II.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CASES JULY 18, 2015

U.S. Supreme Court

Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914)
Weeks v. United States
No. 461
Argued December 2, 3, 1913
Decided February 24,1914
232 U.S. 383
ERROR TO THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
Syllabus

issue will not be raised to ascertain the source of competent evidence, Adams
v. New York, 192 U. S. 585, that rule does not justify the retention of letters
seized in violation of the protection given by the Fourth Amendment where
an application in the cause for their return has been made by the accused
before trial.
The court has power to deal with papers and documents in the possession of
the District Attorney and other officers of the court and to direct their return
to the accused if wrongfully seized.
Where letters and papers of the accused were taken from his premises by an
official of the United States, acting under color of office but
Page 232 U. S. 384

Under the Fourth Amendment, Federal courts and officers are under such
limitations and restraints in the exercise of their power and authority as to
forever secure the people, their persons, houses, papers and effects against all
unreasonable searches and seizures under the guise of law.
The protection of the Fourth Amendment reaches all alike, whether accused
of crime or not; and the duty of giving it force and effect is obligatory on all
entrusted with the enforcement of Federal laws.
The tendency of those executing Federal criminal laws to obtain convictions
by means of unlawful seizures and enforced confessions in violation of
Federal rights is not to be sanctioned by the courts which are charged with
the support of constitutional rights.
The Federal courts cannot, as against a seasonable application for their
return, in a criminal prosecution, retain for the purposes of evidence against
the accused his letters and correspondence seized in his house during his
absence and without his authority by a United States marshal holding no
warrant for his arrest or for the search of his premises.
While the efforts of courts and their officials to bring the guilty to
punishment are praiseworthy, they are not to be aided by sacrificing the great
fundamental rights secured by the Constitution.
While an incidental seizure of incriminating papers, made in the execution of
a legal warrant, and their use as evidence, may be justified, and a collateral

without any search warrant and in violation of the constitutional rights of

accused under the Fourth Amendment, and a seasonable application for
return of the letters and papers has been refused and they are used in
evidence over his objection, prejudicial error is committed, and the judgment
should be reversed.
The Fourth Amendment is not directed to individual misconduct of state
officers. Its limitations reach the Federal Government and its agencies. Boyd
v. United States, 116 U. S. 616.
The facts, which involve the validity under the Fourth Amendment of a
verdict and sentence and the extent to which the private papers of the accused
taken without search warrant can be used as evidence against him, are stated
in the opinion.
Page 232 U. S. 386
MR. JUSTICE DAY delivered the opinion of the court:
An indictment was returned against the plaintiff in error, defendant below,
and herein so designated, in the district court of the United States for the
western district of Missouri, containing nine counts. The seventh count, upon
which a conviction was had, charged the use of the mails for the purpose of
transporting certain coupons or tickets representing chances or shares in a
lottery or gift enterprise, in violation of 213 of the Criminal Code. Sentence

of fine and imprisonment was imposed. This writ of error is to review that
judgment.

into their possession, and have failed and refused to return to defendant
portion of same, to-wit:"

The defendant was arrested by a police officer, so far as the record shows,
without warrant, at the Union Station in Kansas City, Missouri, where he was
employed by an express company. Other police officers had gone to the
house of the defendant, and being told by a neighbor where the key was kept,
found it and entered the house. They searched the defendant's room and took
possession of various papers and articles found there, which were afterwards
turned over to the United States marshal. Later in the same day, police
officers returned with the marshal, who thought he might find additional
evidence and, being admitted by someone in the house, probably a boarder,
in response to a rap, the marshal searched the defendant's room and carried
away certain letters and envelops found in the drawer of a chiffonier. Neither
the marshal nor the police officer had a search warrant.

