1.

Agriculture
Sustainable ag is key to solve global war and extinction
Lugar 2k (Richard, a US Senator from Indiana, is Chairman of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, and a member and former chairman of the
Senate Agriculture Committee. calls for a new green revolution to combat
global warming and reduce world instability, pg online @
http://www.unep.org/OurPlanet/imgversn/143/lugar.html Donnie)
In a world confronted by global terrorism, turmoil in the Middle East,
burgeoning nuclear threats and other crises, it is easy to lose sight of the
long-range challenges. But we do so at our peril. One of the most daunting of
them is meeting the worlds need for food and energy in this century. At stake
is not only preventing starvation and saving the environment, but also world
peace and security. History tells us that states may go to war over access to
resources, and that poverty and famine have often bred fanaticism and
terrorism. Working to feed the world will minimize factors that contribute to
global instability and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. With
the world population expected to grow from 6 billion people today to 9 billion
by mid-century, the demand for affordable food will increase well beyond
current international production levels. People in rapidly developing nations
will have the means greatly to improve their standard of living and caloric
intake. Inevitably, that means eating more meat. This will raise demand for
feed grain at the same time that the growing world population will need
vastly more basic food to eat. Complicating a solution to this problem is a
dynamic that must be better understood in the West: developing countries
often use limited arable land to expand cities to house their growing
populations. As good land disappears, people destroy timber resources and
even rainforests as they try to create more arable land to feed themselves.
The long-term environmental consequences could be disastrous for the entire
globe. To meet the expected demand for food over the next 50 years, we in
the United States will have to grow roughly three times more food on the land
we have. Thats a tall order. My farm in Marion County, Indiana, for example,
yields on average 8.3 to 8.6 tonnes of corn per hectare typical for a farm in
central Indiana. To triple our production by 2050, we will have to produce an
annual average of 25 tonnes per hectare. Can we possibly boost output that
much? Well, its been done before. Advances in the use of fertilizer and water,
improved machinery and better tilling techniques combined to generate a
threefold increase in yields since 1935 on our farm back then, my dad
produced 2.8 to 3 tonnes per hectare. Much US agriculture has seen similar
increases. But of course there is no guarantee that we can achieve those
results again. Given the urgency of expanding food production to meet world
demand, we must invest much more in scientific research and target that
money toward projects that promise to have significant national and global
impact. For the United States, that will mean a major shift in the way we
conduct and fund agricultural science. Fundamental research will generate

the innovations that will be necessary to feed the world. The United States
can take a leading position in a productivity revolution. And our success at
increasing food production may play a decisive humanitarian role in the
survival of billions of people and the health of our planet.

2. Biodiversity
Biodiversity in specific hotspots checks extinction
Mittermeier 11
(et al, Dr. Russell Alan Mittermeier is a primatologist, herpetologist and biological anthropologist. He holds Ph.D. from Harvard in
Biological Anthropology and serves as an Adjunct Professor at the State University of New York at Stony Brook. He has conducted
fieldwork for over 30 years on three continents and in more than 20 countries in mainly tropical locations. He is the President of
Conservation International and he is considered an expert on biological diversity. Mittermeier has formally discovered several monkey
species. From Chapter One of the book Biodiversity Hotspots F.E. Zachos and J.C. Habel (eds.), DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-209925_1, # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2011. This evidence also internally references Norman Myers, a very famous British
environmentalist specialising in biodiversity. available at:
http://www.academia.edu/1536096/Global_biodiversity_conservation_the_critical_role_of_hotspots)

Extinction is the gravest consequence of the biodiversity crisis, since it is irreversible.

Human activities have elevated the rate of species extinctions to a thousand or more times
the natural background rate (Pimm et al. 1995). What are the consequences of this loss? Most obvious among them may be
the lost opportunity for future resource use. Scientists have discovered a mere fraction of Earths species (perhaps fewer than 10%,
or even 1%) and understood the biology of even fewer (Novotny et al. 2002). As

species vanish, so too does the

health security of every human. Earths species are a vast genetic storehouse that may harbor a cure for
cancer, malaria, or the next new pathogen cures waiting to be discovered. Compounds initially derived from wild species
account for more than half of all commercial medicines even more in developing nations (Chivian and Bernstein 2008). Natural
forms, processes, and ecosystems provide blueprints and inspiration for a growing array of new materials, energy sources, hi-tech
devices, and other innovations (Benyus 2009). The current loss of species has been compared to burning down the worlds libraries
without knowing the content of 90% or more of the books. With

loss of species, we lose the ultimate source of

our crops and the genes we use to improve agricultural resilience , the inspiration for manufactured products,
and the basis of the structure and function of the ecosystems that support humans and all life on Earth
(McNeely et al. 2009). Above and beyond material welfare and livelihoods, biodiversity contributes to security, resiliency, and
freedom of choices and actions (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 2005). Less tangible, but no less important, are the cultural,
spiritual, and moral costs inflicted by species extinctions. All societies value species for their own sake, and wild plants and animals
are integral to the fabric of all the worlds cultures (Wilson 1984). The road to extinction is made even more perilous to people by the
loss of the broader ecosystems that underpin our livelihoods, communities, and economies(McNeely et al.2009). The loss of coastal
wetlands and mangrove forests, for example, greatly exacerbates both human mortality and economic damage from tropical cyclones
(Costanza et al.2008; Das and Vincent2009), while disease outbreaks such as the 2003 emergence of Severe Acute Respiratory
Syndrome in East Asia have been directly connected to trade in wildlife for human consumption(Guan et al.2003). Other
consequences of biodiversity loss, more subtle but equally damaging, include the deterioration of Earths natural capital. Loss of
biodiversity on land in the past decade alone is estimated to be costing the global economy $500 billion annually (TEEB2009).
Reduced diversity may also reduce resilience of ecosystems and the human communities that depend on them. For example, more
diverse coral reef communities have been found to suffer less from the diseases that plague degraded reefs elsewhere (Raymundo et
al.2009). As Earths climate changes, the roles of species and ecosystems will only increase in their importance to humanity (Turner et
al.2009). In many respects, conservation is local. People generally care more about the biodiversity in the place in which they live.
They also depend upon these ecosystems the most and, broadly speaking, it is these areas over which they have the most control.
Furthermore, we believe that all biodiversity is important and that every nation, every region, and every community should do

Extinction is a
global phenomenon, with impacts far beyond nearby administrative borders. More practically,
everything possible to conserve their living resources. So, what is the importance of setting global priorities?

biodiversity, the threats to it, and the ability of countries to pay for its conservation vary around the world. The vast majority of the
global conservation budget perhaps 90% originates in and is spent in economically wealthy countries (James et al.1999). It is thus
critical that those globally exible funds available in the hundreds of millions annually be guided by systematic priorities if we are
to move deliberately toward a global goal of reducing biodiversity loss. The establishment of priorities for biodiversity conservation
is complex, but can be framed as a single question. Given the choice, where

should action toward reducing the loss of

biodiversity be implemented rst? The eld of conservation planning addresses this question and revolves
around a framework of vulnerability and irreplaceability (Margules and Pressey2000). Vulnerability measures the
risk to the species present in a region if the species and ecosystems that are highly threatened are not protected now, we will not get
another chance in the future. Irreplaceability measures the extent to which spatial substitutes exist for securing biodiversity. The
number of species alone is an inadequate indication of conserva-tion priority because several areas can share the same species. In
contrast, areas with high levels of endemism are irreplaceable. We must conserve these places because the unique species they contain

cannot be saved elsewhere. Put another way, biodiversity is not evenly distributed on our planet. It is heavily concentrated in certain
areas, these areas have exceptionally high concentrations of endemic species found nowhere else, and many (but not all) of these areas
are the areas at greatest risk of disappearing because of heavy human impact. Myers seminal paper (Myers1988) was the rst
application of the principles of irreplaceability and vulnerability to guide conservation planning on a global scale. Myers

described ten tropical forest hotspots on the basis of extraordinary plant endemism and high levels of
habitat loss, albeit without quantitative criteria for the designation of hotspot status. A subsequent analysis added eight
additional hotspots, including four from Mediterranean-type ecosystems (Myers 1990).After adopting hotspots as an institutional
blueprint in 1989, Conservation Interna-tional worked with Myers in a rst systematic update of the hotspots. It introduced two strict
quantitative criteria: to qualify as a hotspot, a region had to contain at least 1,500 vascular plants as endemics ( > 0.5% of the worlds
total), and it had to have 30% or less of its original vegetation (extent of historical habitat cover)remaining. These efforts culminated
in an

extensive global review (Mittermeier et al.1999) and scientic publication (Myers et al.2000) that introduced
seven new hotspots on the basis of both the better-dened criteria and new data. A second systematic update
(Mittermeier et al.2004) did not change the criteria, but revisited the set of hotspots based on new data on the distribution of species
and threats, as well as genuine changes in the threat status of these regions. That update redened several hotspots, such as the Eastern
Afromontane region, and added several others that were suspected hotspots but for which sufcient data either did not exist or were
not accessible to conservation scientists outside of those regions. Sadly, it uncovered another region the East Melanesian Islands
which rapid habitat destruction had in a short period of time transformed from a biodiverse region that failed to meet the less than
30% of original vegetation remaining criterion to a genuine hotspot.

3. Bioterror
Bioterror is the most severe existential riskmagnitude
outweighs
Matheny 07 (Jason Matheny research associate with the Future of Humanity

Institute at Oxford University where his work focuses on technology forecasting and
risk assessment particularly of global catastrophic risks and existential risks, he is a
Sommer Scholar and PhD candidate in Applied Economics at Johns Hopkins
University, Reducing the Risk of Human Extinction
http://physics.harvard.edu/~wilson/pmpmta/Mahoney_extinction.pdf)

More recent predictions of human extinction are little more

optimistic. In their catalogs of extinction risks, Britains Astronomer
Royal, Sir Martin Rees (2003), gives humanity 50-50 odds on
surviving the 21st century; philosopher Nick Bostrom argues that it
would be misguided to assume that the probability of extinction
is less than 25%; and philosopher John Leslie (1996) assigns a 30%
probability to extinction during the next five centuries. The Stern
Review for theU.K. Treasury (2006) assumes that the probability of
human extinction during the next century is 10%. And some
explanations of the Fermi Paradox imply Reducing the Risk of
Human Extinction 1337 a high probability (close to100%)of
extinctionamong technological civilizations (Pisani, 2006).4
Estimating the probabilities of unprecedented events is subjective,
so we should treat these numbers skeptically. Still, even if the
probability of extinction is several orders lower, because the stakes
are high, it could be wise to invest in extinction countermeasures.
We already invest in some extinction countermeasures. NASA
spends $4 million per year monitoring near-Earth asteroids and
comets (Leary, 2007) and there has been some research on how to
deflect these objects using existing technologies (Gritzner&Kahle,
2004; NASA, 2007). $1.7 billion is spent researching climate change
and there are many strategies to reduce carbon emissions (Posner,
2004, p. 181). There are policies to reduce nuclear threats, such as
the Non- Proliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty, as well as efforts to secure expertise by employing former
nuclear scientists. Of current extinction risks, the most severe may
be bioterrorism. The knowledge needed to engineer a virus is
modest compared to that needed to build a nuclear weapon; the
necessary equipment and materials are increasingly accessible and
because biological agents are self-replicating, a weapon can have
an exponential effect on a population (Warrick, 2006; Williams,
2006). 5 Current U.S. biodefense efforts are funded at $5 billion per
year to develop and stockpile new drugs and vaccines, monitor
biological agents and emerging diseases, and strengthen the
capacities of local health systems to respond to pandemics (Lam,

Franco, & Shuler, 2006).

4. Brazil Prolif
Brazil prolif causes Latin American instability and regional prolif
Poblete 8
Jason Poblete, Vice-Chair to the National Security Committee of the American Bar Association, 9-16-2008, "Brazil Wants to Build 50
Nuclear Power Plants, Nuclear Submarines, More?" http://jasonpoblete.com/2008/09/16/brazil-wants-to-build-50-nuclear-powerplants-nuclear-submarines-more/
Despite repeated assurances to the contrary, Brazils

spotty record on transparency in this area should be

cause for concern. Unlike Iran or North Korea, a Latin American nation with a nuclear weapon
would have an immediate destabilizing effect in the Hemisphere. It will surely set off an
mini-arms race with Argentina or, more likely, Venezuelas Hugo Chavez. Either Brazil is committed to a nuclearweapons zone or it is not. Recent statements by high-ranking Brazilian military and civilian officials are not helpful. The regional
mechanisms in place to deal with non-proliferation in the Americas are inadequate. For
example, the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean
(OPANAL), headquartered in Mexico City, Mexico, is wholly unprepared to deal with these
matters. For one thing, the U.S. is not a member, but an observer. The regional mechanism are in need of reform and are politically
anemic. Neither OPANAL, or the Organization of American States, has ever voiced concerns when Brazilian military officials state
that they should be technologically prepared to build an atomic weapon. If OPANAL is not willing to say anything, who will?

