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MISAEL VERA as CIR V. HON.

PEDRO NAVARRO,
judge CFI Pasig, MAGDALENA AVANTO and
CAMILO ERIBAL, DELIA MEDINA, BIENVENIDO
TAN SR., PHIL NATIONAL BANK, PHIL BANKING
CORP, THE OVERSEAS BANK OF MANILA, BANCO
FILIPINO SAVINGS AND MORTGAGE BANK, 79
SCRA 408 (1977)
DIVISION:
PONENTE: J. Castro
NATURE:
FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:
RATIO:

FE QUITA V. COURT OF APPEALS and BLANDINA


DANDA, 300 SCRA 406 (1998)
DIVISION:

PONENTE: J. Bellosillo
NATURE:
FACTS: Fe Quita and Arturo Padlan, both Filipinos,
were married in the Philippines in 1941. They had no
children. Eventually, their relationship soured and as a
result, Quita obtained a divorce decree from a
California court in 1954
1. Subsequently, Quita married a Felix Tupas but
was later divorced. She married for the third
time to a certain Wernimont
2. Padlan died intestate in April 1972. After his
death, Lino Javier Inciong filed a petition before
RTC Quezon City for the issuance of letters of
administration over the estate of the decedent
3. Private respondent Blandina Dandan, claiming
to be the surviving spouse, and Claro, Alexis,
Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida and Yolanda
Padlan, claiming to be the children of the
decedent, opposed and prayed that Atty.
Leonardo Casaba be appointed administrator
instead (which the court granted). Atty. Casaba
was later replaced by Higino Castillon
4. Oppositors Blandina and the Padlan children
submitted copies of the divorce decree between
petitioner Quita and the decedent
5. In 1987, Quita moved for the immediate
declaration of the heirs of the decedent and the
distribution of his estate. The court required the
oppositors to submit the records of birth of the
Padlan children within 10 days which the latter
failed to do
6. The trial court held in favor of Quita, citing the
ruling in Tenchavez v. Escanno, disgregarded the
divorce between Quita and the decedent. The

court declared only petitioner Quita and the


decedents brother, Ruperto Padlan, as the
intestate heirs of the decedent Arturo Padlan
7. On MR, Blandina and the Padlan children were
allowed to present proofs that decedent
recognized the children as his during his
lifetime. Thus, the court ruled that the Padlan
children were entitled to of the estate to the
exclusion of Ruperto Padlan
8. On appeal, private respondent argued that the
trial court erred in deciding the heirs of the
decedent without a hearing. As such, CA
declared the ruling of the trial court and
directed that the case be remanded to the trial
court for further proceedings
ISSUE: WON there is a need to remand the case to the
lower court to determine who is entitled to inherit from
the estate of the decedent
RULING: Yes.
RATIO: Rule 90 Sec 1 provides that if there is a
controversy before the court as to who are the lawful
heirs of the decedent or as to the distributive shares to
which each person is entitled under the law, the
controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary
cases.
CAB: There is no dispute as to the right of the Padlan
children to inherit from the decedent because there
are proofs presented that they had been duly
acknowledged by the decedent and Quita herself even
recognized them as the heirs of Arturo Padlan; nor as
to their respective hereditary shares.

The question to be determined by the trial court


should be limited only to the right of petitioner to
inherit from the decedent as his surviving spouse.
Private respondents claim to heirship was already
resolved. She and the decedent were married in 1947,
while the marriage between Quita and Arturo Padlan
was still subsisting; as such, it was a bigamous
marriage void from the beginning under Art 80 and 83
Civil Code. Consequently, Blandina is not a surviving
spouse that can inherit from the decedent as this
status presupposes a legitimate relationship.