"One (1) leather grip, value about $7; one (1) tin box valued at $3; one (1)
Pettis county, Missouri, bond, value $500; three (3) mining stock certificates
which defendant is unable to more particularly describe, valued at $12,000;
and certain stock certificates in addition thereto, issued by the San Domingo
Mining, Loan, & Investment Company; about $75 in currency; one (1)
newspaper published about 1790, an heirloom; and certain other property
which plaintiff is now unable to describe."

Page 232 U. S. 387

The defendant filed in the cause before the time for trial the following
petition:
"Petition to Return Private Papers, Books, and Other Property."
"Now comes defendant and states that he is a citizen and resident of Kansas
City, Missouri, and that he resides, owns, and occupies a home at 1834 Penn
street in said city:"
"That, on the 21st day of December, 1911, while plaintiff was absent at his
daily vocation, certain officers of the government, whose names are to
plaintiff unknown, unlawfully and without warrant or authority so to do,
broke open the door to plaintiff's said home and seized all of his books,
letters, money, papers, notes, evidences of indebtedness, stock, certificates,
insurance policies, deeds, abstracts, and other muniments of title, bonds,
candies, clothes, and other property in said home, and this in violation of
11 and 23 to the Constitution of Missouri, and of the 4th and Fifth
Amendments to the Constitution of the United States;"
"That the district attorney, marshal, and clerk of the United States court for
the western district of Missouri took the above-described property so seized

"That said property is being unlawfully and improperly

Page 232 U. S. 388
held by said district attorney, marshal, and clerk, in violation of defendant's
rights under the Constitution of the United States and the state of Missouri."
"That said district attorney purposes to use said books, letters, papers,
certificates of stock, etc., at the trial of the above-entitled cause, and that, by
reason thereof and of the facts above set forth, defendant's rights under the
amendments aforesaid to the Constitutions of Missouri and the United States
have been and will be violated unless the court order the return prayed for;"
"Wherefore, defendant prays that said district attorney, marshal, and clerk be
notified, and that the court direct and order said district attorney, marshal,
and clerk, to return said property to said defendant."
Upon consideration of the petition, the court entered in the cause an order
directing the return of such property as was not pertinent to the charge
against the defendant, but denied the petition as to pertinent matter, reserving
the right to pass upon the pertinency at a later time. In obedience to the order,
the district attorney returned part of the property taken and retained the
remainder, concluding a list of the latter with the statement that
"all of which last above described property is to be used in evidence in the
trial of the above-entitled cause, and pertains to the alleged sale of lottery
tickets of the company above named."

After the jury had been sworn and before any evidence had been given, the
defendant again urged his petition for the return of his property, which was
denied by the court. Upon the introduction of such papers during the trial, the
defendant objected on the ground that the papers had been obtained without a
search warrant, and by breaking open his home, in violation of the 4th and
Fifth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, which objection
was overruled by the court. Among the papers retained and put in evidence
were a number of
Page 232 U. S. 389
lottery tickets and statements with reference to the lottery, taken at the first
visit of the police to the defendant's room, and a number of letters written to
the defendant in respect to the lottery, taken by the marshal upon his search
of defendant's room.
The defendant assigns error, among other things, in the court's refusal to
grant his petition for the return of his property, and in permitting the papers
to be used at the trial.
It is thus apparent that the question presented involves the determination of
the duty of the court with reference to the motion made by the defendant for
the return of certain letters, as well as other papers, taken from his room by
the United States marshal, who, without authority of process, if any such
could have been legally issued, visited the room of the defendant for the
declared purpose of obtaining additional testimony to support the charge
against the accused, and, having gained admission to the house, took from
the drawer of a chiffonier there found certain letters written to the defendant,
tending to show his guilt. These letters were placed in the control of the
district attorney, and were subsequently produced by him and offered in
evidence against the accused at the trial. The defendant contends that such
appropriation of his private correspondence was in violation of rights secured
to him by the 4th and Fifth Amendments to the Constitution of the United
States. We shall deal with the 4th Amendment, which provides:
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or

affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the

persons or things to be seized."
The history of this Amendment is given with particularity in the opinion of
Mr. Justice Bradley, speaking for
Page 232 U. S. 390
the court in Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616. As was there shown, it took
its origin in the determination of the framers of the Amendments to the
Federal Constitution to provide for that instrument a Bill of Rights, securing
to the American people, among other things, those safeguards which had
grown up in England to protect the people from unreasonable searches and
seizures, such as were permitted under the general warrants issued under
authority of the government, by which there had been invasions of the home
and privacy of the citizens, and the seizure of their private papers in support
of charges, real or imaginary, make against them. Such practices had also
received sanction under warrants and seizures under the so-called writs of
assistance, issued in the American colonies. See 2 Watson, Const. 1414 et
seq. Resistance to these practices had established the principle which was
enacted into the fundamental law in the Fourth Amendment, that a man's
house was his castle, and not to be invaded by any general authority to search
and seize his goods and papers. Judge Cooley, in his Constitutional
Limitations, pp. 425, 426, in treating of this feature of our Constitution said:
"The maxim that 'every man's house is his castle' is made a part of our
constitutional law in the clauses prohibiting unreasonable searches and
seizures, and has always been looked upon as of high value to the citizen."
"Accordingly," says Lieber in his work on Civil Liberty and SelfGovernment, 62, in speaking of the English law in this respect,
"no man's house can be forcibly opened, or he or his goods be carried away
after it has thus been forced, except in cases of felony; and then the sheriff
must be furnished with a warrant, and take great care lest he commit a
trespass. This principle is jealously insisted upon."

In Ex parte Jackson, 96 U. S. 727, 96 U. S. 733, this court recognized the

principle of protection as applicable to letters and sealed packages in the
mail, and held that, consistently
Page 232 U. S. 391
with this guaranty of the right of the people to be secure in their papers
against unreasonable searches and seizures, such matter could only be
opened and examined upon warrants issued on oath or affirmation,
particularly describing the thing to be seized, "as is required when papers are
subjected to search in one's own household."
In the Boyd case, supra, after citing Lord Camden's judgment in Entick v.
Carrington, 19 Howell's State Trials 1029, Mr. Justice Bradley said (630):
"The principles laid down in this opinion affect the very essence of
constitutional liberty and security. They reach farther than the concrete form
of the case then before the court, with its adventitious circumstances; they
apply to all invasions on the part of the government and its employees of the
sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life. It is not the breaking of his
doors and the rummaging of his drawers that constitutes the essence of the
offense, but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security,
personal liberty, and private property, where that right has never been
forfeited by his conviction of some public offense -- it is the invasion of this
sacred right which underlies and constitutes the essence of Lord Camden's
judgment."
In Bram v. United States, 168 U. S. 532, this court, in speaking by the present
Chief Justice of Boyd's Case, dealing with the Fourth and Fifth Amendments,
said (544):
"It was in that case demonstrated that both of these Amendments
contemplated perpetuating, in their full efficacy, by means of a constitutional
provision, principles of humanity and civil liberty which had been secured in
the mother country only after years of struggle, so as to implant them in our
institutions in the fullness of their integrity, free from the possibilities of
future legislative change."
The effect of the Fourth Amendment is to put the courts