5. China War
US-Sino war goes nuclear. Crisis management wont check
Lowther 13
Note: when this card has a line that reads it says, it is referencing a 42-page report by the
Washington DC-based Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Ask your lab leaders
about the CSIS and the PONI (Project on Nuclear Issues) several of them have worked for that
organization and will have unique insights. The study at hand was prepared by the CSIS Project
on Nuclear Issues. The Tapiei Time article was written by William Lowther, who is the
Washington DC staff writer for that organization and he is citing a report by the Center for
Strategic and International Studies, 3-16-2013, Taiwan could spark nuclear war: report, Taipei
Times, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2013/03/16/2003557211
Although

Beijing and Washington have agreed to a range of crisis management mechanisms, such
the
bases for miscommunication and misunderstanding remain and draw on deep historical
reservoirs of suspicion, the report says. For example, it says, it is unclear whether either side understands
what kinds of actions would result in a military or even nuclear response by the other party. To make
things worse, neither side seems to believe the other s declared policies and intentions, suggesting
that escalation management , already a very uncertain endeavor, could be especially difficult in any conflict, it says.
as the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement and the establishment of a direct hotline between the Pentagon and the Ministry of Defense,

Although conflict mercifully seems unlikely at this point, the report concludes that it cannot be ruled out and may become increasingly likely if we are
unwise or unlucky. The report says: With

both sides possessing and looking set to retain formidable nuclear

weapons arsenals, such a conflict would be tremendously dangerous and quite possibly devastating.

6. Cyber Security
Cyber attacks escalate globally triggers accidental
launch
Fritz 9 (Jason, researcher for International Commission on Nuclear
Nonproliferation and Disarmament, former Army officer and consultant, and
has a master of international relations at Bond University, Hacking Nuclear
Command and Control, July,
http://www.icnnd.org/latest/research/Jason_Fritz_Hacking_NC2.pdf)
This paper will analyse the threat of cyber terrorism in regard to nuclear weapons. Specifically, this
research will use open source knowledge to identify the structure of nuclear command and control centres,
how those structures might be compromised through computer network operations, and how doing so

If access to
command and control centres is obtained, terrorists could fake or actually
cause one nuclear-armed state to attack another, thus provoke a nuclear
response from another nuclear power . This may be an easier alternative for
terrorist groups than building or acquiring a nuclear weapon or dirty bomb
themselves. This would also act as a force equaliser, and provide terrorists
with the asymmetric benefits of high speed, removal of geographical
distance, and a relatively low cost . Continuing difficulties in developing
computer tracking technologies which could trace the identity of intruders , and
would fit within established cyber terrorists capabilities, strategies, and tactics.

difficulties in establishing an internationally agreed upon legal framework to guide responses to computer

point towards an inherent weakness in using computer

networks to manage nuclear weaponry. This is particularly relevant to
reducing the hair trigger posture of existing nuclear arsenals . All computers which
are connected to the internet are susceptible to infiltration and remote control. Computers which
operate on a closed network may also be compromised by various hacker
methods, such as privilege escalation, roaming notebooks, wireless access
points, embedded exploits in software and hardware, and maintenance entry
points. For example, e-mail spoofing targeted at individuals who have access to a
closed network, could lead to the installation of a virus on an open network .
network operations,

This virus could then be carelessly transported on removable data storage between the open and closed

Information found on the internet may also reveal how to access these
closed networks directly. Efforts by militaries to place increasing reliance on
computer networks, including experimental technology such as autonomous
systems, and their desire to have multiple launch options, such as nuclear
triad capability, enables multiple entry points for terrorists . For example, if a
network.

terrestrial command centre is impenetrable, perhaps isolating one nuclear armed submarine would prove

There is evidence to suggest multiple attempts have been made

by hackers to compromise the extremely low radio frequency once used by
the US Navy to send nuclear launch approval to submerged submarines .
Additionally, the alleged Soviet system known as Perimetr was designed to
automatically launch nuclear weapons if it was unable to establish
communications with Soviet leadership. This was intended as a retaliatory
response in the event that nuclear weapons had decapitated Soviet
leadership; however it did not account for the possibility of cyber terrorists
an easier task.

blocking communications through computer network operations in an

attempt to engage the system. Should a warhead be launched, damage could be further
enhanced through additional computer network operations. By using proxies, multi-layered
attacks could be engineered. Terrorists could remotely commandeer
computers in China and use them to launch a US nuclear attack against
Russia. Thus Russia would believe it was under attack from the US and the US
would believe China was responsible. Further, emergency response
communications could be disrupted, transportation could be shut down, and
disinformation, such as misdirection, could be planted, thereby hindering the
disaster relief effort and maximizing destruction. Disruptions in
communication and the use of disinformation could also be used to provoke
uninformed responses. For example, a nuclear strike between India and
Pakistan could be coordinated with Distributed Denial of Service attacks
against key networks, so they would have further difficulty in identifying what
happened and be forced to respond quickly . Terrorists could also knock out
communications between these states so they cannot discuss the situation. Alternatively, amidst
the confusion of a traditional large-scale terrorist attack, claims of
responsibility and declarations of war could be falsified in an attempt to
instigate a hasty military response . These false claims could be posted directly on
Presidential, military, and government websites. E-mails could also be sent to the media and foreign
governments using the IP addresses and e-mail accounts of government officials .

A sophisticated
and all encompassing combination of traditional terrorism and cyber
terrorism could be enough to launch nuclear weapons on its own , without the
need for compromising command and control centres directly .

7. Deforestation
Deforestation causes extinction and kills the worlds most
significant oxygen supply
AIRR, Amazon International Rainforest Reserve, 2K, "The Amazon Stands As A Wonderous Testimony
To Its Glorious Creator,"

http://www.trekking-andes.com/brazil-amazon/history.html

The Amazon Rainforest, the largest and richest ecosystem on earth,

has stood inviolate for thousands if not milions of years since its
creation. The profusion and variety of life forms present in the
rainforest and its critical role in supplying the world with air has resulted in
its being called the "Heart and Lungs" of the planet. Indeed , the majority of the world's
oxygen is supplied by its dense foliage and teeming plant life which upon
first inspection, seems boundless and industructible. A recent study by the Smithsonian Institute indicates

90% of all the plant and animal species existant in the world
today reside in the Amazon Rainforst and depend upon its complex
ecology. Unlike the forests of temperate zones that are populated by stands of a single or double
that about

species of tree, the tropical rainforest will in a two and half acre plot harbor as many as 283 tree species.
With certain trees growing to a height of 150 ft. or more, the rainforest is mulitleveled with an emergent
tree level, upper and lower canopy and understory. Each level harbors a particular constellation of plant
and animal life. Human beings have only begun to catalog and name the creatures that live here. Home to
thousands of varieties of flowering plants, the rainforest supports endless varieties of hummingbirds,
butterflies and insects such as the rhinocerous beetle and the army ant. It is also home to the spider
monkey, pink and gray dolphins, Amazon river otter, piranha, anaconda, jaguar, blue and yellow macaw,
toucan, harpy eagle, fishing bat, tapir sloth, tarantula, caymen crocidile, manatee, etc. In addition to

the Amazon Rainforest constitutes the

world's largest "pharmacy" yielding thousands of previously unknown substances found no
serving as the "Heart and Lungs" of the planet,

where else. Compounds from tropical flora relieve headaches, help treat glaucoma and provide muscle

The Amazon Rainforest has also yielded quinine

for the treatment of malaria and periwinkle for the treatment of
leukemia. Given the rainforest's teeming biological diversity, its value
to humanity as a laboratory of natural phenomena and as a medical
storehouse is priceless. Conversely, if the rainforest disappears,
researchers fear that plants with wonder-drug potential will be lost
forever. In addition to these functions, the Amazon Rainforest attracts huge volumes of precipitation
relaxants used during surgery.

from the Atlantic ocean, releasing it in endless cycles of rain and tropical downpours that give the

the Amazon Rainforest

channels and provides drainage for the Amazon River, the world's
largest river and source of 25% of the world's fresh water supply.
rainforest its name. Averaging from 80 to 120 inches annually,

Moreover, the rainforest is home to some one hundred thousand Indian people, the remnant of
innumerable tribes which have held out against the ravages of five hundred years of conquest and
colonization by Europeans. Since Europeans first appeared in Brazil, nearly 90% of Amazonian Indian
people have disappeared. In the last ten years alone, the Yanomani Indian homeland has been reduced by
government decree from 36,000 to 800 square miles in response to an invasion of 45,000 gold prospectors
into their territory. When the invasion began, there were about 9000 Yanomani. Today they are dying in
large numbers from tuberculosis, hepatitis, malaria and venereal disease. Like the rainforest itself, its
indigenous inhabitants offer something unique to the world, for they are the repository of an ancient,
intimate and all encompassing understanding of the natural world of which they are a part. With the loss of
the rainforest and its original inhabitants, humankind loses a unique and valuable organ for knowing itself
and its ecosystems. As an example, the Yanomani, the largest group of unassimilated Indians in Brazil,

speak a language unrelated to any other spoken in the Amazon basin or anywhere else on earth. Their
world view is synonymous with the Rainforest itself. As the greatest repository of nature's treasures and
most significant source of air, the Amazon Rainforest is crucial to the survival of all life on the planet and to
human beings' understanding of their place in the web of life. In the words of Guatama Buddha, " The

forest is a peculiar organism of unlimited kindness and benevolence

that makes no demands for its sustenance and extends generously, the
products of its like and activity. It affords protection to all living
beings."

8. Economy
Economic decline guarantees multiple scenarios for nuclear war and turns
every other impact
Harris and Burrows 9 - PhD in European History @ Cambridge and Counselor of the US
National Intelligence Council AND Member of the National Intelligence Councils Long Range
Analysis Unit (Mathew J. and Jennifer, Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the
Financial Crisis, April, Washington Quarterly,
http://www.twq.com/09april/docs/09apr_Burrows.pdf)
Of course, the report encompasses more than economics and indeed believes the future is likely to be the result of a number of
intersecting and interlocking forces. With so many possible permutations of outcomes, each with ample Revisiting the Future
opportunity for unintended consequences, there is a growing sense of insecurity. Even so, history may be more instructive than
ever. While we continue to believe that the Great Depression is not likely to be repeated, the lessons to be

drawn from that period include the harmful effects on fledgling democracies and multiethnic
societies (think Central Europe in 1920s and 1930s) and on the sustainability of multilateral
institutions (think League of Nations in the same period). There is no reason to think that this would not be true in the twenty-first as
much as in the twentieth century. For that reason, the ways in which the potential for greater conflict could grow
would seem to be even more apt in a constantly volatile economic environment as they would be if
change would be steadier. In surveying those risks, the report stressed the likelihood that terrorism and nonproliferation will
remain priorities even as resource issues move up on the international agenda. Terrorisms appeal will decline if economic
growth continues in the Middle East and youth unemployment is reduced. For those terrorist groups that remain active in
2025, however, the diffusion

of technologies and scientific knowledge will place some of the

worlds most dangerous capabilities within their reach . Terrorist groups in 2025 will likely be a combination
of descendants of long established groups_inheriting organizational structures, command and control processes, and training
procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated attacks and newly emergent collections of the angry and disenfranchised that
become self-radicalized, particularly in the absence of economic outlets that would become narrower in an economic downturn.
The most dangerous casualty of any economically-induced drawdown of U.S. military presence would almost certainly be the
Middle East. Although Irans acquisition of nuclear weapons is not inevitable, worries about a nuclear-armed Iran could lead
states in the region to develop new security arrangements with external powers, acquire additional weapons, and consider
pursuing their own nuclear ambitions. It is not clear that the type of stable deterrent relationship that existed between the great
powers for most of the Cold War would emerge naturally in the Middle East with a nuclear Iran. Episodes of low intensity

conflict and terrorism taking place under a nuclear umbrella could lead to an unintended
escalation and broader conflict if clear red lines between those states involved are not well
established. The close proximity of potential nuclear rivals combined with underdeveloped surveillance
capabilities and mobile dual-capable Iranian missile systems also will produce inherent difficulties in achieving reliable
indications and warning of an impending nuclear attack. The lack of strategic depth in neighboring states like Israel, short
warning and missile flight times, and uncertainty of Iranian intentions may place more focus on preemption rather

than defense, potentially leading to escalating crises. 36 Types of conflict that the world
continues to experience, such as over resources, could reemerge, particularly if protectionism
grows and there is a resort to neo-mercantilist practices. Perceptions of renewed energy scarcity will drive
countries to take actions to assure their future access to energy supplies. In the worst case, this
could result in interstate conflicts if government leaders deem assured access to energy resources, for example, to be
essential for maintaining domestic stability and the survival of their regime. Even actions short of war, however, will have
important geopolitical implications. Maritime security concerns are providing a rationale for naval buildups and modernization
efforts, such as Chinas and Indias development of blue water naval capabilities. If the fiscal stimulus focus for

these countries indeed turns inward, one of the most obvious funding targets may be military.
Buildup of regional naval capabilities could lead to increased tensions , rivalries, and
counterbalancing moves, but it also will create opportunities for multinational cooperation in protecting critical sea lanes.
With water also becoming scarcer in Asia and the Middle East, cooperation to manage changing water
resources is likely to be increasingly difficult both within and between states in a more dogeat-dog world.

