstanding with
SPO3 Alfredo Rico.25
Atty. Enrico O. Castillo, Branch Clerk of Court, RTC-Branch 39, Lingayen, Pangasinan, was
requested to testify on the available records regarding Search Warrant No. 99-51 on file in the
trial court and to identify said documents. Atty. Castillo testified that he only had with him the
application for search warrant, the supporting affidavits of PO3 Alberto Santiago and Diosdado
Fernandez and the return of the search warrant. 26
Atty. Enrico declared that before he assumed office as Branch Clerk of Court, the person
supposed to be in custody of any transcript of the searching questions and answers made by
Executive Judge Eugenio G. Ramos in connection with the application for Search Warrant No. 9951 was Mrs. Liberata Ariston, who was then a legal researcher and at the same time OIC-Branch
Clerk of Court. However, during the trial of this case, Mrs. Liberata Ariston was in the United
States of America. Atty. Enrico averred that he asked Mrs. Liberata Aristons daughter, Catherine
Ramirez, who is a court stenographer, about said transcript, but it has not been found. Atty.
Enrico testified that based on the records, there is no stenographic notes. He added that they
tried their best to locate the subject transcript, but they could not find it. 27
The Trial Courts Decision
On January 23, 2001, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the prosecution having established beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the
accused of the crime of possession of marijuana defined and penalized under Section 8 of
RA 6425, as amended, this Court in the absence of any modifying circumstances, hereby
sentences said accused to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and to pay a fine of
Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000), plus costs of this suit.
The period of preventive imprisonment suffered by the accused shall be credited in full in
service of his sentence in accordance with Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code.
SO ORDERED.28
The Appeal
Appellant contends that the trial court made the following errors:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING AS INADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE THE ARTICLES
ALLEGEDLY SEIZED FROM ACCUSED-APPELLANT CONSIDERING THAT SEARCH WARRANT NO. 9951 WAS ILLEGALLY ISSUED.
II
THE TRIAL COURT LIKEWISE ERRED IN NOT DECLARING AS TOTALLY INADMISSIBLE THE
INVENTORIED ARTICLES IN THE RECEIPT OF SEIZED PROPERTY AND THE CORRESPONDING
CERTIFICATION ISSUED THERETO (EXHS. "J" AND "I") SINCE THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS NOT
ASSISTED BY COUNSEL WHEN HE SIGNED THE SAME.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME CHARGED
DESPITE THE FACT THAT HIS GUILT WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. 29
Appellant prays for his acquittal on the ground that Search Warrant No. 99-51 was illegally issued
considering that there was no evidence showing that the required searching questions and
answers were made anent the application for said search warrant. Appellant pointed out that
Branch Clerk of Court Enrico O. Castillo testified that based on the records, there was no
transcript of stenographic notes of the proceedings in connection with the application for said
search warrant. Appellant thus asserts that it cannot be said that the judge made searching
questions upon the alleged applicant and his witnesses, which is in violation of Section 2, Article
III of the Constitution and Section 5, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.
Our Ruling
Appellants contention is meritorious.
The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is guaranteed under Article III, Section 2,
of the Constitution, thus:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall
be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or

affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Said Constitutional provision is implemented under Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, thus:
Sec. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall not issue except
upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
things to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines.
Sec. 5. Examination of complainant; record. -- The judge must, before issuing the warrant,
personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under
oath, the complainant and the witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to
them and attach to the record their sworn statements, together with the affidavits
submitted.
Under the above provisions, the issuance of a search warrant is justified only upon a finding of
probable cause. Probable cause for a search has been defined as such facts and circumstances
which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to
be searched.30 In determining the existence of probable cause, it is required that: (1) the judge
must examine the complainant and his witnesses personally; (2) the examination must be under
oath; and (3) the examination must be reduced in writing in the form of searching questions and
answers.31
Atty. Enrico O. Castillo, Branch Clerk of Court, RTC-Branch 39 of Lingayen, Pangasinan, who was
requested to testify on the available records kept in their office regarding Search Warrant No. 9951, presented before the court only the application for search warrant 32 and the supporting
affidavits33 of PO3 Alberto Santiago and Diosdado Fernandez. Atty. Castillo could not produce the
sworn statements of the complainant and his witnesses showing that the judge examined them
in the form of searching questions and answers in writing as required by law. Atty. Castillo
testified, thus:
xxx

xxx

xxx

Q Would you admit that from the records available there is no transcript of the
proceedings of a searching questions and answers made by the Executive Judge upon the
complainant as well as the two (2) witnesses not only in connection with application for
Search Warrant 99-51 but in all of those application covered by that record namely, 99-49,
99-50, 99-51, 99-52, 99-53 and 99-54?
A Sir, based on the records there is no transcript of [s]tenographic notes.
Q Did you not ask Catherine Ramirez, the daughter of then OIC-Mrs. Liberata Ariston about
said transcript?
A I asked her for several times, sir, and in fact I asked her again yesterday and she told me
that she will try to find on (sic) the said transcript.
Q But until now there is no transcript yet?
A Yes, sir.

Q Because according to the rules the transcript must be attached to the records of this
case together with the application for search warrant as well as the supporting affidavit of
the said application, but there is no records available to have it with you and there is no
proof with you?
A Because during the time I assumed the office, sir, the records in the store room which
they placed is topsy turvy and all the records are scattered. So, we are having a hard time
in scanning the records, sir.
Q But did you not try your very best assisted by the Court personnel to locate said
transcript, Mr. Witness?
A Sir, we tried our best but based on the transcript I can not just read the said transcript.
Q You mean to say you were able to [find] the stenographic notes?
A No, sir. There are stenographic notes but they are not yet transcribed, sir.
Q That is by a machine steno?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you not ask the assistance of the co-stenographers in your sala who are using the
machine steno to identify what cases does that stenographic notes (sic)?
A Sir, I was assisted by some stenographers but we can (sic) not find the
transcript of stenographic notes concerning Search Warrant No. 99-49 to 9954.34 (Underscoring ours)
Based on the above testimony and the other evidence on record, the prosecution failed to prove
that Executive Judge Eugenio G. Ramos put into writing his examination of the applicant and his
witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers before issuance of the search warrant.
The records only show the existence of an application 35 for a search warrant and the
affidavits36 of the complainants witnesses. In Mata v. Bayona,37we held:
Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The examining
Judge has to take depositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce and to attach them to the record. Such written deposition is necessary in order
that the Judge may be able to properly determine the existence or non-existence of the
probable cause, to hold liable for perjury the person giving it if it will be found later that
his declarations are false.
We, therefore, hold that the search warrant is tainted with illegality by the failure of the Judge to
conform with the essential requisites of taking the depositions in writing and attaching them to
the record, rendering the search warrant invalid.
We cannot give credit to the argument of the Solicitor General that the issuing judge examined
under oath, in the form of searching questions and answers, the applicant SPO2 Chito S.
Esmenda and his witnesses on January 25, 1999 as it is so stated in Search Warrant No. 99-51.
Although it is possible that Judge Ramos examined the complainant and his witnesses in the form
of searching questions and answers, the fact remains that there is no evidence that the
examination was put into writing as required by law. Otherwise, the depositions in writing of the
complainant and his witnesses would have been attached to the record, together with the
affidavits that the witnesses submitted, as required by Section 5, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.
Consequently, we find untenable the assertion of the Solicitor General that the subject

stenographic notes could not be found at the time Branch Clerk of Court Enrico Castillo testified
before the trial court because of the confused state of the records in the latters branch when he
assumed office.
The Solicitor General also argues that appellant is deemed to have waived his right to question
the legality of the search because he did not protest against it, and even admitted during his
testimony that he was neither threatened nor maltreated by the policemen who searched their
residence.
We disagree. The cases38 cited by the Solicitor General involved a warrantless search. In this
case, the police authorities presented a search warrant to appellant before his residence was
searched. At that time, appellant could not determine if the search warrant was issued in
accordance with the law. It was only during the trial of this case that appellant, through his
counsel, had reason to believe that the search warrant was illegally issued causing appellant to
file a motion with memorandum objecting to the admissibility of the evidence formally offered by
the prosecution. In People v. Burgos,39 we ruled:
Neither can it be presumed that there was a waiver, or that consent was given by the
accused to be searched simply because he failed to object. To constitute a waiver, it must
appear first that the right exists; secondly, that the person involved had knowledge, actual
or constructive, of the existence of such a right; and lastly, that said person had an actual
intention to relinquish the right. (Pasion Vda. de Garcia v. Locsin, 65 Phil. 689). The fact
that the accused failed to object to the entry into his house does not amount to a
permission to make a search therein (Magoncia v. Palacio, 80 Phil. 770). As pointed out by
Justice Laurel in the case of Pasion Vda. de Garcia v. Locsin (supra):
xxx

xxx

xxx

"x x x As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of the
citizen, the courts do not place the citizen in the position of either contesting an officers
authority by force, or waiving his constitutional rights; but instead they hold that a
peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not a consent, or an invitation thereto, but is
merely a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law. (56 C.J., pp.1180, 1181)."
We apply the rule that: "courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of
fundamental constitutional rights and that we do not presume acquiescence in the loss of
fundamental rights." (Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458).
In this case, we construe the silence of appellant at the time the policemen showed him the
search warrant as a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law. Moreover, appellant
seasonably objected40 on constitutional grounds to the admissibility of the evidence seized
pursuant to said warrant during the trial of the case, 41 after the prosecution formally offered its
evidence.42 Under the circumstances, no intent to waive his rights can reasonably be inferred
from his conduct before or during the trial.
No matter how incriminating the articles taken from the appellant may be, their seizure cannot
validate an invalid warrant.43 In Mata v. Bayona,44 we ruled:
.[N]othing can justify the issuance of the search warrant but the fulfillment of the legal
requisites. It might be well to point out what has been said in Asian Surety & Insurance
Co., Inc. vs. Herrera:
It has been said that of all the rights of a citizen, few are of greater importance or
more essential to his peace and happiness than the right of personal security, and
that involves the exemption of his private affairs, books and papers from inspection

and scrutiny of others. While the power to search and seize is necessary to the
public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law enforced without transgressing
the constitutional rights of the citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of
sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of government.
Thus, in issuing a search warrant the Judge must strictly comply with the requirements of the
Constitution and the statutory provisions. A liberal construction should be given in favor of the
individual to prevent stealthy encroachment upon, or gradual depreciation of the rights secured
by the Constitution. No presumption of regularity are to be invoked in aid of the process when an
officer undertakes to justify it.
We, therefore, find that the requirement mandated by the law that the examination of the
complainant and his witnesses must be under oath and reduced to writing in the form of
searching questions and answers was not complied with, rendering the search warrant invalid.
Consequently, the evidence seized pursuant to said illegal search warrant cannot be used in
evidence against appellant in accordance with Section 3 (2), 45 Article III of the Constitution.
It is unnecessary to discuss the other issues raised by appellant in seeking to exclude the
evidence seized pursuant to said illegal search warrant.
Without the aforesaid illegally obtained evidence, there is no sufficient basis to sustain the
conviction of appellant.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, Branch 39, in
Criminal Case No. L-5963, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Judgment is hereby rendered declaring
Search Warrant No. 99-51 NULL and VOID and the search and seizure made at appellants
residence illegal. For lack of evidence to establish appellants guilt beyond reasonable doubt,
appellant BENHUR MAMARIL is hereby ACQUITTED and ordered RELEASED from confinement
unless he is being held for some other legal grounds.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ORDERED to IMPLEMENT without delay this Decision
and to INFORM this Court, within ten (10) days from receipt hereof, of the date appellant was
actually released from confinement.
The confiscated marijuana is ORDERED forfeited in favor of the State and the trial court is
hereby directed to deliver or cause its delivery to the Dangerous Drugs Board for proper
disposition.
Costs de oficio. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 122092 May 19, 1999
PAPER INDUSTRIES CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, EVARISTO M. NARVAEZ JR.,
RICARDO G. SANTIAGO, ROBERTO A. DORMENDO, REYDANDE D. AZUCENA, NICEFORO
V. AVILA, FLORENTINO M. MULA, FELIX O. BAITO, HAROLD B. CELESTIAL, ELMEDENCIO
C. CALIXTRO, CARLITO S. LEGACION, ALBINO T. LUBANG, JEREMIAS I. ABAD and
HERMINIO V. VILLAMIL, petitioners,
vs.
JUDGE MAXIMIANO C. ASUNCION, Presiding Judge, Branch 104, Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City; STATE PROSECUTOR LEO B. DACERA III; and the SPECIAL OPERATIONS
UNIT OF THE PNP TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT COMMAND, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

To preserve and to uphold the constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures,
the requisites for the issuance of search warrant must be followed strictly. Where the judge fails
to personally examine the applicant for a search warrant and the latter's witnesses, or where the
witnesses testify on matters not of their own personal knowledge, the search warrant must be
struck down.
The Case
Before us is a petition for Certiorari and Prohibition 1 praying for (1) the nullification of Search
Warrant No. 799 (95) and the Orders dated March 23, 1993 and August 3, 1995, issued by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 104, of Quezon City; 2 and (2) the issuance of temporary
restraining order (TRO) or an injunction against State Prosecutor Leo B. Dacera III, ordering him
to desist proceeding with IS No. 95-167.
In its October 23, 1995 Resolution, 3 this Court issued the TRO prayed for and required the
respondents to comment on the said Petition. On December 20, 1995, Respondent PNP Traffic
Management Command filed its 31-page Opposition 4 to the Petition, together with 90 pages of
annexes. 5 On February 22, 1996, the Office of the Solicitor General filed its Comment 6 agreeing
with petitioners that the writs prayed for must be granted. After petitioners filed a Reply to the
Opposition, the Court gave due course to the Petition and required the parties to submit their
respective memoranda.
In view of the contrary opinion of the Office of the Solicitor General, the Court, in its February 5,
1997 Resolution, 7 required State Prosecutor Leo B. Dacera to prepare the memorandum for the
public respondents. After issuing a show-cause order to Dacera on June 23, 1997, 8 the Court in
its September 24, 1997 Resolution gave him a non-extendible period ending on October 31, 1997
within which to file the required memorandum. In view of Dacera's manifestation that he was
only a nominal party and that he had yet to receive the records of the case from the PNP, the
Court, in its December 8, 1999 Resolution, ordered the Special Operations Unit (SOU) of the PNP
Traffic Management Command to file its memorandum within thirty days from notice; "otherwise,
the petition will be deemed submitted for decision." 9 Even after the expiration of the said period,
the required pleading was not yet received by this Court.
Hence, this Court considered Respondent SOU's refusal/failure to submit its memorandum as a
waiver of its privilege to do so.
The Facts
On January 25, 1995, Police Chief Inspector Napoleon B. Pascua applied for a search warrant
before the said RTC of Quezon City, staring: 10
1. That the management of Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines, located
at PICOP compound, Barangay Tabon, Bislig, Surigao del Sur, represented by its Sr.
Vice President Ricardo G[.] Santiago, is in possession or ha[s] in [its] control high
powered firearms, ammunitions, explosives, which are the subject of the offense, or
used or intended to be used in committing the offense, and which . . . are [being
kept] and conceal[ed] in the premises herein described.
2. That a Search Warrant should be issued to enable any agent of the law to take
possession and bring to this Honorable Court the following described properties:
Seventy (70) M16 Armalite rifles cal. 5.56, ten (10) M16 US rifles, two
(2) AK-47 rifle[s], two (2) UZI submachinegun[s], two (2) M203 Grenade
Launcher[s] cal. 40mm, ten (10) cal.45 pistol[s], ten (10) cal.38

revolver[s], two (2) ammunition reloading machine[s], assorted

ammunitions for said calibers of firearms and ten (10) handgrenades.
Attached to the application 11 were the joint Deposition of SPO3 Cicero S. Bacolod and SPO2
Cecilio T. Morito, 12 as well as a summary of the information and the supplementary statements
of Mario Enad and Felipe Moreno.
After propounding several questions to Bacolod, Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion issued the
contested search warrant, 13 the pertinent portion of which reads:
It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned, after examining under oath,
SPO3 Cicero S. Bacolod, that there is probable cause to believe that the
management of Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines, located at PICOP
Compound, Barangay Tabon, Bislig, Surigao del Sur, represented by its Sr. Vice
President Ricardo G. Santiago, has in its possession or control the following:
Seventy (70) M16 Armalite rifles cal 5.56
Ten (10) M14 US rifles
Two (2) AK-47 rifle(s)
Two (2) UZI submachinegun[s]
Two (2) M203 Grenade Launcher[s] cal. 40mm.
Ten (10) cal 45 pistol[s]
Ten (10) cal. 38 revolver[s]
Two (2) ammunition reloading machine[s]
Assorted ammunitions for said calibers of firearms
Ten (l0) handgrenades
in violation of the Provisions of PD 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms, Ammunition
and Explosives), and the same should be seized and brought before this Court.
NOW, THEREFORE, you are hereby authorized to make an immediate search
daytime between 8:00 a.m. [and] 4:00 p.m. of the aforementioned premises and to
seize and bring the articles above-described and make an immediate return
there[of] 14
On February 4, 1995, the police enforced the search warrant at the PICOP compound and seized
the following: 15
MAKE/TYPE CALIBER SERIAL NUMBER BRAND
01 M16 Rifle 5.56 RP 175636 Elisco
02 M16 Rifle 5.56 RP 175636 (Tampered) Elisco
03 M16Rifle 5.56 RP 171702 Elisco

04 M16Rilfe 5.56 Defaced Elisco

05 M16Rifle 5.56 RP174253 (Tampered) Elisco
06 M16Rifle 5.56 RP173627 (Tampered) Elisco
07 M16Rifle 5.56 RP171337 Elisco
08 M16Rifle 5.56 RP171114 Elisco
09 M16Rifle 5.56 RP171114 (Tampered) Elisco
10 M16Rifle 5.56 RP171167 (Tampered) Elisco
11 M16Rifle 5.56 170881 (Tampered) Elisco
12 M16Rifle 5.56 RP170897 Elisco
13 M16Rifle 5.56 RP171509 Elisco
(With pending
case-Casaway Case)
14 M16Rifle 5.56 RP171754 Elisco
15 M16Rifle 5.56 RP170881 (Tampered) Elisco
16 M16Rifle 5.56 RP174637 Elisco
17 M16Rifle 5.56 RP171366 Elisco
18 M16Rifle 5.56 RP1714637 (Tampered) Elisco
19 M16Rifle 5.56 RP174610 Elisco
20 M16Rifle 5.56 RP171367 (Tampered) Elisco
01 M14 7.62 1499694 Elisco
02 M14 7.62 889163 Elisco
01 BAR Cal. 30 865975 Royal
01 Carbine M1 Cal. 30 384181 US Carbin
02 Carbine M1 Cal. 30 998201 US Carbin
01 Garand M1 Cal. 30 1194008 Springfield
02 Garand M1 Cal. 30 3123784 Springfield
01 Shotgun 12 Gauge H359704 Omega

02 Shotgun 12 Gauge 9211 Homemade

(Paltik)
MAGAZINE ASSEMBLY QTY.
01 M16 (long) 29 pcs.
02 M16 (short) 48 pcs.
03 Carbine M1 171 pcs.
04 BAR 19 pcs.
LIVE AMMUNITION QTY.
01 M16 2,023 rounds
03 Carbine M1 276 rounds
04 M-60 Cal. 7.62 1,800 rounds
05 M1 Garand 1,278 rounds
06 Rifle Grenade 11 rounds
07 Hand Grenade 4 pcs.
AMMO DAM POST NO. 24
MAKE/TYPE CALIBER SERIAL NUMBER BRAND
01 M16 5.56 171425 (Tampered) Gyno Corp.
02 Machine Pistol .22 651 (Tampered) Landmann
MAGAZINE ASSEMBLY QTY.
01 M1 (short) 3 pcs.
02 M16 (long) 1 pc.
03 M14 8 pcs.
04 Clip M1 Garand 3 pcs.
05 Mag Assy Cal .22 1 pc.
LIVE AMMUNITION QTY.
01 M16 73 rounds
02 M14 160 rounds

03 M1 Garand Cal .30 30 rounds

04 Rifle Grenade 1 round
MANAGEMENT INTEL/INVEST UNIT
MAKE/TYPE CALIBER SERIAL NUMBER BRAND
01 M16Rifle 5.56 RP 171725 Elisco
02 M16Rifle 5.56 RP 170799 (Tampered) Elisco
03 M16 5.56 RP 132320 Elisco
04 Machine 9 MM 54887 Intratec
Pistol
05 Three (3) 12 Gauge Surit-Surit (H)
Shotguns
MAGAZINE ASSEMBLY QTY.
01 M16 (long) 3 pcs.
02 M16 (short) 4 pcs.
03 Intratec 1 pc.
04 US Carbine (defective) 2 pcs.
LIVE AMMUNITION QTY.
01 M16 147 rds.
02 Cal .30 5 rounds
03 12 gauge Shotgun 7 rounds
04 Carbine 5 rounds
05 Rifle grenade (AVA-0051-84/0056-84) 2 rounds
06 9 MM 30 rounds
NEW ARMORY POST NO. 16
MAKE/TYPE CALIBER SERIAL NUMBER BRAND
01 Shotgun 12 Gauge A359910 Armscor
02 Shotgun 12 Gauge A359716 Armscor

03 Shotgun 12 Gauge A359706 Armscor

04 Shotgun 12 Gauge A359707 Armscor
05 Shotgun 12 Gauge 1036847 Armscor
06 Shotgun 12 Gauge A359702 Armscor
07 Shotgun 12 Gauge A359732 Armscor
08 Shotgun 12 Gauge A359728 Armscor
09 Shotgun 12 Gauge A359708 Armscor
10 Shotgun 12 Gauge A359711 Armscor
11 Shotgun 12 Gauge A359723 Armscor
12 Shotgun 12 Gauge A359713 Armscor
13 Shotgun 12 Gauge 1031271 Armscor
14 Shotgun 12 Gauge A262338 SB
15 Shotgun 12 Gauge A261619 SB
16 Shotgun 12 Gauge Defaced Not
Indicated
LIVE AMMUNITION QTY.
01 12 GAUGE shotgun 306 rds.
02 M16 2,349 rds.
MAGAZINE ASSEMBLY QTY.
01 Carbine (defective) 76 pcs.
02 Cal. 22 -do- 16 pcs
03 M16 (long-defective) 2 pcs.
04 M16 (short-defective) 2 pcs.
05 Thompson (defective) 8 pcs.
06 Shotgun 12 Gauge (defective) 17 pcs.
07 BAR (defective) 2 pcs.

