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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 109975

February 9, 2001

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,


vs.
ERLINDA MATIAS DAGDAG, respondent.
QUISUMBING, J.:
For review on certiorari is the decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated April 22, 1993, in CA-G.R. CY No. 34378, which
affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City in Civil Case No. 380-0-90 declaring the marriage
of Erlinda Matias Dagdag and Avelino Dagdag void under Article 36 of the Family Code.
On September 7, 1975, Erlinda Matias, 16 years old, married Avelino Parangan Dagdag, 20 years old, at the Iglesia
Filipina Independent Church in Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija.2 The marriage certificate was issued by the Office of the Local
Civil Registrar of the Municipality of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, on October 20, 1988.
Erlinda and Avelino begot two children, namely: Avelyn M. Dagdag, born on January 16, 1978; and Eden M. Dagdag,
born on April 21, 1982.3 Their birth certificates were issued by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality
of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, also on October 20, 1988.
Erlinda and Avelino lived in a house in District 8, Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, located at the back of the house of their inlaws.4 A week after the wedding, Avelino started leaving his family without explanation. He would disappear for
months, suddenly reappear for a few months, then disappear again. During the times when he was with his family, he
indulged in drinking sprees with friends and would return home drunk. He would force his wife to submit to sexual
intercourse and if she refused, he would inflict physical injuries on her.5
On October 1993, he left his family again and that was the last they heard from him. Erlinda was constrained to look
for a job in Olongapo City as a manicurist to support herself and her children. Finally, Erlinda learned that Avelino was
imprisoned for some crime,6 and that he escaped from jail on October 22, 1985.7 A certification therefor dated
February 14, 1990, was issued by Jail Warden Orlando S. Limon. Avelino remains at-large to date.
On July 3, 1990, Erlinda filed with the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City a petition for judicial declaration of nullity
of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.8 Since Avelino could not
be located, summons was served by publication in the Olongapo News, a newspaper of general circulation, on
September 3, 10, and 17, 1990.9 Subsequently, a hearing was conducted to establish jurisdictional facts. Thereafter,
on December 17, 1990, the date set for presentation of evidence, only Erlinda and her counsel appeared. Erlinda
testified and presented her sister-in-law, Virginia Dagdag, as her only witness.
Virginia testified that she is married to the brother of Avelino. She and her husband live in Olongapo City but they
spend their vacations at the house of Avelino's parents in Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija. She testified that Erlinda and Avelino
always quarrelled, and that Avelino never stayed for long at the couple's house. She knew that Avelino had been
gone for a long time now, and that she pitied Erlinda and the children.10
Thereafter, Erlinda rested her case. The trial court issued an Order giving the investigating prosecutor until January 2,
1991, to manifest in writing whether or not he would present controverting evidence, and stating that should he fail to
file said manifestation, the case would be deemed submitted for decision.

In compliance with the Order, the investigating prosecutor conducted an investigation and found that there was no
collusion between the parties. However, he intended to intervene in the case to avoid fabrication of evidence.11
On December 27, 1990, without waiting for the investigating prosecutor's manifestation dated December 5, 1990, the
trial court rendered a decision12 declaring the marriage of Erlinda and Avelino void under Article 36 of the Family
Code, disposing thus:
"WHEREFORE, and viewed from the foregoing considerations, the Court hereby declares the marriage
celebrated at Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija between Erlinda Matias and Avelino Dagdag on 7 September 1975 to be
null and void.
The Local Civil Registrar of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija is hereby ordered to enter into his Book of Marriage this
declaration after this decision shall have become final and executory .
SO ORDERED."
On January 29, 1991, the investigating prosecutor filed a Motion to Set Aside Judgment on the ground that the
decision was prematurely rendered since he was given until January 2, 1991 to manifest whether he was presenting
controverting evidence.
The Office of the Solicitor General likewise filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision on the ground that the
same is not in accordance with the evidence and the law. After requiring Erlinda to comment, the trial court denied the
Motion for Reconsideration in an Order dated August 21, 1991 as follows:13
"This resolves the Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision of this Honorable Court dated December 27,
1990 filed by the Solicitor-General. The observation of the movant is to the effect that 'Mere alcoholism and
abusiveness are not enough to show psychological incapacity. Nor is abandonment. These are common in
marriage. There must be showing that these traits, stemmed from psychological incapacity existing at the
time of celebration of the marriage.
In the case at bar, the abandonment is prolonged as the husband left his wife and children since 1983. The
defendant, while in jail escaped and whose present whereabouts are unknown. He failed to support his
family for the same period of time, actuations clearly indicative of the failure of the husband to comply with
the essential marital obligations of marriage defined and enumerated under Article 68 of the Family Code.
These findings of facts are uncontroverted. 1wphi1.nt
Defendant's character traits, by their nature, existed at the time of marriage and became manifest only after
the marriage. In rerum natura, these traits are manifestations of lack of marital responsibility and appear now
to be incurable. Nothing can be graver since the family members are now left to fend for themselves.
Contrary to the opinion of the Solicitor-General, these are not common in marriage.
Let it be said that the provisions of Article 36 of the New Family Code, to assuage the sensibilities of the
more numerous church, is a substitute for divorce (See: Sempio Diy, New Family Code, p. 36) in order to
dissolve marriages that exist only in name.
WHEREFORE, and the foregoing considered, the motion for Reconsideration aforecited is DENIED for lack
of merit.
SO ORDERED"
The Solicitor General appealed to the Court of Appeals, raising the sole assignment of error that:

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING APPELLEE'S MARRIAGE TO A VELINO DAGDAG NULL
AND VOID ON THE GROUND OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF THE LATTER, PURSUANT TO
ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY CODE, THE PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF THE NATURE
CONTEMPLATED BY THE LAW NOT HAVING BEEN PROVEN TO EXIST.14
On April 22, 1993, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision15 affirming the decision of the trial court, disposing thus:
"Avelino Dagdag is psychologically incapacitated not only because he failed to perform the duties and
obligations of a married person but because he is emotionally immature and irresponsible, an alcoholic, and
a criminal. Necessarily, the plaintiff is now endowed with the right to seek the judicial declaration of nullity of
their marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. Defendant's constant non-fulfillment of any of such
obligations is continously (sic) destroying the integrity or wholeness of his marriage with the plaintiff.
(Pineda, The Family Code of the Philippines Annotated, 1992 Ed., p. 46)."16
Hence, the present petition for review ,17 filed by the Solicitor General.
The Solicitor General contends that the alleged psychological incapacity of Avelino Dagdag is not of the nature
contemplated by Article 36 of the Family Code. According to him, the Court of Appeals made an erroneous and
incorrect interpretation of the phrase "psychological incapacity" and an incorrect application thereof to the facts of the
case. Respondent, in her Comment, insists that the facts constituting psychological incapacity were proven by
preponderance of evidence during trial.
At issue is whether or not the trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly declared the marriage as null and void
under Article 36 of the Family Code, on the ground that the husband suffers from psychological incapacity as he is
emotionally immature and irresponsible, a habitual alcoholic, and a fugitive from justice.
Article 36 of the Family Code provides "A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its solemnization."
Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of a marriage, depends crucially,
more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the case. Each case must be judged, not on the basis ofa
priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. In regard to psychological
incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with another case. The
trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid
substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court.18
In Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina,19 the Court laid down the following GUIDELINES in the interpretation and
application of Article 36 of the Family Code:
"(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.
This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of
the family. x x x
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in
the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the
Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations
and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them,
was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was

assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such
incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle
ofejusdem generis (Salita vs. Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100, June 13, 1994), nevertheless such root cause must
be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be
given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The
evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at
such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely
against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of
marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or
employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and
prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise
his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or
inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less in will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening
disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to
marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code20as
regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code21 in regard to parents
and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. x x x
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as
counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification,
which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as
the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor-General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to
the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution
of the court. The Solicitor-General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor
vinculicontemplated under Canon 1095."22
Taking into consideration these guidelines, it is evident that Erlinda failed to comply with the above-mentioned
evidentiary requirements. Erlinda failed to comply with guideline No. 2 which requires that the root cause of
psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified and sufficiently proven by experts, since no
psychiatrist or medical doctor testified as to the alleged psychological incapacity of her husband. Further, the
allegation that the husband is a fugitive from justice was not sufficiently proven. In fact, the crime for which he was
arrested was not even alleged. The investigating prosecutor was likewise not given an opportunity to present
controverting evidence since the trial court's decision was prematurely rendered.
In the case of Hernandez v. Court of Appeals,23 we affirmed the dismissal of the trial court and Court of Appeals of the
petition for annulment on the ground of dearth of the evidence presented. We further explained therein that -

"Moreover, expert testimony should have been presented to establish the precise cause of private
respondent's psychological incapacity, if any, in order to show that it existed at the inception of the marriage.
The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage rests upon petitioner. The Court is mindful of the
policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social
institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. (Art. II, Sec. 12, Art. XV, Secs. 1-2) Thus, any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage. (citing Republic of the Philippines v. Court of
Appeals, supra. )"24
WHEREFORE, the present petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 22,
1993, in CA-G.R. CY No. 34378 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines


Supreme Court
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
DANILO A. AURELIO, Petitioner,

- versus -

G.R. No. 175367


Present:
CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
NACHURA,
PERALTA,
ABAD, and
MENDOZA, JJ.
Promulgated:
June 6, 2011

VIDA MA. CORAZON P. AURELIO,


Respondent.
x--------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari,[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set
aside the October 6, 2005 Decision[2] and October 26, 2006 Resolution,[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. SP
No. 82238.
The facts of the case are as follows:
Petitioner Danilo A. Aurelio and respondent Vida Ma. Corazon Aurelio were married on March 23, 1988.
They have two sons, namely: Danilo Miguel and Danilo Gabriel.
On May 9, 2002, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 94, a Petition
for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage.[4] In her petition, respondent alleged that both she and petitioner were

psychologically incapacitated of performing and complying with their respective essential marital obligations. In
addition, respondent alleged that such state of psychological incapacity was present prior and even during the time of
the marriage ceremony. Hence, respondent prays that her marriage be declared null and void under Article 36 of the
Family Code which provides:
Article 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
likewise be void, even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
As succinctly summarized by the CA, contained in respondents petition are the following allegations, to wit:
x x x The said petition alleged, inter alia, that both husband and wife are psychologically incapable of
performing and complying with their essential marital obligations. Said psychological incapacity was existing prior and
at the time of the marriage. Said psychological incapacity was manifested by lack of financial support from the
husband; his lack of drive and incapacity to discern the plight of his working wife. The husband exhibited consistent
jealousy and distrust towards his wife. His moods alternated between hostile defiance and contrition. He refused to
assist in the maintenance of the family. He refused to foot the household bills and provide for his familys needs. He
exhibited arrogance. He was completely insensitive to the feelings of his wife. He liked to humiliate and embarrass his
wife even in the presence of their children.
Vida Aurelio, on the other hand, is effusive and displays her feelings openly and freely. Her
feelings change very quickly from joy to fury to misery to despair, depending on her day-to-day
experiences. Her tolerance for boredom was very low. She was emotionally immature; she
cannot stand frustration or disappointment. She cannot delay to gratify her needs. She gets
upset when she cannot get what she wants. Self-indulgence lifts her spirits immensely. Their
hostility towards each other distorted their relationship. Their incapacity to accept and fulfill the
essential obligations of marital life led to the breakdown of their marriage. Private respondent
manifested psychological aversion to cohabit with her husband or to take care of him. The
psychological make-up of private respondent was evaluated by a psychologist, who found that
the psychological incapacity of both husband and wife to perform their marital obligations is
grave, incorrigible and incurable. Private respondent suffers from a Histrionic Personality
Disorder with Narcissistic features; whereas petitioner suffers from passive aggressive
(negativistic) personality disorder that renders him immature and irresponsible to assume the
normal obligations of a marriage.[5]
On November 8, 2002, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss [6] the petition. Petitioner principally argued that the
petition failed to state a cause of action and that it failed to meet the standards set by the Court for the interpretation
and implementation of Article 36 of the Family Code.
On January 14, 2003, the RTC issued an Order[7] denying petitioners motion.
On February 21, 2003, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was, however, denied by the
RTC in an Order[8]dated December 17, 2003. In denying petitioners motion, the RTC ruled that respondents petition
for declaration of nullity of marriage complied with the requirements of the Molina doctrine, and whether or not the
allegations are meritorious would depend upon the proofs presented by both parties during trial, to wit:
A review of the petition shows that it observed the requirements in Republic vs. Court
of Appeals (268 SCRA 198), otherwise known as the Molina Doctrine. There was allegation of
the root cause of the psychological incapacity of both the petitioner and the respondent
contained in paragraphs 12 and 13 of the petition. The manifestation of juridical antecedence
was alleged in paragraphs 5 and 6 of the petition. The allegations constituting the gravity of
psychological incapacity were alleged in paragraph 9 (a to l) of the petition. The incurability was
alleged in paragraph 10 of the petition. Moreover, the clinical finding of incurability was quoted in

paragraph 15 of the petition. There is a cause of action presented in the petition for the
nullification of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Whether or not the allegations are meritorious depends upon the proofs to be
presented by both parties. This, in turn, will entail the presentation of evidence which can only
be done in the hearing on the merits of the case. If the Court finds that there are (sic)
preponderance of evidence to sustain a nullification, then the cause of the petition shall fail.
Conversely, if it finds, through the evidence that will be presented during the hearing on the
merits, that there are sufficient proofs to warrant nullification, the Court shall declare its nullity.[9]
On February 16, 2004, petitioner appealed the RTC decision to the CA via petition for certiorari[10] under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
On October 6, 2005, the CA rendered a Decision dismissing the petition, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, [the] instant petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.[11]

In a Resolution dated October 26, 2004, the CA dismissed petitioners motion for reconsideration.
In its Decision, the CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC and held that respondents complaint for declaration of
nullity of marriage when scrutinized in juxtaposition with Article 36 of the Family Code and the Molina doctrine
revealed the existence of a sufficient cause of action.
Hence, herein petition, with petitioner raising two issues for this Courts consideration, to wit:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS VIOLATED THE APPLICABLE LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT HELD THAT THE ALLEGATIONS CONTAINED IN THE PETITION
FOR DECLARATION OF THE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE ARE SUFFICIENT FOR THE COURT
TO DECLARE THE NULLITY OF THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN VIDA AND DANILO.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS VIOLATED THE APPLICABLE LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT DENIED PETITIONERS ACTION FOR CERTIORARI DESPITE
THE FACT THAT THE DENIAL OF HIS MOTION TO DISMISS BY THE TRIAL COURT IS
PATENTLY AND UTTERLY TAINTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING
TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION; AND THAT APPEAL IN DUE COURSE IS NOT A
PLAIN, ADEQUATE OR SPEEDY REMEDY UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES. [12]

Before anything else, it bears to point out that had respondents complaint been filed after March 15, 2003,
this present petition would have been denied since Supreme Court Administrative Matter No. 02-11-10[13] prohibits the
filing of a motion to dismiss in actions for annulment of marriage. Be that as it may, after a circumspect review of the
arguments raised by petitioner herein, this Court finds that the petition is not meritorious.
In Republic v. Court of Appeals,[14] this Court created the Molina guidelines to aid the courts in the disposition
of cases involving psychological incapacity, to wit:

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)

(7)
(8)

Burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff.
The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified,
(b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision.
The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage.
The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife, as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the
same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s)
must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the
decision.
Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in
the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating
therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition.
[15]

This Court, pursuant to Supreme Court Administrative Matter No. 02-11-10, has modified the above
pronouncements, particularly Section 2(d) thereof, stating that the certification of the Solicitor General required in the
Molina case is dispensed with to avoid delay. Still, Article 48 of the Family Code mandates that the appearance of the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned be on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the
parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.[16]
Petitioner anchors his petition on the premise that the allegations contained in respondents petition are
insufficient to support a declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity. Specifically, petitioner
contends that the petition failed to comply with three of the Molina guidelines, namely: that the root cause of the
psychological incapacity must be alleged in the complaint; that such illness must be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage; and that the non-complied marital obligation
must be stated in the petition.[17]
First, contrary to petitioners assertion, this Court finds that the root cause of psychological incapacity was
stated and alleged in the complaint. We agree with the manifestation of respondent that the family backgrounds of
both petitioner and respondent were discussed in the complaint as the root causes of their psychological incapacity.
Moreover, a competent and expert psychologist clinically identified the same as the root causes.
Second, the petition likewise alleged that the illness of both parties was of such grave a nature as to bring
about a disability for them to assume the essential obligations of marriage. The psychologist reported that respondent
suffers from Histrionic Personality Disorder with Narcissistic Features. Petitioner, on the other hand, allegedly suffers
from Passive Aggressive (Negativistic) Personality Disorder. The incapacity of both parties to perform their marital
obligations was alleged to be grave, incorrigible and incurable.
Lastly, this Court also finds that the essential marital obligations that were not complied with were alleged in
the petition. As can be easily gleaned from the totality of the petition, respondents allegations fall under Article 68 of
the Family Code which states that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect
and fidelity, and render mutual help and support.
It bears to stress that whether or not petitioner and respondent are psychologically incapacitated to fulfill
their marital obligations is a matter for the RTC to decide at the first instance. A perusal of the Molina guidelines

would show that the same contemplate a situation wherein the parties have presented their evidence, witnesses have
testified, and that a decision has been reached by the court after due hearing. Such process can be gleaned from
guidelines 2, 6 and 8, which refer to a decision rendered by the RTC after trial on the merits. It would certainly be too
burdensome to ask this Court to resolve at first instance whether the allegations contained in the petition are
sufficient to substantiate a case for psychological incapacity. Let it be remembered that each case involving the
application of Article 36 must be treated distinctly and judged not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or
generalizations but according to its own attendant facts. Courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case
basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of
church tribunals.[18] It would thus be more prudent for this Court to remand the case to the RTC, as it would be in the
best position to scrutinize the evidence as well as hear and weigh the evidentiary value of the testimonies of the
ordinary witnesses and expert witnesses presented by the parties.
Given the allegations in respondents petition for nullity of marriage, this Court rules that the RTC did not
commit grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners motion to dismiss. By grave abuse of discretion is meant
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not
enough. It must be grave abuse of discretion as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by
reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive
duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.[19] Even
assuming arguendo that this Court were to agree with petitioner that the allegations contained in respondents petition
are insufficient and that the RTC erred in denying petitioners motion to dismiss, the same is merely an error of
judgment correctible by appeal and not an abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari.[20]
Finally, the CA properly dismissed petitioners petition. As a general rule, the denial of a motion to dismiss,
which is an interlocutory order, is not reviewable by certiorari. Petitioners remedy is to reiterate the grounds in his
motion to dismiss, as defenses in his answer to the petition for nullity of marriage, proceed trial and, in case of an
adverse decision, appeal the decision in due time. [21] The existence of that adequate remedy removed the
underpinnings of his petition for certiorari in the CA.[22]
WHEREFORE, premises considered the petition is DENIED. The October 6, 2005 Decision and October
26, 2006Resolution of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 82238, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice Associate Justice
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Second Division, Chairperson

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 162368

July 17, 2006

MA. ARMIDA PEREZ-FERRARIS, petitioner,


vs.
BRIX FERRARIS, respondent.
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This resolves the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Ma. Armida Perez-Ferraris of the Resolution dated
June 9, 2004 denying the petition for review on certiorari of the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated
April 30, 2003 and February 24, 2004, respectively, for failure of the petitioner to sufficiently show that the Court of
Appeals committed any reversible error.
On February 20, 2001, the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 151 rendered a Decision1 denying the petition
for declaration of nullity of petitioner's marriage with Brix Ferraris. The trial court noted that suffering from epilepsy
does not amount to psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Civil Code and the evidence on record were
insufficient to prove infidelity. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in an Order2 dated April 20, 2001
where the trial court reiterated that there was no evidence that respondent is mentally or physically ill to such an
extent that he could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid
assumption thereof.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed3 in toto the judgment of the trial court. It held that the
evidence on record did not convincingly establish that respondent was suffering from psychological incapacity or that
his "defects" were incurable and already present at the inception of the marriage.4 The Court of Appeals also found
that Dr. Dayan's testimony failed to establish the substance of respondent's psychological incapacity; that she failed
to explain how she arrived at the conclusion that the respondent has a mixed personality disorder; that she failed to

clearly demonstrate that there was a natal or supervening disabling factor or an adverse integral element in
respondent's character that effectively incapacitated him from accepting and complying with the essential marital
obligations.5
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied6 for lack of merit; thus, she filed a petition for review on certiorari
with this Court. As already stated, the petition for review was denied for failure of petitioner to show that the appellate
tribunal committed any reversible error.
Petitioner filed the instant motion for reconsideration.7 The Court required respondent Brix Ferraris to file
comment8 but failed to comply; thus, he is deemed to have waived the opportunity to file comment. Further, the Court
directed the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to comment on petitioner's motion for reconsideration which it
complied on March 2, 2006.
After considering the arguments of both the petitioner and the OSG, the Court resolves to deny petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
The issue of whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of marriage depends
crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the case.9 Such factual issue, however, is beyond the
province of this Court to review. It is not the function of the Court to analyze or weigh all over again the evidence or
premises supportive of such factual determination.10 It is a well-established principle that factual findings of the trial
court, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding on this Court,11 save for the most compelling and cogent
reasons, like when the findings of the appellate court go beyond the issues of the case, run contrary to the
admissions of the parties to the case, or fail to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, will justify a
different conclusion; or when there is a misappreciation of facts,12 which are unavailing in the instant case.
The term "psychological incapacity" to be a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code,
refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so
grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond
one is about to assume.13 As all people may have certain quirks and idiosyncrasies, or isolated characteristics
associated with certain personality disorders, there is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to
confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.14 It is for this
reason that the Court relies heavily on psychological experts for its understanding of the human personality. However,
the root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature must be fully
explained,15 which petitioner failed to convincingly demonstrate.
As aptly held by the Court of Appeals:
Simply put, the chief and basic consideration in the resolution of marital annulment cases is the presence of
evidence that can adequately establish respondent's psychological condition. Here, appellant contends that
there is such evidence. We do not agree. Indeed, the evidence on record did not convincingly establish that
respondent was suffering from psychological incapacity. There is absolutely no showing that his "defects"
were already present at the inception of the marriage, or that those are incurable.
Quite apart from being plainly self-serving, petitioner's evidence showed that respondent's alleged failure to
perform his so-called marital obligations was not at all a manifestation of some deep-seated, grave,
permanent and incurable psychological malady. To be sure, the couple's relationship before the marriage
and even during their brief union (for well about a year or so) was not all bad. During that relatively short
period of time, petitioner was happy and contented with her life in the company of respondent. In fact, by
petitioner's own reckoning, respondent was a responsible and loving husband. x x x. Their problems began
when petitioner started doubting respondent's fidelity. It was only when they started fighting about the calls
from women that respondent began to withdraw into his shell and corner, and failed to perform his so-called
marital obligations. Respondent could not understand petitioner's lack of trust in him and her constant

naggings. He thought her suspicions irrational. Respondent could not relate to her anger, temper and
jealousy. x x x.
xxxx
At any rate, Dr. Dayan did not explain how she arrived at her diagnosis that respondent has a mixed
personality disorder called "schizoid," and why he is the "dependent and avoidant type." In fact, Dr. Dayan's
statement that one suffering from such mixed personality disorder is dependent on others for decision x x x
lacks specificity; it seems to belong to the realm of theoretical speculation. Also, Dr. Dayan's information that
respondent had extramarital affairs was supplied by the petitioner herself. Notably, when asked as to the
root cause of respondent's alleged psychological incapacity, Dr. Dayan's answer was vague, evasive and
inconclusive. She replied that such disorder "can be part of his family upbringing" x x x. She stated that there
was a history of respondent's parents having difficulties in their relationship. But this input on the supposed
problematic history of respondent's parents also came from petitioner. Nor did Dr. Dayan clearly
demonstrate that there was really "a natal or supervening disabling factor" on the part of respondent, or an
"adverse integral element" in respondent's character that effectively incapacitated him from accepting, and,
thereby complying with, the essential marital obligations. Of course, petitioner likewise failed to prove that
respondent's supposed psychological or mental malady existed even before the marriage. All these
omissions must be held up against petitioner, for the reason that upon her devolved the onus of establishing
nullity of the marriage. Indeed, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage and the
indissolubility of the marital vinculum.16
We find respondent's alleged mixed personality disorder, the "leaving-the-house" attitude whenever they quarreled,
the violent tendencies during epileptic attacks, the sexual infidelity, the abandonment and lack of support, and his
preference to spend more time with his band mates than his family, are not rooted on some debilitating psychological
condition but a mere refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
In Republic v. Court of Appeals,17 where therein respondent preferred to spend more time with his friends than his
family on whom he squandered his money, depended on his parents for aid and assistance, and was dishonest to his
wife regarding his finances, the Court held that the psychological defects spoken of were more of a "difficulty," if not
outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations and that a mere showing of
irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities in no wise constitute psychological incapacity; it is not enough
to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they
must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological, not physical, illness.
Also, we held in Hernandez v. Court of Appeals18 that habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and
abandonment do not by themselves constitute grounds for declaring a marriage void based on psychological
incapacity.
While petitioner's marriage with the respondent failed and appears to be without hope of reconciliation, the remedy
however is not always to have it declared void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity. An unsatisfactory
marriage, however, is not a null and void marriage.19 No less than the Constitution recognizes the sanctity of marriage
and the unity of the family; it decrees marriage as legally "inviolable" and protects it from dissolution at the whim of
the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.20
Thus, in determining the import of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36, it must be read in conjunction with,
although to be taken as distinct from Articles 35,21 37,22 38,23 and 4124 that would likewise, but for different reasons,
render the marriage void ab initio, or Article 4525 that would make the marriage merely voidable, or Article 55 that
could justify a petition for legal separation. Care must be observed so that these various circumstances are not
applied so indiscriminately as if the law were indifferent on the matter.26 Article 36 should not to be confused with a
divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefor manifest themselves.27 Neither it is to be
equated with legal separation, in which the grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical

violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity,
abandonment and the like.28
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the motion for reconsideration of the Resolution dated June 9, 2004 denying
the petition for review on certiorari for failure of the petitioner to sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals committed
any reversible error, is DENIED WITH FINALITY.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, C.J., Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., Chico-Nazario, J.J., concur.

Republic of the Philippines


Supreme Court
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
ORLANDO G. TONGOL, G.R. NO. 157610
Petitioner,
Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ.
FILIPINAS M. TONGOL, Promulgated:

Respondent. October 19, 2007


x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Assailed in the present Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the Decision[1] of the
Court of Appeals (CA) dated September 25, 2002 in CA-G.R. CV No. 66245, and its Resolution of March 19, 2003,
denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration. The CA Decision affirmed, in toto, the Decision of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 149, which dismissed the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage filed by
herein petitioner Orlando Tongol.
The facts of the case are as follows:
Orlando G. Tongol (Orlando) and Filipinas M. Tongol (Filipinas) were married on August 27, 1967. Out of their union,
they begot four children, namely: Crisanto, born in 1968; Olivia, born in 1969; Frederick, born in 1971, and; Ma.
Cecilia, born in 1972.
On May 13, 1994, Orlando and Filipinas filed a petition for dissolution of their conjugal partnership of gains, which
was granted in a Judgment issued by the RTC of Makati City, Branch 143 on April 24, 1995.
On August 19, 1996, Orlando filed before the RTC of Makati City a verified petition for the declaration of nullity of his
marriage with Filipinas on the ground that the latter is psychologically incapacitated to comply with her essential
marital obligations.
In his Petition, Orlando contended that he and Filipinas got married over the objection of the latter's family; their
marriage was not a happy one because of her parents' continued interference and attempt to break up their union;
greatly influenced by her parents, Filipinas, even at the early stages of their marriage, already treated Orlando with
contempt and without the love and respect due him as her husband; when Orlando started a junk shop business,
Filipinas ridiculed him instead of giving him encouragement; later on, his business became successful and he was
able to embark upon another business venture; he put up a pharmaceutical company which also became profitable;
Filipinas then became interested and began to interfere in the operation of the business; however, because of her
bad attitude, the employees were aloof; she also resented the fact that her husband got along well with the
employees; as a result, she quarreled with her husband causing the latter embarrassment; she even suspected that
the income of the business was being given to her husband's relatives; their continued fighting persisted and affected
their children; efforts atreconciliation proved futile because their differences had become irreconcilable and their
marriage impossible; in 1990, Orlando decided to live separately from Filipinas; in 1994, the spouses filed a petition
for dissolution of their property relationship; and the petition was granted in 1995.
In her Answer with Counter-Petition, Filipinas admitted that efforts at reconciliation have been fruitless and that their
marriage is a failure. However, she claims that their marriage failed because it is Orlando who is psychologically
incapacitated to fulfill his obligations as a married man.

Evidence for Orlando consisted of his own testimony, that of his sister, Angelina Tongol, and of Annaliza Guevara, an
employee in the pharmaceutical company owned by the spouses Tongol. Orlando also presented Dr. Cecilia Villegas,
a psychiatrist who conducted a psychological examination of both parties. Orlando submitted documents evidencing
their marriage, the birth of their four children, the RTC decision granting the petition for dissolution of their conjugal
partnership of gains, and the written evaluation of Dr. Villegas regarding the spouses' psychological examination. On
the other hand, record shows that evidence for Filipinas only consisted of her own testimony.
On June 30, 1999, the RTC of Makati City, Branch 149, rendered a Decision dismissing the petition.
On appeal, the CA affirmed, in toto, the Decision of the RTC.
Hence, herein petition raising the following issues:
1.

WHETHER OR NOT THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL


COURT AND THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS THAT DRA. CECILIA VILLEGAS
FAILED TO STATE WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT'S INADEQUATE PERSONALITY
DISORDER WAS GRAVE, PERMANENT AND INCURABLE (par. 12, p. 3, Annex A,
hereof).

2.

WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE
APPEAL (p. 7, ibid.).

3.

WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DENYING THE
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION (Annex B, hereof).[2]

The basic issue to be resolved in the instant case is whether or not the totality of the evidence presented in the
present case is enough to sustain a finding that herein respondent is psychologically incapacitated to comply with her
essential marital obligations.
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,[3] the term psychological incapacity was defined as:
[N]o less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the
basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations
to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any
doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to
the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at
the time the marriage is celebrated. x x x[4]
Psychological incapacity must be characterized by:
(a) Gravity It must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary
duties required in a marriage;
(b) Juridical Antecedence It must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the
overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and

(c) Incurability It must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the
party involved.[5]

While the CA has already extensively quoted the ruling in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals and Molina,
[6]

wherein the guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 [7] of the Family Code was laid down, this

Court finds it significant to reproduce the same quoted portion, to wit:


(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should
be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution
and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of
marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family,
recognizing it as the foundation of the nation. It decrees marriage as legally inviolable, thereby
protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be
protected by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their
permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in
the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not
physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must
convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent
that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not
have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here
so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis,
nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating
nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the
marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their I
do's. The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself
must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be
relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage,
like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. x x x
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume
the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, mildcharacteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as
downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words,
there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same
Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be
stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our
courts. x x x

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear
as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his
agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the
prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the
date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge
the equivalent function of the defensor vinculicontemplated under Canon 1095.[8]

Under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages,[9] which
took effect on March 15, 2003, the foregoing guidelines have been modified. Section 2(d) of the said Rule provides:

SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.xxxx


(d) What to allege.- A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code shall specifically allege the
complete facts showing that either or both parties were psychologically incapacitated from
complying with the essential marital obligations of marriage at the time of the celebration of
marriage even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its celebration.
The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative of
psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage but expert opinion need not
be alleged.

