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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

304th MI Bn Periodic Open Source Report


304th MI Bn
Fort Huachuca, AZ
LTC Monnard, Commanding
August 2008
OSINT operations are integral to Army intelligence operations. Publicly available information is
the foundation upon which all intelligence operations build to develop all-source intelligence that
supports situational understanding and decisive action.
- Ret. Maj Gen Barbara Fast, MI Professional Bulletin, 2005
Featured in This Edition
MICCC RC STUDENT PAPER: THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF DJIBOUTI ................................................ 2
PRICKLY THOUGHT: IS INTEL RELEASING TOO MUCH PUBLIC INFORMATION? ........................................ 3
OP ED: WHAT IS A FACT IN OPEN SOURCE RESEARCH?............................................................................. 5
FEATURED SOCIAL NETWORKING FORUM: HI5 ........................................................................................... 5
GOT DNI OSC?........................................................................................................................................... 8
AN OPEN SOURCE OVERVIEW OF A SAUDI HACKING WEBSITE ................................................................... 8
BOOK REVIEW: HEZBOLLAH PARTY OF GOD: AN ISLAMIC MOVEMENT PERSPECTIVE ............................. 10
RECOMMENDED LINKS .............................................................................................................................. 11
ANSWERS TO THIS EDITIONS TRIVIA QUESTIONS ..................................................................................... 11

This Editions Intelligence Trivia Questions


What Iraqi school did many of the ideological founders of Hezbollah attend in the late
1960s-1970s?
Who was the founder of Amal (a precursor to Hezbollah)?
On what date did Hezbollah officially announce its existence?
(answers are on the last page)

Periodic Open Source Report Contributors


Chief Editor: Mr. William A. Purciello, william.purciello@us.army.mil
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Publisher & Layout Design: Ms. Sarah Womer, sarah.e.womer@us.army.mil


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Contributing Authors: CPT Terry Lee Davis and the 304th MI Bn OSINT Team Production Cell
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All articles in this Newsletter are authored by contributing staff unless otherwise noted.
The views expressed in this Newsletter are those of the authors and do not necessarily
reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army or the U.S.
Government. If you are interested in submitting an article for publication, please contact
the 304th MI Bn OSINT team at sarah.e.womer@us.army.mil

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MICCC RC Student Paper: The Strategic Importance of Djibouti


Author: CPT Terry Lee Davis, U.S. Army, 304th MI Bn MICCC Alum
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The small North African country of Djibouti is a very important strategic partner for the United
States in the Global War on Terrorism. While Djibouti is slightly smaller than Massachusetts and
has a population of only about 721,000 people according to United Nations estimates, its
significance to the stability of the region is vital. Bordered by Ethiopia on the south and east,
Eritrea to the north, Somalia on the southeast and the Red Sea to the northeast, Djiboutis
resilience is key to the future success of the region.
Mired in violent conflict for much of its history, Djibouti has moved beyond violent civil conflict
since 2000, with the end of fighting between the government and the Front for the Restoration of
Unity and Democracy (FRUD). General elections in the past few years were orderly and peaceful
and represented a change for the positive for the country and the Horn of Africa region.
The United States has long enjoyed a very positive relationship with Djibouti, and this has helped
bolster the U.S. capability to focus its efforts in the region against terrorist activities in the Horn of
Africa. Djibouti represents an island of stability in the region that has been affected by civil war
in Somalia and cross border fighting between its bordering countries of Eritrea and Ethiopia.
The U.S. relationship with Djibouti has allowed for the stationing of almost 1,800 U.S. troops
within its borders. Djibouti has hosted the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa since 2002.
Djibouti has permitted the United States to open a base housing the headquarters of Central
Command for the Horn of Africa, which is tasked with anti-terrorism operations and fulfilling a
program of regional stabilization through civil affairs missions and military cooperation with local
states. It is also a key security partner in that it provides refueling facilities for Coalition naval
vessels. Djibouti is also the warehouse location for pre-positioned emergency food relief used by
the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance in times of crisis.
While Djibouti is a poor country by world standards (ranking 207th in the world out of 229 in GDP
per capita according to the CIA World Fact Book), it continues to support the United States and
its battle against terrorism in the region and plays an increasingly important diplomatic role as a
bridge to other countries in the region. Djiboutis importance stems from its strategic location at
the entrance of the Bab al Mandeb. The countrys airfield served as part of a strategic air bridge
for operations in Somalia, and the United States has an ongoing ship visit program. Djiboutis
pro-Western orientation and long standing French presence afford the United States important
access to support facilities for crisis response.
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Djiboutis most important financial asset continues to be its port facilities in Djibouti City. The
economy is based on these service activities connected with the countrys strategic location and
its status as a free trade zone in northeast Africa. The port in Djibouti City provides services as
both a transit port for the region and an international transshipment and refueling center. Djibouti
controls the passageway between the Suez Canal and the Indian Ocean, giving it prime
importance for outside powers keen to protect their commercial interests in the region. The port
at Djibouti City also has special importance for landlocked Ethiopia, which depends on access to
it for its exports and, most important, for imports of vital food aid supplied by the United States,
European Union, Japan, and Italy. Djiboutis port plays a similar role for the impoverished
landlocked countries in north-central Africa. The port fees accruing from Djiboutis position as a
transshipment point, along with military base rents, sustain the countrys weak economy.
The loss of the port in Djibouti City to a major terrorist attack would deal a significant blow to the
U.S. military and its operations in the region while also reducing the relative safety provided by
the U.S. presence in the area. Alternative locations for the U.S. forces in the region would
significantly degrade its capability to quickly respond to contingencies in the Horn of Africa
Region. Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE represent possible options for the alternate staging
areas for forces in the Horn of Africa Task Force, if a major terrorist attack on operations in the
Port of Djibouti were to occur. The response time from these possible alternate locations would
degrade the U.S. capability to mount coordinated attacks against terrorist networks in the area

