AMBIL JR V.

COMELEC
FACTS:
Petitioner Ambil and respondent Ramirez were candidates for the position of Governor, Eastern Samar, during the
May 11, 1998 elections. On May 16, 1998, the Provincial Board of Canvassers proclaimed Ambil as the duly elected
Governor.
Respondent Ramirez who obtained the second highest number of votes, filed an election protest (EPC Case No. 9829) challenging the results in a total of 201 precincts. The case was assigned to the First Division, Comelec.
Commissioner Guiani prepared a proposed resolution in the case. To which the ponencia, Commissioner Desamito
dissented. Commissioner Tancangco at first did not indicate her vote.
On February 15, 2000, Commissioner Guiani retired from the service and Commissioner Javier was appointed.
On February 24, 2000, petitioner Ambil and respondent Ramirez received a resolution promulgated on February 14,
2000 (Guiani resolution), signed by Commissioner Guiani and Tancangco, with Commissioner Desamito dissenting. It
declared respondent Ramirez as winner. On February 28, 2000, the Comelec, First Division, declared that the Feb.
14 resolution is a useless scrap of paper which should be ignored by the parties.
Comelec, First Division, issued an order setting the promulgation of the resolution in the case (EPC Case No. 98-29)
on April 6, 2000. However, on the same date, petitioner Ambil filed a motion to cancel promulgation challenging the
validity of the purported Guiani resolution. The Comelec, First Division, acting on the motion, on the same date,
postponed the promulgation until this matter is resolved.
The two members of the First Division, sent a joint memorandum to Commissioner Desamito the presiding
Commissioner, recommending that they proceed with the promulgation of the Guiani subject resolution and let the
aggrieved party challenge it through a Motion for Reconsideration before the Commission en banc or through a
certiorari case before the Supreme Court.
On June 15, 2000, the Comelec, First Division, issued an order setting the promulgation of the resolution in the case
on June 20, 2000.
But on June 19, 2000, petitioner interposed the instant petition, seeking to:
- annul the order dated June 15, 2000 setting the promulgation of the resolution of the case (EPC Case No.
98-29) on June 20, 2000, and
-prohibiting the Comelec, First Division, from promulgating the purported Guiani resolution and
-directing the Comelec, First Division, to deliberate anew on the case and to promulgate the resolution
reached in the case after such deliberation.
ISSUE:
Whether Comelec, First Division, in scheduling the promulgation of the resolution in the case (EPC Case No. 98-29)
acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction NO
HELD:
The case at bar is an election protest involving the position of Governor, Eastern Samar. It is within the original
jurisdiction of the Commission on Elections in division. Admittedly, petitioner did not ask for a reconsideration of the
divisions resolution or final decision. In fact, there was really no resolution or decision to speak of because there
was yet no promulgation, which was still scheduled on June 20, 2000. Petitioner went directly to the Supreme Court
from an order of promulgation of the Resolution of this case by the First Division of the Comelec.

Under the existing Constitutional scheme, a party to an election case within the jurisdiction of the Comelec in division
cannot dispense with the filing of a motion for reconsideration of a decision, resolution or final order of the Division
of the Commission on Elections because the case would not reach the Comelec en banc without such motion for
reconsideration having been filed and resolved by the Division.
The instant case does not fall under any of the recognized exceptions to the rule in certiorari cases dispensing with a
motion for reconsideration prior to the filing of a petition. In truth, the exceptions do not apply to election cases
where a motion for reconsideration is mandatory by Constitutional fiat to elevate the case to the Comelec en banc,
whose final decision is what is reviewable via certiorari before the Supreme Court.
We must emphasize that what is questioned here is the order dated June 15, 2000, which is a mere notice of the
promulgation of the resolution in EPC Case No. 98-29.
Consequently, the filing of the instant petition before this Court was premature. Petitioner failed to exhaust adequate
administrative remedies available before the COMELEC.
This Court has held consistently that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a precondition that he should have availed of all the means of administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy
within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned every
opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction, then such remedy should be exhausted first
before the courts judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of courts intervention is fatal to ones cause
of action.
Hence, the petition at bar must be dismissed for prematurity. Failure to exhaust administrative remedies is fatal to a
party's cause of action and a dismissal based on that ground is tantamount to a dismissal based on lack of cause of
action.

DOUGLAS CAGAS V. COMELEC and BAUTISTA

FACTS:
The petitioner Cagas and respondent Bautista contested the position of Governor of the Province of Davao del Sur in
the May 10, 2010 automated national and local elections. Petitioner was proclaimed the winner.
Alleging fraud, anomalies, irregularities, vote-buying and violations of election laws, rules and resolutions, Bautista
filed an electoral protest on May 24, 2010 which was raffled to the COMELEC First Division.
Petitioner averred as his special affirmative defenses that Bautista did not make the requisite cash deposit on time;
and that Bautista did not render a detailed specification of the acts or omissions complained of.
COMELEC First Division denied the special affirmative defenses of the petitioner as there was a substantial
compliance with the requirement of COMELEC.
ISSUES:
1. Whether a party aggrieved by an interlocutory order, issued by a Division of the Comelec in an election protest,
may directly assail the order in this Court through a special civil action for certiorari. NO
2. Whether the case should be referred to the Comelec en banc. NO
HELD:
1.
The remedy is to seek the review of the interlocutory order during the appeal of the decision of the Division
in due course. The court may have the power to review any decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC, limits such