9. Hegemony
Decline in hegemony causes escalation of multiple global flashpoints for
violencethere is no sustainable alternative to American leadership

Kagan 11 (Robert, Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and and a senior fellow in foreign
policy at the Brookings Institution, The Price of Power, 1/24, http://www.weeklystandard.com/articles/price-power_533696.html?
page=3)

Today the international situation is also one of high risk. The terrorists who would like to
kill Americans on U.S. soil constantly search for safe havens from which to plan and carry
out their attacks. American military actions in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Yemen, and elsewhere make it
harder for them to strike and are a large part of the reason why for almost a decade there
has been no repetition of September 11. To the degree that we limit our ability to deny them safe haven, we increase
the chances they will succeed. American forces deployed in East Asia and the Western Pacific have
for decades prevented the outbreak of major war, provided stability, and kept open
international trading routes, making possible an unprecedented era of growth and
prosperity for Asians and Americans alike. Now the United States faces a new challenge and potential
threat from a rising China which seeks eventually to push the U.S. militarys area of operations back to Hawaii and
exercise hegemony over the worlds most rapidly growing economies. Meanwhile, a nuclear-armed North Korea
threatens war with South Korea and fires ballistic missiles over Japan that will someday be
capable of reaching the west coast of the United States. Democratic nations in the region,
worried that the United States may be losing influence, turn to Washington for reassurance
that the U.S. security guarantee remains firm. If the United States cannot provide that
assurance because it is cutting back its military capabilities, they will have to choose
between accepting Chinese dominance and striking out on their own, possibly by building
nuclear weapons. In the Middle East, Iran seeks to build its own nuclear arsenal, supports
armed radical Islamic groups in Lebanon and Palestine, and has linked up with anti-American
dictatorships in the Western Hemisphere. The prospects of new instability in the region
grow every day as a decrepit regime in Egypt clings to power, crushes all moderate opposition, and drives
the Muslim Brotherhood into the streets. A nuclear-armed Pakistan seems to be ever on the brink of
collapse into anarchy and radicalism. Turkey, once an ally, now seems bent on an
increasingly anti-American Islamist course. The prospect of war between Hezbollah and
Israel grows, and with it the possibility of war between Israel and Syria and possibly Iran.
There, too, nations in the region increasingly look to Washington for reassurance, and if
they decide the United States cannot be relied upon they will have to decide whether to
succumb to Iranian influence or build their own nuclear weapons to resist it. In the 1990s, after the
Soviet Union had collapsed and the biggest problem in the world seemed to be ethnic conflict in the Balkans, it was at least plausible
to talk about cutting back on American military capabilities. In

the present, increasingly dangerous

international environment, in which terrorism and great power rivalry vie as the greatest
threat to American security and interests, cutting military capacities is simply reckless.
Would we increase the risk of strategic failure in an already risky world , despite the near irrelevance
of the defense budget to American fiscal health, just so we could tell American voters that their military had suffered its fair share of
the pain? The nature of the risk becomes plain when one considers the nature of the cuts that would have to be made to have even a
marginal effect on the U.S. fiscal crisis. Many

are under the illusion, for instance, that if the United

States simply withdrew from Iraq and Afghanistan and didnt intervene anywhere else for a

while, this would have a significant impact on future deficits. But, in fact, projections of
future massive deficits already assume the winding down of these interventions. Withdrawal
from the two wars would scarcely make a dent in the fiscal crisis . Nor can meaningful reductions be
achieved by cutting back on waste at the Pentagonwhich Secretary of Defense Gates has already begun to do and which has also
been factored into deficit projections. If the United States withdrew from Iran and Afghanistan tomorrow, cut all the waste Gates can
find, and even eliminated a few weapons programsall this together would still not produce a 10 percent decrease in overall defense
spending. In fact, the only way to get significant savings from the defense budgetand by significant, we are still talking about a
tiny fraction of the cuts needed to bring down future deficitsis to cut force structure: fewer troops on the ground; fewer airplanes in
the skies; fewer ships in the water; fewer soldiers, pilots, and sailors to feed and clothe and provide benefits for. To cut the size of the
force, however, requires reducing or eliminating the missions those forces have been performing. Of course, there are any number of
think tank experts who insist U.S. forces can be cut by a quarter or third or even by half and still perform those missions. But this is
snake oil. Over the past two decades, the force has already been cut by a third. Yet no administration has reduced the missions that the
larger force structures of the past were designed to meet. To fulfill existing security commitments, to remain the worlds power
balancer of choice, as Leslie Gelb puts it, to act as the only regional balancer against China in Asia, Russia in eastern Europe, and
Iran in the Middle East requires at least the current force structure, and almost certainly more than current force levels. Those who
recommend doing the same with less are only proposing a policy of insufficiency, where the United States makes commitments it
cannot meet except at high risk of failure. The only way to find substantial savings in the defense budget, therefore, is to change
American strategy fundamentally. The Simpson-Bowles commission suggests as much, by calling for a reexamination of Americas
21st century role, although it doesnt begin to define what that new role might be. Others have. For

decades realist
analysts have called for a strategy of offshore balancing. Instead of the United States providing security
in East Asia and the Persian Gulf, it would withdraw its forces from Japan, South Korea, and the Middle East and let the nations in
those regions balance one another. If the balance broke down and war erupted, the United States would then intervene militarily until
balance was restored. In the Middle East and Persian Gulf, for instance, Christopher Layne has long proposed passing the mantle of
regional stabilizer to a consortium of Russia, China, Iran, and India. In East Asia offshore balancing would mean letting China,
Japan, South Korea, Australia, and others manage their own problems, without U.S. involvementagain, until the balance broke
down and war erupted, at which point the United States would provide assistance to restore the balance and then, if necessary,
intervene with its own forces to restore peace and stability. Before examining whether this would be a wise strategy, it

is
important to understand that this really is the only genuine alternative to the one the United
States has pursued for the past 65 years. To their credit, Layne and others who support the concept of offshore balancing have
eschewed halfway measures and airy assurances that we can do more with less, which are likely recipes for disaster. They recognize
that either the United States is actively involved in providing security and stability in regions beyond the Western Hemisphere, which
means maintaining a robust presence in those regions, or it is not. Layne and others are frank in calling for an end to the global
security strategy developed in the aftermath of World War II, perpetuated through the Cold War, and continued by four successive
post-Cold War administrations. At the same time, it

is not surprising that none of those administrations

embraced offshore balancing as a strategy. The idea of relying on Russia, China, and Iran to
jointly stabilize the Middle East and Persian Gulf will not strike many as an attractive
proposition. Nor is U.S. withdrawal from East Asia and the Pacific likely to have a
stabilizing effect on that region. The prospects of a war on the Korean Peninsula would
increase. Japan and other nations in the region would face the choice of succumbing to
Chinese hegemony or taking unilateral steps for self-defense, which in Japans case would
mean the rapid creation of a formidable nuclear arsenal. Layne and other offshore balancing enthusiasts,
like John Mearsheimer, point to two notable occasions when the United States allegedly practiced this
strategy. One was the Iran-Iraq war, where the United States supported Iraq for years against Iran in the hope that the two would
balance and weaken each other. The other was American policy in the 1920s and 1930s, when the United States allowed the great
European powers to balance one another, occasionally providing economic aid, or military aid, as in the Lend-Lease program of
assistance to Great Britain once war broke out. Whether this was really American strategy in that era is open for debatemost would
argue the United States in this era was trying to stay out of war not as part of a considered strategic judgment but as an end in itself.
Even if the United States had been pursuing offshore balancing in the first decades of the 20th century, however, would

we
really call that strategy a success? The United States wound up intervening with millions of
troops, first in Europe, and then in Asia and Europe simultaneously, in the two most
dreadful wars in human history. It was with the memory of those two wars in mind, and in
the belief that American strategy in those interwar years had been mistaken , that American
statesmen during and after World War II determined on the new global strategy that the United States has pursued ever since. Under
Franklin Roosevelt, and then under the leadership of Harry Truman and Dean Acheson, American leaders determined that the
safest course was to build situations of strength (Achesons phrase) in strategic locations around the world, to build a
preponderance of power, and to create an international system with American power at its center. They left substantial numbers of
troops in East Asia and in Europe and built a globe-girdling system of naval and air bases to enable the rapid projection of force to

strategically important parts of the world. They did not do this on a lark or out of a yearning for global dominion. They simply

rejected the offshore balancing strategy, and they did so because they believed it had led to
great, destructive wars in the past and would likely do so again. They believed their new global strategy
was more likely to deter major war and therefore be less destructive and less expensive in the long run. Subsequent
administrations, from both parties and with often differing perspectives on the proper course in many areas of foreign policy, have all
agreed on this core strategic approach. From the beginning this strategy was assailed as too ambitious and too expensive. At the dawn
of the Cold War, Walter Lippmann railed against Trumans containment strategy as suffering from an unsustainable gap between ends
and means that would bankrupt the United States and exhaust its power. Decades later, in the waning years of the Cold War, Paul

Kennedy warned of imperial overstretch, arguing that American decline was inevitable
if the trends in national indebtedness, low productivity increases, [etc.] were allowed to continue at
the same time as massive American commitments of men, money and materials are made in different parts of the globe. Today, we
are once again being told that this global strategy needs to give way to a more restrained and modest approach, even though the
indebtedness crisis that we face in coming years is not caused by the present, largely successful global strategy. Of

course it is
precisely the success of that strategy that is taken for granted. The enormous benefits that
this strategy has provided, including the financial benefits, somehow never appear on the
ledger. They should. We might begin by asking about the global security order that the United
States has sustained since Word War IIthe prevention of major war, the support of an
open trading system, and promotion of the liberal principles of free markets and free
government. How much is that order worth? What would be the cost of its collapse or transformation into another
type of order? Whatever the nature of the current economic difficulties, the past six decades have seen a greater
increase in global prosperity than any time in human history. Hundreds of millions have
been lifted out of poverty. Once-backward nations have become economic dynamos. And the American economy, though
suffering ups and downs throughout this period, has on the whole benefited immensely from this international order. One price
of this success has been maintaining a sufficient military capacity to provide the essential security
underpinnings of this order. But has the price not been worth it? In the first half of the 20th century, the United States
found itself engaged in two world wars. In the second half, this global American strategy helped produce a peaceful end to the greatpower struggle of the Cold War and then 20 more years of great-power peace. Looked

at coldly, simply in terms of

dollars and cents, the benefits of that strategy far outweigh the costs. The danger, as always,
is that we dont even realize the benefits our strategic choices have provided. Many assume
that the world has simply become more peaceful, that great-power conflict has become
impossible,
that nations have learned that military force has little utility, that economic power is what
counts. This belief in progress and the perfectibility of humankind and the institutions of
international order is always alluring to Americans and Europeans and other children of the
Enlightenment. It was the prevalent belief in the decade before World War I, in the first years after World War II, and in those
heady days after the Cold War when people spoke of the end of history. It is always tempting to believe that the
international order the United States built and sustained with its power can exist in the
absence of that power, or at least with much less of it. This is the hidden assumption of those who call for a change in
American strategy: that the United States can stop playing its role and yet all the benefits that came from that role will keep pouring
in. This

is a great if recurring illusion, the idea that you can pull a leg out from under a table
and the table will not fall over. Much of the present debate, it should be acknowledged, is not about the defense budget
or the fiscal crisis at all. It is only the latest round in a long-running debate over the nature and purposes of American foreign policy.
At the tactical level, some use the fiscal crisis as a justification for a different approach to, say, Afghanistan. Richard Haass, for
instance, who has long favored a change of strategy from counterinsurgency to counterterrorism, now uses the budget crisis to
bolster his casealthough he leaves unclear how much money would be saved by such a shift in strategy. At the broader level of
grand strategy, the current debate, though revived by the budget crisis, can be traced back a century or more, but its most recent
expression came with the end of the Cold War. In the early 1990s, some critics, often calling themselves realists, expressed their
unhappiness with a foreign policyfirst under George H.W. Bush and then under Bill Clintonthat cast the United States as leader of
a new world order, the indispensable nation. As early as 1992, Robert W. Tucker and David C. Hendrickson assailed President
Bush for launching the first Persian Gulf war in response to Saddam Husseins invasion and occupation of Kuwait. They charged him
with pursuing a new world role ... required neither by security need nor by traditional conceptions of the nations purpose, a role
that gave military force an excessive and disproportionate ... position in our statecraft. Tucker and Hendrickson were frank
enough to acknowledge that, pace Paul Kennedy, the peril was not actually to the nations purse or even to our interests but to

the nations soul. This has always been the core critique of expansive American foreign policy doctrines, from the time of the
Founders to the presentnot that a policy of extensive global involvement is necessarily impractical but that it is immoral and
contrary to the nations true ideals.

