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six months in which the trial court failed to act on Plaintiffs motion to add
parties (the trial court eventually denied that motion on an improper basis, as
well, according to the Court of Appeals, when it entered its dismissal order
two weeks prior to a scheduled hearing on the matter).
9.
Defendants proposal to possibly wait another two-and-a-half years for
motions and appeals, before conducting discovery, would even more
severely prejudice Plaintiff. That is especially true since the trial courts
May 2, 2014 dismissal order is rife with blatant errors of law the Court of
Appeals did not need to reach to reverse, including absurd statements that
whether Plaintiff can bring RICO claims does not depend on satisfying the
elements of the RICO statute as enacted by the Legislature, but on the
subjective intentions of counsel.
10.
In addition to the recognized prejudice from delaying discovery, from loss of
memory and so forth, it is firmly established in the record of the tenure
revocation action initiated against Plaintiff Benedek by Defendant Adams,
that Defendants have a very checkered history of disappearing documents. It
is documented and undisputed that Defendants failed to produce and denied
under oath the existence of the UGA-ELTE Cooperative Agreementthat
14.
The Attorney General also claimed, contrary to the Court of Appeals
determination, that there was a motion to dismiss still pending--with respect
to Plaintiffs amended claims--that barred discovery. This is in direct
conflict with the Court of Appeals finding that Plaintiffs amended claims
filed on March 24, 2014 had never been addressed in the proceedings below.
15.
On July 21, 2015, the same day the Attorney General filed the motion to
block the noticed and subpoenaed discovery, Plaintiffs counsel was in the
process of preparing a written response and requesting a hearing for the next
day, when the phone rang and Staff Attorney Michael DAntignac informed
Plaintiffs counsel that he had the Attorney General and the judge on the
line.
16.
Counsel informed the trial courts staff attorney that counsel was in the
process of preparing and about to file his written response to the Attorney
Generals motion filed that morning. The staff attorney advised that would
not be necessary as he had the judge and Attorney General on the line.
17.
Plaintiff was not allowed any opportunity to respond. These include the
spurious claim that the Attorney General had a pending motion to dismiss
directed at Plaintiffs March 24 amended complaintin direct conflict with
the reversal and remand order of the Court of Appeals. The trial court also
relied on the Attorney Generals off-point authority, and did not even
address any of Plaintiffs positions, either as stated in the unrecorded phone
conference or in Plaintiffs Response that was Plaintiff was not allowed to
file before the trial court ruled against Plaintiff.
25.
In the same un-noticed and unrecorded phone conference in which the trial
court issued the ex parte order barring Plaintiffs discovery, the trial judge
indicated an intention to rule on the sovereign immunity issues before the
court without any further delay, claiming the issues were already fully
briefed by the parties.
26.
At that time, the trial judge stated that Plaintiffs counsel should expect an
order sooner rather than later addressing sovereign immunity for Plaintiffs
claims.
27.
10
1
Even
if
Defendants
had
sovereign
immunity
form
a
civil
RICO
action
based
on
their
criminal
predicate
acts,
as
the
attorney
General
has
claimed,
there
is
undisputedly
no
such
sovereign
immunity
to
shield
them
from
a
criminal
RICO
prosectution
based
on
the
same
criminal
predicate
acts
required
to
state
a
claim
under
the
Georgia
RICO
Act.
11
12
arguments that Defendants criminal acts were not governed by the Georgia
Tort Claims Act or shielded by sovereign immunity.
35.
This was eerily similar to the trial courts improper conduct prior to the May
2, 2014 dismissal order.
36.
Plaintiff filed a Motion to add parties in December of 2013, upon remand
from federal court and prior to the commencement of discovery. By April of
2014, the Court still had not ruled on that motion, which prevented Plaintiff
from serving added parties with the Complaint. Also in April of 2014,
Plaintiff discovered that two of the proposed defendants were leaving their
employment at UGA and moving out of state. Proposed defendant Kasee
Laster denied under oath the existence of a key document, the UGA-ELTE
Cooperative Agreement--that was later discovered bearing the signatures of
Defendant Michael Adams and proposed defendant Jane Gatewood. See
Notice of Filing of Exhibits and Exhibits (Exhs. 10-12).
37.
Upon this discovery that Laster and Gatewood were imminently leaving
Georgia, Plaintiff filed a motion to advise the trial court of the urgency of a
ruling so that these parties could be served without chasing them down out
13
of state. Furthermore, there was no legal ground for denying the addition of
parties under the governing statute, OCGA 9-11-21, allowing addition of
parties at any stage of an action as long as it does not work an injustice (case
law urged by the Attorney General requiring an excuse for not adding parties
earlierwhich is limited to fact situations in which discovery has already
closed--is inapposite to this case in which discovery has never begun, as
highlighted by the trial courts very July 21 order, to which Plaintiff
objectsit is not supported by fact or law, which is the very reason ex parte
orders are prohibited except in limited, situations specified by statute).
38.
Plaintiff advised the trial court that Laster and Gatewood were expected to
depart the state by May 9, and that the trial court should go ahead and grant
to motion to add parties that had been pending for six monthssince the
statute of limitations had not expired and Plaintiff clearly had the right, in
the alternative, to merely dismiss the action and re-file it with all the parties
Plaintiff wished to add.
39.
Initially, the trial court set a phone conference to address this matter (similar
to the phone conference of July 21, 2015, except that there was prior notice
of the conference regarding the proposed parties). However, when a CBS
14
15
and to the ex parte order that is not based on accurate facts or valid law
similar to the dismissal order reversed by the Court of Appeals.
43.
Plaintiff also objects to the plain and manifest appearance of bias and
disregard for the governing law that has demonstrably pervaded the trial
courts actions to date.
Wherefore, premises considered, the trial court should vacate its order of
July 21, 2015.
16
CERTIFICATE
OF
SERVICE
Samuel S. Olens
Dennis R. Dunn
Kathleen M. Pacious
Annette M. Cowart
Loretta L. Pinkston
Christopher A. McGraw
C. McLaurin Sitton
Office of the Attorney General
40 Capitol Square, SW
Atlanta, Georgia 30334-1300
17