ESTATE OF HILARIO RUIZ V. COURT OF APPEALS,


MARIA PILAR RUIZ-MONTES, MARIA CATHRYN
RUIZ,
CANDICE
ALBERTINE
RUIZ,
MARIA
ANGELINE RUIZ and RTC Pasig Br. 156, 252 SCRA
541 (1996)

ISSUE: WON the estate can be distributed prior to the


payment of estate tax
RULING: No.
RATIO: No distribution shall be allowed until the
payment of the obligations above-mentioned has been
made or provided for, unless the distributees, or any of
them, give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the court,
conditioned for the payment of said obligations within
such time as the court directs.
In settlement of estate proceedings, the distribution of
the estate properties can only be made: (1) after all
the debts, funeral charges, expenses of administration,
allowance to the widow, and estate tax have been
paid; or (2) before payment of said obligations only if
the distributees or any of them gives a bond in a sum
fixed by the court conditioned upon the payment of
said obligations within such time as the court directs,
or when provision is made to meet those obligations.
CAB: The probate court ordered the release of the
titles to the Valle Verde property and the Blue
Ridge apartments to the private respondents after the
lapse of six months from the date of first publication of
the notice to creditors. The questioned order speaks of
notice to creditors, not payment of debts and
obligations. Hilario Ruiz allegedly left no debts when he
died but the taxes on his estate had not hitherto been
paid, much less ascertained. The estate tax is one of
those obligations that must be paid before distribution
of the estate. If not yet paid, the rule requires that the
distributees post a bond or make such provisions as to
meet the said tax obligation in proportion to their
respective shares in the inheritance.

It was also too early in the day for the probate court to
order the release of the titles six months after
admitting the will to probate. The probate of a will is
conclusive as to its due execution and extrinsic
validity21 and settles only the question of whether the
testator, being of sound mind, freely executed it in
accordance with the formalities prescribed by law.
1. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS;
SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE; ALLOWANCE FOR
SUPPORT; SHOULD NOT BE LIMITED TO MINOR
OR INCAPACITATED CHILD-REN. - It is settled that
allowances for support under Section 3 of Rule 83
should not be limited to the minor or incapacitated
children of the deceased. Article 188 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines, the substantive law in force at the
time of the testators death, provides that during the
liquidation of the conjugal partnership, the deceaseds
legitimate spouse and children, regardless of their age,
civil status or gainful employment, are entitled to
provisional support from the funds of the estate. The
law is rooted on the fact that the right and duty to
support, especially the right to education, subsist even
beyond the age of majority.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; DOES NOT EXTEND TO
DECEASEDS GRANDCHILDREN. - The law clearly
limits the allowance to widow and children and does
not extend it to the deceaseds grandchildren,
regardless of their minority or incapacity.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; WHEN DISTRIBUTION OF
ESTATE PROPERTIES CAN BE MADE. In settlement
of estate proceedings, the distribution of the estate
properties can only be made: (1) after all the debts,

funeral charges, expenses of administration, allowance


to the widow, and estate tax have been paid; or (2)
before payment of said obligations only if
the distributees or any of them gives a bond in a sum
fixed by the court conditioned upon the payment of
said obligations within such time as the court directs,
or when provision is made to meet those obligations.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; PAYMENT OF ESTATE TAX; AN
OBLIGATION THAT MUST BE PAID BEFORE THE
DISTRIBUTION OF ESTATE. The estate tax is one of
those obligations that must be paid before distribution
of the estate. If not yet paid, the rule requires that
the distributees post a bond or make such provisions
as to meet the said tax obligation in proportion to their
respective shares in the inheritance.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; PURPOSE OF PROBATE. The
probate of a will is conclusive as to its due execution
and extrinsic validity and settles only the question of
whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely
executed it in accordance with the formalities
prescribed by law. Questions as to the intrinsic validity
and efficacy of the provisions of the will, the legality of
any devise or legacy may be raised even after the will
has been authenticated.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; RIGHT OF AN EXECUTOR OR
ADMINISTRATOR OVER PROPERTIES OF THE
DECEASED.
- The right of an executor or
administrator to the possession and management of
the real and personal properties of the deceased is not
absolute and can only be exercised so long as it is
necessary for the payment of the debts and expenses
of administration.

