Criminal Law I

I. Criminal Law
A body of rules and statutes that defines conduct prohibited by the government because it
threatens and harms public safety and welfare and that establishes punishment to be imposed
for the commission of such acts.
A. Classical Theory of Criminal Law - this theory suggests that people think
before they proceed with criminal actions; that when one commits a crime, it
is because the individual decided that it was advantageous to commit the
crime. The individual commits the crime from his own free will being well
aware of the punishment. This theory, derived its basis from what John Locke
penned The Social Contract. Locke proposed that all citizens are equal, and
that there is an unwritten but voluntary contract between the state and its
citizens, giving power to those in government and defining a framework of
mutual rights and duties. In Leviathan, Thomas Hobbes wrote, the right of all
sovereigns is derived from the consent of every one of those who are to be
governed. This way of thinking enforces the idea that we, as citizens, agree
to follow the laws of the government in return for our protection and
sustenance which is very different from early European authoritarianism.
B. Positivist Theory of Criminal Law - On the other side of the spectrum, the
positivist rejects the idea that each individual makes a conscious, rational
choice to commit a crime but rather, some individuals are low in intelligence,
social acceptance, or some other way, and that causes them to commit
crime. This theory acts on the proposition that one who commits a crime
cannot morally comprehend the wrongfulness of his actions in the same way
individuals of average intelligence or who are socially accepted, etc are able
to do so. The mind of these individuals has been affected in a particular way
and therefore does not have the capability to make a conscious, rational
choice to obey the law. Unfortunately a case can be made based on this
theory regarding shootings on school campuses where students have
murdered fellow students usually because of some type of bullying involved.
II. Crime
noun: crime; plural noun: crimes
1. an action or omission that constitutes an offense that may be prosecuted by
the state and is punishable by law

III. Sources of Criminal Law

a) Revised Penal Code -contains the general penal laws of the Philippines.
First enacted in 1930, it remains in effect today, despite several amendments
thereto. It does not comprise a comprehensive compendium of all Philippine
penal laws.
b) Special Penal Laws - violations of Special Penal Laws are generally referred
to as malum prohibitum or an act that is wrong because it is prohibited. Thus,
no criminal intent is needed in order to find a person liable for crimes
punished under Special Penal Laws. As long as the act is committed, then it is
punishable as a crime under law.
c) Presidential Decrees issued during Martial Law - Defining The Conditions
Under Which The President may Issue Orders Of Arrest Or Commitment Orders During Martial
Law Or When The Privilege Of The Writ Of Habeas Corpus Is Suspended

d) Are there Common Law Crimes in Philippines? - There is no crime unless the
act is defined and penalized by the Criminal Code of the Philippines or other laws at the time of
commission. Criminal laws are prospective in application unless favorable to the accused.

IV. Police Power

police power is the capacity of the states to regulate behavior and enforce order
within their territory for the betterment of the health, safety, morals, and general
welfare of their inhabitants.
December 8, 1914
G.R. No. L-9726
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CARSON TAYLOR, defendant-appellant.
C. W. O'Brien for appellant. Office of the Solicitor General Corpus for appellee.
JOHNSON, J.:
This was an action for criminal libel.
The complaint alleged:
That on the 25th day of September, 1913, the said Carson Taylor, being then and
there the acting editor and proprietor, manager, printer, and publisher in the city of
Manila, Philippine Islands, of a certain daily bilingual newspaper, edited in the
English and Spanish languages, and known as the 'Manila Daily Bulletin,' a paper of
large circulation throughout the Philippine Islands, as well as in the United States
and other countries in all of which both languages are spoken and written, and
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having as such the supervision and control of said newspaper, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully, feloniously, maliciously, and with intent to impeach the
honesty, virtue, and reputation of one Ramon Sotelo as a member of the bar of the
Philippine Islands and as private individual, and to expose him to public hatred,
contempt and ridicule, compose, print, edit, publish, and circulate and procure to be
composed, printed, edited, published, and circulated in said newspaper's issue of
the above mentioned date, September 25, 1913, a certain false and malicious
defamation and libel in the English language of and concerning the said Ramon
Sotelo, which reads as follows:
OWNERS FIRED BUILDING TO COLLECT INSURANCE. CRIMINAL CHARGES FOLLOWS
CIVIL SUIT.
'Conspiracy divulged in three sworn statements made by members of the party
after a family disagreement. Sensational statement sworn to. Mystery of Calle
O'Donnell fire solved and papers served.
'Conspiracy to defraud the insurance company.'
'The building was fired to collect the amount of insurance.'
'The movable furniture of value was removed before the fire.'
'The full amount of the insurance was collected, and the conspiracy was a success.'
'The above is the gist of the sworn statements of Vicente Sotelo and Eugenio Martin
in connection with the fire that destroyed house No. 2157 Calle O'Donnell on April
4.'
'The case in question is a sensational one to say the least, and the court is being
petitioned to set aside the ruling and cite the parties to show cause why they should
not be cited to answer charges of conspiracy to defraud.'
'On April 4, 1913, the house located at 2157 Calle O'donnell was destroyed by fire.
The house was insured for P5,000, the contents for an additional P5,000, with the
West of Scotland Insurance Association, of which Lutz & Co. are the local agents,
with an additional P1,500 with Smith, Bell & Co.'
'The full amount of the insurance on the property was paid by the paid by the
agents of the insurance companies and the matter apparently dropped from the
records.'
'Then there was internal trouble and information began to leak out which resulted in
sensational statements to the effect that the destruction of the property had been
an act of incendiarism in order to collect the insurance. The there was an
investigation started and it resulted in sworn statements of the three persons above
mentioned.'
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'Notarial returns were made yesterday by the sheriff, based on the sworn
statements and the parties are cited to appear in court and show cause.'
'The investigation also showed that the furniture, which was supposed to be in line
the house at the time of the conflagration and which was paid for by the insurance
agents, sworn statements having been made that it was destroyed in the fire, was
in certain house in Montalban, where it was identified upon the sworn statements of
the above mentioned. Implicated in the charges of conspiracy and fraud is the name
of the attorney for the plaintiff who made affidavit as to the burning of the house
and against whom criminal proceedings will be brought as well as against the
original owners.'
'Attorney Burke, who represents Lutz & Co. in the proceedings, was seen last night
and asked for a statement as to the case. Mr. Burke refused to talk on the case and
stated that when it came to trial it would be time enough to obtain the facts.'
'The present action came before the court on motion of Attorney Burke to set aside
the judgment, which, in the original case, given the owners of the property
judgment for the amount of the insurance.'
'Attorney Burke filed the sworn statements with the court and the notarial returns to
the same were made yesterday afternoon, the sworn statements as to the burning
of the house being in the hands of the sheriff.'
'It was stated yesterday that a criminal action would follow the civil proceedings
instituted to recover the funds in the case entitled on the court records, Maria
Mortera de Eceiza and Manuel Eceiza versus the West o Sctoland Association,
Limited, No. 10191 on the court records.'
'It might be stated also that Eugenio Martin was one of the plaintiffs in the recent
suit brought against Ex-Governor W. Cameron Forbes for lumber supplied for his
Boston home.'
That in this article is contained the following paragraph. To wit:
". . . Implicated in the charges of conspiracy and fraud is the name of the attorney
for the plaintiff who made affidavit as to the burning of the house and against whom
criminal proceedings will be brought as well as against the original owners," by
which the said accused meant to refer and did refer to the said Ramon Sotelo, who
then and there was the attorney for the plaintiff in the case aforesaid, No. 10191 of
the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila, and so was understood by the public
who read the same; that the statements and allegations made in said paragraph are
wholly false and untrue, thus impeaching the honesty, virtue, and reputation of the
said offended party as a member of the bar of the Philippine Islands and as private
individual, and exposing him to public hatred, contempt and ridicule. Contrary to
law.
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Upon said complaint the defendant was arrested, arraigned, plead not guilty, was
tried, found guilty of the crime charged, and sentenced by the Honorable George N.
Hurd, judge, to pay a fine of P200. From the sentence the defendant appealed to
this court and made the following assignment of error:
First. The court erred in finding that the defendant was responsible for and guilty of
the alleged libel.
Second. The court erred in finding that the defendant was the proprietor and
publisher of the "Manila Daily Bulletin."
Third. The court erred in finding that the alleged libelous articles was libelous per
se.
Fourth. The court erred in holding that the article was libelous, while finding that
there was no malice.
Fifth. The court erred in finding that the alleged libelous article referred to attorney
Ramon Sotelo.
Sixth. The court erred in finding that Ramon Sotelo was attorney for the plaintiffs in
case No. 10191, when the alleged libel was published.
After a careful examination of the record and the arguments presented by the
appellant, we deem it necessary to discuss only the first and second assignments of
error.
In the Philippine Islands there exist no crimes such as are known in the United
States and England as common law crimes. No act constitutes a crime here unless it
is made so by law. Libel is made a crime here by Act No. 277 of the United States
Philippine Commission. Said Act (No. 277) not only defines the crime of libel and
prescribes the particular conditions necessary to constitute it, but it also names the
persons who may be guilty of such crime. In the present case the complaint alleges
that the defendant was, at the time of the publication of said alleged article "the
acting editor, proprietor, manager, printer, publisher, etc. etc. of a certain bilingual
newspaper, etc., known as the 'Manila Daily Bulletin,' a paper of large circulation
throughout the Philippine Islands, as well as in the United States and other
countries."
It will be noted that the complaint charges the defendant as "the acting editor,
proprietor, manager, printer, and publisher." From an examination of said Act No.
277, we find that section 6 provides that: "Every author, editor, or proprietor of any
book, newspaper, or serial publication is chargeable with the publication of any
words contained in any part of said book or number of each newspaper or serial as
fully as if he were the author of the same."
By an examination of said article, with reference to the persons who may be liable
for the publication of a libel in a newspaper, we find that it only provides for a
punishment of "the author, editor, or proprietor." It would follow, therefore, that
unless the proof shows that the defendant in the present case is the "author, editor,
or proprietor" of the newspaper in which the libel was published, he can not be held
liable.
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In the present case the Solicitor-General in his brief said that - "No person is
represented to be either the 'author, editor, or proprietor.'" That statement of the
Solicitor-General is fully sustained by the record. There is not a word of proof in the
record showing that the defendant was either the "author, the editor, or the
proprietor." The proof shows that the defendant was the "manager." He must,
therefore, be acquitted of the crime charged against him, unless it is shown by the
proof that he, as "manager" of the newspaper, was in some way directly responsible
for the writing, editing, or publishing of the matter contained in said alleged libelous
article. The prosecution presented the newspaper, the "Manila Daily Bulletin," for
the purpose of showing the relation which the defendant had to it. That was the only
proof presented by the prosecution to show the relation which the defendant had to
the publication of the libel in question. From an examination of the editorial page of
said exhibit, we find that it shows that the "Manila Daily Bulletin" is owned by the
"Bulletin Publishing Company," and that the defendant was its manager. There is
not a word of proof in the record which shows what relation the manager had to the
publication of said newspaper. We might, by series of presumptions and
assumptions, conclude that the manager of a newspaper has some direct
responsibility with its publication. We believe, however, that such presumptions and
assumptions, in the absence of a single letter of proof relating thereto, would be
unwarranted and unjustified. The prosecuting attorney had an opportunity to
present proof or because no such proof was obtainable, he presented none. It
certainly is not difficult matter to ascertain who is the real person responsible for
the publication of a newspaper which is published daily and has a wide circulation in
a particular community. No question was asked the defendant concerning his
particular relation to the publication of the newspaper in question. We do not desire
to be understood in our conclusions here as holding that the "manager" or the
"printer" may not, under certain conditions and proper proof, he held to be the
"author, editor, or proprietor" of a newspaper. He may nominate himself as
"manager" or "printer" simply, and be at the same time the "author, editor, or
proprietor" of the newspaper. He can not avoid responsibility by using some other
term or word, indicating his relation to the newspaper or the publication, when, as a
matter of fact, he is the "author, the editor, or the proprietor" of the same. His real
relation to the said publication is a matter of proof. The Solicitor-General, in his with
the hope of evading legal responsibility, as the Libel Law places the responsibility
for publishing a libel, on "every author, editor, or proprietor of any book, etc." Had
the prosecuting attorney in the trial of the cause believed that the defendant, even
though he called himself the "manager" was, in fact, the "author, editor, or
proprietor" of said publication, he should have presented some proof supporting
that contention. Neither do we desire to be understood as holding that simply
because a person connected with the publication of a newspaper who calls himself
the "manager" or "printer" may not, in fact and at the same time, be the "author,
editor, or proprietor." The "author, editor, or proprietor" can not avoid responsibility
for the writing and publication of a libelous article, by simply calling himself the
"manager" or the "printer" of a newspaper. That, however, is a question of proof.
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The burden is upon the prosecution to show that the defendant is, by whatever
name he may call himself, in truth and in fact, the "author, editor, or proprietor" of a
newspaper. The courts cannot assume, in the absence of proof, that one who called
himself "manager" was in fact the "author, editor, or proprietor." We might assume,
perhaps, that the "manager" of a newspaper plays an important part in the
publication of the same by virtue of the general signification of the word "manager."
Men can not, however, be sentenced upon the basis of a mere assumption. There
must be some proof. The word "manage" has been defined by Webster to mean "to
have under control and direction; to conduct; to guide; to administer; to treat; to
handle." Webster defines "manager" to be "one who manages; a conductor or
director; as, the manager of a theater." A manager, as that word is generally
understood, we do not believe includes the idea of ownership. Generally speaking it
means one who is representing another as an agent. That being true, his power and
duties and obligations are generally defined by contract. He may have expressed as
well as implied powers, but whatever his powers and duties are they must be
defendant upon the nature of the business and the terms of his contract. There is no
fixed rule which indicates particularly and definitely his duties, powers and
obligations. An examination into the character of the business and the contract of
his employment must be made for the purpose of ascertaining definitely what his
duties and obligations are. His exact relation is always a matter of proof. It is
incumbent upon the prosecution is a case like the present, to show that whatever
title, name or designation the defendant may bear, he was, in fact, the "author, the
editor, or the proprietor" of the newspaper. If he was in fact the "author, editor, or
proprietor," he can not escape responsibility by calling the "manager" or "printer." It
is the relation which he bears to the publication and not the name or title he has
assumed, which is important in an investigation. He can not wear the toga of author
of editor and hide his responsibility by giving himself some other name. While the
terms "author, editor, and proprietor" of a newspaper are terms well defined, the
particular words "author, editor, or proprietor" are not material or important, further
than that they are words which are intended to show the relation of the responsible
party to the publication. That relation may as well exist under some other name or
denomination.
For the foregoing reasons, therefore, there being no proof whatever in the record
showing that the defendant was the "author, the editor, or the proprietor" of the
newspaper in question, the sentence of the lower court must be reversed, the
complaint dismissed and the defendant discharged from the custody of the law,
with costs de officio. So ordered.
V. Constitutional Sources
1. Article II Section 5
The maintenance of peace and order, the proection of life, liberty, and
property, and the promotion of the general welfare are essential for the
enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy.
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2. Article IV Section 1
The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which
shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the
extent reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and referendum.
3. Article II Section 1
The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in
the people and all governtment authority emanates from them.
VI. Limitations on the enactment of penal legislation
a. Article III (Bill of Rights)
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the
equal protection of the laws.
Section 14. (1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal
offense without due process of law.
Section 18. (1) No person shall be detained solely by reason of
his political
beliefs and aspiration
(2) No involuntary servitude in any form shall exist except as a
punishment for a crime whereof the part y shall have been duly
convicted.
Section 19. (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel,
degrading or inhuman punishmentinflicted. Neither shall death
penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving
heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it. Any
death penalty imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua.
(2) The employment of physical, psychological, or degrading
punishment against any prisoner or detainee or the use of
substandard or inadequate penal facilities under subhuman
conditions shall be dealt with by law.
Section 20. No person shall be imprisoned for debt or nonpayment of a poll tax.