10. Meltdowns
Meltdowns cause extinction
Lendman, 2011
(Stephen, Research Associate of the Centre for Research on Globalization, 03/ 13, Nuclear
Meltdown in Japan,, The Peoples Voice
http://www.thepeoplesvoice.org/TPV3/Voices.php/2011/03/13/nuclear-meltdown-in-japan,
accessed 10/12/12,WYO/JF
Reuters said the

1995 Kobe quake caused $100 billion in damage, up to then the most costly ever natural
disaster. This time, from quake and tsunami damage alone, that figure will be dwarfed . Moreover,
under a worst case core meltdown, all bets are off as the entire region and beyond will be
threatened with permanent contamination, making the most affected areas unsafe to live in. On March 12, Stratfor
Global Intelligence issued a "Red Alert: Nuclear Meltdown at Quake-Damaged Japanese Plant," saying: Fukushima Daiichi
"nuclear power plant in Okuma, Japan, appears to have caused a reactor meltdown." Stratfor
downplayed its seriousness, adding that such an event "does not necessarily mean a nuclear disaster," that already
may have happened - the ultimate nightmare short of nuclear winter. According to Stratfor, "(A)s
long as the reactor core, which is specifically designed to contain high levels of heat, pressure and radiation, remains
intact, the melted fuel can be dealt with. If the (core's) breached but the containment facility
built around (it) remains intact, the melted fuel can be....entombed within specialized
concrete" as at Chernobyl in 1986. In fact, that disaster killed nearly one million people worldwide from
nuclear radiation exposure. In their book titled, "Chernobyl: Consequences of the Catastrophe for People and the Environment,"
Alexey Yablokov, Vassily Nesterenko and Alexey Nesterenko said: "For the past 23 years, it has been clear that there is a danger
greater than nuclear weapons concealed within nuclear power. Emissions

from this one reactor exceeded a

hundred-fold the radioactive contamination of the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and
Nagasaki." "No citizen of any country can be assured that he or she can be protected from radioactive contamination. One
nuclear reactor can pollute half the globe. Chernobyl fallout covers the entire Northern Hemisphere." Stratfor
explained that if Fukushima's floor cracked, "it is highly likely that the melting fuel will burn through (its) containment system and
enter the ground. This

has never happened before," at least not reported. If now occurring, "containment goes
from being merely dangerous, time consuming and expensive to nearly impossible ," making the
quake, aftershocks, and tsunamis seem mild by comparison. Potentially, millions of lives will be jeopardized. Japanese
officials said Fukushima's reactor container wasn't breached. Stratfor and others said it was, making the potential calamity far worse
than reported. Japan's Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) said the explosion at Fukushima's Saiichi No. 1 facility could
only have been caused by a core meltdown. In fact, 3 or more reactors are affected or at risk. Events are fluid and developing, but
remain very serious. The possibility of an extreme catastrophe can't be discounted . Moreover, independent
nuclear safety analyst John Large told Al Jazeera that by venting radioactive steam from the inner reactor to the outer dome, a reaction
may have occurred, causing the explosion. "When I look at the size of the explosion," he said, "it is my opinion that there could be a
very large leak (because) fuel continues to generate heat." Already, Fukushima way exceeds Three Mile Island that experienced a
partial core meltdown in Unit 2. Finally it was brought under control, but coverup and denial concealed full details until much later.
According to anti-nuclear activist Harvey Wasserman, Japan's quake fallout may cause nuclear disaster, saying: " This

is a very
serious situation. If the cooling system fails (apparently it has at two or more plants), the super-heated radioactive
fuel rods will melt, and (if so) you could conceivably have an explosion," that, in fact, occurred. As a result,
massive radiation releases may follow, impacting the entire region. "It could be, literally, an apocalyptic event. The
reactor could blow." If so, Russia, China, Korea and most parts of Western Asia will be affected. Many thousands will die,
potentially millions under a worse case scenario, including far outside East Asia.

11. Middle East War

Most probable impact.
Russell 9
James A. Russell, Senior Lecturer, National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, 9 (Spring) Strategic Stability
Reconsidered: Prospects for Escalation and Nuclear War in the Middle East IFRI, Proliferation Papers, #26,
http://www.ifri.org/downloads/PP26_Russell_2009.pdf

Strategic stability in the region is thus undermined by various factors: (1) asymmetric interests in the
bargaining framework that can introduce unpredictable behavior from actors; (2) the presence of non-state actors
that introduce unpredictability into relationships between the antagonists ; (3) incompatible
assumptions about the structure of the deterrent relationship that makes the bargaining framework
strategically unstable; (4) perceptions by Israel and the United States that its window of
opportunity for military action is closing, which could prompt a preventive attack; (5) the prospect
that Irans response to pre-emptive attacks could involve unconventional weapons, which could prompt escalation by Israel and/or the
United States; (6) the lack of a communications framework to build trust and cooperation among

framework participants. These systemic weaknesses in the coercive bargaining framework all suggest that escalation by
any the parties could happen either on purpose or as a result of miscalculation or the pressures of wartime circumstance. Given these
factors, it is disturbingly easy to imagine scenarios under which a conflict could quickly

escalate in which the regional antagonists would consider the use of chemical, biological,
or nuclear weapons. It would be a mistake to believe the nuclear taboo can somehow
magically keep nuclear weapons from being used in the context of an unstable strategic
framework. Systemic asymmetries between actors in fact suggest a certain increase in the probability of
war a war in which escalation could happen quickly and from a variety of participants. Once such a war starts,
events would likely develop a momentum all their own and decision-making would consequently be shaped
in unpredictable ways. The international community must take this possibility seriously, and muster every tool at its disposal to
prevent such an outcome, which would be an unprecedented disaster for the peoples of the region,

with substantial risk for the entire world.

12. Nanowar
Nanowar causes extinction
CRN 8 [Center for Responsible Nanotechnology, non-profit research and advocacy organization with a
focus on molecular manufacturing and its possible effects, both positive and negative, 2008, Why early
development may be the safest, http://www.crnano.org/early.htm, Stransky]

An important question is whether nanotech weapons would be stabilizing or destabilizing.

Nuclear weapons, for example, perhaps can be credited with preventing

major wars since their invention. However, nanotech weapons are not
very similar to nuclear weapons. Nuclear stability stems from at least
four factors. The most obvious is the massive destructiveness of all-out nuclear war. Allout nanotech war is probably equivalent in the short term , but
nuclear weapons also have a high long-term cost of use (fallout, contamination)
that would be much lower with nanotech weapons. Nuclear weapons cause

Nuclear weapons
require massive research effort and industrial development, which can be
tracked far more easily than nanotech weapons development ;
indiscriminate destruction; nanotech weapons could be targeted.

nanotech weapons can be developed much more rapidly due to faster,

cheaper prototyping. Finally, nuclear weapons cannot easily be delivered in advance of

Greater uncertainty of the

capabilities of the adversary, less response time to an attack, and better
being used; the opposite is true of nanotech.

targeted destruction of an enemy's visible resources during an attack all

make nanotech arms races less stable. Also, unless nanotech is tightly
controlled, the number of nanotech nations in the world could be

much higher than the number of nuclear nations, increasing the

chance of a regional conflict blowing up. Molecular manufacturing allows the
cheap creation of incredibly powerful devices and products. How many of these products will

The range of possible damage

is vast, from personal low-flying supersonic aircraft injuring large numbers
we want? What environmental damage will they do?

of animals to collection of solar energy on a sufficiently large scale to

modify the planet's albedo and directly affect the environment . Stronger
materials will allow the creation of much larger machines, capable of excavating or otherwise
destroying large areas of the planet at a greatly accelerated pace. It is too early to tell
whether there will be economic incentive to do this. However, given the large number of

activities and purposes that would damage the environment if taken to

extremes, and the ease of taking them to extremes with molecular
manufacturing, it seems likely that this problem is worth worrying about.
Some forms of damage can result from an aggregate of individual actions, each almost
harmless by itself.

Such damage is quite hard to prevent by persuasion,

and laws frequently don't work either; centralized restriction on the

technology itself may be a necessary part of the solution . Finally, the
extreme compactness of nanomanufactured machinery will tempt the use
of very small products, which can easily turn into nano-litter that will be
hard to clean up and may cause health problems.

13. Oil Dependence

Oil dependence escalates multiple flashpoints globally
Rosen (Deputy General Counsel at the Center for Naval Analyses & Professor of Homeland
Security Law and Policy at George Washington University) 2010 Energy Independence and Climate
Mark

Change: The Economic and National Security Consequences of Failing to Act University of Richmond Law
Review, Lexis

There is a growing consensus in U.S. national security circles that American dependence on imported oil constitutes a
threat to the United States because a substantial portion of those oil reserves are controlled by governments
that have historically pursued policies inimical to U.S. interests. For example, Venezuela, which represents
eleven percent of U.S. oil imports, "regularly espouses anti-American and anti-Western rhetoric both at
home and abroad ... [and] ... promotes ... [an] anti-U.S. influence in parts of Latin and South America ..." 72 that retards the growth of
friendly political and economic ties among the United States, Venezuela, and a few other states in Latin and South America. This
scenario plays out in many different regions. Russia, for example, has used its oil leverage to exert extreme political
pressure upon Ukraine and Belarus. 73 Longstanding Western commercial relations with repressive regimes in the Middle

East - i.e., Iran, Sudan, and Saudi Arabia - raise similar issues because of the mixed strategic messages that are being sent. Of
course, large wealth [*989] transfers have allowed the Taliban in Saudi Arabia to bankroll terrorism. 74 A. Chokepoints and
Flashpoints For the foreseeable future, the U.S. military will most likely be involved in protecting access to oil
supplies - including the political independence of oil producers - and the global movements of using oil to help
sustain the smooth functioning of the world economy. The security challenges associated with preserving

access to oil are complicated by geographical "chokepoints," through which oil flows or is transported, but which
are vulnerable to piracy or closure. 75 "Flashpoints" also exist as a result of political - and sometimes military - competition
to secure commercial or sovereign access to oil in the face of disputed maritime and land claims that are associated with oil and gas
deposits. Together, these

challenges have necessitated that the United States and its allies maintain costly
navies and air forces to protect sea lanes, ocean access, and maintain a presence to deter military
competition in disputed regions. A selection of today's chokepoints and flashpoints follow. The Strait of Hormuz. This strait
is the narrow waterway that allows access from the Indian Ocean into the Persian Gulf. Two-thirds of the world's oil is transported by
ocean, and a very large percentage of that trade moves through Hormuz. The northern tip of Oman forms the southern shoreline of the
strait. 76 Hormuz is protected by the constant transits of the U.S. Navy and its allies. Even though the strait has not been closed, the
Persian Gulf has been the scene of extensive military conflict. 77 On September 22, 1980, Iraq invaded Iran, initiating an eight-year
war between the two countries that featured the "War of the Tankers," in which 543 ships, including the USS Stark, were attacked,
while the U.S. Navy provided escort services to protect tankers [*990] that were transiting the Persian Gulf. 78 There have been
past threats by Iran to militarily close the strait. 79 Additionally, there are ongoing territorial disputes
between the United Arab Emirates and Iran over ownership of three islands that are located in approaches to the strait. 80
Closure of the strait would cause severe disruption in the movements of the world's oil supplies and, at a
minimum, cause significant price increases and perhaps supply shortages in many regions for the duration of the closure. 81 During
the War of the Tankers, oil prices increased from $ 13 per barrel to $ 31 a barrel due to supply disruptions and other "fear" factors. 82
Bab el-Mandeb. The strait separates Africa (Djibouti and Eritrea) and Asia (Yemen), and it connects the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean
via the Gulf of Aden. The strait is an oil transit chokepoint since most of Europe's crude oil from the Middle East passes north through
Bab el-Mandeb into the Mediterranean via the Suez Canal. 83 Closure of the strait due to terrorist activities or for political/military
reasons, could keep tankers from the Persian Gulf from reaching the Suez Canal and Sumed Pipeline complex, diverting them around
the southern tip of Africa (the Cape of Good Hope). 84 This would add greatly to transit time and cost, and would effectively tie-up
spare tanker capacity. Closure of the Bab el-Mandeb would effectively block non-oil shipping from using the Suez Canal. 85 In
October 2002 the French-flagged tanker Limburg was attacked off the coast of Yemen by terrorists. 86 During the [*991] Yom Kippur
War in 1973, Egypt closed the strait as a means of blockading the southern Israeli port of Eilat. 87 The Turkish Straits and Caspian
Oil. The term "Turkish Straits" refers to the two narrow straits in northwestern Turkey, the Bosporus and the Dardanelles, which
connect the Sea of Marmara with the Black Sea on one side and the Aegean arm of the Mediterranean Sea on the other. Turkey and
Russia have been locked in a longstanding dispute over passage issues involving the Turkish Straits. 88 The 1936 Montreux
Convention puts Turkey in charge of regulating traffic through the straits; 89 yet Turkey has been hard pressed to stop an onslaught of
Russian, Ukrainian, and Cypriot tankers, which transport Caspian Sea oil to markets in Western Europe. 90 Because of the very heavy
shipping traffic and very challenging geography, there have been many collisions and groundings in the past, creating terrible
pollution incidents and death. 91 Thus far, none of these incidents have been attributed to state-on-state-conflict or terrorism; 92
however, the confined waterway is an especially attractive target because of the grave economic and

environmental damage that would result from a well-timed and well-placed attack on a loaded tanker.