The new Rule dispensed with the certification from the Solicitor General, stating therein his reasons for his agreement
or opposition to the petition. Attachment of expert opinions to the petition is also dispensed with.
In the instant case, the RTC and the CA gave credence to the conclusion of the examining psychiatrist, Dr. Villegas,
that respondent is suffering from Inadequate Personality Disorder. However, both courts ruled that the behavior
exhibited by respondent does not amount to psychological incapacity as contemplated under Article 36 of the Family
Code.
This Court finds no cogent reason to depart from the assessment of the RTC and the CA for the following reasons:
First, petitioner relies heavily on the findings of Dr. Villegas who made the following written evaluation regarding
respondent's psychological makeup:
xxxx
On the other hand, Mrs. Filipinas Mendoza-Tongol belonged to a matriarchal family where the
mother assumed a more active and dominant role. She was left to the care of her aunt and
developed a basic feeling a (sic) rejection.
The only college graduate among 7 children her operating intellectual ability is low-average.
Sudden change overwhelmed her. When seized by an impulse, she is likely to give way, even
minor pressures upset her and when this happens, emotional control could not be relied upon.
In marriage when her husband shows good relationship with their employees, especially with
females, she became (sic) suspicious, jealous, and threatened, and this is related to her basic
feelings of rejection in early life. She coped (sic) up with her uncomfortable feelings by exhibiting

temper tantrums, irritability and dominance, a replica of her mother's attitude, but to the distaste of
her husband.
At present she is depressed, though hostile, and now living in the expectation of further rejection.
Additionally, she is threatened by a neurological illness (tremor of the hands) for which she is
consulting a neurologist.
Based on the above findings, it is the opinion of the undersigned that Mr. Orlando Tongol is
suffering from some depressive features, which seems to be a recent development as a result of
marital problems. On the other hand, Mrs. Tongol is suffering from an Inadequate Personality
Disorder, with hysterical coloring, which renders her psychologically incapacitated to perform the
duties and responsibilities of marriage. She is unable to cope with the sudden work and
environmental shifts, that overwhelmed her, due to insufficient psychological inner resources.[10]

In her testimony, Dr. Villegas explained respondent's personality disorder in this wise:
ATTY. VILLAREAL xxxx
Q- What exactly do you mean [by] inadequate personality disorder?
A- Inadequate personality disorder means, there are not times that in all aspects of her life, she
could not function in the way that she feels or she is confident. She has always been very much in
doubt of her own capabilities, Sir.
Q- What about hysterical coloring?
A- Hysterical coloring means, there is always an exaggeration of her psychological reactions to any
stresses, Sir.
Q- Exaggeration in what aspect?
A- Exaggeration in any emotional reactions or situations like if she would be seeing the husband
talking to some employees then, she is suddenly irritable and would present some tantrums. In
short, she cannot control her emotion at the moment of stresses circulations, Sir.[11]
When asked how such personality disorder affects respondent's capacity to assume the essential obligations of
marriage, Dr. Villegas expounded as follows:
ATTY. RENDOR xxxx
Q- How about Mrs. Tongol, what are your findings?
A- Mrs. Tongol is a college graduate and she finished commerce. Basically, she has a feeling of
rejection from the start of her development and this was carried on into her adult life. When
the husband started having some good relationship with his employees, then she started to get
jealous and she wouldembarrass him in front of their employees and insulted him and would go
into tantrums and this was very much resented by Mr. Tongol, Sir.
ATTY. RENDOR Q- In your expert opinion, Doctor, can you tell us the reason why Mrs. Tongol acted in such a way?
A- Because of her basic rejection at that time, Sir. She was afraid that Mr. Tongol was already
rejecting her as a wife and being attracted to other people, but it is the way of how
Mrs. Tongol reacted to her own feelings of rejection, Sir.

xxxx
Q- What made you say that because of inadequate personality disorder, Mrs. Tongol rendered her
psychological (sic) incapacitated to perform the duties and responsibilities of the marriage. What is
your basis in saying that?
A- She belongs to a very matriarchal family. The mother was very dominant. She always gets what
she wanted in the house. In short, she was the authority in the house and during her growing
up stage, she was given up to the aunt, for the aunt to take care of her. She only came back to the
family when she was already a sort of an early teenager. With this, there has always been a feeling
of rejection during her personality development. Besides, she feels that she is one of those not
favor (sic) by the mother during her growing up stage, Sir.
Q- Based on your examination of the spouses, what do you recommend as far as the marriage is
concerned, considering that this is a petition for the annulment of marriage?
A- I could recommend that they have their marriage annulled because it will only be sufferings from
(sic) both of them because on the part of Mrs. Tongol, it is one that is more or less permanent
and Mr. Tongol is also suffering from some depression, Sir.[12]

The Court can only gather from the foregoing explanations of Dr. Villegas that as a child, Filipinas had always felt
rejected, especially by her mother; that she never got rid of those feelings of rejection even when she became an
adult and got married; that her fits of jealousy and temper tantrums, every time she sees her husband having a good
interaction with their employees, are ways of coping up with her feelings of rejection. However, Dr. Villegas failed to
link respondent's personality disorder to her conclusion that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform
her obligations as wife and mother. The Court cannot see how respondent's personality disorder which, according to
Dr. Villegas, is inextricably linked to her feelings of rejection, would render her unaware of the essential marital
obligations, or to borrow the terms used in Santos, to be trulyincognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage. What has been established in the
instant case is that, by reason of her feelings of inadequacy and rejection, respondent not only encounters a lot of
difficulty but even refuses to assume some of her obligations towards her husband, such as respect, help and support
for him. However, this Court has ruled that psychological incapacity must be more than just a difficulty, a refusal or a
neglect in the performance of some marital obligations.[13] As held inSantos:
There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of
an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated.[14]
Second, Dr. Villegas also failed to fully and satisfactorily explain if the personality disorder of respondent is grave
enough to bring about her disability to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Petitioner contends that
respondent's exaggerated reactions to normal situations, her unreasonable feelings of rejection brought about by her
dysfunctional upbringing, are all indications of the gravity of her psychological condition. Even granting that
respondent's psychological disorder is serious, the fact remains that there is no evidence to prove that such condition
is of such nature as to render respondent incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage.
Third, there is no evidence that such incapacity is incurable. Neither in her written evaluation nor in her testimony did
Dr. Villegas categorically and conclusively characterize respondent's inadequate personality disorder as permanent

or incurable. Dr. Villegas was not sure of the permanence or incurability of respondent's illness as shown by her
following statement:
I could recommend that they have their marriage annulled because it will only be sufferings from
(sic) both of them because on the part of Mrs. Tongol, it is one that is more or less permanent and
Mr. Tongol is also suffering from some depression, Sir.[15] (Emphasis supplied)

Fourth, the psychological incapacity considered under Article 36 of the Family Code is not meant to comprehend all
possible cases of psychoses.[16] The fourth guideline in Molina requires that the psychological incapacity as
understood under Article 36 of the Family Code must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not
necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job.In the present
case, the testimonies of both petitioner and respondent as well as the other witnesses regarding the spouses'
differences and misunderstanding basically revolve around and are limited to their disagreement regarding the
management of their business. In fact, respondent herself, in her Memorandum submitted to the trial court, claimed
that their quarrels arose solely from their disagreement on how to run their business. [17] This is confirmed by the
testimony of petitioner's sister who lived with the spouses for a considerable period of time. [18] However, amere
showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity.[19]
In addition, it is true that the marital obligations of a husband and wife enumerated under the Family Code include the
mutual responsibility of the spouses to manage the household and provide support for the family, which means that
compliance with this obligation necessarily entails the management of the income and expenses of the household.
While disagreements on money matters would, no doubt, affect the other aspects ofone's marriage as to make the
wedlock unsatisfactory, this is not a sufficient ground to declare a marriage null and void. In the present case,
respondent's disagreement with her husband's handling of the family's business and finances and her propensity to
start a fight with petitionerspouse regarding these matters can hardly be considered as a manifestation of the kind of
psychological incapacity contemplated under Article 36 of the Family Code. In fact, the Court takes judicial notice of
the fact that disagreements regarding money matters is a common, and even normal, occurrence between husbands
and wives.
Fifth, marital obligation includes not only a spouse's obligation to the other spouse but also one's obligation toward
their children. In the present case, no evidence was presented to show that respondent had been remiss in
performing her obligations toward their children as enumerated in Article 220 of the Family Code.[20]
It is settled that Article 36 of the Family Code is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the
time the causes thereformanifest themselves.[21] It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even
before the celebration of marriage.[22] It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the
duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.[23] In the instant case, the Court finds no
error in the findings of the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, that the aversive behavior of petitioner and respondent
towards each other is a mere indication of incompatibility brought about by their different family backgrounds as well
as their attitudes, which developed after their marriage.

In sum, it is not disputed that respondent is suffering from a psychological disorder. However, the totality of the
evidence presented in the present case does not show that her personality disorder is of the kind contemplated by
Article 36 of the Family Code as well as jurisprudence as to render her psychologically incapacitated or incapable of
complying with the essential obligations of marriage.
It remains settled that the State has a high stake in the preservation of marriage rooted in its recognition of the
sanctity of married life and its mission to protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution.
[24]

Hence, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its

dissolution and nullity.[25]


WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The September 25, 2002 Decision and March 19, 2003 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66245 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice

Republic of the Philippines


SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 112019 January 4, 1995


LEOUEL SANTOS, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND JULIA ROSARIO BEDIA-SANTOS, respondents.

VITUG, J.:
Concededly a highly, if not indeed the most likely, controversial provision introduced by the Family Code is Article 36
(as amended by E.O. No. 227 dated 17 July 1987), which declares:
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void
even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
The present petition for review on certiorari, at the instance of Leouel Santos ("Leouel"), brings into fore the
above provision which is now invoked by him. Undaunted by the decisions of the court a quo 1 and the

Court of Appeal, 2 Leouel persists in beseeching its application in his attempt to have his marriage
with herein private respondent, Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos ("Julia"), declared a nullity.
It was in Iloilo City where Leouel, who then held the rank of First Lieutenant in the Philippine Army, first met Julia. The
meeting later proved to be an eventful day for Leouel and Julia. On 20 September 1986, the two exchanged vows
before Municipal Trial Court Judge Cornelio G. Lazaro of Iloilo City, followed, shortly thereafter, by a church wedding.
Leouel and Julia lived with the latter's parents at the J. Bedia Compound, La Paz, Iloilo City. On 18 July 1987, Julia
gave birth to a baby boy, and he was christened Leouel Santos, Jr. The ecstasy, however, did not last long. It was
bound to happen, Leouel averred, because of the frequent interference by Julia's parents into the young spouses
family affairs. Occasionally, the couple would also start a "quarrel" over a number of other things, like when and
where the couple should start living independently from Julia's parents or whenever Julia would express resentment
on Leouel's spending a few days with his own parents.
On 18 May 1988, Julia finally left for the United Sates of America to work as a nurse despite Leouel's pleas to so
dissuade her. Seven months after her departure, or on 01 January 1989, Julia called up Leouel for the first time by
long distance telephone. She promised to return home upon the expiration of her contract in July 1989. She never
did. When Leouel got a chance to visit the United States, where he underwent a training program under the auspices
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines from 01 April up to 25 August 1990, he desperately tried to locate, or to
somehow get in touch with, Julia but all his efforts were of no avail.
Having failed to get Julia to somehow come home, Leouel filed with the regional trial Court of Negros Oriental,
Branch 30, a complaint for "Voiding of marriage Under Article 36 of the Family Code" (docketed, Civil Case No.
9814). Summons was served by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in Negros Oriental.
On 31 May 1991, respondent Julia, in her answer (through counsel), opposed the complaint and denied its
allegations, claiming, in main, that it was the petitioner who had, in fact, been irresponsible and incompetent.
A possible collusion between the parties to obtain a decree of nullity of their marriage was ruled out by the Office of
the Provincial Prosecutor (in its report to the court).
On 25 October 1991, after pre-trial conferences had repeatedly been set, albeit unsuccessfully, by the court, Julia
ultimately filed a manifestation, stating that she would neither appear nor submit evidence.
On 06 November 1991, the court a quo finally dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. 3
Leouel appealed to the Court of Appeal. The latter affirmed the decision of the trial court. 4

The petition should be denied not only because of its non-compliance with Circular 28-91, which requires a
certification of non-shopping, but also for its lack of merit.
Leouel argues that the failure of Julia to return home, or at the very least to communicate with him, for more than five
years are circumstances that clearly show her being psychologically incapacitated to enter into married life. In his
own words, Leouel asserts:
. . . (T)here is no leave, there is no affection for (him) because respondent Julia Rosario BediaSantos failed all these years to communicate with the petitioner. A wife who does not care to inform
her husband about her whereabouts for a period of five years, more or less, is psychologically
incapacitated.
The family Code did not define the term "psychological incapacity." The deliberations during the sessions of the
Family Code Revision Committee, which has drafted the Code, can, however, provide an insight on the import of the
provision.
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 36. . . .
(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was wanting in the
sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage or was
psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such
lack of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration.
On subparagraph (7), which as lifted from the Canon Law, Justice (Jose B.L.) Reyes suggested
that they say "wanting in sufficient use," but Justice (Eduardo) Caguioa preferred to say "wanting in
the sufficient use." On the other hand, Justice Reyes proposed that they say "wanting in sufficient
reason." Justice Caguioa, however, pointed out that the idea is that one is not lacking in judgment
but that he is lacking in the exercise of judgment. He added that lack of judgment would make the
marriage voidable. Judge (Alicia Sempio-) Diy remarked that lack of judgment is more serious than
insufficient use of judgment and yet the latter would make the marriage null and void and the
former only voidable. Justice Caguioa suggested that subparagraph (7) be modified to read:
"That contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even
if such lack of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration."
Justice Caguioa explained that the phrase "was wanting in sufficient use of reason of judgment to
understand the essential nature of marriage" refers to defects in the mental faculties vitiating
consent, which is not the idea in subparagraph (7), but lack of appreciation of one's marital
obligations.
Judge Diy raised the question: Since "insanity" is also a psychological or mental incapacity, why is
"insanity" only a ground for annulment and not for declaration or nullity? In reply, Justice Caguioa
explained that in insanity, there is the appearance of consent, which is the reason why it is a
ground for voidable marriages, while subparagraph (7) does not refer to consent but to the very
essence of marital obligations.

Prof. (Araceli) Baviera suggested that, in subparagraph (7), the word "mentally" be deleted, with
which Justice Caguioa concurred. Judge Diy, however, prefers to retain the word "mentally."
Justice Caguioa remarked that subparagraph (7) refers to psychological impotence. Justice
(Ricardo) Puno stated that sometimes a person may be psychologically impotent with one but not
with another. Justice (Leonor Ines-) Luciano said that it is called selective impotency.
Dean (Fortunato) Gupit stated that the confusion lies in the fact that in inserting the Canon Law
annulment in the Family Code, the Committee used a language which describes a ground for
voidable marriages under the Civil Code. Justice Caguioa added that in Canon Law, there are
voidable marriages under the Canon Law, there are no voidable marriages Dean Gupit said that
this is precisely the reason why they should make a distinction.
Justice Puno remarked that in Canon Law, the defects in marriage cannot be cured.
Justice Reyes pointed out that the problem is: Why is "insanity" a ground for void ab
initio marriages? In reply, Justice Caguioa explained that insanity is curable and there are lucid
intervals, while psychological incapacity is not.
On another point, Justice Puno suggested that the phrase "even if such lack or incapacity is made
manifest" be modified to read "even if such lack or incapacity becomes manifest."
Justice Reyes remarked that in insanity, at the time of the marriage, it is not apparent.
Justice Caguioa stated that there are two interpretations of the phrase "psychological or mentally
incapacitated" in the first one, there is vitiation of consent because one does not know all the
consequences of the marriages, and if he had known these completely, he might not have
consented to the marriage.
xxx xxx xxx
Prof. Bautista stated that he is in favor of making psychological incapacity a ground for voidable
marriages since otherwise it will encourage one who really understood the consequences of
marriage to claim that he did not and to make excuses for invalidating the marriage by acting as if
he did not understand the obligations of marriage. Dean Gupit added that it is a loose way of
providing for divorce.
xxx xxx xxx
Justice Caguioa explained that his point is that in the case of incapacity by reason of defects in the
mental faculties, which is less than insanity, there is a defect in consent and, therefore, it is clear
that it should be a ground for voidable marriage because there is the appearance of consent and it
is capable of convalidation for the simple reason that there are lucid intervals and there are cases
when the insanity is curable. He emphasized that psychological incapacity does not refer to mental
faculties and has nothing to do with consent; it refers to obligations attendant to marriage.
xxx xxx xxx
On psychological incapacity, Prof. (Flerida Ruth P.) Romero inquired if they do not consider it as
going to the very essence of consent. She asked if they are really removing it from consent. In
reply, Justice Caguioa explained that, ultimately, consent in general is effected but he stressed that
his point is that it is not principally a vitiation of consent since there is a valid consent. He objected

to the lumping together of the validity of the marriage celebration and the obligations attendant to
marriage, which are completely different from each other, because they require a different capacity,
which is eighteen years of age, for marriage but in contract, it is different. Justice Puno, however,
felt that psychological incapacity is still a kind of vice of consent and that it should not be classified
as a voidable marriage which is incapable of convalidation; it should be convalidated but there
should be no prescription. In other words, as long as the defect has not been cured, there is always
a right to annul the marriage and if the defect has been really cured, it should be a defense in the
action for annulment so that when the action for annulment is instituted, the issue can be raised
that actually, although one might have been psychologically incapacitated, at the time the action is
brought, it is no longer true that he has no concept of the consequence of marriage.
Prof. (Esteban) Bautista raised the question: Will not cohabitation be a defense? In response,
Justice Puno stated that even the bearing of children and cohabitation should not be a sign that
psychological incapacity has been cured.
Prof. Romero opined that psychological incapacity is still insanity of a lesser degree. Justice
Luciano suggested that they invite a psychiatrist, who is the expert on this matter. Justice Caguioa,
however, reiterated that psychological incapacity is not a defect in the mind but in the
understanding of the consequences of marriage, and therefore, a psychiatrist will not be a help.
Prof. Bautista stated that, in the same manner that there is a lucid interval in insanity, there are also
momentary periods when there is an understanding of the consequences of marriage. Justice
Reyes and Dean Gupit remarked that the ground of psychological incapacity will not apply if the
marriage was contracted at the time when there is understanding of the consequences of
marriage. 5

xxx xxx xxx


Judge Diy proposed that they include physical incapacity to copulate among the grounds for void
marriages. Justice Reyes commented that in some instances the impotence that in some instances
the impotence is only temporary and only with respect to a particular person. Judge Diy stated that
they can specify that it is incurable. Justice Caguioa remarked that the term "incurable" has a
different meaning in law and in medicine. Judge Diy stated that "psychological incapacity" can also
be cured. Justice Caguioa, however, pointed out that "psychological incapacity" is incurable.
Justice Puno observed that under the present draft provision, it is enough to show that at the time
of the celebration of the marriage, one was psychologically incapacitated so that later on if already
he can comply with the essential marital obligations, the marriage is still void ab initio. Justice
Caguioa explained that since in divorce, the psychological incapacity may occur after the marriage,
in void marriages, it has to be at the time of the celebration of marriage. He, however, stressed that
the idea in the provision is that at the time of the celebration of the marriage, one is psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations, which incapacity continues and later
becomes manifest.
Justice Puno and Judge Diy, however, pointed out that it is possible that after the marriage, one's
psychological incapacity become manifest but later on he is cured. Justice Reyes and Justice
Caguioa opined that the remedy in this case is to allow him to remarry. 6

xxx xxx xxx


Justice Puno formulated the next Article as follows:

Art. 37. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration,
was psychologically incapacitated, to comply with the essential obligations of
marriage shall likewise be void from the beginning even if such incapacity
becomes manifest after its solemnization.
Justice Caguioa suggested that "even if" be substituted with "although." On the other hand, Prof.
Bautista proposed that the clause "although such incapacity becomes manifest after its
solemnization" be deleted since it may encourage one to create the manifestation of psychological
incapacity. Justice Caguioa pointed out that, as in other provisions, they cannot argue on the basis
of abuse.
Judge Diy suggested that they also include mental and physical incapacities, which are lesser in
degree than psychological incapacity. Justice Caguioa explained that mental and physical
incapacities are vices of consent while psychological incapacity is not a species of vice or consent.
Dean Gupit read what Bishop Cruz said on the matter in the minutes of their February 9, 1984
meeting:
"On the third ground, Bishop Cruz indicated that the phrase "psychological or
mental impotence" is an invention of some churchmen who are moralists but not
canonists, that is why it is considered a weak phrase. He said that the Code of
Canon Law would rather express it as "psychological or mental incapacity to
discharge . . ."
Justice Caguioa remarked that they deleted the word "mental" precisely to distinguish it from vice of
consent. He explained that "psychological incapacity" refers to lack of understanding of the
essential obligations of marriage.
Justice Puno reminded the members that, at the last meeting, they have decided not to go into the
classification of "psychological incapacity" because there was a lot of debate on it and that this is
precisely the reason why they classified it as a special case.
At this point, Justice Puno, remarked that, since there having been annulments of marriages arising
from psychological incapacity, Civil Law should not reconcile with Canon Law because it is a new
ground even under Canon Law.
Prof. Romero raised the question: With this common provision in Civil Law and in Canon Law, are
they going to have a provision in the Family Code to the effect that marriages annulled or declared
void by the church on the ground of psychological incapacity is automatically annulled in Civil Law?
The other members replied negatively.
Justice Puno and Prof. Romero inquired if Article 37 should be retroactive or prospective in
application.
Justice Diy opined that she was for its retroactivity because it is their answer to the problem of
church annulments of marriages, which are still valid under the Civil Law. On the other hand,
Justice Reyes and Justice Puno were concerned about the avalanche of cases.
Dean Gupit suggested that they put the issue to a vote, which the Committee approved.
The members voted as follows:

(1) Justice Reyes, Justice Puno and Prof. Romero were for prospectivity.
(2) Justice Caguioa, Judge Diy, Dean Gupit, Prof. Bautista and Director Eufemio were for
retroactivity.
(3) Prof. Baviera abstained.
Justice Caguioa suggested that they put in the prescriptive period of ten years within which the
action for declaration of nullity of the marriage should be filed in court. The Committee approved
the suggestion. 7
It could well be that, in sum, the Family Code Revision Committee in ultimately deciding to adopt the provision with
less specificity than expected, has in fact, so designed the law as to allow some resiliency in its application. Mme.
Justice Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, a member of the Code Committee, has been quoted by Mr. Justice Josue N. Bellosillo
in Salita vs. Hon. Magtolis (G.R. No. 106429, 13 June 1994); thus: 8
The Committee did not give any examples of psychological incapacity for fear that the giving of
examples would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis.
Rather, the Committee would like the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis,
guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by
decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given
persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law.
A part of the provision is similar to Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, 9 which reads:
Canon 1095. They are incapable of contracting marriage:
1. who lack sufficient use of reason;
2. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment concerning essentila matrimonial rights
and duties, to be given and accepted mutually;
3. who for causes of psychological nature are unable to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. (Emphasis supplied.)
Accordingly, although neither decisive nor even perhaps all that persuasive for having no juridical or secular effect,
the jurisprudence under Canon Law prevailing at the time of the code's enactment, nevertheless, cannot be
dismissed as impertinent for its value as an aid, at least, to the interpretation or construction of the codal provision.
One author, Ladislas Orsy, S.J., in his treaties, 10 giving an account on how the third paragraph of Canon 1095

has been framed, states:


The history of the drafting of this canon does not leave any doubt that the legislator intended,
indeed, to broaden the rule. A strict and narrow norm was proposed first:
Those who cannot assume the essential obligations of marriage because of a
grave psycho-sexual anomaly (ob gravem anomaliam psychosexualem) are
unable to contract marriage (cf. SCH/1975, canon 297, a new canon, novus);
then a broader one followed:

. . . because of a grave psychological anomaly (ob gravem anomaliam psychicam) . . .


(cf.SCH/1980, canon 1049);
then the same wording was retained in the text submitted to the pope (cf. SCH/1982, canon 1095,
3);
finally, a new version was promulgated:
because of causes of a psychological nature (ob causas naturae psychiae).
So the progress was from psycho-sexual to psychological anomaly, then the term anomaly was
altogether eliminated. it would be, however, incorrect to draw the conclusion that the cause of the
incapacity need not be some kind of psychological disorder; after all, normal and healthy person
should be able to assume the ordinary obligations of marriage.
Fr. Orsy concedes that the term "psychological incapacity" defies any precise definition since psychological causes
can be of an infinite variety.
In a book, entitled "Canons and Commentaries on Marriage," written by Ignatius Gramunt, Javier Hervada and LeRoy
Wauck, the following explanation appears:
This incapacity consists of the following: (a) a true inability to commit oneself to the essentials of
marriage. Some psychosexual disorders and other disorders of personality can be the psychic
cause of this defect, which is here described in legal terms. This particular type of incapacity
consists of a real inability to render what is due by the contract. This could be compared to the
incapacity of a farmer to enter a binding contract to deliver the crops which he cannot possibly
reap; (b) this inability to commit oneself must refer to the essential obligations of marriage: the
conjugal act, the community of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, the procreation and
education of offspring; (c) the inability must be tantamount to a psychological abnormality. The
mere difficulty of assuming these obligations, which could be overcome by normal effort, obviously
does not constitute incapacity. The canon contemplates a true psychological disorder which
incapacitates a person from giving what is due (cf. John Paul II, Address to R. Rota, Feb. 5, 1987).
However, if the marriage is to be declared invalid under this incapacity, it must be proved not only
that the person is afflicted by a psychological defect, but that the defect did in fact deprive the
person, at the moment of giving consent, of the ability to assume the essential duties of marriage
and consequently of the possibility of being bound by these duties.
Justice Sempio-Diy 11 cites with approval the work of Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former Presiding Judge of the

Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila (Branch 1), who opines that
psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying
out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the
marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be incurable
or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.
It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions, including, and most importantly, the deliberations of the
Family Code Revision Committee itself, that the use of the phrase "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the
Code has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some
ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances (cited in Fr. Artemio Baluma's
"Void and Voidable Marriages in the Family Code and their Parallels in Canon Law," quoting from the Diagnostic
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder by the American Psychiatric Association; Edward Hudson's "Handbook II for
Marriage Nullity Cases"). Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of, but must

stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus correlated, "psychological incapacity" should
refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so
expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect
and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine
the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of
an utter intensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This pschologic condition must exist
at the time the marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the
spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which
considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be "legitimate."
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of a party being of unsound mind
or concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage
contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcholism, lesbianism or
homosexuality should occur only during the marriage, they become mere grounds for legal separation under Article
55 of the Family Code. These provisions of the Code, however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these
various circumstances being themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of
psychological incapacity.
Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established, every circumstance that may have some
bearing on the degree, extent, and other conditions of that incapacity must, in every case, be carefully examined and
evaluated so that no precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily decreed. The well-considered opinions of
psychiatrists, psychologists, and persons with expertise in psychological disciplines might be helpful or even
desirable.
Marriage is not an adventure but a lifetime commitment. We should continue to be reminded that innate in our
society, then enshrined in our Civil Code, and even now still indelible in Article 1 of the Family Code, is that
Art. 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man a woman entered into in
accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the
family and an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed
by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations
during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code. (Emphasis supplied.)
Our Constitution is no less emphatic:
Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall
strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development.
Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be
protected by the State. (Article XV, 1987 Constitution).
The above provisions express so well and so distinctly the basic nucleus of our laws on marriage and the family, and
they are doubt the tenets we still hold on to.
The factual settings in the case at bench, in no measure at all, can come close to the standards required to decree a
nullity of marriage. Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands aggrieved, even desperate, in his present
situation. Regrettably, neither law nor society itself can always provide all the specific answers to every individual
problem.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ.,
concur.
Feliciano, J., is on leave.

Separate Opinions

PADILLA, J., dissenting:


It is difficult to dissent from a well-written and studied opinion as Mr. Justice Vitug's ponencia. But, after an extended
reflection on the facts of this case, I cannot see my way clear into holding, as the majority do, that there is no ground
for the declaration of nullity of the marriage between petitioner and private respondent.
To my mind, it is clear that private respondent has been shown to be psychologically incapacitated to comply with at
least one essential marital obligation, i.e. that of living and cohabiting with her husband, herein petitioner. On the
other hand, it has not been shown that petitioner does not deserve to live and cohabit with his wife, herein private
respondent.
There appears to be no disagreement that the term "psychological incapacity" defies precision in definition. But, as
used in Article 36 of the Family Code as a ground for the declaration of nullity of a marriage, the intent of the framers
of the Code is evidently to expand and liberalize the grounds for nullifying a marriage, as well pointed out by Madam
Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero in her separate opinion in this case.
While it is true that the board term "psychological incapacity" can open the doors to abuse by couples who may wish
to have an easy way out of their marriage, there are, however, enough safeguards against this contingency, among
which, is the intervention by the State, through the public prosecutor, to guard against collusion between the parties
and/or fabrication of evidence.
In their case at bench, it has been abundantly established that private respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos
exhibits specific behavior which, to my mind, shows that she is psychologically incapacitated to fulfill her essential
marital obligations, to writ:
a. It took her seven (7) months after she left for the United States to call up her husband.
b. Julia promised to return home after her job contract expired in July 1989, but she never did and
neither is there any showing that she informed her husband (herein petitioner) of her whereabouts
in the U.S.A.
c. When petitioner went to the United States on a mission for the Philippine Army, he exerted efforts
to "touch base" with Julia; there were no similar efforts on the part of Julia; there were no similar
efforts on the part of Julia to do the same.

d. When petitioner filed this suit, more than five (5) years had elapsed, without Julia indicating her
plans to rejoin the petitioner or her whereabouts.
e. When petitioner filed this case in the trial court, Julia, in her answer, claimed that it is the former
who has been irresponsible and incompetent.
f. During the trial, Julia waived her right to appear and submit evidence.
A spouse's obligation to live and cohabit with his/her partner in marriage is a basic ground rule in marriage, unless
there are overpowering compelling reasons such as, for instance, an incurable contagious disease on the part of a
spouse or cruelty of one partner, bordering on insanity. There may also be instances when, for economic and
practical reasons, husband and wife have to live separately, but the marital bond between the spouses always
remains. Mutual love and respect for each other would, in such cases, compel the absent spouse to at least have
regular contracts with the other to inform the latter of his/her condition and whereabouts.
In the present case, it is apparent that private respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos has no intention of cohabiting
with petitioner, her husband, or maintaining contact with him. In fact, her acts eloquently show that she does not want
her husband to know of her whereabouts and neither has she any intention of living and cohabiting with him.
To me there appears to be, on the part of private respondent, an unmistakeable indication of psychological incapacity
to comply with her essential marital obligations, although these indications were made manifest after the celebration
of the marriage.
It would be a great injustice, I believe, to petitioner for this Court to give a much too restrictive interpretation of the law
and compel the petitioner to continue to be married to a wife who for purposes of fulfilling her marital duties has, for
all practical purposes, ceased to exist.
Besides, there are public policy considerations involved in the ruling the Court makes today. Is it not, in effect directly
or indirectly, facilitating the transformation of petitioner into a "habitual tryster" or one forced to maintain illicit relations
with another woman or women with emerging problems of illegitimate children, simply because he is denied by
private respondent, his wife, the companionship and conjugal love which he has sought from her and to which he is
legally entitled?
I do not go as far as to suggest that Art. 36 of the Family Code is a sanction for absolute divorce but I submit that we
should not constrict it to non-recognition of its evident purpose and thus deny to one like petitioner, an opportunity to
turn a new leaf in his life by declaring his marriage a nullity by reason of his wife's psychological incapacity to perform
an essential marital obligation.
I therefore vote to GRANT the petition and to DECLARE the marriage between petitioner Leouel Santos and private
respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos VOID on the basis of Article 36 of the Family Code.
ROMERO, J., concurring:
I agree under the circumstances of the case, petitioner is not entitled to have his marriage declared a nullity on the
ground of psychological incapacity of private respondent.
However, as a member of both the Family Law Revision Committee of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the
Civil Code Revision Committee of the UP Law Center, I wish to add some observations. The letter 1 dated April 15,

1985 of then Judge Alicia V. Sempio-Diy written in behalf of the Family Law and Civil Code Revision
Committee to then Assemblywoman Mercedes Cojuangco-Teodoro traced the background of the inclusion
of the present Article 36 in the Family Code.

During its early meetings, the Family Law Committee had thought of including a chapter on
absolute divorce in the draft of a new Family Code (Book I of the Civil Code) that it had been
tasked by the IBP and the UP Law Center to prepare. In fact, some members of the Committee
were in favor of a no-fault divorce between the spouses after a number of years of separation, legal
or de-facto. Justice J.B.L. Reyes was then requested to prepare a proposal for an action for
dissolution of marriage and the effects thereof based on two grounds: (a) five continuous years of
separation between the spouses, with or without a judicial decree of legal separation, and (b)
whenever a married person would have obtained a decree of absolute divorce in another country.
Actually, such a proposal is one for absolute divorce but called by another name. Later, even the
Civil Code Revision Committee took time to discuss the proposal of Justice Reyes on this matter.
Subsequently, however, when the Civil Code Revision Committee and Family Law Committee
started holding joint meetings on the preparation of the draft of the New Family Code, they agreed
and formulated the definition of marriage as
"a special contract of permanent partnership between a man and a woman
entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family
life. It is an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and
incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage
settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage within the limits
provided by law."
With the above definition, and considering the Christian traditional concept of marriage of the
Filipino people as a permanent, inviolable, indissoluble social institution upon which the family and
society are founded, and also realizing the strong opposition that any provision on absolute divorce
would encounter from the Catholic Church and the Catholic sector of our citizenry to whom the
great majority of our people belong, the two Committees in their joint meetings did not pursue the
idea of absolute divorce and instead opted for an action for judicial declaration of invalidity of
marriage based on grounds available in the Canon Law. It was thought that such an action would
not only be an acceptable alternative to divorce but would also solve the nagging problem of
church annulments of marriages on grounds not recognized by the civil law of the State. Justice
Reyes was thus requested to again prepare a draft of provisions on such action for celebration of
invalidity of marriage. Still later, to avoid the overlapping of provisions on void marriages as found in
the present Civil Code and those proposed by Justice Reyes on judicial declaration of invalidity of
marriage on grounds similar to the Canon Law, the two Committees now working as a Joint
Committee in the preparation of a New Family Code decided to consolidate the present provisions
on void marriages with the proposals of Justice Reyes. The result was the inclusion of an additional
kind of void marriage in the enumeration of void marriages in the present Civil Code, to wit:
"(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration,
was wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the
essential nature of marriage or was psychologically or mentally incapacitated to
discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is
made manifest after the celebration."
as well as the following implementing provisions:
"Art. 32. The absolute nullity of a marriage may be invoked or pleaded only on
the basis of a final judgment declaring the marriage void, without prejudice to the
provision of Article 34."
"Art. 33. The action or defense for the declaration of the absolute nullity of a
marriage shall not prescribe."

xxx xxx xxx


It is believed that many hopelessly broken marriages in our country today may already dissolved or
annulled on the grounds proposed by the Joint Committee on declaration of nullity as well as
annulment of marriages, thus rendering an absolute divorce law unnecessary. In fact, during a
conference with Father Gerald Healy of the Ateneo University as well as another meeting with
Archbishop Oscar Cruz of the Archdiocese of Pampanga, the Joint Committee was informed that
since Vatican II, the Catholic Church has been declaring marriages null and void on the ground of
"lack of due discretion" for causes that, in other jurisdictions, would be clear grounds for divorce,
like teen-age or premature marriages; marriage to a man who, because of some personality
disorder or disturbance, cannot support a family; the foolish or ridiculous choice of a spouse by an
otherwise perfectly normal person; marriage to a woman who refuses to cohabit with her husband
or who refuses to have children. Bishop Cruz also informed the Committee that they have found out
in tribunal work that a lot of machismo among husbands are manifestations of their sociopathic
personality anomaly, like inflicting physical violence upon their wives, constitutional indolence or
laziness, drug dependence or addiction, and psychological anomaly. . . . (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, by incorporating what is now Article 36 into the Family Code, the Revision Committee referred to above
intended to add another ground to those already listed in the Civil Code as grounds for nullifying a marriage, thus
expanding or liberalizing the same. Inherent in the inclusion of the provision on psychological incapacity was the
understanding that every petition for declaration of nullity based on it should be treated on a case-to-case basis;
hence, the absence of a definition and an enumeration of what constitutes psychological incapacity. Moreover, the
Committee feared that the giving of examples would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle
of ejusdem generis. But the law requires that the same be existing at the time of marriage although it be manifested
later.
Admittedly, the provision on psychological incapacity, just like any other provision of law, is open to abuse. To prevent
this, "the court shall take order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take
steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or
suppressed." 2 Moreover, the judge, in interpreting the provision on a case-to-case basis, must be guided

by "experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of
church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the
provisions was taken from Canon Law." 3
The constitutional and statutory provisions on the family 4 will remain the lodestar which our society will hope to

achieve ultimately. Therefore, the inclusion of Article 36 is not to be taken as an abandonment of the ideal
which we all cherish. If at all, it is a recognition of the reality that some marriages, by reason of the
incapacity of one of the contracting parties, fall short of this ideal; thus, the parties are constrained to find
a way of putting an end to their union through some legally-accepted means.
Any criticism directed at the way that judges have interpreted the provision since its enactment as to render it easier
for unhappily-married couples to separate is addressed, not to the wisdom of the lawmakers but to the manner by
which some members of the Bench have implemented the provision. These are not interchangeable, each being
separate and distinct from the other.

Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., dissenting:

It is difficult to dissent from a well-written and studied opinion as Mr. Justice Vitug's ponencia. But, after an extended
reflection on the facts of this case, I cannot see my way clear into holding, as the majority do, that there is no ground
for the declaration of nullity of the marriage between petitioner and private respondent.
To my mind, it is clear that private respondent has been shown to be psychologically incapacitated to comply with at
least one essential marital obligation, i.e. that of living and cohabiting with her husband, herein petitioner. On the
other hand, it has not been shown that petitioner does not deserve to live and cohabit with his wife, herein private
respondent.
There appears to be no disagreement that the term "psychological incapacity" defies precision in definition. But, as
used in Article 36 of the Family Code as a ground for the declaration of nullity of a marriage, the intent of the framers
of the Code is evidently to expand and liberalize the grounds for nullifying a marriage, as well pointed out by Madam
Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero in her separate opinion in this case.
While it is true that the board term "psychological incapacity" can open the doors to abuse by couples who may wish
to have an easy way out of their marriage, there are, however, enough safeguards against this contingency, among
which, is the intervention by the State, through the public prosecutor, to guard against collusion between the parties
and/or fabrication of evidence.
In their case at bench, it has been abundantly established that private respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos
exhibits specific behavior which, to my mind, shows that she is psychologically incapacitated to fulfill her essential
marital obligations, to writ:
a. It took her seven (7) months after she left for the United States to call up her husband.
b. Julia promised to return home after her job contract expired in July 1989, but she never did and
neither is there any showing that she informed her husband (herein petitioner) of her whereabouts
in the U.S.A.
c. When petitioner went to the United States on a mission for the Philippine Army, he exerted efforts
to "touch base" with Julia; there were no similar efforts on the part of Julia; there were no similar
efforts on the part of Julia to do the same.
d. When petitioner filed this suit, more than five (5) years had elapsed, without Julia indicating her
plans to rejoin the petitioner or her whereabouts.
e. When petitioner filed this case in the trial court, Julia, in her answer, claimed that it is the former
who has been irresponsible and incompetent.
f. During the trial, Julia waived her right to appear and submit evidence.
A spouse's obligation to live and cohabit with his/her partner in marriage is a basic ground rule in marriage, unless
there are overpowering compelling reasons such as, for instance, an incurable contagious disease on the part of a
spouse or cruelty of one partner, bordering on insanity. There may also be instances when, for economic and
practical reasons, husband and wife have to live separately, but the marital bond between the spouses always
remains. Mutual love and respect for each other would, in such cases, compel the absent spouse to at least have
regular contracts with the other to inform the latter of his/her condition and whereabouts.
In the present case, it is apparent that private respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos has no intention of cohabiting
with petitioner, her husband, or maintaining contact with him. In fact, her acts eloquently show that she does not want
her husband to know of her whereabouts and neither has she any intention of living and cohabiting with him.

To me there appears to be, on the part of private respondent, an unmistakeable indication of psychological incapacity
to comply with her essential marital obligations, although these indications were made manifest after the celebration
of the marriage.
It would be a great injustice, I believe, to petitioner for this Court to give a much too restrictive interpretation of the law
and compel the petitioner to continue to be married to a wife who for purposes of fulfilling her marital duties has, for
all practical purposes, ceased to exist.
Besides, there are public policy considerations involved in the ruling the Court makes today. Is it not, in effect directly
or indirectly, facilitating the transformation of petitioner into a "habitual tryster" or one forced to maintain illicit relations
with another woman or women with emerging problems of illegitimate children, simply because he is denied by
private respondent, his wife, the companionship and conjugal love which he has sought from her and to which he is
legally entitled?
I do not go as far as to suggest that Art. 36 of the Family Code is a sanction for absolute divorce but I submit that we
should not constrict it to non-recognition of its evident purpose and thus deny to one like petitioner, an opportunity to
turn a new leaf in his life by declaring his marriage a nullity by reason of his wife's psychological incapacity to perform
an essential marital obligation.
I therefore vote to GRANT the petition and to DECLARE the marriage between petitioner Leouel Santos and private
respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos VOID on the basis of Article 36 of the Family Code.
ROMERO, J., concurring:
I agree under the circumstances of the case, petitioner is not entitled to have his marriage declared a nullity on the
ground of psychological incapacity of private respondent.
However, as a member of both the Family Law Revision Committee of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the
Civil Code Revision Committee of the UP Law Center, I wish to add some observations. The letter 1 dated April 15,

1985 of then Judge Alicia V. Sempio-Diy written in behalf of the Family Law and Civil Code Revision
Committee to then Assemblywoman Mercedes Cojuangco-Teodoro traced the background of the inclusion
of the present Article 36 in the Family Code.
During its early meetings, the Family Law Committee had thought of including a chapter on
absolute divorce in the draft of a new Family Code (Book I of the Civil Code) that it had been
tasked by the IBP and the UP Law Center to prepare. In fact, some members of the Committee
were in favor of a no-fault divorce between the spouses after a number of years of separation, legal
or de-facto. Justice J.B.L. Reyes was then requested to prepare a proposal for an action for
dissolution of marriage and the effects thereof based on two grounds: (a) five continuous years of
separation between the spouses, with or without a judicial decree of legal separation, and (b)
whenever a married person would have obtained a decree of absolute divorce in another country.
Actually, such a proposal is one for absolute divorce but called by another name. Later, even the
Civil Code Revision Committee took time to discuss the proposal of Justice Reyes on this matter.
Subsequently, however, when the Civil Code Revision Committee and Family Law Committee
started holding joint meetings on the preparation of the draft of the New Family Code, they agreed
and formulated the definition of marriage as
"a special contract of permanent partnership between a man and a woman
entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family
life. It is an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and
incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage

settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage within the limits
provided by law."
With the above definition, and considering the Christian traditional concept of marriage of the
Filipino people as a permanent, inviolable, indissoluble social institution upon which the family and
society are founded, and also realizing the strong opposition that any provision on absolute divorce
would encounter from the Catholic Church and the Catholic sector of our citizenry to whom the
great majority of our people belong, the two Committees in their joint meetings did not pursue the
idea of absolute divorce and instead opted for an action for judicial declaration of invalidity of
marriage based on grounds available in the Canon Law. It was thought that such an action would
not only be an acceptable alternative to divorce but would also solve the nagging problem of
church annulments of marriages on grounds not recognized by the civil law of the State. Justice
Reyes was thus requested to again prepare a draft of provisions on such action for celebration of
invalidity of marriage. Still later, to avoid the overlapping of provisions on void marriages as found in
the present Civil Code and those proposed by Justice Reyes on judicial declaration of invalidity of
marriage on grounds similar to the Canon Law, the two Committees now working as a Joint
Committee in the preparation of a New Family Code decided to consolidate the present provisions
on void marriages with the proposals of Justice Reyes. The result was the inclusion of an additional
kind of void marriage in the enumeration of void marriages in the present Civil Code, to wit:
"(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration,
was wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the
essential nature of marriage or was psychologically or mentally incapacitated to
discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is
made manifest after the celebration."
as well as the following implementing provisions:
"Art. 32. The absolute nullity of a marriage may be invoked or pleaded only on
the basis of a final judgment declaring the marriage void, without prejudice to the
provision of Article 34."
"Art. 33. The action or defense for the declaration of the absolute nullity of a
marriage shall not prescribe."
xxx xxx xxx
It is believed that many hopelessly broken marriages in our country today may already dissolved or
annulled on the grounds proposed by the Joint Committee on declaration of nullity as well as
annulment of marriages, thus rendering an absolute divorce law unnecessary. In fact, during a
conference with Father Gerald Healy of the Ateneo University as well as another meeting with
Archbishop Oscar Cruz of the Archdiocese of Pampanga, the Joint Committee was informed that
since Vatican II, the Catholic Church has been declaring marriages null and void on the ground of
"lack of due discretion" for causes that, in other jurisdictions, would be clear grounds for divorce,
like teen-age or premature marriages; marriage to a man who, because of some personality
disorder or disturbance, cannot support a family; the foolish or ridiculous choice of a spouse by an
otherwise perfectly normal person; marriage to a woman who refuses to cohabit with her husband
or who refuses to have children. Bishop Cruz also informed the Committee that they have found out
in tribunal work that a lot of machismo among husbands are manifestations of their sociopathic
personality anomaly, like inflicting physical violence upon their wives, constitutional indolence or
laziness, drug dependence or addiction, and psychological anomaly. . . . (Emphasis supplied)

Clearly, by incorporating what is now Article 36 into the Family Code, the Revision Committee referred to above
intended to add another ground to those already listed in the Civil Code as grounds for nullifying a marriage, thus
expanding or liberalizing the same. Inherent in the inclusion of the provision on psychological incapacity was the
understanding that every petition for declaration of nullity based on it should be treated on a case-to-case basis;
hence, the absence of a definition and an enumeration of what constitutes psychological incapacity. Moreover, the
Committee feared that the giving of examples would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle
of ejusdem generis. But the law requires that the same be existing at the time of marriage although it be manifested
later.
Admittedly, the provision on psychological incapacity, just like any other provision of law, is open to abuse. To prevent
this, "the court shall take order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take
steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or
suppressed." 2 Moreover, the judge, in interpreting the provision on a case-to-case basis, must be guided

by "experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of
church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the
provisions was taken from Canon Law." 3
The constitutional and statutory provisions on the family 4 will remain the lodestar which our society will hope to

achieve ultimately. Therefore, the inclusion of Article 36 is not to be taken as an abandonment of the ideal
which we all cherish. If at all, it is a recognition of the reality that some marriages, by reason of the
incapacity of one of the contracting parties, fall short of this ideal; thus, the parties are constrained to find
a way of putting an end to their union through some legally-accepted means.
Any criticism directed at the way that judges have interpreted the provision since its enactment as to render it easier
for unhappily-married couples to separate is addressed, not to the wisdom of the lawmakers but to the manner by
which some members of the Bench have implemented the provision. These are not interchangeable, each being
separate and distinct from the other.

Republic of the Philippines


SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 155800

March 10, 2006

LEONILO ANTONIO Petitioner,


vs.
MARIE IVONNE F. REYES, Respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Statistics never lie, but lovers often do, quipped a sage. This sad truth has unsettled many a love transformed into
matrimony. Any sort of deception between spouses, no matter the gravity, is always disquieting. Deceit to the depth
and breadth unveiled in the following pages, dark and irrational as in the modern noir tale, dims any trace of certitude
on the guilty spouses capability to fulfill the marital obligations even more.
The Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the Decision1 and Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals dated 29
November 2001 and 24 October 2002. The Court of Appeals had reversed the judgment3 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Makati declaring the marriage of Leonilo N. Antonio (petitioner) and Marie Ivonne F. Reyes (respondent),
null and void. After careful consideration, we reverse and affirm instead the trial court.
Antecedent Facts
Petitioner and respondent met in August 1989 when petitioner was 26 years old and respondent was 36 years of age.
Barely a year after their first meeting, they got married before a minister of the Gospel 4 at the Manila City Hall, and
through a subsequent church wedding5 at the Sta. Rosa de Lima Parish, Bagong Ilog, Pasig, Metro Manila on 6
December 1990.6 Out of their union, a child was born on 19 April 1991, who sadly died five (5) months later.

On 8 March 1993,7 petitioner filed a petition to have his marriage to respondent declared null and void. He anchored
his petition for nullity on Article 36 of the Family Code alleging that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential obligations of marriage. He asserted that respondents incapacity existed at the time their
marriage was celebrated and still subsists up to the present.8
As manifestations of respondents alleged psychological incapacity, petitioner claimed that respondent persistently
lied about herself, the people around her, her occupation, income, educational attainment and other events or
things, 9 to wit:
(1) She concealed the fact that she previously gave birth to an illegitimate son,10 and instead introduced the boy to
petitioner as the adopted child of her family. She only confessed the truth about the boys parentage when petitioner
learned about it from other sources after their marriage.11
(2) She fabricated a story that her brother-in-law, Edwin David, attempted to rape and kill her when in fact, no such
incident occurred.12
(3) She misrepresented herself as a psychiatrist to her obstetrician, Dr. Consuelo Gardiner, and told some of her
friends that she graduated with a degree in psychology, when she was neither.13
(4) She claimed to be a singer or a free-lance voice talent affiliated with Blackgold Recording Company (Blackgold);
yet, not a single member of her family ever witnessed her alleged singing activities with the group. In the same vein,
she postulated that a luncheon show was held at the Philippine Village Hotel in her honor and even presented an
invitation to that effect14 but petitioner discovered per certification by the Director of Sales of said hotel that no such
occasion had taken place.15
(5) She invented friends named Babes Santos and Via Marquez, and under those names, sent lengthy letters to
petitioner claiming to be from Blackgold and touting her as the "number one moneymaker" in the commercial industry
worth P2 million.16 Petitioner later found out that respondent herself was the one who wrote and sent the letters to him
when she admitted the truth in one of their quarrels.17 He likewise realized that Babes Santos and Via Marquez were
only figments of her imagination when he discovered they were not known in or connected with Blackgold.18
(6) She represented herself as a person of greater means, thus, she altered her payslip to make it appear that she
earned a higher income. She bought a sala set from a public market but told petitioner that she acquired it from a
famous furniture dealer.19 She spent lavishly on unnecessary items and ended up borrowing money from other people
on false pretexts.20
(7) She exhibited insecurities and jealousies over him to the extent of calling up his officemates to monitor his
whereabouts. When he could no longer take her unusual behavior, he separated from her in August 1991. He tried to
attempt a reconciliation but since her behavior did not change, he finally left her for good in November 1991.21
In support of his petition, petitioner presented Dr. Dante Herrera Abcede (Dr. Abcede), a psychiatrist, and Dr. Arnulfo
V.
Lopez (Dr. Lopez), a clinical psychologist, who stated, based on the tests they conducted, that petitioner was
essentially a normal, introspective, shy and conservative type of person. On the other hand, they observed that
respondents persistent and constant lying
to petitioner was abnormal or pathological. It undermined the basic relationship that should be based on love, trust
and respect.22 They further asserted that respondents extreme jealousy was also pathological. It reached the point of
paranoia since there was no actual basis for her to suspect that petitioner was having an affair with another woman.
They concluded based on the foregoing that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential
marital obligations.23

In opposing the petition, respondent claimed that she performed her marital obligations by attending to all the needs
of her husband. She asserted that there was no truth to the allegation that she fabricated stories, told lies and
invented personalities.24 She presented her version, thus:
(1) She concealed her child by another man from petitioner because she was afraid of losing her husband.25
(2) She told petitioner about Davids attempt to rape and kill her because she surmised such intent from Davids act of
touching her back and ogling her from head to foot.26
(3) She was actually a BS Banking and Finance graduate and had been teaching psychology at the Pasig Catholic
School for two (2) years.27
(4) She was a free-lance voice talent of Aris de las Alas, an executive producer of Channel 9 and she had done three
(3) commercials with McCann Erickson for the advertisement of Coca-cola, Johnson & Johnson, and Traders Royal
Bank. She told petitioner she was a Blackgold recording artist although she was not under contract with the company,
yet she reported to the Blackgold office after office hours. She claimed that a luncheon show was indeed held in her
honor at the Philippine Village Hotel on 8 December 1979.28
(5) She vowed that the letters sent to petitioner were not written by her and the writers thereof were not fictitious. Bea
Marquez Recto of the Recto political clan was a resident of the United States while Babes Santos was employed with
Saniwares.29
(6) She admitted that she called up an officemate of her husband but averred that she merely asked the latter in a
diplomatic matter if she was the one asking for chocolates from petitioner, and not to monitor her husbands
whereabouts.30
(7) She belied the allegation that she spent lavishly as she supported almost ten people from her monthly budget
of P7,000.00.31
In fine, respondent argued that apart from her non-disclosure of a child prior to their marriage, the other lies attributed
to her by petitioner were mostly hearsay and unconvincing. Her stance was that the totality of the evidence presented
is not sufficient for a finding of psychological incapacity on her part.32
In addition, respondent presented Dr. Antonio Efren Reyes (Dr. Reyes), a psychiatrist, to refute the allegations anent
her psychological condition. Dr. Reyes testified that the series of tests conducted by his assistant,33together with the
screening procedures and the Comprehensive Psycho-Pathological Rating Scale (CPRS) he himself conducted, led
him to conclude that respondent was not psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations.
He postulated that regressive behavior, gross neuroticism, psychotic tendencies, and poor control of impulses, which
are signs that might point to the presence of disabling trends, were not elicited from respondent.34
In rebuttal, Dr. Lopez asseverated that there were flaws in the evaluation conducted by Dr. Reyes as (i) he was not
the one who administered and interpreted respondents psychological evaluation, and (ii) he made use of only one
instrument called CPRS which was not reliable because a good liar can fake the results of such test.35
After trial, the lower court gave credence to petitioners evidence and held that respondents propensity to lying about
almost anythingher occupation, state of health, singing abilities and her income, among othershad been duly
established. According to the trial court, respondents fantastic ability to invent and fabricate stories and personalities
enabled her to live in a world of make-believe. This made her psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her
incapable of giving meaning and significance to her marriage.36 The trial court thus declared the marriage between
petitioner and respondent null and void.

Shortly before the trial court rendered its decision, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila annulled the
Catholic marriage of the parties, on the ground of lack of due discretion on the part of the parties.37During the
pendency of the appeal before the Court of Appeals, the Metropolitan Tribunals ruling was affirmed with modification
by both the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal, which held instead that only respondent was impaired by a lack
of due discretion.38 Subsequently, the decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal was upheld by the
Roman Rota of the Vatican.39
Petitioner duly alerted the Court of Appeals of these rulings by the Catholic tribunals. Still, the appellate court
reversed the RTCs judgment. While conceding that respondent may not have been completely honest with petitioner,
the Court of Appeals nevertheless held that the totality of the evidence presented was insufficient to establish
respondents psychological incapacity. It declared that the requirements in the case of Republic v. Court of
Appeals40 governing the application and interpretation of psychological incapacity had not been satisfied.
Taking exception to the appellate courts pronouncement, petitioner elevated the case to this Court. He contends
herein that the evidence conclusively establish respondents psychological incapacity.
In considering the merit of this petition, the Court is heavily influenced by the credence accorded by the RTC to the
factual allegations of petitioner.41 It is a settled principle of civil procedure that the conclusions of the trial court
regarding the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect from the appellate courts because the trial court had
an opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses while giving testimony which may indicate their candor or lack
thereof.42 The Court is likewise guided by the fact that the Court of Appeals did not dispute the veracity of the
evidence presented by petitioner. Instead, the appellate court concluded that such evidence was not sufficient to
establish the psychological incapacity of respondent.43
Thus, the Court is impelled to accept the factual version of petitioner as the operative facts. Still, the crucial question
remains as to whether the state of facts as presented by petitioner sufficiently meets the standards set for the
declaration of nullity of a marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. These standards were definitively laid down in
the Courts 1997 ruling in Republic v. Court of Appeals44 (also known as the Molina case45), and indeed the Court of
Appeals cited the Molina guidelines in reversing the RTC in the case at bar.46 Since Molinawas decided in 1997, the
Supreme Court has yet to squarely affirm the declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code.47 In fact, even before Molina was handed down, there was only one case, Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of
Appeals,48 wherein the Court definitively concluded that a spouse was psychologically incapacitated under Article 36.
This state of jurisprudential affairs may have led to the misperception that the remedy afforded by Article 36 of the
Family Code is hollow, insofar as the Supreme Court is concerned.49 Yet what Molina and the succeeding cases did
ordain was a set of guidelines which, while undoubtedly onerous on the petitioner seeking the declaration of nullity,
still leave room for a decree of nullity under the proper circumstances. Molina did not foreclose the grant of a decree
of nullity under Article 36, even as it raised the bar for its allowance.
Legal Guides to Understanding Article 36
Article 36 of the Family Code states that "[a] marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration,
was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void
even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization."50 The concept of psychological incapacity as a
ground for nullity of marriage is novel in our body of laws, although mental incapacity has long been recognized as a
ground for the dissolution of a marriage.
The Spanish Civil Code of 1889 prohibited from contracting marriage persons "who are not in the full enjoyment of
their reason at the time of contracting marriage."51 Marriages with such persons were ordained as void,52 in the same
class as marriages with underage parties and persons already married, among others. A partys mental capacity was
not a ground for divorce under the Divorce Law of 1917,53 but a marriage where "either party was of unsound mind" at
the time of its celebration was cited as an "annullable marriage" under the Marriage Law of 1929.54 Divorce on the
ground of a spouses incurable insanity was permitted under the divorce law enacted during the Japanese

occupation.55 Upon the enactment of the Civil Code in 1950, a marriage contracted by a party of "unsound mind" was
classified under Article 85 of the Civil Code as a voidable marriage.56 The mental capacity, or lack thereof, of the
marrying spouse was not among the grounds for declaring a marriage void ab initio.57 Similarly, among the marriages
classified as voidable under Article 45 (2) of the Family Code is one contracted by a party of unsound mind.58
Such cause for the annulment of marriage is recognized as a vice of consent, just like insanity impinges on consent
freely given which is one of the essential requisites of a contract.59 The initial common consensus on psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code was that it did not constitute a specie of vice of consent. Justices
Sempio-Diy and Caguioa, both members of the Family Code revision committee that drafted the Code, have opined
that psychological incapacity is not a vice of consent, and conceded that the spouse may have given free and
voluntary consent to a marriage but was nonetheless incapable of fulfilling such rights and obligations.60 Dr. Tolentino
likewise stated in the 1990 edition of his commentaries on the Family Code that this "psychological incapacity to
comply with the essential marital obligations does not affect the consent to the marriage."61
There were initial criticisms of this original understanding of Article 36 as phrased by the Family Code committee.
Tolentino opined that "psychologically incapacity to comply would not be
juridically different from physical incapacity of consummating the marriage, which makes the marriage only voidable
under Article 45 (5) of the Civil Code x x x [and thus] should have been a cause for annulment of the marriage
only."62 At the same time, Tolentino noted "[it] would be different if it were psychological incapacity to understand the
essential marital obligations, because then this would amount to lack of consent to the marriage."63 These concerns
though were answered, beginning with Santos v. Court of Appeals,64 wherein the Court, through Justice Vitug,
acknowledged that "psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that
causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage."65
The notion that psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to understand the obligations of marriage, as
opposed to a mere inability to comply with them, was further affirmed in the Molina66 case. Therein, the Court, through
then Justice (now Chief Justice) Panganiban observed that "[t]he evidence [to establish psychological incapacity]
must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such extent that the person
could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereto."67 Jurisprudence since then has recognized that psychological incapacity "is a malady so grave and
permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to
assume."68
It might seem that this present understanding of psychological incapacity deviates from the literal wording of Article
36, with its central phase reading "psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations of marriage."69 At the same time, it has been consistently recognized by this
Court that the intent of the Family Code committee was to design the law as to allow some resiliency in its
application, by avoiding specific examples that would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle
ofejusdem generis. Rather, the preference of the revision committee was for "the judge to interpret the provision ona
case-to-case basis, guided by experience, in the findings of experts and researchers in psychological
disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on
the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law."70
We likewise observed in Republic v. Dagdag:71
Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of a marriage, depends crucially,
more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the case. Each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori
assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. In regard to psychological incapacity as a

ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with another case. The trial judge must
take pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its
own judgment for that of the trial court.72
The Court thus acknowledges that the definition of psychological incapacity, as intended by the revision committee,
was not cast in intractable specifics. Judicial understanding of psychological incapacity may be informed by evolving
standards, taking into account the particulars of each case, current trends in psychological and even canonical
thought, and experience. It is under the auspices of the deliberate ambiguity of the framers that the Court has
developed the Molina rules, which have been consistently applied since 1997. Molina has proven indubitably useful in
providing a unitary framework that guides courts in adjudicating petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. At
the same time, the Molina guidelines are not set in stone, the clear legislative intent mandating a case-to-case
perception of each situation, and Molina itself arising from this evolutionary understanding of Article 36. There is no
cause to disavow Molina at present, and indeed the disposition of this case shall rely primarily on that precedent.
There is need though to emphasize other perspectives as well which should govern the disposition of petitions for
declaration of nullity under Article 36.
Of particular notice has been the citation of the Court, first in Santos then in Molina, of the considered opinion of
canon law experts in the interpretation of psychological incapacity. This is but unavoidable, considering that the
Family Code committee had bluntly acknowledged that the concept of psychological incapacity was derived from
canon law,73 and as one member admitted, enacted as a solution to the problem of marriages already annulled by the
Catholic Church but still existent under civil law.74 It would be disingenuous to disregard the influence of Catholic
Church doctrine in the formulation and subsequent understanding of Article 36, and the Court has expressly
acknowledged that interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the local Church, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.75 Still, it must be emphasized that the Catholic
Church is hardly the sole source of influence in the interpretation of Article 36. Even though the concept may have
been derived from canon law, its incorporation into the Family Code and subsequent judicial interpretation occurred in
wholly secular progression. Indeed, while Church thought on psychological incapacity is merely persuasive on the
trial courts, judicial decisions of this Court interpreting psychological incapacity are binding on lower courts.76
Now is also opportune time to comment on another common legal guide utilized in the adjudication of petitions for
declaration of nullity under Article 36. All too frequently, this Court and lower courts, in denying petitions of the kind,
have favorably cited Sections 1 and 2, Article XV of the Constitution, which respectively state that "[t]he State
recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively
promote its total developmen[t]," and that "[m]arriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family
and shall be protected by the State." These provisions highlight the importance of the family and the constitutional
protection accorded to the institution of marriage.
But the Constitution itself does not establish the parameters of state protection to marriage as a social institution and
the foundation of the family. It remains the province of the legislature to define all legal aspects of marriage and
prescribe the strategy and the modalities to protect it, based on whatever socio-political influences it deems proper,
and subject of course to the qualification that such legislative enactment itself adheres to the Constitution and the Bill
of Rights. This being the case, it also falls on the legislature to put into operation the constitutional provisions that
protect marriage and the family. This has been accomplished at present through the enactment of the Family Code,
which defines marriage and the family, spells out the corresponding legal effects, imposes the limitations that affect
married and family life, as well as prescribes the grounds for declaration of nullity and those for legal separation.
While it may appear that the judicial denial of a petition for declaration of nullity is reflective of the constitutional
mandate to protect marriage, such action in fact merely enforces a statutory definition of marriage, not a
constitutionally ordained decree of what marriage is. Indeed, if circumstances warrant, Sections 1 and 2 of Article XV
need not be the only constitutional considerations to be taken into account in resolving a petition for declaration of
nullity.
Indeed, Article 36 of the Family Code, in classifying marriages contracted by a psychologically incapacitated person
as a nullity, should be deemed as an implement of this constitutional protection of marriage. Given the avowed State

interest in promoting marriage as the foundation of the family, which in turn serves as the foundation of the nation,
there is a corresponding interest for the State to defend against marriages ill-equipped to promote family life. Void ab
initio marriages under Article 36 do not further the initiatives of the State concerning marriage and family, as they
promote wedlock among persons who, for reasons independent of their will, are not capacitated to understand or
comply with the essential obligations of marriage.
These are the legal premises that inform us as we decide the present petition.
Molina Guidelines As Applied in This Case
As stated earlier, Molina established the guidelines presently recognized in the judicial disposition of petitions for
nullity under Article 36. The Court has consistently applied Molina since its promulgation in 1997, and the guidelines
therein operate as the general rules. They warrant citation in full:
1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.
This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of
the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of
the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of
the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their
permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in
the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the
Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychologicalnot physical, although its manifestations
and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them,
was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such
incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle
ofejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.
3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The
evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I dos." The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at
such moment, or prior thereto.
4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability
may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against
everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment
in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine
to cure them but not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an
essential obligation of marriage.
5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or
inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening

disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to
marriage.
6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as
regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents
and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision.
7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that
Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon
Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:
"The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential obligations of
marriage due to causes of psychological nature."
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith
of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to
decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideallysubject to our law on evidencewhat is decreed as canonically invalid
should also be decreed civilly void.77
Molina had provided for an additional requirement that the Solicitor General issue a certification stating his reasons
for his agreement or opposition to the petition.78 This requirement however was dispensed with following the
implementation of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, or the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages.79 Still, Article 48 of the Family Code mandates that the appearance of the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned be on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the
parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. Obviously, collusion is not an issue in this
case, considering the consistent vigorous opposition of respondent to the petition for declaration of nullity. In any
event, the fiscals participation in the hearings before the trial court is extant from the records of this case.
As earlier noted, the factual findings of the RTC are now deemed binding on this Court, owing to the great weight
accorded to the opinion of the primary trier of facts, and the refusal of the Court of Appeals to dispute the veracity of
these facts. As such, it must be considered that respondent had consistently lied about many material aspects as to
her character and personality. The question remains whether her pattern of fabrication sufficiently establishes her
psychological incapacity, consistent with Article 36 and generally, the Molina guidelines.
We find that the present case sufficiently satisfies the guidelines in Molina.
First. Petitioner had sufficiently overcome his burden in proving the psychological incapacity of his spouse. Apart from
his own testimony, he presented witnesses who corroborated his allegations on his wifes behavior, and certifications
from Blackgold Records and the Philippine Village Hotel Pavillon which disputed respondents claims pertinent to her
alleged singing career. He also presented two (2) expert witnesses from the field of psychology who testified that the
aberrant behavior of respondent was tantamount to psychological incapacity. In any event, both courts below
considered petitioners evidence as credible enough. Even the appellate court acknowledged that respondent was
not totally honest with petitioner.80
As in all civil matters, the petitioner in an action for declaration of nullity under Article 36 must be able to establish the
cause of action with a preponderance of evidence. However, since the action cannot be considered as a non-public
matter between private parties, but is impressed with State interest, the Family Code likewise requires the
participation of the State, through the prosecuting attorney, fiscal, or Solicitor General, to take steps to prevent
collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. Thus, even if the

petitioner is able establish the psychological incapacity of respondent with preponderant evidence, any finding of
collusion among the parties would necessarily negate such proofs.
Second. The root cause of respondents psychological incapacity has been medically or clinically identified, alleged in
the complaint, sufficiently proven by experts, and clearly explained in the trial courts decision. The initiatory complaint
alleged that respondent, from the start, had exhibited unusual and abnormal behavior "of peren[n]ially telling lies,
fabricating ridiculous stories, and inventing personalities and situations," of writing letters to petitioner using fictitious
names, and of lying about her actual occupation, income, educational attainment, and family background, among
others.81
These allegations, initially characterized in generalities, were further linked to medical or clinical causes by expert
witnesses from the field of psychology. Petitioner presented two (2) such witnesses in particular. Dr. Abcede, a
psychiatrist who had headed the department of psychiatry of at least two (2) major hospitals,82 testified as follows:
WITNESS:
Given that as a fact, which is only based on the affidavit provided to me, I can say that there are a couple of things
that [are] terribly wrong with the standards. There are a couple of things that seems (sic) to be repeated over and
over again in the affidavit. One of which is the persistent, constant and repeated lying of the "respondent"; which, I
think, based on assessment of normal behavior of an individual, is abnormal or pathological. x x x
ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness)
Q- Would you say then, Mr. witness, that because of these actuations of the respondent she is then incapable of
performing the basic obligations of her marriage?
A- Well, persistent lying violates the respect that one owes towards another. The lack of concern, the lack of love
towards the person, and it is also something that endangers human relationship. You see, relationship is based on
communication between individuals and what we generally communicate are our thoughts and feelings. But then
when one talks and expresse[s] their feelings, [you] are expected to tell the truth. And therefore, if you constantly lie,
what do you think is going to happen as far as this relationship is concerned. Therefore, it undermines that basic
relationship that should be based on love, trust and respect.
Q- Would you say then, Mr. witness, that due to the behavior of the respondent in constantly lying and fabricating
stories, she is then incapable of performing the basic obligations of the marriage?
xxx
ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness)
Q- Mr. witness, based on the testimony of Mr. Levy Mendoza, who is the third witness for the petitioner, testified that
the respondent has been calling up the petitioners officemates and ask him (sic) on the activities of the petitioner and
ask him on the behavior of the petitioner. And this is specifically stated on page six (6) of the transcript of
stenographic notes, what can you say about this, Mr. witness?
A- If an individual is jealous enough to the point that he is paranoid, which means that there is no actual basis on her
suspect (sic) that her husband is having an affair with a woman, if carried on to the extreme, then that is pathological.
That is not abnormal. We all feel jealous, in the same way as we also lie every now and then; but everything that is
carried out in extreme is abnormal or pathological. If there is no basis in reality to the fact that the husband is having
an affair with another woman and if she persistently believes that the husband is having an affair with different
women, then that is pathological and we call that paranoid jealousy.