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and reduce the overall effectiveness in the region. The symbiotic relationship between the United
States and Djibouti allows the United States to stage military operations against terror targets in
the region and help protect both U.S. and Djiboutis interests, while simultaneously stimulating the
economy of one of the poorest countries in the world.
References:
Redente, Jenifer (February 25th, 2008). CAPSTONE Officers Study Djiboutians, Task Force
Relationship. Retrieved March 11th, 2008 from http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123087651
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Economy of Djibouti (2002). Retrieved March 11 , 2008 from


http://www.arab.net/djibouti/di_economy.htm
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Fiscal 2009 Defense Authorization (March 05, 2008). Retrieved March 11th, 2008 from
https://www.opensource.gov from CQ Congressional Testimony of March 5th, 2008.
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Gimbel, Barney (February 22 , 2008). Searching for the Next Dubai-An Inside Look at how a
huge Middle Eastern company wants to remake the developing world in its hometowns image.
Retrieved March 11th, 2008 from
http://money.cnn.com/2008/02/20/news/international/Dubai_djibouti.fortune/index.htm
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Djibouti. Retrieved March 11 , 2008 from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Djibouti


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Country Profile: Djibouti (January 26 , 2008). Retrieved March 11 2008 from


http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/country_profiles/1070579.stm
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Policy Options in the Horn of Africa (March 11, 2008). Received March 11th, 2008 from
https://www.opensource.gov from CQ Congressional Testimony of March 11th, 2008.
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Prickly Thought: Is INTEL Releasing Too Much Public Information?


During the Week of March 10, 2008 three stories caught my eye that made me question whether
or not USG intelligence releases too much information. The First story published in the UK
mentioned that a friend of a terrorist who was on trial downloaded the al Qaida training manual off
a USG website for terrorist activities. The second story published by the Fort Leavenworth Times
explained how the USG separates detainees in Iraq for Counter Insurgency Operations (COIN
Ops) and the third published by the Air Force Times provides an overview of How OSI conducts
operations to catch killers in Iraq. For the first story, al Qaida training manuals are widely
available on USG and non USG websites. However, it is ironic that an al Qaida affiliate
downloaded the manual from a USG website and faced trial in the UK. However, this tactic is not
new and terrorists collect OSINT from USG websites on a fairly frequent basis. I will let the
reader decide whether or not the other two stories release too much public information. Following
are excerpts from both articles:
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Excerpts from Unit Integral Part of Counterinsurgency Fight in Iraq published by the Fort
Leavenworth Times on March 12, 2008

The 15 months the 705th spent in Iraq can be divided into three stages: Tactical,
operational and strategic. During the tactical stage, which lasted from January to May,
the detainees were categorized and separated; the operational phase, from May to
September, set conditions and regularized procedures; and the strategic period, from
September onward, linked operations inside the camp to the larger COIN struggle outside
the camp.

