WHAT AMSTERDAM HAS MEANT

Some Reflections
on the Ecumenical Movement
Jacques Ellul

I should like to start with three preliminary reflections. The first is that the context
for the ecumenical movement has changed since 1948. Then the great problem was the
division or fragmentation of the churches and it was constantly being said that their
separation was both a scandal in the eyes of the world, and a betrayal of the command
that "they may all be one". Hence these churches must at the very least recognize each
other and agree to enter into dialogue and to present a common approach in the
societies to which they belonged, both out of obedience and to make the Christian faith
more credible to "the world". This raised a two-sided question: first, that of the old,
traditional theological conflicts which it was essential to try and look at again. There
was, it seemed, a need to take up again the questions on which Christians had parted
company and discover whether these theological, liturgical and spiritual divisions still
existed in 1948 (as relevant a question now in 1988 as then) other than as tradition; and
whether it could be said that because of changes in society and in scientific and
philosophical standpoints many of the old problems should be restated in new terms. It
was necessary also to think in terms of an increasingly close dialogue that might lead
to reconciliations. To me it did not seem a good approach to pass too quickly over the
past and simply rubber-stamp it. Then there was the question of the extent to which the
divisions had become first and foremost institutional: how far were they a product of
the will to survive which is, sociologically, intrinsic to all human institutions, even
when they can no longer justify their existence? Seemingly the resolve was rather to
look to the future in the conviction that if it became possible to work together the very
fact of travelling side by side and getting to know each other would leud to a reduction
in conflicts and to mutual understanding and the present display of a Christian
"common front" towards the world at large.
The second point is that the world has changed considerably over the last forty
years, not only as regards the economic, political and social situations where the
change is self-evident, but also intellectually, spiritually and in terms of values. We
had seen Christianity relentlessly challenged by science (and even more by scientism),
but Western societies (including those of the communist world) were still structured on
the basis of values held often unconsciously which had their origin in
Christianity. For instance individual human beings (even in collectivist societies)
retained an unique, irreplaceable value, and the horror evoked by Nazism had its
source in that attitude. But we have to realize that there has been a change in the
system of values. Around us today the values originating in Christianity are in ruins
and social systems are disintegrating. Everything that reminds us either closely or
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distantly of Christianity is not merely called in question but entirely devoid of