The issues surrounding the straits are also a subset of larger problems associated with the exploitation of Caspian oil, including severe
pollution of the Caspian Sea as a result of imprudent extraction techniques, as well as the ever-present potential for conflict among the
various claimants to the Caspian's hydrocarbon resources due to an inability of the various Caspian littoral states to agree on their
maritime boundaries - and their [*992] legal areas in which to drill. 93 Any one of these problems could become a
major flashpoint in the future. China vs. Japan. The Daiyu/Senkaku islands located in the East China Sea have become an
increasingly contentious dispute because both claimants have, in the past, used modern military platforms to patrol the areas of their
claims in which there are suspected oil and gas deposits in the seabed. 94 In September 2005, for example, China dispatched five
warships to disputed waters surrounding its oil and gas platforms, which were spotted by a Japanese maritime patrol aircraft. 95
There have been other similar military-to-military encounters. 96 Given the fact that both countries have modern
armed forces and are comparatively energy starved, it is not difficult to envision serious conflict erupting over
these disputed areas. The Arctic Super Highway. Traditionalists would probably not include the Arctic as a security chokepoint.
The oil connection is reasonably well known: "22 percent of the world's undiscovered energy reserves are projected to be in the region
(including 13 percent of the world's petroleum and 30 percent of natural gas)." 97 However, given the very small margins that
transporters earn transporting oil from point A to B, 98 shipping companies are always in search of shorter routes to transport oil to
market. As the thawing of the Arctic Ocean continues as a result of climate change, 99 this may create new
shipping routes that transporters of [*993] oil and other goods will use to maximize their profits and minimize their transit
times. As supplies of readily exploitable crude oil are reduced, the probability increases that some of this trade will result from
exploitation activities in the land and littoral areas adjacent to the Arctic Sea. This development is concerning for a number of reasons:
(1) the area is very remote and could provide a safe haven to pirates seeking to hijack cargoes; (2) the
environmental sensitivity of the area, and the concomitant difficulty of mounting a cleanup effort, means that an oil spill in that marine
environment will be much more persistent than an oil spill in temperate waters; 100 (3) the Arctic presents unique navigational
difficulties due to the lack of good charts, navigational aids, and communications towers, as well as the impacts of extreme cold on the
operational effectiveness of systems; 101 (4) the unsettled nature of claims by various countries, including the United States, to the
seabed continental shelf resources in the littoral areas off their coastlines creates the potential for military competition and conflict
over these claims. 102 The International Maritime Organization ("IMO") is now circulating draft guidelines for ships operating in
Arctic areas to promote - but not require - ship hardening against an iceberg strike, better crew training, and environmental protection
measures. 103 These guidelines are merely advisory and can only be implemented via the flag states. 104 Also, neither IMO nor any
of the UN Law of the Sea Institutions have mandatory jurisdiction over any of the flashpoint issues relating [*994] to competing
continental shelf claims in the Arctic, 105 meaning that any disputes will remain unresolved for a long time. The above is only a
selected list of potential flashpoints in which oil is the main culprit. Disputes between China and six other nations of
the Spratly Islands, and other territories in the South China Sea, remain unresolved. 106 The Spratly Islands could
become a flashpoint in the future, involving the United States or its allies, because of the proximity of those areas to the major
sea routes to Japan and Korea. 107 The strategic straits of Malacca, Lombok, and Sunda in Southeast Asia are
absolutely essential to the movement of raw materials to Japan, Korea, and China. 108 Because of Lombok's depth
and strategic location, it is a major transit route for very large crude carriers that move between the Middle East and Asia. 109
Lombok is an undefended waterway that is only eighteen kilometers in width at its southern opening, making it an attractive
chokepoint for hijacking or eco-terrorism in which the waters of the environmentally sensitive Indonesian archipelago would be held
hostage. 110

14. Resource Wars

This specific type of resource war escalates causing huge death tolls.
Lendman 7
(Stephen Lendman is a renowned author and Research Associate of the Center for Research on Globalization (CRG). The Centre for
Research on Globalization (CRG) is an independent research and media organization based in Montreal. The CRG is involved in book
publishing, support to humanitarian projects as well as educational outreach activities including the organization of public conferences
and lectures. The Centre also acts as a think tank on crucial economic and geopolitical issues. Stephen has written extensively on war
and peace, social justice in America and many other national and international issues. Stephen Lendman is a recipient of a 2008
Project Censored Award, University of California at Sonoma Resource Wars Can We Survive Them? Global Research, June
06, 2007 http://www.globalresearch.ca/resource-wars-can-we-survive-them/5892)

With the worlds energy supplies finite, the US heavily dependent on imports, and peak oil
near or approaching, security for America means assuring a sustainable supply of what we cant do
without. It includes waging wars to get it, protect it, and defend the maritime trade routes over which it travels. That means energys
partnered with predatory New World Order globalization, militarism, wars, ecological recklessness, and now an extremist US administration willing to
risk Armageddon for world dominance. Central to its plan is first controlling essential resources everywhere, at any cost, starting with oil and where most
of it is located in the Middle East and Central Asia. The New Great Game and Perils From It The new Great Games begun, but this time the

stakes are greater than ever as explained above. The old one lasted nearly 100 years pitting the British empire against Tsarist Russia
when the issue wasnt oil. This time, its the US with help from Israel, Britain, the West, and satellite states like Japan, South Korea and
Taiwan challenging Russia and China with todays weapons and technology on both sides making earlier ones look like toys.
At stake is more than oil. Its planet earth with survival of all life on it issue number one twice over.
Resources and wars for them means militarism is increasing, peace declining, and the planets ability to sustain life front and center, if
anyones paying attention. Theyd better be because beyond the point of no return, theres no second chance the way
Einstein explained after the atom was split. His famous quote on future wars was : I know not with what weapons World War III will be
fought, but World War IV will be fought with sticks and stones. Under a worst case scenario, its more dire than that. There may be
nothing left but resilient beetles and bacteria in the wake of a nuclear holocaust meaning even a new stone age
is way in the future, if at all. The threat is real and once nearly happened during the Cuban Missile
Crisis in October, 1962. We later learned a miracle saved us at the 40th anniversary October, 2002 summit meeting in Havana
attended by the US and Russia along with host country Cuba. For the first time, we were told how close we came to
nuclear Armageddon. Devastation was avoided only because Soviet submarine captain
Vasily Arkhipov countermanded his order to fire nuclear-tipped torpedos when Russian
submarines were attacked by US destroyers near Kennedys quarantine line . Had he done it, only
our imagination can speculate what might have followed and whether planet earth, or at least a big part of it, would have survived.

15. Russia War

Small US-Russia conflicts can escalate or cause nuclear miscalc.
Gottemoeller 8
(Rose Gottemoeller was sworn in as the United States Department of State's Assistant Secretary for Arms Control, Verification, and
Compliance on April 6, 2009. She was the chief negotiator of the follow on for the Strategic Arms Reductions Treaty otherwise known
as the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) with the Russian Federation. Since 2000, she had been with the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace U.S.-Russia Cooperation on Iran: Aftermath of the Summer War in Georgia, Carnegie
Moscow Center, August- July 2008. PLESE NOTE THIS CARD APPEARS IN A HOST OF CURRENT OPEN-SOURCE DEBATE
DOCS AND THE URL THAT APPEARS ON THOSE CARDS MISDIRECTS TO A DIFFERENT Gottemoeller ARTICLE. The
website below redirects to her October article: http://www.scribd.com/doc/13031239/RussianAmerican-Security-Relations-AfterGeorgia)
No holds barred, no rulesthe

United States and Russia may be heading to a confrontation more

unpredictable and dangerous than any we have seen since the Cuban missile crisis. A
confrontation today would be differentthe two countries are in constant and intense communication, unlike the situation in 1962
but if those exchanges

provoke mutual anger and recrimination, they have the potential to spark a
dangerous crisis. This effect is especially dangerous because both countries are in presidential transitions. Russia, whose
government is riven by corruption, internal competition, and disorder, is attempting an unprecedented tandem leadership arrangement.
The United States is in the midst of its quadrennial election season, with both political parties competing to show that their man is
more skilled and tough on national security issues than his opponent. The unpredictability of these two transitions

stokes the
potential for misunderstanding and descent into crisis. We must avoid such a crisis, because
we have never succeeded in escaping the nuclear existential threat that we each pose to the
other. We never even came close to transforming the U.S.Russian relationship into one that is closer to that which the United
States has with the United Kingdom or France. What if Russia had refused to confirm or deny that no nuclear
weapons were on the bombers it flew to Venezuela? Our nuclear weapons are still faced off
to launch on warning of an attack, and in a no-holds-barred confrontation between us, we could come close
to nuclear catastrophe before we knew it.

16. Saudi Arabia Proliferation

Saudi prolif causes nuclear war.
Edelman 11
(Eric Distinguished Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments & Former U.S. Undersecretary of Defense for
Policy, Foreign Affairs, Jan/Feb, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67162/eric-s-edelman-andrew-f-krepinevich-jr-and-evanbraden-montgomer/the-dangers-of-a-nuclear-iran)
There is, however, at least one state that could receive significant outside support: Saudi Arabia. And if it did, proliferation could
accelerate throughout the region. Iran and Saudi Arabia have long been geopolitical and ideological rivals. Riyadh would face
tremendous pressure to respond in some form to a nuclear-armed Iran, not only to deter Iranian coercion and subversion but also to
preserve its sense that Saudi Arabia is the leading nation in the Muslim world. The

Saudi government is already

pursuing a nuclear power capability, which could be the first step along a slow road to nuclear
weapons development. And concerns persist that it might be able to accelerate its progress by exploiting its close ties to
Pakistan. During the 1980s, in response to the use of missiles during the Iran-Iraq War and their growing proliferation throughout the
region, Saudi Arabia acquired several dozen css-2 intermediate-range ballistic missiles from China. The Pakistani government
reportedly brokered the deal, and it may have also offered to sell Saudi Arabia nuclear warheads for the css-2s, which are not accurate
enough to deliver conventional warheads effectively. There

are still rumors that Riyadh and Islamabad have had

discussions involving nuclear weapons, nuclear technology, or security guarantees. This Islamabad option could
develop in one of several different ways. Pakistan could sell operational nuclear weapons and delivery
systems to Saudi Arabia, or it could provide the Saudis with the infrastructure , material, and technical
support they need to produce nuclear weapons themselves within a matter of years, as opposed to a decade or
longer. Not only has Pakistan provided such support in the past, but it is currently building two more heavy-water reactors for
plutonium production and a second chemical reprocessing facility to extract plutonium from spent nuclear fuel. In other words, it
might accumulate more fissile material than it needs to maintain even a substantially expanded arsenal of its own. Alternatively,
Pakistan might offer an extended deterrent guarantee to Saudi Arabia and deploy nuclear weapons, delivery systems, and troops on
Saudi territory, a practice that the United States has employed for decades with its allies. This arrangement could be particularly
appealing to both Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. It would allow the Saudis to argue that they are not violating the NPT since they would
not be acquiring their own nuclear weapons. And an extended deterrent from Pakistan might be preferable to one from the United
States because stationing foreign Muslim forces on Saudi territory would not trigger the kind of popular opposition that would
accompany the deployment of U.S. troops. Pakistan, for its part, would gain financial benefits and international clout by deploying
nuclear weapons in Saudi Arabia, as well as strategic depth against its chief rival, India. The