Section 22. NO ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be

enacted
Ex post Facto Laws - is a law that retroactively changes the
legal consequences (or status) of actions that were committed, or
relationships that existed, before the enactment of the law.
-A law that makes illegal an act that was legal when committed,
increases the penalties for an infraction after it has been
committed, or changes the rules of evidence to make conviction
easier. The Constitution prohibits the making of ex post facto law.

G.R. No. L-46228 January 17, 1978

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ROLANDO R. VILLARAZA (as City Judge of Cagayan de Oro City), and
CAESAR PUERTO, respondents.
Francisco P. Rabanes, Edgardo Y. Raagas, Casiano A. Gamotin, Jr., Office of the City
Fiscal of Cagayan de Oro City for petitioner.
Eric Menchavez for respondent Caesar Puerto.

AQUINO, J.:
This case is about the jurisdiction of a city court in estafa cases.
On December 3, 1975 an assistant city fiscal charged Caesar Puerto with estafa in the
city court of Cagayan de Oro City for having issued on October 16, 1974 two bouncing
checks for the total sum of P4, 966. 63 (Criminal Case No. 32140).
City Judge Rolando R. Villaraza in his order March 31, 1976 noted that the accused had
waived the second stage of the preliminary investigation. He directed that the case be
elevated, for trial, to the court of First Instance or the Circuit Criminal Court.
Upon petition of the prosecution, the Court of first Instance of Misamis Oriental,
Cagayan de Oro Branch VIII, in its order of February 3, 1977 returned the case to the
city court because in its opinion the case falls within the concurrent jurisdiction of the
two courts and, the city court, as the first court which took cognizance of the case,
should try it.
Disagreeing with the Court of First Instance, respondent city judge in his order of April
21, 1977 directed the re-elevation of the case. His view is that the case falls within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance because estafa committed by
the accused is punishable by prision mayor medium under Presidential Decree No. 818
9

which took effect on October 22, 1975 and which amended article 315 of the Revised
Penal Code.
That order of respondent judge is assailed in the petition for certiorari filed in this Court
on May 27, 1977 by the office of the city fiscal of Cagayan de Oro City.
We hold that the case was properly filed with the city court which has original jurisdiction
over it. The estafa imputed to Caesar Puerto is punishable under article 315 of the
Revised Penal Code by arresto mayor maximum to prision correccional minimum or
four months and one day to two years and four months.
The penalty of prision mayor medium, or eight years and one day to ten years, imposed
by Presidential Decree No. 818, applies only to swindling by means of issuing bouncing
checks which was committed or after October 22, 1975.
That increased penalty does not apply to the estafa committed by Puerto on October
16, 1974. To apply it to Puerto would make the decree an ex post facto law. Its
retroactive application is prohibited by articles 21 and 22 of the Revised Penal Code
and section 12, Article IV of the Constitution.
The city court has original jurisdiction over the case because the penultimate paragraph
or section 87 of the Judiciary Law, as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 2613 and 3828,
provides that "judges of city courts shall have like jurisdiction as the Court of First
Instance to try parties charged with an offense committed within their respective
jurisdictions, in which the penalty provided by law does not exceed prision correccional
or imprisonment for not more than six years or fine not exceeding six thousand pesos or
both."
As section 87 itself shows, that jurisdiction is concurrent with the court of First Instance
which is empowered to try "all criminal cases in which the penalty provided by law is
imprisonment for more than six months, or a fine of more than two hundred pesos"
(Sec. 44[f], Judiciary Law. See People vs. Nazareno, L-40037, April 30, 1976, 70 SCRA
531).
It was not necessary for the city court to have conducted the preliminary investigation of
the case. The filing of the information by the fiscal presupposes that he had conducted
the requisite preliminary investigation pursuant to Rule 112 of the Rules of Court and
Republic Act No. 5180, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 77.
WHEREFORE, the order of the Court of First Instance, returning the case to the city
court, is affirmed and the two orders of the respondent city judge, elevating the case to
the Court of First Instance, are set aside. The city court is directed to try the case. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.

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In RE: Declaration of the Petitioner's Rights and Duties under Section 8 of RA 6132. Kay
Villegas Kami. [GR L-32485, 22 October 1970]
First Division, Makasiar (J): 4 concur, 1 reserves vote, 2 maintain opinions in Imbong vs.
Comelec and
Gonzales vs. Comelec, 1 concurs partly, 1 on leave, 1 files separate dissenting opinion
Facts:
Kay Villegas Kami, Inc., filed a petition for declaratory relief, claiming to be a duly recognized
and existing non-stock and non-profit corporation created under the laws of the land, and
praying for a determination of the validity of Section 8 of RA 6132 and a declaration of
petitioner's rights and duties thereunder. In paragraph 7 of its petition, "Kay Villegas Kami" avers
that it has printed materials designed to propagate its ideology and program of government, and
that in paragraph 11 of said petition, it intends to pursue its purposes by supporting delegates to
the Constitutional Convention who will propagate its ideology. "Kay Villegas kami" actually
impugns only the first paragraph of Sec. 8(a) on the ground that it violates the due process
clause, right of association, and freedom of expression and that it is an ex post facto law.
Issue:
Whether Section 8 of RA 6132 is in the nature of an ex-post facto law.
Held:
An ex post facto law is one which: (1) makes criminal an act done before the passage of the law
and which was innocent when done, and punishes such an act; (2) aggravates a crime, or
makes it greater than it was, when committed; (3) changes the punishment and inflicts a greater
punishment than the law annexed to the crime when committed; (4) alters the legal rules of
evidence, and authorizes conviction upon less or different testimony than the law required at the
time of the commission of the offense; (5) assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in
effect imposes penalty or deprivation of a right for something which when done was lawful; and
(6) deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has become
entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty.
From the aforesaid definition as well as classification of ex post facto laws, the constitutional
inhibition refers only to criminal laws which are given retroactive effect. While it is true that Sec.
18 penalizes a violation of any provision of RA 6132 including Sec. 8 (a) thereof, the penalty is
imposed only for acts committed after the approval of the law and not those perpetrated prior
thereto. There is nothing in the law that remotely insinuates that Secs. 8(a) and 18, or any other
provision thereof, shall apply to acts carried out prior to its approval. On the contrary, Sec. 23
directs that the entire law shall be effective upon its approval. It was approved on 24 August
1970.

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ROBERTO S. BENEDICTO and HECTOR T. RIVERA, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF

APPEALS, HON. GUILLERMO L. LOJA, SR., PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF MANILA, BRANCH 26, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
The factual antecedents of the instant petition are as follows:
On December 27, 1991, Mrs. Imelda Marcos and Messrs. Benedicto and Rivera were indicted
for violation of Section 10 of Circular No. 960 in relation to Section 34 of the Central Bank Act
(Republic Act No. 265, as amended) in five Informations filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Manila. Docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 91-101879 to 91-101883, the charge sheets alleged
that the trio failed to submit reports of their foreign exchange earnings from abroad and/or failed
to register with the Foreign Exchange Department of the Central Bank within the period
mandated by Circular No. 960. Said Circular prohibited natural and juridical persons from
maintaining foreign exchange accounts abroad without prior authorization from the Central
Bank. It also required all residents of the Philippines who habitually earned or received foreign
currencies from invisibles, either locally or abroad, to report such earnings or receipts to the
Central Bank. Violations of the Circular were punishable as a criminal offense under Section 34
of the Central Bank Act.
That same day, nine additional Informations charging Mrs. Marcos and Benedicto with the same
offense, but involving different accounts, were filed with the Manila RTC, which docketed these
as Criminal Cases Nos. 91-101884 to 91-101892. The accusatory portion of the charge sheet in
Criminal Case No. 91-101888 reads:
That from September 1, 1983 up to 1987, both dates inclusive, and for sometime thereafter,
both accused, conspiring and confederating with each other and with the late President
Ferdinand E. Marcos, all residents of Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously fail to submit reports in
the prescribed form and/or register with the Foreign Exchange Department of the Central Bank
within 90 days from October 21, 1983 as required of them being residents habitually/customarily
earning, acquiring or receiving foreign exchange from whatever source or from invisibles locally
or from abroad, despite the fact they actually earned interests regularly every six (6 ) months for
the first two years and then quarterly thereafter for their investment of $50-million, later reduced
to $25-million in December 1985, in Philippine-issued dollar denominated treasury notes with
floating rates and in bearer form, in the name of Bank Hofmann, AG, Zurich, Switzerland, for the
benefit of Avertina Foundation, their front organization established for economic advancement
purposes with secret foreign exchange account Category (Rubric) C.A.R. No. 211 925-02 in
Swiss Credit Bank (also known as SKA) in Zurich, Switzerland, which earned, acquired or
received for the accused Imelda Romualdez Marcos and her late husband an interest of
$2,267,892 as of December 16, 1985 which was remitted to Bank Hofmann, AG, through
Citibank, New York, United States of America, for the credit of said Avertina account on
December 19, 1985, aside from the redemption of $25 million (one-half of the original $50-M) as
of December 16, 1985 and outwardly remitted from the Philippines in the amounts of
$7,495,297.49 and $17,489,062.50 on December 18, 1985 for further investment outside the
Philippines without first complying with the Central Bank reporting/registering requirements.
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CONTRARY TO LAW.
The other charge sheets were similarly worded except the days of the commission of the
offenses, the name(s) of the alleged dummy or dummies, the amounts in the foreign exchange
accounts maintained, and the names of the foreign banks where such accounts were held by
the accused.
On January 3, 1992, eleven more Informations accusing Mrs. Marcos and Benedicto of the
same offense, again in relation to different accounts, were filed with the same court, docketed
as Criminal Cases Nos. 92-101959 to 92-101969. The Informations were similarly worded as
the earlier indictments, save for the details as to the dates of the violations of Circular No. 960,
the identities of the dummies used, the balances and sources of the earnings, and the names of
the foreign banks where these accounts were maintained.
All of the aforementioned criminal cases were consolidated before Branch 26 of the said trial
court.
On the same day that Criminal Cases Nos. 92-101959 to 92-101969 were filed, the Central
Bank issued Circular No. 1318 which revised the rules governing non-trade foreign exchange
transactions. It took effect on January 20, 1992.
On August 24, 1992, the Central Bank, pursuant to the governments policy of further liberalizing
foreign exchange transactions, came out with Circular No. 1353, which amended Circular No.
1318. Circular No. 1353 deleted the requirement of prior Central Bank approval for foreign
exchange-funded expenditures obtained from the banking system.
Both of the aforementioned circulars, however, contained a saving clause, excepting from their
coverage pending criminal actions involving violations of Circular No. 960 and, in the case of
Circular No. 1353, violations of both Circular No. 960 and Circular No. 1318.
On September 19, 1993, the government allowed petitioners Benedicto and Rivera to return to
the Philippines, on condition that they face the various criminal charges instituted against them,
including the dollar-salting cases. Petitioners posted bail in the latter cases.
On February 28, 1994, petitioners Benedicto and Rivera were arraigned. Both pleaded not guilty
to the charges of violating Central Bank Circular No. 960. Mrs. Marcos had earlier entered a
similar plea during her arraignment for the same offense on February 12, 1992.
On August 11, 1994, petitioners moved to quash all the Informations filed against them in
Criminal Cases Nos. 91-101879 to 91-101883; 91-101884 to 91-101892, and 91-101959 to 91101969. Their motion was grounded on lack of jurisdiction, forum shopping, extinction of
criminal liability with the repeal of Circular No. 960, prescription, exemption from the Central
Banks reporting requirement, and the grant of absolute immunity as a result of a compromise
agreement entered into with the government.
On September 6, 1994, the trial court denied petitioners motion. A similar motion filed on May
23, 1994 by Mrs. Marcos seeking to dismiss the dollar-salting cases against her due to the
repeal of Circular No. 960 had earlier been denied by the trial court in its order dated June 9,
1994. Petitioners then filed a motion for reconsideration, but the trial court likewise denied this
motion on October 18, 1994.
13

On November 21, 1994, petitioners moved for leave to file a second motion for reconsideration.
The trial court, in its order of November 23, 1994, denied petitioners motion and set the
consolidated cases for trial on January 5, 1995.
Two separate petitions for certiorari and prohibition, with similar prayers for temporary
restraining orders and/or writs of preliminary injunction, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 35719 and
CA-G.R. SP No. 35928, were respectively filed by Mrs. Marcos and petitioners with the Court of
Appeals. Finding that both cases involved violations of Central Bank Circular No. 960, the
appellate court consolidated the two cases.
On May 23, 1996, the Court of Appeals disposed of the consolidated cases as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Judge in denying
petitioners respective Motions to Quash, except that with respect to Criminal Case No. 91101884, the instant petitions are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The assailed September
6, 1994 Order, in so far as it denied the Motion to Quash Criminal Case No. 91-101884 is
hereby nullified and set aside, and said case is hereby dismissed. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Dissatisfied with the said decision of the court a quo, except with respect to the portion ordering
the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 91-101884, petitioners filed the instant petition, attributing
the following errors to the appellate court:
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE INFORMATIONS/CASES FILED
AGAINST PETITIONERS-APPELLANTS ARE QUASHABLE BASED ON THE FOLLOWING
GROUNDS:
(A)
LACK OF JURISDICTION/FORUM SHOPPING/NO VALID PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION
(B)
EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY
1) REPEAL OF CB CIRCULAR NO. 960 BY CB CIRCULAR NO. 1353;
2) REPEAL OF R.A. 265 BY R.A. 7653
(C)
PRESCRIPTION
(D)
EXEMPTION FROM CB REPORTING REQUIREMENT
(E)
GRANT OF ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY.
Simply stated, the issues for our resolution are:
(1)Did the Court of Appeals err in denying the Motion to Quash for lack of jurisdiction on the
part of the trial court, forum shopping by the prosecution, and absence of a valid
preliminary investigation?
(2)Did the repeal of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and Republic Act No. 265 by Circular
No. 1353 and Republic Act No. 7653 respectively, extinguish the criminal liability of
petitioners?
(3)

Had the criminal cases in violation of Circular No. 960 already prescribed?