power to a final decision or resolution of the COMELEC en banc, and does not extend to an interlocutory order issued
by a Division of the COMELEC.
Otherwise stated, the Court has no power to review on certiorari an interlocutory order or even a final resolution
issued by a Division of the COMELEC. Where the Commission in division committed grave abuse of discretion or
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in issuing interlocutory orders relative to an action pending before it and the
controversy did not fall under any of the instances mentioned in Section 2, Rule 3 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure, the remedy of the aggrieved party is not to refer the controversy to the Commission en banc as this is not
permissible under its present rules but to elevate it to this Court via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court.
2.
It does not appear that the subject controversy is one of the cases specifically provided under the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure in which the Commission may sit en banc. Neither is it shown that the present
controversy a case where a division is not authorized to act nor a situation wherein the members of the First Division
unanimously voted to refer the subject case to the Commission en banc. Clearly, the Commission en banc, under the
circumstances shown above, cannot be the proper forum which the matter concerning the assailed interlocutory
orders can be referred to.
In a situation such as this where the Commission in division committed grave abuse of discretion or acted without or
in excess of jurisdiction in issuing interlocutory orders relative to an action pending before it and the controversy did
not fall under any of the instances mentioned in Section 2, Rule 3 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the remedy
of the aggrieved party is not to refer the controversy to the Commission en banc as this is not permissible under its
present rules but to elevate it to this Court via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

CAYETANO V. COMELEC and TINGA

FACTS:
In the automated national and local elections held on May 10, 2010, petitioner and private respondent were
candidates for the position of Mayor of Taguig City. Petitioner was proclaimed the winner thereof.
The private respondent filed an Election Protest against petitioner before the COMELEC for allegedly committing
election frauds and irregularities which translated to the latters ostensible win as Mayor of Taguig City. On the whole,
private respondent claims that he is the actual winner of the mayoralty elections in Taguig City.
In the petitioners Answer with Counter-Protest and Counterclaim, she raised, among others, the affirmative defense
of insufficiency in form and content of the Election Protest and prayed for the immediate dismissal thereof. However,
it was denied by the COMELEC. Her Motion for Reconsideration was also denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
refusing to dismiss the protest of private respondent, to allow its review by this Court NO
HELD:
The general rule is that a decision or an order of a COMELEC Division cannot be elevated directly to this Court
through a special civil action for certiorari. Furthermore, a motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order, or ruling
of a COMELEC Division shall be elevated to the COMELEC En Banc.
However, a motion to reconsider an interlocutory order of a COMELEC Division shall be resolved by the division
which issued the interlocutory order, except when all the members of the division decide to refer the matter to the
COMELEC En Banc. Thus, in general, interlocutory orders of a COMELEC Division are not appealable, nor can they
be proper subject of a petition for certiorari. This does not mean that the aggrieved party is without recourse if a

COMELEC Division denies the motion for reconsideration. The aggrieved party can still assign as error the
interlocutory order if in the course of the proceedings he decides to appeal the main case to the COMELEC En Banc.
The exception enunciated is when the interlocutory order of a COMELEC Division is a patent nullity because of
absence of jurisdiction to issue the interlocutory order, as where a COMELEC Division issued a temporary restraining
order without a time limit, or where a COMELEC Division admitted an answer with counter-protest which was filed
beyond the reglementary period.
The Court has no jurisdiction to review an order, whether final or interlocutory, even a final resolution of a division of
the COMELEC. Stated otherwise, the Court can only review via certiorari a decision, order, or ruling of the COMELEC
en banc. In short, the final order of the COMELEC (Second Division) denying the affirmative defenses of petitioner
cannot be questioned before this Court even via a petition for certiorari. Although the rule admits of exceptions as
when the issuance of the assailed interlocutory order is a patent nullity because of the absence of jurisdiction to issue
the same. However, none of the circumstances permitting an exception to the rule occurs in this instance.
In addition to that, certiorari will not lie in this case. The issuance of a special writ of certiorari has two prerequisites:
(1) a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (2) there is no appeal, or
any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Although it is not the duty of the Court to point petitioner, or all litigants for that matter, to the appropriate remedy
which she should have taken. The aggrieved party can still assign as error the interlocutory order if in the course of
the proceedings he decides to appeal the main case to the COMELEC En Banc. Moreover, the protest filed by private
respondent and the counter-protest filed by petitioner remain pending before the COMELEC, which should afford
petitioner ample opportunity to ventilate her grievances. Thereafter, the COMELEC should decide these cases with
dispatch.

GUIEB V. FONTANILLA 247 SCRA 348

FACTS:
Petitioner and private respondent were candidates for the position of Punong Barangay of Barangay Nilombot, Sta.
Barbara, Pangasinan in the barangay election of May 1994. Petitioner was proclaimed as the winning candidate to
which the latter seasonably filed an election protest with the Municipal Trial Court.
The Municipal Trial Court confirmed the proclamation of the petitioner and dismissed the protest to which private
respondent appealed to the Regional Trial Court, which gave a favorable decision by reversing the court a quo.
Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari with the High Court regarding the decision.
ISSUE:
Whether the RTC is the proper forum for the appeal and has jurisdiction on election contests involving barangay
positions NO
HELD:
The RTC had absolutely no jurisdiction over the appeal from the decision of the MTC. Under Article IX, Section 2,
Paragraph 2-C of the Constitution, it is the COMELEC, and not the Regional Trial Courts, that has exclusive
jurisdiction over all contests involving elective barangay officials decided by courts of limited jurisdiction, which are
the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.