significance. Decisive factors in this are, clearly, the destruction of language and the
devaluation of the question of meaning; also the universal diffusion of "artificial
intelligence". The human factor is no longer meaningful; it is simply something which
can be assimilated into systems of networks and vectors. Hence I would say that
ecumenism has become something much more than the simple coming together of
churches of different confessions. It represents the need to rediscover a basic common
substratum which will make it possible to reassert certain values without which
humanity will disappear. Twenty years ago it was being proclaimed that after the death
of God would come the death of humanity. It has happened! Since therefore that which
is specifically human no longer has its place, ecumenism ought to be the force to
restore meaning to it. In other words, I consider that ecumenism is no longer
something relating to church order and institutions or to theological conflicts but has to
do with human survival. Here too we must not of course make any mistakes about
what has to be done in the world of today. To this point I shall return.
Lastly, a third preliminary reflection: simply to recall some well-known facts and
observations. There is on the one hand an ecumenism of the "grassroots" which does
not match that of the "summits" of councils and assemblies. I have the feeling that
the "grassroots" membership of the various churches has been more aware of the
fearful problem just mentioned than the central bodies and directors (but most often
without being explicit about it). And so alongside the recognized institutional churches
charismatic movements are also coming into being (in which this ecumenism of the
base is frequently practised) and it is very difficult to get them into the "ecumenical
movement". And in these charismatic groups there is something of everything: there is
an effort at greater Christian credibility and also a "simple return to religion" which is
no cause for rejoicing on our part as it encourages one of the worst of confusions
that of Christianity with Religion. We are confronted by a society without values, and
all sorts of groups set up their own values for living since it is not possible for human
beings to live in a meaningless universe. Thus far my preliminary comments.
The church and the disorder of society
The trends in the Amsterdam report were undoubtedly very much conditioned both
by the renewal of theology which followed Karl Barth and by political circumstances.
The world had just emerged from a frightful war which had revealed the horrors of
Nazism and there was the consequent condemnation of what totalitarianism could
be; but at that time of course it was a fascist-style totalitarianism of the right,
associated with capitalism. So there was then a tendency to see in the values of the left
not indeed an expression of Christianity but the chance of a more humane society. But
to gain acceptance for this it was necessary to start with a struggle at a deeper level.
Were Christians to become interested and perhaps involved in politics given that till
around 1940 Christianity had continued to be very avowedly church-centred in some
churches and very individualistic in others? I have in mind the French Reformed
Christians for whom the essentials of the faith related to "mv salvation", "my
responsibility before God", "my duty" etc., and among whom the church as the body
of Christ and the eschatological presence were left out of consideration; likewise,
though of course this was not actually said, Christianity belonged to the spiritual realm
and it was not for Christians to meddle in the affairs of a world which was sinful and
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incapable of reform to achieve justice which only God could achieve. It is indeed true
that since 1880 there had been a small Christian socialist movement but it was wholly
marginal, like that of conscientious objectors. And, unintentionally, Karl Barth's
theology reinforced that "spiritual" tendency. "The God who was Wholly Other" did not
imply our meddling in the affairs of the world. The God who had a plan for human
history was managing matters without using these human beings who were wholly
incapable of good actions and of "saving themselves". Christianity was becoming a total
faith in grace but this did not imply responsibilities in the world. Of course the war
period and Hitlerism had called in question these attitudes which were almost unanimously held in (say) 1936. But Christians as a whole remained far removed from having
any sense of responsibility in the political field. And everywhere there was a need for an
initial step to be taken to convince them of the most elementary things.
It was thus one of the merits of the Amsterdam Assembly to affirm that Christians
cannot be outsiders in the society to which they belong but must take part in political
life and because of the gospel's demands must make a choice and opt for the most
coherent approach in the attention they pay to all society's problems. But this was the
period when it seemed that first and foremost it was the Russians who had conquered
Nazism, and consequently the politics which seemed most admissible for Christians
was socialism. While Karl Barth was providing theological justification for socialism
certain theologians who were to play an important part in the World Council
Hromadka, Bereczki had accepted and supported the communist regime in their
country, and F. Lieb was at pains to demonstrate that the Soviet regime had changed
considerably, that there no longer was a Red Terror in the USSR and that there was a
trend towards liberalization. The essential task was to rebuild a world that had both
been spiritually destroyed by Nazism and devastated by the most distressing of wars.
And at the same time fundamental values were being rediscovered which had to be
recovered and reasserted among others freedom and the possibility of rebuilding a
more humane world. But there was no way of dismissing the horror caused by the
Hiroshima explosion, so that everything pointed in the same direction: the German
capitalists had supported Hitler and the American capitalists had produced the most
frightful means of destruction. Here again socialism seemed to be the best road to take,
the more so since the other great tragic scenario had been racism and it was discovered
that there was a racist USA. A world of values, such as would make liberty and
equality possible, had to be rebuilt against racism and capitalism on the one hand and
for socialism with a human face on the other. This is precisely what is reflected, as I
see it, in the report on the church and the disorder of society.
At all events, these Amsterdam reflections embraced two elements which I find
wholly correct and prophetic. First, in the attention given to the third world (realization that a Eurocentric approach must be abandoned, that an answer had to be given as
quickly as possible to the disorder in which the third world was going to be engulfed,
after the Japanese occupation in Asia and the expansion of communism in Europe, and
after the quite involuntary involvement of so many people from Africa in that
barbarous war in which they had learned the value of national liberation). Then there
was the denunciation of all totalitarianisms and'some realization that totalitarianism
could be left wing as well as right wing. But it was not yet clearly seen that
totalitarianism could also emerge (though in a different way) in democratic societies.
There was no need to change a constitution or a political regime for totalitarianism to
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develop. It was enough if a wholly effective administrative system and a system of