QUASHA ANCHETA PENA


OFFICE for its own behalf,
HEIRS
OF
RAYMOND
CONSTRUCTION CORP, 563

and NOLASCO LAW


and representing THE
TRIVIERE
V.
LCN
SCRA 426 (2008)

ISSUE: WON CA erred in disallowing the advance


award of shares by RTC to petitioner children and

widow of Raymond Triviere is already a distribution of


the residue of the estate
RULING: No.
RATIO: The 2nd paragraph of Rule 90 Sec 1 allows the
distribution of the estate prior to the payment of the
obligations mentioned therein, provided that the
distributees, or any of them, gives a bon, in a sum to
be fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of
said obligations within such time as the court directs.
Although it is within the discretion of RTC whether or
not to permit the advance distribution of the estate, its
exercise of such discretion should be qualified by the
following:
(1) Only part of the estate that is not affected by
any pending controversy or appeal may be the
subject of advance distribution (Rule 109 Sec 2);
and
(2) The distributees must post a bond, fixed by
court, conditioned for the payment of
outstanding obligations of the estate (Rule 90
Sec 1 2nd par)
CAB: There is no showing that the RTC, in awarding to
the petitioner children and widow their shares in the
estate prior to the settlement of all its obligations,
complied with these two requirements, or at the very
least, took the same into consideration. Taking into
account that the claim of LCN against the estate
allegedly amounted to P6,016,570.65, already in
excess of the P4,738,558.63 reported total value of the
estate, the RTC should have been more prudent in
approving the advance distribution of the same.

NATIVIDAD ARIAGA VDA DE GURREA, CARLOS


GURREA, JULIETA GURREA, TERESA GURREARODRIGUEZ,
RICARDO
GURREA
JR.,
MA.
VICTORIA
GURREA-CANDEL,
and
RAMONA
GURREA-MONTINOLA V. ENRIQUE SUPLICO, 488
SCRA 332 (2006)
DIVISION:
PONENTE: J. Austria-Martinez
NATURE: Petition for certiorari under Rule 45 assailing
the decision of CA which affirmed in toto RTC decision
in Civil Case no 47543
FACTS: The property in question was originally owned
by Rosalina Gurrea. Sometime in 1958, Rosalina
transferred the ownership of said lot to Adelina Gurrea.
1. After Adelinas death, testate proceedings were
instituted to have her will probated. Under the
said will, the San Juan lot (subject property) was
bequeathed to Pilar and Luis Gurrea, while of
the Baguio property and a property in Negros
Occidental were given to Ricardo Gurrea
2. Ricardo Gurrea, represented by Atty. Enrique
Suplico, opposed the probate proceedings. It
appears that Ricardo agreed to pay Atty. Suplico
a 20% contingent fee, composed of either real
or personal property
3. During the pendency of the proceedings, Atty.
Suplico succeeded in negotiating with the other
heirs of Adelina to transfer the ownership of the
Spain property to Ricardos daughter, Juliet
Gurrea de Melendres

4. As payment for his fees, Ricardo offered the San


Juan lot to Atty. Suplico to which the latter
agreed with the further understanding that he
will receive an additional commission of 5% if he
sells the Baguio property.
5. Ricardo then executed a Deed of Transfer of
Rights and interest over the subject property in
favor of Atty. Suplico. He, then, registered the
deed and obtained a new TCT in his name to the
San Juan property
6. After the death of Ricardo, his heirs instituted
intestate proceedings to settle his estate. In the
said proceedings, Atty. Suplico filed several
claims for unpaid attorneys fees, however, all
claims were dismissed with finality
7. Carlos Gurrea, the administrator of the estate of
Ricardo, filed an inventory of the properties left
by the decedent
8. Petitioners filed a civil action against Atty.
Suplico for the recovery of the San Juan
property. The trial court rendered in favor of
Atty. Suplico and dismissed the case
9. On appeal, petitioners argued that RTC erred in
upholding the supposed contract of attorneys
fees between Ricardo and Atty. Suplico which
provided for the payment of attorneys fees sin
the form of real property because such
agreement is prohibited under Art 1491 NCC
ISSUE: WON the subject property was still the object
of litigation at the time the deed of transfer of rights
and interest in favor of Atty. Suplico was executed
RULING: Yes.