Believing that the warrant was invalid and the search unreasonable, the petitioners filed a
"Motion to Quash" 16 before the trial court. Subsequently, they also filed a "Supplemental
Pleading to the Motion to Quash" and a "Motion to Suppress Evidence." 17
On March 23, 1995, the RTC issued the first contested Order which denied petitioners'
motions. 18 On August 3, 1995, the trial court rendered its second contested Order 19 denying
petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration. 20
Hence, this recourse to this Court on pure questions of law.
Issues
In their Memorandum, petitioners submit the following grounds in support of their cause:

21

I
Petitioners respectfully submit that Judge Asuncion has committed grave abuse of
discretion or has exceeded his jurisdiction in refusing to quash Search Warrant No.
799(95). Probable cause [has] not . . . been sufficiently established and partaking as
it does of the nature of a general warrant.
II
Petitioners respectfully submit that Judge Asuncion has committed grave abuse of
discretion or has exceeded his jurisdiction in refusing to quash Search Warrant No.
799(95) on the ground that it was unlawfully served or implemented.
III
Petitioners respectfully submit that State Prosecutor Dacera is acting with grave
abuse of discretion his jurisdiction in continuing with the proceedings in IS No. 95167 on the basis of illegally seized evidence.
In the main, petitioners question the validity of the search warrant. As a preliminary matter, we
shall also discuss respondents' argument that the Petition should be dismissed for raising factual
questions.
This Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
Preliminary Issue:
Alleged Factual Questions
In their Opposition, respondents argue that the Petition should be dismissed for raising questions
of fact, which are not proper in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. They maintain that the
Petition merely assails the "factual basis for the issuance of the warrant and regularity of its
implementation. 22
This argument is not convicting. It is settled that "there is a question of fact when the doubt
arises as to the truth or the falsity of alleged facts." 23 In the present case, petitioner do not
question the truth of the facts as found by the judge; rather, they are assailing the way in which
those findings were arrived at, a procedure which they contend was violative of the which those

Constitution and the Rules of Court. We agree that the Petition raises only question of law, which
may be resolved in the present case.
Main Issue:
Validity of the Search Warrant
The fundamental right against unreasonable and searches and seizures and the basic conditions
for the issuance of a search warrant are laid down in Section 2, Article III of the 1987
Constitution, which reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose
shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized. (Emphasis supplied)
Consistent with the foregoing constitutional provision, Section 3 and 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of
Court, 24 detail the requisites for the issuance of a valid search warrant as follows:
Sec. 3. Requisite for issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall not issue but
upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the things to be seized.
Sec. 4. Examination of complainant; record. The judge must, before issuing the
warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in
writing and under oath the complainant and any witnesses he may produce on facts
personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements together
with any affidavits submitted.
More simply stated, the requisites of a valid search warrant are: (1) probable cause is present;
(2) such presence is determined personally by the judge; (3) the complainant and the witnesses
he or she may produce are personally examined by the judge, in writing and under oath or
affirmation; (4) the applicant and the witnesses testify on facts personally known to them; and
(5) the warrant specifically describes the place to be searched and the things to be seized. 25
In the present case, the search warrant is invalid because (1) the trail court failed to examine
personally the complainant and the other deponents; (2) SPO3 Cicero Bacolod, who appeared
during the hearing for the issuance or the search warrant, had no personal knowledge that
petitioners were not licensed to possess the subject firearms; and (3) the place to be searched
was not described with particularity.
No Personal Examination
of the Witnesses
In his Order dated March 23, 1995, the trial judge insisted that the search warrant was valid,
stating that "before issuing the subject warrant, the court propounded searching questions to the
applicant and the witnesses in order to determined whether there was probable
cause . . .." 26 (Emphasis supplied.) This was supported by the Opposition to the Motion to Quash,
which argued that "it is erroneous for PICOP to allege that the Honorable Court did not propound

searching questions upon applicant P/Chief Inspector Napoleon Pascua and the witnesses he
produced." 27 The records, however, proclaim otherwise.
As earlier stated, Chief Inspector Pascua's application for a search warrant was supported by (1)
the joint Deposition of SPO3 Cicero S. Bacolod and SPO2 Cecilio T. Moriro, (2) a summary of
information and (3) supplementary statements of Mario Enad and Felipe Moreno. Except for
Pascua and Bacolod however, none of the aforementioned witnesses and policemen appeared
before the trial court. Moreover, the applicant's participation in the hearing for the issuance of
the search warrant consisted only of introducing Witness Bacolod: 28
COURT:
Where is the witness for this application for search warrant?
P/Chief Insp. NAPOLEON PASCUA:
SPO3 CICERO S. BACOLOD, Your Honor.
COURT:
Swear the witness.
STENOGRAPHER: (To the witness)
Please raise your right hand, sir. Do you swear to tell the truth, the
whole truth and nothing but the truth before this Court?
WITNESS:
Yes Ma'am.
STENOGRAPHER:
Please state your name, age, civil status, occupation, address and
other personal circumstances.
WITNESS:
SPO3 Cicero S. Bacolod, 42 years old, married, policeman, c/o Camp
Crame, Quezon City, SOU, TMC.
xxx xxx xxx
Chief Inspector Pascua was asked nothing else, and he said nothing more. In fact, he failed even
to affirm his application. Contrary to his statement, the trial judge failed to propound questions,
let alone probing questions, to the applicant and to his witnesses other than Bacolod (whose
testimony, as will later be shown, is also improper). Obviously, His Honor relied mainly on their
affidavits. This Court has frowned on this practice in this language:
Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The
examining Judge has to take depositions in writing of the complainant and the
witnesses he may procedure and attach them to the record. Such written deposition
is necessary in order that the Judge may be able to properly determine the

existence or non-existence of the probable cause, to hold liable for perjury the
person giving it if it will be found later that his declarations are false.
xxx xxx xxx
It is axiomatic that the examination must be probing and exhaustive, not merely
routinary or pro-forma, if the claimed probable cause is to be established. The
examining magistrate must not simply rehash the contents of the affidavit but must
make his own inquiry on the intent and justification of the application. 29
Bacolod's Testimony Pertained Not to
Facts Personally Known to Him
Bacolod appeared during the hearing and was extensively examined by the judge. But his
testimony showed that he did not have personal knowledge that the petitioners, in violation of
PD 1866, were not licensed to possess firearms, ammunitions or explosives. In his Deposition, he
stated:
Q How do you know that said the properties were subject of the
offense?
A Sir, as a result of our intensified surveillance and case build up for
several days, we gathered informations from reliable sources that
subject properties [which] are in their possession and control [are] the
herein described properties subject of the offense. (Summary of
Information dtd Oct. '94. SS's of Mario Enad and Felipe Moreno both dtd
30 Nov '94 are hereto attached). 30
When questioned by the judge, Bacolod stated merely that he believed that the PICOP security
guards had no license to possess the subject firearms. This, however, does not meet the
requirement that a witness must testify on his personal knowledge, not belief. He declared:
Q This is an application for Search Warrant against Paper Industries
Corporation located at PICOP Compound Barangay Tabon, Bislig,
Surigao del Sur. How come that you have knowledge that there are
illegal firearms in that place?
A At Camp Crame, Quezon City, I was dispatched by our Commander
to investigate the alleged assassination plot of Congressman Amante.
Q In the course of your investigation, what happened?
A We found out that some of the suspects in the alleged assassination
plot are employees of PICOP.
Q Know[ing] that the suspects are employees of PICOP, what did you
do?
A We conducted the surveillance in that area inside the compound of
PICOP in Tabon.
Q What did you find . . .?

A I found . . . several high-powered firearms.

Q How were you able to investigate the compound of PICOP?
A I exerted effort to enter the said compound.
Q By what means?
A By pretending to have some official business with the company.
Q So, in that aspect, you were able to investigate the compound of
PICOP?
A Yes, sir.
Q What did you f[i]nd . . .?
A I found . . . several high-powered firearms being kept in the
compound of PICOP.
Q Where are those located?
A Sir, there are firearms kept inside the ammo dam.
Q Inside the compound?
A Located inside the compound.
Q Then what?
A Others, sir, were kept in the security headquarters or office.
Q You mean to say that this Paper Industries Corporation has its own
security guards?
A Yes, they call it Blue Guards.
Q You mean to say that their own security guards guarded the PICOP?
A Yes, sir.
Q So, it is possible that the firearms used by the security guards are
illegally obtained?
A I believe they have no license to possess high-powered firearms. As
far as the verification at FEU, Camp Crame, [is concerned,] they have
no license. (Emphasis supplied.)
Q Have you investigated the Blue Guards Security Agency?
A I conducted the inquiry.
Q What did you find out?

A They are using firearms owned by PICOP.

Q Using firearms owned by PICOP?
A Yes, sir.
Q You mean to say that this Blue Guard Security Agency has no
firearms of their own?
A No high-powered firearms.
Q By the way, Mr. Witness, what kind of firearms have you seen inside
the compound of PICOP?
A There are M-16 armalite rifles.
Q What else?
A AK-47, armalites, M-203 Grenade Launcher, M-14 US rifles, .38
caliber revolvers, .45 caliber pistols, several handgrenades and
ammos. 31 (Emphasis supplied)
Moreover, Bacolod failed to affirm that none of the firearms seen inside the PICOP compound was
licensed. Bacolod merely declared that the security agency and its guard were not licensed. He
also said that some of the firearms were owned by PICOP. Yet, he made no statement before the
trail court PICOP, aside from the security agency, had no license to possess those firearms.
Worse, the applicant and his witnesses inexplicably failed to attach to the application a copy
aforementioned "no license" certification from the Firearms and Explosives Office (FEO) of the
PNP or to present it during the hearing. Such certification could have been easily obtained,
considering that the FEO was located in Camp Crame where the unit of Bacolod was also based.
InPeople v. Judge Estrada, 32 the Court held:
The facts and circumstances that would show probable cause must be the best
evidence that could be obtained under the circumstances. The introduction of such
evidence is necessary in cases where the issue is the existence of the negative
ingredient of the offense charged for instance, the absence of a license required
by law, as in the present case and such evidence is within the knowledge and
control of the applicant who could easily produce the same. But if the best evidence
could not be secured at the time of the application, the applicant must show a
justifiable reason therefor during the examination by the judge.
Particularity of the
Place to Be Searched
In view of the manifest objective of the against unreasonable search, the Constitution to be
searched only to those described in the warrant. 33 Thus, this Court has held that "this
constitutional right [i]s the embodiment of a spiritual concept: the belief that to value the privacy
of home and person and to afford it constitutional protection against the long reach of
government is no less than to value human dignity, and that his privacy must not be disturbed
except in case of overriding social need, and then only under stringent procedural
safeguards." 34 Additionally, the requisite of particularity is related to the probable cause
requirement in that, at least under some circumstances, the lack of a more specific description
will make it apparent that there has not been a sufficient showing to the magistrate that the
described items are to be found in particular place. 35

In the present case, the assailed search warrant failed to described the place with particularly. It
simply authorizes a search of "the aforementioned premises," but it did not specify such
premises. The warrant identifies only one place, and that is the "Paper Industries Corporation of
the Philippines, located at PICOP Compound, Barangay Tabon, Bislig[,] Surigao del Sur." The
PICOP compound, however, is made up of "200 offices/building, 15 plants, 84 staff houses, 1
airstrip, 3 piers/wharves, 23 warehouses, 6 POL depots/quick service outlets and some 800
miscellaneous structures, all of which are spread out over some one hundred fifty-five
hectares." 36 Obviously, the warrant gives the police officers unbridled and thus illegal authority
to search all the structures found inside the PICOP compound. 37
In their Opposition, the police state that they complied with the constitutional requirement,
because they submitted sketches of the premises to be searched when they applied for the
warrant. They add that not one of the PICOP Compound housing units was searched, because
they were not among those identified during the hearing. 38
These arguments are not convincing. The sketches allegedly submitted by the police were not
made integral parts of the search warrant issued by Judge Asucion. Moreover, the fact that the
raiding police team knew which of the buildings or structures in the PICOP Compound housed
firearms and ammunitions did not justify the lack of particulars of the place to be
searched. 39 Otherwise, confusion would arise regarding the subject of the warrant the place
indicated in the warrant or the place identified by the police. Such conflict invites uncalled for
mischief or abuse of discretion on the part of law enforces.
Thus, in People v. Court of Appeals, 40 this Court ruled that the police had no authority to search
the apartment behind the store, which was the place indicated in the warrant, even if they
intended it to be the subject of their application. Indeed, the place to be searched cannot be
changed, enlarged or amplified by the police, viz.:
. . . In the instant case, there is no ambiguity at all in the warrant. The ambiguity
lies outside the instrument, arising from the absence of a meeting of the minds as
to the place to be searched between the applicants for the warrant and the Judge
issuing the same; and what was done was to substitute for the place that the Judge
had written down in the warrant, the premises that the executing officers had in
their mind. This should not have been done. It [was] neither fairnor licit to allow
police officers to search a place different from that stated in the warrant on the
claim that the place actually searched although not that specified in the warrant
[was] exactly what they had in view when they applied for the warrant and had
demarcated in the supporting evidence. What is material in determining the validity
of a search is the place stated in the warrant itself, not what the applicants had in
their thoughts, or had represented in the proofs they submitted to the court issuing
the warrant. Indeed, following the officers' theory, in the context of the facts of this
case, all four (4) apartment units at the rear of Abigail's Variety Store would have
been fair game for a search.
The place to be searched, as set out in the warrant, cannot be amplified or modified
by the officers' own personal knowledge of the premises, or the evidence they
adduced in support of their application for the warrant. Such a change is proscribed
by the Constitution which requires inter alia the search warrant to particularly
describe the place to be searched as well as the persons or things to be seized. It
would concede to police officers the power of choosing the place to be searched,
even if it not be that delineated in the warrant. It would open wide the door to
abuse of the search process, and grant to officers executing a search warrant that
discretion which the Constitution has precisely removed from them. The
particularization of the description of the place to be searched may properly be

done only by the Judge, and only in the warrant itself; it cannot be left to the
discretion of the police officers conducting the search. (Emphasis supplied.)
Seized Firearms and Explosives
Inadmissible in Evidence
As a result of the seizure of the firearms, effected pursuant to Search Warrant No. 799 (95)
issued by the respondent judge, the PNP filed with the Department of Justice a complaint
docketed as IS No. 95-167 against herein petitioners for illegal possession of firearms. State
Prosecutor Dacera, to whom the Complaint was assigned for preliminary investigation, issued a
subpoena requiring petitioners to file their counter-affidavits.
Instead of complying with the subpoena, petitioners asked for the suspension of the preliminary
investigation, pending the resolution of their motion to quash the search warrant. They argued,
as they do now, that the illegal obtained firearms could not be the basis of the criminal
Complaint. Their motion was denied. A subsequent Motion for Reconsideration met the same
fate. In the present Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, petitioners assert that "State
Prosecutor Dacera cannot have any tenable basis for continuing with the proceedings in IS No.
95-167." 41
Because the search warrant was procured in violation of the Constitution and the Rules of Court,
all the firearms, explosives and other materials seized were "inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding." 42 As the Court noted in an earlier case, the exclusion of unlawfully seized evidence
was "the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable
searches and seizures." 43 Verily, they are the "fruits of the poisonous tree." Without this
exclusionary rule, the constitutional right "would be so ephemeral and so neatly severed from its
conceptual nexus with the freedom from all brutish means evidence means of coercing
evidence . . .." 44
In the present case, the complaint for illegal possession of firearms is based on the firearms and
other materials seized pursuant to Search Warrant No. 799 (95). Since these illegally obtained
pieces of evidence are inadmissible, the Complainant and the proceedings before State
Prosecutor Dacera have no more leg to stand on.
This Court sympathizes with the police effort to stamp out criminality and to maintain peace and
order in the country; however, it reminds the law enforcement authorities that they must do so
only upon strict observance of the constitutional and statutory rights of our people.
Indeed, "there is a right way to do the right thing at the right time for the right reason."

45

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition is hereby GRANTED and Search
Warrant No. 799 (95) accordingly declared NULL and VOID. The temporary restraining order
issued by this Court on October 23, 1995 is hereby MADE PERMANENT. No pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 133254-55

April 19, 2001

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ROBERTO SALANGUIT y KO, accused-appellant.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision,1 dated January 27, 1998, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
96, Quezon City, finding accused-appellant Roberto Salanguit y Ko guilty of violation of 16 of
Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, and sentencing him accordingly to suffer imprisonment
ranging from six (6) months of arresto mayor,as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months
of prision correccional, as maximum, and of 8 of the same law and sentencing him for such
violation to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P700, 000.00.
Charges against accused-appellant for violations of R.A. No. 6425 were filed on December 28,
1995. In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64357, the information alleged:
That on or about the 26th day of December 1995, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said
accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly possess and/or use 11.14
grams of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (Shabu) a regulated drug, without the
necessary license and/or prescription therefor, in violation of said law.
CONTRARY TO LAW .2
In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64358, the information charged:
That on or about the 26th day of December 1995, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said
accused not being authorized by law to possess or use any prohibited drug, did, then and
there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession and under his custody and
control 1,254 grams of Marijuana, a prohibited drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW ,3
When arraigned on May 21, 1996, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty 4 whereupon he was tried.
Three witnesses were presented by the prosecution: P/Insp. Sonia S. Ludovico, forensic chemist
and chief of the Physical Science Branch of the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory,
Senior Inspector Rodolfo Aguilar of the Narcotics Command, Camp Crame, Quezon City, and PO3
Rolando Duazo of Station 10, Kamuning, Quezon City, a field operative. The prosecution evidence
established the following:
On December 26, 1995, Sr. Insp. Aguilar applied for a warrant 5 in the Regional Trial Court, Branch
90, Dasmariias, Cavite, to search the residence of accused-appellant Robert Salanguit y Ko on
Binhagan St., Novaliches, Quezon City. He presented as his witness SPO1 Edmund Badua, who
testified that as a poseur-buyer, he was able to purchase 2.12 grams of shabu from accusedappellant. The sale took place in accused-appellant's room, and Badua saw that the shabu was
taken by accused-appellant from a cabinet inside his room. The application was granted, and a
search warrant was later issued by Presiding Judge Dolores L. Espaol.
At about 10:30 p.m. of December 26, 1995, a group of about 10 policemen, along with one
civilian informer, went to the residence of accused-appellant to serve the warrant. 6

The police operatives knocked on accused-appellants door, but nobody opened it. They heard
people inside the house, apparently panicking. The police operatives then forced the door open
and entered the house.7
After showing the search warrant to the occupants of the house, Lt. Cortes and his group started
searching the house.8 They found 12 small heat-sealed transparent plastic bags containing a
white crystalline substance, a paper clip box also containing a white crystalline substance, and
two bricks of dried leaves which appeared to be marijuana wrapped in newsprint 9 having a total
weight of approximately 1,255 grams.10 A receipt of the items seized was prepared, but the
accused-appellant refused to sign it. 11
After the search, the police operatives took accused-appellant with them to Station 10, EDSA,
Kamuning, Quezon City, along with the items they had seized. 12
PO3 Duazo requested a laboratory examination of the confiscated evidence. 13 The white
crystalline substance with a total weight of 2.77 grams and those contained in a small box with a
total weight of 8.37 grams were found to be positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride. On
the other hand, the two bricks of dried leaves, one weighing 425 grams and the other 850
grams, were found to be marijuana.14
For the defense, accused-appellant testified in his own behalf. His testimony was corroborated by
his mother-in-law, Soledad Arcano.
Accused-appellant testified that on the night of December 26, 1995, as they were about to leave
their house, they heard a commotion at the gate and on the roof of their house. Suddenly, about
20 men in civilian attire, brandishing long firearms, climbed over the gate and descended
through an opening in the roof.15
When accused-appellant demanded to be shown a search warrant, a piece of paper inside a
folder was waved in front of him. As accused-appellant fumbled for his glasses, however, the
paper was withdrawn and he had no chance to read it. 16
Accused-appellant claimed that he was ordered to stay in one place of the house while the
policemen conducted a search, forcibly opening cabinets and taking his bag containing money, a
licensed .45 caliber firearm, jewelry , and canned goods. 17
The policemen left at around 12:30 a.m. of December 27, 1995, and, after putting handcuffs on
accused-appellant, took him with them to the NARCOM on EDSA, Quezon City, where accusedappellant was detained.18
Accused-appellant's mother-in law, Soledad Arcano, corroborated his testimony. Arcano testified
that the policemen ransacked their house, ate their food, and took away canned goods and other
valuables. 19
After hearing, the trial court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64357, for violation of Sec. 16, Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended, finding the accused ROBERTO SALANGUIT y KO guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime charged and he is hereby accordingly sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
sentence with a minimum of six (6) months ofarresto mayor and a maximum of four (4)
years and two (2) months of prision correccional; and,

2. In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64358, for violation of Sec. 8, Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended, finding the accused ROBERTO SALANGUIT y KO guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime charged and he is hereby accordingly sentenced to suffer reclusion
perpetua and to pay a fine of P700,000.00.
The accused shall further pay the costs of suit.
The 11.14 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride and the 1,254 grams of marijuana
bricks are hereby confiscated and condemned for disposition according to law. The
evidence custodian of this Court is hereby directed to turn such substances over to the
National Bureau of Investigation pursuant to law.
SO ORDERED.20
Hence this appeal. Accused-appellant contends that THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING THE SEARCH WARRANT VALID
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR ILLEGAL POSSESSION
OF METHAMPHETAMINE HYDRO-CHLORIDE(SHABU)
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSSED-APPELLANT FOR VIOLATION
8, R.A. No. 6425
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE TWO (2) BRICKS OF MARIJUANA
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE POLICEMEN USED EXCESSIVE FORCE
IN ENFORCING THE SEARCH WARRANT.
Accused-appellant is contesting his conviction on three grounds. First, the admissibility of
the shabu allegedly recovered from his residence as evidence against him on the ground that the
warrant used in obtaining it was invalid. Second, the admissibility in evidence of the marijuana
allegedly seized from accused-appellant pursuant to the "plain view" doctrine. Third, the
employment of unnecessary force by the police in the execution of the warrant.
First. Rule 126, 4 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure 21 provides that a search warrant
shall not issue except upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines.
In issuing a search warrant, judges must comply strictly with the requirements of the Constitution
and the Rules of Criminal Procedure. No presumption of regularity can be invoked in aid of the
process when an officer undertakes to justify its issuance. 22 Nothing can justify the issuance of
the search warrant unless all the legal requisites are fulfilled.
In this case, the search warrant issued against accused-appellant reads:
SEARCH
WARRANT
NO.160 For:
Violation of
RA 6425

SEARCH WARRANT
TO ANY PEACE OFFICER:
G R E E T I N G S:
It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned after examining under oath SR. INSP.
RODOLFO V. AGUILAR, PNP and his witness SPO1 EDMUND M. BADUA, PNP that there is
probable cause to believe that ROBERT SALANGUIT has in his possession and control in his
premises Binhagan St., San Jose, Quezon City as shown in Annex "A", the properties to wit:
UNDETERMINED QUANTITY OF SHABU AND DRUG PARAPHERNALIA
which should be seized and brought to the undersigned.
You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search anytime of the day/night of the
premises above-described and forthwith seize and take possession of the above-stated
properties and bring said properties to the undersigned to be dealt with as the law directs.
GIVEN UNDER MY HAND this 26th day of December 1995 at Imus, Cavite, Philippines.
(SGD.)
DOLORES L.
ESPAOL
J
udge
Accused-appellant assails the validity of the warrant on three grounds: (1) that there was no
probable cause to search for drug paraphernalia; (2) that the search warrant was issued for more
than one specific offense; and (3) that the place to be searched was not described with sufficient
particularity.
Existence of Probable Cause
The warrant authorized the seizure of "undetermined quantity of shabu and drug paraphernalia."
Evidence was presented showing probable cause of the existence of methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu. Accused-appellant contends, however, that the search warrant issued is
void because no evidence was presented showing the existence of drug paraphernalia and the
same should not have been ordered to be seized by the trial court. 23
The contention has no merit. To be sure, SPO1 Edmund Badua, the intelligence officer who acted
as a poseur-buyer, did not testify in the proceedings for the issuance of a search warrant on
anything about drug paraphernalia. He stated:
Q -Being a member of the Intelligence and Operation Section, NMDU, NARCOM, do you
remember if you were assigned into a monitoring or surveillance work?
A -Yes, sir.
Q Of what particular assignment or area were you assigned for monitoring or
surveillance?