14

(4)

Were petitioners exempted from the application and coverage of Circular No. 960?
(5)Were petitioners' alleged violations of Circular No. 960 covered by the absolute immunity
granted in the Compromise Agreement of November 3, 1990?

On the first issue, petitioners assail the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. They aver that
the dollar-salting charges filed against them were violations of the Anti-Graft Law or Republic
Act No. 3019, and the Sandiganbayan has original and exclusive jurisdiction over their cases.
Settled is the rule that the jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is determined by the law in
force at the time the action is instituted. The 25 cases were filed in 1991-92. The applicable law
on jurisdiction then was Presidential Decree 1606. Under P.D. No. 1606, offenses punishable by
imprisonment of not more than six years fall within the jurisdiction of the regular trial courts, not
the Sandiganbayan.
In the instant case, all the Informations are for violations of Circular No. 960 in relation to
Section 34 of the Central Bank Act and not, as petitioners insist, for transgressions of Republic
Act No. 3019. Pursuant to Section 34 of Republic Act No. 265, violations of Circular No. 960 are
punishable by imprisonment of not more than five years and a fine of not more than P20,000.00.
Since under P.D. No. 1606 the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction to try criminal cases where
the imposable penalty is less than six years of imprisonment, the cases against petitioners for
violations of Circular No. 960 are, therefore, cognizable by the trial court. No error may thus be
charged to the Court of Appeals when it held that the RTC of Manila had jurisdiction to hear and
try the dollar-salting cases.
Still on the first issue, petitioners next contend that the filing of the cases for violations of
Circular No. 960 before the RTC of Manila constitutes forum shopping. Petitioners argue that
the prosecution, in an attempt to seek a favorable verdict from more than one tribunal, filed
separate cases involving virtually the same offenses before the regular trial courts and the
Sandiganbayan. They fault the prosecution with splitting the cases. Petitioners maintain that
while the RTC cases refer only to the failure to report interest earnings on Treasury Notes, the
Sandiganbayan cases seek to penalize the act of receiving the same interest earnings on
Treasury Notes in violation of the Anti-Graft Laws provisions on prohibited transactions.
Petitioners aver that the violation of Circular No. 960 is but an element of the offense of
prohibited transactions punished under Republic Act No. 3019 and should, thus, be deemed
absorbed by the prohibited transactions cases pending before the Sandiganbayan.
For a charge of forum shopping to prosper, there must exist between an action pending in one
court and another action before another court: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as
represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for,
the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two preceding particulars
is such that any judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is
successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration. Here, we find that the
single act of receiving unreported interest earnings on Treasury Notes held abroad constitutes
an offense against two or more distinct and unrelated laws, Circular No. 960 and R.A. 3019.
Said laws define distinct offenses, penalize different acts, and can be applied independently.i[14]
Hence, no fault lies at the prosecutions door for having instituted separate cases before
separate tribunals involving the same subject matter.

15

With respect to the RTC cases, the receipt of the interest earnings violate Circular No. 960 in
relation to Republic Act No. 265 because the same was unreported to the Central Bank. The act
to be penalized here is the failure to report the interest earnings from the foreign exchange
accounts to the proper authority. As to the anti-graft cases before the Sandiganbayan involving
the same interest earnings from the same foreign exchange accounts, the receipt of the interest
earnings transgresses Republic Act No. 3019 because the act of receiving such interest is a
prohibited transaction prejudicial to the government. What the State seeks to punish in these
anti-graft cases is the prohibited receipt of the interest earnings. In sum, there is no identity of
offenses charged, and prosecution under one law is not an obstacle to a prosecution under the
other law. There is no forum shopping.
Finally, on the first issue, petitioners contend that the preliminary investigation by the
Department of Justice was invalid and in violation of their rights to due process. Petitioners
argue that governments ban on their travel effectively prevented them from returning home and
personally appearing at the preliminary investigation. Benedicto and Rivera further point out that
the joint preliminary investigation by the Department of Justice, resulted to the charges in one
set of cases before the Sandiganbayan for violations of Republic Act No. 3019 and another set
before the RTC for violation of Circular No. 960.
Preliminary investigation is not part of the due process guaranteed by the Constitution. It is an
inquiry to determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a
crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof. Instead, the right to a
preliminary investigation is personal. It is afforded to the accused by statute, and can be waived,
either expressly or by implication. The waiver extends to any irregularity in the preliminary
investigation, where one was conducted.
The petition in the present case contains the following admissions:
1. Allowed to return to the Philippines on September 19, 1993on the condition that he face the
criminal charges pending in courts, petitioner-appellant Benedicto, joined by his co-petitioner
Rivera, lost no time in attending to the pending criminal charges by posting bail in the abovementioned cases.
2. Not having been afforded a real opportunity of attending the preliminary investigation
because of their forced absence from the Philippines then, petitioners-appellants invoked their
right to due process thru motions for preliminary investigationUpon denial of their demands for
preliminary investigation, the petitioners intended to elevate the matter to the Honorable Court
of Appeals and actually caused the filing of a petition for certiorari/prohibition sometime before
their arraignment but immediately caused the withdrawal thereofin view of the prosecutions
willingness to go to pre-trial wherein petitioners would be allowed access to the records of
preliminary investigation which they could use for purposes of filing a motion to quash if
warranted.
3. Thus, instead of remanding the Informations to the Department of Justicerespondent Judge
set the case for pre-trial in order to afford all the accused access to the records of the
prosecution
5. On the basis of disclosures at the pre-trial, the petitioners-appellants Benedicto and Rivera
moved for the quashing of the informations/cases

16

The foregoing admissions lead us to conclude that petitioners have expressly waived their right
to question any supposed irregularity in the preliminary investigation or to ask for a new
preliminary investigation. Petitioners, in the above excerpts from this petition, admit posting bail
immediately following their return to the country, entered their respective pleas to the charges,
and filed various motions and pleadings. By so doing, without simultaneously demanding a
proper preliminary investigation, they have waived any and all irregularities in the conduct of a
preliminary investigation. The trial court did not err in denying the motion to quash the
informations on the ground of want of or improperly conducted preliminary investigation. The
absence of a preliminary investigation is not a ground to quash the information.
On the second issue, petitioners contend that they are being prosecuted for acts punishable
under laws that have already been repealed. They point to the express repeal of Central Bank
Circular No. 960 by Circular Nos. 1318 and 1353 as well as the express repeal of Republic Act
No. 265 by Republic Act No. 7653. Petitioners, relying on Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code,
contend that repeal has the effect of extinguishing the right to prosecute or punish the offense
committed under the old laws.
As a rule, an absolute repeal of a penal law has the effect of depriving a court of its authority to
punish a person charged with violation of the old law prior to its repeal.] This is because an
unqualified repeal of a penal law constitutes a legislative act of rendering legal what had been
previously declared as illegal, such that the offense no longer exists and it is as if the person
who committed it never did so. There are, however, exceptions to the rule. One is the inclusion
of a saving clause in the repealing statute that provides that the repeal shall have no effect on
pending actions. Another exception is where the repealing act reenacts the former statute and
punishes the act previously penalized under the old law. In such instance, the act committed
before the reenactment continues to be an offense in the statute books and pending cases are
not affected, regardless of whether the new penalty to be imposed is more favorable to the
accused.
In the instant case, it must be noted that despite the repeal of Circular No. 960, Circular No.
1353 retained the same reportorial requirement for residents receiving earnings or profits from
non-trade foreign exchange transactions. Second, even the most cursory glance at the
repealing circulars, Circular Nos. 1318 and 1353 shows that both contain a saving clause,
expressly providing that the repeal of Circular No. 960 shall have no effect on pending actions
for violation of the latter Circular. A saving clause operates to except from the effect of the
repealing law what would otherwise be lost under the new law. In the present case, the
respective saving clauses of Circular Nos. 1318 and 1353 clearly manifest the intent to reserve
the right of the State to prosecute and punish offenses for violations of the repealed Circular No.
960, where the cases are either pending or under investigation.
Petitioners, however, insist that the repeal of Republic Act No. 265, particularly Section 34, by
Republic Act No. 7653, removed the applicability of any penal sanction for violations of any nontrade foreign exchange transactions previously penalized by Circular No. 960. Petitioners posit
that a comparison of the two provisions shows that Section 36 of Republic Act No. 7653 neither
retained nor reinstated Section 34 of Republic Act No. 265. Since, in creating the Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas, Congress did not include in its charter a clause providing for the application
of Section 34 of Republic Act No. 265 to pending cases, petitioners pending dollar-salting cases
are now bereft of statutory penalty, the saving clause in Circular No. 1353 notwithstanding. In
other words, absent a provision in Republic Act No. 7653 expressly reviving the applicability of
any penal sanction for the repealed mandatory foreign exchange reporting regulations formerly
17

required under Circular No. 960, violations of aforesaid repealed Circular can no longer be
prosecuted criminally.
A comparison of the old Central Bank Act and the new Bangko Sentrals charter repealing the
former show that in consonance with the general objective of the old law and the new law to
maintain internal and external monetary stability in the Philippines and preserve the international
value of the peso, both the repealed law and the repealing statute contain a penal clause which
sought to penalize in general, violations of the law as well as orders, instructions, rules, or
regulations issued by the Monetary Board. In the case of the Bangko Sentral, the scope of the
penal clause was expanded to include violations of other pertinent banking laws enforced or
implemented by the Bangko Sentral. In the instant case, the acts of petitioners sought to be
penalized are violations of rules and regulations issued by the Monetary Board. These acts are
proscribed and penalized in the penal clause of the repealed law and this proviso for
proscription and penalty was reenacted in the repealing law. We find, therefore, that while
Section 34 of Republic Act No. 265 was repealed, it was nonetheless, simultaneously reenacted
in Section 36 of Republic Act No. 7653. Where a clause or provision or a statute for that matter
is simultaneously repealed and reenacted, there is no effect, upon the rights and liabilities which
have accrued under the original statute, since the reenactment, in effect neutralizes the repeal
and continues the law in force without interruption. The rule applies to penal laws and statutes
with penal provisions. Thus, the repeal of a penal law or provision, under which a person is
charged with violation thereof and its simultaneous reenactment penalizing the same act done
by him under the old law, will neither preclude the accuseds prosecution nor deprive the court of
its jurisdiction to hear and try his case. As pointed out earlier, the act penalized before the
reenactment continues to remain an offense and pending cases are unaffected. Therefore, the
repeal of Republic Act No. 265 by Republic Act No. 7653 did not extinguish the criminal liability
of petitioners for transgressions of Circular No. 960 and cannot, under the circumstances of this
case, be made a basis for quashing the indictments against petitioners.
Petitioners, however, point out that Section 36 of Republic Act No. 7653, in reenacting Section
34 of the old Central Act, increased the penalty for violations of rules and regulations issued by
the Monetary Board. They claim that such increase in the penalty would give Republic Act No.
7653 an ex post facto application, violating the Bill of Rights.
Is Section 36 of Republic Act No. 7653 an ex post facto legislation?
An ex post facto law is one which: (1) makes criminal an act done before the passage of the law
and which was innocent when done, and punishes such an act; (2) aggravates a crime, or
makes it greater than it was when committed; (3) changes the punishment and inflicts a greater
punishment than the law annexed to the crime when committed; (4) alters the legal rules of
evidence, and authorizes conviction upon less or different testimony than the law required at the
time of the commission of the offense; (5) assuming to regulate civil rights, and remedies only,
in effect imposes penalty or deprivation of a right for something which when done was lawful;
and (6) deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has become
entitled such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty.
The test whether a penal law runs afoul of the ex post facto clause of the Constitution is: Does
the law sought to be applied retroactively take from an accused any right that was regarded at
the time of the adoption of the constitution as vital for the protection of life and liberty and which
he enjoyed at the time of the commission of the offense charged against him?