Q- Now, if a person is in paranoid jealousy, would she be considered psychologically incapacitated to perform the
basic obligations of the marriage?
A- Yes, Maam.83
The other witness, Dr. Lopez, was presented to establish not only the psychological incapacity of respondent, but
also the psychological capacity of petitioner. He concluded that respondent "is [a] pathological liar, that [she
continues] to lie [and] she loves to fabricate about herself."84
These two witnesses based their conclusions of psychological incapacity on the case record, particularly the trial
transcripts of respondents testimony, as well as the supporting affidavits of petitioner. While these witnesses did not
personally examine respondent, the Court had already held in Marcos v. Marcos85 that personal examination of the
subject by the physician is not required for the spouse to be declared psychologically incapacitated.86 We deem the
methodology utilized by petitioners witnesses as sufficient basis for their medical conclusions. Admittedly, Drs.
Abcede and Lopezs common conclusion of respondents psychological incapacity hinged heavily on their own
acceptance of petitioners version as the true set of facts. However, since the trial court itself accepted the veracity of
petitioners factual premises, there is no cause to dispute the conclusion of psychological incapacity drawn therefrom
by petitioners expert witnesses.
Also, with the totality of the evidence presented as basis, the trial court explicated its finding of psychological
incapacity in its decision in this wise:
To the mind of the Court, all of the above are indications that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform
the essential obligations of marriage. It has been shown clearly from her actuations that respondent has that
propensity for telling lies about almost anything, be it her occupation, her state of health, her singing abilities, her
income, etc. She has this fantastic ability to invent and fabricate stories and personalities. She practically lived in a
world of make believe making her therefore not in a position to give meaning and significance to her marriage to
petitioner. In persistently and constantly lying to petitioner, respondent undermined the basic tenets of relationship
between spouses that is based on love, trust and respect. As concluded by the psychiatrist presented by petitioner,
such repeated lying is abnormal and pathological and amounts to psychological incapacity.87
Third. Respondents psychological incapacity was established to have clearly existed at the time of and even before
the celebration of marriage. She fabricated friends and made up letters from fictitious characters well before she
married petitioner. Likewise, she kept petitioner in the dark about her natural childs real parentage as she only
confessed when the latter had found out the truth after their marriage.
Fourth. The gravity of respondents psychological incapacity is sufficient to prove her disability to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. It is immediately discernible that the parties had shared only a little over a year of
cohabitation before the exasperated petitioner left his wife. Whatever such circumstance speaks of the degree of
tolerance of petitioner, it likewise supports the belief that respondents psychological incapacity, as borne by the
record, was so grave in extent that any prolonged marital life was dubitable.
It should be noted that the lies attributed to respondent were not adopted as false pretenses in order to induce
petitioner into marriage. More disturbingly, they indicate a failure on the part of respondent to distinguish truth from
fiction, or at least abide by the truth. Petitioners witnesses and the trial court were emphatic on respondents
inveterate proclivity to telling lies and the pathologic nature of her mistruths, which according to them, were revelatory
of respondents inability to understand and perform the essential obligations of marriage. Indeed, a person unable to
distinguish between fantasy and reality would similarly be unable to comprehend the legal nature of the marital bond,
much less its psychic meaning, and the corresponding obligations attached to marriage, including parenting. One
unable to adhere to reality cannot be expected to adhere as well to any legal or emotional commitments.

The Court of Appeals somehow concluded that since respondent allegedly tried her best to effect a reconciliation, she
had amply exhibited her ability to perform her marital obligations. We are not convinced. Given the nature of her
psychological condition, her willingness to remain in the marriage hardly banishes nay extenuates her lack of capacity
to fulfill the essential marital obligations. Respondents ability to even comprehend what the essential marital
obligations are is impaired at best. Considering that the evidence convincingly disputes respondents ability to adhere
to the truth, her avowals as to her commitment to the marriage cannot be accorded much credence.
At this point, it is worth considering Article 45(3) of the Family Code which states that a marriage may be annulled if
the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, and Article 46 which enumerates the circumstances constituting
fraud under the previous article, clarifies that "no other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, health, rank,
fortune or chastity shall constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for the annulment of marriage." It would
be improper to draw linkages between misrepresentations made by respondent and the misrepresentations under
Articles 45 (3) and 46. The fraud under Article 45(3) vitiates the consent of the spouse who is lied to, and does not
allude to vitiated consent of the lying spouse. In this case, the misrepresentations of respondent point to her own
inadequacy to cope with her marital obligations, kindred to psychological incapacity under Article 36.
Fifth. Respondent is evidently unable to comply with the essential marital obligations as embraced by Articles 68 to
71 of the Family Code. Article 68, in particular, enjoins the spouses to live together, observe mutual love, respect and
fidelity, and render mutual help and support. As noted by the trial court, it is difficult to see how an inveterate
pathological liar would be able to commit to the basic tenets of relationship between spouses based on love, trust and
respect.
Sixth. The Court of Appeals clearly erred when it failed to take into consideration the fact that the marriage of the
parties was annulled by the Catholic Church. The appellate court apparently deemed this detail totally
inconsequential as no reference was made to it anywhere in the assailed decision despite petitioners efforts to bring
the matter to its attention.88 Such deliberate ignorance is in contravention of Molina, which held that interpretations
given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or
decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
As noted earlier, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila decreed the invalidity of the marriage in
question in a Conclusion89 dated 30 March 1995, citing the "lack of due discretion" on the part of respondent.90Such
decree of nullity was affirmed by both the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal,91 and the Roman Rota of the
Vatican.92 In fact, respondents psychological incapacity was considered so grave that a restrictive clause93was
appended to the sentence of nullity prohibiting respondent from contracting another marriage without the Tribunals
consent.
In its Decision dated 4 June 1995, the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal pronounced:
The JURISRPRUDENCE in the Case maintains that matrimonial consent is considered ontologically defective and
wherefore judicially ineffective when elicited by a Part Contractant in possession and employ of a discretionary
judgment faculty with a perceptive vigor markedly inadequate for the practical understanding of the conjugal
Covenant or serious impaired from the correct appreciation of the integral significance and implications of the
marriage vows.
The FACTS in the Case sufficiently prove with the certitude required by law that based on the depositions of the
Partes in Causa and premised on the testimonies of the Common and Expert Witnesse[s], the Respondent made
the marriage option in tenure of adverse personality constracts that were markedly antithetical to the
substantive content and implications of the Marriage Covenant, and that seriously undermined the integrality
of her matrimonial consent in terms of its deliberative component. In other words, afflicted with a
discretionary faculty impaired in its practico-concrete judgment formation on account of an adverse action
and reaction pattern, the Respondent was impaired from eliciting a judicially binding matrimonial consent.
There is no sufficient evidence in the Case however to prove as well the fact of grave lack of due discretion on the
part of the Petitioner.94

Evidently, the conclusion of psychological incapacity was arrived at not only by the trial court, but also by canonical
bodies. Yet, we must clarify the proper import of the Church rulings annulling the marriage in this case. They hold
sway since they are drawn from a similar recognition, as the trial court, of the veracity of petitioners allegations. Had
the trial court instead appreciated respondents version as correct, and the appellate court affirmed such conclusion,
the rulings of the Catholic Church on this matter would have diminished persuasive value. After all, it is the factual
findings of the judicial trier of facts, and not that of the canonical courts, that are accorded significant recognition by
this Court.
Seventh. The final point of contention is the requirement in Molina that such psychological incapacity be shown to be
medically or clinically permanent or incurable. It was on this score that the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of
the trial court, the appellate court noting that it did not appear certain that respondents condition was incurable and
that Dr. Abcede did not testify to such effect.95
Petitioner points out that one month after he and his wife initially separated, he returned to her, desiring to make their
marriage work. However, respondents aberrant behavior remained unchanged, as she continued to lie, fabricate
stories, and maintained her excessive jealousy. From this fact, he draws the conclusion that respondents condition is
incurable.
From the totality of the evidence, can it be definitively concluded that respondents condition is incurable? It would
seem, at least, that respondents psychosis is quite grave, and a cure thereof a remarkable feat. Certainly, it would
have been easier had petitioners expert witnesses characterized respondents condition as incurable. Instead, they
remained silent on whether the psychological incapacity was curable or incurable.
But on careful examination, there was good reason for the experts taciturnity on this point.
The petitioners expert witnesses testified in 1994 and 1995, and the trial court rendered its decision on 10 August
1995. These events transpired well before Molina was promulgated in 1997 and made explicit the requirement that
the psychological incapacity must be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such requirement
was not expressly stated in Article 36 or any other provision of the Family Code.
On the other hand, the Court in Santos, which was decided in January 1995, began its discussion by first citing the
deliberations of the Family Code committee,96 then the opinion of canonical scholars,97 before arriving at its
formulation of the doctrinal definition of psychological incapacity.98 Santos did refer to Justice Caguioas opinion
expressed during the deliberations that "psychological incapacity is incurable,"99 and the view of a former presiding
judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila that psychological incapacity must be
characterized "by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability."100 However, in formulating the doctrinal
rule on psychological incapacity, the Court in Santos omitted any reference to incurability as a characteristic of
psychological incapacity.101
This disquisition is material as Santos was decided months before the trial court came out with its own ruling that
remained silent on whether respondents psychological incapacity was incurable. Certainly, Santos did not clearly
mandate that the incurability of the psychological incapacity be established in an action for declaration of nullity. At
least, there was no jurisprudential clarity at the time of the trial of this case and the subsequent promulgation of the
trial courts decision that required a medical finding of incurability. Such requisite arose only with Molina in 1997, at a
time when this case was on appellate review, or after the reception of evidence.
We are aware that in Pesca v. Pesca,102 the Court countered an argument that Molina and Santos should not apply
retroactively
with the observation that the interpretation or construction placed by the courts of a law constitutes a part of that law
as of the date the statute in enacted.103 Yet we approach this present case from utterly practical considerations. The
requirement that psychological incapacity must be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable is one

that necessarily cannot be divined without expert opinion. Clearly in this case, there was no categorical averment
from the expert witnesses that respondents psychological incapacity was curable or incurable simply because there
was no legal necessity yet to elicit such a declaration and the appropriate question was not accordingly propounded
to him. If we apply Pesca without deep reflection, there would be undue prejudice to those cases tried
before Molina or Santos, especially those presently on appellate review, where presumably the respective petitioners
and their expert witnesses would not have seen the need to adduce a diagnosis of incurability. It may hold in those
cases, as in this case, that the psychological incapacity of a spouse is actually incurable, even if not pronounced as
such at the trial court level.
We stated earlier that Molina is not set in stone, and that the interpretation of Article 36 relies heavily on a case-tocase perception. It would be insensate to reason to mandate in this case an expert medical or clinical diagnosis of
incurability, since the parties would have had no impelling cause to present evidence to that effect at the time this
case was tried by the RTC more than ten (10) years ago. From the totality of the evidence, we are sufficiently
convinced that the incurability of respondents psychological incapacity has been established by the petitioner. Any
lingering doubts are further dispelled by the fact that the Catholic Church tribunals, which indubitably consider
incurability as an integral requisite of psychological incapacity, were sufficiently convinced that respondent was so
incapacitated to contract marriage to the degree that annulment was warranted.
All told, we conclude that petitioner has established his cause of action for declaration of nullity under Article 36 of the
Family Code. The RTC correctly ruled, and the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court.
There is little relish in deciding this present petition, pronouncing as it does the marital bond as having been inexistent
in the first place. It is possible that respondent, despite her psychological state, remains in love with petitioner, as
exhibited by her persistent challenge to the petition for nullity. In fact, the appellate court placed undue emphasis on
respondents avowed commitment to remain in the marriage. Yet the Court decides these cases on legal reasons and
not vapid sentimentality. Marriage, in legal contemplation, is more than the legitimatization of a desire of people in
love to live together.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the RTC dated 10 August 1995, declaring the marriage
between petitioner and respondent NULL and VOID under Article 36 of the Family Code, is REINSTATED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice

Republic of the Philippines


Supreme Court
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

RICARDO P. TORING,
Petitioner,

G.R. No. 165321


Present:

versus -

CARPIO MORALES, J., Chairperson,


BRION,
BERSAMIN,
*
ABAD, and
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.

TERESITA M. TORING and REPUBLIC OF


THEPHILIPPINES,
Respondents.

Promulgated:

August 3, 2010
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
BRION, J.:

We resolve the appeal filed by petitioner Ricardo P. Toring from the May 31, 2004 decision [1] of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 71882. The CA reversed the August 10, 2001 judgment of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 106 of Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-99-36662, [2] nullifying Ricardo's marriage with
respondent Teresita M. Toring on the ground of psychological incapacity.

THE FACTS
Ricardo was introduced to Teresita in 1978 at his aunts house in Cebu. Teresita was then his cousins
teacher in Hawaiian dance and was conducting lessons at his aunts house. Despite their slight difference in age (of
five years), the younger Ricardo found the dance teacher attractive and fell in love with her. He pursued Teresita and
they became sweethearts after three months of courtship. They eloped soon after, hastened by the bid of another
girlfriend, already pregnant, to get Ricardo to marry her.
Ricardo and Teresita were married on September 4, 1978 before Hon. Remigio Zari of the City Court of
Quezon City. They begot three children: Richardson, Rachel Anne, and Ric Jayson.
On February 1, 1999, more than twenty years after their wedding, Ricardo filed a petition for annulment
before the RTC. He claimed that Teresita was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations
of marriage prior to, at the time of, and subsequent to the celebration of their marriage. He asked the court to declare
his marriage to Teresita null and void.
At the trial, Ricardo offered in evidence their marriage contract; the psychological evaluation and signature
of his expert witness, psychiatrist Dr. Cecilia R. Albaran, and his and Dr. Albarans respective testimonies. Teresita did
not file any answer or opposition to the petition, nor did she testify to refute the allegations against her.[3]

Ricardo alleged in his petition and in his testimony at the trial that Teresita was an adulteress and a
squanderer. He was an overseas seaman, and he regularly sent money to his wife to cover the familys living
expenses and their childrens tuition. Teresita, however, was not adept in managing the funds he sent and their
finances. Many times, Ricardo would come home and be welcomed by debts incurred by his wife; he had to settle
these to avoid embarrassment.
Aside from neglect in paying debts she incurred from other people, Teresita likewise failed to remit amounts
she collected as sales agent of a plasticware and cosmetics company. She left the familys utility bills and their
childrens tuition fees unpaid. She also missed paying the rent and the amortization for the house that Ricardo
acquired for the family, so their children had to live in a small rented room and eventually had to be taken in by
Ricardos parents. When confronted by Ricardo, Teresita would simply offer the excuse that she spent the funds
Ricardo sent to buy things for the house and for their children.
Ricardo likewise accused Teresita of infidelity and suspected that she was pregnant with another mans child.
During one of his visits to the country, he noticed that Teresitas stomach was slightly bigger. He tried to convince her
to have a medical examination but she refused. Her miscarriage five months into her pregnancy confirmed his worst
suspicions. Ricardo alleged that the child could not have been his, as his three instances of sexual contact with
Teresita were characterized by withdrawals; other than these, no other sexual contacts with his wife transpired, as he
transferred and lived with his relatives after a month of living with Teresita in Cebu. Ricardo reported, too, of rumors
that his wife represented herself to others as single, and went out on dates with other men when he was not around.
Ricardo opined that his wife was a very extravagant, materialistic, controlling and demanding person, who
mostly had her way in everything; had a taste for the nightlife and was very averse to the duties of a housewife; was
stubborn and independent, also most unsupportive, critical and uncooperative; was unresponsive to his hard work
and sacrifices for their family; and was most painfully unmindful of him. [4] He believed that their marriage had broken
down beyond repair and that they both have lost their mutual trust and love for one another.[5]
Dr. Cecilia R. Albaran testified that a major factor that contributed to the demise of the marriage was
Teresitas Narcissistic Personality Disorder that rendered her psychologically incapacitated to fulfill her essential
marital obligations. To quote Dr. Albaran:
Teresita, the respondent[,] has [sic] shown to manifest the following pervasive pattern of behaviors:
a sense of entitlement as she expected favorable treatment and automatic compliance to her
wishes, being interpersonally exploitative as on several occasions she took advantage of him to
achieve her own ends, lack of empathy as she was unwilling to recognize her partners [sic] feelings
and needs[,] taking into consideration her own feelings and needs only, her haughty and arrogant
behavior and attitude and her proneness to blame others for her failures and shortcomings. These
patterns of behavior speaks [sic] of a Narcissistic Personality Disorder, which started to manifest in
early adulthood. The disorder is considered to be grave and incurable based on the fact that
individuals do not recognize the symptoms as it is ego syntonic and they feel there is nothing wrong
in them. Because of that[,] they remain unmotivated for treatment and impervious to recovery.[6]
She based her diagnosis on the information she gathered from her psychological evaluation on Ricardo and
Richardson (Ricardo and Teresitas eldest son). She admitted, though, that she did not personally observe and

examine Teresita; she sent Teresita a personally-delivered notice for the conduct of a psychiatric evaluation, but the
notice remained unanswered.
In opposing the petition for annulment, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contended that there was
no basis to declare Teresita psychologically incapacitated. It asserted that the psychological evaluation conducted on
Ricardo (and his son Richardson) only revealed a vague and general conclusion on these parties personality traits
but not on Teresitas psychological makeup. The OSG also argued that the evidence adduced did not clinically identify
and sufficiently prove the medical cause of the alleged psychological incapacity. Neither did the evidence indicate that
the alleged psychological incapacity existed prior to or at the time of marriage, nor that the incapacity was grave and
incurable.
The RTC agreed with Ricardo, and annulled his marriage to Teresita. In short, the RTC believed Dr.
Albarans psychological evaluation and testimony and, on the totality of Ricardos evidence, found Teresita to be
psychologically incapacitated to assume the essential obligations of marriage. The OSG appealed the decision to the
CA.
The CA reversed the RTC decision and held that the trial courts findings did not satisfy the rules and
guidelines set by this Court in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina.[7] The RTC failed to specifically point out the
root illness or defect that caused Teresitas psychological incapacity, and likewise failed to show that the incapacity
already existed at the time of celebration of marriage.
The CA found that the conclusions from Dr. Albarans psychological evaluation do not appear to have been
drawn from well-rounded and fair sources, and dwelt mostly on hearsay statements and rumors. Likewise, the CA
found that Ricardos allegations on Teresitas overspending and infidelity do not constitute adequate grounds for
declaring the marriage null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code. These allegations, even if true, could only
effectively serve as grounds for legal separation or a criminal charge for adultery.
THE PETITION AND THE PARTIES ARGUMENTS
Ricardo faults the CA for disregarding the factual findings of the trial court, particularly the expert testimony of Dr.
Albaran, and submits that the trial court in declaring the nullity of the marriage fully complied with Molina.
In its Comment,[8] the OSG argued that the CA correctly reversed the RTCs decision, particularly in its conclusion that
Ricardo failed to comply with this Courts guidelines for the proper interpretation and application of Article 36 of the
Family Code. Reiterating its earlier arguments below, the OSG asserts that the evidence adduced before the trial
court failed to show the gravity, juridical antecedence, or incurability of the psychological incapacity of Teresita, and
failed as well to identify and discuss its root cause. The psychiatrist, likewise, failed to show that Teresita was
completely unable to discharge her marital obligations due to her alleged Narcissistic Personality Disorder.
Ricardos Reply[9] reiterated that the RTC decision thoroughly discussed the root cause of Teresitas psychological
incapacity and identified it as Narcissistic Personality Disorder. He claimed that sufficient proof had been adduced by

the psychiatrist whose expertise on the subject cannot be doubted. Interestingly, Ricardo further argued that alleging
the root cause in a petition for annulment under Article 36 of the Family Code is no longer necessary,
citing Barcelona v. Court of Appeals.[10]
These positions were collated and reiterated in the memoranda the parties filed.
THE COURTS RULING
We find the petition unmeritorious, as the CA committed no reversible error when it set aside the RTCs decision
for lack of legal and factual basis.
In the leading case of Santos v. Court of Appeals, et al.,[11] we held that psychological incapacity under Article 36 of
the Family Code must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability, to be sufficient
basis to annul a marriage. The psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity
that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage.[12]
We further expounded on Article 36 of the Family Code in Molina and laid down definitive guidelines in the
interpretation and application of this article. These guidelines incorporate the basic requirements of gravity, juridical
antecedence and incurability established in the Santos case, as follows:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the
validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the
Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable,"
thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to
be "protected" by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and
emphasizes
their
permanence,
inviolability
and
solidarity.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b)
alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical,
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the
court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the
person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have
given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as
not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis (Salita v.
Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100, 108), nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological
illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the
marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their
"I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself
must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse,

not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be
relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage,
like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in
diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be
psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential
obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume
the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as
downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words,
there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby
complying
with
the
obligations
essential
to
marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same
Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be
stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our
courts.[13]

Subsequent jurisprudence on psychological incapacity applied these basic guidelines to varying factual
situations, thus confirming the continuing doctrinal validity of Santos. In so far as the present factual situation is
concerned, what should not be lost in reading and applying our established rulings is the intent of the law to confine
the application of Article 36 of the Family Code to the most serious cases of personality disorders; these are the
disorders that result in the utter insensitivity or inability of the afflicted party to give meaning and significance to the
marriage he or she contracted. Furthermore, the psychological illness and its root cause must have been there from
the inception of the marriage.From these requirements arise the concept that Article 36 of the Family Code does not
really dissolve a marriage; it simply recognizes that there never was any marriage in the first place because the
affliction already then existing was so grave and permanent as to deprive the afflicted party of awareness of the
duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she was to assume or had assumed.[14]
In the present case and guided by these standards, we find the totality of the petitioners evidence to be
insufficient to prove that Teresita was psychologically incapacitated to perform her duties as a wife. As already
mentioned, the evidence presented consisted of the testimonies of Ricardo and Dr. Albaran, and the latters
psychological evaluation of Ricardo and Richardson from where she derived a psychological evaluation of Teresita.
a.

Dr. Albarans psychological evaluation and testimony


Dr. Albaran concluded in her psychological evaluation that Teresita suffers from Narcissistic Personality

Disorder that rendered her psychologically incapacitated to assume essential marital obligations. To support her
findings and conclusion, she banked on the statements told to her by Ricardo and Richardson, which she narrated in
her evaluation. Apparently relying on the same basis, Dr. Albaran added that Teresitas disorder manifested during her
early adulthood and is grave and incurable.

To say the least, we are greatly disturbed by the kind of testimony and evaluation that, in this case, became
the basis for the conclusion that no marriage really took place because of the psychological incapacity of one of the
parties at the time of marriage.
We are in no way convinced that a mere narration of the statements of Ricardo and Richardson, coupled
with the results of the psychological tests administered only on Ricardo, without more, already constitutes sufficient
basis for the conclusion that Teresita suffered from Narcissistic Personality Disorder. This Court has long been
negatively critical in considering psychological evaluations, presented in evidence, derived solely from one-sided
sources, particularly from the spouse seeking the nullity of the marriage.
In So v. Valera,[15] the Court considered the psychologists testimony and conclusions to be insufficiently indepth and comprehensive to warrant the finding of respondents psychological incapacity because the facts, on which
the conclusions were based, were all derived from the petitioners statements whose bias in favor of his cause cannot
be discounted. In another case, Padilla-Rumbaua v. Rumbaua,[16] the Court declared that while the various tests
administered on the petitioner-wife could have been used as a fair gauge to assess her own psychological condition,
this same statement could not be made with respect to the respondent-husbands psychological condition. To our
mind, conclusions and generalizations about Teresitas psychological condition, based solely on information fed by
Ricardo, are not any different in kind from admitting hearsay evidence as proof of the truthfulness of the content of
such evidence.[17]
To be sure, we have recognized that the law does not require that the allegedly incapacitated spouse be
personally examined by a physician or by a psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. [18] This recognition, however, does not signify that the evidence, we
shall favorably appreciate, should be any less than the evidence that an Article 36 case, by its nature, requires.
Our recognition simply means that the requirements for nullity outlined in Santos and Molina need not
necessarily come from the allegedly incapacitated spouse. In other words, it is still essential although from sources
other than the respondent spouse to show his or her personality profile, or its approximation, at the time of marriage;
the root cause of the inability to appreciate the essential obligations of marriage; and the gravity, permanence and
incurability of the condition.
Other than from the spouses, such evidence can come from persons intimately related to them, such as
relatives, close friends or even family doctors or lawyers who could testify on the allegedly incapacitated spouses
condition at or about the time of marriage, or to subsequent occurring events that trace their roots to the incapacity
already present at the time of marriage.
In the present case, the only other party outside of the spouses who was ever asked to give statements for
purposes of Teresitas psychological evaluation was Richardson, the spouses eldest son who would not have been
very reliable as a witness in an Article 36 case because he could not have been there when the spouses were
married and could not have been expected to know what was happening between his parents until long after his birth.

We confirm the validity of this observation from a reading of the summary of Richardsons interview with the
pyschologist: Richardsons statement occupied a mere one paragraph (comprising eleven sentences) in the
psychological evaluation and merely recited isolated instances of his parents fighting over the foreclosure of their
house, his fathers alleged womanizing, and their differences in religion (Ricardo is a Catholic, while Teresita is a
Mormon).[19]
We find nothing unusual in these recited marital incidents to indicate that Teresita suffered from some
psychological disorder as far back as the time of her marriage to Ricardo, nor do we find these fights to be indicative
of problems traceable to any basic psychological disorder existing at the time of marriage. For one, these points of
dispute are not uncommon in a marriage and relate essentially to the usual roots of marital problems finances, fidelity
and religion. The psychologist, too, never delved into the relationship between mother and son except to observe
their estranged relationship due to a previous argument a money problem involving Ricardos financial remittances to
the family. To state the obvious, the psychologists evaluation never explained how the recited incidents, made by one
who was not even born at the time of the spouses marriage, showed a debilitating psychological incapacity already
existing at that time.
Of more serious consequence, fatal to Ricardos cause, is the failure of Dr. Albarans psychological evaluation
to fully explain the details i.e.,the what, how, when, where and since when of Teresitas alleged Narcissistic
Personality Disorder. It seems to us that, with hardly any supporting evidence to fall back on, Dr. Albaran simply
stated out of the blue that Teresitas personality disorder manifested itself in early adulthood, presuming thereby that
the incapacity should have been there when the marriage was celebrated. Dr. Albaran never explained, too, the
incapacitating nature of Teresitas alleged personality disorder, and how it related to the essential marital obligations
that she failed to assume.Neither did the good doctor adequately explain in her psychological evaluation how grave
and incurable was Teresitas psychological disorder.
Dr. Albarans testimony at the trial did not improve the evidentiary situation for Ricardo, as it still failed to
provide the required insights that would have remedied the evidentiary gaps in her written psychological
evaluation. In fact, Dr. Albarans cross-examination only made the evidentiary situation worse when she admitted that
she had difficulty pinpointing the root cause of Teresitas personality disorder, due to the limited information she
gathered from Ricardo and Richardson regarding Teresitas personal and family history. To directly quote from the
records, Dr. Albaran confessed this limitation when she said that [t]he only data that I have is that, the respondent
seem [sic] to have grown from a tumultuous family and this could be perhaps the [sic] contributory to the
development of the personality disorder.[20] Dr. Albarans obvious uncertainty in her assessment only proves our point
that a complete personality profile of the spouse, alleged to be psychologically incapacitated, could not be determined
from meager information coming only from a biased source.
b.

Ricardos testimony
Ricardo testified in court that Teresita was a squanderer and an adulteress. We do not, however, find

Ricardos characterizations of his wife sufficient to constitute psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family
Code. Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital

obligations. Mere difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill will on the part of the
spouse is different from incapacity rooted on some debilitating psychological condition or illness.[21]
Ricardos testimony merely established that Teresita was irresponsible in managing the familys finances by
not paying their rent, utility bills and other financial obligations. Teresitas spendthrift attitude, according to Ricardo,
even resulted in the loss of the house and lot intended to be their family residence. This kind of irresponsibility,
however, does not rise to the level of a psychological incapacity required under Article 36 of the Family Code. At
most, Teresitas mismanagement of the familys finances merely constituted difficulty, refusal or neglect, during the
marriage, in the handling of funds intended for the familys financial support.
Teresitas alleged infidelity, even if true, likewise does not constitute psychological incapacity under Article 36
of the Family Code. In order for sexual infidelity to constitute as psychological incapacity, the respondents
unfaithfulness must be established as a manifestation of a disordered personality, completely preventing the
respondent from discharging the essential obligations of the marital state;[22] there must be proof of a natal or
supervening disabling factor that effectively incapacitated her from complying with the obligation to be faithful to her
spouse.[23]
In our view, Ricardo utterly failed in his testimony to prove that Teresita suffered from a disordered
personality of this kind. Even Ricardos added testimony, relating to rumors of Teresitas dates with other men and her
pregnancy by another man, would not fill in the deficiencies we have observed, given the absence of an adverse
integral element and link to Teresitas allegedly disordered personality.
Moreover, Ricardo failed to prove that Teresitas alleged character traits already existed at the inception of
their marriage. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the psychological incapacity must exist at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. [24] In the absence
of this element, a marriage cannot be annulled under Article 36.
Root cause of the psychological incapacity needs to be alleged in a petition for
annulment under Article 36 of the Family Code
Citing Barcelona,[25] Ricardo defended the RTC decision, alleging that the root cause in a petition for
annulment under Article 36 of the Family Code is no longer necessary. We find this argument completely at variance
with Ricardos main argument against the assailed CA decisioni.e., that the RTC, in its decision, discussed thoroughly
the root cause of Teresitas psychological incapacity as Narcissistic Personality Disorder.These conflicting positions,
notwithstanding, we see the need to address this issue to further clarify our statement in Barcelona, which Ricardo
misquoted and misinterpreted to support his present petition that since the new Rules do not require the petition to
allege expert opinion on the psychological incapacity, it follows that there is also no need to allege in the petition the
root cause of the psychological incapacity.[26]
In Barcelona, the petitioner assailed the bid for annulment for its failure to state the root cause of the
respondents alleged psychological incapacity. The Court resolved this issue, ruling that the petition sufficiently stated
a cause of action because the petitioner instead of stating a specific root cause clearly described the physical

manifestations indicative of the psychological incapacity. This, the Court found to be sufficiently compliant with
the first requirement in the Molina case that the root cause of the psychological incapacity be alleged in an Article 36
petition.
Thus, contrary to Ricardos position, Barcelona does not do away with the root cause requirement. The ruling
simply means that the statement of the root cause does not need to be in medical terms or be technical in nature, as
the root causes of many psychological disorders are still unknown to science. It is enough to merely allege the
physical manifestations constituting the root cause of the psychological incapacity.Section 2, paragraph (d) of the
Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (Rules)[27] in fact
provides:
SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.
xxxx
(d) What to allege. A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code shall specially
allege the complete facts showing that either or both parties were
psychologically incapacitated from complying with the essential marital
obligations of marriages at the time of the celebration of marriage even if
such incapacity becomes manifest only after its celebration.
The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative of
psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage but expert opinion
need not be alleged.
As we explained in Barcelona, the requirement alleging the root cause in a petition for annulment under
Article 36 of the Family Code was not dispensed with by the adoption of the Rules. What the Rules really eliminated
was the need for an expert opinion to prove the root cause of the psychological incapacity. The Court further held that
the Rules, being procedural in nature, apply only to actions pending and unresolved at the time of their adoption.
To sum up, Ricardo failed to discharge the burden of proof to show that Teresita suffered from psychological
incapacity; thus, his petition for annulment of marriage must fail. Ricardo merely established that Teresita had been
remiss in her duties as a wife for being irresponsible in taking care of their familys finances a fault or deficiency that
does not amount to the psychological incapacity that Article 36 of the Family Code requires. We reiterate that
irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, and the like, do
notby themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity, as the same may only be due to a persons difficulty,
refusal or neglect to undertake the obligations of marriage that is not rooted in some psychological illness that Article
36 of the Family Code addresses.[28]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition and AFFIRM the decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 71882. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. NO. 168796

April 15, 2010

SILVINO A. LIGERALDE, Petitioner,


vs.
MAY ASCENSION A. PATALINGHUG and the REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This petition seeks to set aside the November 30, 2004 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) which reversed the
Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City (RTC) declaring the marriage between petitioner Silvino A.
Ligeralde (Silvino) and private respondent May Ascension A. Patalinghug (May) null and void.
Silvino and May got married on October 3, 1984. They were blessed with four children. Silvino claimed that, during
their marriage, he observed that May had several manifestations of a negative marital behavior. He described her as
immature, irresponsible and carefree. Her infidelity, negligence and nocturnal activities, he claimed, characterized
their marital relations.
Sometime in September 1995, May arrived home at 4:00 oclock in the morning. Her excuse was that she had
watched a video program in a neighboring town, but admitted later to have slept with her Palestinian boyfriend in a
hotel. Silvino tried to persuade her to be conscientious of her duties as wife and mother. His pleas were ignored. His
persuasions would often lead to altercations or physical violence.
In the midst of these, Silvinos deep love for her, the thought of saving their marriage for the sake of their children,
and the commitment of May to reform dissuaded him from separating from her. He still wanted to reconcile with her.
The couple started a new life. A few months after, however, he realized that their marriage was hopeless. May was
back again to her old ways. This was demonstrated when Silvino arrived home one day and learned that she was
nowhere to be found. He searched for her and found her in a nearby apartment drinking beer with a male lover.
Later, May confessed that she had no more love for him. They then lived separately.
With Mays irresponsible, immature and immoral behavior, Silvino came to believe that she is psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage.
Prior to the filing of the complaint, Silvino referred the matter to Dr. Tina Nicdao-Basilio for psychological evaluation.
The psychologist certified that May was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations; that
the incapacity started when she was still young and became manifest after marriage; and that the same was serious
and incurable.3
On October 22, 1999, the RTC declared the marriage of Silvino and May null and void. Its findings were based on the
Psychological Evaluation Report of Dr. Tina Nicdao-Basilio.
The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC decision. It ruled that private respondents alleged sexual infidelity, emotional
immaturity and irresponsibility do not constitute psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code
and that the psychologist failed to identify and prove the root cause thereof or that the incapacity was medically or
clinically permanent or incurable.
Hence, this petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
The core issue raised by petitioner Silvino Ligeralde is that "the assailed order of the CA is based on conjecture and,
therefore, issued without jurisdiction, in excess of jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction."4

The Court required the private respondent to comment but she failed to do so. Efforts were exerted to locate her but
to no avail.
Nevertheless, the petition is technically and substantially flawed. On procedural grounds, the Court agrees with the
public respondent that the petitioner should have filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 instead of this
petition for certiorari under Rule 65. For having availed of the wrong remedy, this petition deserves outright dismissal.
Substantially, the petition has no merit. In order to avail of the special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court,5 the petitioner must clearly show that the public respondent acted without jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess in jurisdiction. By grave abuse of discretion is meant such
capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law,
or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason
of passion and hostility. In sum, for the extraordinary writ of certiorari to lie, there must be capricious, arbitrary or
whimsical exercise of power.6
In this case at bench, the Court finds no commission of a grave abuse of discretion in the rendition of the assailed CA
decision dismissing petitioners complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Upon close scrutiny of the records, we find nothing whimsical, arbitrary or capricious in its findings.
A petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is anchored on Article 36 of the Family Code which provides:
ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after its solemnization.
Psychological incapacity required by Art. 36 must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence and (c)
incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the
ordinary duties required in marriage. It must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although
the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage. It must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the
cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.7 The Court likewise laid down the guidelines in resolving
petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage, based on Article 36 of the Family Code, in Republic v. Court of
Appeals.8 Relevant to this petition are the following:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff; (2) the root cause of the
psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by
experts and clearly explained in the decision; (3) the incapacity must be proven to be existing at the "time of the
celebration" of the marriage; (4) such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable; and (5) such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage.
1avvphi1

Guided by these pronouncements, it is the Courts considered view that petitioners evidence failed to establish
respondent Mays psychological incapacity.
Petitioner's testimony did not prove the root cause, gravity and incurability of private respondents condition. Even Dr.
Nicdao-Basilio failed to show the root cause of her psychological incapacity. The root cause of the psychological
incapacity must be identified as a psychological illness, its incapacitating nature fully explained and established by
the totality of the evidence presented during trial.9
More importantly, the acts of private respondent do not even rise to the level of the "psychological incapacity" that the
law requires. Private respondent's act of living an adulterous life cannot automatically be equated with a
psychological disorder, especially when no specific evidence was shown that promiscuity was a trait already existing

at the inception of marriage. Petitioner must be able to establish that respondent's unfaithfulness is a manifestation of
a disordered personality, which makes her completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital
state.10
Doubtless, the private respondent was far from being a perfect wife and a good mother. She certainly had some
character flaws. But these imperfections do not warrant a conclusion that she had a psychological malady at the time
of the marriage that rendered her incapable of fulfilling her marital and family duties and obligations.11
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice

THIRD DIVISION

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,


Petitioner,

G.R. No. 168335


Present:

- versus -

CARPIO MORALES, J., Chairperson,


BRION,
BERSAMIN,
*
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR. and
*
SERENO, JJ.
Promulgated:
June 6, 2011

NESTOR GALANG,
Respondent.