A Its within the Quezon City area particularly a house without a number located at
Binhagan St., San Jose Quezon City, Sir.
Q Do You know the person who occupies the specific place?
A Yes, sir, he is ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert.
Q Are you familiar with that place?
A Yes, sir, as part of my surveillance, I was able to penetrate inside the area and
established contract with ROBERT SALANGUIT alias Robert through my friend who
introduced me to the former.
Q In what particular occasion did you meet ROBERT SALANGUIT alias Robert?
A When I was introduced by my friend as a good buyer and drug pusher of shabu, sir .
Q Were you able to buy at that time?
A Yes, sir.
Q How much if you can still remember the amount involved?
A I was able to buy two point twelve (2.12) grams of shabu in the amount of Two
Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty (P2,750.00) pesos, sir .
Q Having established contact with ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert, do you know where the
stuff (shabu) were being kept?
A Yes, sir, inside a cabinet inside his room.
Q How were you able to know the place where he kept the stuff?
A When I first bought the 2.12 grams of shabu from him, it was done inside his room and
I saw that the shabu was taken by him inside his cabinet.
Q Do you know who is in control of the premises?
A Yes, sir, it was ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert.
Q How sure are you, that the shabu that you bought from ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert
is genuine shabu?
A After I left the house of ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert, I proceeded back to our office
and reported the progress of my mission to our Chief and presented to him the 2.12,
grams of shabu I bought from the subject. Then afterwards, our Chief formally requested
the Chief PNP Central Crime Laboratory Services, NPDC, for Technical Analysis which
yielded positive result for shabu, a regulated drug as shown in the attached certification of
PNP CLS result No. D-414-95 dated 19 December 95.
Q Do you have anything more to add or retract from your statement?

A Yes, sir, I was offered by him (ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert) that anything I wish to
buy bigger quantity of shabu, he is willing to transact to me on cash basis at his price of
One Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty (P1,750.00) pesos per gram.
Q Are you willing to sign your statement freely and voluntarily?
A Yes, sir.24
However, the fact that there was no probable cause to support the application for the seizure of
drug paraphernalia does not warrant the conclusion that the search warrant is void. This fact
would be material only if drug paraphernalia was in fact seized by the police. The fact is that
none was taken by virtue of the search warrant issued. If at all, therefore, the search warrant is
void only insofar as it authorized the seizure of drug paraphernalia, but it is valid as to the
seizure of methamphetamine hydrochloride as to which evidence was presented showing
probable cause as to its existence. Thus, in Aday v. Superior Court,25 the warrant properly
described two obscene books but improperly described other articles. It was held:
Although the warrant was defective in the respects noted, it does not follow that it was
invalid as a whole. Such a conclusion would mean that the seizure of certain articles, even
though proper if viewed separately, must be condemned merely because the warrant was
defective with respect to other articles. The invalid portions of the warrant are severable
from the authorization relating to the named books, which formed the principal basis of
the charge of obscenity. The search for and seizure of these books, if otherwise valid, were
not rendered illegal by the defects concerning other articles. ...In so holding we do not
mean to suggest that invalid portions "of a warrant will be treated as severable under all
circumstances. We recognize the danger that warrants might be obtained which are
essentially general in character but as to minor items meet the requirement of
particularity, and that wholesale seizures might be made under them, in the expectation
that the seizure would in any event be upheld as to the property specified. Such an abuse
of the warrant procedure, of course, could not be tolerated.
It would be a drastic remedy indeed if a warrant, which was issued on probable cause and
particularly describing the items to be seized on the basis thereof, is to be invalidated in
toto because the judge erred in authorizing a search for other items not supported by the
evidence.26 Accordingly, we hold that the first part of the search warrant, authorizing the search
of accused-appellant's house for an undetermined quantity of shabu, is valid, even though the
second part, with respect to the search for drug paraphernalia, is not.
Specificity of the Offense Charged
Accused-appellant contends that the warrant was issued for more than one specific offense
because possession or use of methamphetamine hydrochloride and possession of drug
paraphernalia are punished under two different provisions of R.A. No. 6425. 27 It will suffice to
quote what this Court said in a similar case to dispose of this contention:
While it is true that the caption of the search warrant states that it is in connection with
"Violation of R.A. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972," it is clearly
recited in the text thereof that "There is probable cause to believe that Adolfo Olaes alias
'Debie' and alias 'Baby' of No.628 Comia St., Filtration, Sta. Rita, Olongapo City, has in
their session and control and custody of marijuana dried stalks/leaves/ seeds/cigarettes
and other regulated/prohibited and exempt narcotics preparations which is the subject of
the offense stated above." Although the specific section of the Dangerous Drugs Act is not
pinpointed, there is no question at all of the specific offense alleged to have been
committed as a basis for the finding of probable cause. The search warrant also satisfies

the requirement in the Bill of Rights of the particularity of the description to be made of
the "place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized." 28
Indeed, in People v. Dichoso29 the search warrant was also for "Violation of R.A. 6425," without
specifying what provisions of the law were violated, and it authorized the search and seizure of
"dried marijuana leaves and methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) and sets of paraphernalias
(sic)." This Court, however, upheld the validity of the warrant:
Appellant's contention that the search warrant in question was issued for more than (1)
offense, hence, in violation of Section 3, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, is unpersuasive.
He engages in semantic juggling by suggesting that since illegal possession of shabu,
illegal possession of marijuana and illegal possession of paraphernalia are covered by
different articles and sections of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, the search warrant is
clearly for more than one (1) specific offense. In short, following this theory, there should
have been three (3) separate search warrants, one for illegal possession of shabu, the
second for illegal possession of marijuana and the third for illegal possession of
paraphernalia. This argument is pedantic. The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 is a special
law that deals specifically with dangerous drugs which are subsumed into "prohibited" and
"regulated" drugs and defines and penalizes categories of offenses which are closely
related or which belong to the same class or species. Accordingly, one (1) search warrant
may thus be validly issued for the said violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act. 30
Similarly, in another case,31 the search warrant was captioned: "For Violation of P .D. No.1866
(Illegal Possession of Firearms, etc.)." The validity of the warrant was questioned on the ground
that it was issued without reference to any particular provision in P.D. No.1866, which punished
several offenses. We held, however, that while illegal possession of firearms is penalized under
1 of P.D. No.1866 and illegal possession of explosives is penalized under 3 thereof, the decree
is a codification of the various laws on illegal possession of firearms, ammunitions, and
explosives which offenses are so related as to be subsumed within the category of illegal
possession of firearms, etc. under P.D. No.1866. Thus, only one warrant was necessary to cover
the violations under the various provisions of the said law.
Particularly of the Place
Accused-appellant contends that the search warrant failed to indicate the place to be searched
with sufficient particularity.
This contention is without merit. As the Solicitor General states:
.....While the address stated in the warrant is merely "Binhagan St., San Jose, Quezon
City," the trial court took note of the fact that the records of Search Warrant Case No.160
contained several documents which identified the premises to be searched, to wit: 1) the
application for search warrant which stated that the premises to be searched was located
in between No.7 and 11 at Binhagan Street, San Jose, Quezon City; 2) the deposition of
witness which described the premises as "a house without a number located at Binhagan
St., San Jose, Quezon City; and 3) the pencil sketch of the location of the premises to be
searched. In fact, the police officers who raided appellant's house under the leadership of
Police Senior Inspector Rodolfo Aguilar could not have been mistaken as Inspector Aguilar
resides in the same neighborhood in Binhagan where appellant lives and in fact Aguilar's
place is at the end of appellant's place in Binhagan. Moreover, the house raided by
Aguilar's team is undeniably appellant'.s house and it was really appellant who was the
target. The raiding team even first ascertained through their informant that appellant was
inside his residence before they actually started their operation. 32

The rule is that a description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the
warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended to be
searched.33 For example, a search warrant authorized a search of Apartment Number 3 of a
building at 83 Pleasant Street, Malborough, Massachusetts. As it turned out, there were five
apartments in the basement and six apartments on both the ground and top floors and that there
was an Apartment Number 3 on each floor. However, the description was made determinate by a
reference to the affidavit supporting the warrant that the apartment was occupied by the
accused "Morris Ferrante of 83 Pleasant Street, Malboro Mass." 34 In this case, the location of
accused-appellant's house being indicated by the evidence on record, there can be no doubt that
the warrant described the place to be searched with sufficient particularity.1wphi1.nt
In sum, we hold that with respect to the seizure of shabu from accused-appellant's residence,
Search Warrant No.160 was properly issued, such warrant being founded on probable cause
personally determined by the judge under oath or affirmation of the deposing witness and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized.
Second. The search warrant authorized the seizure of methamphetamine hydrochloride
or shabu but not marijuana. However, seizure of the latter drug is being justified on the ground
that the drug was seized within the "plain view" of the searching party. This is contested by
accused-appellant.
Under the "plain view doctrine," unlawful objects within the "plain view" of an officer who has the
right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented in
evidence.35 For this doctrine to apply, there must be: (a) prior justification; (b ) inadvertent
discovery of the evidence; and (c) immediate apparent illegality of the evidence before the
police.36 The question is whether these requisites were complied with by the authorities in seizing
the marijuana in this case.
Prior Justification and Discovery by Inadvertence
Because the location of the shabu was indicated in the warrant and thus known to the police
operatives, it is reasonable to assume that the police found the packets of the shabu first. Once
the valid portion of the search warrant has been executed, the "plain view doctrine" can no
longer provide any basis -for admitting the other items subsequently found. As has been
explained:
What the 'plain view' cases have in common is that the police officer in each of them had
a prior justification for an intrusion in the course of which he came inadvertently across a
piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The doctrine serves to supplement the prior
justification -whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search incident to
lawful arrest, or some other legitimate reason for being present unconnected with a search
directed against the accused -and permits the warrantless seizure. Of course, the
extension of the original justification is legitimate only where it is immediately apparent to
the police that they have evidence before them; the 'plain view' doctrine may not be used
to extend a general exploratory search from one object to another until something
incriminating at last emerges.37
The only other possible justification for an intrusion by the police is the conduct of a search
pursuant to "accused-appellant's lawful arrest for possession of shabu. However, a search
incident to a lawful arrest is limited to the person of the one arrested and the premises within his
immediate control.18 The rationale for permitting such a search is to prevent the person arrested
from obtaining a weapon to commit violence, or to reach for incriminatory evidence and destroy
it.

The police failed to allege in this case the time when the marijuana was found, i.e., whether prior
to, or contemporaneous with, the shabu subject of the warrant, or whether it was recovered on
accused-appellant's person or in an area within his immediate control. Its recovery, therefore,
presumably during the search conducted after the shabu had been recovered from the cabinet,
as attested to by SPO1 Badua in his depostion, was invalid.
Apparent Illegality of the Evidence
The marijuana bricks were wrapped in newsprint. There was no apparent illegality to justify their
seizure. This case is similar to People. v. Musa39 in which we declared inadmissible the marijuana
recovered by NARCOM agents because the said drugs were contained in plastic bag which gave
no indication of its contents. We explained:
Moreover, when the NARCOM agents saw the plastic bag hanging in one corner of the
kitchen, they had no clue as to its contents. They had to ask the appellant what the bag
contained. When the appellant refused to respond, they opened it and found the
marijuana. Unlike Ker v. California, where the marijuana was visible to the police officer's
eyes, the NARCOM agents in this case could not have discovered the inculpatory nature of
the contents of the bag had they not forcibly opened it; Even assuming then, that the
NARCOM agents inadvertently came across the plastic bag because it was within their
"plain view," what may be said to be the object in their "plain view" was just the plastic
bag and not the marijuana. The incriminating nature of the contents of the plastic bag was
not immediately apparent from the "plain view" of said object. It cannot be claimed that
the plastic bag clearly betrayed its contents, whether by its distinctive configuration, is
transparency, or otherwise, that its contents are obvious to an observer . 40
No presumption of regularity may be invoked by an officer in aid of the process when he
undertakes to justify an encroachment of rights secured by the Constitution. 41 In this case, the
marijuana allegedly found in the possession of accused-appellant was in the form of two bricks
wrapped in newsprint. Not being in a transparent container, the contents wrapped in newsprint
could not have been readily discernible as marijuana. Nor was there mention of the time or
manner these items were discovered. Accordingly, for failure of the prosecution to prove that the
seizure of the marijuana without a warrant was conducted in accordance with the "plain view
doctrine," we hold that the marijuana is inadmissible in evidence against accused-appellant.
However, the confiscation of the drug must be upheld.
Third. Accused-appellant claims that undue and unnecessary force was employed by the
searching party in effecting the raid.
Rule 126, 7 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure 42 provides:
Right to break door or window to effect search. - The officer, if refused admittance to the
place of directed search after giving notice of his purpose and authority, may break open
any outer or inner door or window of a house or any part of a house or anything therein to
execute the warrant or liberate himself or any person lawfully aiding him when unlawfully
detained therein.
Accused-appellant's claim that the policemen had clambered up the roof of his house to gain
entry and had broken doors and windows in the process is unsupported by reliable and
competent proof. No affidavit or sworn statement of disinterested persons, like the barangay
officials or neighbors, has been presented by accused-appellant to attest to the truth of his claim.
In contrast, Aguilar and Duano's claim that they had to use some force in order to gain entry
cannot be doubted. The occupants of the house, especially accused-appellant, refused to open
the door despite the fact that the searching party knocked on the door several times.

Furthermore, the agents saw the suspicious movements of the people inside the house. These
circumstances justified the searching party's forcible entry into the house, founded as it is on the
apprehension that the execution of their mission would be frustrated unless they do so.
WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. Q-95-64357, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
96, Quezon City, finding accused-appellant Roberto Salanguit y Ko guilty of possession of illegal
drugs under 16 of R.A. No.6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended, and
sentencing him to suffer a prison term ranging from six (6) months of arresto mayor, as
minimum, and four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum, and
ordering the confiscation of 11.14 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride is AFFIRMED .
In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64358, the decision of the same court finding accused-appellant
Roberto Salanguit y Ko guilty of possession of prohibited drugs under 8 of R.A. No. 6425, as
amended, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of
Pl00,000.00 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and accused- appellant is ACQUITTED of the
crime charged. However, the confiscation of the 1,254 grams of marijuana, as well as the 11.14
grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride, and its disposition as ordered by the trial court is
AFFIRMED .
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 94902-0 April 21, 1999

BENJAMIN V. KHO and ELIZABETH ALINDOGAN, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ROBERTO L. MAKALINTAL and NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, respondents.

PURISIMA, J
This is a petition for certiorari assailing the Order, dated July 26, 1990, of Branch LXXVII of the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Paranaque, which denied petitioners' Motion to Quash Search Warrants
emanating from the same Court. Petitioners sought to restrain the respondent National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) from using the objects seized by virtue of such warrants in any case or cases
filed or to be filed against them and to return immediately the said items, including the firearms,
ammunition and explosives, radio communication equipment, hand sets, transceivers, two units
of vehicles and motorcycle.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On May 15, 1990, NBI Agent Max B. Salvador applied for the issuance of search warrants by the
respondent Judge against Benjamin V. Kho, now petitioner, in his residence at No. 45 Bb. Ramona
Tirona St., BF Homes, Phase I, Paranaque. On the same day, Eduardo T. Arugay, another NBI
agent, applied with the same court for the issuance of search warrants against the said petitioner
in his house at No. 326 McDivitt St., Bgy. Moonwalk, Paranaque. The search warrants were
applied for after teams of NBI agents had conducted a personal surveillance and investigation in
the two houses referred to on the basis of confidential, information they received that the said
places were being used as storage centers for unlicensed firearms and "chop-chop" vehicles.
Respondent NBI sought for the issuance of search warrants in anticipation of criminal cases to be
instituted against petitioner Kho.
On the same day, the respondent Judge conducted the necessary examination of the applicants
and their witnesses, after which he issued Search Warrant Nos. 90-11, 90-12, 90-13, 90-14, and
90-15.
On the following day, May 16, 1990, armed with Search Warrant Nos. 90-11 and 90-12, NBI
agents searched subject premises at BF Homes, Paranaque, and they recovered various highpowered firearms and hundreds of rounds of ammunition. Meanwhile, another search was
conducted at the house at No. 326 McDivitt St. Bgy. Moonwalk, Paranaque, by another team of
NBI agents using Search Warrant Nos. 90-13, 90-14 and 90-15. The said second search yielded
several high-powered firearms will explosives and more than a thousand rounds of ammunition.
The simultaneous searches also resulted in the confiscation of various radio and
telecommunication equipment, two units of motor vehicles (Lite-Ace vans) and one motorcycle.
Upon verification with the Firearms and Explosives Unit in Camp Crame, the NBI agents found out
that no license has ever been issued to any person or entity for the confiscated firearms in
question. Likewise, the radio agents found out that no license has ever been issued to any
person or entity for the confiscated firearms in question. Likewise, the radio transceivers
recovered and motor vehicles seized turned out to be unlicensed and unregistered per records of
the government agencies concerned.
On May 22, 1990, the raiding teams submitted separate returns to the respondent Judge
requesting that the items seized be in the continued custody of the NBI (Annexes "O", "P", and
"Q", Petition).

On May 28, 1990, the petitioners presented a Motion to Quash the said Search Warrants,
contending that:
1. The subject search warrants were issued without probable cause:
2. The same search warrants are prohibited by the Constitution for being general warrants;
3. The said search warrants were issued in violation of the procedural requirements set forth by
the Constitution;
4. The search warrants aforesaid were served in violation of the Revised Rules of Court; and
5. The objects seized were all legally possessed and issued.
On July 26, 1990, respondent Judge issued the assailed Order denying the said Motion To Quash
interposed by petitioners.
Petitioners question the issuance of subject search warrants, theorizing upon the absence of any
probable cause therefor. They contend that the surveillance and investigation conducted by NBI
agents within the premises involved, prior to the application for the search warrants under
controversy, were not sufficient to vest in the applicants personal knowledge of facts and
circumstances showing or indicating the commission of a crime by them (petitioners).
Petitioners' contention is untenable. Records show that the NBI agents who conducted the
surveillance and investigation testified unequivocally that they saw guns being carried to and
unloaded at the two houses searched, and motor vehicles and spare parts were stored therein. In
fact, applicant Max B. Salvador declared that he personally attended the surveillance together
with his witnesses (TSN, May 15, 1990, pp. 2-3), and the said witness personally saw the
weapons being unloaded from motor vehicles and carried to the premises referred to. NBI Agent
Ali Vargas testified that he actually saw the firearms being unloaded from a Toyota Lite-Ace van
and brought to the aformentioned house in BF Homes, Paranaque because he was there inside
the compound posing as an appliance agent (TSN, May 15, 1990, pp. 4-5). It is therefore
decisively clear that the application for the questioned search warrants was based on the
personal knowledge of the applicants and their witnesses.
In the case of Central Bank v. Morfe (20 SCRA 507), this Court ruled that the question of whether
or not a probable cause exists is one which must be determined in light of the conditions
obtaining given situations. InLuna v. Plaza (26 SCRA 310), it held that the existence of a probable
cause depends to a large extent upon the finding or opinion of the judge who conducted the
required examination of the applicants and the witnesses.
After a careful study, the Court discerns no basis for disturbing the findings and conclusions
arrived at by the respondent Judge after examining the applicants and witnesses. Respondent
judge had the singular opportunity to assess their testimonies and to find out their personal
knowledge of facts and circumstances enough to create a probable cause. The Judge was the one
who personally examined the applicants and witnesses and who asked searching questions vis-avis the applications for search warrants. He was thus able to observe and determine whether
subject applicants and their witnesses gave accurate accounts of the surveillance and
investigation they conducted at the premises to be searched. In the absence of any showing that
respondent judge was recreant of his duties in connection with the personal examination he so
conducted on the affiants before him, there is no basis for doubting the reliability and
correctness of his findings and impressions.
Petitioners brand as fatally defective and deficient the procedure followed in the issuance of
subject search warrants, reasoning out that the same did not comply with constitutional and

statutory requirements. They fault respondent Judge for allegedly failing to ask specific questions
they deem particularly important during the examination of the applicants and their witnesses.
To buttress their submission, petitioners invite attention to the following question, to wit:
"How did you know that there are unlicensed firearms being kept by Benjamin Kho at No. 45 Bb.
Ramona Tirona St., Phase I, BF Homes, Paranaque, Metro Manila?" (TSN, Ali Vargas, May 15,
1990, p. 4).
Petitioners argue that by propounding the aforequoted question, the respondent Judge assumed
that the firearms at the premises to be searched were unlicensed, instead of asking for a detailed
account of how the NBI agents came to know that the firearms being kept thereat were
unlicensed.
This stance of petitioners is similarly devoid of any sustainable basis. Nothing improper is
perceived in the manner the respondent Judge conducted the examination of subject applicants
for search warrants and their witnesses. He personally examined them under oath, and asked
them searching questions on the facts and circumstances personally known to them, in
compliance with prescribed procedure and legal requirements. It can be gleaned that the sworn
statements and affidavits submitted by the witnesses were duly attached to the pertinent
records of the proceedings. It was within the discretion of the examining Judge to determine what
questions to ask the witnesses so long as the questions asked are germane to the pivot of inquiry
the existence or absence of a probable cause.
Petitioners claim that subject search warrants are general warrants prescribed by the
Constitution. According to them, the things to be seized were not described and detailed out, i.e.
the firearms listed were not classified as to size or make, etc.
Records on hand indicate that the search warrants under scrutiny specifically describe the items
to be seized thus:
Search Warrant No. 90- 11.
Unlicensed radio communications equipments such as transmitters,
transceivers, handsets, scanners, monitoring device and the like.
Search Warrant No, 90-13.
Unlicensed radio communications equipments such as transmitters,
transceivers, handsets, radio communications equipments, scanners,
monitoring devices and others.
The use of the phrase "and the like" is of no moment. The same did not make the search
warrants in question general warrants. In Oca v. Maiquez (14 SCRA 735), the Court upheld the
warrant although it described the things to be seized as "books of accounts and allied papers."
Subject Warrant Nos. 90-12 and 90-15 refer to:
Unlicensed firearms of various calibers and ammunitions for the said
firearms.
Search Warrant No. 90-14 states:
Chop-chop vehicles and other spare parts.