RATIO: A thing is said to be in litigation not only if


there is some contest or litigation over it in court, but
also from the moment it becomes the subject to the
judicial action of the judge.
CAB: There is no proof to show that at the time the
Deed of Transfer of Rights and Interest was executed,
the probate court had issued an order granting the
motion for termination of proceeding and discharge of
the executor and bond. Since the judge has yet to act
on the motion, it follows that the subject property is
still the object of litigation.
The rule is that as long as the order for the distribution
of the estate has not been complied with, the probate
proceedings cannot be deemed closed and terminated.
The probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate under
administration only after the payment of all the debts
and the remaining estate delivered to the heirs
entitled to receive the same.
CAB: While the subject lot was assigned as Ricardos
share in the project of partition executed by the heirs
of Adelina Gurrea, the title of the subject lot was still in
the name of Adelina and was not yet conveyed to
Ricardo when the Transfer of Rights and Interest was
executed.
Since at the time of the execution of the Deed of
Transfer of Rights, the subject property still formed
part of the estate of Adelina, the probate proceedings
concerning Adelinas estate cannot be deemed to have
been closed and terminated and the subject property
still the object of litigation.

CELSA VDA DE KILAYKO, ENCARNACION VDA DE


PANLILIO, and REMEDIOS VDA DE GUINTO V.
HON. ERNESTO TENGCO, CFI Bacolod City,
RODOLFO LIZARES and AMELO LIZARES, 207
SCRA 600 (1992)
DIVISION:
PONENTE: J. Romero
NATURE: Consolidated cases seeking to annul the
orders of CFI Negros Occidental in cancelling the
notice of lis pendens filed by petitioner Celsa Vda. De
Kilayko with Register of Deeds
FACTS: Maria Lizares died testate in 1968. Upon her
death, the decedents niece, Eustaquia Lizares filed a
petition for the settlement of the testate estate of the
decedent before CFI Negros Occidental
1. The probate court, then, issued an order
declaring the will probated and appointed
Eustaquia as the executrix of the estate of Maria
Lizares
2. In 1968, Eustaquia filed a project of partition
which was granted by the probate court.
Simultaneously, the court declared the heirs,
devisees,
legatees
and
usufructuaries
mentioned in the project to partition as the only
heirs of the estate; adjudicated to them the
properties assigned to them and ordered the
Register of Deeds to effect the transfer of real
properties
3. Thereafter, Eustaquia filed a motion to reopen
the estate proceedings in order that some
properties of the decedent which had been
omitted in the partition be adjudicated to her.
The court granted motion and adjudicated the
properties to Eustaquia

4. In 1972, the heirs of Maria Lizares (Encarnacion


vda de Panlilio, Remedios vda de Guinto et al)
executed an agreement of partition thereby
terminating their co-ownership
5. A year later, Eustaquia died single and without
any descendant. Subsquently, Rodolfo Lizares
and Amelo Lizares
6. Petitioners Celsa vda de Kilayco et al tried to
reopen the testate proceedings of Maria Lizares
and prayed that a substitute administrator be
appointed.
7. The heirs of Eustaquia opposed the motion.
They alleged that the court had no more
jurisdiction to reopen the testate estate
proceedings of Maria LIzares since the order of
closure had long been final
8. The court denied the motion to reopen the
testate proceedings citing that since the
settlement proceeding is in rem, it is binding
against the whole world. MR denied
9. Petitioners, then, filed a complaint for recovery
of ownership of possession of real property
against the joint administrators of the estate of
Eustaquia
10.The joint administrators of the estate of
Eustaquia filed a motion to dismiss alleging that
the court had no jurisdiction over the subject
matter or nature of the cause. Consequently,
the filed a motion for the cancellation of the
notice of lis pendens; the court granted the
same. It held that the notice of lis pendens was
not necessary since the subject properties,
being in custodial egis, could not just be
alienated without court approval