Islamabad option raises a

host of difficult issues, perhaps the most worrisome being how India would respond. Would it
target Pakistans weapons in Saudi Arabia with its own conventional or nuclear weapons? How
would this expanded nuclear competition influence stability during a crisis in either the Middle East or South Asia? Regardless of
Indias reaction, any

decision by the Saudi government to seek out nuclear weapons, by whatever

means, would be highly destabilizing. It would increase the incentives of other nations in the
Middle East to pursue nuclear weapons of their own. And it could increase their ability to do so
by eroding the remaining barriers to nuclear proliferation: each additional state that acquires
nuclear weapons weakens the nonproliferation regime, even if its particular method of acquisition
only circumvents, rather than violates, the NPT. Were Saudi Arabia to acquire nuclear weapons,
the Middle East would count three nuclear-armed states, and perhaps more before long. It is unclear
how such an n-player competition would unfold because most analyses of nuclear deterrence are based on the U.S.- Soviet rivalry
during the Cold War. It seems likely, however, that the

interaction among three or more nuclear-armed powers

would be more prone to miscalculation and escalation than a bipolar competition. During the Cold War, the United
States and the Soviet Union only needed to concern themselves with an attack from the other. Multi- polar systems are
generally considered to be less stable than bipolar systems because coalitions can shift quickly,
upsetting the balance of power and creating incentives for an attack. More important, emerging
nuclear powers in the Middle East might not take the costly steps necessary to preserve regional
stability and avoid a nuclear exchange. For nuclear-armed states, the bedrock of deterrence is the knowledge that each
side has a secure second-strike capability, so that no state can launch an attack with the expectation that it can wipe out its opponents

forces and avoid a devastating retaliation. However, emerging

nuclear powers might not invest in expensive but

survivable capabilities such as hardened missile silos or submarine- based nuclear forces. Given
this likely vulnerability, the close proximity of states in the Middle East, and the very short flight
times of ballistic missiles in the region, any new nuclear powers might be compelled to launch
on warning of an attack or even, during a crisis, to use their nuclear forces preemptively. Their governments might also
delegate launch authority to lower-level commanders, heightening the possibility of miscalculation and escalation. Moreover, if early
warning systems were not integrated into robust command-and-control systems, the risk of an unauthorized or accidental launch
would increase further still. And without sophisticated early warning systems ,

a nuclear attack might be unattributable

or attributed incorrectly. That is, assuming that the leadership of a targeted state survived a first strike, it might not be able to
accurately determine which nation was responsible. And this uncertainty, when combined with the pressure to
respond quickly, would create a significant risk that it would retaliate against the wrong party,
potentially triggering a regional nuclear war. Most existing nuclear powers have taken steps to protect their nuclear
weapons from unauthorized use: from closely screening key personnel to developing technical safety measures, such as permissive
action links, which require special codes before the weapons can be armed. Yet there

is no guarantee that emerging

nuclear powers would be willing or able to implement these measures, creating a significant risk
that their governments might lose control over the weapons or nuclear material and that nonstate
actors could gain access to these items . Some states might seek to mitigate threats to their nuclear arsenals; for instance,
they might hide their weapons. In that case, however, a single intelligence compromise could leave their weapons vulnerable to attack
or theft. Meanwhile, states outside the Middle East could also be a source of instability. Throughout the Cold War, the United States
and the Soviet Union were engaged in a nuclear arms race that other nations were essentially powerless to influence. In a multipolar
nuclear Middle East, other nuclear powers and states with advanced military technology could influencefor good or illthe military
competition within the region by selling or transferring technologies that most local actors lack today: solid-fuel rocket motors,
enhanced missile-guidance systems, war- head miniaturization technology, early warning systems, air and missile defenses. Such
transfers could stabilize a fragile nuclear balance if the emerging nuclear powers acquired more survivable arsenals as a result. But
they could also be highly destabilizing. If, for example, an outside power sought to curry favor with a potential client state or gain
influence with a prospective ally, it might share with that state the technology it needed to enhance the accuracy of its missiles and
thereby increase its ability to launch a disarming first strike against any adversary. The

ability of existing nuclear powers

and other technically advanced military states to shape the emerging nuclear competition in the
Middle East could lead to a new Great Game, with unpredictable consequences.

17. Nuclear Terrorism

Nuclear terrorism escalates to major nuclear war. Global coop on material
transfers is key.
Ayson10
Robert Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand at the Victoria University of
Wellington After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Volume 33, Issue 7,
July, obtained via InformaWorld
A terrorist nuclear attack, and even the use of nuclear weapons in response by the country attacked in the first place, would not
necessarily represent the worst of the nuclear worlds imaginable. Indeed, there are reasons to wonder whether nuclear terrorism should
ever be regarded as belonging in the category of truly existential threats. A contrast can be drawn here with the global catastrophe that
would come from a massive nuclear exchange between two or more of the sovereign states that possess these weapons in significant
numbers. Even the worst terrorism that the twenty-first century might bring would fade into insignificance alongside considerations of
what a general nuclear war would have wrought in the Cold War period. And it must be admitted that as long as the major nuclear
weapons states have hundreds and even thousands of nuclear weapons at their disposal, there is always the possibility of a truly awful
nuclear exchange taking place precipitated entirely by state possessors themselves. But these two

nuclear worldsa nonstate actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchangeare not necessarily
separable. It is just possible that some sort of terrorist attack, and especially an act of nuclear terrorism, could
precipitate a chain of events leading to a massive exchange of nuclear weapons between two
or more of the states that possess them. In this context, todays and tomorrows terrorist groups might assume the place allotted
during the early Cold War years to new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a catalytic
nuclear war between the superpowers started by third parties. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and early 1960s as
concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem. It may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict
an especially plausible situation where an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example, in
the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be
brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of
terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as
easily threaten them as well. Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For example, how

might the United

States react if it was thought or discovered that the fissile material used in the act of nuclear
terrorism had come from Russian stocks, FN

40

and if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for

nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material to a particular country might not be a case of science fiction given the
observation by Michael May et al. that while the debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be spread over a wide area in tiny
fragments, its radioactivity makes it detectable, identifiable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its
analysis: the efficiency of the explosion, the materials used and, most important some indication of where the nuclear material
came from.41 Alternatively, if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and American officials refused to believe that
a terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all) suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors. Ruling out Western
ally countries like the United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington would be left with
a very short list consisting of North Korea, perhaps Iran if its program continues, and possibly Pakistan. But at what stage would
Russia and China be definitely ruled out in this high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? In particular ,

if the act of nuclear

terrorism occurred against a backdrop of existing tension in Washingtons relations with Russia
and/or China, and at a time when threats had already been traded between these major powers, would officials and political
leaders not be tempted to assume the worst? Of course, the chances of this occurring would only seem to increase
if the United States was already involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they were confronting
each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present time. The reverse might well
apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during a period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with
the United States, could Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures that might rise domestically to consider the United States as a
possible perpetrator or encourager of the attack? Washingtons early response

to a terrorist nuclear attack on

its own soil might also raise the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear aided) confrontation with
Russia and/or China. For example, in the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack,
the U.S. president might be expected to place the countrys armed forces, including its nuclear arsenal, on a
higher stage of alert. In such a tense environment, when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality, it is just
possible that Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S. intentions to use

force (and possibly nuclear force) against them. In that situation, the temptations to preempt such actions
might grow, although it must be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response. As part
of its initial response to the act of nuclear terrorism (as discussed earlier) Washington might decide to order a
significant conventional (or nuclear) retaliatory or disarming attack against the leadership of the terrorist group and/or states seen
to support that group. Depending on the identity and especially the location of these targets, Russia and/or
China might interpret such action as being far too close for their comfort, and potentially as an
infringement on their spheres of influence and even on their sovereignty. One far-fetched but perhaps not
impossible scenario might stem from a judgment in Washington that some of the main aiders and abetters of the terrorist action resided
somewhere such as Chechnya, perhaps in connection with what Allison claims is the Chechen insurgents long-standing interest in
all things nuclear.42 American pressure on that part of the world would almost certainly raise alarms in Moscow that might require a
degree of advanced consultation from Washington that the latter found itself unable or unwilling to provide.There is also the question
of how other nuclear-armed states respond to the act of nuclear terrorism on another member of that special club. It could reasonably
be expected that following a nuclear terrorist attack on the United States, both Russia and China would extend immediate sympathy
and support to Washington and would work alongside the United States in the Security Council. But there is just a chance, albeit a
slim one, where the support of Russia and/or China is less automatic in some cases than in others. For example, what would happen if
the United States wished to discuss its right to retaliate against groups based in their territory? If, for some reason, Washington found
the responses of Russia and China deeply underwhelming, (neither for us or against us) might it also suspect that they secretly were
in cahoots with the group, increasing (again perhaps ever so slightly) the chances of a major exchange. If the terrorist group had some
connections to groups in Russia and China, or existed in areas of the world over which Russia and China held sway, and if Washington
felt that Moscow or Beijing were placing a curiously modest level of pressure on them, what conclusions might it then draw about
their culpability? If Washington decided to use, or decided to threaten the use of, nuclear weapons, the responses of Russia and China
would be crucial to the chances of avoiding a more serious nuclear exchange. They might surmise, for example, that while the act of
nuclear terrorism was especially heinous and demanded a strong response, the response simply had to remain below the nuclear
threshold. It would be one thing for a non-state actor to have broken the nuclear use taboo, but an entirely different thing for a state
actor, and indeed the leading state in the international system, to do so. If Russia and China felt sufficiently strongly about that
prospect, there is then the question of what options would lie open to them to dissuade the United States from such action: and as has
been seen over the last several decades, the central dissuader of the use of nuclear weapons by states has been the threat of nuclear
retaliation. If some readers find this simply too fanciful, and perhaps even offensive to contemplate, it

may be informative
to reverse the tables. Russia, which possesses an arsenal of thousands of nuclear warheads and that has been one of the two
most important trustees of the non-use taboo, is subjected to an attack of nuclear terrorism. In response, Moscow
places its nuclear forces very visibly on a higher state of alert and declares that it is considering the use of nuclear retaliation against
the group and any of its state supporters. How would Washington view such a possibility? Would it really be
keen to support Russias use of nuclear weapons, including outside Russias traditional sphere of influence? And if not, which seems
quite plausible, what options would Washington have to communicate that displeasure? If China had been the victim of the nuclear
terrorism and seemed likely to retaliate in kind, would the United States and Russia be happy to sit back and let this occur? In

the
charged atmosphere immediately after a nuclear terrorist attack, how would the attacked country respond
to pressure from other major nuclear powers not to respond in kind? The phrase how dare they tell us what
to do immediately springs to mind. Some might even go so far as to interpret this concern as a tacit form of sympathy or support for

might not help the chances of nuclear restraint. FN 40. One way of
reducing, but probably not eliminating, such a prospect, is further international cooperation
on the control of existing fissile material holdings.
the terrorists. This

18. Warming
Warming causes extinctionoutweighs all other impacts
Deibel 2007 (Terry, "Foreign Affairs Strategy: Logic of American Statecraft," Conclusion:
American Foreign Affairs Strategy Today)
Finally, there

is one major existential threat to American security (as well as prosperity) of a nonviolent nature, which,
is the threat of global warming to the stability of the climate
upon which all earthly life depends. Scientists worldwide have been observing the gathering of
this threat for three decades now, and what was once a mere possibility has passed through
probability to near certainty. Indeed not one of more than 900 articles on climate change
published in refereed scientific journals from 1993 to 2003 doubted that anthropogenic warming
is occurring. In legitimate scientific circles, writes Elizabeth Kolbert, it is virtually impossible to find evidence
of disagreement over the fundamentals of global warming. Evidence from a vast international
scientific monitoring effort accumulates almost weekly, as this sample of newspaper reports
shows: an international panel predicts brutal droughts, floods and violent storms across the
planet over the next century; climate change could literally alter ocean currents, wipe away huge portions of Alpine Snowcaps
though far in the future, demands urgent action. It

and aid the spread of cholera and malaria; glaciers in the Antarctic and in Greenland are melting much faster than expected, and
worldwide, plants are blooming several days earlier than a decade ago; rising sea temperatures have been accompanied by a
significant global increase in the most destructive hurricanes; NASA scientists have concluded from direct temperature
measurements that 2005 was the hottest year on record, with 1998 a close second; Earths warming

climate is estimated
to contribute to more than 150,000 deaths and 5 million illnesses each year as disease spreads; widespread bleaching
from Texas to Trinidadkilled broad swaths of corals due to a 2-degree rise in sea temperatures. The world is slowly
disintegrating, concluded Inuit hunter Noah Metuq, who lives 30 miles from the Arctic Circle. They call it climate changebut we
just call it breaking up. From the founding of the first cities some 6,000 years ago until the beginning of the industrial revolution,
carbon dioxide levels in the atmosphere remained relatively constant at about 280 parts per million (ppm). At present they are
accelerating toward 400 ppm, and by 2050 they will reach 500 ppm, about double pre-industrial levels. Unfortunately, atmospheric
CO2 lasts about a century, so there is no way immediately to reduce levels, only to slow their increase, we

are thus in for

significant global warming; the only debate is how much and how serous the effects will be . As the
newspaper stories quoted above show, we are already experiencing the effects of 1-2 degree warming in more violent storms, spread
of disease, mass die offs of plants and animals, species extinction, and threatened inundation of low-lying
countries like the Pacific nation of Kiribati and the Netherlands at a warming of 5 degrees or less the Greenland and West Antarctic

ice sheets could disintegrate, leading to a sea level of rise of 20 feet that would cover North
Carolinas outer banks, swamp the southern third of Florida, and inundate Manhattan up to the middle of
Greenwich Village. Another catastrophic effect would be the collapse of the Atlantic thermohaline
circulation that keeps the winter weather in Europe far warmer than its latitude would otherwise allow. Economist William Cline
once estimated the damage to the United States alone from moderate levels of warming at 1-6 percent of GDP annually; severe
warming could cost 13-26 percent of GDP. But the

most frightening scenario is runaway greenhouse warming,

based on positive feedback from the buildup of water vapor in the atmosphere that is both caused
by and causes hotter surface temperatures. Past ice age transitions, associated with only 5-10 degree changes in
average global temperatures, took place in just decades, even though no one was then pouring ever-increasing amounts of carbon into
the atmosphere. Faced with this specter, the best one can conclude is that humankinds continuing enhancement of the natural
greenhouse effect is akin to playing Russian roulette with the earths climate and humanitys life support system. At worst, says
physics professor Marty Hoffert of New York University, were

just going to burn everything up; were going to het

will

the atmosphere to the temperature it was in the Cretaceous when there were crocodiles at the poles, and then everything

collapse. During the Cold War, astronomer Carl Sagan popularized a theory of nuclear winter to describe how a thermonuclear
war between the Untied States and the Soviet Union would not only destroy both countries but possible end life on this planet.