18

The crucial words in the test are vital for the protection of life and liberty. We find, however, the
test inapplicable to the penal clause of Republic Act No. 7653. Penal laws and laws which, while
not penal in nature, nonetheless have provisions defining offenses and prescribing penalties for
their violation operate prospectively. Penal laws cannot be given retroactive effect, except when
they are favorable to the accused. Nowhere in Republic Act No. 7653, and in particular Section
36, is there any indication that the increased penalties provided therein were intended to
operate retroactively. There is, therefore, no ex post facto law in this case.
On the third issue, petitioners ask us to note that the dollar interest earnings subject of the
criminal cases instituted against them were remitted to foreign banks on various dates between
1983 to 1987. They maintain that given the considerable lapse of time from the dates of the
commission of the offenses to the institution of the criminal actions in 1991 and 1992, the States
right to prosecute them for said offenses has already prescribed. Petitioners assert that the
Court of Appeals erred in computing the prescriptive period from February 1986. Petitioners
theorize that since the remittances were made through the Central Bank as a regulatory
authority, the dates of the alleged violations are known, and prescription should thus be counted
from these dates.
In ruling that the dollar-salting cases against petitioners have not yet prescribed, the court a quo
quoted with approval the trial courts finding that:
[T]he alleged violations of law were discovered only after the EDSA Revolution in 1986 when
the dictatorship was toppled down. The date of the discovery of the offense, therefore, should
be the basis in computing the prescriptive period. Since (the) offenses charged are punishable
by imprisonment of not more than five (5) years, they prescribe in eight (8) years. Thus, only a
little more than four (4) years had elapsed from the date of discovery in 1986 when the cases
were filed in 1991.
The offenses for which petitioners are charged are penalized by Section 34 of Republic Act No.
265 by a fine of not more than Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) and by imprisonment of
not more than five years. Pursuant to Act No. 3326, which mandates the periods of prescription
for violations of special laws, the prescriptive period for violations of Circular No. 960 is eight (8)
years. The period shall commence to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the
law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and institution of
judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment. In the instant case, the indictments
against petitioners charged them with having conspired with the late President Ferdinand E.
Marcos in transgressing Circular No. 960. Petitioners contention that the dates of the
commission of the alleged violations were known and prescription should be counted from these
dates must be viewed in the context of the political realities then prevailing. Petitioners, as close
associates of Mrs. Marcos, were not only protected from investigation by their influence and
connections, but also by the power and authority of a Chief Executive exercising strong-arm
rule. This Court has taken judicial notice of the fact that Mr. Marcos, his family, relations, and
close associates resorted to all sorts of clever schemes and manipulations to disguise and hide
their illicit acquisitions. In the instant case, prescription cannot, therefore, be made to run from
the dates of the commission of the offenses charged, for the obvious reason that the
commission of those offenses were not known as of those dates. It was only after the EDSA
Revolution of February, 1986, that the recovery of ill-gotten wealth became a highly prioritized
state policy, pursuant to the explicit command of the Provisional Constitution.ii[45] To ascertain
the relevant facts to recover ill-gotten properties amassed by the leaders and supporters of the
(Marcos) regime various government agencies were tasked by the Aquino administration to
19

investigate, and as the evidence on hand may reveal, file and prosecute the proper cases.
Applying the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed, we are more inclined
to believe that the violations for which petitioners are charged were discovered only during the
post-February 1986 investigations and the tolling of the prescriptive period should be counted
from the dates of discovery of their commission. The criminal actions against petitioners, which
gave rise to the instant case, were filed in 1991 and 1992, or well within the eight-year
prescriptive period counted from February 1986.
The fourth issue involves petitioners claim that they incurred no criminal liability for violations of
Circular No. 960 since they were exempted from its coverage.
Petitioners postulate that since the purchases of treasury notes were done through the Central
Banks Securities Servicing Department and payments of the interest were coursed through its
Securities Servicing Department/Foreign Exchange Department, their filing of reports would be
surplusage, since the requisite information were already with the Central Bank. Furthermore,
they contend that the foreign currency investment accounts in the Swiss banks were subject to
absolute confidentiality as provided for by Republic Act No. 6426, as amended by Presidential
Decree Nos. 1035, 1246, and 1453, and fell outside the ambit of the reporting requirements
imposed by Circular No. 960. Petitioners further rely on the exemption from reporting provided
for in Section 10(q), a Circular No. 960, and the confidentiality granted to Swiss bank accounts
by the laws of Switzerland.
Petitioners correctly point out that Section 10(q) of Circular No. 960 exempts from the reporting
requirement foreign currency eligible for deposit under the Philippine Foreign Exchange
Currency Deposit System, pursuant to Republic Act No. 6426, as amended. But, in order to
avail of the aforesaid exemption, petitioners must show that they fall within its scope. Petitioners
must satisfy the requirements for eligibility imposed by Section 2, Republic Act No. 6426. Not
only do we find the record bare of any proof to support petitioners claim of falling within the
coverage of Republic Act No. 6426, we likewise find from a reading of Section 2 of the Foreign
Currency Deposit Act that said law is inapplicable to the foreign currency accounts in question.
Section 2, Republic Act No. 6426 speaks of deposit with such Philippine banks in good
standing, as maybe designated by the Central Bank for the purpose. The criminal cases filed
against petitioners for violation of Circular No. 960 involve foreign currency accounts maintained
in foreign banks, not Philippine banks. By invoking the confidentiality guarantees provided for by
Swiss banking laws, petitioners admit such reports made. The rule is that exceptions are strictly
construed and apply only so far as their language fairly warrants, with all doubts being resolved
in favor of the general proviso rather than the exception. Hence, petitioners may not claim
exemption under Section 10(q).
With respect to the banking laws of Switzerland cited by petitioners, the rule is that Philippine
courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Laws of foreign jurisdictions must be alleged
and proved. Petitioners failed to prove the Swiss law relied upon, either by: (1) an official
publication thereof; or (2) a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or
by his deputy, and accompanied by a certification from the secretary of the Philippine embassy
or legation in such country or by the Philippine consul general, consul, vice-consul, or consular
agent stationed in such country, or by any other authorized officer in the Philippine foreign
service assigned to said country that such officer has custody. Absent such evidence, this Court
cannot take judicial cognizance of the foreign law invoked by Benedicto and Rivera.

20

Anent the fifth issue, petitioners insist that the government granted them absolute immunity
under the Compromise Agreement they entered into with the government on November 3, 1990.
Petitioners cite our decision in Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 226 SCRA 314 (1993), upholding
the validity of the said Agreement and directing the various government agencies to be
consistent with it. Benedicto and Rivera now insist that the absolute immunity from criminal
investigation or prosecution granted to petitioner Benedicto, his family, as well as to officers and
employees of firms owned or controlled by Benedicto under the aforesaid Agreement covers the
suits filed for violations of Circular No. 960, which gave rise to the present case.
The pertinent provisions of the Compromise Agreement read:
WHEREAS, this Compromise Agreement covers the remaining claims and the cases of the
Philippine Government against Roberto S. Benedicto including his associates and nominees,
namely, Julita C. Benedicto, Hector T. Rivera,
WHEREAS, specifically these claims are the subject matter of the following cases (stress
supplied):
1. Sandiganbayan Civil Case No. 9
2. Sandiganbayan Civil Case No. 24
3. Sandiganbayan Civil Case No. 34
4. Tanodbayan (Phil-Asia)
5. PCGG I.S. No. 1
WHEREAS, following the termination of the United States and Swiss cases, and also without
admitting the merits of their respective claims and counterclaims presently involved in uncertain,
protracted and expensive litigation, the Republic of the Philippines, solely motivated by the
desire for the immediate accomplishment of its recovery mission and Mr. Benedicto being
interested to lead a peaceful and normal pursuit of his endeavors, the parties have decided to
withdraw and/or dismiss their mutual claims and counterclaims under the cases pending in the
Philippines, earlier referred to (underscoring supplied);
II. Lifting of Sequestrations, Extension of Absolute Immunity and Recognition of the Freedom to
Travel
a) The Government hereby lifts the sequestrations over the assets listed in Annex C hereof, the
same being within the capacity of Mr. Benedicto to acquire from the exercise of his profession
and conduct of business, as well as all the haciendas listed in his name in Negros Occidental,
all of which were inherited by him or acquired with income from his inheritanceand all the other
sequestered assets that belong to Benedicto and his corporation/nominees which are not listed
in Annex A as ceded or to be ceded to the Government.
Provided, however, (that) any asset(s) not otherwise settled or covered by this Compromise
Agreement, hereinafter found and clearly established with finality by proper competent court as
being held by Mr. Roberto S. Benedicto in trust for the family of the late Ferdinand E. Marcos,
shall be returned or surrendered to the Government for appropriate custody and disposition.
b) The Government hereby extends absolute immunity, as authorized under the pertinent
provisions of Executive Orders Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, to Benedicto, the members of his family,
officers and employees of his corporations above mentioned, who are included in past, present
and future cases and investigations of the Philippine Government, such that there shall be no
21

criminal investigation or prosecution against said persons for acts (or) omissions committed
prior to February 25, 1986, that may be alleged to have violated any laws, including but not
limited to Republic Act No. 3019, in relation to the acquisition of any asset treated, mentioned or
included in this Agreement.
In construing contracts, it is important to ascertain the intent of the parties by looking at the
words employed to project their intention. In the instant case, the parties clearly listed and
limited the applicability of the Compromise Agreement to the cases listed or identified therein.
We have ruled in another case involving the same Compromise Agreement that:
[T]he subject matters of the disputed compromise agreement are Sandiganbayan Civil Case No.
0009, Civil Case No. 00234, Civil Case No. 0034, the Phil-Asia case before the Tanodbayan
and PCGG I.S. No. 1. The cases arose from complaints for reconveyance, reversion,
accounting, restitution, and damages against former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, members
of his family, and alleged cronies, one of whom was respondent Roberto S. Benedicto.
Nowhere is there a mention of the criminal cases filed against petitioners for violations of
Circular No. 960. Conformably with Article 1370 of the Civil Code, the Agreement relied upon by
petitioners should include only cases specifically mentioned therein. Applying the parol evidence
rule, where the parties have reduced their agreement into writing, the contents of the writing
constitute the sole repository of the terms of the agreement between the parties. Whatever is
not found in the text of the Agreement should thus be construed as waived and abandoned.
Scrutiny of the Compromise Agreement will reveal that it does not include all cases filed by the
government against Benedicto, his family, and associates.
Additionally, the immunity covers only criminal investigation or prosecution against said persons
for acts (or) omissions committed prior to February 25, 1986 that may be alleged to have
violated any penal laws, including but not limited to Republic Act No. 3019, in relation to the
acquisition of any asset treated, mentioned, or included in this Agreement. It is only when the
criminal investigation or case involves the acquisition of any ill-gotten wealth treated, mentioned,
or included in this Agreement that petitioners may invoke immunity. The record is bereft of any
showing that the interest earnings from foreign exchange deposits in banks abroad, which is the
subject matter of the present case, are treated, mentioned, or included in the Compromise
Agreement. The phraseology of the grant of absolute immunity in the Agreement precludes us
from applying the same to the criminal charges faced by petitioners for violations of Circular No.
960. A contract cannot be construed to include matters distinct from those with respect to which
the parties intended to contract.
In sum, we find that no reversible error of law may be attributed to the Court of Appeals in
upholding the orders of the trial court denying petitioners Motion to Quash the Informations in
Criminal Case Nos. 91-101879 to 91-101883, 91-101884 to 91-101892, and 92-101959 to 92101969. In our view, none of the grounds provided for in the Rules of Court upon which
petitioners rely, finds application in this case.
One final matter. During the pendency of this petition, counsel for petitioner Roberto S.
Benedicto gave formal notice to the Court that said petitioner died on May 15, 2000. The death
of an accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability as well as the civil liability
based solely thereon.

22

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The assailed consolidated Decision of the
Court of Appeals dated May 23, 1996, in CA-G.R. SP No. 35928 and CA-G.R. SP No. 35719, is
AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION that the charges against deceased petitioner, Roberto S.
Benedicto, particularly in Criminal Cases Nos. 91-101879 to 91-101883, 91-101884 to 101892,
and 92-101959 to 92-101969, pending before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 26, are
ordered dropped and that any criminal as well as civil liability ex delicto that might be
attributable to him in the aforesaid cases are declared extinguished by reason of his death on
May 15, 2000. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

23

iiBills of Attainder - an act of legislature finding a person guilty of treason or felony without trial. People vs.
Ferrer [GRs L-32613-14, 27 December 1972]
First Division, Castro (J): 5 concur, 12 took no part, 1 dissented in a separate opinion
Facts:
On 5 March 1970 a criminal complaint for violation of section 4 of the Anti-Subversion Act was filed against
Feliciano Co in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Tarlac. On March 10, Judge Jose C. de Guzman conducted a
preliminary investigation and, finding a prima facie case against Co, directed the Government prosecutors to file
the corresponding information. The twice-amended information (Criminal Case 27), recites "That on or about
May 1969 to December 5, 1969, in the Municipality of Capas, Province of Tarlac, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, feloniously became an officer and/or ranking
leader of the Communist Party of the Philippines, an outlawed and illegal organization aimed to overthrow the
Government of the Philippines by means of force, violence, deceit, subversion, or any other illegal means for the
purpose of establishing in the Philippines a totalitarian regime and placing the government under the control and