The Court believes, and so holds, that the said warrants comply with Constitutional and statutory
requirements. The law does not require that the things to be seized must be described in precise
and minute detail as to leave no room for doubt on the part of the searching authorities.
Otherwise, it would be virtually impossible for the applicants to obtain a warrant as they would
not know exactly what kind of things they are looking for. Since the element of time is very
crucial in criminal cases, the effort and time spent in researching on the details to be embodied
in the warrant would render the purpose of the search nugatory.
In the case under consideration, the NBI agents could not have been in a position to know before
hand the exact caliber or make of the firearms to be seized. Although the surveillance they
conducted did disclose the presence of unlicensed firearms within the premises to be searched,
they could not have known the particular type of weapons involved before seeing such weapons
at close range, which was of course impossible at the time of the filing of the applications for
subject search warrants.
Verily, the failure to specify detailed descriptions in the warrants did not render the same
general. Retired Justice Ricardo Francisco's book on Criminal Procedure has this useful insight:
A description of the property to be seized need not be technically accurate nor
necessarily precise; and its nature will necessarily vary according to whether the
identity of the property, or its character, is the matter of concern. Further, the
description is required to be specific only so for as the circumstances will ordinarily
allow. . . .
In People v. Rubio (57 Phil 384), the Court held that, ". . . But where, by the nature of the goods
to be seized, their description must be rather general, it is not required that a technical
description be given, for this would mean that no warrant could issue."
It is indeed understandable that the agents of respondent Bureau have no way of knowing
whether the guns they intend to seize are a Smith and Wesson or a Beretta. The surveillance
conducted could not give the NBI agents a close view of the weapons being transported or
brought to the premises to be searched. Thus, they could not be expected to know the detailed
particulars of the objects to be seized. Consequently, the list submitted in the applications for
subject search warrants should be adjudged in substantial compliance with the requirements of
law.
Petitioners contend that the searching agents grossly violated the procedure in enforcing the
search warrants in question. The petition avers supposedly reprehensible acts perpetrated by the
NBI agents. Among the irregularities alluded to, are:
1. The raiding team failed to perform the following before breaking into the
premises:
a. Properly identify themselves and showing necessary
credentials including presentation of the Search Warrants;
b. Furnishing of Search Warrants and allowing the
occupants of the place to scrutinize the same;
c. Giving ample time to the occupants to voluntarily allow
the raiders entry into the place and to search the
premises.
2. The team entered the premises by climbing the fence and by forcing open the
main door of the house.

3. Once inside the house, the raiders herded the maids and the sixteen year-old son
of defendant Kho into the dining room where they were confined for the duration of
the raid. In the case of the son, he was gagged with a piece of cloth, his hands were
tied behind his back and he was made to lie face down.
4. Defendant Kho's hands were immediately tied behind his back (initially with a rag
and later with the electric cord of a rechargeable lamp) and was restrained in a
kneeling position with guns pointed at him throughout the duration of the search. It
was only after the search was completed and the seized items stuffed in carton
boxes (and a T-bag) that his hands were untied so he can sign the search warrants
which he was forced to do.
5. All throughout the search, defendant Kho and his companions were kept in the
dining room and continuously intimidated of being shot while the raiders search all
the rooms all by themselves and without anybody seeing whatever they were doing.
The question of whether there was abuse in the enforcerment of the challanged search warrants
is not within the scope of a Motion to Quash. In a Motion to Quash, what is assailed is the validity
of the issuance of the warrant. The manner of serving the warrant and of effecting the search are
not an issue to be resolved here. As aptly opined and ruled by the respondent Judge, petitioners
have remedies under pertinent penal, civil and administrative laws for their problem at hand,
which cannot be solved by their present motion to quash.
According to petitioner Kho, the premises searched and objects seized during the search sued
upon belong to the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB) of which he is an agent
and therefore, the NBI agents involved had no authority to search the aforesaid premises and to
confiscate the objects seized.
Whether the places searched and objects seized are government properties are questions of fact
outside the scope of the petition under consideration. The Court does not see its way clear to
rule on such issues lest it preempts the disposition of the cases filed by the respondent NBI
against the herein petitioners.
Considering that cases for Illegal Possession of Firearms and Explosives and Violation of Section 3
in relation to Section 14 of Republic Act No. 6539, otherwise known as the Anti-Carnapping Act of
1972, have been instituted against the petitioners, the petition for mandamus with preliminary
and mandatory injunction to return all objects seized and to restrain respondent NBI from using
the said objects as evidence, has become moot and academic.
WHEREFORE, or want of merit and on the ground that it has become moot and academic, the
petition at bar is hereby DISMISSED. No pronoucement as to costs.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 136292

January 15, 2002

RUDY CABALLES y TAIO, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
PUNO, J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision1 of respondent Court of Appeals dated
September 15, 1998 which affirmed the judgment rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Santa
Cruz, Laguna, finding herein petitioner, Rudy Caballes y Taio, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of theft, and the resolution 2 dated November 9, 1998 which denied petitioner's motion
for reconsideration.
In an Information3 dated October 16, 1989, petitioner was charged with the crime of theft
committed as follows:
"That on or about the 28th day of June, 1989, in the Municipality of Pagsanjan, and/or
elsewhere in the Province of Laguna, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, with intent of gain, and without the knowledge and consent of
the owner thereof, the NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away about 630-kg of Aluminum Cable
Conductors, valued at P27, 450.00, belonging to and to the damage and prejudice of said
owner National Power Corp., in the aforesaid amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW."
During the arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty and hence, trial on the merits ensued.
The facts are summarized by the appellate court as follows:
"[At] about 9:15 p.m. of June 28, 1989, Sgt. Victorino Noceja and Pat. Alex de Castro, while
on a routine patrol in Barangay Sampalucan, Pagsanjan, Laguna, spotted a passenger jeep
unusually covered with "kakawati" leaves.
Suspecting that the jeep was loaded with smuggled goods, the two police officers flagged
down the vehicle. The jeep was driven by appellant. When asked what was loaded on the
jeep, he did not answer; he appeared pale and nervous.
With appellant's consent, the police officers checked the cargo and they discovered
bundles of 3.08 mm aluminum/galvanized conductor wires exclusively owned by National
Power Corporation (NPC). The conductor wires weighed 700 kilos and valued at P55,
244.45. Noceja asked appellant where the wires came from and appellant answered that
they came from Cavinti, a town approximately 8 kilometers away from Sampalucan.
Thereafter, appellant and the vehicle with the high-voltage wires were brought to the
Pagsanjan Police Station. Danilo Cabale took pictures of the appellant and the jeep loaded
with the wires which were turned over to the Police Station Commander of Pagsanjan,
Laguna. Appellant was incarcerated for 7 days in the Municipal jail.
In defense, appellant interposed denial and alibi. He testified that he is a driver and
resident of Pagsanjan, Laguna; a NARCOM civilian agent since January, 1988 although his
identification card (ID) has already expired. In the afternoon of June 28, 1989, while he was
driving a passenger jeepney, he was stopped by one Resty Fernandez who requested him
to transport in his jeepney conductor wires which were in Cavinti, Laguna. He told Resty to
wait until he had finished his last trip for the day from Santa Cruz, Laguna. On his way to

Santa Cruz, Laguna, he dropped by the NARCOM headquarters and informed his superior,
Sgt. Callos, that something unlawful was going to happen. Sgt. Callos advised him to
proceed with the loading of the wires and that the former would act as back-up and
intercept the vehicle at the Sambat Patrol Base in Pagsanjan.
After receiving those instructions, he went back to see Resty. Although Resty had his own
vehicle, its tires were old so the cable wires were loaded in appellant's jeep and covered
with kakawati leaves. The loading was done by about five (5) masked men. He was
promised P1,000.00 for the job. Upon crossing a bridge, the two vehicles separated but in
his case, he was intercepted by Sgt. Noceja and Pat. De Castro. When they discovered the
cables, he told the police officers that the cables were loaded in his jeep by the owner,
Resty Fernandez. But despite his explanation, he was ordered to proceed to police
headquarters where he was interrogated. The police officers did not believe him and
instead locked him up in jail for a week." 4
On April 27, 1993, the court a quo rendered judgment5 the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Theft of
property worthP55,244.45, the Court hereby sentences him to suffer imprisonment from
TWO (2) [YEARS], FOUR (4) MONTHS, and ONE (1) DAY of Prision Correccional, as
minimum, to TEN (10) YEARS of Prision Mayor, as maximum, to indemnify the complainant
National Power Corporation in the amount of P55, 244.45, and to pay the costs."
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction but deleted the award for
damages on the ground that the stolen materials were recovered and modified the penalty
imposed, to wit:
"WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that
appellant RUDY CABALLES is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal in theft,
defined and penalized under Articles 308 and 309, par. 1, Revised Penal Code, and there
being no modifying circumstances, he is hereby meted an indeterminate penalty of Four
(4) years, Nine (9) months and Eleven (11) days of prision correccional, as minimum term,
to Eight (8) years, Eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum term.
No civil indemnity and no costs."6
Petitioner comes before us and raises the following issues:
"(a) Whether or not the constitutional right of petitioner was violated when the police
officers searched his vehicle and seized the wires found therein without a search warrant
and when samples of the wires and references to them were admitted in evidence as basis
for his conviction;
(b) Whether or not respondent Court erred in rejecting petitioner's defense that he was
engaged in an entrapment operation and in indulging in speculation and conjecture in
rejecting said defense; and
(c) Whether or not the evidence of the prosecution failed to establish the guilt of petitioner
beyond reasonable doubt and thus failed to overcome the constitutional right of petitioner
to presumption of innocence."
The conviction or acquittal of petitioner hinges primarily on the validity of the warrantless search
and seizure made by the police officers, and the admissibility of the evidence obtained by virtue
thereof.
In holding that the warrantless search and seizure is valid, the trial court ruled that:

"As his last straw of argument, the accused questions the constitutionality of the search
and validity of his arrest on the ground that no warrant was issued to that effect. The
Court cannot again sustain such view. In the case of People v. Lo Ho [Wing], G.R. No.
88017, January 21, 1991, it has been held that 'considering that before a warrant can be
obtained, the place, things and persons to be searched must be described to the
satisfaction of the issuing judge - a requirement which borders on the impossible in the
case of smuggling effected by the use of a moving vehicle that can transport contraband
from one place to another with impunity, a warrantless search of a moving vehicle is
justified on grounds of practicability.' The doctrine is not of recent vintage. In the case of
Valmonte vs. de Villa, G.R. No. 83988, May 24, 1990 (Resolution on Motion for
Reconsideration, September 29, 1989), it was ruled that 'automobiles because of their
mobility may be searched without a warrant upon facts not justifying warrantless search of
a resident or office. x x x To hold that no criminal can, in any case, be arrested and
searched for the evidence and tokens of his crime without a warrant, would be to leave
society, to a large extent, at the mercy of the shrewdest, the most expert, and the most
depraved of criminals, facilitating their escape in many instances' (Ibid.). In Umil v. Ramos,
187 SCRA 311, and People vs. Ortiz, 191 SCRA 836, the Supreme Court held that a search
may be made even without a warrant where the accused is caught in flagrante. Under the
circumstances, the police officers are not only authorized but are also under obligation to
arrest the accused even without a warrant." 7
Petitioner contends that the flagging down of his vehicle by police officers who were on routine
patrol, merely on "suspicion" that "it might contain smuggled goods," does not constitute
probable cause that will justify a warrantless search and seizure. He insists that, contrary to the
findings of the trial court as adopted by the appellate court, he did not give any consent, express
or implied, to the search of the vehicle. Perforce, any evidence obtained in violation of his right
against unreasonable search and seizure shall be deemed inadmissible.
Enshrined in our Constitution is the inviolable right of the people to be secure in their persons
and properties against unreasonable searches and seizures, as defined under Section 2, Article III
thereof, which reads:
"Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall
be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized."
The exclusionary rule under Section 3(2), Article III of the Constitution bars the admission of
evidence obtained in violation of such right.
The constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures is not absolute but
admits of certain exceptions, namely: (1) warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest
recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence; 8 (2)
seizure of evidence in plain view;9 (3) search of moving vehicles;10 (4) consented warrantless
search;11 (5) customs search; (6) stop and frisk situations (Terry search); 12 and (7) exigent and
emergency circumstances.13
In cases where warrant is necessary, the steps prescribed by the Constitution and reiterated in
the Rules of Court must be complied with. In the exceptional events where warrant is not
necessary to effect a valid search or seizure, or when the latter cannot be performed except
without a warrant, what constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure is purely a
judicial question, determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved, including the
purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in

which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched and the character of the
articles procured.14
It is not controverted that the search and seizure conducted by the police officers in the case at
bar was not authorized by a search warrant. The main issue is whether the evidence taken from
the warrantless search is admissible against the appellant. Without said evidence, the
prosecution cannot prove the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt.1wphi1.nt
I. Search of moving vehicle
Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle's inherent mobility reduces expectation of
privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion
amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity. 15 Thus, the rules
governing search and seizure have over the years been steadily liberalized whenever a moving
vehicle is the object of the search on the basis of practicality. This is so considering that before a
warrant could be obtained, the place, things and persons to be searched must be described to
the satisfaction of the issuing judge a requirement which borders on the impossible in the case
of smuggling effected by the use of a moving vehicle that can transport contraband from one
place to another with impunity. We might add that a warrantless search of a moving vehicle is
justified on the ground that it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be
quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought. 16 Searches
without warrant of automobiles is also allowed for the purpose of preventing violations of
smuggling or immigration laws, provided such searches are made at borders or 'constructive
borders' like checkpoints near the boundary lines of the State. 17
The mere mobility of these vehicles, however, does not give the police officers unlimited
discretion to conduct indiscriminate searches without warrants if made within the interior of the
territory and in the absence of probable cause. 18 Still and all, the important thing is that there
was probable cause to conduct the warrantless search, which must still be present in such a
case.
Although the term eludes exact definition, probable cause signifies a reasonable ground of
suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious
man's belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged; or the
existence of such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet and prudent
man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the items, articles or objects sought
in connection with said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by law is in the place to be
searched.19 The required probable cause that will justify a warrantless search and seizure is not
determined by a fixed formula but is resolved according to the facts of each case. 20
One such form of search of moving vehicles is the "stop-and-search" without warrant at military
or police checkpoints which has been declared to be not illegal per se, 21 for as long as it is
warranted by the exigencies of public order 22 and conducted in a way least intrusive to
motorists.23 A checkpoint may either be a mere routine inspection or it may involve an extensive
search.
Routine inspections are not regarded as violative of an individual's right against unreasonable
search. The search which is normally permissible in this instance is limited to the following
instances: (1) where the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is
parked on the public fair grounds;24 (2) simply looks into a vehicle;25 (3) flashes a light therein
without opening the car's doors;26 (4) where the occupants are not subjected to a physical or
body search;27 (5) where the inspection of the vehicles is limited to a visual search or visual
inspection;28 and (6) where the routine check is conducted in a fixed area. 29

None of the foregoing circumstances is obtaining in the case at bar. The police officers did not
merely conduct a visual search or visual inspection of herein petitioner's vehicle. They had to
reach inside the vehicle, lift the kakawati leaves and look inside the sacks before they were able
to see the cable wires. It cannot be considered a simple routine check.
In the case of United States vs. Pierre,30 the Court held that the physical intrusion of a part of
the body of an agent into the vehicle goes beyond the area protected by the Fourth Amendment,
to wit:
"The Agent . . . stuck his head through the driver's side window. The agent thus effected a
physical intrusion into the vehicle. . . [W]e are aware of no case holding that an officer did
not conduct a search when he physically intruded part of his body into a space in which
the suspect had a reasonable expectation of privacy. [The] Agent['s] . . . physical intrusion
allowed him to see and to smell things he could not see or smell from outside the vehicle. .
. In doing so, his inspection went beyond that portion of the vehicle which may be viewed
from outside the vehicle by either inquisitive passersby or diligent police officers, and into
the area protected by the Fourth amendment, just as much as if he had stuck his head
inside the open window of a home."
On the other hand, when a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such a
warrantless search would be constitutionally permissible only if the officers conducting the
search have reasonable or probable cause to believe, before the search, that either the motorist
is a law-offender or they will find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime in the
vehicle to be searched.31
This Court has in the past found probable cause to conduct without a judicial warrant an
extensive search of moving vehicles in situations where (1) there had emanated from a package
the distinctive smell of marijuana; (2) agents of the Narcotics Command ("Narcom") of the
Philippine National Police ("PNP") had received a confidential report from informers that a
sizeable volume of marijuana would be transported along the route where the search was
conducted; (3) Narcom agents had received information that a Caucasian coming from Sagada,
Mountain Province, had in his possession prohibited drugs and when the Narcom agents
confronted the accused Caucasian, because of a conspicuous bulge in his waistline, he failed to
present his passport and other identification papers when requested to do so; (4) Narcom agents
had received confidential information that a woman having the same physical appearance as
that of the accused would be transporting marijuana; 32 (5) the accused who were riding a
jeepney were stopped and searched by policemen who had earlier received confidential reports
that said accused would transport a large quantity of marijuana; and (6) where the moving
vehicle was stopped and searched on the basis of intelligence information and clandestine
reports by a deep penetration agent or spy - one who participated in the drug smuggling
activities of the syndicate to which the accused belonged - that said accused were bringing
prohibited drugs into the country.33
In the case at bar, the vehicle of the petitioner was flagged down because the police officers who
were on routine patrol became suspicious when they saw that the back of the vehicle was
covered with kakawati leaves which, according to them, was unusual and uncommon.
Pat. Alex de Castro recounted the incident as follows:
"ATTY. SANTOS
Q
Now on said date and time do you remember of any unusual incident while you were
performing your duty?

A
Yes, sir, at that time and date myself and Police Sgt. Noceja were conducting patrol
in the said place when we spotted a suspicious jeepney so we stopped the jeepney and
searched the load of the jeepney and we found out (sic) these conductor wires.
Q
You mentioned about the fact that when you saw the jeepney you became
suspicious, why did you become suspicious?
A

Because the cargo was covered with leaves and branches, sir.

Q
When you became suspicious upon seeing those leaves on top of the load what did
you do next, if any?
A

We stopped the jeepney and searched the contents thereof, sir." 34

The testimony of Victorino Noceja did not fare any better:

"ATTY SANTOS
Q

When you saw the accused driving the said vehicle, what did you do?

A
Because I saw that the vehicle being drawn by Caballes was covered by
kakawati leaves, I became suspicious since such vehicle should not be covered
by those and I flagged him, sir."35
We hold that the fact that the vehicle looked suspicious simply because it is not common for such
to be covered with kakawati leaves does not constitute "probable cause" as would justify the
conduct of a search without a warrant.
In People vs. Chua Ho San,36 we held that the fact that the watercraft used by the accused
was different in appearance from the usual fishing boats that commonly cruise over the
Bacnotan seas coupled with the suspicious behavior of the accused when he attempted to flee
from the police authorities do not sufficiently establish probable cause. Thus:
"In the case at bar, the Solicitor General proposes that the following details are suggestive
of probable cause - persistent reports of rampant smuggling of firearm and other
contraband articles, CHUA's watercraft differing in appearance from the usual fishing boats
that commonly cruise over the Bacnotan seas, CHUA's illegal entry into the Philippines x x
x, CHUA's suspicious behavior, i.e., he attempted to flee when he saw the police
authorities, and the apparent ease by which CHUA can return to and navigate his
speedboat with immediate dispatch towards the high seas, beyond the reach of Philippine
laws.
This Court, however, finds that these do not constitute "probable cause." None of the
telltale clues, e.g., bag or package emanating the pungent odor of marijuana or other
prohibited drug, confidential report and/or positive identification by informers of courier of
prohibited drug and/or the time and place where they will transport/deliver the same,
suspicious demeanor or behavior, and suspicious bulge in the waist - accepted by this
Court as sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest exists in this case. There was no classified
information that a foreigner would disembark at Tammocalao beach bearing prohibited
drug on the date in question. CHUA was not identified as a drug courier by a police
informer or agent. The fact that the vessel that ferried him to shore bore no
resemblance to the fishing boats of the area did not automatically mark him as
in the process of perpetrating an offense. x x x." (emphasis supplied)

In addition, the police authorities do not claim to have received any confidential report or tipped
information that petitioner was carrying stolen cable wires in his vehicle which could otherwise
have sustained their suspicion. Our jurisprudence is replete with cases where tipped information
has become a sufficient probable cause to effect a warrantless search and
seizure.37 Unfortunately, none exists in this case.
II. Plain view doctrine
It cannot likewise be said that the cable wires found in petitioner's vehicle were in plain view,
making its warrantless seizure valid.
Jurisprudence is to the effect that an object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly exposed
to sight. Where the object seized was inside a closed package, the object itself is not in plain
view and therefore cannot be seized without a warrant. However, if the package proclaims its
contents, whether by its distinctive configuration, its transparency, or if its contents are obvious
to an observer, then the contents are in plain view and may be seized. In other words, if the
package is such that an experienced observer could infer from its appearance that it contains the
prohibited article, then the article is deemed in plain view. It must be immediately apparent to
the police that the items that they observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise
subject to seizure.38
It is clear from the records of this case that the cable wires were not exposed to sight because
they were placed in sacks39 and covered with leaves. The articles were neither transparent nor
immediately apparent to the police authorities. They had no clue as to what was hidden
underneath the leaves and branches. As a matter of fact, they had to ask petitioner what was
loaded in his vehicle. In such a case, it has been held that the object is not in plain view which
could have justified mere seizure of the articles without further search. 40
III. Consented search
Petitioner contends that the statement of Sgt. Victorino Noceja that he checked the vehicle "with
the consent of the accused" is too vague to prove that petitioner consented to the search. He
claims that there is no specific statement as to how the consent was asked and how it was given,
nor the specific words spoken by petitioner indicating his alleged "consent." At most, there was
only an implied acquiescence, a mere passive conformity, which is no "consent" at all within the
purview of the constitutional guarantee.
Doubtless, the constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal
right which may be waived. The consent must be voluntary in order to validate an otherwise
illegal detention and search, i.e., the consent is unequivocal, specific, and intelligently given,
uncontaminated by any duress or coercion. 41Hence, consent to a search is not to be lightly
inferred, but must be shown by clear and convincing evidence. 42The question whether a consent
to a search was in fact voluntary is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the
circumstances.43 Relevant to this determination are the following characteristics of the person
giving consent and the environment in which consent is given: (1) the age of the defendant; (2)
whether he was in a public or secluded location; (3) whether he objected to the search or
passively looked on;44 (4) the education and intelligence of the defendant; (5) the presence of
coercive police procedures; (6) the defendant's belief that no incriminating evidence will be
found;45 (7) the nature of the police questioning; (8) the environment in which the questioning
took place; and (9) the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person consenting. 46 It is the
State which has the burden of proving, by clear and positive testimony, that the necessary
consent was obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily given. 47
In the case at bar, Sgt. Victorino Noceja testified on the manner in which the search was
conducted in this wise:

"WITNESS
Q

On June 28, 1989, where were you?

We were conducting patrol at the poblacion and some barangays, sir.

xxx

xxx

xxx

Q
After conducting the patrol operation, do you remember of any unusual incident on
said date and time?
A

Yes, sir.