Page 232 U. S. 392

of the United States and Federal officials, in the exercise of their power and
authority, under limitations and restraints as to the exercise of such power
and authority, and to forever secure the people, their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against all unreasonable searches and seizures under the guise of
law. This protection reaches all alike, whether accused of crime or not, and
the duty of giving to it force and effect is obligatory upon all intrusted under
our Federal system with the enforcement of the laws. The tendency of those
who execute the criminal laws of the country to obtain conviction by means
of unlawful seizures and enforced confessions, the latter often obtained after
subjecting accused persons to unwarranted practices destructive of rights
secured by the Federal Constitution, should find no sanction in the judgments
of the courts, which are charged at all times with the support of the
Constitution, and to which people of all conditions have a right to appeal for
the maintenance of such fundamental rights.
What, then, is the present case? Before answering that inquiry specifically, it
may be well, by a process of exclusion, to state what it is not. It is not an
assertion of the right on the part of the government always recognized under
English and American law to search the person of the accused when legally
arrested, to discover and seize the fruits or evidences of crime. This right has
been uniformly maintained in many cases. 1 Bishop.Criminal Procedure
211; Wharton, Crim. Plead. & Practice 8th ed. 60; Dillon v. O'Brien, 16
Cox C.C. 245. Nor is it the case of testimony offered at a trial where the
court is asked to stop and consider the illegal means by which proofs,
otherwise competent, were obtained -- of which we shall have occasion to
treat later in this opinion. Nor is it the case of burglar's tools or other proofs
of guilt found upon his arrest within the control of the accused.
Page 232 U. S. 393
The case in the aspect in which we are dealing with it involves the right of
the court in a criminal prosecution to retain for the purposes of evidence the
letters and correspondence of the accused, seized in his house in his absence
and without his authority, by a United States marshal holding no warrant for
his arrest and none for the search of his premises. The accused, without
awaiting his trial, made timely application to the court for an order for the

return of these letters, as well or other property. This application was denied,
the letters retained and put in evidence, after a further application at the
beginning of the trial, both applications asserting the rights of the accused
under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the Constitution. If letters and
private documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence against a
citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the Fourth Amendment,
declaring his right to be secure against such searches and seizures, is of no
value, and, so far as those thus placed are concerned, might as well be
stricken from the Constitution. The efforts of the courts and their officials to
bring the guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided
by the sacrifice of those great principles established be years of endeavor and
suffering which have resulted in their embodiment in the fundamental law of
the land. The United States marshal could only have invaded the house of the
accused when armed with a warrant issued as required by the Constitution,
upon sworn information, and describing with reasonable particularity the
thing for which the search was to be made. Instead, he acted without sanction
of law, doubtless prompted by the desire to bring further proof to the aid of
the government, and, under color of his office, undertook to make a seizure
of private papers in direct violation of the constitutional prohibition against
such action. Under such circumstances, without sworn information and
particular description, not even an order of court would
Page 232 U. S. 394
have justified such procedure; much less was it within the authority of the
United States marshal to thus invade the house and privacy of the accused.
In Adams v. New York, 192 U. S. 585, this court said that the Fourth
Amendment was intended to secure the citizen in person and property against
unlawful invasion of the sanctity of his home by officers of the law, acting
under legislative or judicial sanction. This protection is equally extended to
the action of the government and officers of the law acting under it. (Boyd
Case, supra) To sanction such proceedings would be to affirm by judicial
decision a manifest neglect, if not an open defiance, of the prohibitions of the
Constitution, intended for the protection of the people against such
unauthorized action.
The court before which the application was made in this case recognized the
illegal character of the seizure, and ordered the return of property not in its

judgment competent to be offered at the trial, but refused the application of

the accused to turn over the letters, which were afterwards put in evidence on
behalf of the government. While there is no opinion in the case, the court in
this proceeding doubtless relied upon what is now contended by the
government to be the correct rule of law under such circumstances -- that the
letters having come into the control of the court, it would not inquire into the
manner in which they were obtained, but, if competent, would keep them and
permit their use in evidence. Such proposition, the government asserts, is
conclusively established by certain decisions of this court, the first of which
is Adams v. New York, supra. In that case, the plaintiff in error had been
convicted in the Supreme Court of the State of New York for having in his
possession certain gambling paraphernalia used in the game known as policy,
in violation of the Penal Code of New York. At the trial, certain papers,
which had been seized by police officers executing a search warrant for the
discovery and
Page 232 U. S. 395
seizure of policy slips, and which had been found in addition to the policy
slips, were offered in evidence over his objection. The conviction was
affirmed by the court of appeals of New York (176 N.Y. 351), and the case
was brought here for alleged violation of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments
to the Constitution of the United States. Pretermitting the question whether
these Amendments applied to the action of the states, this court proceeded to
examine the alleged violations of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, and put
its decision upon the ground that the papers found in the execution of the
search warrant, which warrant had a legal purpose in the attempt to find
gambling paraphernalia, was competent evidence against the accused, and
their offer in testimony did not violate his constitutional privilege against
unlawful search or seizure, for is was held that such incriminatory documents
thus discovered were not the subject of an unreasonable search and seizure,
and, in effect, that the same were incidentally seized in the lawful execution
of a warrant, and not in the wrongful invasion of the home of a citizen and
the unwarranted seizure of his papers and property. It was further held,
approving in that respect the doctrine laid down in 1 Greenleaf, 254a, that
it was no valid objection to the use of the papers that they had been thus
seized, and that the courts in the course of a trial would not make an issue to