domination of an alien power, by being an instructor in the Mao Tse Tung University, the training school of
recruits of the New People's Army, the military arm of the said Communist Party of the Philippines. That in the
commission of the above offense, the following aggravating circumstances are present, to wit: (a) That the crime
has been committed in contempt of or with insult to public authorities; (b) That the crime was committed by a
band; and (c) With the aid of armed men or persons who insure or afford impunity." Co moved to quash on the
ground that the Anti-Subversion Act is a bill of attainder. Meanwhile, on 25 May 1970, another criminal
complaint was filed with the same court, charging Nilo Tayag and five others with subversion. After preliminary
investigation was had, an information was filed. On 21 July 1970 Tayag moved to quash, impugning the validity
of the statute on the grounds that (1) Republic Act 1700 is a bill of attainder; (2) it is vague; (3) it embraces more
than one subject not expressed in the title thereof; and (4) it denies him the equal protection of the laws.
Resolving the constitutional issues raised, the trial court, in its resolution of 15 September 1970, declared the
statute void on the grounds that it is a bill of attainder and that it is vague and overbroad, and dismissed the
informations against the two accused. The Government appealed. The Supreme Court resolved to treat its appeal
as a special civil action for certiorari.
Issue:
Whether the Anti-Subversion Law partakes of the nature of a Bill of Attainder.
Held:
Article III, section 1 (11) of the Constitution states that "No bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall be
enacted." A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without trial. Its essence is the
substitution of a legislative for a judicial determination of guilt. The constitutional ban against bills of attainder
serves to implement the principle of separation of powers by confining legislatures to rule-making and thereby
forestalling legislative usurpation of the judicial function. History in perspective, bills of attainder were
employed to suppress unpopular causes and political minorities, and it is against this evil that the constitutional
prohibition is directed. The singling out of a definite class, the imposition of a burden on it, and a legislative
intent, suffice to stigmatize a statute as a bill of attainder. Herein, when the Anti-Subversion Act is viewed in its
actual operation, it will be seen that it does not specify the Communist Party of the Philippines Constitutional
Law II, 2005 (3) or the members thereof for the purpose of punishment. What it does is simply to declare the
Party to be an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the Government for the purposes of the prohibition,
stated in section 4, against membership in the outlawed organization. The term "Communist Party of the
Philippines" is used solely for definitional purposes. In fact the Act applies not only to the Communist Party of
the Philippines but also to "any other organization having the same purpose and their successors." Its focus is not
on individuals but on conduct. Were the Anti-Subversion Act a bill of attainder, it would be totally unnecessary
to charge Communists in court, as the law alone, without more, would suffice to secure their punishment. But the
undeniable fact is that their guilt still has to be judicially established. The Government has yet to prove at the
trial that the accused joined the Party knowingly, willfully and by overt acts, and that they joined the Party,
knowing its subversive character and with specific intent to further its basic objective, i.e., to overthrow the
existing Government by force, deceit, and other illegal means and place the country under the control and
domination of a foreign power. Further, the statute specifically requires that membership must be knowing or
active, with specific intent to further the illegal objectives of the Party. That is what section 4 means when it
requires that membership, to be unlawful, must be shown to have been acquired "knowingly, willfully and by
overt acts." The ingredient of specific intent to pursue the unlawful goals of the Party must be shown by "overt
acts." This constitutes an element of "membership" distinct from the ingredient of guilty knowledge. The former
requires proof of direct participation in the organization's unlawful activities, while the latter requires proof of

mere adherence to the organization's illegal objectives. Even assuming, however, that the Act specifies
individuals and not activities, this feature is not enough to render it a bill of attainder. It is only when a statute
applies either to named individuals or to easily ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to inflict
punishment on them without a judicial trial does it become a bill of attainder. Nor is it enough that the statute
specify persons or groups in order that it may fall within the ambit of the prohibition against bills of attainder. It
is also necessary that it must apply retroactively and reach past conduct. This requirement follows from the
nature of a bill of attainder as a legislative adjudication of guilt. Indeed, if one objection to the bill of attainder is
that Congress thereby assumes judicial magistracy, then it must be demonstrated that the statute claimed to be a
bill of attainder reaches past conduct and that the penalties it imposes are inescapable. Section 4 of AntiSubversion Act expressly states that the prohibition therein applies only to acts committed "After the approval of
this Act." Only those who "knowingly, willfully and by overt acts affiliate themselves with, become or remain
members of the Communist Party of the Philippines and/or its successors or of any subversive association" after
20 June 1957, are punished. Those who were members of the Party or of any other subversive association at the
time of the enactment of the law, were given the opportunity of purging themselves of liability by renouncing in
writing and under oath their membership in the Party. The law expressly provides that such renunciation shall
operate to exempt such persons from penal liability. The penalties prescribed by the Act are therefore not
inescapable.
VI. Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, Rule 115
RIGHTS OF ACCUSED
Section 1. Rights of accused at trial. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be entitled to the following
rights:
(a) To be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved beyond reasonable doubt.
(b) To be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
(c) To be present and defend in person and by counsel at every stage of the proceedings, from arraignment to
promulgation of the judgment. The accused may, however, waive his presence at the trial pursuant to the
stipulations set forth in his bail, unless his presence is specifically ordered by the court for purposes of
identification. The absence of the accused without justifiable cause at the trial of which he had notice shall be
considered a waiver of his right to be present thereat. When an accused under custody escapes, he shall be
deemed to have waived his right to be present on all subsequent trial dates until custody over him is regained.
Upon motion, the accused may be allowed to defend himself in person when it sufficiently appears to the court
that he can properly protect his rights without the assistance of counsel.
(d) To testify as a witness in his own behalf but subject to cross-examination on matters covered by direct
examination. His silence shall not in any manner prejudice him.
(e) To be exempt from being compelled to be a witness against himself.
(f) To confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him at the trial. Either party may utilize as part of its
evidence the testimony of a witness who is deceased, out of or can not with due diligence be found in the
Philippines, unavailable, or otherwise unable to testify, given in another case or proceeding, judicial or
administrative, involving the same parties and subject matter, the adverse party having the opportunity to crossexamine him.
(g) To have compulsory process issued to secure the attendance of witnesses and production of other evidence in

his behalf.
(h) To have speedy, impartial and public trial.
(i) To appeal in all cases allowed and in the manner prescribed by law.
RIGHTS OF ACCUSED
Section 1. Rights of accused at trial. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be entitled to the following
rights:
(a) To be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved beyond reasonable doubt.
(b) To be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
(c) To be present and defend in person and by counsel at every stage of the proceedings, from arraignment to
promulgation of the judgment. The accused may, however, waive his presence at the trial pursuant to the
stipulations set forth in his bail, unless his presence is specifically ordered by the court for purposes of
identification. The absence of the accused without justifiable cause at the trial of which he had notice shall be
considered a waiver of his right to be present thereat. When an accused under custody escapes, he shall be
deemed to have waived his right to be present on all subsequent trial dates until custody over him is regained.
Upon motion, the accused may be allowed to defend himself in person when it sufficiently appears to the court
that he can properly protect his rights without the assistance of counsel.
(d) To testify as a witness in his own behalf but subject to cross-examination on matters covered by direct
examination. His silence shall not in any manner prejudice him.
(e) To be exempt from being compelled to be a witness against himself.
(f) To confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him at the trial. Either party may utilize as part of its
evidence the testimony of a witness who is deceased, out of or can not with due diligence be found in the
Philippines, unavailable, or otherwise unable to testify, given in another case or proceeding, judicial or
administrative, involving the same parties and subject matter, the adverse party having the opportunity to crossexamine him.
(g) To have compulsory process issued to secure the attendance of witnesses and production of other evidence in
his behalf.
(h) To have speedy, impartial and public trial.
(i) To appeal in all cases allowed and in the manner prescribed by law.
VII. Civil Code, Article 2
Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette,
unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such publication.
VIII. Characteristics of Criminal Law
CASES

U.S. v. Sweet, 1 Phil. 18 (1901)

FACTS: Sweet was employed by the United States military who committed an offense against a POW. His case
is filed with the CFI, who is given original jurisdiction in all criminal cases for
which a penalty of more than 6 months is imposed. He is now contending that the courts are without jurisdiction
because he was acting in the line of duty.
ISSUES:
1. WON this case is within the jurisdiction of the CFI.
Yes. By Act No. 136 of the US-Phil Commission, the CFIs are given original jurisdiction in all criminal cases in
which a penalty more than 6 months imprisonment or a fine greater
than $100 may be imposed. Furthermore, CFIs have jurisdiction to try offenders charged with violation of the
Penal Code within their territorial limits, regardless of the military character of the accused. The defendant and
his acts are within the jurisdiction of the CFI because he failed
to prove that he was indeed acting in the line of duty.
2. WON an assault committed by a soldier or military employee upon a prisoner of war is not an offense under
the penal code?
Yes. Though assault by military officer against a POW is not in the RPC, physical assault charges may be
pressed under the RPC.
3. Assuming that it is an offence under the penal code, whether or not the military character sustained by the
person charged with the offence at the time of its commission exempts him from the ordinary jurisdiction of the
civil tribunals?
No. The application of the general principle that the jurisdiction of the civil tribunals is unaffected by the
military or other special character brought before them for trial (R.A.
No. 7055). Appellant claims that the act was servicebut this cannot affect the right of the Civil Court to takes
jurisdiction of the case.
Judgment: Judgment thereby affirmed An offense charged against a military officer in consequence of an act
done in obedience to an order is clearly shown on the face, where such offense is against the military law, is not
within the jurisdiction of the courts of the Civil Government. Per Cooper, J., concurring

G.R. No. L-246

SILVERIO VALDEZ, petitioner,
vs.
ANTONIO G. LUCERO, Judge of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, and CELESTINO JIMENEZ,
Provincial Warden of Ilocos Sur, respondents.
Severino D. Dagdag for petitioner.
Respondent judge in his own behalf.
No appearance for respondent Warden.
JARANILLA, J.:
The above-entitled case came up to be regularly heard in this court by virtue of a petition filed by
Silverio Valdez praying that the judgment be rendered "(a) annulling the proceedings of the lower
court, (b) declaring the respondent judge without jurisdiction of the case, (c) commanding the
respondent judge to desist from further proceeding in the cause, (d) ordering the provincial warden,
Celestino Jimenez, to discharge the defendant, Silverio Valdez, from jail, (e) granting preliminary
injunction enjoining the respondent judge from hearing the case on the merits pending proceedings in
the case, (f) assessing costs against the respondents, and (g) granting such other or further relief or
reliefs as may be just or equitable."
The undisputed facts are:
That Silverio Valdez was prosecuted for murder under an information filed by the provincial fiscal in
the justice of the peace court of Vigan, Ilocos Sur, which information, in part, reads as follows:
That on or about the 17th day of January, 1945, in the barrio of San Julian, municipality of Bantay,
province of Ilocos Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Hon. Court, the above-named
defendant, Silverio Valdez, with intent to kill, and with evident premeditation and treachery, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously with cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting
the suffering of one Juan Ponce, kill the latter with bolo, dagger and other weapons and died instantly.
That said Silverio Valdez moved for the dismissal of the foregoing information in the justice of the
peace court, alleging that the fiscal had no authority to file it and that the court acquired no jurisdiction
of the defendant, which motion was denied by the justice of the peace on September 5, 1945; and that
since that date accused has been detained as a provincial prisoner in the provincial jail in Vigan, Ilocos
Sur;
That on September 13, 1945, the provincial fiscal reproduced the said information in the Court of First
Instance of Ilocos Sur; and that the defendant filed a motion to quash it on December 18, 1945, which
motion was denied by the court on December 20, 1945;
That on December 29, 1945, a petition for the reconsideration of the denial of the motion to quash was
filed but was also denied on January 7, 1946.

The main issue here is whether the civil courts have jurisdiction to take cognizance of and try the case
for murder filed against petitioner Silverio Valdez, as above stated, because, he alleges, he was not only
a member of a recognized guerrilla and hence a member of the United States armed forces in the
Philippines, in North Luzon, but was also later on absorbed into the Philippine Army and therefore, he
claims, he should be tried by a general court martial, which has jurisdiction over the crime charged and
the person of the accused pursuant to article 93 of the Articles of War (Commonwealth Act No. 408).
Petitioner also contends that the whole of Ilocos Sur was at the time imputed in the information overrun
by the enemy and that any place of hiding of the guerrillas in the province was a military reservation
for the safety of the Philippine and American armed forces within the purview of the Articles of War.
During the oral argument of this case, we understood from counsel appearing for petitioner that neither
the United States Army nor the Philippine Army was claming precedence or priority in the trial of the
herein petitioner, nor that either was demanding that he be tried by a court martial. In fact, no allegation
to that effect may be found in this petition.
The petitioner relies mainly on the provision of article 93 of the Articles of War (Commonwealth Act
No. 408) which reads:
1. ART. 93. Murder. Any person subject to military law who commits murder in time of war shall
suffer death or imprisonment for life, as a court-martial may direct.
He argues that pursuant to said article 93 of the Articles of War only a court martial can have
jurisdiction to try his case for murder, he being a person subject to military law and the crime having
been committed in time of war.
Granting all the facts alleged by the petitioner and that he was a regular member of the guerrilla duly
recognized by the United States Army and granting further that his unit was incorporated into the
United States Army, thus giving him the standing of a regular member of the United States armed
forces, and that he was subsequently incorporated into the Philippine Army, we are of the opinion,
nevertheless, that the civil courts of the Commonwealth of the Philippines are not deprived of their
jurisdiction over the petitioner herein, but have concurrent jurisdiction with the military courts or
general courts martial to try and take cognizance of the case of murder against the petitioner herein, for
the reason that said article 93 of the Articles of War is almost identical with the 92d Article of War of
the United States Army, and the latter has been interpreted by the courts to mean that even in time of
war the civil courts are not deprived of their jurisdiction over murder cases committed by persons
subject to military law. Such was the holding in Cadwell vs.. Parker (Ala., 1920; 40 Sup. Ct., 388; 252
U. S., 376; 64 Law. ed., 621):
That section 1564 of this Article (Art. 92), providing for punishment of murder or rape as the courtmartial may direct, but prohibiting trial by courts-martial in time of peace, section 1565 of this Article
(Art. 93), providing for the punishment of various other offenses as a court-martial may direct, and this
section (Art. 74), requiring military authorities to deliver accused persons to the civil authorities, except
in time of war, do not give military courts exclusive jurisdiction in time of war over offenses committed

in violation of state laws by person in the military service, and a state court has jurisdiction over such
offenses. (Emphasis added.)
Identical doctrines holding that the civil courts have concurrent jurisdiction over cases of murder
committed by persons subject to military law were laid down in the following cases:
Articles of War enacted August 29, 1916, do not deprive the civil courts, either in time of peace or war,
of the concurrent jurisdiction previously vested in them over crimes against either federal or state law,
committed within the United States, by persons subject to military law. (United States vs. Hirsch [D.C.,
N.Y., 1918], 254 F., 109; emphasis added.)
Prisoners of war are amenable for offenses malum in se and may be tried by the ordinary tribunals in
the country in which the crime is committed; and this though they may also be triable by courts-martial.
(Govt. vs. McGregory [1780], 14 Mass., 499.)
A court of oyer and terminer had jurisdiction to try all cases of murder committed within the country,
and that a murder committed by a soldier in the military service of the United States, in time of war,
insurrection, or rebellion, forms no exception. (People vs.. Gardiner [N.Y., 1865], 6 Parker Cr. R., 143;
emphasis added.).
Any changes in Articles of War in years 1913 and 1916 did not alter rule that courts-martial do not have
exclusive jurisdiction for trial of a soldier for murder committed in time of war, but that the state courts
have jurisdiction until it is assumed by military authorities. (People vs.. Denman [1918], 177 P., 461;
179 Cal., 497.)
In the instant case it also appears that when the information for murder was filed the Philippines had
already been liberated and the actual hostilities had already ceased. It is claimed, however, that up to
the present time a status of war still exists for the reason that the treaty of peace has not yet been
signed. But this contention cannot be upheld because, although the formal termination of war by means
of the signing of the treaty has not yet been effected, at the time when the petitioner was prosecuted for
murder in the civil courts the actual fighting or hostilities were no longer going on; in other words, the
actual fighting had already ceased and the Philippines had already been liberated. Thus it was held in
the following decision:
Notwithstanding this section (Art. 74), requiring a soldier to be delivered to civil authorities for trial for
an alleged crime except in time of war, the jurisdiction of the military courts over a soldier is not
exclusive of the civil court even during time of war, if the soldier was stationed within one of the states
where the civil courts were functioning and where no actual hostilities were in progress. (Ex parte
Koester [1922], 206 P., 166; 56 Cal. App., 621; emphasis added.)
It clearly appears also in the present case as aforesaid that the military authorities are not claiming
priority to try the petitioner herein as provided in the Articles of War. Such being the case, we are of the
opinion that the petitioner cannot raise and invoke the right to be tried by a court martial without the
military authorities' claiming to try him in accordance with the military law or the Articles of War. To
this effect was the ruling in People vs.. Denman (supra):