What is that incident?

A
While I was conducting my patrol at barangay Sampalucan, I saw Rudy Caballes
driving a vehicle and the vehicle contained aluminum wires, sir.
xxx
Q

xxx

xxx

When you saw the accused driving the said vehicle, what did you do?

A
Because I saw that the vehicle being driven by Caballes was covered by kakawati
leaves, I became suspicious since such vehicle should not be covered by those and I
flagged him, sir.
Q

Did the vehicle stop?

A
Yes, sir, and after said vehicle stop[ped], I removed the cover of said
vehicle and by so doing, I saw the aluminum wires.
Q

Before you saw the aluminum wires, did you talk to the accused?

Yes, sir, I asked him what his load was.

What was the answer of Caballes?

A
He did not answer and I observed him to be pale, "nagpapamutla" (sic), so
I told him I will look at the contents of his vehicle and he answered in the
positive.
Q
do?

And after you saw for yourself the aluminum wires loaded on the jeep, what did you

A
I asked him where those wires came from and he answered those came from the
Cavinti area, sir."48
This Court is not unmindful of cases upholding the validity of consented warrantless searches
and seizure. But in these cases, the police officers' request to search personnel effects was orally
articulated to the accused and in such language that left no room for doubt that the latter fully
understood what was requested. In some instance, the accused even verbally replied to the
request demonstrating that he also understood the nature and consequences of such request. 49

In Asuncion vs. Court of Appeals,50 the apprehending officers sought the permission of
petitioner to search the car, to which the latter agreed. Petitioner therein himself freely gave his
consent to said search. In People vs. Lacerna,51 the appellants who were riding in a taxi were
stopped by two policemen who asked permission to search the vehicle and the appellants readily
agreed. In upholding the validity of the consented search, the Court held that appellant himself
who was "urbanized in mannerism and speech" expressly said that he was consenting to the
search as he allegedly had nothing to hide and had done nothing wrong. In People vs.
Cuizon,52 the accused admitted that they signed a written permission stating that they freely
consented to the search of their luggage by the NBI agents to determine if they were carrying
shabu. In People vs. Montilla,53 it was held that the accused spontaneously performed
affirmative acts of volition by himself opening the bag without being forced or intimidated to do
so, which acts should properly be construed as a clear waiver of his right. In People vs.
Omaweng,54 the police officers asked the accused if they could see the contents of his bag to
which the accused said "you can see the contents but those are only clothings." Then the
policemen asked if they could open and see it, and accused answered "you can see it." The Court
said there was a valid consented search.1wphi1.nt
In case of consented searches or waiver of the constitutional guarantee against obtrusive
searches, it is fundamental that to constitute a waiver, it must first appear that (1) the right
exists; (2) that the person involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the existence
of such right; and (3) the said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right. 55
In the case at bar, the evidence is lacking that the petitioner intentionally surrendered his right
against unreasonable searches. The manner by which the two police officers allegedly obtained
the consent of petitioner for them to conduct the search leaves much to be desired. When
petitioner's vehicle was flagged down, Sgt. Noceja approached petitioner and "told him I will
look at the contents of his vehicle and he answered in the positive." We are hard put to
believe that by uttering those words, the police officers were asking or requesting for permission
that they be allowed to search the vehicle of petitioner. For all intents and purposes, they
were informing, nay, imposing upon herein petitioner that they will search his vehicle. The
"consent" given under intimidating or coercive circumstances is no consent within the purview of
the constitutional guaranty. In addition, in cases where this Court upheld the validity of
consented search, it will be noted that the police authorities expressly asked, in no uncertain
terms, for the consent of the accused to be searched. And the consent of the accused was
established by clear and positive proof. In the case of herein petitioner, the statements of the
police officers were not asking for his consent; they were declaring to him that they will look
inside his vehicle. Besides, it is doubtful whether permission was actually requested and granted
because when Sgt. Noceja was asked during his direct examination what he did when the vehicle
of petitioner stopped, he answered that he removed the cover of the vehicle and saw the
aluminum wires. It was only after he was asked a clarificatory question that he added that he
told petitioner he will inspect the vehicle. To our mind, this was more of an afterthought.
Likewise, when Pat. de Castro was asked twice in his direct examination what they did when they
stopped the jeepney, his consistent answer was that they searched the vehicle. He never
testified that he asked petitioner for permission to conduct the search. 56
Neither can petitioner's passive submission be construed as an implied acquiescence to the
warrantless search. In People vs. Barros,57 appellant Barros, who was carrying a carton box,
boarded a bus where two policemen were riding. The policemen inspected the carton and found
marijuana inside. When asked who owned the box, appellant denied ownership of the box and
failed to object to the search. The Court there struck down the warrantless search as illegal and
held that the accused is not to be presumed to have waived the unlawful search conducted
simply because he failed to object, citing the ruling in the case of People vs. Burgos,58 to wit:
"As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of the citizen,
the courts do not place the citizens in the position of either contesting an officer's

authority by force, or waiving his constitutional rights; but instead they hold that a
peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not a consent or an invitation thereto, but is
merely a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law."
Casting aside the cable wires as evidence, the remaining evidence on record are insufficient to
sustain petitioner's conviction. His guilt can only be established without violating the
constitutional right of the accused against unreasonable search and seizure.
WHEREFORE, the impugned decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and accused Rudy
Caballes is herebyACQUITTED of the crime charged. Cost de oficio.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 125299 January 22, 1999

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FLORENCIO DORIA y BOLADO and VIOLETA GADDAO y CATAMA @ "NENETH," accusedappellants.

PUNO, J.:
On December 7, 1995, accused-appellants Florencio Doria y Bolado and Violeta Gaddao y
Catama @ "Neneth" were charged with violation of Section 4, in relation to Section 21 of the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. 1 The information reads:
That on or about the 5th day of December, 1995 in the City of Mandaluyong,
Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping and aiding one another
and without having been authorized by law, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously sell, administer, deliver and give away to another eleven (11) plastic
bags of suspected marijuana fruiting tops weighing 7,641.08 grams in violation of
the above-cited law.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 2
The prosecution contends the offense was committed as follows: In November 1995, members of
the North Metropolitan District, Philippine National Police (PNP) Narcotics Command (Narcom),
received information from two (2) civilian informants (CI) that one "Jun" was engaged in illegal
drug activities in Mandaluyong City. The Narcom agents decided to entrap and arrest "Jun" in a
buy-bust operation. As arranged by one of the CI's, a meeting between the Narcom agents and
"Jun" was scheduled on December 5, 1995 at E. Jacinto Street in Mandaluyong City.
On December 5, 1995, at 6:00 in the morning, the CI went to the PNP Headquarters at EDSA,
Kamuning, Quezon City to prepare for the buy-bust operation. The Narcom agents formed Team
Alpha composed of P/Insp. Nolasco Cortes as team leader and PO3 Celso Manlangit, SPO1
Edmund Badua and four (4) other policemen as members. P/Insp. Cortes designated P03
Manlangit as the poseur-buyer and SPO1 Badua as his back-up, and the rest of the team as
perimeter security. Superintendent Pedro Alcantara, Chief of the North Metropolitan District PNP
Narcom, gave the team P2, 000. 00 to cover operational expenses. From this sum, PO3 Manlangit
set aside P1,600.00 a one thousand peso bill and six (6) one hundred peso bills 3 as money
for the buy-bust operation. The market price of one kilo of marijuana was then P1,600.00. P03
Manlangit marked the bills with his initials and listed their serial numbers in the police
blotter. 4 The team rode in two cars and headed for the target area.
At 7:20 of the same morning, "Jun" appeared and the CI introduced PO3 Manlangit as interested
in buying one (1) kilo of marijuana. P03 Manlangit handed "Jun" the marked bills worth
P1,600.00. "Jun" instructed P03 Manlangit to wait for him at the corner of Shaw Boulevard and
Jacinto Street while he got the marijuana from his associate. 5 An hour later, "Jun" appeared at
the agreed place where P03 Manlangit, the CI and the rest of the team were waiting. "Jun" took
out from his bag an object wrapped in plastic and gave it to P03 Manlangit. P03 Manlangit
forthwith arrested "Jun" as SPO1 Badua rushed to help in the arrest. They frisked "Jun" but did
not find the marked bills on him. Upon inquiry, "Jun" revealed that he left the money at the house
of his associate named "Neneth. 6 "Jun" led the police team to "Neneth's" house nearby at Daang
Bakal.

The team found the door of "Neneth's" house open and a woman inside. "Jun" identified the
woman as his associate. 7 SPO1 Badua asked "Neneth" about the P1,600.00 as PO3 Manlangit
looked over "Neneth's" house. Standing by the door, PO3 Manlangit noticed a carton box under
the dining table. He saw that one of the box's flaps was open and inside the box was something
wrapped in plastic. The plastic wrapper and its contents appeared similar to the marijuana earlier
"sold" to him by "Jun." His suspicion aroused, PO3 Manlangit entered "Neneth's" house and took
hold of the box. He peeked inside the box and found that it contained ten (10) bricks of what
appeared to be dried marijuana leaves.
Simultaneous with the box's discovery, SPO1 Badua recovered the marked bills from
"Neneth." 8 The policemen arrested "Neneth." They took "Neneth" and "Jun," together with the
box, its contents and the marked bills and turned them over to the investigator at headquarters.
It was only then that the police learned that "Jun" is Florencio Doria y Bolado while "Neneth" is
Violeta Gaddao y Catama. The one (1) brick of dried marijuana leaves recovered from "Jun" plus
the ten (10) bricks recovered from "Neneth's" house were examined at the PNP Crime
Laboratory. 9 The bricks, eleven (11) in all, were found to be dried marijuana fruiting tops of
various weights totalling 7,641.08 grams. 10
The prosecution story was denied by accused-appellants Florencio Doria and Violeta Gaddao.
Florencio Doria, a 33-year old carpenter, testified that on December 5, 1995, at 7:00 in the
morning, he was at the gate of his house reading a tabloid newspaper. Two men appeared and
asked him if he knew a certain "Totoy." There were many "Totoys" in their area and as the men
questioning him were strangers, accused-appellant denied knowing any "Totoy." The men took
accused-appellant inside his house and accused him of being a pusher in their community. When
accused-appellant denied the charge, the men led him to their car outside and ordered him to
point out the house of "Totoy." For five (5) minutes, accused-appellant stayed in the car.
Thereafter, he gave in and took them to "Totoy's" house.
Doria knocked on the door of "Totoy's" house but no one answered. One of the men, later
identified as P03 Manlangit, pushed open the door and he and his companions entered and
looked around the house for about three minutes. Accused-appellant Doria was left standing at
the door. The policemen came out of the house and they saw Violeta Gaddao carrying water from
the well. He asked Violeta where "Totoy" was but she replied he was not there. Curious onlookers
and kibitzers were, by that time, surrounding them. When Violeta entered her house, three men
were already inside. Accused-appellant Doria, then still at the door, overheard one of the men
say that they found a carton box. Turning towards them, Doria saw box on top of the table. The
box was open and had something inside. P03 Manlangit ordered him and Violeta to go outside
the house and board the car. They were brought to police headquarters where they were
investigated.
Accused-appellant Doria further declared that his co-accused, Violeta Gaddao, is the wife of his
acquaintance, Totoy Gaddao. He said that he and Totoy Gaddao sometimes drank together at the
neighborhood store. This closeness, however, did not extend to Violeta, Totoy's wife. 11
Accused-appellant Violeta Gaddao, a 35-year old rice vendor, claimed that on December 5, 1995,
she was at her house at Daang Bakal, Mandaluyong City where she lived with her husband and
five (5) children, namely, Arvy, aged 10, Arjay, aged 8, the twins Raymond and Raynan, aged 5,
and Jason, aged 3. That day, accused-appellant woke up at 5:30 in the morning and bought pan
de sal for her children's breakfast. Her husband, Totoy, a housepainter, had left for Pangasinan
five days earlier. She woke her children and bathed them. Her eldest son, Arvy, left for school at
6:45 A.M. Ten minutes later, she carried her youngest son, Jayson, and accompanied Arjay to
school. She left the twins at home leaving the door open. After seeing Arjay off, she and Jayson
remained standing in front of the school soaking in the sun for about thirty minutes. Then they
headed for home. Along the way, they passed the artesian well to fetch water. She was pumping
water when a man clad in short pants and denim jacket suddenly appeared and grabbed her left

wrist. The man pulled her and took her to her house. She found out later that the man was P03
Manlangit.
Inside her house were her co-accused Doria and three (3) other persons. They asked her about a
box on top of the table. This was the first time she saw the box. The box was closed and tied with
a piece of green straw. The men opened the box and showed her its contents. She said she did
not know anything about the box and its contents.
Accused-appellant Violeta Gaddao confirmed that her co-accused Florencio Doria was a friend of
her husband, and that her husband never returned to their house after he left for Pangasinan.
She denied the charge against her and Doria and the allegation that marked bills were found in
her person. 12
After trial, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 156, Pasig City convicted the accused-appellants. The
trial court found the existence of an "organized/syndicated crime group" and sentenced both
accused-appellants to death and pay a fine of P500,000.00 each. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the guilt of accused, FLORENCIO DORIA y BOLADO @ "Jun" and
VIOLETA GADDAO y CATAMA @ "Neneth" having been established beyond
reasonable doubt, they are both
CONVICTED of the present charge against them.
According to the amendatory provisions of Sec. 13 of Republic Act No. 7659 which
cover violations of Sec. 4 of Republic Act No. 6425 and which was exhaustively
discussed in People v. Simon, 234 SCRA 555, the penalty imposable in this case
is reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos
to ten million pesos. Taking into consideration, however, the provisions of Sec. 23,
also of Republic Act No. 7659 which explicitly state that:
The maximum penalty shall be imposed if the offense was committed
by any person who belongs to an organized/syndicated crime group.
An organized/syndicated crime group means a group of two or more
persons collaborating, confederating or mutually helping one another
for purposes of gain in the commission of any crime.
the Court is hereby constrained to sentence (hereby sentences) said FLORENCIO
DORIA y BOLADO @ "Jun" and VIOLETA GADDAO y CATAMA @ "Neneth" to DEATH
and to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) each without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.
The confiscated marijuana bricks (7,641.08 grams) shall be turned over to the
Dangerous Drugs Board, NBI for destruction in accordance with law.
Let a Commitment Order be issued for the transfer of accused DORIA from the
Mandaluyong City Jail to the New Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa City and also for
accused GADDAO for her transfer to the Correctional Institute for Women,
Mandaluyong City.
Let the entire records of this case be forwarded immediately to the Supreme Court
for mandatory review.
SO ORDERED.

13

Before this Court, accused-appellant Doria assigns two errors, thus:

I
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT TO THE TESTIMONY OF THE
WITNESSES FOR THE PROSECUTION WHEN THEIR TESTIMONIES WERE SHOT WITH
DISCREPANCIES, INCONSISTENCIES AND THAT THE CORPUS DELICTI OF THE
MARIJUANA ALLEGEDLY TAKEN FROM APPELLANT WAS NOT POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED
BY THE POSEUR-BUYER.
II
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN ADMITTING AS EVIDENCE THE MARIJUANA
FRUITINGS FOUND INSIDE THE CARTON BOX AS THESE WERE OBTAINED THROUGH A
WARRANTLESS SEARCH AND DOES NOT COME WITHIN THE PLAIN VIEW
DOCTRINE. 14
Accused-appellant Violeta Gaddao contends:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING APPELLANT GUILTY DESPITE THE
INCREDIBILITY OF THE POLICE VERSION OF THE MANNER THE ALLEGED BUY-BUST
WAS CONDUCTED.
II
THE PNP OFFICERS' VERSIONS AS TO WHERE THE BUY-BUST MONEY CAME FROM
ARE INCONSISTENT WITH ONE ANOTHER AND ALSO REEKS WITH INCREDIBILITY.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING APPELLANT GUILTY AND SENTENCING HER
TO DEATH DESPITE THE MANIFESTLY IRRECONCILABLE INCONSISTENCIES IN THE
VERSIONS OF THE POLICE AS TO HOW AND BY WHOM THE ALLEGED BUY-BUST
MONEY WAS RECOVERED FROM HER, WHICH IN CONSEQUENCE RESULTS IN THE
EVIDENCE, OF RETRIEVAL FROM HER OF THE SAME, NEBULOUS, AT BEST, NIL, AT
WORST.
IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE VALIDITY OF THE WARRANTLESS
SEARCH LEADING TO THE SEIZURE OF THE MARIJUANA ALLEGEDLY FOUND INSIDE
THE HOUSE OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT. 15
The assigned errors involve two principal issues: (1) the validity of the buy-bust operation in the
apprehension of accused-appellant Doria; and (2) the validity of the warrantless arrest of
accused-appellant Gaddao, the search of her person and house, and the admissibility of the
pieces of evidence obtained therefrom.
Accused-appellants were caught by the police in a buy-bust operation. A buy-bust operation is a
form of entrapment employed by peace officers as an effective way of apprehending a criminal in
the act of the commission of an offense. 16 Entrapment has received judicial sanction when
undertaken with due regard to constitutional and legal safeguards. 17

Entrapment was unknown in common law. It is a judicially created twentieth-century American

doctrine that evolved from the increasing use of informers and undercover agents in the
detection of crimes, particularly liquor and narcotics offenses. 18 Entrapment sprouted from the
doctrine of estoppel and the public interest in the formulation and application of decent
standards in the enforcement of criminal law. 19 It also took off from a spontaneous moral
revulsion against using the powers of government to beguile innocent but ductile persons into
lapses that they might otherwise resist. 20
In the American jurisdiction, the term "entrapment" has a generally negative meaning because it
is understood as the inducement of one to commit a crime not contemplated by him, for the
mere purpose of instituting a criminal prosecution against him. 21 The classic definition of
entrapment is that articulated by Justice Roberts inSorrells v. United States, 22 the first Supreme
Court decision to acknowledge the concept: "Entrapment is the conception and planning of an
offense by an officer, and his procurement of its commission by one who would not have
perpetrated it except for the trickery, percuasion or fraud of the officers." 23 It consists of two (2)
elements: (a) acts of percuasion, trickery, or fraud carried out by law enforcement officers or the
agents to induce a defendant to commit a crime; and (b) the origin of the criminal design in the
minds of the government officials rather than that of the innocent defendant, such that the crime
is the product of the creative activity of the law enforcement officer. 24
It is recognized that in every arrest, there is a certain amount of entrapment used to outwit the
persons violating or about to violate the law. Not every deception is forbidden. The type of
entrapment the law forbids is the inducing of another to violate the law, the "seduction" of an
otherwise innocent person into a criminal career. 25Where the criminal intent originates criminal
in the mind of the entrapping person and the accused is lured into the commission of the offense
charged in order to prosecute him, there is entrapment and no conviction may be had. 26Where,
however, the criminal intent originates in the mind of the accused and the criminal offense is
completed, the fact that a person acting as a decoy for the state, or public officials furnished the
accused an opportunity for commission of the offense, or that the accused is aided in the
commission of the crime in order to secure the evidence necessary to prosecute him, there is no
entrapment and the accused must be convicted. 27 The law tolerates the use of decoys and other
artifices to catch a criminal.
Entrapment is recognized as a valid defense 28 that can be raised by an accused and partakes of
the nature of a confession and avoidance. 29 It is a positive defense. Initially, an accused has the
burden of providing sufficient evidence that the government induced him to commit the offense.
Once established, the burden shifts to the governmet to show otherwise. 30 When entrapment is
raised as a defense, American federal courts and a majority of state courts use the "subjective"
or "origin of intent" test laid down in Sorrells v. United States 31 to determine whether
entrapment actually occurred. The focus of the inquiry is on the accused's predisposition to
commit the offense charged, his state of mind and inclination before his initial exposure to
government agents. 32 All relevant facts such as the accused's mental and character traits, his
past offenses, activities, his eagerness in committing the crime, his reputation, etc., are
considered to assess his state of mind before the crime. 33 The predisposition test emphasizes
the accused's propensity to commit the offense rather than the officer's misconduct 34 and
reflects an attempt to draw a line between a "trap for the unwary innocent and the trap for the
unwary criminal." 35 If the accused was found to have been ready and willing to commit the
offense at any favorable opportunity, the entrapment defense will fail even if a police agent used
an unduly persuasive inducement. 36 Some states, however, have adopted the "objective"
test. 37 This test was first authoritatively laid down in the case of Grossman v. State 38 rendered
by the Supreme Court of Alaska. Several other states have subsequently adopted the test by
judicial pronouncement or legislation. Here, the court considers the nature of the police activity
involved and the propriety of police conduct. 39 The inquiry is focused on the inducements used
by government agents, on police conduct, not on the accused and his predisposition to commit
the crime. For the goal of the defense is to deter unlawful police conduct. 40 The test of

entrapment is whether the conduct of the law enforcement agent was likely to induce a normally
law-abiding person, other than one who is ready and willing, to commit the offense; 41 for
purposes of this test, it is presumed that a law-abiding person would normally resist the
temptation to commit a crime that is presented by the simple opportunity to act
unlawfully. 42 Official conduct that merely offers such an opportunity is permissible, but
overbearing conduct, such as badgering, cajoling or importuning, 43 or appeals to sentiments
such as pity, sympathy, friendship or pleas of desperate illness, are not. 44 Proponents of this test
believe that courts must refuse to convict an entrapped accused not because his conduct falls
outside the legal norm but rather because, even if his guilt has been established, the methods
employed on behalf of the government to bring about the crime "cannot be countenanced." To
some extent, this reflects the notion that the courts should not become tainted by condoning law
enforcement improprieties. 45 Hence, the transactions leading up to the offense, the interaction
between the accused and law enforcement officer and the accused's response to the officer's
inducements, the gravity of the crime, and the difficulty of detecting instances of its commission
are considered in judging what the effect of the officer's conduct would on a normal person. 46
Both the "subjective" and "objective" approaches have been criticized and objected to. It is
claimed that the "subjective" test creates an "anything goes" rule, i.e, if the court determines
that an accused was predisposed to commit the crime charged, no level of police deceit,
badgering or other unsavory practices will be deemed impermissible. 47 Delving into the
accused's character and predisposition obscures the more important task of judging police
behavior and prejudices the accused more generally. It ignores the possibility that no matter
what his past crimes and general disposition were, the accused might not have committed the
particular crime unless confronted with inordinate inducements. 48 On the other extreme, the
purely "objective" test eliminates entirely the need for considering a particular accused's
predisposition. His predisposition, at least if known by the police, may have an important bearing
upon the question of whether the conduct of the police and and their agents was proper. 49 The
undisputed fact that the accused was a dangerous and chronic offender or that he was a shrewd
and active member of a criminal syndicate at the time of his arrest is relegated to irrelevancy. 50
Objections to the two tests gave birth to hybrid approaches to entrapment. Some states in the
United States now combine both the "subjective" and "objective" 51 In Cruz v. State, 52 the Florida
Supreme Court declared that the permissibility of police conduct must first be determined. If this
objective test is satisfied, then the analysis turns to whether the accused was predisposed to
commit the crime. 53 In Baca v. State, 54 the New Mexico Supreme Court modified the state's
entrapment analysis by holding that "a criminal defendant may successfully assert a defense of
entrapment, either by showing lack of predisposition to commit the crime for which he is
charged, or, that the police exceeded the standards of proper investigation. 55 The hybrid
approaches combine and apply the "objective" and "subjective" tests alternatively or
concurrently.
As early as 1910, this Court has examined the conduct of law enforcers while apprehending the
accused caught in flagrante delicto. In United States v. Phelps, 56 we acquitted the accused from
the offense of smoking opium after finding that the government employee, a BIR personnel,
actually induced him to commit the crime in order to prosecute him. Smith, the BIR agent,
testified that Phelps' apprehension came after he overheard Phelps in a saloon say that he liked
smoking opium on some occasions. Smith's testimony was disregarded. We accorded significance
to the fact that it was Smith who went to the accused three times to convince him to look for an
opium den where both of them could smoke this drug. 57 The conduct of the BIR agent was
condemned as "most reprehensible." 58 In People v. Abella, 59 we acquitted the accused of the
crime of selling explosives after examining the testimony of the apprehending police officer who
pretended to be a merchant. The police officer offered "a tempting price, . . . a very high one"
causing the accused to sell the explosives. We found that there was inducement, "direct,
persistent and effective" by the police officer and that outside of his testimony, there was no
evidence sufficient to convict the accused. 60 InPeople v. Lua Chu and Uy Se Tieng, 61 we