determine that question, and many state cases were cited supporting that
doctrine.
The same point had been ruled in People v. Adams, 176 N.Y. 351, from
which decision the case was brought to this court, where it was held that if
the papers seized in addition to the policy slips were competent evidence in
the case, as the court held they were, they were admissible in evidence at the
trial, the court saying (p. 358):
"The underlying principle obviously is that the court, when engaged in trying
a criminal cause, will not take notice of
Page 232 U. S. 396
the manner in which witnesses have possessed themselves of papers or other
articles of personal property which are material and properly offered in
evidence."
This doctrine thus laid down by the New York Court of Appeals and
approved by this Court, that a court will not, in trying a criminal cause,
permit a collateral issue to be raised as to the source of competent testimony,
has the sanction of so many state cases that it would be impracticable to cite
or refer to them in detail. Many of them are collected in the note to State v.
Turner, 136 Am. St. Rep. 129, 135 et seq. After citing numerous cases, the
editor says:
"The underlying principle of all these decisions obviously is that the court,
when engaged in the trial of a criminal action, will not take notice of the
manner in which a witness has possessed himself of papers or other chattels,
subjects of evidence which are material and properly offered in
evidence. People v. Adams, supra. Such an investigation is not involved
necessarily in the litigation in chief, and to pursue it would be to halt in the
orderly progress of a cause, and consider incidentally a question which has
happened to cross the path of such litigation, and which is wholly
independent thereof."
It is therefore evident that the Adams Case affords no authority for the action
of the court in this case, when applied to in due season for the return of
papers seized in violation of the Constitutional Amendment. The decision in

that case rests upon incidental seizure made in the execution of a legal
warrant, and in the application of the doctrine that a collateral issue will not
be raised to ascertain the source from which testimony, competent in a
criminal case, comes.

G.R. No. L-19550

June 19, 1967

HARRY S. STONEHILL, ROBERT P. BROOKS, JOHN J. BROOKS

and KARL BECK, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JOSE W. DIOKNO, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF
JUSTICE; JOSE LUKBAN, in his capacity as Acting Director, National
Bureau of Investigation; SPECIAL PROSECUTORS PEDRO D.
CENZON, EFREN I. PLANA and MANUEL VILLAREAL, JR. and
ASST. FISCAL MANASES G. REYES; JUDGE AMADO ROAN,
Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE ROMAN CANSINO, Municipal
Court of Manila; JUDGE HERMOGENES CALUAG, Court of First
Instance of Rizal-Quezon City Branch, and JUDGE DAMIAN
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Upon application of the officers of the government named on the margin 1
hereinafter referred to as Respondents-Prosecutors several judges 2
hereinafter referred to as Respondents-Judges issued, on different dates, 3 a
total of 42 search warrants against petitioners herein 4 and/or the corporations
of which they were officers,5 directed to the any peace officer, to search the
persons above-named and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses and/or
residences, and to seize and take possession of the following personal
property to wit:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts,
ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents
and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursements
receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette
wrappers).