Conceding paramount right of military authorities in the time of war to custody of soldier
notwithstanding criminal charges against him in the courts of a state, the right inures solely to military
authorities and cannot be raised by the offender. (Emphasis added.).
In Funk vs.. State ([1919], 208 S.W., 509; 84 Tex. Cr. R., 402), the following doctrines were also laid
down:
A soldier of the United States who murders a citizen of the state offends against both the military and
the state laws and may be tried in the state courts.
Although under this section (Art. 92), military authorities have the prior right to try soldier who has
murdered a citizen, the soldier who has committed the crime cannot object to being tried by a state
court, where the military authorities have not asserted any right. (Emphasis added.)
In view of all the foregoing, we are of the opinion and so hold that the Court of First Instance of Ilocos
Sur has jurisdiction over the murder case against the petitioner and cannot be deprived of such
jurisdiction. This being our conclusion, it is unnecessary to pass upon the other questions of law raised
by the petition.
Being without any merit whatsoever, the petition is hereby dismissed, with costs against the petitioner.
Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Paras, Feria, De Joya, Pablo, Perfecto, Hilado, Bengzon, and Briones, JJ.,
concur.

Marcos/Concordia vs. AFP

GR No. L-4663
GR No. L-4671
FACTS:
1. Alleged that the AFP Military Tribunals unlawfully excluded MARCOS and
CONDORDIA from their right to appear as counsel on the ground that they
are DISQUALIFIED/EXEMPTED/INHIBITED from SEC 17, Article 17 of the
Constitution:
a.

SEC. 17: No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall

directly or indirectly be financially interested in any contract with the
Government or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof, or in any

franchise or special privilege granted by the Congress during his term

of office.
b. He shall not appear as counsel before the Electoral Tribunals or before
any court in any civil case wherein the Government or any
subdivision or instrumentality thereof is the adverse party, or in any
criminal case wherein an offer or employee of the Government is
accused of an offense committed in relation to his office
ISSUE:
WON the prohibition contained in the above quoted section 17 of our Constitution
is applicable to the petitioners in the two cases. YES.
HELD:
MARCOS AND CONCONDIA DISQUALIFIED TO APPEAR AS COUNSEL FOR ACCUSED
IN COURT-MARTIALS. AFP DID NOT UNLAWFULLY EXCLUDED THEIR RIGHTS. HENCE,
PETITIONS FOR MANDAMUS ARE DENIED WITH COSTS.
1. MARCOS/CONCORDIA: applicable, because the words "any court" includes
the General Court-Martial, and a court-martial case is a criminal case within
the meaning of the above quoted provisions of our Constitution.
a. Words any court, used in
appear as counsel in any
employee of the Government
relation to his office, refers
courts.

prohibiting members of Congress to

criminal case in which an officer or
is accused of an offense committed in
not only to civil, but also to military

i. General meaning must prevail over restricted meaning UNLESS the

nature of the subject matter clearly indicates that limited sense is intended.
2. It would be a bar to another prosecution for the same case which would
result to DOUBLE JEOPARDY.
a. If a court-martial has jurisdiction to try an officer or soldier for a
crime, its judgment will be accorded the finality and conclusiveness as
to the issues involved which attend the judgments of a civil court in a
case of which it may legally take cognizance.
b. Restricting our decision to the above question of double jeopardy, the
plaintiff in error, having been acquitted of the crime of homicide,
could not be subsequently tried for the same offense in a civil court
exercising authority in that territory.

c. In Sec 17, it is obvious that the reason of prohibiting appearance of

members of the Senate/House of Representatives as counsel for the
accused in court-martials, as for inhibiting them to appear as such in
civil courts, because the independence of civil courts judges is
guaranteed by our Constitution.
d. Ubi eadem ratio ibi eadem lexi
3. A court-martial is strictly a criminal court. It has no civil jurisdiction; cannot
enforce a contract, collect a debt or award damages in favor of an
individual.
a. Judgment is a criminal sentence, not a civil verdict.
b. Proper function is to award punishment upon the ascertainment of
guilt.
3

Court-martial is a lawful tribunal existing by same authority that any other

exists by, and the military law is a branch of law as valid as the others.
a. It differs from other laws only because- it applies to officers and
soldiers but not to other members of the body politic, it is limited to
beaches of military duty.

G.R. No. L-492

TEODORO CANTOS (TEODORO TATISHI), petitioner,
vs.
WILHELM D. STYER, Commanding General, United States Army Forces, Western Pacific,
respondent.
Capt. John J. Greer, 1st Lt. John J. Berry, jr., 1st Lt. Everett W. Thode, and 2d Lt. John McCullough for
petitioner.
MORAN, C.J.:
This is a petition for habeas corpus filed by petitioner Teodoro Cantos (Teodoro Tatishi) against
Lieutenant General Wilhelm D. Syer, Commanding General of the United States Army Forces, Western
Pacific, upon the ground that petitioner is a Filipino citizen, residing in Ilang, Davao City, and is now
confined by order of the respondent at the residence of the High Commissioner in Manila, Philippines,
with no legal cause whatsoever.
Petitioner was born in Davao on December 7, 1913, his father being Japanese and his mother, Filipino.
At the age of 27 he elected to become a Filipino citizen under the name of Teodoro Cantos, and was
given Philippine citizenship by the Court of First Instance of Davao on September 17, 1939. On March
25, 1946, he was indicted for war crimes before the military commission duly constituted by order of
General Styer, respondent. The charges are as follows:
SPECIFICATIONS
1. In that Teodoro Tatishi, a Japanese civilian, and other persons connected and acting with Japan, did,
at or near Tibungko, Davao City, Mindanao, Philippine Islands, on or about 28 December 1941, during
a time of war between the United States of America, its allies and Japan, willfully and unlawfully kill
Sixto Babao, Dalmacio Babao, Francisco Cobling and Martin Marquez, unarmed, non-combatant
Filipino civilians, by striking them with a saber, and by shooting them, in violation of the laws of war.
2. In that Teodoro Tatishi, a Japanese civilian, and other persons connected and acting with Japan, did,
at or near Ilang, Davao City, Mindanao, Philippine Islands, on or about 7 January 1942, during a time
of war between the United States of America, its allies and Japan, willfully, unlawfully and forcibly
take and loot personal property of Justina Larracoecha Babao, in violation of the laws of war.
Dated: 25 March 1946
The military commission, after hearing, found petitioner guilty of the charges and sentenced him to
death by hanging.
There seems to be no question that petitioner is charged with war crimes before a military commission
duly constituted. It is maintained, however, that the petitioner being a Filipino civilian when he
allegedly committed the crimes charged and the Philippine courts being open and capable to administer
justice, the military commission has no jurisdiction to try him. It is well settled that war crimes may be
committed not only by lawful belligerents but by any "men and bodies of men, who, without being
lawful belligerents" "nevertheless commit hostile acts of any kind." (Par. 351, Rules of Land Warfare.)

"Persons of the enemy territory who steal within the lines of hostile army for the purpose of robbing,
killing, etc." are also war criminals subject to the jurisdiction of military commissions. (Par. 352, id.,
id.) And in the preamble to the Hague Convention it is declared that "until a more complete code of the
laws of war has been issued, the High Contracting Parties deem it expedient to declare that, in cases not
included in the Regulations adopted by them, the inhabitants and the belligerents remain under the
protection and the rule of the principles of the law of nations, as they result from the usages established
among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, and the dictates of the public conscience."
All this goes to show that war crimes may be committed by any person regardless of his nationality.
Thus, the Supreme Court of the United States, in Ex parte Quirin (317 U.S., No. 1 [Off. Rep. Sup. Ct.],
pp. 37, 38), said that "citizenship in the United States of an enemy belligerent does not relieve him
from the consequences of a belligerency which is unlawful because in violation of the law of war.
Citizen who associate themselves with the military army of the enemy government, and with its aid,
guidance and direction enter this country bent on hostile acts, are enemy belligerents within the
meaning of the Hague Convention and the law of war."
Here, the petitioner is a Filipino citizen though of a Japanese father, and associating himself with Japan
in the war against the United States of America and the Philippines, committed atrocities against
unarmed and noncombatant Filipino civilians and looted Filipino property. He is, indeed, a war
criminal subject to the jurisdiction of the military commission, and his confinement by the respondent
is not illegal. (In re Yamashita, 66 Sup. Ct., 340; 90 Law. ed., 499.)
It is argued that, by direction of the President of the United States of America, the Joint Chiefs of Staff
of the America Military Forces, on September 12, 1945, instructed General Douglas MacArthur,
Commander in Chief of the United States Army Forces, Pacific, to proceed with the trial before
appropriate military tribunals of such Japanese war criminals as have been or may be apprehended, and
that, therefore, the petitioner, who is a Filipino citizen, cannot be a Japanese war criminal subject to the
jurisdiction of the Military commission constituted under such presidential authority. There is before us
no conclusive evidence that General Douglas MacArthur's authority is thus limited. At any rate, we
believe that the military commission may look through the naturalization papers into the real
nationality of a person with Japanese blood charged with war crimes. After due hearing the military
commission found the petitioner to be a Japanese mestizo. The certificate of Filipino citizenship was
issued in his favor after he had sworn to have renounced his allegiance and fidelity to Japan and
pledged faith and allegiance to the United States of America and the Philippines. But there is evidence
before the military commission to the effect that during the war he was a member of the Japanese
civilian army and committed atrocities against unarmed and noncombatant Filipino civilians. In his
oath of naturalization he swore that he owned real property in the Philippines worth P1,200 as required
by the Naturalization Law. It appears, however, from his sworn testimony before the military
commission that he never owned any property in the Philippines. If the military commission believes,
as it apparently does, that, by reason of the above circumstances, the petitioner never acquired Filipino
citizenship or he already lost it, we certainly find no reason to interfere.
Fore all the foregoing, petition is dismissed, without costs.
Paras, Feria, De Joya, Pablo, and Bengzon, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions

PERFECTO, J., dissenting:

Respondent failed to appear in this case or to answer the petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
The main question in this case is whether the military commission set up by respondent under the
authority of General MacArthur, Commander in Chief, United States Army Forces, Pacific, has
jurisdiction to try and convict petitioner for an alleged war crime, when petitioner is a naturalized
Filipino citizen and not a Japanese.
Chief Justice Stone, in his majority opinion in the case of In re Yamashita (66 Sup. Ct., 340; 90 Law.
ed., 499, 507), speaking for the United States Supreme Court, stated:
By direction of the President, the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the American Military Forces, on September
12, 1945, instructed General MacArthur, Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces, Pacific, to
proceed with the trial, before appropriate military tribunals, of such Japanese war criminals `as have
been or may be apprehended.' By order of General MacArthur of September 24, 1945, General Styer
was specifically directed to proceed with the trial of petitioner upon the charge here involved. This
order was accompanied by detailed rules and regulations which General MacArthur prescribed for the
trial of war criminals. These regulations directed, among other things, that review of the sentence
imposed by the commission should be by the officer convening it, with `authority to approve, mitigate,
remit, commute, suspend, reduce or otherwise alter the sentence imposed', and directed that no
sentence of death should be carried into effect until confirmed by the Commander-in-Chief, United
States Army Forces, Pacific.
From the foregoing, it is evident that the jurisdiction of the military commission is limited by the
instructions given to General MacArthur, under whose authority the military commission has been set
up, such jurisdiction not extending to any person except "Japanese war criminals."
It appearing from the record that petitioner Teodoro Cantons is a Filipino citizen, the military
commission can not legally exercise jurisdiction over him, and all acts of said commission outside of
its jurisdiction are null and void.
Judicial proceedings without or in excess of jurisdiction are without any legal effect.
Courts created by statute and not by the Constitution are tribunals of special and limited and
jurisdiction only. They can exercise only such powers as are directly conferred on them by legislative
enactment and such as may be incidentally necessary to the execution of those powers. Therefore,
unless authority for the exercise of jurisdiction in a given case can be found in the statutes, given either
expressly or by necessary implication, their proceedings are void; for the rule is that such a court can
only take cognizance of such matters as are clearly within its jurisdiction. (14 Am. Jur., p. 369.)
When a court or judicial officer exercises a special statutory power outside the scope of the usual
jurisdiction of courts of general powers, the record of the proceedings must show that the statutory
authority has been pursued. (Cowdrey vs. Town of Caneadea, 16 Fed., 532.)
Where a court is exercising a special statutory jurisdiction, the record must show upon its face that the
case is one where the court has authority to act. Jurisdiction in such cases is never presumed, and it

does not appear the judgment will be void and subject to collateral attack. (Rice vs. Travis, 216 Ill.,
249; 74 N.E., 801; Payson vs. People, 175 Ill., 267; 51 N.E., 588; Haywood vs. Collins, 60 Ill., 328.)
Whatever the rank of the court exercising a special statutory jurisdiction, it is governed by the same
rules as courts of limited jurisdiction. (Cases cited.) Keal vs. Rhyderck, 148 N.E., 54.)
This court has often held that, where jurisdiction is conferred on a court by special statute, which is to
be exercised in a special manner therein prescribed, the record of such court must show the facts
essential to give the court jurisdiction; otherwise no presumption as to its jurisdiction will be indulged.
The statute, in such cases, must be strictly pursued, and the jurisdiction must be made to appear in the
mode pointed out by the statute. (Morris vs. Dooley, 59 Ark., 483; 28 S.W., 30, 430; Hindman vs.
O'Connor, 54 Ark., 643; 16 S.W. 1052; 13 L.R.A., 490; Gibney vs. Crawford, 51 Ark., 35; 9 S.W., 309;
See, also, Cross vs. Wilson, 52 Ark., 312; 12 S.W., 576; Lusk vs. Perkins, 48 Ark., 238; 2 S. W., 847.
(Reeves vs. Conger, 147 S.W., 438, 439.)
If petitioner is amenable to be prosecuted and convicted for any crime allegedly committed during the
war, the proceeding can not take place before the commission set up by respondent, but before either a
special tribunal with the proper jurisdiction or the ordinary civil courts of the Philippines.
Under the facts on record, petitioner is entitled to be discharged from confinement, and we vote that the
writ of habeas corpus prayed for be issued.