convicted the accused after finding that there was no inducement on the part of the law
enforcement officer. We stated that the Customs secret serviceman smoothed the way for the
introduction of opium from Hongkong to Cebu after the accused had already planned its
importation and ordered said drug. We ruled that the apprehending officer did not induce the
accused to import opium but merely entrapped him by pretending to have an understanding with
the Collector of Customs of Cebu to better assure the seizure of the prohibited drug and the
arrest of the surreptitious importers. 62
It was also in the same case of People v. Lua Chu and Uy Se Tieng 63 we first laid down the
distinction between entrapment vis-a-vis instigation or inducement. Quoting 16 Corpus
Juris, 64 we held:
ENTRAPMENT AND INSTIGATION. While it has been said that the practice of
entrapping persons into crime for the purpose of instituting criminal prosecutions is
to be deplored, and while instigation, as distinguished from mere entrapment, has
often been condemned and has sometimes been held to prevent the act from being
criminal or punishable, the general rule is that it is no defense to the perpetrator of
a crime that facilities for its commission were purposely placed in his way, or that
the criminal act was done at the 'decoy solicitation' of persons seeking to expose
the criminal, or that detectives feigning complicity in the act were present and
apparently assisting in its commission. Especially is this true in that class of cases
where the offense is one of a kind habitually committed, and the solicitation merely
furnishes evidence of a course of conduct. Mere deception by the detective will not
shield defendant, if the offense was committed by him, free from the influence or
instigation of the detective. The fact that an agent of an owner acts as a supposed
confederate of a thief is no defense to the latter in a prosecution for larceny,
provided the original design was formed independently of such agent; and where a
person approached by the thief as his confederate notifies the owner or the public
authorities, and, being authorised by them to do so, assists the thief in carrying out
the plan, the larceny is nevertheless committed. It is generally held that it is no
defense to a prosecution for an illegal sale of liquor that the purchase was made by
a "spotter," detective, or hired informer; but there are cases holding the contrary. 65
The distinction above-quoted was reiterated in two (2) decisions of the Court of Appeals.
In People v. Galicia, 66the appellate court declared that "there is a wide difference between
entrapment and instigation." The instigator practically induces the would-be accused into the
commission of the offense and himself becomes a co-principal. In entrapment, ways and means
are resorted to by the peace officer for the purpose of trapping and capturing the lawbreaker in
the execution of his criminal plan. 67 In People v. Tan Tiong, 68 the Court of Appeals further
declared that "entrapment is no bar to the prosecution and conviction of the lawbreaker. 69
The pronouncement of the Court of Appeals in People v. Galicia was affirmed by this Court
in People v. Tiu Ua.70 Entrapment, we further held, is not contrary to public policy. It is instigation
that is deemed contrary to public policy and illegal. 71
It can thus be seen that the concept of entrapment in the American jurisdiction is similar to
instigation or inducement in Philippine jurisprudence. Entrapment in the Philippines is not a
defense available to the accused. It is instigation that is a defense and is considered an
absolutory cause. 72 To determine whether there is a entrapment or instigation, our courts have
mainly examined the conduct of the apprehending officers, not the predisposition of the accused
to commit the crime. The "objective" test first applied in United States v. Phelps has been
followed in a series of similar cases. 73 Nevertheless, adopting the "objective" approach has not
precluded us from likewise applying the "subjective" test. In People v. Boholst, 74 we applied both
tests by examining the conduct of the police officers in a buy-bust operation and admitting
evidence of the accused's membership with the notorious and dreaded Sigue-Sigue Sputnik

Gang. We also considered accused's previous his convictions of other crimes 75 and held that his
opprobrious past and membership with the dreaded gang strengthened the state's evidence
against him. Conversely, the evidence that the accused did not sell or smoke marijuana and did
not have any criminal record was likewise admitted in People v. Yutuc 76 thereby sustaining his
defense that led to his acquittal.
The distinction between entrapment and instigation has proven to be very material in antinarcotics operations. In recent years, it has become common practice for law enforcement
officers and agents to engage in buy-bust operations and other entrapment procedures in
apprehending drug offenders. Anti-narcotics laws, like anti-gambling laws are regulatory
statutes. 77 They are rules of convenience designed to secure a more orderly regulation of the
affairs of society, and their violation gives rise to crimes mala prohibita. 78 They are not the
traditional type of criminal law such as the law of murder, rape, theft, arson, etc. that deal with
crimes mala in se or those inherently wrongful and immoral. 79 Laws defining crimes mala
prohibita condemn behavior directed, not against particular individuals, but against public
order. 80 Violation is deemed a wrong against society as a whole and is generally unattended with
any particular harm to a definite person. 81 These offenses are carried on in secret and the
violators resort to many devices and subterfuges to avoid detection. It is rare for any member of
the public, no matter how furiously he condemns acts mala prohibita, to be willing to assist in the
enforcement of the law. It is necessary, therefore, that government in detecting and punishing
violations of these laws, rely, not upon the voluntary action of aggrieved individuals, but upon
the diligence of its own officials. This means that the police must be present at the time the
offenses are committed either in an undercover capacity or through informants, spies or stool
pigeons. 82
Though considered essential by the police in enforcing vice legislation, the confidential informant
system breeds abominable abuse. Frequently, a person who accepts payment from the police in
the apprehension of drug peddlers and gamblers also accept payment from these persons who
deceive the police. The informant himself maybe a drug addict, pickpocket, pimp, or other petty
criminal. For whatever noble purpose it serves, the spectacle that government is secretly mated
with the underworld and uses underworld characters to help maintain law and order is not an
inspiring one. 83 Equally odious is the bitter reality of dealing with unscrupulous, corrupt and
exploitative law enforcers. Like the informant, unscrupulous law enforcers' motivations are legion
harassment, extortion, vengeance, blackmail, or a desire to report an accomplishment to their
superiors. This Court has taken judicial notice of this ugly reality in a number of cases 84 where
we observed that it is a common modus operandi of corrupt law enforcers to prey on weak and
hapless persons, particularly unsuspecting provincial hicks. 85The use of shady underworld
characters as informants, the relative ease with which illegal drugs may be planted in the hands
or property of trusting and ignorant persons, and the imposed secrecy that inevitably shrouds all
drug deals have compelled this Court to be extra-vigilant in deciding drug cases. 86 Criminal
activity is such that stealth and strategy, although necessary weapons in the arsenal of the
police officer, become as objectionable police methods as the coerced confession and the
unlawful search. As well put by the Supreme Court of California in People v. Barraza,87
[E]ntrapment is a facet of a broader problem. Along with illegal search and seizures,
wiretapping, false arrest, illegal detention and the third degree, it is a type of
lawless enforcement. They all spring from common motivations. Each is a substitute
for skillful and scientific investigation. Each is condoned by the sinister sophism that
the end, when dealing with known criminals of the 'criminal class,' justifies the
employment of illegal means. 88
It is thus imperative that the presumption, juris tantum, of regularity in the performance of
official duty by law enforcement agents raised by the Solicitor General be applied with studied
restraint. This presumption should not by itself prevail over the presumption of innocence and
the constitutionally-protected rights of the individual. 89 It is the duty of courts to preserve the

purity of their own temple from the prostitution of the criminal law through lawless
enforcement. 90 Courts should not allow themselves to be used as an instrument of abuse and
injustice lest an innocent person be made to suffer the unusually severe penalties for drug
offenses. 91
We therefore stress that the "objective" test in buy-bust operations demands that the details of
the purported transaction must be clearly and adequately shown. This must start from the initial
contact between the poseur-buyer and the pusher, the offer to purchase, the promise or
payment of the consideration until the consummation of the sale by the delivery of the illegal
drug subject of the sale. 92 The manner by which the initial contact was made, whether or not
through an informant, the offer to purchase the drug, the payment of the "buy-bust" money, and
the delivery of the illegal drug, whether to the informant alone or the police officer, must be the
subject of strict scrutiny by courts to insure that law-abiding citizens are not unlawfully induced
to commit an offense. Criminals must be caught but not at all cost. At the same time, however,
examining the conduct of the police should not disable courts into ignoring the accused's
predisposition to commit the crime. If there is overwhelming evidence of habitual delinquency,
recidivism or plain criminal proclivity, then this must also be considered. Courts should look at all
factors to determine the predisposition of an accused to commit an offense in so far as they are
relevant to determine the validity of the defense of inducement.1wphi1.nt
In the case at bar, the evidence shows that it was the confidential informant who initially
contacted accused-appellant Doria. At the pre-arranged meeting, the informant was
accompanied by PO3 Manlangit who posed as the buyer of marijuana. P03 Manlangit handed the
marked money to accused-appellant Doria as advance payment for one (1) kilo of marijuana.
Accused-appellant Doria was apprehended when he later returned and handed the brick of
marijuana to P03 Manlangit.
PO3 Manlangit testified in a frank, spontaneous, straightforward and categorical manner and his
credibility was not crumpled on cross-examination by defense counsel. Moreover, P03
Manlangit's testimony was corroborated on its material points by SPO1 Badua, his back-up
security. The non-presentation of the confidential informant is not fatal to the prosecution.
Informants are usually not presented in court because of the need to hide their identity and
preserve their invaluable service to the police. 93 It is well-settled that except when the appellant
vehemently denies selling prohibited drugs and there are material inconsistencies in the
testimonies of the arresting officers, 94 or there are reasons to believe that the arresting officers
had motives to testify falsely against the appellant, 95 or that only the informant was the poseurbuyer who actually witnessed the entire transaction, 96 the testimony of the informant may be
dispensed with as it will merely be corroborative of the apprehending officers' eyewitness
testimonies. 97 There is no need to present the informant in court where the sale was actually
witnessed and adequately proved by prosecution witnesses. 98
The inconsistencies in P03 Manlangit's and SPO1 Badua's testimonies and the other police
officers' testimonies are minor and do not detract from the veracity and weight of the
prosecution evidence. The source of the money for the buy-bust operation is not a critical fact in
the case at bar. It is enough that the prosecution proved that money was paid to accusedappellant Doria in consideration of which he sold and delivered the marijuana.
Contrary to accused-appellant Doria's claim, the one kilo of marijuana "sold" by him to PO3
Manlangit was actually identified by PO3 Manlangit himself before the trial court. After
appellants' apprehension, the Narcom agents placed this one (1) brick of marijuana recovered
from appellant Doria inside the carton box lumping it together with the ten (10) bricks inside.
This is why the carton box contained eleven (11) bricks of marijuana when brought before the
trial court. The one (1) brick recovered from appellant Doria and each of the ten (10) bricks,
however, were identified and marked in court. Thus:

ATTY. ARIAS, Counsel for Florencio Doria:

Mr. Police Officer, when you identified that box,. Tell the court, how
were you able to identify that box?
A This is the box that I brought to the crime laboratory which contained
the eleven pieces of marijuana brick we confiscated from the suspect,
sir.
Q Please open it and show those eleven bricks.
PROSECUTOR Witness bringing out from the said box. . .
ATTY. VALDEZ, Counsel for Violeta Gaddao:
Your Honor, I must protest the line of questioning considering the fact
that we are now dealing with eleven items when the question posed to
the witness was what was handed to him by Jun?
COURT So be it.
ATTY. ARIAS May we make it of record that the witness is pulling out
them after item from the box showed to him and brought in front of
him.
COURT Noted.
Q Now tell the court, how did you know that those are the eleven
bricks?
xxx xxx xxx
A I have markings on these eleven bricks, sir.
Q Point to the court, where are those markings?
A Here, sir, my signature, my initials with the date, sir.
PROSECUTOR Witness showed a white wrapper and pointing to CLM
and the signature.
Q Whose signature is that?
ATTY. VALDEZ Your Honor, may we just limit the inquiry to the basic
question of the fiscal as to what was handed to him by the accused
Jun, your Honor?
PROSECUTOR Your Honor, there is already a ruling by this Honorable
Court, your Honor, despite reconsideration.
COURT Let the prosecution do its own thing and leave the appreciation
of what it has done to the court.
ATTY. VALDEZ We submit, your Honor.

A This brick is the one that was handed to me by the suspect Jun, sir.
COURT Why do you know that that is the thing? Are you sure that is not
"tikoy?"
A Yes, your Honor.
Q What makes you so sure?
A I am sure that this is the one, your Honor. This is the Exhibit "A"
which I marked before I brought it to the PCCL, your Honor.
Q What are you sure of?
A I am sure that this is the brick that was given to me by one alias Jun,
sir.
Q What makes you so sure?
A Because I marked it with my own initials before giving it to the
investigator and before we brought it to the PCCL, your Honor.
xxx xxx xxx
PROSECUTOR May we request that a tag be placed on this white plastic
bag and this be marked as Exhibit "D?"
COURT Mark it as Exhibit "D."
Q To stress, who made the entries of this date, Exhibit "A" then the
other letters and figures on this plastic?
A This one, the signature, I made the signature, the date and the time
and this Exhibit "A."
Q How about this one?
A I don't know who made this marking, sir.
PROSECUTOR May it be of record that this was just entered this
morning.
Q I am asking you about this "itim" and not the "asul."
A This CLM, the date and the time and the Exhibit "A," I was the one
who made these markings, sir.
PROSECUTOR May we place on record that the one that was enclosed. .
.
ATTY. ARIAS Your Honor, there are also entries included in that
enclosure where it appears D-394-95 also Exhibit "A," etc. etc., that
was not pointed to by the witness. I want to make it of record that
there are other entries included in the enclosure.

COURT Noted. The court saw it.

Q Now, and this alleged brick of marijuana with a piece of paper, with a
newspaper wrapping with a piece of paper inside which reads: "D-39495, Exhibit A, 970 grams SSL" be marked as our Exhibit "D-2?"
COURT Tag it. Mark it.
Q This particular exhibit that you identified, the wrapper and the
contents was given to you by whom?
A It was given to me by suspect Jun, sir.
Q Whereat?
A At the corner of Boulevard and Jacinto St., sir.
Q How about the other items that you were able to recover?
xxx xxx xxx
A These other marijuana bricks, because during our follow-up, because
according to Jun the money which I gave him was in the hands of
Neneth and so we proceeded to the house of Neneth, sir.
xxx xxx xxx 99
The first brick identified by P03 Manlangit was the brick of marijuana "given to [him] by suspect
Jun" at the corner of Boulevard and Jacinto Streets. This brick, including the newspaper and white
plastic wrapping were marked as Exhibits "D," "D-l," and "D-2" and described as weighing nine
hundred seventy (970) grams. 100
We also reject appellant's submission that the fact that P03 Manlangit and his team waited for
almost one hour for appellant Doria to give them the one kilo of marijuana after he "paid"
P1,600.00 strains credulity. Appellant cannot capitalize on the circumstance that the money and
the marijuana in the case at bar did not change hands under the usual "kaliwaan" system. There
is no rule of law which requires that in "buy-bust" operations there must be a simultaneous
exchange of the marked money and the prohibited drug between the poseur- buyer and the
pusher. 101 Again, the decisive fact is that the poseur-buyer received the marijuana from the
accused-appellant. 102
We also hold that the warrantless arrest of accused-appellant Doria is not unlawful. Warrantless
arrests are allowed in three instances as provided by Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure, to wit:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
xxx xxx xxx 103
Under Section 5 (a), as above-quoted, a person may be arrested without a warrant if he
"has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense." Appellant
Doria was caught in the act of committing an offense. When an accused is apprehended
in flagrante delicto as a result of a buy-bust operation, the police are not only authorized
but duty-bound to arrest him even without a warrant. 104
The warrantless arrest of appellant Gaddao, the search of her person and residence, and the
seizure of the box of marijuana and marked bills are different matters.
Our Constitution proscribes search and seizure without a judicial warrant and any evidence
obtained without such warrant is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. 105 The rule is,
however, not absolute. Search and seizure may be made without a warrant and the evidence
obtained therefrom may be admissible in the following instances: 106 (1) search incident to a
lawful arrest;107 (2) search of a moving motor vehicle; 108 (3) search in violation of customs
laws; 109 (4) seizure of evidence in plain view; 110 (5) when the accused himself waives his right
against unreasonable searches and seizures. 111
The prosecution admits that appellant Gaddao was arrested without a warrant of arrest and the
search and seizure of the box of marijuana and the marked bills were likewise made without a
search warrant. It is claimed, however, that the warrants were not necessary because the arrest
was made in "hot pursuit" and the search was an incident to her lawful arrest.
To be lawful, the warrantless arrest of appellant Gaddao must fall under any of the three (3)
instances enumerated in Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as
aforequoted. The direct testimony of PO3 Manlangit, the arresting officer, however shows
otherwise:
ATTY. VALDEZ, Counsel for appellant Gaddao:
We submit at this juncture, your Honor, that there will be no basis for
that question.
Q This particular exhibit that you identified, the wrapper and the
contents was given to you by whom?
A It was given to me by suspect Jun, sir.
Q Whereat?
A At the corner of Boulevard and Jacinto Street, sir.
Q How about, the other items that you were able to recover?
ATTY. VALDEZ: We submit at this juncture, your Honor, that there will
be no basis for that question.
COURT There is. Answer.

A These other marijuana bricks, because during our follow-up, because

according to Jun the money which I gave him was in the hands of
Neneth and so we proceeded to the house of Neneth, sir.
Q Whereat?
A At Daang Bakal near the crime scene at Shaw Boulevard, sir.
Q And what happened upon arrival thereat?
A We saw alias Neneth inside the house and we asked him to give us
the buy-bust money, sir.
Q You mentioned "him?"
A Her, sir. We asked her to give us the money, the marked money
which Jun gave her, sir.
Q And what happened?
A At this instance, it was SPO1 Badua who can testify regarding this
buy-bust money, sir.
xxx xxx xxx 112
SPO1 Badua testified on cross-examination that:
Q What was your intention in going to the house of Aling Neneth?
A To arrest her, sir.
Q But the fact is, Mr. Witness, when you reached the house of Aling
Neneth, Aling Neneth was there?
A Yes, sir.
Q As far as you can see, she was just inside her house?
A I saw her outside, sir.
Q She was fetching water as a matter of fact?
A She was 'sa bandang poso.'
Q Carrying a baby?
A No, sir.
Q At that particular time when you reached the house of Aling Neneth
and saw her outside the house, she was not committing any crime, she
was just outside the house?
A No, sir.

Q She was not about to commit any crime because she was just
outside the house doing her daily chores. Am I correct?
A I just saw her outside, sir.
Q And at that point in time you already wanted to arrest her. That is
correct, is it not?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, if any memory of your testimony is correct, according to you
SPO1 Manlangit approached her?
A PO3 Manlangit, sir.
Q You did not approach her because P03 Manlangit approached her?
A Yes, sir.
Q During all the time that this confrontation, arrest or whatever by
SPO3 Manlangit was taking place, you were just in the side lines?
A I was just watching, sir.
Q So you were just an on-looker to what Manlangit was doing, because
precisely according to you your role in this buy-bust operation was as a
back-up?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who got the alleged marijuana from inside the house of Mrs.
Neneth?
A P03 Manlangit, sir.
Q Manlangit got the marijuana?
A Yes, sir.
Q And the money from Aling Neneth?
A I don't know, sir.
Q You did not even know who got the money from Aling Neneth?
PROSECUTOR:
There is no basis for this question, your Honor. Money, there 's no
testimony on that.
ATTY. VALDEZ:
I was asking him precisely.

PROSECUTOR:
No basis.
COURT:
Sustained.
Q Alright. I will ask you a question and I expect an honest answer.
According to the records, the amount of P1,600.00 was recovered from
the person of Aling Neneth. That's right?
A Yes, sir, the buy-bust money.
Q What you are now saying for certain and for the record is the fact
that you were not the one who retrieved the money from Aling Neneth,
it was Manlangit maybe?
A I saw it, sir.
Q It was Manlangit who got the money from Aling Neneth?
A The buy-bust money was recovered from the house of Aling Neneth,
sir.
Q It was taken from the house of Aling Neneth, not from the person of
Aling Neneth. Is that what you are trying to tell the Court?
A No, sir.
ATTY. VALDEZ:
I am through with this witness, your Honor.

113

Accused-appellant Gaddao was not caught red-handed during the buy-bust operation to give
ground for her arrest under Section 5 (a) of Rule 113. She was not committing any crime.
Contrary to the finding of the trial court, there was no occasion at all for appellant Gaddao to flee
from the policemen to justify her arrest in "hot pursuit." 114 In fact, she was going about her daily
chores when the policemen pounced on her.
Neither could the arrest of appellant Gaddao be justified under the second instance of Rule 113.
"Personal knowledge" of facts in arrests without warrant under Section 5 (b) of Rule 113 must be
based upon "probable cause" which means an "actual belief or reasonable grounds of
suspicion." 115 The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of
the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of
committing the offense, is based an actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently
strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. 116 A
reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on
the part of the peace officers making the arrest. 117
Accused-appellant Gaddao was arrested solely on the basis of the alleged identification made by
her co-accused. PO3 Manlangit, however, declared in his direct examination that appellant Doria
named his co-accused in response to his (PO3 Manlangit's) query as to where the marked money
was. 118 Appellant Doria did not point to appellant Gaddao as his associate in the drug business,

but as the person with whom he left the marked bills. This identification does not necessarily
lead to the conclusion that appellant Gaddao conspired with her co-accused in pushing drugs.
Appellant Doria may have left the money in her house, 119 with or without her knowledge, with or
without any conspiracy. Save for accused-appellant Doria 's word, the Narcom agents had no
reasonable grounds to believe that she was engaged in drug pushing. If there is no showing that
the person who effected the warrantless arrest had, in his own right, knowledge of facts
implicating the person arrested to the perpetration of a criminal offense, the arrest is legally
objectionable. 120
Since the warrantless arrest of accused-appellant Gaddao was illegal, it follows that the search of
her person and home and the subsequent seizure of the marked bills and marijuana cannot be
deemed legal as an incident to her arrest. This brings us to the question of whether the trial
court correctly found that the box of marijuana was in plain view, making its warrantless seizure
valid.
Objects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view
are subject to seizure even without a search warrant and maybe introduced in evidence. 121 The
"plain view" doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement
officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from
which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is
inadvertent; (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be
evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. 122 The law enforcement officer
must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a position from which he can particularly
view the area. 123 In the course of such lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of
evidence incriminating the accused. 124 The object must be open to eye and
hand 125 and its discovery inadvertent. 126
It is clear that an object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly exposed to sight. The
difficulty arises when the object is inside a closed container. Where the object seized was inside a
closed package, the object itself is not in plain view and therefore cannot be seized without a
warrant. However, if the package proclaims its contents, whether by its distinctive configuration,
its transparency, or if its contents are obvious to an observer, then the contents are in plain view
and may be seized. 127 In other words, if the package is such that an experienced observer could
infer from its appearance that it contains the prohibited article, then the article is deemed in
plain view. 128 It must be immediately apparent to the police that the items that they observe
may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. 129
PO3 Manlangit, the Narcom agent who found the box, testified on cross-examination as follows:
ATTY. VALDEZ:
So here we are. When you and Badua arrived, Aling Neneth was inside
the house?
A Yes, sir.
Q Badua demanded from Aling Neneth the buy-bust money?
A Yes, sir.
Q At that particular instance, you saw the carton?
A Yes, sir.
Q This carton, according to you was under a table?

