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FERNANDEZ
GR No. L-31364 March 30, 1979
89 SCRA 199
FACTS: The BIR filed on July 29, 1969 a motion for allowance
of claim and for payment of taxes representing the estate's tax
deficiencies in 1963 to 1964 in the intestate proceedings of Luis
Tongoy. The administrator opposed arguing that the claim was
already barred by the statute of limitation, Section 2 and Section 5
of Rule 86 of the Rules of Court which provides that all claims
for money against the decedent, arising from contracts, express or
implied, whether the same be due, not due, or contingent, all
claims for funeral expenses and expenses for the last sickness of
the decedent, and judgment for money against the decedent, must
be filed within the time limited in the notice; otherwise they are
barred forever.
ISSUE: Does the statute of non-claims of the Rules of Court bar
the claim of the government for unpaid taxes?
HELD: No. The reason for the more liberal treatment of claims
for taxes against a decedent's estate in the form of exception from
the application of the statute of non-claims, is not hard to find.
Taxes are the lifeblood of the Government and their prompt and
certain availability are imperious need. (CIR vs. Pineda, 21 SCRA
105). Upon taxation depends the Government ability to serve the
people for whose benefit taxes are collected. To safeguard such
interest, neglect or omission of government officials entrusted
with the collection of taxes should not be allowed to bring harm
or detriment to the people, in the same manner as private persons
may be made to suffer individually on account of his own
negligence, the presumption being that they take good care of
their personal affairs. This should not hold true to government
officials with respect to matters not of their own personal
concern. This is the philosophy behind the government's
exception, as a general rule, from the operation of the principle of
estoppel.
REYES v. ALMANZOR
GR Nos. L-49839-46, April 26, 1991
196 SCRA 322
FACTS: Petitioners JBL Reyes et al. owned a parcel of land in
Tondo which are leased and occupied as dwelling units by tenants
who were paying monthly rentals of not exceeding P300.
Sometimes in 1971 the Rental Freezing Law was passed
prohibiting for one year from its effectivity, an increase in
monthly rentals of dwelling units where rentals do not exceed
three hundred pesos (P300.00), so that the Reyeses were
precluded from raising the rents and from ejecting the tenants. In
1973, respondent City Assessor of Manila re-classified and
reassessed the value of the subject properties based on the
schedule of market values, which entailed an increase in the
corresponding tax rates prompting petitioners to file a
Memorandum of Disagreement averring that the reassessments
made were "excessive, unwarranted, inequitable, confiscatory and
unconstitutional" considering that the taxes imposed upon them
greatly exceeded the annual income derived from their properties.
They argued that the income approach should have been used in
determining the land values instead of the comparable sales
approach which the City Assessor adopted.
ISSUE: Is the approach on tax assessment used by the City
Assessor reasonable?
LUTZ v. ARANETA
GR No. L-7859, December 22, 1955
98 PHIL 148
FACTS: Plaintiff Walter Lutz, in his capacity as judicial
administrator of the intestate estate of Antionio Ledesma, sought
to recover from the CIR the sum of P14,666.40 paid by the estate
as taxes, under section 3 of the CA 567 or the Sugar Adjustment
Act thereby assailing its constitutionality, for it provided for an
increase of the existing tax on the manufacture of sugar, alleging
that such enactment is not being levied for a public purpose but
solely and exclusively for the aid and support of the sugar
industry thus making it void and unconstitutional. The sugar
industry situation at the time of the enactment was in an imminent
threat of loss and needed to be stabilized by imposition of
emergency measures.
ISSUE: Is CA 567 constitutional, despite its being allegedly
violative of the equal protection clause, the purpose of which is
not for the benefit of the general public but for the rehabilitation
only of the sugar industry?
HELD: Yes. The protection and promotion of the sugar industry is
a matter of public concern, it follows that the Legislature may
determine within reasonable bounds what is necessary for its
protection and expedient for its promotion. Here, the legislative
discretion must be allowed to fully play, subject only to the test of
reasonableness; and it is not contended that the means provided in
the law bear no relation to the objective pursued or are oppressive
in character. If objective and methods are alike constitutionally
valid, no reason is seen why the state may not levy taxes to raise
funds for their prosecution and attainment. Taxation may be made
the implement of the state's police power.