ISSUE: WON the errors in the distribution warrants the


reopening of the estate of the testator
RULING: No.
RATIO: The probate court, in the exercise of its
jurisdiction to distribute the estate, has the power to
determine the proportion or parts to which each
distributee is entitled. A project of partition is merely a
proposal for the distribution of the hereditary estate
which the court may accept or reject. It is the court
that makes that distribution of the estate and
determines the persons entitled thereto.
CAB: The records show that in the settlement of the
estate of Maria Lizares, the subject properties were
part of the project of partition and assigned exclusively
to Eustaquia as a devisee of the testatrix. Accordingly,
the heirs of Maria Lizares including the petitioners
executed an agreement of partition and subdivision
whereby they agreed to terminate their co-ownership
over the subject properties. These facts show that the
LIzares sisters recognized the decree of partition
sanctioned by the probate court and in fact reaped the
fruits thereof.
A final decree of distribution of the estate of a
decedent vests title to the land of the estate in the
distributees. If the decree is erroneous, it should be
corrected by opportune appeal, for once it becomes
final, its binding effect is like any judgment in rem,
unless properly set aside for lack of jurisdiction or
fraud. Where the court has validly issued a decree of
distribution and the same has become final, the
validity or invalidity of the project of partition becomes
irrelevant.

ROLANDO SANCHEZ, FLORIDA MIERLY SANCHEZ,


ALFREDO SANCHEZ and MYRNA SANCHEZ V.
COURT OF APPEALS, ROSALIA LUGOD, ARTURO
LUGOD, and ROBERTO LUGOD, 279 SCRA 647
(1997)
DIVISION:
PONENTE: J. Panganiban
NATURE: Petition for review on certiorari assailing the
CA decision which annulled the decision of the trial
court and which declared the compromise agreement
among the parties valid and binding even without
court approval
FACTS: Rosalia Lugod is the only child of spouses Juan
Sanchez
and
Maria
Villafranca
while
private
respondents Arturo, Evelyn and Roberto Lugod are the
legitimate children of Rosalia
1. Rolando, Florida Mierly, Alfredo and Myrna
Sanchez, are the illegitimate children
2. Following the death of her mother, Maria
Villafranca, in 1967, Rosalia filed a petition for
letters of administration over the estate of her
mother and estate of her father, who was at the
time in a state of senility
3. Before the administration proceedings could be
formally terminated, Juan Sanchez died in 1968
4. Petitioners, as heirs of Juan Sanchez, filed a
petition for letters of administration over the
intestate estate of Juan Sanchez but was
opposed by Rosalia
5. Pending the proceedings, Rosalia and the
petitioners executed a compromise agreement
wherein they agreed to divide the properties of
the estate of Juan Sanchez

6. Years later, petitioenrs filed a motion to require


Rosalia to submit a new inventory and to render
an accounting over properties not included in
the compromise agreement. They likewise filed
a motion to defer the approval of the
compromise agreement
7. Petitioners contend that CA erred in deeming
the special proceedings closed and terminated
arguing that there was as yet no order of
distribution of the estate pursuant to Rule 90
ISSUE: WON the CA erred in ruling that the special
proceedings were already closed and terminated
RULING: Yes.
RATIO: Under Rule 90 Sec 1, an order for the
distribution of the estate may be made when the
debts,
funeral
charges,
and
expenses
of
administration, the allowance to the widow, and
inheritance tax, if any, had been paid. This order for
the distribution of the estates residue must contain
the names and shares of the persons entitled thereto.
CAB: A perusal of the whole record, particular the trial
courts conclusion reveals that the foregoing elements
already concurred in this case. The payment of the
indebtedness of the estates of Juan Sanchez and Maria
Villafranca in the amount of P51,598.93 was
shouldered by private respondent Rosalia, who also
absorbed or charged against her share the advances
of Rolando Lugod in the sum of P8,533.94, in
compliance with Art 1061 NCC on collation.
Furthermore, the compromise of the parties, which is
the law between them, already contains the names