Where else in Iraq is there a place where the soldier, the sailor, the airman or the marine
has 24-hour access to al-Qaida?" Williams questioned. "It's in detention.

Detainees were classified as people who posed a security threat to coalition forces, the
Iraqi government or the Iraqi populace. Once captured, detainees were housed at Camp
Bucca
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It took the battalion about four months to isolate the extremists from the moderates.
Roughly 20 or 25 percent of the detainees were "hard core" and another 5 percent were
"irreconcilable.

A very small number of hard-core extremists could effectively control large numbers of
detainees using fear and intimidation.

Prison riots were commonplace until the extremists were separated.

While the unit separated moderate and extremist detainees, it had to expand the camp
from 18 to 34 compounds to accommodate additional prisoners generated by the surge.

He said COIN teams were formed to gather counterintelligence about detainees inside
the camps and help differentiate between moderates and extremists.

Excerpts from How OSI Agents Are Catching Killers in Iraq published by the Air Force
Times on March 10, 2008

In the days after the attack, agents conducted an initial assessment of the situation,
combing through their intelligence reports of the area where the attack occurred, talking
to Army units that had been on the scene and coordinating with the Armys Counter
Explosive Exploitation Cell CEXC for short which collects forensic information about
IEDs.

OSI cultivates robust source networks near air bases, drawing on everyone from Iraqi
police officers who know the neighborhoods best to local residents who can be recruited
as informants. But Mahmudiyah is not near an air base, McCombs said, so OSIs source
network in the area of the attack was not as productive as the agents would have liked.

OSI took this basic information to local police in Mahmudiyah and asked for help
identifying potential suspects. The Iraqi police had hunches about which groups might fit
the bill, so they scoured the usual haunts of Mahmudiyahs insurgents and criminals.

OSI wanted to do its own interrogation, so the agents geared up with body armor and
weapons as they do nearly every day when deployed and made their way to the
police station in Mahmudiyah. Over the course of several days, they interviewed the
suspect three or four times for a total of about 15 hours, McCombs said.

For each session, the agents would take custody of al-Dulaymi, move him to a nearby
American base for questioning and then return him to the Iraqi jail when they were
finished.

An American polygrapher determined al-Dulaymi was telling the truth in his confession,
but the OSI agents quickly concluded he was not alone in the attack. He claimed and
McCombs said he believes him that he was beaten and coerced by a group of Sunni
insurgents who threatened to kill him if he did not cooperate with the plot.

OSI provided the identities and other information to the Army and the Iraqi police so they
could be put on watch lists.

According to an OSI agent involved in the case who asked not to be identified because of
the sensitivity of his work, the informant told the agents he knew the identity of an
insurgent cell member who had participated in an attack that killed American soldiers.

The preceding article excerpts provide examples for debate on whether or not Intel is releasing
too much information. Prior to publishing this article there was a debate on base on whether or
not this article could be published in the first place. This seemed to be a moot point as one article
was published by the Forth Leavenworth Times, from an Army source, and the other in the Air
Force Times, from an OSI source, and was viewed by thousands of people as unclassified
information on the World Wide Web. Whether or not the article contains too much information
seems to be of lesser importance than the question of why would we want to share it? And did
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we cross the line?

OP ED: What is a Fact in Open Source Research?