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] filed by the Republic of the Philippines (petitioner),
challenging the decision[2] datedNovember 25, 2004 and the resolution[3] dated May 9, 2005 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 70004. The challenged decision affirmed the decision [4] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 62, Angeles City, declaring the marriage of Nestor Galang (respondent) and Juvy Salazar null and void on the
ground of the latters psychological incapacity. The assailed resolution denied the petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
Antecedent Facts
On March 9, 1994, the respondent and Juvy contracted marriage in Pampanga. They resided in the house of the
respondents father in San Francisco, Mabalacat, Pampanga. The respondent worked as an artist-illustrator at the
Clark Development Corporation, earning P8,500.00 monthly. Juvy, on the other hand, stayed at home as a
housewife. They have one child, Christopher.
On August 4, 1999, the respondent filed with the RTC a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Juvy,
under Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 9494. He alleged that
Juvy was psychologically incapacitated to exercise the essential obligations of marriage, as she was a kleptomaniac
and a swindler. He claimed that Juvy stole his ATM card and his parents money, and often asked money from their
friends and relatives on the pretext that Christopher was confined in a hospital. According to the respondent, Juvy
suffers from mental deficiency, innate immaturity, distorted discernment and total lack of care, love and affection
[towards him and their] child. He posited that Juvys incapacity was extremely serious and appears to be incurable.[5]
The
RTC
ordered
the
city
prosecutor
to
investigate
if
collusion
existed
between
the
parties. Prosecutor Angelito I. Balderama formally manifested, on October 18, 1999, that he found no evidence of
collusion between the parties. The RTC set the case for trial in its Order of October 20, 1999. The respondent
presented testimonial and documentary evidence to substantiate his allegations.

In his testimony, the respondent alleged that he was the one who prepared their breakfast because Juvy did not want
to wake up early; Juvy often left their child to their neighbors care; and Christopher almost got lost in the market when
Juvy brought him there.[6]
The respondent further
stated
that
Juvy
squandered
the P15,000.00
he entrusted to her.
He added that Juvy stole his ATM card and falsified his signature to encash the check representing his (the
respondents) fathers pension. He, likewise, stated that he caught Juvy playing mahjong andkuwaho three (3) times.
Finally, he testified that Juvy borrowed money from their relatives on the pretense that their son was confined in a
hospital.[7]
Aside from his testimony, the respondent also presented Anna Liza S. Guiang, a psychologist, who testified that she
conducted a psychological test on the respondent. According to her, she wrote Juvy a letter requesting for an
interview, but the latter did not respond.[8] In her Psychological Report, the psychologist made the following findings:
Psychological Test conducted on client Nestor Galang resembles an emotionally-matured
individual. He is well-adjusted to the problem he meets, and enable to throw-off major irritations but
manifest[s] a very low frustration tolerance which means he has a little ability to endure anxiety and
the client manifests suppressed feelings and emotions which resulted to unbearable emotional
pain, depression and lack of self-esteem and gained emotional tensions caused by his wifes
behavior.
The incapacity of the defendant is manifested [in] such a manner that the defendant-wife:
(1) being very irresponsible and very lazy and doesnt manifest any sense of responsibility; (2) her
involvement in gambling activities such as mahjong and kuwaho; (3) being an estafador which
exhibits her behavioral and personality disorders; (4) her neglect and show no care attitude towards
her husband and child; (5) her immature and rigid behavior; (6) her lack of initiative to change and
above all, the fact that she is unable to perform her marital obligations as a loving, responsible and
caring wife to her family. There are just few reasons to believe that the defendant is suffering from
incapacitated mind and such incapacity appears to be incorrigible.
xxx
The following incidents are the reasons why the couple separated:
1.

After the marriage took place, the incapacity of the defendant was manifested on
such occasions wherein the plaintiff was the one who prepared his breakfast,
because the defendant doesnt want to wake up early; this became the daily routine of
the plaintiff before reporting to work;

2.

After reporting from work, the defendant was often out gambling, as usual, the
plaintiff was the one cooking for supper while the defendant was very busy with her
gambling activities and never attended to her husbands needs;

3.

There was an occasion wherein their son was lost in the public market because of
the irresponsible attitude of the defendant;

4.

That the defendant suffers from personality and behavioral disorders, there was an
occasion wherein the defendant [would] steal money from the plaintiff and use them
for gambling;

5.

Defendant, being an estafador had been manifested after their marriage took place,
wherein
the
defendant
would
come
with
stories
so
that people[would] feel pity on her and give her money. Through false pretenses she

[would] be able to deceive and take money from neighbors, relatives and other
people.

6.

That the plaintiff convinced the defendant to stop her unhealthy lifestyle (gambling),
but the defendant never listened to his advices;

7.

That the plaintiff was the one who [was] taking care of their son, when the plaintiff
will leave for work, the defendant [would] entrust their son to their neighbor and go [to]
some place. This act reflects the incapacity of the defendant by being an irresponsible
mother;

8.

That the defendant took their son and left their conjugal home that resulted into the
couples separation.

Psychological findings tend to confirm that the defendant suffers from personality and
behavioral disorders. These disorders are manifested through her grave dependency on gambling
and stealing money. She doesnt manifest any sense of responsibility and loyalty and these
disorders appear to be incorrigible.
The plaintiff tried to forget and forgive her about the incidents and start a new life again
and hoping she would change. Tried to get attention back by showing her with special care, treating
her to places for a weekend vacation, cook[ing] her favorite food, but the defendant didnt care to
change, she did not prepare meals, wash clothes nor clean up. She neglected her duties and failed
to perform the basic obligations as a wife.
So in the view of the above-mentioned psychological findings, it is my humble opinion that
there is sufficient reason to believe that the defendant wife is psychologically incapacitated to
perform her marital duties as a wife and mother to their only son.[9]
The RTC Ruling
The RTC nullified the parties marriage in its decision of January 22, 2001. The trial court saw merit in the
testimonies of the respondent and the psychologist, and concluded that:
After a careful perusal of the evidence in the instant case and there being no controverting
evidence, this Court is convinced that as held in Santoscase, the psychological incapacity of
respondent to comply with the essential marital obligations of his marriage with petitioner, which Dr.
Gerardo Veloso said can be characterized by (a) gravity because the subject cannot carry out the
normal and ordinary duties of marriage and family shouldered by any average couple existing
under ordinary circumstances of life and work; (b) antecedence, because the root cause of the
trouble can be traced to the history of the subject before marriage although its overt manifestations
appear over after the wedding; and (c) incurability, if treatments required exceed the ordinary
means or subject, or involve time and expense beyond the reach of the subject are all obtaining in
this case.
xxxx
WHEREFORE,
premises
considered,
the
instant
petition
is
granted
and the marriage between petitioner and defendant is hereby declared null and void pursuant to
Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines.[10]
The CA Decision

The petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General, appealed the RTC decision to the CA. The CA, in its
decision dated November 25, 2004, affirmed the RTC decision in toto.
The CA held that Juvy was psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations. It
explained that Juvys indolence and lack of sense of responsibility, coupled with her acts of gambling and swindling,
undermined her capacity to comply with her marital obligations. In addition, the psychologist characterized Juvys
condition to be permanent, incurable and existing at the time of the celebration of her marriage with the respondent.[11]
The petitioner moved to reconsider this Decision, but the CA denied his motion in its resolution dated May 9, 2005.[12]
The Petition and the Issues
The petitioner claims in the present petition that the totality of the evidence presented by the respondent was
insufficient to establish Juvys psychological incapacity to perform her essential marital obligations. The petitioner
additionally argues that the respondent failed to show the juridical antecedence, gravity, and incurability of Juvys
condition.[13] The respondent took the exact opposite view.
The issue boils down to whether there is basis to nullify the respondents marriage to Juvy on the ground that at the
time of the celebration of the marriage, Juvy suffered from psychological incapacity that prevented her from
complying with her essential marital obligations.
The Courts Ruling
After due consideration, we resolve to grant the
petition,
and
hold
that no sufficient basis exists to annul the marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity under the terms of
Article 36 of the Family Code.
Article 36 of the Family Code
and Related Jurisprudence
Article 36 of the Family Code provides that a marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.[14]
In Leouel Santos v. Court of Appeals, et al.,[15] the Court first declared that psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability. The defect should refer to no less than
a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage. It must be confined to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage.[16] We laid down more definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article
36 of the Family Code inRepublic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals and Roridel Olaviano Molina, whose salient
points are footnoted below.[17] These guidelines incorporate the basic requirements we established in Santos.[18]
In Brenda B. Marcos v. Wilson G. Marcos,[19] we further clarified that it is not absolutely necessary to introduce expert
opinion in a petition under Article 36 of the Family Code if the totality of evidence shows that psychological incapacity
exists and its gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability can be duly established. Thereafter, the Court
promulgated A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC (Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages)[20] which provided that the complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are
indicative of psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage but expert opinion need not be
alleged.
Our 2009 ruling in Edward Kenneth Ngo Te v. Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu-Te[21] placed some cloud in the
continued applicability of the time-tested Molina[22] guidelines. We stated in this case that instead of serving as a
guideline, Molina unintentionally became a straightjacket; it forced all cases involving psychological incapacity to fit
into and be bound by it. This is contrary to the intention of the law, since no psychological incapacity case can be
considered as completely on "all fours" with another.
Benjamin G. Ting v. Carmen M. Velez-Ting [23] and Jocelyn M. Suazo v. Angelito Suazo, [24] however, laid to
rest any question regarding the continued applicability of Molina.[25] In these cases, we clarified that Ngo Te[26] did not
abandon Molina.[27] Far from abandoning Molina,[28]Ngo Te[29] simply suggested the relaxation of its stringent
requirements. We also explained that Suazo[30] that Ngo Te[31] merely stands for a more flexible approach in
considering petitions for declaration of nullity of marriages based on psychological incapacity.[32]

The Present Case


In the present case and using the above guidelines, we find the totality of the respondents evidence the
testimonies of the respondent and the psychologist, and the latters psychological report and evaluation insufficient to
prove Juvys psychological incapacity pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code.
a.

The respondents testimony

The respondents testimony merely showed that Juvy: (a) refused to wake up early to prepare breakfast; (b)
left their child to the care of their neighbors when she went out of the house; (c) squandered a huge amount of
the P15,000.00 that the respondent entrusted to her; (d) stole the respondents ATM card and attempted to withdraw
the money deposited in his account; (e) falsified the respondents signature in order to encash a check; (f) made up
false stories in order to borrow money from their relatives; and (g) indulged in gambling.
These acts, to our mind, do not per se rise to the level of psychological incapacity that the law requires. We
stress that psychological incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty," "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance
of some marital obligations. In Republic
of
the
Philippines
v.
Norma
Cuison-Melgar,
et
al.,
[33]
we ruled that it is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married
person; it is essential that he or she must be shown to be incapable of doing so because of some psychological,
not physical, illness. In other words, proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person an adverse
integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations essential to marriage had to be shown.[34] A cause has to be shown and linked with the
manifestations of the psychological incapacity.
The respondents testimony failed to show that Juvys condition is a manifestation of a disordered personality
rooted in some incapacitating or debilitating psychological condition that rendered her unable to discharge her
essential marital obligation. In this light, the acts attributed to Juvy only showed indications of immaturity and lack of
sense of responsibility, resulting in nothing more than the difficulty, refusal or neglect in the performance of marital
obligations. In Ricardo B. Toring v. Teresita M. Toring,[35] we emphasized that irreconcilable differences, sexual
infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, and the like do not by themselves warrant a finding
of psychological incapacity, as these may only be due to a person's difficulty, refusal or neglect to undertake the
obligations of marriage that is not rooted in some psychological illnessthat Article 36 of the Family Code addresses.
In like manner, Juvys acts of falsifying the respondents signature to encash a check, of stealing the
respondents ATM, and of squandering a huge portion of the P15,000.00 that the respondent entrusted to her, while
no doubt reprehensible, cannot automatically be equated with a psychological disorder, especially when the evidence
shows that these were mere isolated incidents and not recurring acts. Neither can Juvys penchant for
playing mahjong and kuwaho for money, nor her act of soliciting money from relatives on the pretext that her child
was sick, warrant a conclusion that she suffered from a mental malady at the time of the celebration of marriage that
rendered her incapable of fulfilling her marital duties and obligations. The respondent, in fact, admitted that Juvy
engaged in these behaviors (gambling and what the respondent refers to as swindling) only two (2) years after their
marriage, and after he let her handle his salary and manage their finances. The evidence also shows that Juvy even
tried to augment the familys income during the early stages of their marriage by putting up a sari-sari store and by
working as a manicurist.
b.

The Psychologists Report

The submitted psychological report hardly helps the respondents cause, as it glaringly failed to establish that
Juvy was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital duties at the material time required by Article
36 of the Family Code.
To begin with, the psychologist admitted in her report that she derived her conclusions exclusively from the
information given her by the respondent. Expectedly, the respondents description of Juvy would contain a
considerable degree of bias; thus, a psychological evaluation based on this one-sided description alone can hardly be
considered as credible or sufficient. We are of course aware of our pronouncement in Marcos[36]that the person
sought
to
be
declared
psychologically
incapacitated
need
not
be
examined
by
the
psychologist as a condition precedent to arrive at a conclusion. If the incapacity can be proven by independent
means, no reason exists why such independent proof cannot be admitted to support a conclusion of psychological
incapacity, independently of a psychologists examination and report. In this case, however, no such independent
evidence has ever been gathered and adduced. To be sure, evidence from independent sources who intimately knew
Juvy before and after the celebration of her marriage would have made a lot of difference and could have added
weight to the psychologists report.

Separately from the lack of the requisite factual basis, the psychologists report simply stressed Juvys
negative traits which she considered manifestations of Juvys psychological incapacity (e.g., laziness, immaturity and
irresponsibility; her involvement in swindling and gambling activities; and her lack of initiative to change), and
declared that psychological findings tend to confirm that the defendant suffers from personality and behavioral
disorders x x x she doesnt manifest any sense of responsibility and loyalty, and these disorders appear to be
incorrigible.[37] In the end, the psychologist opined without stating the psychological basis for her conclusion
that there is sufficient reason to believe that the defendant wife is psychologically incapacitated to perform her marital
duties as a wife and mother to their only son.[38]
We find this kind of conclusion and report grossly inadequate. First, we note that the psychologist did not
even
identify
the
types
of
psychological
tests which she administered on the respondent and the root cause of Juvys psychological condition.
We also stress that the acts alleged to have been committed by Juvy all occurred during the marriage;
there was no showing that any mental disorder existed at the inception of the marriage. Second, the report failed to
prove the gravity or severity of Juvys alleged condition, specifically, why and to what extent the disorder is serious,
and how it incapacitated her to comply with her marital duties. Significantly, the report did not even categorically state
the particular type of personality disorder found. Finally, the report failed to establish the incurability of Juvys
condition. The reports pronouncements that Juvy lacks the initiative to change and that her mental incapacity appears
incorrigible[39] are insufficient to prove that her mental condition could not be treated, or if it were otherwise, the cure
would be beyond her means to undertake.
c. The Psychologists Testimony
The psychologists court testimony fared no better in proving the juridical antecedence, gravity or incurability
of Juvys alleged psychological defect as she merely reiterated what she wrote in her report i.e., that Juvy was lazy
and irresponsible; played mahjong and kuhawo for money; stole money from the respondent; deceived people to
borrow cash; and neglected her child without linking these to an underlying psychological cause. Again, these
allegations, even if true, all occurred during the marriage. The testimony was totally devoid of any information or
insight into Juvys early life and associations, how she acted before and at the time of the marriage, and how the
symptoms of a disordered personality developed. Simply put, the psychologist failed to trace the history of Juvys
psychological condition and to relate it to an existing incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
She, likewise, failed to successfully prove the elements of gravity and incurability. In these respects, she
merely stated that despite the respondents efforts to show love and affection, Juvy was hesitant to change. From this
premise, she jumped to the conclusion that Juvy appeared to be incurable or incorrigible, and would be very hard to
cure. These unfounded conclusions cannot be equated with gravity or incurability that Article 36 of the Family Code
requires. To be declared clinically or medically incurable is one thing; to refuse or be reluctant to change is another.
To hark back to what we earlier discussed, psychological incapacity refers only to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage.[40]
The Constitution sets out a policy of protecting and strengthening the family as the basic social institution,
and marriage is the foundation of the family. Marriage, as an inviolable institution protected by the State, cannot be
dissolved at the whim of the parties. In petitions for the declaration of nullity of marriage, the burden of proof to show
the nullity of marriage lies with the plaintiff. [41] Unless the evidence presented clearly reveals a situation where the
parties, or one of them, could not have validly entered into a marriage by reason of a grave and serious psychological
illness existing at the time it was celebrated, we are compelled to uphold the indissolubility of the marital tie.[42]
WHEREFORE, in view of these considerations, we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the Decision and
the Resolution of the Court of Appeals, dated November 25, 2004 and May 9, 2005, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No.
70004. Accordingly, we DISMISS respondent Nestor Galangs petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to
Juvy Salazar under Article 36 of the Family Code. Costs against respondent Nestor Galang.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

THIRD DIVISION
EDWARD KENNETH NGO TE,
Petitioner,
- versus ROWENA ONG GUTIERREZ YU-TE,
Respondent,
REPUBLIC OF THEPHILIPPINES,
Oppositor.

G.R. No. 161793


Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA, and
PERALTA, JJ.
Promulgated:
February 13, 2009

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Far from novel is the issue involved in this petition. Psychological incapacity, since its incorporation in our laws, has
become a clichd subject of discussion in our jurisprudence. The Court treats this case, however, with much ado, it
having realized that current jurisprudential doctrine has unnecessarily imposed a perspective by which psychological
incapacity should be viewed, totally inconsistent with the way the concept was formulatedfree in form and devoid of
any definition.
For the resolution of the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
August 5, 2003 Decision[1]of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 71867. The petition further assails the
January 19, 2004 Resolution[2] denying the motion for the reconsideration of the challenged decision.
The relevant facts and proceedings follow.
Petitioner Edward Kenneth Ngo Te first got a glimpse of respondent Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu-Te in a
gathering organized by the Filipino-Chinese association in their college. Edward was then initially attracted to
Rowenas close friend; but, as the latter already had a boyfriend, the young man decided to court Rowena. That was
in January 1996, when petitioner was a sophomore student and respondent, a freshman.[3]
Sharing similar angst towards their families, the two understood one another and developed a certain
degree of closeness towards each other.In March 1996, or around three months after their first meeting, Rowena

asked Edward that they elope. At first, he refused, bickering that he was young and jobless. Her persistence,
however, made him relent. Thus, they left Manila and sailed to Cebu that month; he, providing their travel money and
she, purchasing the boat ticket.[4]
However, Edwards P80,000.00 lasted for only a month. Their pension house accommodation and daily
sustenance fast depleted it. And they could not find a job. In April 1996, they decided to go back to Manila. Rowena
proceeded to her uncles house and Edward to his parents home. As his family was abroad, and Rowena kept on
telephoning him, threatening him that she would commit suicide, Edward agreed to stay with Rowena at her uncles
place.[5]
On April 23, 1996, Rowenas uncle brought the two to a court to get married. He was then 25 years old, and
she, 20.[6] The two then continued to stay at her uncles place where Edward was treated like a prisonerhe was not
allowed to go out unaccompanied. Her uncle also showed Edward his guns and warned the latter not to leave
Rowena.[7] At one point, Edward was able to call home and talk to his brother who suggested that they should stay at
their parents home and live with them. Edward relayed this to Rowena who, however, suggested that he should get
his inheritance so that they could live on their own. Edward talked to his father about this, but the patriarch got mad,
told Edward that he would be disinherited, and insisted that Edward must go home.[8]
After a month, Edward escaped from the house of Rowenas uncle, and stayed with his parents. His family
then hid him from Rowena and her family whenever they telephoned to ask for him.[9]
In June 1996, Edward was able to talk to Rowena. Unmoved by his persistence that they should live with his
parents, she said that it was better for them to live separate lives. They then parted ways.[10]
After almost four years, or on January 18, 2000, Edward filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 106, for the annulment of his marriage to Rowena on the basis of the latters
psychological incapacity. This was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-00-39720.[11]
As Rowena did not file an answer, the trial court, on July 11, 2000, ordered the Office of the City Prosecutor
(OCP) of Quezon City to investigate whether there was collusion between the parties. [12] In the meantime, on July 27,
2000, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance and deputized the OCP to appear on its
behalf and assist it in the scheduled hearings.[13]
On August 23, 2000, the OCP submitted an investigation report stating that it could not determine if there
was collusion between the parties; thus, it recommended trial on the merits.[14]
The clinical psychologist who examined petitioner found both parties psychologically incapacitated, and
made the following findings and conclusions:
BACKGROUND DATA & BRIEF MARITAL HISTORY:
EDWARD KENNETH NGO TE is a [29-year-old] Filipino male adult born and baptized Born Again
Christian at Manila. He finished two years in college atAMA Computer College last 1994 and is
currently unemployed. He is married to and separated from ROWENA GUTIERREZ YU-TE. He
presented himself at my office for a psychological evaluation in relation to his petition for
Nullification of Marriage against the latter by the grounds of psychological incapacity. He is now
residing at 181 P. Tuazon Street, Quezon City.
Petitioner got himself three siblings who are now in business and one deceased sister. Both his
parents are also in the business world by whom he [considers] as generous, hospitable, and
patient. This said virtues are said to be handed to each of the family member. He generally
considers himself to be quiet and simple. He clearly remembers himself to be afraid of meeting
people. After 1994, he tried his luck in being a Sales Executive of Mansfield International
Incorporated. And because of job incompetence, as well as being quiet and loner, he did not stay
long in the job until 1996. His interest lie[s] on becoming a full servant of God by being a priest or a
pastor. He [is] said to isolate himself from his friends even during his childhood days as he only
loves to read the Bible and hear its message.
Respondent is said to come from a fine family despite having a lazy father and a disobedient
wife. She is said to have not finish[ed] her collegiate degree and shared intimate sexual moments
with her boyfriend prior to that with petitioner.

In January of 1996, respondent showed her kindness to petitioner and this became the foundation
of their intimate relationship. After a month of dating, petitioner mentioned to respondent that he is
having problems with his family. Respondent surprisingly retorted that she also hates her family
and that she actually wanted to get out of their lives. From that [time on], respondent had insisted to
petitioner that they should elope and live together. Petitioner hesitated because he is not prepared
as they are both young and inexperienced, but she insisted that they would somehow manage
because petitioner is rich. In the last week of March 1996, respondent seriously brought the idea of
eloping and she already bought tickets for the boat going to Cebu. Petitioner reluctantly agreed to
the idea and so they eloped to Cebu. The parties are supposed to stay at the house of a friend of
respondent, but they were not able to locate her, so petitioner was compelled to rent an
apartment. The parties tried to look for a job but could not find any so it was suggested by
respondent that they should go back and seek help from petitioners parents. When the parties
arrived at the house of petitioner, all of his whole family was all out of the country so respondent
decided to go back to her home for the meantime while petitioner stayed behind at their
home. After a few days of separation, respondent called petitioner by phone and said she wanted
to talk to him. Petitioner responded immediately and when he arrived at their house, respondent
confronted petitioner as to why he appeared to be cold, respondent acted irrationally and even
threatened to commit suicide. Petitioner got scared so he went home again.Respondent would call
by phone every now and then and became angry as petitioner does not know what to
do. Respondent went to the extent of threatening to file a case against petitioner and scandalize his
family in the newspaper. Petitioner asked her how he would be able to make amends and at this
point in time[,] respondent brought the idea of marriage. Petitioner[,] out of frustration in life[,]
agreed to her to pacify her. And so on April 23, 1996, respondents uncle brought the parties to
Valenzuela[,] and on that very same day[,] petitioner was made to sign the Marriage Contract
before the Judge. Petitioner actually never applied for any Marriage License.
Respondent decided that they should stay first at their house until after arrival of the parents of
petitioner. But when the parents of petitioner arrived, respondent refused to allow petitioner to go
home. Petitioner was threatened in so many ways with her uncle showing to him many
guns. Respondent even threatened that if he should persist in going home, they will commission
their military friends to harm his family. Respondent even made petitioner sign a declaration that if
he should perish, the authorities should look for him at his parents[ ]and relatives[]
houses. Sometime in June of 1996, petitioner was able to escape and he went home. He told his
parents about his predicament and they forgave him and supported him by giving him military
escort. Petitioner, however, did not inform them that he signed a marriage contract with
respondent. When they knew about it[,] petitioner was referred for counseling.Petitioner[,] after the
counseling[,] tried to contact respondent. Petitioner offered her to live instead to[sic] the home of
petitioners parents while they are still studying. Respondent refused the idea and claimed that she
would only live with him if they will have a separate home of their own and be away from his
parents. She also intimated to petitioner that he should already get his share of whatever he would
inherit from his parents so they can start a new life.Respondent demanded these not knowing [that]
the petitioner already settled his differences with his own family. When respondent refused to live
with petitioner where he chose for them to stay, petitioner decided to tell her to stop harassing the
home of his parents. He told her already that he was disinherited and since he also does not have
a job, he would not be able to support her. After knowing that petitioner does not have any money
anymore, respondent stopped tormenting petitioner and informed petitioner that they should live
separate lives.
The said relationship between Edward and Rowena is said to be undoubtedly in the wreck and
weakly-founded. The break-up was caused by both parties[] unreadiness to commitment and their
young age. He was still in the state of finding his fate and fighting boredom, while she was still
egocentrically involved with herself.
TESTS ADMINISTERED:
Revised Beta Examination
Bender Visual Motor Gestalt Test
Draw A Person Test
Rorschach Psychodiagnostic Test
Sachs Sentence Completion Test
MMPI

TEST RESULTS & EVALUATION:


Both petitioner and respondent are dubbed to be emotionally immature and recklessly impulsive
upon swearing to their marital vows as each of them was motivated by different notions on
marriage.
Edward Kenneth Ngo Te, the petitioner in this case[,] is said to be still unsure and unready so as to
commit himself to marriage. He is still founded to be on the search of what he wants in life. He is
absconded as an introvert as he is not really sociable and displays a lack of interest in social
interactions and mingling with other individuals. He is seen too akin to this kind of lifestyle that he
finds it boring and uninteresting to commit himself to a relationship especially to that of respondent,
as aggravated by her dangerously aggressive moves. As he is more of the reserved and timid type
of person, as he prefer to be religiously attached and spend a solemn time alone.
ROWENA GUTIERREZ YU-TE, the respondent, is said to be of the aggressive-rebellious
type of woman. She is seen to be somewhat exploitative in her [plight] for a life of wealth and
glamour. She is seen to take move on marriage as she thought that her marriage with petitioner will
bring her good fortune because he is part of a rich family. In order to have her dreams realized, she
used force and threats knowing that [her] husband is somehow weak-willed. Upon the realization
that there is really no chance for wealth, she gladly finds her way out of the relationship.
REMARKS:
Before going to marriage, one should really get to know himself and marry himself before
submitting to marital vows. Marriage should not be taken out of intuition as it is profoundly a serious
institution solemnized by religious and law. In the case presented by petitioner and respondent[,]
(sic) it is evidently clear that both parties have impulsively taken marriage for granted as they are
still unaware of their own selves. He is extremely introvert to the point of weakening their
relationship by his weak behavioral disposition. She, on the other hand[,] is extremely exploitative
and aggressive so as to be unlawful, insincere and undoubtedly uncaring in her strides toward
convenience. It is apparent that she is suffering the grave, severe, and incurable presence of
Narcissistic and Antisocial Personality Disorder that started since childhood and only manifested
during marriage. Both parties display psychological incapacities that made marriage a big mistake
for them to take.[15]
The trial court, on July 30, 2001, rendered its Decision [16] declaring the marriage of the parties null and void
on the ground that both parties were psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations.
[17]
The Republic, represented by the OSG, timely filed its notice of appeal.[18]
On review, the appellate court, in the assailed August 5, 2003 Decision[19] in CA-G.R. CV No. 71867,
reversed and set aside the trial courts ruling.[20] It ruled that petitioner failed to prove the psychological incapacity of
respondent. The clinical psychologist did not personally examine respondent, and relied only on the information
provided by petitioner. Further, the psychological incapacity was not shown to be attended by gravity, juridical
antecedence and incurability. In sum, the evidence adduced fell short of the requirements stated in Republic v. Court
of Appeals and Molina[21] needed for the declaration of nullity of the marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.
[22]
The CA faulted the lower court for rendering the decision without the required certification of the OSG briefly
stating therein the OSGs reasons for its agreement with or opposition to, as the case may be, the petition. [23] The CA
later denied petitioners motion for reconsideration in the likewise assailed January 19, 2004 Resolution.[24]
Dissatisfied, petitioner filed before this Court the instant petition for review on certiorari. On June 15, 2005,
the Court gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective memoranda.[25]
In his memorandum,[26] petitioner argues that the CA erred in substituting its own judgment for that of the trial
court. He posits that the RTC declared the marriage void, not only because of respondents psychological incapacity,
but rather due to both parties psychological incapacity.Petitioner also points out that there is no requirement for the
psychologist to personally examine respondent. Further, he avers that the OSG is bound by the actions of the OCP
because the latter represented it during the trial; and it had been furnished copies of all the pleadings, the trial court
orders and notices.[27]
For its part, the OSG contends in its memorandum, [28] that the annulment petition filed before the RTC
contains no statement of the essential marital obligations that the parties failed to comply with. The root cause of the

psychological incapacity was likewise not alleged in the petition; neither was it medically or clinically identified. The
purported incapacity of both parties was not shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. And the
clinical psychologist did not personally examine the respondent. Thus, the OSG concludes that the requirements
in Molina[29] were not satisfied.[30]
The Court now resolves the singular issue of whether, based on Article 36 of the Family Code, the marriage
between the parties is null and void.[31]
I.
We begin by examining the provision, tracing its origin and charting the development of jurisprudence
interpreting it.
Article 36 of the Family Code[32] provides:
Article 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
As borne out by the deliberations of the Civil Code Revision Committee that drafted the Family Code, Article
36 was based on grounds available in the Canon Law. Thus, Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero elucidated in her
separate opinion in Santos v. Court of Appeals:[33]
However, as a member of both the Family Law Revision Committee of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines and the Civil Code Revision Commission of the UP Law Center, I wish to add
some observations. The letter dated April 15, 1985 of then Judge Alicia V. Sempio-Diy written in
behalf of the Family Law and Civil Code Revision Committee to then Assemblywoman Mercedes
Cojuangco-Teodoro traced the background of the inclusion of the present Article 36 in the Family
Code.
During its early meetings, the Family Law Committee had thought of
including a chapter on absolute divorce in the draft of a new Family Code (Book I
of the Civil Code) that it had been tasked by the IBP and the UP Law Center to
prepare. In fact, some members of the Committee were in favor of a no-fault
divorce between the spouses after a number of years of separation, legal or de
facto. Justice J.B.L. Reyes was then requested to prepare a proposal for an
action for dissolution of marriage and the effects thereof based on two grounds:
(a) five continuous years of separation between the spouses, with or without a
judicial decree of legal separation, and (b) whenever a married person would
have obtained a decree of absolute divorce in another country. Actually, such a
proposal is one for absolute divorce but called by another name. Later, even the
Civil Code Revision Committee took time to discuss the proposal of Justice
Reyes on this matter.
Subsequently, however, when the Civil Code Revision Committee and
Family Law Committee started holding joint meetings on the preparation of the
draft of the New Family Code, they agreed and formulated the definition of
marriage as
a special contract of permanent partnership between
a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for
the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is an inviolable
social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents
are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that
marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the
marriage within the limits provided by law.
With the above definition, and considering the Christian traditional
concept of marriage of the Filipino people as a permanent, inviolable,
indissoluble social institution upon which the family and society are founded, and
also realizing the strong opposition that any provision on absolute divorce would
encounter from the Catholic Church and the Catholic sector of our citizenry to

whom the great majority of our people belong, the two Committees in their joint
meetings did not pursue the idea of absolute divorce and, instead, opted for an
action for judicial declaration of invalidity of marriage based on grounds available
in the Canon Law. It was thought that such an action would not only be an
acceptable alternative to divorce but would also solve the nagging problem of
church annulments of marriages on grounds not recognized by the civil law of
the State. Justice Reyes was, thus, requested to again prepare a draft of
provisions on such action for celebration of invalidity of marriage. Still later, to
avoid the overlapping of provisions on void marriages as found in the present
Civil Code and those proposed by Justice Reyes on judicial declaration of
invalidity of marriage on grounds similar to the Canon Law, the two Committees
now working as a Joint Committee in the preparation of a New Family Code
decided to consolidate the present provisions on void marriages with the
proposals of Justice Reyes. The result was the inclusion of an additional kind of
void marriage in the enumeration of void marriages in the present Civil Code, to
wit:
(7) those marriages contracted by any party who, at
the time of the celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of
reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of
marriage or was psychologically or mentally incapacitated to
discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack or
incapacity is made manifest after the celebration.
as well as the following implementing provisions:
Art. 32. The absolute nullity of a marriage may be
invoked or pleaded only on the basis of a final judgment
declaring the marriage void, without prejudice to the provision
of Article 34.
Art. 33. The action or defense for the declaration of
the absolute nullity of a marriage shall not prescribe.
xxxxxxxxx
It is believed that many hopelessly broken marriages in our country today may already be dissolved
or annulled on the grounds proposed by the Joint Committee on declaration of nullity as well as
annulment of marriages, thus rendering an absolute divorce law unnecessary. In fact, during a
conference with Father Gerald Healy of the Ateneo University, as well as another meeting with
Archbishop Oscar Cruz of the Archdiocese of Pampanga, the Joint Committee was informed that
since Vatican II, the Catholic Church has been declaring marriages null and void on the ground of
lack of due discretion for causes that, in other jurisdictions, would be clear grounds for divorce, like
teen-age or premature marriages; marriage to a man who, because of some personality disorder or
disturbance, cannot support a family; the foolish or ridiculous choice of a spouse by an otherwise
perfectly normal person; marriage to a woman who refuses to cohabit with her husband or who
refuses to have children. Bishop Cruz also informed the Committee that they have found out in
tribunal work that a lot of machismo among husbands are manifestations of their sociopathic
personality anomaly, like inflicting physical violence upon their wives, constitutional indolence or
laziness, drug dependence or addiction, and psychosexual anomaly.[34]
In her separate opinion in Molina,[35] she expounded:
At the Committee meeting of July 26, 1986, the draft provision read:
(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage
or was psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even
if such lack of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration.

The twists and turns which the ensuing discussion took finally produced the following
revised provision even before the session was over:
(7) That contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack or incapacity
becomes manifest after the celebration.
Noticeably, the immediately preceding formulation above has dropped any reference to
wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage
and to mentally incapacitated. It was explained that these phrases refer to defects in the mental
faculties vitiating consent, which is not the idea . . . but lack of appreciation of one's marital
obligation. There being a defect in consent, it is clear that it should be a ground for voidable
marriage because there is the appearance of consent and it is capable of convalidation for the
simple reason that there are lucid intervals and there are cases when the insanity is curable . . .
Psychological incapacity does not refer to mental faculties and has nothing to do with consent; it
refers to obligations attendant to marriage.
My own position as a member of the Committee then was that psychological incapacity is,
in a sense, insanity of a lesser degree.
As to the proposal of Justice Caguioa to use the term psychological or mental impotence,
Archbishop Oscar Cruz opined in the earlier February 9, 1984 session that this term is an invention
of some churchmen who are moralists but not canonists, that is why it is considered a weak
phrase. He said that the Code of Canon Law would rather express it as psychological or mental
incapacity to discharge . . . Justice Ricardo C. Puno opined that sometimes a person may be
psychologically impotent with one but not with another.
One of the guidelines enumerated in the majority opinion for the interpretation and
application of Art. 36 is: Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent
or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse,
not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
The Committee, through Prof. Araceli T. Barrera, considered the inclusion of the phrase
and is incurable but Prof. Esteban B. Bautista commented that this would give rise to the question
of how they will determine curability and Justice Caguioa agreed that it would be more problematic.
Yet, the possibility that one may be cured after the psychological incapacity becomes manifest after
the marriage was not ruled out by Justice Puno and Justice Alice Sempio-Diy. Justice Caguioa
suggested that the remedy was to allow the afflicted spouse to remarry.
For clarity, the Committee classified the bases for determining void marriages, viz.:
1. lack of one or more of the essential requisites of marriage as contract;
2. reasons of public policy;
3. special cases and special situations.
The ground of psychological incapacity was subsumed under special cases and special situations,
hence, its special treatment in Art. 36 in the Family Code as finally enacted.
Nowhere in the Civil Code provisions on Marriage is there a ground for avoiding or
annulling marriages that even comes close to being psychological in nature.
Where consent is vitiated due to circumstances existing at the time of the marriage, such
marriage which stands valid until annulled is capable of ratification or convalidation.
On the other hand, for reasons of public policy or lack of essential requisites, some
marriages are void from the beginning.
With the revision of Book I of the Civil Code, particularly the provisions on Marriage, the
drafters, now open to fresh winds of change in keeping with the more permissive mores and
practices of the time, took a leaf from the relatively liberal provisions of Canon Law.

Canon 1095 which states, inter alia, that the following persons are incapable of
contracting marriage: 3. (those) who, because of causes of a psychological nature, are unable to
assume the essential obligations of marriage provided the model for what is now Art. 36 of the
Family Code: A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
It bears stressing that unlike in Civil Law, Canon Law recognizes only two types of
marriages with respect to their validity: valid and void. Civil Law, however, recognizes an
intermediate state, the voidable or annullable marriages. When the Ecclesiastical Tribunal annuls a
marriage, it actually declares the marriage null and void, i.e., it never really existed in the first place,
for a valid sacramental marriage can never be dissolved. Hence, a properly performed and
consummated marriage between two living Roman Catholics can only be nullified by the formal
annulment process which entails a full tribunal procedure with a Court selection and a formal
hearing.
Such so-called church annulments are not recognized by Civil Law as severing the
marriage ties as to capacitate the parties to enter lawfully into another marriage. The grounds for
nullifying civil marriage, not being congruent with those laid down by Canon Law, the former being
more strict, quite a number of married couples have found themselves in limbofreed from the
marriage bonds in the eyes of the Catholic Church but yet unable to contract a valid civil marriage
under state laws. Heedless of civil law sanctions, some persons contract new marriages or enter
into live-in relationships.
It was precisely to provide a satisfactory solution to such anomalous situations that the
Civil Law Revision Committee decided to engraft the Canon Law concept of psychological
incapacity into the Family Codeand classified the same as a ground for declaring marriages
void ab initio or totally inexistent from the beginning.
A brief historical note on the Old Canon Law (1917). This Old Code, while it did not
provide directly for psychological incapacity, in effect, recognized the same indirectly from a
combination of three old canons: Canon #1081 required persons to be capable according to law in
order to give valid consent; Canon #1082 required that persons be at least not ignorant of the major
elements required in marriage; and Canon #1087 (the force and fear category) required that
internal and external freedom be present in order for consent to be valid. This line of interpretation
produced two distinct but related grounds for annulment called lack of due discretion and lack of
due competence. Lack of due discretion means that the person did not have the ability to give valid
consent at the time of the wedding and, therefore, the union is invalid. Lack of due competence
means that the person was incapable of carrying out the obligations of the promise he or she made
during the wedding ceremony.
Favorable annulment decisions by the Roman Rota in the 1950s and 1960s
involving sexual disorders such as homosexuality and nymphomania laid the foundation for a
broader approach to the kind of proof necessary for psychological grounds for annulment.
The Rota had reasoned for the first time in several cases that the capacity to give valid consent at
the time of marriage was probably not present in persons who had displayed such problems shortly
after the marriage. The nature of this change was nothing short of revolutionary. Once
the Rota itself had demonstrated a cautious willingness to use this kind of hindsight, the way was
paved for what came after 1970. Diocesan Tribunals began to accept proof of serious
psychological problems that manifested themselves shortly after the ceremony as proof of an
inability to give valid consent at the time of the ceremony.[36]
Interestingly, the Committee did not give any examples of psychological incapacity for fear that by so doing,
it might limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. The Committee desired that the
courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil
courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision itself was taken from the Canon Law. [37] The law is then so
designed as to allow some resiliency in its application.[38]
Yet, as held in Santos,[39] the phrase psychological incapacity is not meant to comprehend all possible cases
of psychoses. It refers to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly noncognitive

of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage
which, as expressed by Article 68 [40] of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe
love, respect and fidelity; and render help and support. The intendment of the law has been to confine it to the most
serious of cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage.[41] This interpretation is, in fact, consistent with that in Canon Law, thus:
3.5.3.1. The Meaning of Incapacity to Assume. A sharp conceptual distinction must be made
between the second and third paragraphs of C.1095, namely between the grave lack of
discretionary judgment and the incapacity to assume the essential obligation. Mario Pompedda, a
rotal judge, explains the difference by an ordinary, if somewhat banal, example. Jose wishes to sell
a house to Carmela, and on the assumption that they are capable according to positive law to enter
such contract, there remains the object of the contract, viz, the house. The house is located in a
different locality, and prior to the conclusion of the contract, the house was gutted down by fire
unbeknown to both of them. This is the hypothesis contemplated by the third paragraph of the
canon. The third paragraph does not deal with the psychological process of giving consent because
it has been established a priori that both have such a capacity to give consent, and they both know
well the object of their consent [the house and its particulars]. Rather, C.1095.3 deals with the
object of the consent/contract which does not exist. The contract is invalid because it lacks its
formal object. The consent as a psychological act is both valid and sufficient. The psychological
act, however, is directed towards an object which is not available. Urbano Navarrete summarizes
this distinction: the third paragraph deals not with the positing of consent but with positing the
object of consent. The person may be capable of positing a free act of consent, but he is not
capable of fulfilling the responsibilities he assumes as a result of the consent he elicits.
Since the address of Pius XII to the auditors of the Roman Rota in 1941 regarding psychic
incapacity with respect to marriage arising from pathological conditions, there has been an
increasing trend to understand as ground of nullity different from others, the incapacity to assume
the essential obligations of marriage, especially the incapacity which arises from sexual
anomalies. Nymphomania is a sample which ecclesiastical jurisprudence has studied under this
rubric.
The problem as treated can be summarized, thus: do sexual anomalies always and in every case
imply a grave psychopathological condition which affects the higher faculties of intellect,
discernment, and freedom; or are there sexual anomalies that are purely so that is to say, they
arise from certain physiological dysfunction of the hormonal system, and they affect the sexual
condition, leaving intact the higher faculties however, so that these persons are still capable of free
human acts. The evidence from the empirical sciences is abundant that there are certain anomalies
of a sexual nature which may impel a person towards sexual activities which are not normal, either
with respect to its frequency [nymphomania, satyriasis] or to the nature of the activity itself [sadism,
masochism, homosexuality]. However, these anomalies notwithstanding, it is altogether possible
that the higher faculties remain intact such that a person so afflicted continues to have an adequate
understanding of what marriage is and of the gravity of its responsibilities. In fact, he can choose
marriage freely. The question though is whether such a person can assume those responsibilities
which he cannot fulfill, although he may be able to understand them. In this latter hypothesis, the
incapacity to assume the essential obligations of marriage issues from the incapacity to posit the
object of consent, rather than the incapacity to posit consent itself.
Ecclesiastical jurisprudence has been hesitant, if not actually confused, in this regard. The initial
steps taken by church courts were not too clear whether this incapacity is incapacity to posit
consent or incapacity to posit the object of consent. A case c. Pinna, for example, arrives at the
conclusion that the intellect, under such an irresistible impulse, is prevented from properly
deliberating and its judgment lacks freedom. This line of reasoning supposes that the intellect, at
the moment of consent, is under the influence of this irresistible compulsion, with the inevitable
conclusion that such a decision, made as it was under these circumstances, lacks the necessary
freedom. It would be incontrovertible that a decision made under duress, such as this irresistible
impulse, would not be a free act. But this is precisely the question: is it, as a matter of fact, true that
the intellect is always and continuously under such an irresistible compulsion? It would seem
entirely possible, and certainly more reasonable, to think that there are certain cases in which one
who is sexually hyperaesthetic can understand perfectly and evaluate quite maturely what marriage
is and what it implies; his consent would be juridically ineffective for this one reason that he cannot
posit the object of consent, the exclusive jus in corpus to be exercised in a normal way and with
usually regularity. It would seem more correct to say that the consent may indeed be free, but is

juridically ineffective because the party is consenting to an object that he cannot deliver. The house
he is selling was gutted down by fire.
3.5.3.2. Incapacity as an Autonomous Ground. Sabattani seems to have seen his way more
clearly through this tangled mess, proposing as he did a clear conceptual distinction between the
inability to give consent on the one hand, and the inability to fulfill the object of consent, on the
other. It is his opinion that nymphomaniacs usually understand the meaning of marriage, and they
are usually able to evaluate its implications. They would have no difficulty with positing a free and
intelligent consent. However, such persons, capable as they are of eliciting an intelligent and free
consent, experience difficulty in another sphere: delivering the object of the consent. Anne, another
rotal judge, had likewise treated the difference between the act of consenting and the act of
positing the object of consent from the point of view of a person afflicted with
nymphomania. According to him, such an affliction usually leaves the process of knowing and
understanding and evaluating intact. What it affects is the object of consent: the delivering of the
goods.
3.5.3.3 Incapacity as Incapacity to Posit the Object of Consent. From the selected rotal
jurisprudence cited, supra, it is possible to see a certain progress towards a consensus doctrine
that the incapacity to assume the essential obligations of marriage (that is to say, the formal object
of consent) can coexist in the same person with the ability to make a free decision, an intelligent
judgment, and a mature evaluation and weighing of things. The decision coram
Sabattaniconcerning a nymphomaniac affirmed that such a spouse can have difficulty not only with
regard to the moment of consent but also, and especially, with regard to the matrimonium in facto
esse. The decision concludes that a person in such a condition is incapable of assuming the
conjugal obligation of fidelity, although she may have no difficulty in understanding what the
obligations of marriage are, nor in the weighing and evaluating of those same obligations.
Prior to the promulgation of the Code of Canon Law in 1983, it was not unusual to refer to this
ground as moral impotence or psychic impotence, or similar expressions to express a specific
incapacity rooted in some anomalies and disorders in the personality. These anomalies leave intact
the faculties of the will and the intellect. It is qualified as moral or psychic, obviously to distinguish it
from the impotence that constitutes the impediment dealt with by C.1084.Nonetheless, the
anomalies render the subject incapable of binding himself in a valid matrimonial pact, to the extent
that the anomaly renders that person incapable of fulfilling the essential obligations. According to
the principle affirmed by the long tradition of moral theology: nemo ad impossibile tenetur.
xxxx
3.5.3.5 Indications of Incapacity. There is incapacity when either or both of the contractants are
not capable of initiating or maintaining this consortium.One immediately thinks of those cases
where one of the parties is so self-centered [e.g., a narcissistic personality] that he does not even
know how to begin a union with the other, let alone how to maintain and sustain such a
relationship. A second incapacity could be due to the fact that the spouses are incapable of
beginning or maintaining a heterosexual consortium, which goes to the very substance of
matrimony. Another incapacity could arise when a spouse is unable to concretize the good of
himself or of the other party. The canon speaks, not of the bonum partium, but of the bonum
conjugum. A spouse who is capable only of realizing or contributing to the good of the other
party qua persona rather than qua conjunx would be deemed incapable of contracting
marriage. Such would be the case of a person who may be quite capable of procuring the
economic good and the financial security of the other, but not capable of realizing the bonum
conjugale of the other. These are general strokes and this is not the place for detained and
individual description.
A rotal decision c. Pinto resolved a petition where the concrete circumstances of the case concerns
a person diagnosed to be suffering from serious sociopathy. He concluded that while the
respondent may have understood, on the level of the intellect, the essential obligations of marriage,
he was not capable of assuming them because of his constitutional immorality.
Stankiewicz clarifies that the maturity and capacity of the person as regards the fulfillment of
responsibilities is determined not only at the moment of decision but also and especially during the
moment of execution of decision. And when this is applied to constitution of the marital consent, it
means that the actual fulfillment of the essential obligations of marriage is a pertinent consideration

that must be factored into the question of whether a person was in a position to assume the
obligations of marriage in the first place. When one speaks of the inability of the party to assume
and fulfill the obligations, one is not looking at matrimonium in fieri, but also and especially
at matrimonium in facto esse. In [the] decision of 19 Dec. 1985, Stankiewicz collocated the
incapacity of the respondent to assume the essential obligations of marriage in the psychic
constitution of the person, precisely on the basis of his irresponsibility as regards money and his
apathy as regards the rights of others that he had violated. Interpersonal relationships are
invariably disturbed in the presence of this personality disorder. A lack of empathy (inability to
recognize and experience how others feel) is common. A sense of entitlement, unreasonable
expectation, especially favorable treatment, is usually present. Likewise common is interpersonal
exploitativeness, in which others are taken advantage of in order to achieve ones ends.
Authors have made listings of obligations considered as essential matrimonial obligations. One of
them is the right to the communio vitae. This and their corresponding obligations are basically
centered around the good of the spouses and of the children. Serious psychic anomalies, which do
not have to be necessarily incurable, may give rise to the incapacity to assume any, or several, or
even all of these rights. There are some cases in which interpersonal relationship is
impossible. Some characteristic features of inability for interpersonal relationships in marriage
include affective immaturity, narcissism, and antisocial traits.
Marriage and Homosexuality. Until 1967, it was not very clear under what rubric homosexuality was
understood to be invalidating of marriage that is to say, is homosexuality invalidating because of
the inability to evaluate the responsibilities of marriage, or because of the inability to fulfill its
obligations.Progressively, however, rotal jurisprudence began to understand it as incapacity to
assume the obligations of marriage so that by 1978, Parisella was able to consider, with charity,
homosexuality as an autonomous ground of nullity. This is to say that a person so afflicted is said to
be unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage. In this same rotal decision, the object of
matrimonial consent is understood to refer not only to the jus in corpus but also theconsortium
totius vitae. The third paragraph of C.1095 [incapacity to assume the essential obligations of
marriage] certainly seems to be the more adequate juridical structure to account for the complex
phenomenon that homosexuality is. The homosexual is not necessarily impotent because, except
in very few exceptional cases, such a person is usually capable of full sexual relations with the
spouse. Neither is it a mental infirmity, and a person so afflicted does not necessarily suffer from a
grave lack of due discretion because this sexual anomaly does not by itself affect the critical,
volitive, and intellectual faculties.Rather, the homosexual person is unable to assume the
responsibilities of marriage because he is unable to fulfill this object of the matrimonial contract. In
other words, the invalidity lies, not so much in the defect of consent, as in the defect of the object of
consent.
3.5.3.6 Causes of Incapacity. A last point that needs to be addressed is the source of incapacity
specified by the canon: causes of a psychological nature.Pompedda proffers the opinion that the
clause is a reference to the personality of the contractant. In other words, there must be a
reference to the psychic part of the person. It is only when there is something in the psyche or in
the psychic constitution of the person which impedes his capacity that one can then affirm that the
person is incapable according to the hypothesis contemplated by C.1095.3. A person is judged
incapable in this juridical sense only to the extent that he is found to have something rooted in his
psychic constitution which impedes the assumption of these obligations. A bad habit deeply
engrained in ones consciousness would not seem to qualify to be a source of this invalidating
incapacity. The difference being that there seems to be some freedom, however remote, in the
development of the habit, while one accepts as given ones psychic constitution. It would seem then
that the law insists that the source of the incapacity must be one which is not the fruit of some
degree of freedom.[42]
Conscious of the laws intention that it is the courts, on a case-to-case basis, that should determine whether
a party to a marriage is psychologically incapacitated, the Court, in sustaining the lower courts judgment of annulment
in Tuason v. Court of Appeals,[43] ruled that the findings of the trial court are final and binding on the appellate courts.
[44]

Again, upholding the trial courts findings and declaring that its decision was not a judgment on the
pleadings, the Court, in Tsoi v. Court of Appeals,[45] explained that when private respondent testified under oath before
the lower court and was cross-examined by the adverse party, she thereby presented evidence in the form of
testimony. Importantly, the Court, aware of parallel decisions of Catholic marriage tribunals, ruled that the senseless

and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the marital obligation of procreating children is equivalent to
psychological incapacity.
The resiliency with which the concept should be applied and the case-to-case basis by which the provision
should be interpreted, as so intended by its framers, had, somehow, been rendered ineffectual by the imposition of a
set of strict standards in Molina,[46] thus:
From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the following guidelines in the
interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the
guidance of the bench and the bar:
(1)
The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff.
Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws
cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire
Article on the Family, recognizing it as the foundation of the nation. It decrees marriage as legally
inviolable, thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and
marriage are to be protected by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and
emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in
the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychologicalnot
physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must
convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent
that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not
have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here
so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis,
nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating
nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the
marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their I
do's. The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself
must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be
relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage,
like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in
diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be
psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential
obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume
the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, mild characterological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as
downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words,
there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same
Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be
stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our
courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon
1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:
The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the
essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature.
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil
laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization,
great persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally subject to
our law on evidencewhat is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code
provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State
and the Churchwhile remaining independent, separate and apart from each othershall walk
together in synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the
family as the inviolable base of the nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General
issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his
agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the
prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the
date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge
the equivalent function of thedefensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.[47]
Noteworthy is that in Molina, while the majority of the Courts membership concurred in the ponencia of then
Associate Justice (later Chief Justice) Artemio V. Panganiban, three justices concurred in the result and another
threeincluding, as aforesaid, Justice Romerotook pains to compose their individual separate opinions. Then Justice
Teodoro R. Padilla even emphasized that each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions,
predelictions or generalizations, but according to its own facts. In the field of psychological incapacity as a ground for
annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on all fours with another case. The trial judge must take pains
in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment
for that of the trial court.[48]
Predictably, however, in resolving subsequent cases, [49] the Court has applied the aforesaid standards,
without too much regard for the laws clear intention that each case is to be treated differently, as courts should
interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.
In hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid set of rules, as the one in Molina,
in resolving all cases of psychological incapacity. Understandably, the Court was then alarmed by the deluge of
petitions for the dissolution of marital bonds, and was sensitive to the OSGs exaggeration of Article 36 as the most
liberal divorce procedure in the world. [50] The unintended consequences of Molina, however, has taken its toll on
people who have to live with deviant behavior, moral insanity and sociopathic personality anomaly, which, like
termites, consume little by little the very foundation of their families, our basic social institutions. Far from what was
intended by the Court,Molina has become a strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to fit into and be bound by it. Wittingly or
unwittingly, the Court, in conveniently applyingMolina, has allowed diagnosed sociopaths, schizophrenics,
nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like, to continuously debase and pervert the sanctity of marriage. Ironically, the
Roman Rota has annulled marriages on account of the personality disorders of the said individuals.[51]
The Court need not worry about the possible abuse of the remedy provided by Article 36, for there are ample
safeguards against this contingency, among which is the intervention by the State, through the public prosecutor, to
guard against collusion between the parties and/or fabrication of evidence. [52] The Court should rather be alarmed by
the rising number of cases involving marital abuse, child abuse, domestic violence and incestuous rape.
In dissolving marital bonds on account of either partys psychological incapacity, the Court is not demolishing
the foundation of families, but it is actually protecting the sanctity of marriage, because it refuses to allow a person
afflicted with a psychological disorder, who cannot comply with or assume the essential marital obligations, from
remaining in that sacred bond. It may be stressed that the infliction of physical violence, constitutional indolence or

laziness, drug dependence or addiction, and psychosexual anomaly are manifestations of a sociopathic personality
anomaly.[53] Let it be noted that in Article 36, there is no marriage to speak of in the first place, as the same is void
from the very beginning.[54]To indulge in imagery, the declaration of nullity under Article 36 will simply provide a decent
burial to a stillborn marriage.
The prospect of a possible remarriage by the freed spouses should not pose too much of a concern for the
Court. First and foremost, because it is none of its business. And second, because the judicial declaration of
psychological incapacity operates as a warning or a lesson learned. On one hand, the normal spouse would have
become vigilant, and never again marry a person with a personality disorder. On the other hand, a would-be spouse
of the psychologically incapacitated runs the risk of the latters disorder recurring in their marriage.
Lest it be misunderstood, we are not suggesting the abandonment of Molina in this case. We simply declare
that, as aptly stated by Justice Dante O. Tinga in Antonio v. Reyes,[55] there is need to emphasize other perspectives
as well which should govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. At the risk of being
redundant, we reiterate once more the principle that each case must be judged, not on the basis of a
priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. And, to repeat for emphasis, courts
should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers
in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.
II.
We now examine the instant case.
The parties whirlwind relationship lasted more or less six (6) months. They met in January 1996, eloped in
March, exchanged marital vows in May, and parted ways in June. The psychologist who provided expert testimony
found both parties psychologically incapacitated. Petitioners behavioral pattern falls under the classification of
dependent personality disorder, and respondents, that of the narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder.[56]
By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary task and burden of decisionmaking, must not discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on the
psychological and mental temperaments of the parties.[57]
Justice Romero explained this in Molina, as follows:
Furthermore, and equally significant, the professional opinion of a psychological expert
became increasingly important in such cases. Data about the person's entire life, both before and
after the ceremony, were presented to these experts and they were asked to give professional
opinions about a party's mental capacity at the time of the wedding. These opinions were rarely
challenged and tended to be accepted as decisive evidence of lack of valid consent.
The Church took pains to point out that its new openness in this area did not amount to
the addition of new grounds for annulment, but rather was an accommodation by the Church to
the advances made in psychology during the past decades. There was now the expertise to
provide the all-important connecting link between a marriage breakdown and premarital causes.
During the 1970s, the Church broadened its whole idea of marriage from that of a legal
contract to that of a covenant. The result of this was that it could no longer be assumed in
annulment cases that a person who could intellectually understand the concept of marriage could
necessarily give valid consent to marry. The ability to both grasp and assume the real obligations of
a mature, lifelong commitment are now considered a necessary prerequisite to valid matrimonial
consent.
Rotal decisions continued applying the concept of incipient psychological incapacity, not
only to sexual anomalies but to all kinds of personality disorders that incapacitate a spouse or both
spouses from assuming or carrying out the essential obligations of marriage. For marriage . . . is
not merely cohabitation or the right of the spouses to each other's body for heterosexual acts, but
is, in its totality the right to the community of the whole of life; i.e., the right to a developing lifelong
relationship. Rotal decisions since 1973 have refined the meaning of psychological or psychic
capacity for marriage as presupposing the development of an adult personality; as meaning the
capacity of the spouses to give themselves to each other and to accept the other as a distinct
person; that the spouses must be other oriented since the obligations of marriage are rooted in a
self-giving love; and that the spouses must have the capacity for interpersonal relationship because

marriage is more than just a physical reality but involves a true intertwining of personalities. The
fulfillment of the obligations of marriage depends, according to Church decisions, on the strength of
this interpersonal relationship. A serious incapacity for interpersonal sharing and support is held to
impair the relationship and consequently, the ability to fulfill the essential marital obligations. The
marital capacity of one spouse is not considered in isolation but in reference to the fundamental
relationship to the other spouse.
Fr. Green, in an article in Catholic Mind, lists six elements necessary to the mature marital
relationship:
The courts consider the following elements crucial to the marital
commitment: (1) a permanent and faithful commitment to the marriage partner;
(2) openness to children and partner; (3) stability; (4) emotional maturity; (5)
financial responsibility; (6) an ability to cope with the ordinary stresses and
strains of marriage, etc.
Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the psychological conditions that might lead to the
failure of a marriage:
At stake is a type of constitutional impairment precluding conjugal communion
even with the best intentions of the parties. Among the psychic factors possibly
giving rise to his or her inability to fulfill marital obligations are the following: (1)
antisocial personality with its fundamental lack of loyalty to persons or sense of
moral values; (2) hyperesthesia, where the individual has no real freedom of
sexual choice; (3) the inadequate personality where personal responses
consistently fall short of reasonable expectations.
xxxx
The psychological grounds are the best approach for anyone who
doubts whether he or she has a case for an annulment on any other terms. A
situation that does not fit into any of the more traditional categories often fits very
easily into the psychological category.
As new as the psychological grounds are, experts are already detecting
a shift in their use. Whereas originally the emphasis was on the parties' inability
to exercise proper judgment at the time of the marriage (lack of due discretion),
recent cases seem to be concentrating on the parties' incapacity to assume or
carry out their responsibilities and obligations as promised (lack of due
competence). An advantage to using the ground of lack of due competence is
that at the time the marriage was entered into civil divorce and breakup of the
family almost always is proof of someone's failure to carry out marital
responsibilities as promised at the time the marriage was entered into.[58]
Hernandez v. Court of Appeals[59] emphasizes the importance of presenting expert testimony to establish the
precise cause of a partys psychological incapacity, and to show that it existed at the inception of the marriage. And
as Marcos v. Marcos[60] asserts, there is no requirement that the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated
be personally examined by a physician, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity.[61] Verily, the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest
psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.
This is not to mention, but we mention nevertheless for emphasis, that the presentation of expert proof
presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive
diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of psychological incapacity.[62] Parenthetically, the Court, at this
point, finds it fitting to suggest the inclusion in the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages,[63] an option for the trial judge to refer the case to a court-appointed
psychologist/expert for an independent assessment and evaluation of the psychological state of the parties. This will
assist the courts, who are no experts in the field of psychology, to arrive at an intelligent and judicious determination
of the case. The rule, however, does not dispense with the parties prerogative to present their own expert witnesses.

