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The trial court then rendered a decision in favor of the petitioners-appellants prompting the Secretary to interpose an
appeal to the Court of Appeals.
The Secretary assigned a single assignment of error, to wit:
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN HAVING ANNULLED THE DECISIONS RENDERED
BY THE SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS AND COMMUNICATIONS, IN CASES
JURISDICTION, AND IN PERMANENTLY ENJOINING SAID SECRETARY FROM
IMPLEMENTING THE ORDER TO REMOVE THE ENCROACMENTS PLACED BY THE
APPEALLEES ON THE TULAO RIVER. (At p. 17, Rollo)
In support of this lone assignment of error, the petitioner raised the following arguments:
1) The Secretary was duly vested with jurisdiction both over the parties and subject matter of the
controversy.
2) The Secretary duly conformed to the requirements of due process in the exercise of his authority
under Republic Act No. 2056.
3) The Secretary did not, as concluded by the court a quo, rule on the validity of appellees' titles
over the lots in question.
4) The issuance of fishpond permits by the Bureau of Fisheries did not preclude the Secretary from
conducting due investigation and in ruling upon the same.
5) The Secretary's findings of fact are entitled to respect from the courts. (At pp. 17-18, Rollo)
As stated earlier, the main issue hinges on the authority of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications under
Republic Act 2056 to declare that the construction or building of dams, dikes or any other works which encroach into
any public navigable river, stream, coastal waters and any other navigable public waters or waterways as well as the
construction or building of dams, dikes or any other works in areas declared as communal fishing grounds is
prohibited and to order their removal as "public nuisances or as prohibited constructions."
The lower court concluded that the Secretary abused his authority under Republic Act No. 2056 on the following
points: (1) The Secretary passed judgment on the validity of the titles of the petitioners over Encroachments 3, 4 and
5 when he declared such titles as null and void; and (2) the dikes denominated as Encroachments Nos. 1 and 2 were
constructed by virtue of a permit legally issued in favor of the late Santiago Pastoral by the Bureau of Fisheries on
July 19, 1948 because the area was deemed fit by said Office of fishpond purposes, and the construction of such
dikes would not impede the flow of the river. The lower court opined that in constructing the dikes, the petitioners
were only exercising a right legally granted to them and that "they shall remain to enjoy the privilege until such time
that their permit shall have been cancelled."
The petition is impressed with merit.
The records belie the lower court's finding that the Secretary passed judgment on the titles of the lots in question.
In connection with Encroachments Nos. 3 and 4, the Heirs of Santiago Pastoral presented a certified true copy of
Original Certificate of Title No. 9 issued by the Register of Deeds of Dagupan City to show that the encroachments
are within their titled lands. The Secretary, however, stated in his decision:
As regards the last two encroachments, the evidence shows that the southern boundary thereof is
the original bank of the Tulao River. The properties in question, titled as they are, are clearly within
the bed of the river. Even the testimony of Aniceto Luis, a representative of the Bureau of Lands in
the investigation, shows without doubt, that the encroachments are within the river bed as may be
gleaned from the following:
dominion, registration under Act No. 496 did not make the possessor a true owner thereof. (Celso
Ledesma v. The Municipality of Iloilo, Concepcion Lopez, Maximo M. Kalaw and wife, and Julia
Ledesma, defendants, 49 Phil. 769). (pp. 1-2, Decision in RA-2056-37)
In effect, the Secretary passed judgment only to the extent that, although the encroachments were inside titled
properties, they are within the bed of a river. With this factual finding, he declared the encroachments, converted into
fishponds within the Tulao River, as prohibited and ordered their removal pursuant to his authority under Republic Act
2056. He never declared that the titles of the petitioners over the lots in question were null and void.
The Secretary's authority to determine questions of fact such as the existence of a river even inside titled properties
was recognized in the cases of Lovina v. Moreno, (9 SCRA 557) and Taleon vs. Secretary of Public Works and
Communications (20 SCRA 69). We stated that the fact-finding power of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications is merely "incidental to his duty to clear all navigable streams of unauthorized constructions and,
hence its grant did not constitute an unlawful delegation of judicial power. ... that although the titles were silent as to
the existence of any stream inside the property, that did not confer a right to the stream, it being of a public nature
and not subject to private appropriation, even by prescription." In the instant cases, the residents along the Tulao
River complained about obstructions on the river. From a width of 70 to 105 meters, the river had been reduced to a
width of only 10 to 15 meters. The river was navigable and even at low-tide was two to three meters deep.
As regards the lower court's finding that the dikes designated as Encroachments Nos. 1 and 2 were constructed
under the petitioners' Fishpond Permit issued by the Bureau of Fisheries in 1948 and, therefore, must be respected,
the Secretary counters that such issuance of fishpond permit did not preclude him from conducting due investigation
pursuant to his authority under Republic Act 2056.
We agree.
Section 1 of Republic Act 2056 is explicit in that "Any provision or provisions of law to the contrary
notwithstanding,the construction or building of dams, dikes ... which encroaches into any public navigable river,
stream, coastal waters and any other navigable public waters or waterways ... shall be ordered removed as public
nuisance or as prohibited construction as herein provided ... The record shows that the petitioners' fishpond permit
was issued in 1948 while the Act took effect on June 3, 1958. Therefore, the Secretary's more specific authority to
remove dikes constructed in fishponds whenever they obstruct or impede the free passage of any navigable river or
stream or would cause inundation of agricultural areas (Section 2, Republic Act 2056) takes precedence. Moreover,
the power of the Secretary of Public Works to investigate and clear public streams from unauthorized encroachments
and obstructions was granted as early as Act 3708 of the old Philippine Legislature and has been upheld by this
Court in the cases of Palanca v. Commonwealth (69 Phil. 449) and Meneses v. Commonwealth (69 Phil. 647). The
same rule was applied in Lovina v. Moreno, (supra) Santos etc., et al. v. Secretary of Public Works and
Communications (19 SCRA 637).
All in all, we find no grave abuse of discretion or an illegal exercise of authority on the part of the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications in ordering the removal of the encroachments designated as Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 of
Exhibit "A".
The rules of due process were observed in the conduct of investigation in the two cases. The parties concerned were
all notified and hearings of the two cases were conducted by the Secretary through the City Engineer of Dagupan
City. All parties were given opportunity to present evidence to prove their claims after which the Secretary rendered
separate decisions pursuant to Republic Act 2056.
The factual findings of the Secretary are substantiated by evidence in the administrative records. In the absence of
any illegality, error of law, fraud or imposition, none of which were proved by the petitioners in the instant case, said
findings should be respected. (Lovina v. Moreno, supra; Santos, etc., et al. v. Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, supra; See also Borja v. Moreno, 11 SCRA 568; Taleon v. Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, 20 SCRA 69).
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is GRANTED. The questioned decision of the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The decisions of the then Secretary of Public Works and
Communications in Cases No. RA 2056-26 and No. RA-2056-37 are REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.