police supervision were established (without any terrorism) for a totalitarianism to
exist, no longer politically as in fascism, with the absolute obedience of everyone to
the state but socially, with the total absorption of the individual in a rigid, unified
social organism.1 One then had a totalitarianism which initially was difficult to
identify because it was not expressed in a doctrine but established itself gradually
without any violence. And we cannot hold it against the Amsterdam Assembly that
they did not divine this possibility when they condemned "all forms of totalitarianism". It was actually only after the much later work of sociologists like Castoriadis and
Touraine that this form of totalitarianism began to be known. But subsequently the
World Council did not pay much attention to it.
Limitations
Now I shall have to offer some criticisms regarding these Amsterdam conclusions.
The first is that the Assembly was very much obsessed by political problems. It is very
easy to see why this was so, given the world situation at the time the concerns of the
various nations and the political upheavals but while some clear-sightedness, not to
say prophetic vision, might have been expected, it was scarcely in evidence. Of
course, the world's disorder not as it then was but as it could be foreseen was
already conditioned by phenomena which, though not so far dominant, were already
identifiable, and the importance they might come to have should have been evaluated.
First among them was the astounding development of technology. It is astonishing that
when the first atomic bomb exploded no study in depth was undertaken as to the
implications. It is a fact that apart from humanist and sentimentalist protests (if we
except that of Karl Jaspers) no one thought to look at the phenomenon of the atomic
bomb theologically and as to the warning it gave of the change, the mutation, from
which the world would suffer. Theologically, this kind of disintegration of matter was
an assault on the very substance of which creation is constituted. That being so, was it
legitimate to disintegrate matter? But the theologians, still benumbed by "the Galileo
affair", did not dare to pass any judgments on scientific research and, all things
considered, tended to favour it. To ask the question I am asking was to place a
question mark against all scientific research. Only Einstein himself repented of his
discovery and questioned the omnipotence of science. But with the failure ever to ask
that question it could be foreseen politically that this use of atomic energy would
engender a diabolical disorder in the world as a whole, given the multiplication of
atom bombs and subsequent "peaceful" application of the splitting of the atom, with
the production of nuclear energy. In its train this was going to bring a whole host of
inequalities and in particular would increase the disparity between the third world and
the energy-consuming world. In its turn this last factor was to involve huge advances
in all kinds of technology. This growth would take us out of an industrial into what D.
Bell has called a "post-industrial" society (a meaningless term; I was the first to call it
a "technological society"). This should have been foreseen. My contention is that, all
the present disorders of the world arise out of this unlimited technicization. So do the
disbalances between the power blocs, the wrong direction taken in the "development"
of the third-world countries, the great difficulty in applying the simple rules of
1

See De Tocqueville's book La dmocratie en Amrique (Democracy in America).

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democracy, the possibility of frighteningly destructive localized wars, international