as "the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of

the offense," or "used or intended to be used as the means of committing the
offense," which is described in the applications adverted to above as
"violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue
(Code) and the Revised Penal Code."
Alleging that the aforementioned search warrants are null and void, as
contravening the Constitution and the Rules of Court because, inter alia:
(1) they do not describe with particularity the documents, books and things to
be seized; (2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were actually
seized; (3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence against the
aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases filed against them; (4) the
searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and (5) the documents,
papers and cash money seized were not delivered to the courts that issued the
warrants, to be disposed of in accordance with law on March 20, 1962,
said petitioners filed with the Supreme Court this original action
for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction, and prayed that,
pending final disposition of the present case, a writ of preliminary injunction
be issued restraining Respondents-Prosecutors, their agents and /or
representatives from using the effects seized as aforementioned or any copies
thereof, in the deportation cases already adverted to, and that, in due course,
thereafter, decision be rendered quashing the contested search warrants and
declaring the same null and void, and commanding the respondents, their
agents or representatives to return to petitioners herein, in accordance with
Section 3, Rule 67, of the Rules of Court, the documents, papers, things and
cash moneys seized or confiscated under the search warrants in question.
In their answer, respondents-prosecutors alleged, 6 (1) that the contested
search warrants are valid and have been issued in accordance with law; (2)
that the defects of said warrants, if any, were cured by petitioners' consent;
and (3) that, in any event, the effects seized are admissible in evidence
against herein petitioners, regardless of the alleged illegality of the
aforementioned searches and seizures.
On March 22, 1962, this Court issued the writ of preliminary injunction
prayed for in the petition. However, by resolution dated June 29, 1962, the
writ was partially lifted or dissolved, insofar as the papers, documents and
things seized from the offices of the corporations above mentioned are

concerned; but, the injunction was maintained as regards the papers,

documents and things found and seized in the residences of petitioners
herein.7
Thus, the documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of
the warrants in question may be split into two (2) major groups, namely: (a)
those found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned corporations, and
(b) those found and seized in the residences of petitioners herein.
As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein have no cause of
action to assail the legality of the contested warrants and of the seizures made
in pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that said corporations have their
respective personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of herein
petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of the interest of
each of them in said corporations, and whatever the offices they hold therein
may be.8 Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be
contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby,9 and
that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and
cannot be availed of by third parties. 10 Consequently, petitioners herein may
not validly object to the use in evidence against them of the documents,
papers and things seized from the offices and premises of the corporations
adverted to above, since the right to object to the admission of said papers in
evidence belongsexclusively to the corporations, to whom the seized effects
belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings
against them in their individual capacity. 11 Indeed, it has been held:
. . . that the Government's action in gaining possession of papers belonging to
the corporation did not relate to nor did it affect the personal defendants. If
these papers were unlawfully seized and thereby the constitutional rights of
or any one were invaded, they were the rights of the corporation and not the
rights of the other defendants. Next, it is clear that a question of the
lawfulness of a seizure can be raised only by one whose rights have been
invaded. Certainly, such a seizure, if unlawful, could not affect the
constitutional rights of defendants whose property had not been seized or the
privacy of whose homes had not been disturbed; nor could they claim for
themselves the benefits of the Fourth Amendment, when its violation, if any,
was with reference to the rights of another. Remus vs. United
States (C.C.A.)291 F. 501, 511. It follows, therefore, that the question of the