Going back, in the case at bench, the psychological assessment, which we consider as adequate, produced
the findings that both parties are afflicted with personality disordersto repeat, dependent personality disorder for
petitioner, and narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder for respondent. We note that The Encyclopedia of
Mental Health discusses personality disorders as follows
A group of disorders involving behaviors or traits that are characteristic of a persons recent and
long-term functioning. Patterns of perceiving and thinking are not usually limited to isolated
episodes but are deeply ingrained, inflexible, maladaptive and severe enough to cause the
individual mental stress or anxieties or to interfere with interpersonal relationships and normal
functioning. Personality disorders are often recognizable by adolescence or earlier, continue
through adulthood and become less obvious in middle or old age. An individual may have more
than one personality disorder at a time.
The common factor among individuals who have personality disorders, despite a variety of
character traits, is the way in which the disorder leads to pervasive problems in social and
occupational adjustment. Some individuals with personality disorders are perceived by others as
overdramatic, paranoid, obnoxious or even criminal, without an awareness of their behaviors. Such
qualities may lead to trouble getting along with other people, as well as difficulties in other areas of
life and often a tendency to blame others for their problems. Other individuals with personality
disorders are not unpleasant or difficult to work with but tend to be lonely, isolated or
dependent. Such traits can lead to interpersonal difficulties, reduced self-esteem and
dissatisfaction with life.
Causes of Personality Disorders Different mental health viewpoints propose a variety of
causes of personality disorders. These include Freudian, genetic factors, neurobiologic theories
and brain wave activity.
Freudian Sigmund Freud believed that fixation at certain stages of development led to
certain personality types. Thus, some disorders as described in the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders (3d ed., rev.) are derived from his oral, anal and phallic character
types. Demanding and dependent behavior (dependent and passive-aggressive) was thought to
derive from fixation at the oral stage. Characteristics of obsessionality, rigidity and emotional
aloofness were thought to derive from fixation at the anal stage; fixation at the phallic stage was
thought to lead to shallowness and an inability to engage in intimate relationships. However, later
researchers have found little evidence that early childhood events or fixation at certain stages of
development lead to specific personality patterns.
Genetic Factors Researchers have found that there may be a genetic factor involved in
the etiology of antisocial and borderline personality disorders; there is less evidence of inheritance
of other personality disorders. Some family, adoption and twin studies suggest that schizotypal
personality may be related to genetic factors.
Neurobiologic Theories In individuals who have borderline personality, researchers have
found that low cerebrospinal fluid 5-hydroxyindoleacetic acid (5-HIAA) negatively correlated with
measures of aggression and a past history of suicide attempts. Schizotypal personality has been
associated with low platelet monoamine oxidase (MAO) activity and impaired smooth pursuit eye
movement.
Brain Wave Activity Abnormalities in electroencephalograph (EEG) have been reported in antisocial
personality for many years; slow wave is the most widely reported abnormality. A study of
borderline patients reported that 38 percent had at least marginal EEG abnormalities, compared
with 19 percent in a control group.
Types of Disorders According to the American Psychiatric Associations Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders (3d ed., rev., 1987), or DSM-III-R, personality disorders are
categorized into three major clusters:
Cluster A: Paranoid, schizoid and schizotypal personality disorders. Individuals who have these
disorders often appear to have odd or eccentric habits and traits.
Cluster B: Antisocial, borderline, histrionic and narcissistic personality disorders. Individuals who
have these disorders often appear overly emotional, erratic and dramatic.
Cluster C: Avoidant, dependent, obsessive-compulsive and passive-aggressive personality
disorders. Individuals who have these disorders often appear anxious or fearful.

The DSM-III-R also lists another category, personality disorder not otherwise specified, that can be
used for other specific personality disorders or for mixed conditions that do not qualify as any of the
specific personality disorders.
Individuals with diagnosable personality disorders usually have long-term concerns, and
thus therapy may be long-term.[64]
Dependent personality disorder is characterized in the following manner
A personality disorder characterized by a pattern of dependent and submissive behavior. Such
individuals usually lack self-esteem and frequently belittle their capabilities; they fear criticism and
are easily hurt by others comments. At times they actually bring about dominance by others
through a quest for overprotection.
Dependent personality disorder usually begins in early adulthood. Individuals who have this
disorder may be unable to make everyday decisions without advice or reassurance from others,
may allow others to make most of their important decisions (such as where to live), tend to agree
with people even when they believe they are wrong, have difficulty starting projects or doing things
on their own, volunteer to do things that are demeaning in order to get approval from other people,
feel uncomfortable or helpless when alone and are often preoccupied with fears of being
abandoned.[65]
and antisocial personality disorder described, as follows
Characteristics include a consistent pattern of behavior that is intolerant of the conventional
behavioral limitations imposed by a society, an inability to sustain a job over a period of years,
disregard for the rights of others (either through exploitiveness or criminal behavior), frequent
physical fights and, quite commonly, child or spouse abuse without remorse and a tendency to
blame others. There is often a faade of charm and even sophistication that masks disregard, lack of
remorse for mistreatment of others and the need to control others.
Although characteristics of this disorder describe criminals, they also may befit some individuals
who are prominent in business or politics whose habits of self-centeredness and disregard for the
rights of others may be hidden prior to a public scandal.
During the 19th century, this type of personality disorder was referred to as moral insanity. The term
described immoral, guiltless behavior that was not accompanied by impairments in reasoning.
According to the classification system used in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (3d ed., rev. 1987), anti-social personality disorder is one of the four dramatic personality
disorders, the others being borderline, histrionic and narcissistic.[66]
The seriousness of the diagnosis and the gravity of the disorders considered, the Court, in this case, finds as
decisive the psychological evaluation made by the expert witness; and, thus, rules that the marriage of the parties is
null and void on ground of both parties psychological incapacity. We further consider that the trial court, which had a
first-hand view of the witnesses deportment, arrived at the same conclusion.
Indeed, petitioner, who is afflicted with dependent personality disorder, cannot assume the essential marital
obligations of living together, observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering help and support, for he is unable to
make everyday decisions without advice from others, allows others to make most of his important decisions (such as
where to live), tends to agree with people even when he believes they are wrong, has difficulty doing things on his
own, volunteers to do things that are demeaning in order to get approval from other people, feels uncomfortable or
helpless when alone and is often preoccupied with fears of being abandoned. [67] As clearly shown in this case,
petitioner followed everything dictated to him by the persons around him. He is insecure, weak and gullible, has no
sense of his identity as a person, has no cohesive self to speak of, and has no goals and clear direction in life.
Although on a different plane, the same may also be said of the respondent. Her being afflicted with antisocial
personality disorder makes her unable to assume the essential marital obligations. This finding takes into account her
disregard for the rights of others, her abuse, mistreatment and control of others without remorse, her tendency to
blame others, and her intolerance of the conventional behavioral limitations imposed by society.[68] Moreover, as
shown in this case, respondent is impulsive and domineering; she had no qualms in manipulating petitioner with her
threats of blackmail and of committing suicide.

Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and incurable psychological incapacity, the precipitous marriage which
they contracted on April 23, 1996 is thus, declared null and void.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The August 5, 2003
Decision and the January 19, 2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 71867
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the Decision, dated July 30, 2001,REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA


Associate Justice

SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION


LESTER BENJAMIN S. HALILI, G.R. No. 165424
Petitioner,
Present:
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
CORONA,
- v e r s u s - VELASCO, JR.,*
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO and
PERALTA,** JJ.
CHONA M. SANTOS-HALILI
and THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES,
Respondents. Promulgated:
June 9, 2009
x--------------------------------------------------x
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
This resolves the motion for reconsideration of the April 16, 2008 resolution of this Court denying petitioners
petition for review on certiorari (under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court). The petition sought to set aside the January 26,
2004 decision[1] and September 24, 2004resolution[2] of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 60010.
Petitioner Lester Benjamin S. Halili filed a petition to declare his marriage to respondent Chona M. SantosHalili null and void on the basis of his psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Pasig City, Branch 158.
He alleged that he wed respondent in civil rites thinking that it was a joke. After the ceremonies, they never
lived together as husband and wife, but maintained the relationship. However, they started fighting constantly a year
later, at which point petitioner decided to stop seeing respondent and started dating other women. Immediately
thereafter, he received prank calls telling him to stop dating other women as he was already a married man. It was
only upon making an inquiry that he found out that the marriage was not fake.

Eventually, the RTC found petitioner to be suffering from a mixed personality disorder, particularly dependent
and self-defeating personality disorder, as diagnosed by his expert witness, Dr. Natividad Dayan. The court a
quo held that petitioners personality disorder was serious and incurable and directly affected his capacity to comply
with his essential marital obligations to respondent. It thus declared the marriage null and void.[3]
On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the decision of the trial court on the ground that the totality of the
evidence presented failed to establish petitioners psychological incapacity. Petitioner moved for reconsideration. It
was denied.
The case was elevated to this Court via a petition for review under Rule 45. We affirmed the CAs decision
and resolution upholding the validity of the marriage.
Petitioner then filed this motion for reconsideration reiterating his argument that his marriage to respondent
ought to be declared null and void on the basis of his psychological incapacity. He stressed that the evidence he
presented, especially the testimony of his expert witness, was more than enough to sustain the findings and
conclusions of the trial court that he was and still is psychologically incapable of complying with the essential
obligations of marriage.
We grant the motion for reconsideration.
In the recent case of Te v. Yu-Te and the Republic of the Philippines,[4] this Court reiterated that courts
should interpret the provision on psychological incapacity (as a ground for the declaration of nullity of a marriage) on
a case-to-case basis guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines and
by decisions of church tribunals.
Accordingly, we emphasized that, by the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary task
and burden of decision-making, must consider as essential the expert opinion on the psychological and mental
disposition of the parties.[5]
In this case, the testimony[6] of petitioners expert witness revealed that petitioner was suffering from
dependent personality disorder. Thus:
Q. Dr. Dayan, going back to the examinations and interviews which you conducted, can you briefly
tell this court your findings [and] conclusions?
A. Well, the petitioner is suffering from a personality disorder. It is a mixed personality disorder
from self-defeating personality disorder to [dependent] personality disorder and this is brought
about by [a] dysfunctional family that petitioner had. He also suffered from partner relational
problem during his marriage with Chona. There were lots of fights and it was not truly a marriage,
sir.
Q. Now, what made you conclude that Lester is suffering from psychological incapacity to handle
the essential obligations of marriage?
A. Sir, for the reason that his motivation for marriage was very questionable. It was a very impulsive
decision. I dont think he understood what it meant to really be married and after the marriage, there
was no consummation, there was no sexual intercourse, he never lived with the respondent. And
after three months he refused to see or talk with the respondent and afterwards, I guess the
relationship died a natural death, and he never thought it was a really serious matter at all.
xx xx xx
Q. Likewise, you stated here in your evaluation that Lester Halili and respondent suffered from a
grave lack of discretionary judgment. Can you expound on this?
A. xx xx I dont think they truly appreciate the civil [rites which] they had undergone. [It was] just a
spur of the moment decision that they should get married xx xx I dont think they truly considered
themselves married.
xx xx xx
Q. Now [from] what particular portion of their marriage were you able to conclude xx xx that
petitioner and respondent are suffering from psychological incapacity?

A. xx xx they never lived together[.] [T]hey never had a residence, they never consummated the
marriage. During the very short relationship they had, there were frequent quarrels and so there
might be a problem also of lack of respect [for] each other and afterwards there was abandonment.
In Te, this Court defined dependent personality disorder[7] as
[a] personality disorder characterized by a pattern of dependent and submissive behavior.
Such individuals usually lack self-esteem and frequently belittle their capabilities; they fear criticism
and are easily hurt by others comments. At times they actually bring about dominance by others
through a quest for overprotection.
Dependent personality disorder usually begins in early adulthood. Individuals who have
this disorder may be unable to make everyday decisions without advice or reassurance from
others, may allow others to make most of their important decisions (such as where to live), tend to
agree with people even when they believe they are wrong, have difficulty starting projects or doing
things on their own, volunteer to do things that are demeaning in order to get approval from other
people, feel uncomfortable or helpless when alone and are often preoccupied with fears of being
abandoned.
In her psychological report,[8] Dr. Dayan stated that petitioners dependent personality disorder was evident in
the fact that petitioner was very much attached to his parents and depended on them for decisions. [9] Petitioners
mother even had to be the one to tell him to seek legal help when he felt confused on what action to take upon
learning that his marriage to respondent was for real.[10]
Dr. Dayan further observed that, as expected of persons suffering from a dependent personality disorder,
petitioner typically acted in a self-denigrating manner and displayed a self-defeating attitude. This submissive attitude
encouraged other people to take advantage of him. [11] This could be seen in the way petitioner allowed himself to be
dominated, first, by his father who treated his family like robots [12] and, later, by respondent who was as domineering
as his father.[13] When petitioner could no longer take respondents domineering ways, he preferred to hide from her
rather than confront her and tell her outright that he wanted to end their marriage.[14]
Dr. Dayan traced petitioners personality disorder to his dysfunctional family life, to wit: [15]
Q. And what might be the root cause of such psychological incapacity?
A. Sir, I mentioned awhile ago that Lesters family is dysfunctional. The father was very
abusive, very domineering. The mother has been very unhappy and the children never had
affirmation. They might [have been] x x x given financial support because the father was [a] very
affluent person but it was never an intact family. x x x The wife and the children were practically
robots. And so, I would say Lester grew up, not having self-confidence, very immature and
somehow not truly understand[ing] what [it] meant to be a husband, what [it] meant to have a real
family life.
Ultimately, Dr. Dayan concluded that petitioners personality disorder was grave and incurable and already
existent at the time of the celebration of his marriage to respondent.[16]
It has been sufficiently established that petitioner had a psychological condition that was grave and incurable
and had a deeply rooted cause. This Court, in the same Te case, recognized that individuals with diagnosable
personality disorders usually have long-term concerns, and thus therapy may be long-term. [17] Particularly, personality
disorders are long-standing, inflexible ways of behaving that are not so much severe mental disorders as
dysfunctional styles of living. These disorders affect all areas of functioning and, beginning in childhood or
adolescence, create problems for those who display them and for others.[18]
From the foregoing, it has been shown that petitioner is indeed suffering from psychological incapacity that
effectively renders him unable to perform the essential obligations of marriage. Accordingly, the marriage between
petitioner and respondent is declared null and void.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby GRANTED. The April 16, 2008 resolution of this
Court and the January 26, 2004decision and September 24, 2004 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 60010 are SET ASIDE.

The decision
hereby REINSTATED.

of

the

Regional

Trial

Court, Pasig City,

Branch

158

dated April

17,

1998 is

SO ORDERED.
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 126010. December 8, 1999]
LUCITA

ESTRELLA
HERNANDEZ, petitioner
HERNANDEZ, respondents.

vs. COURT

OF

APPEALS

and

MARIO

C.

DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals, dated January 30, 1996,
affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Tagaytay City, dated April 10, 1993, which dismissed the
petition for annulment of marriage filed by petitioner.
Petitioner Lucita Estrella Hernandez and private respondent Mario C. Hernandez were married at the Silang
Catholic Parish Church in Silang, Cavite on January 1, 1981 (Exh. A). [2] Three children were born to them, namely,
Maie, who was born on May 3, 1982 (Exh. B), [3] Lyra, born on May 22, 1985 (Exh. C), [4] and Marian, born on June 15,
1989 (Exh. D).[5]
On July 10, 1992, petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Tagaytay City, a petition seeking
the annulment of her marriage to private respondent on the ground of psychological incapacity of the latter. She
alleged that from the time of their marriage up to the time of the filing of the suit, private respondent failed to perform
his obligation to support the family and contribute to the management of the household, devoting most of his time
engaging in drinking sprees with his friends. She further claimed that private respondent, after they were married,
cohabited with another woman with whom he had an illegitimate child, while having affairs with different women, and
that, because of his promiscuity, private respondent endangered her health by infecting her with a sexually
transmissible disease (STD). She averred that private respondent was irresponsible, immature and unprepared for
the duties of a married life. Petitioner prayed that for having abandoned the family, private respondent be ordered to
give support to their three children in the total amount of P9,000.00 every month; that she be awarded the custody of
their children; and that she be adjudged as the sole owner of a parcel of land located at Don Gregorio Subdivision I in
Bo. Bucal, Dasmarias, Cavite, purchased during the marriage, as well as the jeep which private respondent took with
him when he left the conjugal home on June 12, 1992.[6]

On October 8, 1992, because of private respondents failure to file his answer, the trial court issued an order
directing the assistant provincial prosecutor to conduct an investigation to determine if there was collusion between
the parties.[7] Only petitioner appeared at the investigation on November 5, 1992. Nevertheless, the prosecutor found
no evidence of collusion and recommended that the case be set for trial.[8]
Based on the evidence presented by the petitioner, the facts are as follows:[9]
Petitioner and private respondent met in 1977 at the Philippine Christian University in Dasmarias,
Cavite. Petitioner, who is five years older than private respondent, was then in her first year of teaching zoology and
botany. Private respondent, a college freshman, was her student for two consecutive semesters. They became
sweethearts in February 1979 when she was no longer private respondents teacher. On January 1, 1981, they were
married.
Private respondent continued his studies for two more years. His parents paid for his tuition fees, while
petitioner provided his allowances and other financial needs.The family income came from petitioners salary as a
faculty member of the Philippine Christian University. Petitioner augmented her earnings by selling Tupperware
products, as well as engaging in the buy-and-sell of coffee, rice and polvoron.
From 1983 up to 1986, as private respondent could not find a stable job, it was agreed that he would help
petitioner in her businesses by delivering orders to customers.However, because her husband was a spendthrift and
had other women, petitioners business suffered. Private respondent often had smoking and drinking sprees with his
friends and betted on fighting cocks. In 1982, after the birth of their first child, petitioner discovered two love letters
written by a certain Realita Villena to private respondent. She knew Villena as a married student whose husband was
working in Saudi Arabia. When petitioner confronted private respondent, he admitted having an extra-marital affair
with Villena. Petitioner then pleaded with Villena to end her relationship with private respondent. For his part, private
respondent said he would end the affairs, but he did not keep his promise. Instead, he left the conjugal home and
abandoned petitioner and their child. When private respondent came back, however, petitioner accepted him, despite
private respondents infidelity in the hope of saving their marriage.
Upon the recommendation of a family friend, private respondent was able to get a job at Reynolds Philippines,
Inc. in San Agustin, Dasmarias, Cavite in 1986.However, private respondent was employed only until March 31, 1991,
because he availed himself of the early retirement plan offered by the company. He receivedP53,000.00 in retirement
pay, but instead of spending the amount for the needs of the family, private respondent spent the money on himself
and consumed the entire amount within four months of his retirement.
While private respondent worked at Reynolds Philippines, Inc., his smoking, drinking, gambling and womanizing
became worse. Petitioner discovered that private respondent carried on relationships with different women. He had
relations with a certain Edna who worked at Yazaki; Angie, who was an operator of a billiard hall; Tess, a Japayuki;
Myrna Macatangay, a secretary at the Road Master Drivers School in Bayan, Dasmarias, Cavite, with whom he
cohabited for quite a while; and, Ruth Oliva, by whom he had a daughter named Margie P. Oliva, born on September
15, 1989 (Exh. E).[10] When petitioner confronted private respondent about his relationship with Tess, he beat her up,
as a result of which she was confined at the De la Salle University Medical Center in Dasmarias, Cavite on July 4-5,
1990 because of cerebral concussion (Exh. F).[11]
According to petitioner, private respondent engaged in extreme promiscuous conduct during the latter part of
1986. As a result, private respondent contracted gonorrhea and infected petitioner. They both received treatment at
the Zapote Medical Specialists Center in Zapote, Bacoor, Cavite from October 22, 1986 until March 13, 1987 (Exhs.
G & H).[12]
Petitioner averred that on one occasion of a heated argument, private respondent hit their eldest child who was
then barely a year old. Private respondent is not close to any of their children as he was never affectionate and hardly
spent time with them.

On July 17, 1979, petitioner entered into a contract to sell (Exh. J)[13] with F & C Realty Corporation whereby she
agreed to buy from the latter a parcel of land at the Don Gregorio Heights Subdivision I in Bo. Bucal, Dasmarias,
Cavite and placed a partial payment of P31,330.00. On May 26, 1987, after full payment of the amount ofP51,067.10,
inclusive of interests from monthly installments, a deed of absolute sale (Exh. K) [14] was executed in her favor and
TCT No. T-221529 (Exh. M)[15] was duly issued.
According to petitioner, on August 1, 1992, she sent a handwritten letter [16] to private respondent expressing her
frustration over the fact that her efforts to save their marriage proved futile. In her letter, petitioner also stated that she
was allowing him to sell their owner-type jeepney [17] and to divide the proceeds of the sale between the two of
them. Petitioner also told private respondent of her intention to file a petition for the annulment of their marriage.
It does not appear that private respondent ever replied to petitioners letter. By this time, he had already
abandoned petitioner and their children. In October 1992, petitioner learned that private respondent left for the Middle
East. Since then, private respondents whereabouts had been unknown.
Ester Alfaro, petitioners childhood friend and co-teacher at the Philippine Christian University, testified during the
hearing on the petition for annulment. She said that sometime in June 1979, petitioner introduced private respondent
to her (Alfaro) as the formers sweetheart. Alfaro said she was not impressed with private respondent who was her
student in accounting. She observed private respondent to be fun-loving, spending most of his time with campus
friends. In November 1980, when petitioner asked Alfaro to be one of the secondary sponsors at her forthcoming
wedding, Alfaro wanted to dissuade petitioner from going through with the wedding because she thought private
respondent was not ready for married life as he was then unemployed. True enough, although the couple appeared
happy during the early part of their marriage, it was not long thereafter that private respondent started drinking with
his friends and going home late at night. Alfaro corroborated petitioners claim that private respondent was a habitual
drunkard who carried on relationships with different women and continued hanging out with his friends. She also
confirmed that petitioner was once hospitalized because she was beaten up by private respondent. After the first year
of petitioners marriage, Alfaro tried to talk to private respondent, but the latter accused her of meddling with their
marital life. Alfaro said that private respondent was not close to his children and that he had abandoned petitioner.[18]
On April 10, 1993, the trial court rendered a decision[19] dismissing the petition for annulment of marriage filed by
petitioner. The pertinent portion of the decision reads:[20]
The Court can underscore the fact that the circumstances mentioned by the petitioner in support of her claim that
respondent was psychologically incapacitated to marry her are among the grounds cited by the law as valid reasons
for the grant of legal separation (Article 55 of the Family Code) - not as grounds for a declaration of nullity of
marriages or annulment thereof. Thus, Article 55 of the same code reads as follows:
Art. 55. A petition for legal separation may be filed on any of the following grounds:
(1) Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against the petitioner, a common child, or a child
of the petitioner;
....
(5) Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism of the respondent;
....
(8) Sexual infidelity or perversion;
....

(10) Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more than one year.
....
If indeed Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines, which mentions psychological incapacity as a ground for the
declaration of the nullity of a marriage, has intended to include the above-stated circumstances as constitutive of
such incapacity, then the same would not have been enumerated as grounds for legal separation.
In the same manner, this Court is not disposed to grant relief in favor of the petitioner under Article 46, paragraph (3)
of the Family Code of the Philippines, as there is no dispute that the gonorrhea transmitted to the petitioner by
respondent occurred sometime in 1986, or five (5) years after petitioners marriage with respondent was celebrated in
1981. The provisions of Article 46, paragraph (3) of the same law should be taken in conjunction with Article 45,
paragraph (3) of the same code, and a careful reading of the two (2) provisions of the law would require the existence
of this ground (fraud) at the time of the celebration of the marriage. Hence, the annulment of petitioners marriage with
the respondent on this ground, as alleged and proved in the instant case, cannot be legally accepted by the Court.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which, on January 30, 1996, rendered its decision affirming the
decision of the trial court. Citing the ruling in Santos v. Court of Appeals,[21] the Court of Appeals held:[22]
It is clear in the above law and jurisprudence that the psychological incapacity of a spouse, as a ground for
declaration of nullity of marriage, must exist at the time of the celebration of marriage. More so, chronic sexual
infidelity, abandonment, gambling and use of prohibited drugs are not grounds per se, of psychological incapacity of a
spouse.
We agree with the Solicitor General that petitioner-appellant failed to prove that her respondent-husband was
psychologically incapacitated at the time of the celebration of the marriage. Certainly, petitioner-appellants declaration
that at the time of their marriage her respondent-husbands character was on the borderline between a responsible
person and the happy-go-lucky, could not constitute the psychological incapacity in contemplation of Article 36 of the
Family Code. In fact, petitioner-appellant herself ascribed said attitude to her respondent-husbands youth and very
good looks, who was admittedly several years younger than petitioner-appellant who, herself, happened to be the
college professor of her respondent-husband. Petitioner-appellant even described her respondent-husband not as a
problem student but a normal one (p. 24, tsn, Dec. 8, 1992).
The acts and attitudes complained of by petitioner-appellant happened after the marriage and there is no proof that
the same have already existed at the time of the celebration of the marriage to constitute the psychological incapacity
under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Hence, this petition. Petitioner contends that the respondent Court of Appeals erred
I. IN FINDING THAT THE PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT TO
COMPLY WITH HIS ESSENTIAL MARITAL OBLIGATIONS DID NOT EXIST FROM THE TIME OF
THE CELEBRATION OF THE MARRIAGE.
II. IN RULING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT WAS NOT PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED TO
COMPLY WITH HIS ESSENTIAL MARITAL OBLIGATIONS.
III. IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT DENYING THE AWARD OF PERMANENT
CUSTODY OF THE CHILDREN TO PETITIONER.
IV. IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT DENYING THE PRAYER FOR ISSUANCE OF
AN ORDER REQUIRING PRIVATE RESPONDENT TO GIVE SUPPORT TO THE THREE CHILDREN
IN THE AMOUNT OF P3,000.00 PER CHILD.

V. IN NOT DECLARING THE REAL PROPERTY ACQUIRED BY PETITIONER AS HER EXCLUSIVE


PROPERTY.
The issue in this case is whether or not the marriage of petitioner and private respondent should be annulled on
the ground of private respondents psychological incapacity.
Petitioner alleges that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that petitioner failed to show that private
respondents psychological incapacity existed at the time of the celebration of the marriage. She argues that the fact
that the acts of incapacity of private respondent became manifest only after the celebration of their marriage should
not be a bar to the annulment of their marriage.
Art. 36 of the Family Code states:
A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest
only after its solemnization.[23]
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,[24] we held:
Psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together,
observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the
law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This
psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon
the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit under
Article 54 of the Family Code which considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void
marriage to be legitimate.
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of a party being of unsound mind
or concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage
contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or
homosexuality should occur only during the marriage, they become mere grounds for legal separation under Article
55 of the Family Code. These provisions of the Code, however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these
various circumstances being themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of
psychological incapacity.
Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established, every circumstance that may have some
bearing on the degree, extent, and other conditions of that incapacity must, in every case, be carefully examined and
evaluated so that no precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily decreed. The well-considered opinions of
psychiatrists, psychologists, and persons with expertise in psychological disciplines might be helpful or even
desirable.
In the instant case, other than her self-serving declarations, petitioner failed to establish the fact that at the time
they were married, private respondent was suffering from a psychological defect which in fact deprived him of the
ability to assume the essential duties of marriage and its concomitant responsibilities. As the Court of Appeals pointed
out, no evidence was presented to show that private respondent was not cognizant of the basic marital obligations. It
was not sufficiently proved that private respondent was really incapable of fulfilling his duties due to some incapacity
of a psychological nature, and not merely physical. Petitioner says that at the outset of their marriage, private
respondent showed lack of drive to work for his family. Private respondents parents and petitioner supported him
through college. After his schooling, although he eventually found a job, he availed himself of the early retirement

plan offered by his employer and spent the entire amount he received on himself. For a greater part of their marital
life, private respondent was out of job and did not have the initiative to look for another. He indulged in vices and
engaged in philandering, and later abandoned his family. Petitioner concludes that private respondents condition is
incurable, causing the disintegration of their union and defeating the very objectives of marriage.
However, private respondents alleged habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment do
not by themselves constitute grounds for finding that he is suffering from a psychological incapacity within the
contemplation of the Family Code. It must be shown that these acts are manifestations of a disordered personality
which make private respondent completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state, and not
merely due to private respondents youth and self-conscious feeling of being handsome, as the appellate court
held. As pointed out in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals:[25]
The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code
requires that the incapacity must be psychological not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be
physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or physically ill to such
an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have
given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis (citing Salita v. Magtolis, supra) nevertheless such
root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence
may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
Moreover, expert testimony should have been presented to establish the precise cause of private respondents
psychological incapacity, if any, in order to show that it existed at the inception of the marriage. The burden of proof to
show the nullity of the marriage rests upon petitioner. The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to
protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the
family.[26] Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.[27]
We, therefore, find no reason to reverse the ruling of respondent Court of Appeals whose conclusions, affirming
the trial courts finding with regard to the non-existence of private respondents psychological incapacity at the time of
the marriage, are entitled to great weight and even finality.[28] Only where it is shown that such findings are whimsical,
capricious, and arbitrary can these be overturned.
The conclusion we have reached makes it unnecessary for us to pass upon petitioners contentions on the issue
of permanent custody of children, the amount for their respective support, and the declaration of exclusive ownership
of petitioner over the real property. These matters may more appropriately be litigated in a separate proceeding for
legal separation, dissolution of property regime, and/or custody of children which petitioner may bring.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo (Chairman), Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

THIRD DIVISION
DIGNA A. NAJERA,

G.R. No. 164817

Petitioner,

Present:

- versus -

EDUARDO J. NAJERA,
Respondent.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA, and
PERALTA, JJ.
Promulgated:
July 3, 2009

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision dated February 23, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 68053 and its Resolution August 5, 2004, denying petitioners motion for reconsideration. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, Branch
68 (RTC), which found petitioner Digna A. Najera and respondent Eduardo J. Najeraentitled to legal separation, but
not annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.

The facts are as follows:


On January 27, 1997, petitioner filed with the RTC a verified Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
with Alternative Prayer for Legal Separation, with Application for Designation as Administrator Pendente Lite of the
Conjugal Partnership of Gains.[1]
Petitioner alleged that she and respondent are residents of Bugallon, Pangasinan, but respondent is
presently living in the United States of America (U.S.A). They were married on January 31, 1988 by Rev. Father Isidro
Palinar, Jr. at the Saint Andrew the Apostle Church at Bugallon, Pangasinan.[2] They are childless.
Petitioner claimed that at the time of the celebration of marriage, respondent was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of the marriage, and such incapacity became manifest
only after marriage as shown by the following facts:

(a)
At the time of their marriage, petitioner was already employed with the Special Services Division
of the Provincial Government of Pangasinan, while respondent was jobless. He did not exert enough effort to find a
job and was dependent on petitioner for support. Only with the help of petitioners elder brother, who was a seaman,
was respondent able to land a job as a seaman in 1988 through the Intercrew Shipping Agency.
(b)
While employed as a seaman, respondent did not give petitioner sufficient financial support and
she had to rely on her own efforts and the help of her parents in order to live.

(c)
As a seaman, respondent was away from home from nine to ten months each year. In May 1989,
when he came home from his ship voyage, he started to quarrel with petitioner and falsely accused her of having an
affair with another man. He took to smoking marijuana and tried to force petitioner into it. When she refused, he
insulted her and uttered unprintable words against her. He would go out of the house and when he arrived home, he
was always drunk.
(d)
When respondent arrived home from his ship voyage in April 1994, as had been happening every
year, he quarreled with petitioner.He continued to be jealous, he arrived home drunk and he smoked marijuana. On
July 3, 1994, while he was quarreling with petitioner, without provocation, he inflicted physical violence upon her and
attempted to kill her with a bolo. She was able to parry his attack with her left arm, yet she sustained physical injuries
on different parts of her body. She was treated by Dr. Padlan, and the incident was reported at the Bugallon Police
Station.
(e)
Respondent left the family home, taking along all their personal belongings. He lived with his
mother at Banaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, and he abandoned petitioner.
Petitioner learned later that respondent jumped ship while it was anchored in Los Angeles, California, U.S.A.
Petitioner prayed that upon filing of the petition, an Order be issued appointing her as the sole administrator
of their conjugal properties; and that after trial on the merits, judgment be rendered (1) declaring their marriage
void ab initio in accordance with Article 36 of the Family Code; (2) in the alternative, decreeing legal separation of
petitioner and respondent pursuant to Title II of the Family Code; and (3) declaring the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership of petitioner and respondent and the forfeiture in
favor of petitioner of respondents share in the said properties pursuant to Articles 42 (2) and 63 (2) of the Family
Code; and (4) granting petitioner other just and equitable reliefs.
On March 7, 1997, the RTC issued an Order granting the motion of petitioner to effect service by publication
as provided under Section 17, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court.
On April 17, 1997, respondent filed his Answer[3] wherein he denied the material allegations in the petition
and averred that petitioner was incurably immature, of dubious integrity, with very low morality, and guilty of
infidelity. He claimed that the subject house and lot were acquired through his sole effort and money. As counterclaim,
respondent prayed for the award of P200,000.00 as moral damages, P45,000.00 as attorneys fees, and P1,000.00
as appearance fee for every scheduled hearing.
On July 18, 1997, the Office of the Solicitor General filed its Notice of Appearance.
On June 29, 1998, the RTC issued an Order [4] terminating the pre-trial conference after the parties signed a
Formal Manifestation/Motion, which stated that they had agreed to dissolve their conjugal partnership of gains and
divide equally their conjugal properties.
On August 3, 1998, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Ely R. Reintar filed a Compliance manifesting that after
conducting an investigation, he found that no collusion existed between the parties. [5] The initial hearing of the case
was held on November 23, 1998.
Petitioner testified in court and presented as witnesses the following: her mother, Celedonia
Aldana; psychologist Cristina R. Gates; and Senior Police Officer 1 (SPO1) Sonny Dela Cruz, a member of the
Philippine National Police (PNP), Bugallon, Pangasinan.