indebtedness etc. Now in 1948 it was perfectly possible to achieve this foresight and
have that clearsightedness.
But Christian vision ought to have been at its most perceptive on what has since
come to be called ecology. Account should have been taken of the fact that industrial
growth or the increasingly intensified use of raw materials would place a question
mark over the natural world and its capacity for resistance, reproduction and recovery.
At the time this was not at all unpredictable for there were those who did foresee it
but a theology of nature should have been worked out and it should have been
understood that when all is said this disorder was much more serious for the human
race as a whole than social inequalities or even exploitation of others. But here the
difficulty was that to have any kind of new thinking it was necessary to move away
from the realm of traditional values justice, equality, fraternity and so on which
had always been defended in Christian circles. It should have been understood that if
humanity as a whole were annihilated by a nuclear war or by excessive pollution, the
traditional problems would simply have vanished. There was of course a possible
biblical basis for this kind of prophetic vision: to mention only the New Testament, it
is to be found in the virtue of enkrateia for which moderation is a flavourless
translation, since the term is a very strong one and means rather self-mastery, the
imposition of limits on oneself the exact opposite of hubris, which is characteristic
of technology. And this seemed all the more indispensable when already in 1948 it was
seen that science and technology were heading for unlimited growth and power. And
here we rediscovered something that was very common in the Old Testament: the
unbounded acquisitiveness and lust for absolute power in the human will which the
prophets categorically condemned. But their experience of this was very small
alongside what we were in process of creating. The insanity of planning for unlimited
production in a delimited world should also have been grasped. Today the real disorder
of the world is to be found much more in this than let us say in apartheid! And
the World Council would have played a really prophetic part if it had oriented its
activities along these lines instead of allowing itself to be dominated by political
problems quite apart from the fact that a consensus would probably have been
easier to achieve on these subjects than on thorny political questions. Then the Council
would have been fulfilling its proper function as a source of wisdom in a world
emerging from the madness of war by recalling humanity to another Wisdom.
The second element of criticism the importance of which I shall be bold enough to
stress is that in almost all the 1948 Assembly documents there is an absence of
discipline in the use of the terms used a lack of precision and proper definition.
Thus for example we frequently hear of the need to establish or have respect for
"justice". But what are we talking about? What is "justice"? For three thousand years
Western civilizations have debated what this term might refer to. For of course legal
justice conformity with the law is not social justice: the justitia of the
nominalists is not that of the realists, the cardinal virtue is not Ulpian's ars aequi et
boni, etc. etc. And Pauline "justice" (cf. also "righteousness") as the outcome of
justification1 is something wholly different again! The least that should have been done
2

Translator's note: Cf. Greek dikaiosune and associated terms. Unfortunately French has only the word
"justice" for both "justice" and "righteousness".

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was to say clearly what the word "justice" used so often in ecumenical documents
was understood to mean. For lack of this we most frequently get the impression that
justice is being invoked to provide moral or metaphysical support for choices dictated
either by political preferences and highly general options (e.g. in favour of all the
"oppressed"; I shall come back to this) or by support for this or that doctrine things
which have little to do with "justice" unless it is to be identified with some cause or other
(which was always so with all the totalitarian parties). But this attitude is very dangerous
because then it can be used to justify every action and every means to ensure the triumph
of that cause, as has been our experience during this century. If then there is no clear,
strict definition of the word "justice" the references we make to it are invalid.
There is another term, not unrelated to the above, which can lack content and
precision: "human rights". The World Council has resolutely worked for the recognition of a declaration on human rights and one can very well understand the spirit in
which this was done. The world was emerging from a period of contempt for human
beings, not just for personal rights obtained through democracy and established by the
law, but for physical integrity, respect shown to beliefs and for the "soul"; and a
hundred times it had been noticed that in a variety of regimes there was a compulsion
to degrade and dehumanize. Very well, then. But here too there was (and still is) a lack
of precision; and I would like to make quite a number of points. First, when we talk
about "right"3 we are using a legal term whether we like it or not. But when we say
"legal" we are also speaking of an authority that ordains what is legally right, what
sanctions are to be imposed and who is to judge (or at least arbitrate) when it comes to
assessing where there has been a violation of what is (legally) right. But there is
nothing of that here. (I have mentioned the World Council though it alone is not to
blame because its influence was not inconsiderable in the drafting of the Declaration of
Human Rights). In these circumstances, can we still talk about "right"? It is a
downright abuse of words. Which brings me to my second criticism. The World
Council was not able to see that we were in fact entering a period in which human
"rights" were to be affirmed by a mad verbal inflation. Long ago the US Constitution
had provided an example of such an abuse of words by talking about the "right to
happiness" which means nothing. And since then we have had the right to holidays,
the right to go and ski (sic!!), the right of a child to be born and so on. I could quote a
hundred such nonsenses. The primary work of the World Council should in reality
have been theological so that on the basis of a theology of the human person it could
produce a formula indicating which commandments were non-negotiable for human
life in a world rapidly developing, technologically transformed, politicized and given
over to mass culture; without taking into account the political options, the various
regimes, the value of science and so on ad infinitum. But had it done this theological
work (instead of resting content with general ideas) the next problem, which was not
touched on, would have raised its head: is there such an entity as "humanity" (when it
comes to its "rights")? To put it differently: is our charter appropriate for every culture
(the Islamic declaration of human rights is quite different)? The Council should not
have avoided the burning issue of the continuity and identity of humanity irrespective
of particular cultures and societies. Such a study, in fact, would inevitably have meant
3
Translator's note: "droit" covers a range of connotations from "right" through "law", including both these
possibilities.