The online Merriam Webster dictionary has six different meanings for the word fact. For
intelligence analysts, the most common meanings used for this word are a piece of information
presented as having objective reality, or something that has actual existence and/or an actual
occurrence.1 Based on these definitions, there are instances where analysts report on facts.
However, much analysis is based on subjective probabilities. For example, predicting social and
cultural variables that would influence whether or not a terrorist organization desired biological
weapons.
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A pitfall to analysis is that subjective pieces of information can be presented as having objective
reality. For example, in HUMINT interrogations, an intelligence professional may write a report
from the information that is attained during a discussion. The information may or may not be
dependable or credible based on several factors, including the source and reliability of the
information. A similar issue exists for open source and all source analysts when they attain
materials from the World Wide Web. The collector or acquirer of information is faced with the
dilemma of determining the informations credibility. Most well trained HUMINT professionals will
have an inherent level of skepticism for sources, as all humans have deception built in. If you
dont believe that you are deceptive, ask yourself Have I ever lied? The question is not whether
you are deceptive, but What am I deceptive about? In addition, humans relay falsified or nonfactual information based on their life experiences or from attaining information from a respected
subjective source.
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In open source, as with other INTs, a fact is sometimes hidden and/or buried and may not be
apparent from the first level of research. A buried fact may be the golden acorn of information
that is needed for a particular assessment or collection requirement. Analysts who dive for the
golden acorn often find that it can be time consuming and frustrating. Sometimes, the fact is in
the first level of research such as a blatant observation--It is raining outside. However, there is
an inclination for most humans to select information that they agree with or from a perceived
authoritative source.
Open source analysis should be able to embrace uncertainty when it exists and incorporate that
uncertainty into their reports. Uncertainty can indicate where intelligence gaps exist and can
assist in directing further collection requirements. Analysts should avoid using absolutes where
there is uncertainty or ambiguity. For example, if someone assesses a website that provides
explosives instructions for RDX and multiple videos from al Qaidas Global Islamic Media Front
(GIMF), that is not enough information to state the website actually belongs to al Qaida. The
analyst may want to describe the website as a possible or probable al Qaida website.
An excellent overview for assessing uncertainties and analytical biases can be found on the
Central Intelligence Agencys Center for the Studies of Intelligence homepage under the
Psychology of Intelligence Analysis at
https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-ofintelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/psychology-of-intelligence-analysis/art1.html.
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Reference
Fact Merriam Webster Online Dictionary, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/fact
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Featured Social Networking Forum: Hi5

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Many extremists, self-claimed terrorists, hackers, and wannabe terrorists utilize social networking
forums for communications, outreach, recruitment, propaganda and training materials.
Extremists will utilize venues like MySpace and FaceBook. However, many extremists will use
other networking forums that are not as popular and/or that are more regional and topic centric.
Cyber social networking forums are a valuable venue for open source acquisition as they provide
insight into cyber cultures, recruitment, indoctrination, training, collective cyber groups (cells), and
sometimes provide posted documents for open source exploitation. One primary intervening
variable of open source harvesting from social networking sites is source confirmation. The only
way to really confirm that a cyber identity is extremist (versus someone pretending to be one)
would be to combine cyber HUMINT with the open source collection by engaging the self-claimed
extremist in social dialogue. Currently some cyber-vigilantes, that have no association to the
government, use this tactic when they research extremist social networks. For example, at least
one cyber vigilante website tried to engage the Taliban in dialogue via e-mail.1
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The below example, from Hi5, is the first in a 304 MI Bn OSINT Newsletter series on Extremist
Social Networking forums. Future editions of the newsletter will periodically feature a variety of
different social networking forums as they relate to OSINT issues. This research was only
conducted from open source acquisition and the sources have not been confirmed.
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Social Networking Forum: Hi5


The Social networking forum Hi5 at www.hi5.com is popular for a multitude of alleged extremists
from around the world including Afghanistan, Sweden, London, Pakistan, Indonesia, and Saudi
Arabia. Below are three interconnected examples from the forum.
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Ridwan at Hi5

This is Ridwan at http://sandbox.hi5.com/friend/33974628--Ridwan--Profile-html. He claims to be 29 years old and that he speaks Urdu, English and
Arabic (in addition to his native language, Indonesian.) His primary interests are reading the Quran and traveling. His favorite movies are an interview
with Usama bin Laden, an interview with an al Qaida terrorist in Iraq and other extremist multimedia. His favorite music is religious songs. His favorite
books are spiritual and jihad books. And he describes his favorite TV show as an al Qaida-like website, www.qaqaz.com. His current location is not
listed but from his photo album, he may be in Indonesia. Ridwan claims 64 Hi5 friends. Three are mentioned below.

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Friend of Ridwan: Abdullah AKA Mujtahid2006


A Mujtahid loosely defined is an Islamic scholar who can interpret Islamic Law (Sharia)

This is Abdullah at http://sandbox.hi5.com/friend/85699683--Abdullah--Profile-html. He has 11 photos posted on his page, four of which are depicted above.
He claims to live in London and below is an excerpt of his self description: I'm described as a "Terrorist, homicidal fanatic and extremist fundamentalist"- but
who believes government reports anyway?...(oops, wrong file, thats my psychiatric report!) I reverted to Islam when I was 14, but in the absence of any
Muslims to guide me- I did not become fully practicing until I was 18, but I never let obstacles get in my way; then my life changed dramatically, Islam opened
up a world of possibilities to me and I learned what it is to think clearly, rationally and without prejudice in my life.My only sole desire in this life is to live for
the Deen, fight for the deen and die for the Deen. Abdullah has many interests. Including writing and publishing books, newsletter articles, leaflets and poetry.
He also has an extremist lectures series available on YouTube. Abdullah has 476 friends.