Kuroda vs Jalandoni 83 Phil 171

Facts
Shinegori Kuroda, a former Lieutenant-General of the Japanese Imperial Army and Commanding
General of the Japanese Imperial Forces in the Philippines was charged before the Philippine Military
Commission for war crimes. As he was the commanding general during such period of war, he was
tried for failure to discharge his duties and permitting the brutal atrocities and other high crimes
committed by his men against noncombatant civilians and prisoners of the Japanese forces, in violation
of of the laws and customs of war.
Kuroda, in his petition, argues that the Military Commission is not a valid court because the law that
created it, Executive Order No. 68, is unconstitutional. He further contends that using as basis the
Hague Conventions Rules and Regulations covering Land Warfare for the war crime committed cannot
stand ground as the Philippines was not a signatory of such rules in such convention. Furthermore, he
alleges that the United States is not a party of interest in the case and that the two US prosecutors
cannot practice law in the Philippines.

Issue
1.Whether or not Executive Order No. 68 is constitutional
2.Whether or not the US is a party of interest to this case
Ruling
The Supreme Court ruled that Executive Order No. 68, creating the National War Crimes Office and
prescribing rules on the trial of accused war criminals, is constitutional as it is aligned with Sec
3,Article 2 of the Constitution which states that The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of
national policy and adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of
the nation. The generally accepted principles of international law includes those formed during the
Hague Convention, the Geneva Convention and other international jurisprudence established by United
Nations. These include the principle that all persons, military or civilian, who have been guilty of
planning, preparing or waging a war of aggression and of the commission of crimes and offenses in
violation of laws and customs of war, are to be held accountable. In the doctrine of incorporation, the
Philippines abides by these principles and therefore has a right to try persons that commit such crimes
and most especially when it is committed againsts its citizens. It abides with it even if it was not a
signatory to these conventions by the mere incorporation of such principles in the constitution.
The United States is a party of interest because the country and its people have been equally, if not
more greatly, aggrieved by the crimes with which the petitioner is charged for. By virtue of Executive
Order No. 68, the Military Commission is a special military tribunal and that the rules as to parties and
representation are not governed by the rules of court but by the very provisions of this special law.

Scheneckerburger vs. Moran, 63 Phil. 249 (1943)

FACTS: Schneckenburger, who is an honorary consul of Uruguay at Manila was subsequently charged
in CFI-Manila with the crime of falsification of a private document. He objected to this
saying that under the US and Philippine Constitution, the CFI has no jurisdiction to try him. After his
objection was overruled, he filed a petition for a writ of prohibition to prevent the CFI from taking
cognizance of the criminal action filed against him. Aside from this, he contended that original
jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors and consuls is conferred exclusively
upon the Supreme Court of the Philippines.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the US Supreme Court has Original Jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors,
consuls, et. al and such jurisdiction excludes courts of the Phils.
No. First of all, a consul is not entitled to the privilege of diplomatic immunity. A consul is not exempt
from criminal prosecution for violations of the laws of the country where he resides. The inauguration
of the Philippine Commonwealth on Nov. 15, 1935 caused the Philippine Constitution to go into full
force and effect. This Constitution is the supreme law of the land. This Constitution provides that the
original jurisdiction of this court shall include all cases affecting ambassadors, consuls et.al.

2. Whether or not original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, consuls, et. al. is conferred
exclusively upon the Supreme Court of the Philippines
The Supreme Court shall have original and appellate jurisdiction as may be possessed and exercised
by themSupreme Court of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this constitution. According to
Sec. 17. of Act No. 136 and by virtue of it, jurisdiction to issue writs of quo warranto, certiorari,
mandamus, prohibition and habeas corpus was also conferred on the CFIs. As a result, the original
jurisdiction possessed and exercised by the Supreme Court of the Philippines at the time the
Constitution was adopted was not exclusive of, but concurrent with, that of the CFIs. The original
jurisdiction conferred to Supreme Court by the Constitution was not an exclusive jurisdiction.
Judgment: CFI has jurisdiction to try the petitioner, and the petition for a writ of prohibition must be
denied.

Raquiza vs. Bradford, 75 Phil. 50 (1948)

FACTS: By virtue of the proclamation issued by General of the Army MacArthur, petitioners were
arrested by the 306 CIC and detained under security commitment order No 385. The
petitioners Raquiza, Tee Han Kee, and Infante were charged with Espionage activity with the Japanese,
active collaboration with the enemy respectively. Power for Commander of the US
Army to proclaim by virtue of military necessity is not questioned. He based proclamation on the
reasons that the apprehended have violated due allegiance to the US and it is a military necessity.
Petitioners move for writ of Habeas Corpus.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the war terminated within the meaning of that part in the proclamation? [Note: The power
of commander in chief of the US Army to issue a proclamation providing for military measures to be
taken upon the apprehension of Filipino citizens who voluntarily have given aid, comfort and
sustenance to the enemy, cannot be seriously questioned.]
No. The war, in the legal sense, continues until, and terminated at the same time of, some formal
proclamation of peace by an authority competent to proclaim it. It is the province of the political
department, and not the judicial department, to determine if war has ended. The fact that delivery of
certain persons under custody of the US Army has already begun does not mean that the war has, in the
legal sense, already terminated, which clearly it has not. Delivery within the power of military
authorities to make even before was terminates.
2. Whether or not this court has jurisdiction or legal power to afford relief to the petitioners in the sad

and sorry plight to which they have been and are being subjected?
No. Civil Courts should not interfere. A foreign army permitted to march through a friendly country or
to be stationed in it, is exempt from civil and criminal jurisdiction of the place. Grant of free passage
implies a waiver of all jurisdiction over troops during passage (let them exercise their own discipline).
Any attempt by our civil Courts to exercise jurisdiction over US troops would be a violation of our
countrys faith. On the other hand, petitioners may have recourse to proper military authorities.

Case: KHOSROW MINUCHER v. CA and ARTHUR SCALZO (G.R. 142396)Date: February 11,
2003Ponente: J. VitugFacts:
Minucher is an Iranian national who came to study in UP in 1974 and was appointed Labor Attache for
the Iranian Embasies inTokyo and Manila; he continued to stay in the Philippines when the Shah of
Iran was deposed by Khomeini, he became a refugee of the UN and he headed the Iranian National
Resistance Movement in the Philippines.On the other hand, Scalzo was a special agent of the US Drugs
Enforcement Agency. He conducts surveillance operations onsuspected drug dealers in the Philippines
believed to be the source of prohibited drugs shipped to the US and make the actual arrest.Minucher
and one Abbas Torabian was charged for a violation of Act. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972)
before the PasigRTC, such criminal charge was followed by a buy-bust operation conducted by the
Philippine police narcotic agents to which Scalzowas a witness for the prosecution. They were
acquitted.Later on, Minucher filed a complaint for damages against Scalzo. It was said that Minucher
and Scalzo came to know of eachother thru Jose Iigo; they conducted some business i.e. the former
sold to the latter some caviar and Persian carpets. Scalzo thenrepresented himself as a special agent of
the Drug Enforcement Administration, DOJ of US.Minucher expressed his desire to obtain a US Visa
for him and his Abbass wife. Scalzo told him that he could help him for a$2,000 fee per visa. After a
series of business transactions between the two, when Scalzo came to deliver the visas to
Minuchershouse, he told the latter that he would be leaving the Philippines soon and requested him to
come out of the house so he can introducehim to his cousin waiting in the cab. To his surprise, 30-40
armed Filipino soldiers came to arrest him.In his complaint for damages, he said that some of his
properties were missing like Persian carpets, a painting together withhis TV and betamax sets. There

was nothing left in his house. He averred that his arrest as a heroine trafficker was well publicized
andthat when we got arrested, he was not given any food or water for 3 days.In his defense, Scalzo
asserted his diplomatic immunity as evidenced by a Diplomatic Note. He contended that it
wasrecognized by the US Government pursuant to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and
the Philippine government itself thruits Executive Department and DFA.The courts ruled in favor of
Scalzo on the ground that as a special agent of the US Drug Enforcement Administration, he
wasentitled to diplomatic immunity. Hence, the present recourse of Minucher.
Issue:
WON Scalzo is entitled to diplomatic immunity
Held:
Yes.
Ratio:
The Convention lists the classes of heads of diplomatic missions to include (a) ambassadors or nuncios
accredited to theheads of state, (b) envoys, ministers or
internuncios
accredited to the heads of states; and (c) charges d' affairs accredited to theministers of foreign affairs.
Comprising the "staff of the (diplomatic) mission" are the diplomatic staff, the administrative staff and
thetechnical and service staff. Only the heads of missions, as well as members of the diplomatic staff,
excluding the members of theadministrative, technical and service staff of the mission, are accorded
diplomatic rank. Even while the Vienna Convention onDiplomatic Relations provides for immunity to
the members of diplomatic missions, it does so, nevertheless, with an understanding thatthe same be
restrictively applied.
The main yardstick in ascertaining whether a person is a diplomat entitled to immunity is
thedetermination of whether or not he performs duties of diplomatic nature.
Scalzo was an Assistant Attach of the US diplomatic mission. An attach belongs to a category of
officers in the diplomaticestablishment who may be in charge of its cultural, press, administrative or
financial affairs. There could also be a class of attachesbelonging to certain ministries or departments
of the government, other than the foreign ministry or department, who are detailed bytheir respective
ministries or departments with the embassies such as the military, naval, air, commercial, agricultural,
labor, science,and customs attaches, or the like
. Attaches assist a chief of mission in his duties and are administratively under him, but their main
function is to observe, analyze and interpret trends and developments in their respective fields in the
host country andsubmit reports to their own ministries or departments in the home government. These
officials are not generally regarded asmembers of the diplomatic mission, nor are they normally
designated as having diplomatic rank.Vesting a person with diplomatic immunity is a prerogative of the

executive branch of the government.

Thegovernment of the United States itself, which Scalzo claims to be acting for, has formulated its
standards for recognition of a diplomaticagent. The State Department policy is to only concede
diplomatic status to a person who possesses an acknowledged diplomatic titleand "performs duties of
diplomatic nature." Supplementary criteria for accreditation are the possession of a valid diplomatic
passportor, from States which do not issue such passports, a diplomatic note formally representing the
intention to assign the person todiplomatic duties, the holding of a non-immigrant visa, being over
twenty-one years of age, and performing diplomatic functions on anessentially full-time basis.
Diplomatic missions are requested to provide the most accurate and descriptive job title to that
whichcurrently applies to the duties performed. The Office of the Protocol would then assign each
individual to the appropriate functionalcategory.
United States vs. Fowler
December 31, 1902 (1 Phil 614)
PARTIES:
Complainant and appellant: United States
Defendants and appellees: William Fowler et. al.
FACTS:
August 12, 1901, the defendants were accused of the theft of 16 champagne bottles worth 20 dollars
while on board the vessel Lawton. The counsel for defendants alleged to the Court of First Instance
that they were without jurisdiction over the crime charged . Since it happened in the high seas and not
in the city of Manila or in the territory in which the jurisdiction of the court extends, they asked that the
case be dismissed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of First Instance has jurisdiction over crimes committed on the high seas on
board of transport not registered in the Philippines.
HELD:
No. The Philippine court has no jurisdiction over the crime of theft committed on high seas on board a
vessel not registered or licensed in teh Philippines. The transport Lawton not being a vessel of this
class, our courts are without jurisdiction to take a cognizance of a crime committed on board the same.
Brief Fact Summary. Fowler, Appellant, was convicted of failure to file tax returns for the years 19711975. He had not filed a tax return since 1953. He represented himself at trial and appealed the
conviction because the trial court did not let him testify because he would not swear or affirm to tell the
truth.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. Federal Rule of Evidence 603 provides that before testifying, every witness
shall be required to declare that he will testify truthfully, by oath or affirmation.
Facts. Fowler, Appellant, stopped filing tax returns in 1953. He was indicted for failing to file returns
from 1971-1975, and he was convicted. Appellant represented himself at trial but was represented by
counsel on appeal. He claims the court erred in not allowing him to testify because he would not swear
to tell the truth and would not allow cross examination. Appellant was willing to state I am a truthful
man, and I would not tell a lie to stay out of jail. The judge was willing to allow him to say I state I

will tell the truth in my testimony, but Appellant did not agree.
Issue. Did the trial court err in refusing to allow him to testify because he would not swear or affirm
that he would tell the truth?