Global warming is the post-Cold War eras equivalent of nuclear winter at least as serious and
considerably better supported scientifically. Over the long run it puts dangers form terrorism and

traditional military challenges to shame. It is a threat not only to the security and prosperity to the
United States, but potentially to the continued existence of life on this planet.

19. Korean War

Korean war goes nuclear, spills over globally---risk of miscalc is high and this
time is different
Steven Metz 13, Chairman of the Regional Strategy and Planning Department and Research
Professor of National Security Affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute, 3/13/13, Strategic
Horizons: Thinking the Unthinkable on a Second Korean War,
http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12786/strategic-horizons-thinking-the-unthinkableon-a-second-korean-war
Today, North

Korea is the most dangerous country on earth and the greatest threat to U.S.

security. For years, the bizarre regime in Pyongyang has issued an unending stream of claims that a U.S. and South Korean invasion is imminent,
while declaring that it will defeat this offensive just as -- according to official propaganda -- it overcame the unprovoked American attack in 1950. Often
the press

releases from the official North Korean news agency are absurdly funny, and American
policymakers tend to ignore them as a result. Continuing to do so , though, could be dangerous as
events and rhetoric turn even more ominous. In response to North Korea's Feb. 12 nuclear test, the U.N. Security Council
recently tightened existing sanctions against Pyongyang. Even China, North Korea's long-standing benefactor and protector, went along. Convulsed by
anger, Pyongyang then threatened

a pre-emptive nuclear strike against the United States and South

Korea, abrogated the 1953 armistice that ended the Korean War and cut off the North-South hotline installed in 1971 to help avoid an
escalation of tensions between the two neighbors. A spokesman for the North Korean Foreign Ministry asserted that a second Korean War is unavoidable.
He might be right; for the first time, an official statement from the North Korean government may prove true. No

American leader
wants another war in Korea. The problem is that the North Koreans make so many threatening and
bizarre official statements and sustain such a high level of military readiness that American
policymakers might fail to recognize the signs of impending attack . After all, every recent U.S.
war began with miscalculation ; American policymakers misunderstood the intent of their
opponents, who in turn underestimated American determination. The conflict with North Korea
could repeat this pattern. Since the regime of Kim Jong Un has continued its predecessors tradition of responding hysterically to every
action and statement it doesn't like, it's hard to assess exactly what might push Pyongyang over the edge
and cause it to lash out. It could be something that the United States considers modest and reasonable, or it could be some sort of internal
power struggle within the North Korean regime invisible to the outside world. While we cannot know whether the recent round
of threats from Pyongyang is serious or simply more of the same old lathering , it would be prudent
to think the unthinkable and reason through what a war instigated by a fearful and delusional North Korean regime might mean for U.S.
security. The second Korean War could begin with missile strikes against South Korean,
Japanese or U.S. targets, or with a combination of missile strikes and a major conventional invasion of the South -- something North
Korea has prepared for many decades. Early attacks might include nuclear weapons , but even if they didn't, the United
States would probably move quickly to destroy any existing North Korean nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. The war itself would
be extremely costly and probably long. North Korea is the most militarized society on earth. Its armed forces are backward but huge.
It's hard to tell whether the North Korean people, having been fed a steady diet of propaganda based on adulation of the Kim regime, would resist U.S.
and South Korean forces that entered the North or be thankful for relief from their brutally parasitic rulers. As the conflict in Iraq showed, the United
States and its allies should prepare for widespread, protracted resistance even while hoping it doesn't occur. Extended guerrilla operations and insurgency
could potentially last for years following the defeat of North Korea's conventional military. North Korea would need massive relief, as would South
Korea and Japan if Pyongyang used nuclear weapons. Stabilizing North Korea and developing an effective and peaceful regime would require a lengthy
occupation, whether U.S.-dominated or with the United States as a major contributor. The

second Korean War would force

military mobilization in the United States. This would initially involve the military's existing reserve component, but it would
probably ultimately require a major expansion of the U.S. military and hence a draft . The military's training
infrastructure and the defense industrial base would have to grow. This would be a body blow to efforts to cut
government spending in the United States and postpone serious deficit reduction for some time , even
if Washington increased taxes to help fund the war. Moreover, a second Korean conflict would

shock the global economy and potentially have destabilizing effects outside Northeast Asia .
Eventually, though, the United States and its allies would defeat the North Korean military. At that point it would be impossible for the United States to
simply re-establish the status quo ante bellum as it did after the first Korean War. The Kim regime is too unpredictable, desperate and dangerous to
tolerate. Hence regime change and a permanent ending to the threat from North Korea would have to be America's strategic objective. China would pose
the most pressing and serious challenge to such a transformation of North Korea. After all, Beijing's intervention saved North Korean dictator Kim Il
Sung after he invaded South Korea in the 1950s, and Chinese assistance has kept the subsequent members of the Kim family dictatorship in power. Since
the second Korean War would invariably begin like the first one -- with North Korean aggression -- hopefully China has matured enough as a great power
to allow the world to remove its dangerous allies this time. If the war began with out-of-the-blue North Korean missile strikes, China could conceivably
even contribute to a multinational operation to remove the Kim regime. Still, China would vehemently oppose a long-term U.S. military presence in
North Korea or a unified Korea allied with the United States. One way around this might be a grand bargain leaving a unified but neutral Korea. However
appealing this might be, Korea might hesitate to adopt neutrality as it sits just across the Yalu River from a China that tends to claim all territory that it
controlled at any point in its history. If the aftermath of the second Korean War is not handled adroitly, the

result could easily be

heightened hostility between the United States and China, perhaps even a new cold war. After all, history shows that
deep economic connections do not automatically prevent nations from hostility and war -- in
1914 Germany was heavily involved in the Russian economy and had extensive trade and financial ties with France and Great Britain. It is not
inconceivable then, that after the second Korean War, U.S.-China relations would be antagonistic and hostile at the same time that the two continued
mutual trade and investment. Stranger things have happened in statecraft.

20. Pakistan Prolif

Pakistan loose nukes cause global nuclear conflict
Pitt 9 William, a New York Times and internationally bestselling author of two books: "War on
Iraq: What Team Bush Doesn't Want You to Know" and "The Greatest Sedition Is Silence,
5/8/09, Unstable Pakistan Threatens the World,
http://www.arabamericannews.com/news/index.php?
mod=article&cat=commentary&article=2183
But a suicide bomber in Pakistan rammed a car packed with explosives into a jeep filled with troops today, killing five and wounding as many as 21,
including several children who were waiting for a ride to school. Residents of the region where the attack took place are fleeing in terror as gunfire rings
out around them, and government forces have been unable to quell the violence. Two regional government officials were beheaded by militants in
retaliation for the killing of other militants by government forces. As familiar as this sounds, it did not take place where we have come to expect such
terrible events. This, unfortunately, is a whole new ballgame. It is part of another conflict that is brewing, one which puts what is happening in Iraq and
Afghanistan in deep shade, and which represents a grave and growing threat to us all .

Pakistan is now trembling on the edge

of violent chaos, and is doing so with nuclear weapons in its hip pocket, right in the middle of one of the
most dangerous neighborhoods in the world. The situation in brief: Pakistan for years has been a nation in turmoil, run by a
shaky government supported by a corrupted system, dominated by a blatantly criminal security service, and threatened by a large fundamentalist Islamic
population with deep ties to the Taliban in Afghanistan. All this is piled atop an ongoing standoff with neighboring India that has been the center of

The fact that Pakistan, and India, and Russia, and

China all possess nuclear weapons and share the same space means any ongoing or
escalating violence over there has the real potential to crack open the very gates of Hell
itself. Recently, the Taliban made a military push into the northwest Pakistani region
around the Swat Valley. According to a recent Reuters report: The (Pakistani) army deployed troops in Swat in October 2007 and used
political gravity in the region for more than half a century.

artillery and gunship helicopters to reassert control. But insecurity mounted after a civilian government came to power last year and tried to reach a
negotiated settlement. A peace accord fell apart in May 2008. After that, hundreds including soldiers, militants and civilians died in battles.
Militants unleashed a reign of terror, killing and beheading politicians, singers, soldiers and opponents. They banned female education and destroyed
nearly 200 girls' schools. About 1,200 people were killed since late 2007 and 250,000 to 500,000 fled, leaving the militants in virtual control. Pakistan
offered on February 16 to introduce Islamic law in the Swat valley and neighboring areas in a bid to take the steam out of the insurgency. The militants
announced an indefinite cease-fire after the army said it was halting operations in the region. President Asif Ali Zardari signed a regulation imposing
sharia in the area last month. But the Taliban refused to give up their guns and pushed into Buner and another district adjacent to Swat, intent on
spreading their rule. The

United States, already embroiled in a war against Taliban forces in

Afghanistan, must now face the possibility that Pakistan could collapse under the mounting
threat of Taliban forces there. Military and diplomatic advisers to President Obama, uncertain how best to proceed, now face one of
the great nightmare scenarios of our time. "Recent militant gains in Pakistan," reported The New York Times on Monday, "have so alarmed the White
House that the national security adviser, Gen. James L. Jones, described the situation as 'one of the very most serious problems we face.'" "Security was
deteriorating rapidly," reported The Washington Post on Monday, "particularly in the mountains along the Afghan border that harbor al-Qaeda and the
Taliban, intelligence chiefs reported, and there were signs that those groups were working with indigenous extremists in Pakistan's populous Punjabi
heartland. The Pakistani government was mired in political bickering. The army, still fixated on its historical adversary India, remained ill-equipped and
unwilling to throw its full weight into the counterinsurgency fight. But despite the threat the intelligence conveyed, Obama has only limited options for
dealing with it. Anti-American feeling in Pakistan is high, and a U.S. combat presence is prohibited. The United States is fighting Pakistan-based
extremists by proxy, through an army over which it has little control, in alliance with a government in which it has little confidence." It is believed
Pakistan is currently in possession of between 60 and 100 nuclear weapons. Because Pakistan's stability is threatened by the wide swath of its population
that shares ethnic, cultural and religious connections to the fundamentalist Islamic populace of Afghanistan, fears over what could happen to those
nuclear weapons if the Pakistani government collapses are very real. "As

the insurgency of the Taliban and Al Qaeda

spreads in Pakistan," reported the Times last week, "senior American officials say they are increasingly
concerned about new vulnerabilities for Pakistan's nuclear arsenal, including the potential
for militants to snatch a weapon in transport or to insert sympathizers into laboratories or
fuel-production facilities. In public, the administration has only hinted at those concerns, repeating the formulation that the Bush
administration used: that it has faith in the Pakistani Army. But that cooperation, according to officials who would not speak for attribution because of the
sensitivity surrounding the exchanges between Washington and Islamabad, has been sharply limited when the subject has turned to the vulnerabilities in
the Pakistani nuclear infrastructure." "The prospect of turmoil in Pakistan sends shivers up the spines of those U.S. officials charged with keeping tabs on
foreign nuclear weapons," reported Time Magazine last month. "Pakistan is thought to possess about 100 the U.S. isn't sure of the total, and may not
know where all of them are. Still, if Pakistan collapses, the U.S. military is primed to enter the country and secure as many of those weapons as it can,
according to U.S. officials. Pakistani officials insist their personnel safeguards are stringent, but a sleeper cell could cause big trouble, U.S. officials say."
In other words, a shaky Pakistan spells trouble for everyone, especially if America loses the footrace to secure those weapons in the event of the worstcase scenario.

If Pakistani militants ever succeed in toppling the government, several very dangerous events

India could be galvanized into military action of some kind, as could

nuclear-armed China or nuclear-armed Russia. If the Pakistani government does fall, and all those Pakistani nukes are
not immediately accounted for and secured, the specter (or reality) of loose nukes falling into the hands of terrorist
organizations could place the entire world on a collision course with unimaginable disaster.
could happen at once. Nuclear-armed

We have all been paying a great deal of attention to Iraq and Afghanistan, and rightly so. The developing situation in Pakistan, however, needs to be
placed immediately on the front burner. The Obama administration appears to be gravely serious about addressing the situation. So should we all.