and shares of the heirs to the residual estate, which


shares had also been delivered.
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE ADRIANO MALOTO:
ALDINA
MALOTO
CASIANO,
CONSTANCIO
MALOTO, PURIFICACION MIRAFLOR, ROMAN
CATHOLIC CHURCH OF MOLO, and ASILO DE
MOLO V. FELINO MALOTO and FELINO MALOTO,
158 SCRA 451 (1977)
DIVISION:
PONENTE: J. Fernandez
ISSUE: WON the present action is barred by res
judicata
RULING: No.
RATIO: The doctrine of res adjudicata finds no
application in the present controversy. For a judgment
to be a bar to a subsequent case, the following
requisites must concur: (1) the presence of a final
former judgment; (2) the former judgment was
rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the
subject matter and the parties; (3) the former
judgment is a judgment on the merits; and (4) there is,
between the first and the second action, identity of
parties, of subject matter, and of cause of action. Not
all requisites are present in this case.
For one, there is yet, strictly speaking, no final
judgment rendered insofar as the probate of Adriana
Maloto's will is concerned. The decision of the trial
court in Special Proceeding No. 1736, although final,
involved only the intestate settlement of the estate of
Adriana. As such, that judgment could not in any
manner be construed to be final with respect to the
probate of the subsequently discovered will of the

decedent. Neither is it a judgment on the merits of the


action for probate. This is understandably so because
the trial court, in the intestate proceeding, was without
jurisdiction to rule on the probate of the contested will.
After all, an action for probate, as it implies, is founded
on the presence of a will and with the objective of
proving its due execution and validity, something
which cannot be properly done in an intestate
settlement of estate proceeding which is predicated on
the assumption that the decedent left no will. Thus,
there is likewise no identity between the cause of
action in intestate proceeding and that in an action for
probate. Be that as it may, it would be remembered
that it was precisely because of our ruling in G.R. No.
L-30479 that the petitioners instituted this separate
action for the probate of the late Adriana Maloto's will.
Hence, on these grounds alone, the position of the
private respondents on this score cannot be sustained.
1.
CIVIL LAW; SUCCESSION; WILLS; REVOCATION
THEREOF; PHYSICAL ACT OF DESTRUCTION; ANIMUS
REVOCANDI, A NECESSARY ELEMENT. The physical
act of destruction of a will, like burning in this case,
does not per se constitute an effective revocation,
unless the destruction is coupled with animus
revocandi on the part of the testator. It is not
imperative that the physical destruction be done by
the testator himself. It may be performed by another
person but under the express direction and in the
presence of the testator. Of course, it goes without
saying that the document destroyed must be the will
itself. In this case, while animus revocandi, or the
intention to revoke, may be conceded, for that is a
state of mind, yet that requisite alone would not
suffice. "Animus revocandi is only one of the necessary
elements for the effective revocation of a last will and

testament. The intention to revoke must be


accompanied by the overt physical act of burning,
tearing, obliterating, or cancelling the will carried out
by the testator or by another person in his presence
and under his express direction.
2.
REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL ACTIONS; RES JUDICATA;
ELEMENTS. For a judgment to be a bar to a
subsequent case, the following requisites must concur:
(1) the presence of a final former judgment; (2) the
former judgment was rendered by a court having
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3)
the former judgment is a judgment on the merits; and
(4) there is, between the first and the second action,
identity of parties, of subject matter, and of cause of
action. We do not find here the presence of all the
enumerated requisites.
3.
ID.; ID.; ID.; DOCTRINE NOT APPLICABLE IN CASE
AT BAR. There is yet, strictly speaking, no final
judgment rendered insofar as the probate of Adriana
Maloto's will is concerned. The decision of the trial
court in Special Proceeding No. 1736, although final,

involved only the intestate settlement of the estate of


Adriana. As such, that judgment could not in any
manner be construed to be final with respect to the
probate of the subsequently discovered will of the
decedent. Neither is it a judgment on the merits of the
action for probate. This is understandably so because
the trial court, in the intestate proceeding, was without
jurisdiction to rule on the probate of the contested will.
After all, an action for probate, as it implies, is founded
on the presence of a will and with the objective of
proving its due execution and validity, something
which can not be properly done in an intestate
settlement of estate proceeding which is predicated on
the assumption that the decedent left no will. Thus,
there is likewise no identity between the cause of
action in intestate proceeding and that in an action for
probate. Be that as it may, it would be remembered
that it was precisely because of our ruling in G.R. No.
L-30479 that the petitioners instituted this separate
action for the probate of the late Adriana Maloto's will.
Hence, on these grounds alone, the position of the
private respondents on this score cannot be sustained.