A Yes, sir, dining table.

Q I noticed that this carton has a cover?
A Yes, sir.
Q I ask you were the flaps of the cover raised or closed?
A It was open, sir. Not like that.
COURT
Go down there. Show to the court.
INTERPRETER
Witness went down the witness stand and approached a carton box.
A Like this, sir.
PROSECUTOR
Can we describe it?
ATTY. VALDEZ
Yes.
PROSECUTOR
One flap is inside and the other flap is standing and with the contents
visible.
COURT
Noted.
Q At this juncture, you went inside the house?
A Yes, sir.
Q And got hold of this carton?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you mention anything to Aling Neneth?
A I asked her, what's this. . .
Q No, no. no. did you mention anything to Aling Neneth before getting
the carton?

A I think it was Badua who accosted Aling Neneth regarding the buybust money and he asked "Sa iyo galing ang marijuanang ito, nasaan
ang buy-bust money namin?" sir.
Q Making reference to the marijuana that was given by alias Jun?
A Yes, sir.
Q When you proceeded to take hold of this carton, Aling Neneth was
not yet frisked, is it not [sic]?
A I just don't know if she was frisked already by Badua, sir.
Q Who got hold of this?
A I was the one, sir.
Q You were the one who got this?
A Yes, sir.
Q At that particular point in time, you did not know if the alleged buybust money was already retrieved by Badua?
A Yes, sir.
Q You went inside the house?
A Yes, sir.
Q You did not have any search warrant?
A Yes, sir.
Q In fact, there was nothing yet as far as you were concerned to
validate the fact that Mrs. Gadao was in possession of the buy-bust
money because according to you, you did not know whether Badua
already retrieved the buy-bust money from her?
A Yes, sir.
Q How far was this from the door?
A Two and a half meters from the door, sir. It was in plain view.
Q Under the table according to you?
A Yes, sir, dining table.
Q Somewhere here?
A It's far, sir.
PROSECUTOR

May we request the witness to place it, where he saw it?

A Here, sir.
Q What you see is a carton?
A Yes, sir, with plastic.
Q Marked "Snow Time Ice Pop?
A Yes, sir.
Q With a piece of plastic visible on top of the carton?
A Yes, sir.
Q That is all that you saw?
A Yes, sir.
PROSECUTOR
For the record, your Honor. . .
Q You were only able to verify according to you . . .
PRESECUTOR
Panero, wait. Because I am objecting to the words a piece of plastic. By
reading it . . .
ATTY. VALDEZ
That's a piece of plastic.
PROSECUTOR
By reading it, it will connote . . . this is not a piece of plastic.
ATTY. VALDEZ
What is that? What can you say, Fiscal? I'm asking you?
PROSECUTOR
With due respect, what I am saying is, let's place the size of the plastic.
A piece of plastic may be big or a small one, for record purposes.
COURT
Leave that to the court.
PROSECUTOR

Leave that to the court.

Q The only reason according to you, you were able to . . . Look at this,
no even Superman . . . I withdraw that. Not even a man with very kin
[sic] eyes can tell the contents here. And according to the Court, it
could be "tikoy," is it not [sic]?
A Yes, sir.
Q Siopao?
A Yes, sir.
Q Canned goods?
A Yes, sir.
Q It could be ice cream because it says Snow Pop, Ice Pop?
A I presumed it was also marijuana because it may . . .
Q I am not asking you what your presumptions are. I'm asking you
what it could possibly be.
A It's the same plastic, sir.
ATTY. VALDEZ
I'm not even asking you that question so why are you voluntarily
saying the information. Let the prosecutor do that for you.
COURT
Continue. Next question.
xxx xxx xxx

130

P03 Manlangit and the police team were at appellant Gaddao's house because they were
led there by appellant Doria. The Narcom agents testified that they had no information on
appellant Gaddao until appellant Doria name her and led them to her. 131 Standing by the
door of appellant Gaddao's house, P03 Manlangit had a view of the interior of said house.
Two and a half meters away was the dining table and underneath it was a carton box. The
box was partially open and revealed something wrapped in plastic.
In his direct examination, PO3 Manlangit said that he was sure that the contents of the box were
marijuana because he himself checked and marked the said contents. 132 On cross-examination,
however, he admitted that he merely presumed the contents to be marijuana because it had the
same plastic wrapping as the "buy-bust marijuana." A close scrutiny of the records reveals that
the plastic wrapper was not colorless and transparent as to clearly manifest its contents to a
viewer. Each of the ten (10) bricks of marijuana in the box was individually wrapped in old
newspaper and placed inside plastic bags white, pink or blue in color. 133 PO3 Manlangit
himself admitted on cross-examination that the contents of the box could be items other than
marijuana. He did not know exactly what the box contained that he had to ask appellant Gaddao
about its contents. 134 It was not immediately apparent to PO3 Manlangit that the content of the

box was marijuana. The marijuana was not in plain view and its seizure without the requisite
search warrant was in violation of the law and the Constitution. 135 It was fruit of the poisonous
tree and should have been excluded and never considered by the trial court. 136
The fact that the box containing about six (6) kilos of marijuana 137 was found in the house of
accused-appellant Gaddao does not justify a finding that she herself is guilty of the crime
charged. 138 Apropos is our ruling in People v. Aminnudin, 139 viz:
The Court strongly supports the campaign of the government against drug addiction
and commends the efforts of our law enforcement officers against those who would
inflict this malediction upon our people, especially the susceptible youth. But as
demanding as this campaign may be, it cannot be more so than the compulsions of
the Bill of Rights for the protection of the liberty of every individual in the realm,
including the basest of criminals. The Constitution covers with the mantle of its
protection the innocent and the guilty alike against any manner of high-handedness
from the authorities, however praiseworthy their intentions.
Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the right
of the individual in the name of order. Order is too high a price for the loss of liberty.
As Justice Holmes, again, said, 'I think it a less evil that some criminals should
escape than that the government should play an ignoble part.' It is simply not
allowed in the free society to violate a law to enforce another, especially if the law
violated is the Constitution itself. 140
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425, the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by Section 13
of Republic Act No. 7659 punishes the "sale, administration, delivery, distribution and
transportation of a prohibited drug" with the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine
ranging from P500,000.00 to P10 million, to wit:
Sec. 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Prohibited
Drugs. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, and a fine ranging from five
hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person
who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, administer, deliver, give away to another,
distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug, or shall act as a
broker in any of such transactions.
xxx xxx xxx
In every prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, what is material is the submission
of proof that the sale took place between the poseur-buyer and the seller thereof and the
presentation of the drug, i.e., thecorpus delicti, as evidence in court. 141 The prosecution
has clearly established the fact that in consideration of P1,600.00 which he received,
accused-appellant Doria sold and delivered nine hundred seventy (970) grams of
marijuana to PO3 Manlangit, the poseur-buyer. The prosecution, however, has failed to
prove that accused-appellant Gaddao conspired with accused-appellant Doria in the sale
of said drug. There being no mitigating or aggravating circumstances, the lower penalty
of reclusion perpetua must be imposed. 142
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 156, Pasig City acting as a
Special Court in Criminal Case No. 3307-D is reversed and modified as follows:
1. Accused-appellant Florencio Doria y Bolado is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to pay a fine of five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00).
2. Accused-appellant Violeta Gaddao y Catama is acquitted.

SO ORDERED.

Schneckloth v. Bustamonte
412 U.S. 218 (1973)
Annotate this Case
Syllabus
Case
U.S. Supreme Court
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973)
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte
No. 71-732
Argued October 10, 1972
Decided May 29, 1973
412 U.S. 218
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
Syllabus
During the course of a consent search of a car that had been stopped by officers for traffic
violations, evidence was discovered that was used to convict respondent of unlawfully
possessing a check. In a habeas corpus proceeding, the Court of Appeals, reversing the District
Court, held that the prosecution had failed to prove that consent to the search had been made
with the understanding that it could freely be withheld.

Held: When the subject of a search is not in custody and the State would justify a search on the
basis of his consent, the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments require that it demonstrate that the
consent was in fact, voluntary; voluntariness is to be determined from the totality of the
surrounding circumstances. While knowledge of a right to refuse consent is a factor to be taken
into account, the State need not prove that the one giving permission to search knew that he had
a right to withhold his consent. Pp. 412 U. S. 223-249.
448 F.2d 699, reversed.
STEWART, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and WHITE, BLACKMUN,
POWELL, and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined. BLACKMUN, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 412 U. S.
249. POWELL, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which BURGER, C.J., and REHNQUIST, JJ.,
joined, post, p. 412 U. S. 250. DOUGLAS, J., post, p. 412 U. S. 275, BRENNAN, J., post, p. 412 U. S.
276, and MARSHALL, J., post, p. 412 U. S. 277, filed dissenting opinions.
Page 412 U. S. 219
MR JUSTICE STEWART delivered the opinion of the Court.
It is well settled under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments that a search conducted without
a warrant issued upon probable cause is "per se unreasonable . . . subject only to a few
specifically established and well delineated exceptions." Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 389
U. S. 357; Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443, 403 U. S. 454 455; Chambers v.
Maroney, 399 U. S. 42, 399 U. S. 1. It is equally well settled that one of the specifically
established exceptions to the requirements of both a warrant and probable cause is a search that
is conducted pursuant to consent. Davis v. United States, 328 U. S. 582, 328 U. S. 593-594; Zap
v. Unite,d States, 328 U. S. 624, 328 U. S. 630. The constitutional question in the present case
concerns the definition of "consent" in this Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment context.
I
The respondent was brought to trial in a California court upon a charge of possessing a check
with intent to defraud. [Footnote 1] He moved to suppress the introduction of certain material as
evidence against him on the ground that the material had been acquired through an
unconstitutional search and seizure. In response to the motion, the trial judge conducted an
evidentiary hearing
Page 412 U. S. 220
where it was established that the material in question had been acquired by the State under the
following circumstances:

While on routine patrol in Sunnyvale, California, at approximately 2:40 in the morning, Police
Officer James Rand stopped an automobile when he observed that one headlight and its license
plate light were burned out. Six men were in the vehicle. Joe Alcala and the respondent, Robert
Bustamonte, were in the front seat with Joe Gonzales, the driver. Three older men were seated in
the rear. When, in response to the policeman's question, Gonzales could not produce a driver's
license, Officer Rand asked if any of the other five had any evidence of identification. Only Alcala
produced a license, and he explained that the car was his brother's. After the six occupants had
stepped out of the car at the officer's request, and after two additional policemen had arrived,
Officer Rand asked Alcala if he could search the car. Alcala replied, "Sure, go ahead." Prior to the
search, no one was threatened with arrest, and, according to Officer Rand's uncontradicted
testimony, it "was all very congenial at this time." Gonzales testified that Alcala actually helped
in the search of the car by opening the trunk and glove compartment. In Gonzales' words:
"[T]he police officer asked Joe [Alcala], he goes, 'Does the trunk open?' And Joe said, 'Yes.' He
went to the car and got the keys and opened up the trunk."
Wadded up under the left rear seat, the police officers found three checks that had previously
been stolen from a car wash.
The trial judge denied the motion to suppress, and the checks in question were admitted in
evidence at Bustamonte's trial. On the basis of this and other evidence, he was convicted, and
the California Court of Appeal for the First Appellate District affirmed the conviction.
Page 412 U. S. 221
270 Cal.App.2d 648, 76 Cal.Rptr. 17. In agreeing that the search and seizure were
constitutionally valid, the appellate court applied the standard earlier formulated by the Supreme
Court of California in an opinion by then Justice Traynor:
"Whether, in a particular case, an apparent consent was, in fact, voluntarily given, or was in
submission to an express or implied assertion of authority, is a question of fact to be determined
in the light of all the circumstances."
People v. Michael, 45 Cal.2d 751, 753, 290 P.2d 852, 854. The appellate court found that,
"[i]n the instant case, the prosecution met the necessary burden of showing consent . . . , since
there were clearly circumstances from which the trial court could ascertain that consent had
been freely given without coercion or submission to authority. Not only officer Rand, but
Gonzales, the driver of the automobile, testified that Alcala's assent to the search of his brother's
automobile was freely, even casually given. At the time of the request to search the automobile,
the atmosphere, according to Rand, was 'congenial,' and there had been no discussion of any
crime. As noted, Gonzales said Alcala even attempted to aid in the search."
270 Cal.App.2d at 652, 76 Cal.Rptr. at 20. The California Supreme Court denied review. [Footnote
2]
Thereafter, the respondent sought a writ of habeas corpus in a federal district court. It was
denied. [Footnote 3] On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, relying on its prior
decisions in Cipres v. United States, 343 F.2d 95, and Schoep v. United States, 391 F.2d 390, set
aside the District Court's order. 448 F.2d 699. The appellate court reasoned that a consent was a
waiver of a person's Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, and that the State was under an
obligation to demonstrate,
Page 412 U. S. 222
not only that the consent had been uncoerced, but that it had been given with an understanding
that it could be freely and effectively withheld. Consent could not be found, the court held, solely
from the absence of coercion and a verbal expression of assent. Since the District Court had not
determined that Alcala had known that his consent could have been withheld and that he could
have refused to have his vehicle searched, the Court of Appeals vacated the order denying the
writ and remanded the case for further proceedings. We granted certiorari to determine whether
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments require the showing thought necessary by the Court of
Appeals. 405 U.S. 953.
II
It is important to make it clear at the outset what is not involved in this case. The respondent
concedes that a search conducted pursuant to a valid consent is constitutionally permissible.
In Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 389 U. S. 358, and more recently in Vale v. Louisiana,399 U.
S. 30, 399 U. S. 35, we recognized that a search authorized by consent is wholly valid. See also

Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. at328 U. S. 593-594; Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. at 328 U. S.
630. [Footnote 4] And similarly, the State concedes that,
"[w]hen a prosecutor seeks to rely upon consent to justify the lawfulness of a search, he has the
burden of proving that the consent was, in fact, freely and voluntarily given."
Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U. S. 543, 391 U. S. 548. See also Johnson v. United States, 333 U.
S. 10; Amos v. United States, 255 U. S. 313.
Page 412 U. S. 223
The precise question in this case, then, is what must the prosecution prove to demonstrate that a
consent was "voluntarily" given. And, upon that question, there is a square conflict of views
between the state and federal courts that have reviewed the search involved in the case before
us. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuity concluded that it is an essential part of the State's
initial burden to prove that a person knows he has a right to refuse consent. The California courts
have followed the rule that voluntariness is a question of fact to be determined from the totality
of all the circumstances, and that the state of a defendant's knowledge is only one factor to be
taken into account in assessing the voluntariness of a consent. See, e.g., People v.
Treymayne, 20 Cal.App.3d 1006, 98 Cal.Rptr. 193; People v. Roberts, 246 Cal.App.2d 715, 55
Cal.Rptr. 62.
A
The most extensive judicial exposition of the meaning of "voluntariness" have been developed in
those cases in which the Court has had to determine the "voluntariness" of a defendant's
confession for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. Almost 40 years ago, in Brown v.
Mississippi, 297 U. S. 278, the Court held that a criminal conviction based upon a confession
obtained by brutality and violence was constitutionally invalid under the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. In some 30 different cases decided during the era that intervened
between Brown and Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U. S. 478, the Court was faced with the necessity of
determining whether in fact the confessions in issue had been "voluntarily" given. [Footnote 5] It
is to that body
Page 412 U. S. 224
of case law to which we turn for initial guidance on the meaning of "voluntariness" in the present
context. [Footnote 6]
Those cases yield no talismanic definition of "voluntariness" mechanically applicable to the host
of situations where the question has arisen. "The notion of voluntariness,'" Mr. Justice Frankfurter
once wrote, "is itself an amphibian." Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U. S. 568, 367 U. S. 604 605. It
cannot be taken literally to mean a "knowing" choice.
"Except where a person is unconscious or drugged or otherwise lacks capacity for conscious
choice, all incriminating statements -- even those made under brutal treatment -- are 'voluntary'
in the sense of representing a choice of alternatives. On the other hand, if 'voluntariness'
incorporates notions of 'but-for' cause, the question should be whether the statement would
have been made even absent inquiry or other official action. Under such a test, virtually no
statement would be voluntary, because very few people give incriminating statements in the
absence of official action of some kind. [Footnote 7]"
It is thus evident that neither linguistics nor epistemology will provide a ready definition of the
meaning of "voluntariness."
Rather, "voluntariness" has reflected an accommodation of the complex of values implicated in
police questioning
Page 412 U. S. 225
of a suspect. At one end of the spectrum is the acknowledged need for police questioning as a
tool for the effective enforcement of criminal laws. See Culombe v. Connecticut, supra, at 367 U.
S. 578-580. Without such investigation, those who were innocent might be falsely accused, those
who were guilty might wholly escape prosecution, and many crimes would go unsolved. In short,
the security of all would be diminished. Haynes v. Washington, 373 U. S. 503, 373 U. S. 515. At
the other end of the spectrum is the set of values reflecting society's deeply felt belief that the
criminal law cannot be used as an instrument of unfairness, and that the possibility of unfair and
even brutal police tactics poses a real and serious threat to civilized notions of justice.

"[I]n cases involving involuntary confessions, this Court enforces the strongly felt attitude of our
society that important human values are sacrificed where an agency of the government, in the
course of securing a conviction, wrings a confession out of an accused against his will."
Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U. S. 199, 361 U. S. 206-207. See also Culombe v. Connecticut,
supra, at 367 U. S. 581-584; Chambers v. Florida, 309 U. S. 227, 309 U. S. 235-238.
This Court's decisions reflect a frank recognition that the Constitution requires the sacrifice of
neither security nor liberty. The Due Process Clause does not mandate that the police forgo all
questioning, or that they be given carte blanche to extract what they can from a suspect.
"The ultimate test remains that which has been the only clearly established test in AngloAmerican courts for two hundred years: the test of voluntariness. Is the confession the product of
an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker? If it is, if he has willed to confess, it
may be used against him. If it is not, if his will has been overborne and his capacity for selfdetermination critically impaired, the use of his
Page 412 U. S. 226
confession offends due process."
Culombe v. Connecticut, supra, at 367 U. S. 602.
In determining whether a defendant's will was overborne in a particular case, the Court has
assessed the totality of all the surrounding circumstances -- both the characteristics of the
accused and the details of the interrogation. Some of the factors taken into account have
included the youth of the accused, e.g., Haley v. Ohio, 332 U. S. 596; his lack of education, e.g.,
Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U. S. 560; or his low intelligence, e.g., Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U. S. 191;
the lack of any advice to the accused of his constitutional rights, e.g., Davis v. North
Carolina, 384 U. S. 737; the length of detention, e.g., Chambers v. Florida, supra; the repeated
and prolonged nature of the questioning, e.g., Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U. S. 143; and the use
of physical punishment such as the deprivation of food or sleep, e.g., Reck v. Pate, 367 U. S. 433.
[Footnote 8] In all of these cases, the Court determined the factual circumstances surrounding
the confession, assessed the psychological impact on the accused, and evaluated the legal
significance of how the accused reacted. Culombe v. Connecticut, supra, at 367 U. S. 603.
The significant fact about all of these decisions is that none of them turned on the presence or
absence of a single controlling criterion; each reflected a careful scrutiny of all the surrounding
circumstances. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, 384 U. S. 508 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting); id. at 384 U. S. 534-535 (WHITE, J., dissenting). In none of them did the Court rule
that the Due Process Clause required the prosecution to prove as part of its
Page 412 U. S. 227
initial burden that the defendant knew he had a right to refuse to answer the questions that were
put. While the state of the accused's mind, and the failure of the police to advise the accused of
his rights, were certainly factors to be evaluated in assessing the "voluntariness" of an accused's
responses, they were not, in and of themselves, determinative. See, e.g., Davis v. North Carolina,
supra; Haynes v. Washington, supra, at 373 U. S. 510-511; Culombe v. Connecticut, supra, at 367
U. S. 610; Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338 U. S. 62, 338 U. S. 64.
B
Similar considerations lead us to agree with the courts of California that the question whether a
consent to a search was in fact, "voluntary" or was the product of duress or coercion, express or
implied, is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances. While
knowledge of the right to refuse consent is one factor to be taken into account, the government
need not establish such knowledge as the sine qua non of an effective consent. As with police
questioning, two competing concerns must be accommodated in determining the meaning of a
"voluntary" consent -- the legitimate need for such searches and the equally important
requirement of assuring the absence of coercion.
In situations where the police have some evidence of illicit activity, but lack probable cause to
arrest or search, a search authorized by a valid consent may be the only means of obtaining
important and reliable evidence. [Footnote 9] In the present case, for example, while the police
had reason to stop the car for traffic violations, the State does not contend that there was
probable cause to search the vehicle or that the search was incident to a valid arrest
Page 412 U. S. 228

of any of the occupants. [Footnote 10] Yet the search yielded tangible evidence that served as a
basis for a prosecution, and provided some assurance that others, wholly innocent of the crime,
were not mistakenly brought to trial. And in those cases where there is probable cause to arrest
or search, but where the police lack a warrant, a consent search may still be valuable. If the
search is conducted and proves fruitless, that, in itself, may convince the police that an arrest
with its possible stigma and embarrassment is unnecessary, or that a far more extensive search
pursuant to a warrant is not justified. In short, a search pursuant to consent may result in
considerably less inconvenience for the subject of the search, and, properly conducted, is a
constitutionally permissible and wholly legitimate aspect of effective police activity.
But the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments require that a consent not be coerced, by explicit or
implicit means, by implied threat or covert force. For no matter how subtly the coercion was
applied, the resulting "consent" would be no more than a pretext for the unjustified police
intrusion against which the Fourth Amendment is directed. In the words of the classic admonition
in Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616,116 U. S. 635:
"It may be that it is the obnoxious thing in its mildest and least repulsive form; but illegitimate
and unconstitutional practices get their first footing in that way, namely, by silent approaches
and slight deviations from legal modes of procedure. This can only be obviated by adhering to
the rule that constitutional provisions for the security of person and property should be liberally
construed. A close
Page 412 U. S. 229
and literal construction deprives them of half their efficacy, and leads to gradual depreciation of
the right, as if it consisted more in sound than in substance. It is the duty of courts to be watchful
for the constitutional rights of the citizen and against any stealthy encroachments thereon."
The problem of reconciling the recognized legitimacy of consent searches with the requirement
that they be free from any aspect of official coercion cannot be resolved by any infallible
touchstone. To approve such searches without the most careful scrutiny would sanction the
possibility of official coercion; to place artificial restrictions upon such searches would jeopardize
their basic validity. Just as was true with confessions, the requirement of a "voluntary" consent
reflects a fair accommodation of the constitutional requirements involved. In examining all the
surrounding circumstances to determine if in fact, the consent to search was coerced, account
must be taken of subtly coercive police questions, as well as the possibly vulnerable subjective
state of the person who consents. Those searches that are the product of police coercion can
thus be filtered out without undermining the continuing validity of consent searches. In sum,
there is no reason for us to depart in the area of consent searches, from the traditional definition
of "voluntariness."
The approach of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit finds no support in any of our decisions
that have attempted to define the meaning of "voluntariness." Its ruling, that the State must
affirmatively prove that the subject of the search knew that he had a right to refuse consent,
would, in practice, create serious doubt whether consent searches could continue to be
conducted. There might be rare cases where it could be proved from the record that a person in
fact, affirmatively knew of his
Page 412 U. S. 230
right to refuse -- such as a case where he announced to the police that, if he didn't sign the
consent form, "you [police] are going to get a search warrant;" [Footnote 11] or a case where, by
prior experience and training, a person had clearly and convincingly demonstrated such
knowledge. [Footnote 12] But, more commonly, where there was no evidence of any coercion,
explicit or implicit, the prosecution would nevertheless be unable to demonstrate that the subject
of the search in fact, had known of his right to refuse consent.
The very object of the inquiry -- the nature of a person's subjective understanding -- underlines
the difficulty of the prosecution's burden under the rule applied by the Court of Appeals in this
case. Any defendant who was the subject of a search authorized solely by his consent could
effectively frustrate the introduction into evidence of the fruits of that search by simply failing to
testify that he in fact, knew he could refuse to consent. And the near impossibility of meeting this
prosecutorial burden suggests why this Court has never accepted any such litmus paper test of
voluntariness. It is instructive to recall the fears of then Justice Traynor of the California Supreme
Court:

"[I]t is not unreasonable for officers to seek interviews with suspects or witnesses or to call upon
them at their homes for such purposes. Such inquiries, although courteously made and not
accompanied with any assertion of a right to enter or search or secure answers, would permit the
criminal to defeat his prosecution by voluntarily revealing all of the evidence against him and
then contending that he acted only in response to an implied assertion of
Page 412 U. S. 231
unlawful authority."
People v. Michael, 45 Cal.2d at 754, 290 P.2d at 854.
One alternative that would go far toward proving that the subject of a search did know he had a
right to refuse consent would be to advise him of that right before eliciting his consent. That,
however, is a suggestion that has been almost universally repudiated by both federal [Footnote
13] and state courts [Footnote 14] and, we think, rightly so. For it would be thoroughly
impractical to impose on the normal consent search the detailed requirements of an effective
warning. Consent searches are part of the standard investigatory techniques of law enforcement
Page 412 U. S. 232
agencies. They normally occur on the highway, or in a person's home or office, and under
informal and unstructured conditions. The circumstances that prompt the initial request to search
may develop quickly or be a logical extension of investigative police questioning. The police may
seek to investigate further suspicious circumstances or to follow up leads developed in
questioning persons at the scene of a crime. These situations are a far cry from the structured
atmosphere of a trial where, assisted by counsel if he chooses, a defendant is informed of his
trial rights. Cf. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U. S. 238, 395 U. S. 243. and, while surely a closer
question, these situations are still immeasurably far removed from "custodial interrogation"
where, in Miranda v. Arizona, supra, we found that the Constitution required certain now familiar
warnings as a prerequisite to police interrogation. Indeed, in language applicable to the typical
consent search, we refused to extend the need for warnings:
"Our decision is not intended to hamper the traditional function of police officers in investigating
crime. . . . When an individual is in custody on probable cause, the police may, of course, seek
out evidence in the field to be used at trial against him. Such investigation may include inquiry of
persons not under restraint. General on-the-scene questioning as to facts surrounding a crime or
other general questioning of citizens in the factfinding process is not affected by our holding. It is
an act of responsible citizenship for individuals to give whatever information they may have to
aid in law enforcement."
384 U.S. at 384 U. S. 477-478.
Consequently, we cannot accept the position of the Court of Appeals in this case that proof of
knowledge of the right to refuse consent is a necessary prerequisite
Page 412 U. S. 233
to demonstrating a "voluntary" consent. Rather, it is only by analyzing all the circumstances of
an individual consent that it can be ascertained whether, in fact, it was voluntary or coerced. It is
this careful sifting of the unique facts and circumstances of each case that is evidenced in our
prior decisions involving consent searches.
For example, in Davis v. United States, 328 U. S. 582, federal agents enforcing wartime gasoline
rationing regulations arrested a filling station operator and asked to see his rationing coupons.
He eventually unlocked a room where the agents discovered the coupons that formed the basis
for his conviction. The District Court found that the petitioner had consented to the search -- that,
although he had at first refused to turn the coupons over, he had soon been persuaded to do so,
and that force or threat of force had not been employed to persuade him. Concluding that it
could not be said that this finding was erroneous, this Court, in an opinion by MR. JUSTICE
DOUGLAS that looked to all the circumstances surrounding the consent, affirmed the judgment of
conviction:
"The public character of the property, the fact that the demand was made during business hours
at the place of business where the coupons were required to be kept, the existence of the right to
inspect, the nature of the request, the fact that the initial refusal to turn the coupons over was
soon followed by acquiescence in the demand -- these circumstances all support the conclusion
of the District Court."
Id. at 328 U. S. 593-594. See also Zap v. United States, 328 U. S. 624.

Conversely, if, under all the circumstances, it has appeared that the consent was not given
voluntarily -- that it was coerced by threats or force, or granted only in submission to a claim of
lawful authority -- then we have found the consent invalid and the search unreasonable.See, e.g.,
Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. at 391 U. S. 548-549; Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S.
10; Amos v.
Page 412 U. S. 234
United States, 255 U. S. 313. In Bumper, a 66-year-old Negro widow, who lived in a house located
in a rural area at the end of an isolated mile-long dirt road, allowed four white law enforcement
officials to search her home after they asserted they had a warrant to search the house. We held
the alleged consent to be invalid, noting that,
"[w]hen a law enforcement officer claims authority to search a home under a warrant, he
announces, in effect, that the occupant has no right to resist the search. The situation is instinct
with coercion -- albeit colorably lawful coercion. Where there is coercion, there cannot be
consent."
391 U.S. at 391 U. S. 550.
Implicit in all of these cases is the recognition that knowledge of a right to refuse is not a
prerequisite of a voluntary consent. If the prosecution were required to demonstrate such
knowledge, Davis and Zap could not have found consent without evidence of that knowledge.
And similarly, if the failure to prove such knowledge were sufficient to show an ineffective
consent, the Amos, Johnson, andBumper opinions would surely have focused upon the subjective
mental state of the person who consented. Yet they did not.
In short, neither this Court's prior cases nor the traditional definition of "voluntariness" requires
proof of knowledge of a right to refuse as thesine qua non of an effective consent to a search.
[Footnote 15]
Page 412 U. S. 235
C
It is said, however, that a "consent" is a "waiver" of a person's rights under the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments. The argument is that, by allowing the police to conduct a search, a
person "waives" whatever right he had to prevent the police from searching. It is argued that,
under the doctrine of Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458, 304 U. S. 464, to establish such a
"waiver," the State must demonstrate "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known
right or privilege."
But these standards were enunciated in Johnson in the context of the safeguards of a fair
criminal trial. Our cases do not reflect an uncritical demand for a knowing and intelligent waiver
in every situation where a person has failed to invoke a constitutional protection. As Mr. Justice
Black once observed for the Court: "Waiver' is a vague term used for a great variety of purposes,
good and bad, in the law." Green v. United States, 355 U. S. 184, 355 U. S. 191. With respect to
procedural due process, for example, the Court has acknowledged that waiver is possible, while
explicitly leaving open the question whether a "knowing and intelligent" waiver need be shown.
[Footnote 16]See D. N. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co.,
Page 412 U. S. 236
405 U. S. 174, 405 U. S. 185-186; Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U. S. 67, 407 U. S. 94-96. [Footnote 17]
The requirement of a "knowing" and "intelligent" waiver was articulated in a case involving the
validity of a defendant's decision to forgo a right constitutionally guaranteed to protect a fair trial
and the reliability of the truth-determining process. Johnson v. Zerbst, supra, dealt with the
denial of counsel in a federal criminal trial. There, the Court held that, under the Sixth
Amendment, a criminal defendant is entitled to the assistance of counsel, and that, if he lacks
sufficient funds to retain counsel, it is the Government's obligation to furnish him with a lawyer.
As Mr. Justice Black wrote for the Court:
"The Sixth Amendment stands as a constant admonition that, if the constitutional safeguards it
provides be lost, justice will not 'still be done.' It embodies a realistic recognition of the obvious
truth that the average defendant does not have the professional legal skill to protect himself
when brought before a tribunal with power to take his life or liberty, wherein the prosecution is
presented by experienced and learned counsel. That which is simple, orderly and necessary to
the lawyer, to the untrained layman may appear intricate, complex and mysterious."

304 U.S. at 304 U. S. 462-463 (footnote omitted). To preserve the fairness of the trial process, the
Court established an appropriately heavy burden on the Government before waiver could be
found -- "an intentional
Page 412 U. S. 237
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." Id. at 304 U. S. 464.
Almost without exception, the requirement of a knowing and intelligent waiver has been applied
only to those rights which the Constitution guarantees to a criminal defendant in order to
preserve a fair trial. [Footnote 18] Hence, and hardly surprisingly in view of the facts
ofJohnson itself, the standard of a knowing and intelligent waiver has most often been applied to
test the validity of a waiver of counsel, either at trial, [Footnote 19] or upon a guilty plea.
[Footnote 20] And the Court has also applied the Johnson criteria to assess the effectiveness of a
waiver of other trial rights such as the right to confrontation, [Footnote 21] to a jury trial,
[Footnote 22] and to a speedy trial, [Footnote 23] and the right to be free from
Page 412 U. S. 238
twice being placed in jeopardy. [Footnote 24] Guilty pleas have been carefully scrutinized to
determine whether the accused knew and understood all the rights to which he would be entitled
at trial, and that he had intentionally chosen to forgo them. [Footnote 25] And the Court has
evaluated the knowing and intelligent nature of the waiver of trial rights in trial-type situations,
such as the waiver of the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination before an administrative
agency [Footnote 26] or a congressional committee, [Footnote 27] or the waiver of counsel in a
juvenile proceeding. [Footnote 28] The guarantees afforded a criminal defendant at trial also
protect him at certain stages before the actual trial, and any alleged waiver must meet the strict
standard of an intentional relinquishment of a "known" right. But the "trial" guarantees that have
been applied to the "pretrial"
Page 412 U. S. 239
stage of the criminal process are similarly designed to protect the fairness of the trial itself.
Hence, in United States v. Wade, 388 U. S. 218, and Gilbert v. California, 388 U. S. 263, the Court
held
"that a post-indictment pretrial lineup at which the accused is exhibited to identifying witnesses
is a critical stage of the criminal prosecution; that police conduct of such a lineup without notice
to and in the absence of his counsel denies the accused his Sixth [and Fourteenth] Amendment
right to counsel. . . ."
Id. at 388 U. S. 272. Accordingly, the Court indicated that the standard of a knowing and
intelligent waiver must be applied to test the waiver of counsel at such a lineup. See United
States v. Wade, supra, at 388 U. S. 237. The Court stressed the necessary interrelationship
between the presence of counsel at a postindictment lineup before trial and the protection of the
trial process itself:
"Insofar as the accused's conviction may rest on a courtroom identification in fact, the fruit of a
suspect pretrial identification which the accused is helpless to subject to effective scrutiny at
trial, the accused is deprived of that right of cross-examination which is an essential safeguard to
his right to confront the witnesses against him. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U. S. 400. And even though
cross-examination is a precious safeguard to a fair trial, it cannot be viewed as an absolute
assurance of accuracy and reliability. Thus, in the present context, where so many variables and
pitfalls exist, the first line of defense must be the prevention of unfairness and the lessening of
the hazards of eyewitness identification at the lineup itself. The trial which might determine the
accused's fate may well not be that in the courtroom but that, at the pretrial confrontation, with
the State aligned against the accused, the
Page 412 U. S. 240
witness the sole jury, and the accused unprotected against the overreaching, intentional or
unintentional, and with little or no effective appeal from the judgment there rendered by the
witness -- 'that's the man.'"
Id. at 388 U. S. 235-236.
And in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, the Court found that custodial interrogation by the
police was inherently coercive, and consequently held that detailed warnings were required to
protect the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. The Court made it clear that the basis
for decision was the need to protect the fairness of the trial itself:

"That counsel is present when statements are taken from an individual during interrogation
obviously enhances the integrity of the factfinding processes in court. The presence of an
attorney, and the warnings delivered to the individual, enable the defendant under otherwise
compelling circumstances to tell his story without fear, effectively, and in a way that eliminates
the evils in the interrogation process. Without the protections flowing from adequate warnings
and the rights of counsel,"
"all the careful safeguards erected around the giving of testimony, whether by an accused or any
other witness, would become empty formalities in a procedure where the most compelling
possible evidence of guilt, a confession, would have already been obtained at the unsupervised
pleasure of the police."
Id. at 384 U. S. 466.
The standards of Johnson were, therefore, found to be a necessary prerequisite to a finding of a
valid waiver. See 384 U.S. at 384 U. S. 475-479. Cf. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. at 378 U. S.
490 n. 14. [Footnote 29]
Page 412 U. S. 241
There is a vast difference between those rights that protect a fair criminal trial and the rights
guaranteed under the Fourth Amendment. Nothing, either in the purposes behind requiring a
"knowing" and "intelligent" waiver of trial rights, or in the practical application of such a
requirement suggests that it ought to be extended to the constitutional guarantee against
unreasonable searches and seizures.
A strict standard of waiver has been applied to those rights guaranteed to a criminal defendant
to insure that he will be accorded the greatest possible opportunity to utilize every facet of the
constitutional model of a fair criminal trial. Any trial conducted in derogation of that model leaves
open the possibility that the trial reached an unfair result precisely because all the protections
specified in the Constitution were not provided. A prime example is the right to counsel. For
without that right, a wholly innocent accused faces the real and substantial danger that simply
because of his lack of legal expertise he may be convicted. As Mr. Justice Harlan once wrote:
"The sound reason why [the right to counsel] is so freely extended for a criminal trial is the
severe injustice risked by confronting an untrained defendant with a range of technical points of
law, evidence, and tactics familiar to the prosecutor but, not to
Page 412 U. S. 242
himself."
Miranda v. Arizona, supra, at 384 U. S. 514 (dissenting opinion). The Constitution requires that
every effort be made to see to it that a defendant in a criminal case has not unknowingly
relinquished the basic protections that the Framers thought indispensable to a fair trial. [Footnote
30]
The protections of the Fourth Amendment are of a wholly different order, and have nothing
whatever to do with promoting the fair ascertainment of truth at a criminal trial. Rather, as Mr.
Justice Frankfurter's opinion for the Court put it in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25,338 U. S. 27, the
Fourth Amendment protects the "security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the
police. . . ." In declining to apply the exclusionary rule of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643, to
convictions that had become final before rendition of that decision, the Court emphasized that
"there is no likelihood of unreliability or coercion present in a search and seizure case," Linkletter
v. Walker, 381 U. S. 618, 381 U. S. 638. In Linkletter, the Court indicated that those cases that
had been given retroactive effect went to "the fairness of the trial -- the very integrity of the
factfinding process. Here . . . the fairness of the trial is not under attack." Id. at 381 U. S. 639.
The Fourth Amendment "is not an adjunct to the ascertainment of truth." The guarantees of the
Fourth Amendment stand
"as a protection of quite different constitutional values -- values reflecting the concern of our
society for the right of each individual to be let alone. To recognize this is no more than to accord
those values undiluted respect."
Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U. S. 406, 382 U. S. 416.
Nor can it even be said that a search, as opposed to an eventual trial, is somehow "unfair" if a
person consents to a search. While the Fourth and Fourteenth
Page 412 U. S. 243

Amendments limit the circumstances under which the police can conduct a search, there is
nothing constitutionally suspect in a person's voluntarily allowing a search. The actual conduct of
the search may be precisely the same as if the police had obtained a warrant. And, unlike those
constitutional guarantees that protect a defendant at trial, it cannot be said every reasonable
presumption ought to be indulged against voluntary relinquishment. We have only recently
stated:
"[I]t is no part of the policy underlying the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to discourage
citizens from aiding to the utmost of their ability in the apprehension of criminals."
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. at 403 U. S. 488. Rather, the community has a real interest
in encouraging consent, for the resulting search may yield necessary evidence for the solution
and prosecution of crime, evidence that may insure that a wholly innocent person is not wrongly
charged with a criminal offense.
Those cases that have dealt with the application of the Johnson v. Zerbst rule make clear that it
would be next to impossible to apply to a consent search the standard of "an intentional
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." [Footnote 31] To be true
toJohnson
Page 412 U. S. 244
and its progeny, there must be examination into the knowing and understanding nature of the
waiver, an examination that was designed for a trial judge in the structured atmosphere of a
courtroom. As the Court expressed it in Johnson:
"The constitutional right of an accused to be represented by counsel invokes, of itself, the
protection of a trial court, in which the accused -- whose life or liberty is at stake is without
counsel. This protecting duty imposes the serious and weighty responsibility upon the trial judge
of determining whether there is an intelligent and competent waiver by the accused. While an
accused may waive the right to counsel, whether there is a proper waiver should be clearly
determined by the trial court, and it would be fitting and appropriate for that determination to
appear upon the record."
304 U.S. at 304 U. S. 465. [Footnote 32]
Page 412 U. S. 245
It would be unrealistic to expect that in the informal, unstructured context of a consent search, a
policeman, upon pain of tainting the evidence obtained, could make the detailed type of
examination demanded by Johnson. And, if for this reason a diluted form of "waiver" were found
acceptable, that would itself be ample recognition of the fact that there is no universal standard
that must be applied in every situation where a person forgoes a constitutional right. [Footnote
33]
Similarly, a "waiver" approach to consent searches would be thoroughly inconsistent with our
decisions that have approved "third party consents." In Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S.
at 403 U. S. 487-490, where a wife surrendered to the police guns and clothing belonging to her
husband, we found nothing constitutionally impermissible in the admission of that evidence at
trial, since the wife had not been coerced. Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U. S. 731, 394 U. S. 740, held that
evidence seized from the defendant's duffel bag in a search authorized by his cousin's consent
was admissible at trial. We found that the defendant had assumed the risk that his cousin, with
whom he shared the bag, would allow the police to search it. See also Abel v. United States, 362
U. S. 217. And
Page 412 U. S. 246
in Hill v. California, 401 U. S. 797, 401 U. S. 802-805, we held that the police had validly seized
evidence from the petitioner's apartment incident to the arrest of a third party, since the police
had probable cause to arrest the petitioner and reasonably, though mistakenly, believed the man
they had arrested was he. Yet it is inconceivable that the Constitution could countenance the
waiver of a defendant's right to counsel by a third party, or that a waiver could be found because
a trial judge reasonably, though mistakenly, believed a defendant had waived his right to plead
not guilty. [Footnote 34]
In short, there is nothing in the purposes or application of the waiver requirements of Johnson v.
Zerbst that justifies, much less compels, the easy equation of a knowing waiver with a consent
search. To make such an equation is to generalize from the broad rhetoric of some of our

decisions, and to ignore the substance of the differing constitutional guarantees. We decline to
follow what one judicial scholar has termed
"the domino method of constitutional adjudication . . . wherein every explanatory statement in a
previous opinion is made the basis for extension to a wholly different situation. [Footnote 35]"
D
Much of what has already been said disposes of the argument that the Court's decision in
the Miranda case requires the conclusion that knowledge of a right to refuse is an indispensable
element of a valid consent. The considerations that informed the Court's holding inMiranda are
simply inapplicable in the present case.
Page 412 U. S. 247
In Miranda, the Court found that the techniques of police questioning and the nature of custodial
surroundings produce an inherently coercive situation. The Court concluded that,
"[u]nless adequate protective devices are employed to dispel the compulsion inherent in
custodial surroundings, no statement obtained from the defendant can truly be the product of his
free choice."
384 U.S. at 384 U. S. 458. And, at another point, the Court noted that,
"without proper safeguards, the process of in-custody interrogation of persons suspected or
accused of crime contains inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the
individual's will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely."
Id. at 384 U. S. 467.
In this case, there is no evidence of any inherently coercive tactics -- either from the nature of
the police questioning or the environment in which it took place. Indeed, since consent searches
will normally occur on a person's own familiar territory, the specter of incommunicado police
interrogation in some remote station house is simply inapposite. [Footnote 36] There is no reason
to believe, under circumstances such as are present here, that the response to a policeman's
question is presumptively coerced; and there is, therefore, no reason to reject the traditional test
for determining the voluntariness of a person's response. Miranda, of course, did not reach
investigative questioning of a person not in custody, which is most directly analogous to the
situation of a consent search, and it assuredly did not indicate that such questioning ought to be
deemed inherently coercive. See supra at 412 U. S. 232.
It is also argued that the failure to require the Government to establish knowledge as a
prerequisite to a valid
Page 412 U. S. 248
consent, will relegate the Fourth Amendment to the special province of "the sophisticated, the
knowledgeable and the privileged." We cannot agree. The traditional definition of voluntariness
we accept today has always taken into account evidence of minimal schooling, low intelligence,
and the lack of any effective warnings to a person of his rights; and the voluntariness of any
statement taken under those conditions has been carefully scrutinized to determine whether it
was in fact, voluntarily given. [Footnote 37]
E
Our decision today is a narrow one. We hold only that, when the subject of a search is not in
custody and the State attempts to justify a search on the basis of his consent, the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments require that it demonstrate that the consent was in fact, voluntarily
given, and not the result of duress or coercion, express or implied. Voluntariness is a question of
fact
Page 412 U. S. 249
to be determined from all the circumstances, and while the subject's knowledge of a right to
refuse is a factor to be taken into account, the prosecution is not required to demonstrate such
knowledge as a prerequisite to establishing a voluntary consent. [Footnote 38] Because the
California court followed these principles in affirming the respondent's conviction, and because
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in remanding for an evidentiary hearing, required
more, its judgment must be reversed.
It so ordered.