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compiling a charter of humanity's duties and obligations as a counterpart to one on

human rights (instead of making do with just a brief reference). The World Council
would have done something really original here. And at the same time it would have
discovered the sole possible foundation for "rights" i.e. that rights are based on the
existence of duties.
The last point I want to make as to the absence of precision in this work relates to the
weakness of the texts on law and on the UNO. To begin with, there is wholesale
ambiguity as to what is meant here: several times it is the law of God (and what an
illusion it would be to suppose that all nations must acknowledge the authority of the
law!); sometimes the reference is to international law and sometimes to an abstract
idea which would issue in what European democracy has called the "constitutional
state" (l'Etat de droit). Here too vagueness prevails because of the lack of theological
analysis. Thus while I do not agree very much with Karl Barth's Rechtfertigung und
Recht (justification and justice) I do at least see what he is talking about! I think these
pages bear the mark of what in France is called the tat de droit, but it should have
been gone into in detail, showing all the progress that had to be made.
Finally we cannot fail to be disappointed at the confidence placed in UNO. After the
resounding failures of the League of Nations between 1930 and 1940 how could
anyone again put their trust in a similar body exhibiting the same weaknesses and one
more besides? As to these weaknesses, they lie in the lack of the means to enforce
decisions, and of a supra-state authority: each state retains its full sovereignty. The UN
could issue only recommendations which would be no more than "pious wishes", and
pronounce judgments that lead to nothing. The additional weakness lies in the fact that
as organized in 1948 UNO had a majority which was automatically favourable to any
resolutions from the USA. The USA reigned supreme and the majority was always
established in advance! In other words, the Amsterdam Assembly did not tackle the
basic problem (again contenting itself here with a somewhat vague comment) i.e.
national sovereignty. It was for the World Council to take up arms against the idea that
each nation, and each state representing it, was sovereign and that there is nothing in
principle or in practice to limit or restrain that sovereignty. Here again timidity and
vagueness were exhibited where there should have been a high degree of vigour,
especially at a time when the state of the world after the war was prompting doubts as
to the legitimacy of national sovereignty. With the loss of that opportunity the
consequences were what one would expect: all the new nations at whose birth the
World Council was present, were also going to claim the right to "national
sovereignty" with the support of the Council and this has led to the frightening
international disorder we know today.
And this brings me to my third criticism. The Amsterdam text on war has been the
subject of many discussions during which some very proper opinions have been
expressed, especially that there can no longer be any just wars. But the problem I have
often encountered over the last fifty years is that while the churches lay down right
principles, when these are applied one finds oneself confronted by attitudes which are
in every respect questionable. And I have noted that most frequently these attitudes
spring from a failure to recognize the reality of the situations and from inadequate
information (especially historical and sociological). Thus on the basis of ideas which
are correct, such as the need for the commitment of Christians in politics or the notion
of a "church for the others" certain immediate choices were made: viz. that the World
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Council must champion all the oppressed, the poor nations etc. Which is all very fine;
but must we then distinguish two kinds of wars those of the powerful nations which
are always to be condemned, and those of the oppressed which are legitimate, i.e.
revolutionary wars? We have had many examples of these. When the fourth section
was being discussed someone wisely remarked "there has been no mention of
Palestine..." (the pro-Palestinian trend was thus already indicating its presence) but it
was objected that this would have led to calling in question the situation of the Baltic
States (though good care was taken not to add Bessarabia, Karelia, etc.). And why was