Friend of Friend of Ridwan: Abdurrahman


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Abdurrahman at http://sandbox.hi5.com/friend/photos/displayPhotoUser.do?ownerId=7823146&artistType=&photoFuid=G%3A202787450 states that he is


25 years old and that he is in Mujahidin Worlds, Indonesia. He has 13 photos on his social networking page and an article on Chechnya that was reposted
from the al Qaida-like website that stresses Chechnya issues, www.kavkazcenter.com. His favorite movies are described as Mujahedeen Movies and Umar
Ibn Abdul Aziz (referencing a historical figure that ruled a Caliphate.) All of his listed interests are religious in nature and his favorite quote is DA'WAH &
JIHAD FIISABIILILLAH. Above are sample photos from his preferred photos page. Abdurraham has 159 friends.

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In addition to communicating with each other members can join group communities. All three of
the above examples have participated in the jihad group. However, this social networking forum
provides a variety of other interesting groups and members, including members that want to join
social hacking groups (there are approx. 214 groups in the forum with the tag word hacker),
illegal drug enthusiasts, anarchists, communists, Che Guevara admirers, white supremacists,
regional opposition parties (example-United National Party in Sri Lanka), Pro FARC and Anti
FARC members, Pro Hezbollah and Anti Hezbollah members, gang and wannabe gang members
(domestic and international), Pro and anti-Taliban participants, and potential cyber predators. In
addition, the forum is useful for looking up sentiments, photos and posted documents on a variety
of regions and countries. As of August 4, 2008, there were over 180 groups that discussed
issues in relation to Somalia, 490 groups centered on Sudan, 552 groups discussed Iran, and
approximately 638 groups discussed Iraq, one of the more interesting of which is entitled
supporters of the Iraqi Resistance.
Reference: 1. The Jawa Report, http://mypetjawa.mu.nu/archives/188597.php, July 6, 2007
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Got DNI OSC?


The DNI Open Source Center (OSC) is an
invaluable resource for creating MI OSINT
products. Creating an account is easy and
provides access to a lot of useful resources for
All Source Analysis.
Following is a brief
description of the OSC from their website. To
get an account go to www.opensource.gov and
follow the instructions for signing up. Typically, your account will be completed in less than a day.
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Established on 1 November 2005, the DNI Open Source Center serves as the hub of the
Intelligence Communitys National Open Source Enterprise. OSC collects and analyzes open
source information from around the world and makes its products - ranging from textual
translations to multimedia productions - available to customers throughout the US Government.
OSC also brokers and hosts open source information and products from dozens of other open
source providers, including other USG entities, think tanks, and renowned experts who blog on
topics of national security interest.
OSC covers an immense range of sources: 2,000 periodical publications, 300 radio stations, 235
television stations, and more than 1,000 Internet sites in 82 languages and 161 countries. Using
leading edge technology, OSCs reach extends beyond traditional sources and into new and
emerging media, deriving intelligence from the ever-expanding universe of open sources. As the
hub of the National Open Source Enterprise, OSCs customers range from the President of the
United States to local law enforcement officials.
Reference: OSC, Welcome to the Open Source Center, FEA20070814279510, OSC Feature,
OSC, 14 Aug 07

An Open Source Overview of a Saudi Hacking Website


Periodically, the 304th MI Bn OSINT Team Production Cell serendipitously discovers adversarial
regional hacking groups and electronic jihad postings as a byproduct to other research. This
valuable open source information can provide insights into cyber cultures, issues, and activities of
extremist and adversarial groups. The production cell will periodically feature websites of

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potential interest. Following is open source description of the Saudi hacking forum the TrYaG
TeaM.

