http://www.thefinancialexpress-bd.

com/2015/07/30/102007
VOL 22 NO 253 REGD NO DA 1589 | Dhaka, Thursday, July 30 2015

Ensuring rights of sharecroppers

M. S. Siddiqui
Reforms are widely discussed and undertaken throughout the world for fair and equitable distribution of agricultural lands,
protecting rights of landless sharecroppers and increasing productivity. Land reforms represent policies with significant promise
to reduce rural poverty in developing countries. These reforms include land redistribution, tilling programmes and regulation of
tenancy contracts.
The proposed Land Reform Act 2014 was circulated for public opinion by the government. It has proposed the limit of ownership
of agricultural lands up to 60 bighas and none will be allowed to buy 'benami' property. It has the provision of restriction on
eviction from household and distribution of khash land among landless poor persons.
The most important part of the proposed law is 'borga' or crop-sharing by landowners and farmers. The proposed law says: "No
person shall allow another person to cultivate his land and no person shall cultivate the land of another person on condition of
sharing the produce of such land between them unless they execute a contract for such cultivation in such form and manner as
may be prescribed. A borga contract shall be valid for a period of five years commencing from such date as may be specified in
the borga contract."
Bangladesh had similar Land Reform Ordinance, 1984 but it did not yield any positive outcome during the last 32 years in
genuine reform, particularly in borga contract. We may evaluate the weakness and past experiences before the proposed Land
Reform Act 2014 is finally enacted into a law.
THE EXAMPLE OF WEST BENGAL: Bangladesh can take the global experience of land reforms. The West Bengal (WB)
government successfully passed such a law and implemented reforms in crop-sharing since 1977. The then Left Front
government amended the Land Reforms Act (LRA), making sharecropping hereditary, not valid for certain period like five years
as it is in Bangladesh. The LRA has rendered eviction by landlords a punishable offence, and shifted the onus of proving identity
of the actual tiller to the landlord.
The LRA is the key piece of legislation addressing land reforms and land rights in West Bengal. The LRA covers a range of landrelated topics, but most significantly it (1) defines the rights and obligations of landowners and borgadars, (2) prohibits fixed-rent
leasing of land, (3) places a ceiling on the size of landholdings, (4) defines how lands taken by the government should be
distributed and (5) limits transferability of much of the land obtained through redistribution and also land held by scheduled tribe
members.
Registration of borga agreement has given sharecroppers permanent and hereditary tenancy rights and limited the share of the
crop payable as rent to landlords to 25 per cent. The sharecropper will lose his right to the land only if the landlord wants to use it
for personal cultivation. These rights are inheritable but not transferable. The share that the landlord can demand from a
registered tenant will be no greater than 25 per cent. The reform was framed so that the landlord can not threaten to replace him
with another tenant if he refuses to accept a lower share.
In addition to redistributing some agricultural lands in ownership and protecting borgadars, West Bengal has also transferred
ownership of homestead land to landless agricultural labourers, borgadars and artisans.
Bangladesh's law is mandatory for both landowner and sharecropper but there is no initiative from the government to implement
it. The WB government had initiated a mass mobilisation drive with the assistance of farmers' unions (Kisan Sabha) and newlyempowered local governments to identify sharecropping tenants and induce them to register their contracts with the local Land
Records Office. Registration was also accompanied by a provision of the share accruing to tenants, amounting to 75 per cent
(replaced by 50 per cent if the landlord pays cost of all non-labour inputs).
These land reforms were complemented with creation of a three-tier system of panchayats or elected local governments, one of
those being Gram Panchayats (GPs). The responsibility for delivery of various input supply services and local infrastructure was

delegated to GPs.
The principal responsibilities entrusted to the panchayats included implementation of land reforms, two principal poverty
alleviation schemes (the Integrated Rural Development Programme under which subsidised credit is given to the poor, and
employment programmes such as Food for Work (FFW), National Rural Employment Programme (NREP) and Rural Labour
Employment Guarantee Programme (RLEGP) in the 1980s which were merged into the Jawahar Rozgar Yojana (JRY) from 1989
onwards. Others are distribution of subsidised agricultural inputs (in the form of minikits containing seeds, fertilisers and
pesticides), local infrastructure projects (including roads and irrigation), and miscellaneous welfare schemes (old-age assistance,
disaster relief, housing programmes for the poor etc.).
The bulk of the funds for these programmes were devolved to the local governments under various schemes sponsored by the
Indian central and state governments. The funds percolated down from the central government to GPs through the state
government, its district-wide allocations, and then down through the upper tiers of the panchayats at the block and district levels.
Upper tiers of the panchayats thus effected allocation across different GPs, while the main role of the GPs was to select
beneficiaries of these schemes within their jurisdiction.
The LRA has given priority right of purchase to the borgadars. The first option would be a purchase option under which the
borgadar could assume ownership over the entire borga holding by paying the landowner a government-determined sum of
perhaps 50 per cent (or 60 per cent) of the land's market value. The second would be an exchange option under which the
borgadar could unilaterally choose to assume ownership over 50 per cent of the borga holding by giving up his borgadar rights
over the remaining portion of the land. This part would then revert in unencumbered ownership to the landlord who could either
sell or personally cultivate the land subject to other existing restrictions.
The records revealed that many borgadars and landlords are making or have made deals which have resulted in the borgadar
receiving ownership of a portion of the borga land (ranging from 25 per cent to 60 per cent of the land) in return for giving up
protected borgadar rights on the remaining land.
West Bengal has also taken determined steps to bolster the position of borgadars by regulating the borgadar-landlord relationship
through a programme called 'Operation Borga'. The main components of this regulation consist of tenure security protection for
borgadars and control over the share amount paid to landlords by borgadars. Implementation of these protections has been made
possible largely through the determined recording of existing borgadars throughout the state.
Operation Borga is a programme designed to implement and enforce the long-dormant agricultural tenancy laws that regulated
rents and security of tenure of sharecroppers.
At the same time, the present West Bengal government launched Operation Borga, a massive and well-publicised village-tovillage campaign to register tenants and ensure their rights. Under this programme, the process used to register tenants was
altered to make it easier for the sharecropper to register. Operation Borga officials sought out hesitant sharecroppers, explained
the law, and offered them the opportunity to register.
Moreover, the government used its own village political organisations to make sure that landlords did not intimidate tenants, that
tenants who registered did not face reprisal from the landlords, and that disputes were handled fairly in the courts. Operation
Borga is widely regarded as a success. The agricultural productivity grew faster in West Bengal compared to other states in India.
A CARBON COPY: This proposed law in Bangladesh is identical to the now-defunct Land Reform Ordinance, 1884. There is no
initiative for registration of and implementation of borga agreement and protection of rights of the sharecroppers until today. The
proposed law is a carbon copy of the said ordinance. Provisions on distribution of khash land and rights on the household of poor
farmers have not been implemented so far.
The law in Bangladesh proposes share-crop agreement valid for five years while the WB law ensures unlimited period unless
sharecropper or landowner decides to cultivate himself. The WB government does not rely on owner-sharecroppers' initiative to
register the share agreement with the relevant authority. The WB has given the responsibility of registration to the local
government. It has made the programme successful with the active involvement of local government and by creating a social
movement.
The Operation Borga programme is a success story just across the border. Let us take the experience of West Bengal, revise the
law and ensure people's participation in the implementation of reforms to protect the interests of poor farmers over sharecrops
and rights to purchase the land from existing white- collar farmers or landowners for optimum use of very limited agricultural
land of the small country with a huge population.

The writer is a legal economist.

shah@banglachemcial.com