Petitioner testified that she was a commerce graduate and was working as an accounting clerk in a
government agency in Manila. She and respondent married on January 31, 1988 as evidenced by their marriage
contract.[6] At the time of their marriage, respondent was jobless, while petitioner was employed as Clerk at the
Special Services Division of the Provincial Government of Pangasinan with a monthly salary of P5,000.00.It was
petitioners brother who helped respondent find a job as a seaman at the Intercrew Shipping Agency in Manila. On
July 30, 1988, respondent was employed as a seaman, and he gave petitioner a monthly allotment
of P1,600.00. After ten months at work, he went home in 1989 and then returned to work after three months. Every
time respondent was home, he quarreled with petitioner and accused her of having an affair with another man.
Petitioner noticed that respondent also smoked marijuana and every time he went out of the house and returned
home, he was drunk.However, there was no record in their barangay that respondent was involved in drugs.[7]
In 1990, petitioner and respondent were able to purchase a lot out of their earnings. In 1991, they
constructed a house on the lot.[8]
On July 3, 1994, petitioner and respondent were invited to a party by the boyfriend of petitioners
sister. Respondent, however, did not allow petitioner to go with him. When respondent arrived home at
around midnight, petitioner asked him about the party, the persons who attended it, and the ladies he danced with,
but he did not answer her. Instead, respondent went to the kitchen. She asked him again about what happened at the
party. Respondent quarreled with her and said that she was the one having an affair and suddenly slapped and
boxed her, causing her eyes to be bloodied. When she opened her eyes, she saw respondent holding a bolo, and he
attempted to kill her. However, she was able to parry his attack with her left arm, causing her to sustain injuries on
different parts of her body. When respondent saw that she was bloodied, he got nervous and went out. After 10
minutes, he turned on the light in the kitchen, but he could not find her because she had gone out and was hiding
from him. When she heard respondent start the motorcycle, she left her hiding place and proceeded to Gomez Street
toward the highway. At the highway, she boarded a bus and asked the conductor to stop at a clinic or hospital. She
alighted in Mangatarem, Pangasinan and proceeded to the clinic of one Dr. Padlan, who sutured her wounds. After a
few hours, she went home.[9]
When petitioner arrived home, the house was locked. She called for her parents who were residing about
300 meters away. She then asked her brother to enter the house through the ceiling in order to open the door. She
found that their personal belongings were gone, including her Automated Teller Machine card and jewelry.[10]
Thereafter, petitioner reported the incident at the police station of Bugallon, Pangasinan.[11]
Since then, respondent never returned home. He stayed with his mother in Banaga, Bugallon,
Pangasinan. Petitioner learned that he went abroad again, but she no longer received any allotment from him.[12]
Petitioner testified that her parents were happily married, while
separated. Respondents brothers were also separated from their respective wives.[13]

respondents

parents

were

Petitioner disclosed that she also filed a petition for the annulment of her marriage with the Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Diocese of Alaminos, Pangasinan on the ground of psychological incapacity of respondent.[14]
Psychologist Cristina R. Gates testified that she interviewed petitioner, but not respondent who was
abroad. She confirmed her Psychological Report, the conclusion of which reads:
PSYCHOLOGICAL CONCLUSIONS BASED ON THE INTERVIEWS:
It is clear from the interviews that Respondent is afflicted with psychological hang-ups which are
rooted in the kind of family background he has. His mother had an extramarital affair and separated
from Respondents father. This turn of events left an irreparable mark upon Respondent, gauging
from his alcoholic and marijuana habit. In time, he seemed steep in a kind of a double bind where
he both deeply loved and resented his mother.
His baseless accusation against his wife and his violent behavior towards her appears to be an
offshoot of deep-seated feelings and recurrent thoughts towards his own mother. Unable to resolve
his childhood conflicts and anger, he turned to his wife as the scapegoat for all his troubles.
Based on the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM IV), Respondent is afflicted with a Borderline
Personality Disorder as marked by his pattern of instability in his interpersonal relationships,
his marred self-image and self-destructive tendencies, his uncontrollable impulses. Eduardo

Najeras psychological impairment as traced to his parents separation, aggravated by the continued
meddling of his mother in his adult life, antedates his marriage to Petitioner Digna Aldana.
Furthermore, the ingestion of prohibited substances (alcohol and marijuana), known to cause
irreparable damage organically, and the manifest worsening of his violent and abusive behavior
across time render his impairment grave and irreversible. In the light of these findings, it is
recommended that parties marriage be annulled on grounds of psychological incapacity on the part
of Respondent Eduardo Najera to fully assume his marital duties and responsibilities to Digna
Aldana-Najera.[15]
Psychologist Cristina Gates testified that the chances of curability of respondents psychological disorder
were nil. Its curability depended on whether the established organic damage was minimal -- referring to the
malfunction of the composites of the brain brought about by habitual drinking and marijuana, which possibly afflicted
respondent with borderline personality disorder and uncontrollable impulses.[16]
Further, SPO1 Sonny Dela Cruz, a member of the PNP, Bugallon, Pangasinan, testified that on July 3, 1994,
he received a complaint from petitioner that respondent arrived at their house under the influence of liquor and
mauled petitioner without provocation on her part, and that respondent tried to kill her. The complaint was entered in
the police blotter.[17]
On March 31, 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision that decreed only the legal separation of the petitioner
and respondent, but not the annulment of their marriage. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1.

Decreeing legal separation of


respondent/defendant Eduardo Najera;

Petitioner/Plaintiff

Digna

Najera

and

2.

Ordering the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of the petitioner/plaintiff and


respondent/defendant, and to divide the same equally between themselves pursuant
to their Joint Manifestation/Motion dated April 27, 1998.[18]

Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution[19] dated May 2, 2000.
Petitioner appealed the RTC Decision and Resolution to the Court of Appeals.
In a Decision dated February 23, 2004, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision of the RTC, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, appeal is hereby DISMISSED and judgment of the
Trial Court is AFFIRMED in toto. No costs.[20]
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution dated August 5,
2004.
Hence, this petition raising the following issues:
1.

The Court of Appeals failed to take into consideration the Decision of the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal, contrary to the guidelines decreed by the Supreme Court in the case
of Republic v. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 198.

2.

The evidence of petitioner proved the root cause of the psychological incapacity of
respondent Eduardo Najera.

3.

The factual basis of the Decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal is practically
the same set of facts established by petitioners evidence submitted before the trial court and
therefore the same conclusion ought to be rendered by the Court.
Credence ought to be given to the conclusion of Psychologist Cristina R. Gates as an expert
in Psychology.[21]

4.

The main issue is whether or not the totality of petitioners evidence was able to prove that respondent is
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage warranting the annulment of their
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.[22]
Petitioner contends that her evidence established the root cause of the psychological incapacity of
respondent which is his dysfunctional family background. With such background, respondent could not have known
the obligations he was assuming, particularly the duty of complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
The Court is not persuaded.
Republic v. Court of Appeals[23] laid down the guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of
the Family Code, thus:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the
validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the
Family, recognizing it as the foundation of the nation. It decrees marriage as legally inviolable,
thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to
be protected by the state.
xxxx
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in
the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological -- not
physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must
convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent
that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not
have given valid assumption thereof.Although no example of such incapacity need be given here
so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis,
nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating
nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the
marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their I
dos. The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself
must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent
or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse,
not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be
relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage,
like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in
diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be
psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential
obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume
the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as
downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words,
there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same
Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be
stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our
courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon
1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:
The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are
unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of
psychological nature.
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil
laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization,
great persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally -- subject to
our law on evidence -- what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code
provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State
and the Church -- while remaining independent, separate and apart from each other -- shall walk
together in synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the
family as the inviolable base of the nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General
issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his
agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the
prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the
date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge
the equivalent function of thedefensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.

The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the Court in Santos v. Court of
Appeals: "psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
incurability."[24] The foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to be declared
psychologically incapacitated.[25] In fact, the root cause may be "medically or clinically identified."[26] What is important
is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party's psychological condition. For indeed, if the
totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical
examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.[27]
In this case, the Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that the totality of the evidence submitted by
petitioner failed to satisfactorily prove that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
obligations of marriage. The root cause of respondents alleged psychological incapacity was not sufficiently proven
by experts or shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
As found by the Court of Appeals, Psychologist Cristina Gates conclusion that respondent was
psychologically incapacitated was based on facts relayed to her by petitioner and was not based on her personal
knowledge and evaluation of respondent; thus, her finding is unscientific and unreliable.[28] Moreover, the trial court
correctly found that petitioner failed to prove with certainty that the alleged personality disorder of respondent was
incurable as may be gleaned from Psychologist Cristina Gates testimony:
Q You mentioned in your report that respondent is afflicted with a borderline personality
disorder. [D]id you find any organic cause?
A No, sir.
Q Do you think that this cause you mentioned existed at the time of the marriage of the
respondent?
A I believe so, sir. Physically, if you examined the [respondents family] background, there was
strong basis that respondent developed mal-adoptive pattern.
Q Did you interview the respondents family?
A No, sir , but on the disclosure of petitioner (sic).
xxxx
Q Have you [seen] the respondent?

A He is not in the country, sir.


Q Madam Witness, this disorder that you stated in your report which the respondent is allegedly
affected, is this curable?
A The chances are nil.
Q But it is curable?
A It depends actually if the established organic damage is minimal.
Q What is this organic damage?
A Composites of the brain is malfunctioning.
Q How did you find out the malfunctioning since you have not seen him (respondent)?
A His habitual drinking and marijuana habit possibly afflicted the respondent with
borderline personality disorder. This [is] based on hisinterpersonal relationships,
his marred self-image and self-destructive tendencies, and his uncontrollable
impulses.
Q Did you interview the respondent in this regard?
A I take the words of the petitioner in this regard.[29]

The Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that the evidence presented by petitioner in regard to the
physical violence or grossly abusive conduct of respondent toward petitioner and respondents abandonment of
petitioner without justifiable cause for more than one year are grounds for legal separation[30] only and not for
annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Petitioner argued that the Court of Appeals failed to consider the Decision of the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal which her counsel sought to be admitted by the Court of Appeals on February 11, 2004, twelve
days before the decision was promulgated on February 23, 2004. She contended that the Court of Appeals failed to
follow Guideline No. 7 in Republic v. Court of Appeals, thus:
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our
courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon
1095 of the New Code of Canon law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:
The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the
essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature.
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil
laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization,
great persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally subject to
our law on evidence what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code
provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State
and the Church while remaining independent, separate and apart from each other shall walk
together in synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the
family as the inviolable base of the nation.
Petitioners argument is without merit.
In its Decision dated February 23, 2004, the Court of Appeals apparently did not have the opportunity to
consider the decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal. Nevertheless, it is clear that the Court of Appeals
considered the Matrimonial Tribunals decision in its Resolution dated August 5, 2004 when it resolved petitioners
motion for reconsideration. In the said Resolution, the Court of Appeals took cognizance of the very same issues now
raised before this Court and correctly held that petitioners motion for reconsideration was devoid of merit.It stated:

The Decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal dated July 2, 2002, which was
forwarded to this Court only on February 11, 2004, reads as follows:
x x x The FACTS collated from party complainant and reliable witnesses
which include a sister-in-law of Respondent (despite summons from the Court
dated June 14, 1999, he did not appear before the Court, in effect waiving his
right to be heard, hence, trial in absentia followed) corroborate and lead this
Collegiate Court to believe with moral certainty required by law and conclude
that the husband-respondent upon contracting marriage suffered from
grave lack of due discretion of judgment, thereby rendering nugatory his
marital contract: First, his family was dysfunctional in that as a child, he saw the
break-up of the marriage of his own parents; his own two siblings have broken
marriages; Second, he therefore grew up with a domineering mother with whom
[he] identified and on whom he depended for advice; Third, he was according to
his friends, already into drugs and alcohol before marriage; this affected his
conduct of bipolar kind: he could be very quiet but later very talkative, peaceful
but later hotheaded even violent, he also was aware of the infidelity of his mother
who now lives with her paramour, also married and a policeman; Finally, into
marriage, he continued with his drugs and alcohol abuse until one time he came
home very drunk and beat up his wife and attacked her with a bolo that wounded
her; this led to final separation.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court of Second Instance,
having invoked the Divine Name and having considered the pertinent Law and
relevant Jurisprudence to the Facts of the Case hereby proclaims, declares
and decrees the confirmation of the sentence from the Court a quo in favor
of the nullity of marriage on the ground contemplated under Canon 1095, 2
of the 1983 Code of Canon Law.
However, records of the proceedings before the Trial Court show that, other than herself,
petitioner-appellant offered the testimonies of the following persons only, to wit: Aldana Celedonia
(petitioner-appellants mother), Sonny de la Cruz (member, PNP, Bugallon, Pangasinan), and Ma.
Cristina R. Gates (psychologist). Said witnesses testified, in particular, to the unfaithful night of July
1, 1994 wherein the respondent allegedly made an attempt on the life of the petitioner. But unlike
the hearing and finding before the Matrimonial Tribunal, petitioner-appellants sister-in-law and
friends of the opposing parties were never presented before said Court. As to the contents and
veracity of the latters testimonies, this Court is without any clue.
True, in the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals, et al. (268 SCRA 198), the Supreme
Court held that the interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect
by our courts.However, the Highest Tribunal expounded as follows:
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize
our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to
achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to
decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideallysubject to our law on evidence what
is decreed as [canonically] invalid should be decreed civilly void x x x.
And in relation thereto, Rule 132, Sec. 34 of the Rules of Evidence states:
The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose of
which the evidence is offered must be specified.
Given the preceding disquisitions, petitioner-appellant should not expect us to give
credence to the Decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal when, apparently, it was
made on a different set of evidence of which We have no way of ascertaining their truthfulness.
Furthermore, it is an elementary rule that judgments must be based on the evidence
presented before the court (Manzano vs. Perez, 362 SCRA 430 [2001]). And based on the
evidence on record, We find no ample reason to reverse or modify the judgment of the Trial Court.
[31]

Santos v. Santos[32] cited the deliberations during the sessions of the Family Code Revision Committee,
which drafted the Code, to provide an insight on the import of Article 36 of the Family Code. It stated that a part of the
provision is similar to the third paragraph of Canon 1095 of the Code of Canon Law, which reads:
Canon 1095. The following are incapable of contracting marriage:
1.
2.
3.

those who lack sufficient use of reason;


those who suffer from a grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning the
essential matrimonial rights and obligations to be mutually given and accepted;
those who, because of causes of a psychological nature, are unable to assume the
essential obligations of marriage.

It must be pointed out that in this case, the basis of the declaration of nullity of marriage by the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal is not the third paragraph of Canon 1095 which mentions causes of a psychological
nature, but the second paragraph of Canon 1095 which refers to those who suffer from a grave lack of discretion of
judgment concerning essential matrimonial rights and obligations to be mutually given and accepted. For clarity, the
pertinent portion of the decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal reads:
The FACTS collated from party complainant and reliable witnesses which include a sister-in-law of
Respondent (despite summons from the Court dated June14, 1999, he did not appear before the
Court, in effect waiving his right to be heard, hence, trial in absentia followed) corroborate and lead
this Collegiate Court to believe with moral certainty required by law and conclude that the
husband-respondent upon contacting marriage suffered from grave lack of due discretion of
judgment, thereby rendering nugatory his marital contract x x x.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court of Second Instance, having invoked the
Divine Name and having considered the pertinent Law and relevant Jurisprudence to the Facts of
the Case hereby proclaims, declares and decrees the confirmation of the sentence from the
Court a quo in favor of the nullity of marriage on the ground contemplated under Canon
1095, 2 of the 1983 Code of Canon Law. x x x

Hence, even if, as contended by petitioner, the factual basis of the decision of the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal is similar to the facts established by petitioner before the trial court, the decision of the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal confirming the decree of nullity of marriage by the court a quo is not based on
the psychological incapacity of respondent. Petitioner, therefore, erred in stating that the conclusion of Psychologist
Cristina Gates regarding the psychological incapacity of respondent is supported by the decision of the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal.
In fine, the Court of Appeals did not err in affirming the Decision of the RTC.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 68053,
dated February 23, 2004, and its Resolution dated August 5, 2004, are hereby AFFIRMED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

Republic of the Philippines


SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997


REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and RORIDEL OLAVIANO MOLINA, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:
The Family Code of the Philippines provides an entirely new ground (in addition to those enumerated in the
Civil Code) to assail the validity of a marriage, namely, "psychological incapacity." Since the Code's
effectivity, our courts have been swamped with various petitions to declare marriages void based on this
ground. Although this Court had interpreted the meaning of psychological incapacity in the recent case
of Santos vs. Court of Appeals, still many judges and lawyers find difficulty in applying said novel provision
in specific cases. In the present case and in the context of the herein assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals, the Solicitor General has labelled exaggerated to be sure but nonetheless expressive of his
frustration Article 36 as the "most liberal divorce procedure in the world." Hence, this Court in addition to
resolving the present case, finds the need to lay down specific guidelines in the interpretation and
application of Article 36 of the Family Code.
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 challenging the January 25, 1993 Decision 1of
the Court of Appeals 2 in CA-G.R. CV No. 34858 affirming in toto the May 14, 1991 decision of the Regional
Trial Court of La Trinidad, 3 Benguet, which declared the marriage of respondent Roridel Olaviano Molina to
Reynaldo Molina void ab initio, on the ground of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Family
Code.
The Facts
This case was commenced on August 16, 1990 with the filing by respondent Roridel O. Molina of a verified
petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Essentially, the petition alleged that
Roridel and Reynaldo were married on April 14, 1985 at the San Agustin Church 4 in Manila; that a son, Andre
O. Molina was born; that after a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of "immaturity and irresponsibility"
as a husband and a father since he preferred to spend more time with his peers and friends on whom he
squandered his money; that he depended on his parents for aid and assistance, and was never honest with
his wife in regard to their finances, resulting in frequent quarrels between them; that sometime in February
1986, Reynaldo was relieved of his job in Manila, and since then Roridel had been the sole breadwinner of
the family; that in October 1986 the couple had a very intense quarrel, as a result of which their relationship
was estranged; that in March 1987, Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and went to live with her parents
in Baguio City; that a few weeks later, Reynaldo left Roridel and their child, and had since then abandoned
them; that Reynaldo had thus shown that he was psychologically incapable of complying with essential

marital obligations and was a highly immature and habitually quarrel some individual who thought of himself
as a king to be served; and that it would be to the couple's best interest to have their marriage declared null
and void in order to free them from what appeared to be an incompatible marriage from the start.
In his Answer filed on August 28, 1989, Reynaldo admitted that he and Roridel could no longer live together
as husband and wife, but contended that their misunderstandings and frequent quarrels were due to (1)
Roridel's strange behavior of insisting on maintaining her group of friends even after their marriage; (2)
Roridel's refusal to perform some of her marital duties such as cooking meals; and (3) Roridel's failure to run
the household and handle their finances.
During the pre-trial on October 17, 1990, the following were stipulated:
1. That the parties herein were legally married on April 14, 1985 at the Church of St.
Augustine, Manila;
2. That out of their marriage, a child named Albert Andre Olaviano Molina was born on July
29, 1986;
3. That the parties are separated-in-fact for more than three years;
4. That petitioner is not asking support for her and her child;
5. That the respondent is not asking for damages;
6. That the common child of the parties is in the custody of the petitioner wife.
Evidence for herein respondent wife consisted of her own testimony and that of her friends Rosemarie
Ventura and Maria Leonora Padilla as well as of Ruth G. Lalas, a social worker, and of Dr. Teresita HidalgoSison, a psychiatrist of the Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center. She also submitted documents
marked as Exhibits "A" to "E-1." Reynaldo did not present any evidence as he appeared only during the pretrial conference.
On May 14, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage void. The appeal of petitioner was
denied by the Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the RTC's decision. Hence, the present recourse.
The Issue
In his petition, the Solicitor General insists that "the Court of Appeals made an erroneous and incorrect
interpretation of the phrase 'psychological incapacity' (as provided under Art. 36 of the Family Code) and
made an incorrect application thereof to the facts of the case," adding that the appealed Decision tended "to
establish in effect the most liberal divorce procedure in the world which is anathema to our culture."
In denying the Solicitor General's appeal, the respondent Court relied 5 heavily on the trial court's findings
"that the marriage between the parties broke up because of their opposing and conflicting personalities."
Then, it added it sown opinion that "the Civil Code Revision Committee (hereinafter referred to as
Committee) intended to liberalize the application of our civil laws on personal and family rights. . . ." It
concluded that:
As ground for annulment of marriage, We view psychologically incapacity as a broad range
of mental and behavioral conduct on the part of one spouse indicative of how he or she
regards the marital union, his or her personal relationship with the other spouse, as well as
his or her conduct in the long haul for the attainment of the principal objectives of marriage.

If said conduct, observed and considered as a whole, tends to cause the union to selfdestruct because it defeats the very objectives of marriage, then there is enough reason to
leave the spouses to their individual fates.
In the case at bar, We find that the trial judge committed no indiscretion in analyzing and
deciding the instant case, as it did, hence, We find no cogent reason to disturb the findings
and conclusions thus made.
Respondent, in her Memorandum, adopts these discussions of the Court of Appeals.
The petitioner, on the other hand, argues that "opposing and conflicting personalities" is not equivalent to
psychological incapacity, explaining that such ground "is not simply the neglect by the parties to the
marriage of their responsibilities and duties, but a defect in their psychological nature which renders them
incapable of performing such marital responsibilities and duties."
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals 6 this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, ruled that
"psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (nor physical) incapacity . . . and that (t)here
is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of 'psychological
incapacity' to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity
or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the
time the marriage is celebrated." Citing Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former presiding judge of the Metropolitan
Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila, 7 Justice Vitug wrote that "the psychological
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability."
On the other hand, in the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the psychological defect spoken
of is an incapacity. It appears to us to be more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the
performance of some marital obligations. Mere showing of "irreconciliable differences" and "conflicting
personalities" in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the parties failed
to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to
be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (nor physical) illness.
The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and her husband could nor get along with
each other. There had been no showing of the gravity of the problem; neither its juridical antecedence nor its
incurability. The expert testimony of Dr. Sison showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but only
incompatibility, not psychological incapacity. Dr. Sison testified: 8
COURT
Q It is therefore the recommendation of the psychiatrist based on your
findings that it is better for the Court to annul (sic) the marriage?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q There is no hope for the marriage?
A There is no hope, the man is also living with another woman.

Q Is it also the stand of the psychiatrist that the parties are psychologically
unfit for each other but they are psychologically fit with other parties?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Neither are they psychologically unfit for their professions?
A Yes, Your Honor.
The Court has no more questions.
In the case of Reynaldo, there is no showing that his alleged personality traits were constitutive of
psychological incapacity existing at the time of marriage celebration. While some effort was made to prove
that there was a failure to fulfill pre-nuptial impressions of "thoughtfulness and gentleness" on Reynaldo's
part of being "conservative, homely and intelligent" on the part of Roridel, such failure of expectation is nor
indicative of antecedent psychological incapacity. If at all, it merely shows love's temporary blindness to the
faults and blemishes of the beloved.
During its deliberations, the Court decided to go beyond merely ruling on the facts of this case vis-avisexisting law and jurisprudence. In view of the novelty of Art. 36 of the Family Code and the difficulty
experienced by many trial courts interpreting and applying it, the Court decided to invite two amici curiae,
namely, the Most Reverend Oscar V. Cruz, 9 Vicar Judicial (Presiding Judge) of the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, and Justice Ricardo C. Puno, 10 a member of
the Family Code Revision Committee. The Court takes this occasion to thank these friends of the Court for
their informative and interesting discussions during the oral argument on December 3, 1996, which they
followed up with written memoranda.
From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the following guidelines in the interpretation and
application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.
This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of
the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, 11 recognizing it "as the foundation
of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim
of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.
The Family Code 12 echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes
the permanence, inviolability and solidarity
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in
the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the
Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological not physical. although its manifestations
and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them,
was mentally or physically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such
incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle
of ejusdem generis, 13 nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature explained. Expert evidence may be given qualified psychiatrist and clinical
psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The
evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at
such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely
against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of
marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or
employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and
prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise
his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or
inability, nor a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening
disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to
marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as
regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and
their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that
Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon
Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:
The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the
essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature. 14
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the
religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight
should be given to decision of such appellate tribunal. Ideally subject to our law on evidence what is
decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code provision,
contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Church
while remaining independent, separate and apart from each other shall walk together in synodal cadence
towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the
nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as
counsel for the state. No decision shall he handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification,
which will be quoted in the decision, briefly staring therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as
the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to
the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution
of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor
vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.

In the instant case and applying Leouel Santos, we have already ruled to grant the petition. Such ruling
becomes even more cogent with the use of the foregoing guidelines.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage
of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr., and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
Regalado, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concurs in the result.

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 136490. October 19, 2000]
BRENDA B. MARCOS, petitioner, vs. WILSON G. MARCOS, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Psychological incapacity, as a ground for declaring the nullity of a marriage, may be established by the totality of
evidence presented. There is no requirement, however, that the respondent should be examined by a physician or a
psychologist as a conditio sine qua non for such declaration.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the July 24, 1998
Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 55588, which disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the contested decision is set aside and the marriage between the parties is hereby declared
valid."[2]
Also challenged by petitioner is the December 3, 1998 CA Resolution denying her Motion for Reconsideration.

Earlier, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) had ruled thus:


"WHEREFORE, the marriage between petitioner Brenda B. Marcos and respondent Wilson G. Marcos, solemnized
on September 6, 1982 in Pasig City is declared null and void ab initio pursuant to Art. 36 of the Family Code. The
conjugal properties, if any, is dissolved [sic] in accordance with Articles 126 and 129 of the same Code in relation to
Articles 50, 51 and 52 relative to the delivery of the legitime of [the] parties' children. In the best interest and welfare
of the minor children, their custody is granted to petitioner subject to the visitation rights of respondent.
"Upon finality of this Decision, furnish copy each to the Office of the Civil Registrar of Pasig City where the marriage
was solemnized, the National Census and Statistics Office, Manila and the Register of Deeds of Mandaluyong City
for their appropriate action consistent with this Decision.
"SO ORDERED."
The Facts
The facts as found by the Court of Appeals are as follows:
"It was established during the trial that the parties were married twice: (1) on September 6, 1982 which was
solemnized by Judge Eriberto H. Espiritu at the Municipal Court of Pasig (Exh. A); and (2) on May 8, 1983 which was
solemnized by Rev. Eduardo L. Eleazar, Command Chaplain, at the Presidential Security Command Chapel in
Malacaang Park, Manila (Exh. A-1). Out of their marriage, five (5) children were born (Exhs. B, C, D, E and F).
"Appellant Wilson G. Marcos joined the Armed Forces of the Philippines in 1973. Later on, he was transferred to the
Presidential Security Command in Malacaang during the Marcos Regime. Appellee Brenda B. Marcos, on the other
hand, joined the Women's Auxilliary Corps under the Philippine Air Force in 1978. After the Edsa Revolution, both of
them sought a discharge from the military service.
"They first met sometime in 1980 when both of them were assigned at the Malacaang Palace, she as an escort of
Imee Marcos and he as a Presidential Guard of President Ferdinand Marcos. Through telephone conversations, they
became acquainted and eventually became sweethearts.
"After their marriage on September 6, 1982, they resided at No. 1702 Daisy Street, Hulo Bliss, Mandaluyong, a
housing unit which she acquired from the Bliss Development Corporation when she was still single.
"After the downfall of President Marcos, he left the military service in 1987 and then engaged in different business
ventures that did not however prosper. As a wife, she always urged him to look for work so that their children would
see him, instead of her, as the head of the family and a good provider. Due to his failure to engage in any gainful
employment, they would often quarrel and as a consequence, he would hit and beat her. He would even force her to
have sex with him despite her weariness. He would also inflict physical harm on their children for a slight mistake and
was so severe in the way he chastised them. Thus, for several times during their cohabitation, he would leave their
house. In 1992, they were already living separately.
"All the while, she was engrossed in the business of selling "magic uling" and chickens. While she was still in the
military, she would first make deliveries early in the morning before going to Malacaang. When she was discharged
from the military service, she concentrated on her business. Then, she became a supplier in the Armed Forces of the
Philippines until she was able to put up a trading and construction company, NS Ness Trading and Construction
Development Corporation.
"The 'straw that broke the camel's back' took place on October 16, 1994, when they had a bitter quarrel. As they were
already living separately, she did not want him to stay in their house anymore. On that day, when she saw him in their
house, she was so angry that she lambasted him. He then turned violent, inflicting physical harm on her and even on
her mother who came to her aid. The following day, October 17, 1994, she and their children left the house and
sought refuge in her sister's house.

"On October 19, 1994, she submitted herself [to] medical examination at the Mandaluyong Medical Center where her
injuries were diagnosed as contusions (Exh. G, Records, 153).
"Sometime in August 1995, she together with her two sisters and driver, went to him at the Bliss unit in Mandaluyong
to look for their missing child, Niko. Upon seeing them, he got mad. After knowing the reason for their unexpected
presence, he ran after them with a samurai and even [beat] her driver.
"At the time of the filing of this case, she and their children were renting a house in Camella, Paraaque, while the
appellant was residing at the Bliss unit in Mandaluyong.
"In the case study conducted by Social Worker Sonia C. Millan, the children described their father as cruel and
physically abusive to them (Exh. UU, Records, pp. 85-100).
"The appellee submitted herself to psychologist Natividad A. Dayan, Ph.D., for psychological evaluation (Exh. YY,
Records, pp. 207-216), while the appellant on the other hand, did not.
"The court a quo found the appellant to be psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations mainly
because of his failure to find work to support his family and his violent attitude towards appellee and their children, x x
x."[3]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Reversing the RTC, the CA held that psychological incapacity had not been established by the totality of the evidence
presented. It ratiocinated in this wise:
"Essential in a petition for annulment is the allegation of the root cause of the spouse's psychological incapacity which
should also be medically or clinically identified, sufficiently proven by experts and clearly explained in the decision.
The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage and shown to be medically
or clinically permanent or incurable. It must also be grave enough to bring about the disability of the parties to
assume the essential obligations of marriage as set forth in Articles 68 to 71 and Articles 220 to 225 of the Family
Code and such non-complied marital obligations must similarly be alleged in the petition, established by evidence
and explained in the decision.
"In the case before us, the appellant was not subjected to any psychological or psychiatric evaluation. The
psychological findings about the appellant by psychiatrist Natividad Dayan were based only on the interviews
conducted with the appellee. Expert evidence by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists is essential if only to
prove that the parties were or any one of them was mentally or psychically ill to be truly incognitive of the marital
obligations he or she was assuming, or as would make him or her x x x unable to assume them. In fact, he offered
testimonial evidence to show that he [was] not psychologically incapacitated. The root cause of his supposed
incapacity was not alleged in the petition, nor medically or clinically identified as a psychological illness or sufficiently
proven by an expert. Similarly, there is no evidence at all that would show that the appellant was suffering from an
incapacity which [was] psychological or mental - not physical to the extent that he could not have known the
obligations he was assuming: that the incapacity [was] grave, ha[d] preceded the marriage and [was] incurable."[4]
Hence, this Petition.[5]
Issues
In her Memorandum,[6] petitioner presents for this Court's consideration the following issues:
"I. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals could set aside the findings by the Regional Trial Court of
psychological incapacity of a respondent in a Petition for declaration of nullity of marriage simply because the
respondent did not subject himself to psychological evaluation.
II. Whether or not the totality of evidence presented and the demeanor of all the witnesses should be the basis of the
determination of the merits of the Petition."[7]

The Court's Ruling


We agree with petitioner that the personal medical or psychological examination of respondent is not a requirement
for a declaration of psychological incapacity. Nevertheless, the totality of the evidence she presented does not show
such incapacity.
Preliminary Issue: Need for Personal Medical Examination
Petitioner contends that the testimonies and the results of various tests that were submitted to determine
respondent's psychological incapacity to perform the obligations of marriage should not have been brushed aside by
the Court of Appeals, simply because respondent had not taken those tests himself. Petitioner adds that the CA
should have realized that under the circumstances, she had no choice but to rely on other sources of information in
order to determine the psychological capacity of respondent, who had refused to submit himself to such tests.
In Republic v. CA and Molina,[8] the guidelines governing the application and the interpretation of psychological
incapacity referred to in Article 36 of the Family Code[9] were laid down by this Court as follows:
"1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in
favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact
that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution
devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it 'as the foundation of the nation.' It decrees marriage as legally
'inviolable,' thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be
'protected' by the state.
xxxxxxxxx
2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code
requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may
be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to
such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not
have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit
the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be
identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by
qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at 'the time of the celebration' of the marriage. The evidence must
show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their 'I do's.' The manifestation of the illness need not
be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same
sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to
those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be
effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but not be psychologically
capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, 'mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts cannot be
accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or
difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse
integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards
the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children.

Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the
text of the decision.
7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while
not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
xxxxxxxxx
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the
state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the
decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The
Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15)
days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the
equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095."[10]
The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the Court in Santos v. Court of Appeals:
[11] "psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability." The
foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated.
In fact, the root cause may be "medically or clinically identified." What is important is the presence of evidence that
can adequately establish the party's psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is
enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned
need not be resorted to.
Main Issue: Totality of Evidence Presented
The main question, then, is whether the totality of the evidence presented in the present case -- including the
testimonies of petitioner, the common children, petitioner's sister and the social worker -- was enough to sustain a
finding that respondent was psychologically incapacitated.
We rule in the negative. Although this Court is sufficiently convinced that respondent failed to provide material support
to the family and may have resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, the totality of his acts does not lead to a
conclusion of psychological incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no showing that his "defects" were already
present at the inception of the marriage or that they are incurable.
Verily, the behavior of respondent can be attributed to the fact that he had lost his job and was not gainfully employed
for a period of more than six years. It was during this period that he became intermittently drunk, failed to give
material and moral support, and even left the family home.
Thus, his alleged psychological illness was traced only to said period and not to the inception of the marriage. Equally
important, there is no evidence showing that his condition is incurable, especially now that he is gainfully employed
as a taxi driver.
Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the
time the causes therefor manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before
the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the
duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. These marital obligations are those
provided under Articles 68 to 71, 220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code.
Neither is Article 36 to be equated with legal separation, in which the grounds need not be rooted in psychological
incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual
alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment and the like.[12] At best, the evidence presented by petitioner refers only
to grounds for legal separation, not for declaring a marriage void.
Because Article 36 has been abused as a convenient divorce law, this Court laid down the procedural requirements
for its invocation in Molina. Petitioner, however, has not faithfully observed them.

In sum, this Court cannot declare the dissolution of the marriage for failure of petitioner to show that the alleged
psychological incapacity is characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability; and for her failure to
observe the guidelines outlined in Molina.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and assailed Decision AFFIRMED, except that portion requiring personal
medical examination as a conditio sine qua non to a finding of psychological incapacity. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.

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