The above logos are used by the Saudi TrYaG Team. The first two logos contain the Saudi flag.
The script on the flag is the Shahada (profession of faith) There is no God but God and
Mohammad is the Messenger.
Audience Assessment
The TryYaG Team forum has 24,938 topic threads, 227,191 member posts and 18,765 members.
The IP, 89.144.97.167, is listed as being based out of Saudi Arabia (as of Aug. 14, 2008) from a
registrant who is lookup. The server type is listed as being secured by AraServe. From briefly
assessing information on the forum it appears to contain junior hackers, hackers, wannabe
hackers, hacker enthusiasts, and people who use the forum for other issues; such as general
discussions on politics and religion. The forum also provides instructions and training in addition
to computer software downloads.
Example Participant posting: April 2008 SnIper code posted the following
Total attacks: 17270 Thank you, nEt ^ DeViL May peace and God's mercy be upon you
nEt ^ DeViL from KSA (KSA is the acronym for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia)
As a matter of thanks and gratitude and praise upon his great achievements
He should be proud
His message to the Islamic network, whether through the penetration (hacking) of the call
for peace
The recall God Almighty through the site by Islam, which is certainly speaks for itself ..
www.islamway.com Here are your achievements.
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The contents of the website include the following titled discussion topics: Public Forum,
Islamic Forum, Forum to develop sites & forums, Graphics lessons, Programs for computers and
mobile phones, Where to pay for special computer services, Programming languages, Basic
hacking/computer classes, News & INTERNET piracy technical discussion, Academic scientific
technical institute, Antivirus software , Section on general protection, Kingdom of mail and
protection devices, Impenetrable secure sites and servers and how to penetrate them, Library
gaps, Managing & protecting servers, Open source operating systems, Junior corner (for
beginner hackers), Problems & solutions and applications, Management only, Forum suggestions
& complaints, Forum eliminations (some rules of engagement for forum participation), and Wing
administration.
Website address as of August 14, 2008 is www.tryag.com, language of site is Arabic
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Note: The translated material in the above example was not done by a professional translator
so there may be some errors in translation (the translation was done by an analyst who reads
some Arabic in tandem with using Googles translating tools.)

Book Review: Hezbollah Party of God: An Islamic Movement


Perspective
Book: Hezbollah Party of God: An Islamic Movement Perspective
Edited by: Abdar Rahman Koya
Distributed by: Crescent International
Publisher: The Other Press, Kuala Lumpur, www.ibtbooks.com
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Year: 2006
Hezbollah Party of God: An Islamic Movement Perspective edited by Abdar Rahman Koya and
published by The Other Press, Kula Lumpar (distributed by Crescent International) provides
insights into the movement of Hezbollah from a pro Hezbollah perspective. The book covers a
chronology of Hezbollahs key events, its history, ideology, platforms, connections, and stances
toward other Islamic movements and groups. The book also briefly discusses some of their
historical military tactics and how they evolved. This book is highly recommended for any analyst
and/or MI practitioner that is looking at terrorist ideologies from a red perspective, and Hezbollah
in particular. The book is available from very select distributors and currently does not appear to
be available in most large commercial book stores, such as Amazon or Borders.
Sample locations of where the book is available
please contact the 304th MI Bn OSINT Team):

(for the complete international distributor address listing

Main Office in Malaysia


The Other Press Sdn Bhd
607 Mutiara Majestic
Jalan Othman
46000 Petaling Jaya
Selangor, Malaysia
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United States
Crescent Books
2221 Peachtree Rd
Suite D-109
Atlanta GA
30309
770 662 6970 crescentbooks@hotmail.com
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Canada
Al-Qalam Publications
349-52252 Range Road 215
Sherwood Park
AB T8E 1B7
780-922-0927
al-qalam@al-qalam.org
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Recommended Links
Open Source Center,
www.opensource.gov
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G2 DAIIS OSINT ITELINK U Page,


https://www.intelink.gov/sharepoint
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ICON Portal, The Intelligence Center Online Network,


https://icon.army.mil
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Answers to this Editions Trivia Questions


All questions for this editions trivia quiz came from the reviewed book on Hezbollah.
1. What Iraqi school did many of the ideological founders of Hezbollah attend in the late 1960s-1970s?
The Hawza in Najaf, Iraq. Most studied under Ayatullah Muhammad Baqir al Sadr.
2. Who was the founder of Amal (a precursor to Hezbollah)?
Sayyid Musa al Sadr
3. When did Hezbollah officially announce its existence?

February 16, 1985.

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