THE UNITED STATES vs. BULL

G.R. No. L-5270, January 15, 1910
Facts: The information alleged the following: That on and for many months to December 2, 1908, H.
N. Bull was the master of a steam sailing known as the steamship Standard, the said vessel is engaged
in carrying and transporting cattle, carabaos, and other animals from a foreign port and city of Manila,
Philippines. That the accused Bull while being the master of the said vessel on or about the 2nd day of
December 1908, wilfully, and wrongfully carry, transport and bring into the port and city of Manila 677
head of cattle and carabaos from the port of Ampieng, Formosa, without providing suitable means for
securing said animals while in transit, so as to avoid cruelty and unnecessary suffering to the said
animals. In this, to wit, the accused as the master of the vessel, did then and there fail to provide stalls
for said animals so in transit and suitable means for trying and securing said animals in a proper
manner, and did then and there cause some of said animals to be tied by means of rings passed through
their noses, and allow and permit others to be transported loose in the hold and on the deck of said
vessel without being tied or secured in stalls, and all without bedding; that by reason of the aforesaid
neglect and failure of the accused to provide suitable means for securing said animals while so in
transit, the noses of some of said animals were cruelly torn, and many of said animals were tossed
about upon the decks and hold of said vessel, and cruelly wounded, bruised, and killed.
All contrary to the provisions of Acts No. 55 and No. 275 of the Philippine Commission.
Issue:
1. The complaint does not state facts sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court.
2. That under the evidence the trial court was without jurisdiction to hear and determine the case.
Ruling:
1. Act No. 55 confers jurisdiction over the offense created thereby on Courts of First Instance or any
provost court organized in the province or port in which such animals are disembarked, and there is
nothing inconsistent therewith in Act No. 136, which provides generally for the organization of the
courts of the Philippine Islands. Act No. 400 merely extends the general jurisdiction of the courts over
certain offenses committed on the high seas, or beyond the jurisdiction of any country, or within any of
the waters of the Philippine Islands on board a ship or water craft of any kind registered or licensed in
the Philippine Islands, in accordance with the laws thereof. (U.S. vs. Fowler, 1 Phil. Rep., 614.) This
jurisdiction may be exercised by the Court of First Instance in any province into which such ship or

water upon which the offense or crime was committed shall come after the commission thereof. Had
this offense been committed upon a ship carrying a Philippine registry, there could have been no doubt
of the Jurisdiction of the court, because it is expressly conferred, and the Act is in accordance with well
recognized and established public law. But the Standard was a Norwegian vessel, and it is conceded
that it was not registered or licensed in the Philippine Islands under the laws thereof. We have then the
question whether the court had jurisdiction over an offense of this character, committed on board a
foreign ship by the master thereof, when the neglect and omission which constitutes the offense
continued during the time the ship was within the territorial waters of the United States. No court of the
Philippine Islands had jurisdiction over an offenses or crime committed on the high seas or within the
territorial waters of any other country, but when she came within 3 miles of a line drawn from the
headlines which embrace the entrance to Manila Bay, she was within territorial waters, and a new set of
principles became applicable.
The ship and her crew were then subject to the jurisdiction of the territorial sovereign subject through
the proper political agency. This offense was committed within territorial waters. From the line which
determines these waters the Standard must have traveled at least 25 miles before she came to anchor.
During that part of her voyage the violation of the statue continued, and as far as the jurisdiction of the
court is concerned, it is immaterial that the same conditions may have existed while the vessel was on
the high seas. The offense, assuming that it originated at the port of departure in Formosa, was a
continuing one, and every element necessary to constitute it existed during the voyage across the
territorial waters. The completed forbidden act was done within American waters, and the court
therefore had jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the offense and the person of the offender.
The offense then was thus committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, but the objection to
the jurisdiction raises the further question whether that jurisdiction is restricted by the fact of the
nationality of the ship. Every state has complete control and jurisdiction over its territorial waters.
According to strict legal right, even public vessels may not enter the ports of a friendly power without
permission, but it is now conceded that in the absence of a prohibition such ports are considered as
open to the public ship of all friendly powers. The exemption of such vessels from local jurisdiction
while within such waters was not established until within comparatively recent times.
Such vessels are therefore permitted during times of peace to come and go freely. Local official
exercise but little control over their actions, and offenses committed by their crew are justiciable by
their own officers acting under the laws to which they primarily owe allegiance. This limitation upon
the general principle of territorial sovereignty is based entirely upon comity and convenience, and finds
its justification in the fact that experience shows that such vessels are generally careful to respect local
laws and regulation which are essential to the health, order, and well-being of the port. But comity and
convenience does not require the extension of the same degree of exemption to merchant vessels. There
are two well-defined theories as to extent of the immunities ordinarily granted to them, According to
the French theory and practice, matters happening on board a merchant ship which do not concern the
tranquillity of the port or persons foreign to the crew, are justiciable only by the court of the country to
which the vessel belongs. The French courts therefore claim exclusive jurisdiction over crimes
committed on board French merchant vessels in foreign ports by one member of the crew against
another.
Moreover, the Supreme Court of the United States has recently said that the merchant vessels of one
country visiting the ports of another for the purpose of trade, subject themselves to the laws which

govern the ports they visit, so long as they remain; and this as well in war as in peace, unless otherwise
provided by treaty. (U. S. vs. Diekelman, 92 U. S., 520-525.)
The treaty does not therefore deprive the local courts of jurisdiction over offenses committed on board
a merchant vessel by one member of the crew against another which amount to a disturbance of the
order or tranquility of the country, and a fair and reasonable construction of the language requires us to
hold that any violation of criminal laws disturbs the order or tranquility of the country. The offense
with which the appellant is charged had nothing to so with any difference between the captain and the
crew. It was a violation by the master of the criminal law of the country into whose port he came. We
thus find that neither by reason of the nationality of the vessel, the place of the commission of the
offense, or the prohibitions of any treaty or general principle of public law, are the court of the
Philippine Islands deprived of jurisdiction over the offense charged in the information in this case.
It is further contended that the complaint is defective because it does not allege that the animals were
disembarked at the port of Manila, an allegation which it is claimed is essential to the jurisdiction of the
court sitting at that port. To hold with the appellant upon this issue would be to construe the language
of the complaint very strictly against the Government. The disembarkation of the animals is not
necessary in order to constitute the completed offense, and a reasonable construction of the language of
the statute confers jurisdiction upon the court sitting at the port into which the animals are bought. They
are then within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, and the mere fact of their disembarkation is
immaterial so far as jurisdiction is concerned. This might be different if the disembarkation of the
animals constituted a constitutional element in the offense, but it does not.
The evidence shows not only that the defendants acts were knowingly done, but his defense rests upon
the assertion that according to his experience, the system of carrying cattle loose upon the decks and
in the hold is preferable and more secure to the life and comfort of the animals. It was conclusively
proven that what was done was done knowingly and intentionally.
2. Whether a certain method of handling cattle is suitable within the meaning of the Act cannot be left
to the judgment of the master of the ship. It is a question which must be determined by the court from
the evidence. On December 2, 1908, the defendant Bull brought into and disembarked in the port and
city of Manila certain cattle, which came from the port of Ampieng, Formosa, without providing
suitable means for securing said animals while in transit, so as to avoid cruelty and unnecessary
suffering to said animals, contrary to the provisions of section 1 of Act No. 55, as amended by section 1
of Act No. 275. The trial court found the abovementioned facts true and all of which are fully sustained
by the evidence.
The defendant was found guilty, and sentenced to pay a fine of two hundred and fifty pesos, with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. The sentence and judgment is
affirmed. So ordered.
Notes:
Section 1 of Act No. 55, which went into effect January 1, 1901, provides that
The owners or masters of steam, sailing, or other vessels, carrying or transporting cattle, sheep, swine,
or other animals, from one port in the Philippine Islands to another, or from any foreign port to any port
within the Philippine Islands, shall carry with them, upon the vessels carrying such animals, sufficient

forage and fresh water to provide for the suitable sustenance of such animals during the ordinary period
occupied by the vessel in passage from the port of shipment to the port of debarkation, and shall cause
such animals to be provided with adequate forage and fresh water at least once in every twenty-four
hours from the time that the animals are embarked to the time of their final debarkation.
By Act No. 275, enacted October 23, 1901, Act No. 55 was amended by adding to section 1 thereof the
following:
The owners or masters of steam, sailing, or other vessels, carrying or transporting cattle, sheep, swine,
or other animals from one port in the Philippine Islands to another, or from any foreign port to any port
within the Philippine Islands, shall provide suitable means for securing such animals while in transit so
as to avoid all cruelty and unnecessary suffering to the animals, and suitable and proper facilities for
loading and unloading cattle or other animals upon or from vessels upon which they are transported,
without cruelty or unnecessary suffering. It is hereby made unlawful to load or unload cattle upon or
from vessels by swinging them over the side by means of ropes or chains attached to the thorns.
Section 3 of Act No. 55 provides that
Any owner or master of a vessel, or custodian of such animals, who knowingly and willfully fails to
comply with the provisions of section one, shall, for every such failure, be liable to pay a penalty of not
less that one hundred dollars nor more that five hundred dollars, United States money, for each offense.
Prosecution under this Act may be instituted in any Court of First Instance or any provost court
organized in the province or port in which such animals are disembarked.
FROM ATTY. DOBLADA^^

Look Chaw, 18 Phil. 573

G.R. No.L-5887. December 16, 1910.
ARELLANO, C. J.
Lesson: Crimes NOT involving a breach of public order committed on board a public vessel is NOT triable by
our courts
Laws Applicable: Art. 2 RPC, Opium Law

FACTS:
Upon arrival of steamship Erroll of English nationality, that it came from Hongkong, and that it was bound for
Mexico, via the call ports of Manila and Cebu, 2 sacks of opium where found during the inspection and search of
the cargo.
o Smaller sack of opium on the cabin near the saloon
o larger sack in the hold
o Later on, there was also 4 cans of opium found on the part of the ship where the firemen habitually sleep
the firemen and crew of foreign vessels, pursuant to the instructions he had from the Manila custom-house, were
permitted to retain certain amounts of opium, always provided it should not be taken shore so it was returned
2 charges were filed against Look Chaw at the Court of First Instance of Cebu:
o unlawful possession of opium
o unlawful sale of opium
Look Chaw admitted that he had bought these sacks of opium, in Hongkong with the intention of selling them as
contraband in Mexico or Vera Cruz, and that, as his hold had already been searched several times for opium, he
ordered two other Chinamen to keep the sack.
The court ruled that it did not lack jurisdiction, inasmuch as the crime had been committed within its district, on
the wharf of Cebu. The court sentenced him to5 years imprisonment, to pay a fine of P10,000, with additional
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvencyxxx It further ordered the confiscation, in favor of the Insular
Government.

ISSUE: W/N the Philippine court has jurisdiction.

HELD: YES. Modified by reducing the imprisonment and the fine imposed to six months and P1,000

GR: mere possession of a thing of prohibited use in these Islands, aboard a foreign vessel in transit, in any of
their ports, does NOT constitute a crime triable by the courts of this country, on account of such vessel being
considered as an extension of its own nationality

EX: when the article, whose use is prohibited within the Philippine Islands, in the present case a can of opium, is
landed from the vessel upon Philippine soil, thus committing an open violation of the laws of the land with
respect to which, as it is a violation of the penal law in force at the place of the commission of the crime, only
the court established in that said place itself had competent jurisdiction, in the absence of an agreement under an
international treaty.

U.S. v. Ah Sing, 36 Phil. 978 (1917)

Cf. French vs. English rule
FACTS: The defendant is a subject of China employed as a fireman on a steamship. The steamship is a
foreign steamer which arrived the port of Cebu on April 25, 1917, after a voyage
direct from the port of Saigon. The defendant bought eight cans of opium in Saigon, brought them on
board the steamship and had them in his possession during the trip from Saigon to Cebu. When the
steamer anchored in the port of Cebu, the authorities on making the search found the cans of opium
hidden in the ashes below the boiler of the steamer's engine. The defendant confessed that he was the
owner of the opium and that he had purchased it in Saigon. He did not confess, however, as to his
purpose in buying the opium. He did not say that it was his
intention to import the prohibited drug.
ISSUE: Whether or not the crime of illegal importation of opium into the Philippine Islands has been
proven?

RULING: Yes. It is the onus of the government to prove that the vessel from which the drug discharged
came into Philippine waters from a foreign country with the drug on board. In this
case, it is to be noted that Sec. 4 of Act No. 2381 begins, Any person who shall unlawfully import or
bring any prohibited drug into the Philippine Islands Import and bring should be
construed as synonymous terms. The mere act of going into a port, without breaking bulk, is prima
facie evidence of importation. The importation is not the making entry of goods at
the customhouse, but merely the bringing them into the port, and the importation is complete before the
entry to the customhouse. Moreover, possession for personal use is unlikely, judging from the size of
the amount brought.

Wong Cheng, 46 Phil. 729

G.R. No.L-18924 October 19, 1922
ROMUALDEZ, J.

FACTS:
appellee is accused of having illegally smoked opium, aboard the merchant vessel
Changsa of English nationality while said vessel was anchored in Manila Bay two and a
half miles from the shores of the city.
Lower court dismissed the case
ISSUE: W/N the courts of the Philippines have jurisdiction over crime committed aboard
merchant vessels anchored in our jurisdiction waters

HELD: The order appealed from is revoked and the cause ordered remanded to the court
of origin for further proceedings in accordance with law, without special findings as to
costs.
YES.
2 fundamental rules on this particular matter in connection with International Law
1. French rule-according to which crimes committed aboard a foreign merchant
vessels should not be prosecuted in the courts of the country within whose
territorial jurisdiction they were committed
UNLESS: their commission affects the peace and security of the territory

2. English rule
-based on the territorial principle and followed in the United States
-according to which crimes perpetrated under such circumstances are in general triable in
the courts of the country within territory they were committed.
As to whether the United States has ever consented by treaty or otherwise to
renouncing such jurisdiction or a part thereof, we find nothing to this effect so far as
England is concerned, to which nation the ship where the crime in question was
committed belongs.

mere possession of opium aboard a foreign vessel in transit was held by this court not
triable by or courts, because it being the primary object of our Opium Law to protect the
inhabitants of the Philippines against the disastrous effects entailed by the use of this
drug, its mere possession in such a ship, without being used in our territory, does not
being about in the said territory those effects that our statute contemplates avoiding.
Hence such a mere possession is not considered a disturbance of the public order.
to smoke opium within our territorial limits, even though aboard a foreign merchant
ship, is certainly a breach of the public order here established, because it causes such
drug to produce its pernicious effects within our territory. It seriously contravenes the
purpose that our Legislature has in mind in enacting the aforesaid repressive statute.