that not done? For either one queries all occupations of territories by war or none. This
th World Council did not do. For instance it took the part of the Palestinians but said
nothing about other peoples who had been invaded and subjugated (e.g. Tibet). Very
persistently it took a stance against apartheid (and of course I agree with the
condemnation of racial discrimination) but why did it not denounce social discrimination as unacceptable (some sections of the population being totally deprived of rights
because of their social origins, e.g. in the communist countries?). And this stance on
behalf of the "oppressed" (not all of them!) necessarily led to legitimizing the so-called
wars of liberation.
Now this is where the most serious omission comes to light: the World Council does
not weigh up the foreseeable consequences in many of these wars of "liberation". It
has not been realized that no war of liberation ever led any people to liberty but that
when liberation has been won by war it inevitably gives rise to a new dictatorship. The
Cuban adventure is a case in point and it can be multiplied for all the "liberated"
peoples. The African peoples (apart from those who have obtained their liberty by
negotiation and peaceful means) are all subjected to dictatorships far worse than
"colonialist exploitation". Likewise a vigorous stand has been taken on behalf of the
young and valiant people of Vietnam, and then in support of the Khmer Rouge war of
liberation. This led on the one hand to an extremely violent dictatorship and on the
other to the biggest massacre of civil populations since the time of Stalin. Now, my
contention is that it was perfectly possible to foresee all this. It should have been
realized that every revolutionary movement in the world, whatever its basis, was
immediately taken in hand covertly by international communism and led to such
extremes. It should have been firmly maintained that only peaceful means can lead to
liberation a slow, gradual liberation. Gandhi was not the only one Martin Luther
King did a thousand times more to gain equality for black persons than did the violent
revolutionary movements which followed him (Black Panthers, Black Muslims); and
currently Lech Walesa, using admirable peaceful tactics, is getting the Polish government gradually to give way. The Berlin, Budapest or Prague revolts were not able to
achieve such results. Christians ought to display greater clearsightedness than other
people and a body as large as the World Council, before taking sides, should have at
its disposal all the information, not just that of one side, and should calculate the
probable consequences.
Let me close by repeating two essential truths. Taking sides politically should be
based not on "sentimental idealism" (all the weak, all the oppressed) but on having
certain knowledge of the whole situation in its entirety. And the second is that every
effort must be made to foresee as well as possible the results likely to be brought about
by the movements involved (the oppressed are only rarely liberated by violence). With
the sources of information available today we can in any event have better knowledge
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(provided we do not have any a priori positions, or "filters" which ensure that we take
note only of the information which says we are right); and the methods of analysis used
in political science also make a certain number of forecasts possible4 from which we
have to establish a pattern of commitment on behalf of one element or another in a
conflict.

I should not like these pages to be regarded as a negative criticism of the World
Council. From 1945 to 1948 I took part in the preparations for the 1948 Assembly and
I know the wide range of obstacles and contradictions that had to be overcome. I
should simply like all this to be regarded as positive criticism, that is, as something
intended to help the World Council to re-think some of its attitudes and aim at the
maximum discipline in its reflections, with a maximum of information coming from
different sources. This likewise means theological research and "scientific" analysis
(in so far as sociology, economics and politics may be regarded as sciences...).

E.g. the now well-established rule that when a liberation, independence or revolutionary movement takes
shape among a people, it is always the most extremist faction that gains power when victory comes. The
moderates are inevitably got rid of.

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