21. Cyber Terror

Cyber terrorism triggers nuclear conflict
Fritz 9, Former Captain of the U.S. Army, Jason, July, Hacking Nuclear Command and Control,
www.icnnd.org/Documents/Jason_Fritz_Hacking_NC2.doc

The US uses the two-man rule to achieve a higher level of security in nuclear affairs. Under this
rule two authorized personnel must be present and in agreement during critical stages of nuclear
command and control. The President must jointly issue a launch order with the Secretary of
Defense; Minuteman missile operators must agree that the launch order is valid; and on a
submarine, both the commanding officer and executive officer must agree that the order to launch
is valid. In the US, in order to execute a nuclear launch, an Emergency Action Message (EAM) is
needed. This is a preformatted message that directs nuclear forces to execute a specific attack.
The contents of an EAM change daily and consist of a complex code read by a human voice.
Regular monitoring by shortwave listeners and videos posted to YouTube provide insight into
how these work. These are issued from the NMCC, or in the event of destruction, from the
designated hierarchy of command and control centres. Once a command centre has confirmed the
EAM, using the two-man rule, the Permissive Action Link (PAL) codes are entered to arm the
weapons and the message is sent out. These messages are sent in digital format via the secure
Automatic Digital Network and then relayed to aircraft via single-sideband radio transmitters of
the High Frequency Global Communications System, and, at least in the past, sent to nuclear
capable submarines via Very Low Frequency (Greenemeier 2008, Hardisty 1985). The technical
details of VLF submarine communication methods can be found online, including PC-based VLF
reception. Some reports have noted a Pentagon review, which showed a potential electronic back
door into the US Navys system for broadcasting nuclear launch orders to Trident submarines
(Peterson 2004). The investigation showed that cyber terrorists could potentially infiltrate this
network and insert false orders for launch. The investigation led to elaborate new instructions for
validating launch orders (Blair 2003). Adding further to the concern of cyber terrorists seizing
control over submarine launched nuclear missiles; The Royal Navy announced in 2008 that it
would be installing a Microsoft Windows operating system on its nuclear submarines (Page
2008). The choice of operating system, apparently based on Windows XP, is not as alarming as
the advertising of such a system is. This may attract hackers and narrow the necessary
reconnaissance to learning its details and potential exploits. It is unlikely that the operating
system would play a direct role in the signal to launch, although this is far from certain.
Knowledge of the operating system may lead to the insertion of malicious code, which could be
used to gain accelerating privileges, tracking, valuable information, and deception that could
subsequently be used to initiate a launch. Remember from Chapter 2 that the UKs nuclear
submarines have the authority to launch if they believe the central command has been destroyed.
Attempts by cyber terrorists to create the illusion of a decapitating strike could also be used to
engage fail-deadly systems. Open source knowledge is scarce as to whether Russia continues to
operate such a system. However evidence suggests that they have in the past. Perimetr, also
known as Dead Hand, was an automated system set to launch a mass scale nuclear attack in the
event of a decapitation strike against Soviet leadership and military. In a crisis, military officials
would send a coded message to the bunkers, switching on the dead hand. If nearby ground-level
sensors detected a nuclear attack on Moscow, and if a break was detected in communications
links with top military commanders, the system would send low-frequency signals over

underground antennas to special rockets. Flying high over missile fields and other military sites,
these rockets in turn would broadcast attack orders to missiles, bombers and, via radio relays,
submarines at sea. Contrary to some Western beliefs, Dr. Blair says, many of Russia's nucleararmed missiles in underground silos and on mobile launchers can be fired automatically. (Broad
1993) Assuming such a system is still active, cyber terrorists would need to create a crisis
situation in order to activate Perimetr, and then fool it into believing a decapitating strike had
taken place. While this is not an easy task, the information age makes it easier. Cyber
reconnaissance could help locate the machine and learn its inner workings. This could be done by
targeting the computers high of level officialsanyone who has reportedly worked on such a
project, or individuals involved in military operations at underground facilities, such as those
reported to be located at Yamantau and Kosvinksy mountains in the central southern Urals
(Rosenbaum 2007, Blair 2008) Indirect Control of Launch Cyber terrorists could cause incorrect
information to be transmitted, received, or displayed at nuclear command and control centres, or
shut down these centres computer networks completely. In 1995, a Norwegian scientific
sounding rocket was mistaken by Russian early warning systems as a nuclear missile launched
from a US submarine. A radar operator used Krokus to notify a general on duty who decided to
alert the highest levels. Kavkaz was implemented, all three chegets activated, and the countdown
for a nuclear decision began. It took eight minutes before the missile was properly identifieda
considerable amount of time considering the speed with which a nuclear response must be
decided upon (Aftergood 2000). Creating a false signal in these early warning systems would be
relatively easy using computer network operations. The real difficulty would be gaining access to
these systems as they are most likely on a closed network. However, if they are transmitting
wirelessly, that may provide an entry point, and information gained through the internet may
reveal the details, such as passwords and software, for gaining entrance to the closed network. If
access was obtained, a false alarm could be followed by something like a DDoS attack, so the
operators believe an attack may be imminent, yet they can no longer verify it. This could add
pressure to the decision making process, and if coordinated precisely, could appear as a first
round EMP burst. Terrorist groups could also attempt to launch a non-nuclear missile, such as the
one used by Norway, in an attempt to fool the system. The number of states who possess such
technology is far greater than the number of states who possess nuclear weapons. Obtaining them
would be considerably easier, especially when enhancing operations through computer network
operations. Combining traditional terrorist methods with cyber techniques opens opportunities
neither could accomplish on their own. For example, radar stations might be more vulnerable to a
computer attack, while satellites are more vulnerable to jamming from a laser beam, thus together
they deny dual phenomenology. Mapping communications networks through cyber
reconnaissance may expose weaknesses, and automated scanning devices created by more
experienced hackers can be readily found on the internet. Intercepting or spoofing
communications is a highly complex science. These systems are designed to protect against the
worlds most powerful and well funded militaries. Yet, there are recurring gaffes, and the very
nature of asymmetric warfare is to bypass complexities by finding simple loopholes. For
example, commercially available software for voice-morphing could be used to capture voice
commands within the command and control structure, cut these sound bytes into phonemes, and
splice it back together in order to issue false voice commands (Andersen 2001, Chapter 16).
Spoofing could also be used to escalate a volatile situation in the hopes of starting a nuclear war.
In June 1998, a group of international hackers calling themselves Milw0rm hacked the web site
of Indias Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC) and put up a spoofed web page showing a
mushroom cloud and the text If a nuclear war does start, you will be the first to scream
(Denning 1999). Hacker web-page defacements like these are often derided by critics of cyber

terrorism as simply being a nuisance which causes no significant harm. However, web-page
defacements are becoming more common, and they point towards alarming possibilities in
subversion. During the 2007 cyber attacks against Estonia, a counterfeit letter of apology from
Prime Minister Andrus Ansip was planted on his political party website (Grant 2007). This took
place amid the confusion of mass DDoS attacks, real world protests, and accusations between
governments.

22. Terrorism
Nuclear terrorism causes extinction
Hellman 8 (Martin E. Hellman, emeritus prof of engineering @ Stanford, Risk Analysis of
Nuclear Deterrence SPRING 2008 THE BENT OF TAU BETA PI,
http://www.nuclearrisk.org/paper.pdf)
The threat of nuclear terrorism looms much larger in the publics mind than the threat of a full-scale nuclear war, yet this article focuses primarily on
the latter. An explanation is therefore in order before proceeding. A terrorist attack involving a nuclear weapon would be a
catastrophe of immense proportions: A 10-kiloton bomb detonated at Grand Central Station on a typical work day would likely kill some half a
million people, and inflict over a trillion dollars in direct economic damage. America and its way of life would be changed forever. [Bunn 2003, pages viii-ix]. The
likelihood of such an attack is also significant. Former Secretary of Defense William Perry has estimated the chance
of a nuclear terrorist incident within the next decade to be roughly 50 percent [Bunn 2007, page 15]. David Albright, a former weapons
inspector in Iraq, estimates those odds at less than one percent, but notes, We would never accept a situation where the chance of a major nuclear accident like Chernobyl would

In
a survey of 85 national security experts, Senator Richard Lugar found a median estimate of 20 percent for the
probability of an attack involving a nuclear explosion occurring somewhere in the world in the next 10
years, with 79 percent of the respondents believing it more likely to be carried out by terrorists
than by a government [Lugar 2005, pp. 14-15]. I support increased efforts to reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism, but that is not inconsistent with the approach
of this article. Because terrorism is one of the potential trigger mechanisms for a full-scale nuclear war , the risk analyses
be anywhere near 1% .... A nuclear terrorism attack is a low-probability event, but we cant live in a world where its anything but extremely low-probability. [Hegland 2005].

proposed herein will include estimating the risk of nuclear terrorism as one component of the overall risk. If that risk, the overall risk, or both are found to be unacceptable, then
the proposed remedies would be directed to reduce which- ever risk(s) warrant attention. Similar remarks apply to a number of other threats (e.g., nuclear war between the U.S. and
China over Taiwan). his article would be incomplete if it only dealt with the threat of nuclear terrorism and neglected the threat of full- scale nuclear war. If both risks are

societys almost total neglect of the

threat of full-scale nuclear war makes studying that risk all the more important . The cosT of World War iii The
unacceptable, an effort to reduce only the terrorist component would leave humanity in great peril. In fact,

danger associated with nuclear deterrence depends on both the cost of a failure and the failure rate.3 This section explores the cost of a failure of nuclear deterrence, and the next
section is concerned with the failure rate. While other definitions are possible, this article defines a failure of deterrence to mean a full-scale exchange of all nuclear weapons
available to the U.S. and Russia, an event that will be termed World War III. Approximately 20 million people died as a result of the first World War. World War IIs fatalities were
double or triple that numberchaos prevented a more precise deter- mination. In both cases humanity recovered, and the world today bears few scars that attest to the horror of
those two wars. Many people therefore implicitly believe that a third World War would be horrible but survivable, an extrapola- tion of the effects of the first two global wars. In
that view, World War III, while horrible, is something that humanity may just have to face and from which it will then have to recover. In contrast, some of those most qualified to
assess the situation hold a very different view. In a 1961 speech to a joint session of the Philippine Con- gress, General Douglas MacArthur, stated, Global war has become a

No longer does it possess even the

chance of the winner of a duel. It contains now only the germs of double suicide . Former Secretary of Defense
Robert McNamara ex- pressed a similar view: If deterrence fails and conflict develops, the present U.S. and NATO strategy carries with it a high risk that Western
civilization will be destroyed [McNamara 1986, page 6]. More recently, George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger, and Sam Nunn4 echoed those
Frankenstein to destroy both sides. If you lose, you are annihilated. If you win, you stand only to lose.

concerns when they quoted President Reagans belief that nuclear weapons were totally irrational, totally inhu- mane, good for nothing but killing, possibly destructive of life on
earth and civilization. [Shultz 2007] Official studies, while couched in less emotional terms, still convey the horrendous toll that World War III would exact:

The

resulting deaths would be far beyond any precedent . Executive branch calculations show a range of U.S. deaths from 35 to 77 percent
(i.e., 79-160 million dead) a change in targeting could kill somewhere between 20 million and 30 million additional people on each side .... These calculations reflect only
deaths during the first 30 days. Additional millions would be injured, and many would eventually die from lack of adequate medical care millions of people might starve or
freeze during the follow- ing winter, but it is not possible to estimate how many. further millions might eventually die of latent radiation effects. [OTA 1979, page 8] This
OTA report also noted the possibility of serious ecological damage [OTA 1979, page 9], a concern that as- sumed a new potentiality when the TTAPS report [TTAPS 1983]

nuclear explosions and their resultant fire- storms could usher in a nuclear
winter that might erase homo sapiens from the face of the earth, much as many scientists now believe the K-T Extinction that
proposed that the ash and dust from so many nearly simultaneous

wiped out the dinosaurs resulted from an impact winter caused by ash and dust from a large asteroid or comet striking Earth. The TTAPS report produced a heated debate, and

even a
limited nuclear exchange or one between newer nuclear-weapon states, such as India and Pakistan, could have devastating longlasting climatic consequences due to the large volumes of smoke that would be generated by fires in modern megacities. While it is uncertain how
there is still no scientific consensus on whether a nuclear winter would follow a full-scale nuclear war. Recent work [Robock 2007, Toon 2007] suggests that

destructive World War III would be, prudence dictates that we apply the same engi- neering conservatism that saved the Golden Gate Bridge from collapsing on its 50th
anniversary and assume that

preventing World War III is a necessitynot an option.