admissibility of the evidence based on an alleged unlawful search and seizure

does not extend to the personal defendants but
embraces only the corporation whose property was taken. . . . (A
Guckenheimer & Bros. Co. vs. United States, [1925] 3 F. 2d. 786, 789,
Emphasis supplied.)
With respect to the documents, papers and things seized in the residences of
petitioners herein, the aforementioned resolution of June 29, 1962, lifted the
writ of preliminary injunction previously issued by this Court, 12 thereby, in
effect, restraining herein Respondents-Prosecutors from using them in
evidence against petitioners herein.
In connection with said documents, papers and things, two (2) important
questions need be settled, namely: (1) whether the search warrants in
question, and the searches and seizures made under the authority thereof, are
valid or not, and (2) if the answer to the preceding question is in the negative,
whether said documents, papers and things may be used in evidence against
petitioners herein.1wph1.t
Petitioners maintain that the aforementioned search warrants are in the nature
of general warrants and that accordingly, the seizures effected upon the
authority there of are null and void. In this connection, the
Constitution13 provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and
no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate,
namely: (1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be
determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that
the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized.
None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested
warrants. Indeed, the same were issued upon applications stating that the
natural and juridical person therein named had committed a "violation of

Central Ban Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and
Revised Penal Code." In other words, nospecific offense had been alleged in
said applications. The averments thereof with respect to the offense
committed were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges
who issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, for
the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party
against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or
committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal
laws. As a matter of fact, the applications involved in this case do not allege
any specific acts performed by herein petitioners. It would be the legal
heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of a "violation of Central
Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised
Penal Code," as alleged in the aforementioned applications without
reference to any determinate provision of said laws or
To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out
completely one of the most fundamental rights guaranteed in our
Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy
of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims caprice or
passion of peace officers. This is precisely the evil sought to be remedied by
the constitutional provision above quoted to outlaw the so-called general
warrants. It is not difficult to imagine what would happen, in times of keen
political strife, when the party in power feels that the minority is likely to
wrest it, even though by legal means.
Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with the
disputed search warrants, that this Court deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of
Rule 122 of the former Rules of Court 14 by providing in its counterpart,
under the Revised Rules of Court 15 that "a search warrant shall not issue but
upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense." Not satisfied
with this qualification, the Court added thereto a paragraph, directing that
"no search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense."
The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for the
contested search warrants was compounded by the description therein made
of the effects to be searched for and seized, to wit:

Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence,

receipts, ledgers, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents
and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursement
receipts, balance sheets and related profit and loss statements.
Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining
to all business transactions of petitioners herein, regardless of whether the
transactions were legal or illegal. The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all
records of the petitioners and the aforementioned corporations, whatever
their nature, thus openly contravening the explicit command of our Bill of
Rights that the things to be seized be particularly described as well as
tending to defeat its major objective: the elimination of general warrants.
Relying upon Moncado vs. People's Court (80 Phil. 1), RespondentsProsecutors maintain that, even if the searches and seizures under
consideration were unconstitutional, the documents, papers and things thus
seized are admissible in evidence against petitioners herein. Upon mature
deliberation, however, we are unanimously of the opinion that the position
taken in the Moncado case must be abandoned. Said position was in line with
the American common law rule, that the criminal should not be allowed to go
free merely "because the constable has blundered," 16 upon the theory that the
constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is
protected by means other than the exclusion of evidence unlawfully
obtained, 17 such as the common-law action for damages against the
searching officer, against the party who procured the issuance of the search
warrant and against those assisting in the execution of an illegal search, their
criminal punishment, resistance, without liability to an unlawful seizure, and
such other legal remedies as may be provided by other laws.
However, most common law jurisdictions have already given up this
approach and eventually adopted the exclusionary rule, realizing that this
is the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against
unreasonable searches and seizures. In the language of Judge Learned Hand:
As we understand it, the reason for the exclusion of evidence competent as
such, which has been unlawfully acquired, is that exclusion is the only
practical way of enforcing the constitutional privilege. In earlier times the
action of trespass against the offending official may have been protection

enough; but that is true no longer. Only in case the prosecution which itself
controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their wrong will
that wrong be repressed.18
In fact, over thirty (30) years before, the Federal Supreme Court had already
declared:
If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in
evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the 4th
Amendment, declaring his rights to be secure against such searches and
seizures, is of no value, and, so far as those thus placed are concerned, might
as well be stricken from the Constitution. The efforts of the courts and their
officials to bring the guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not
to be aided by the sacrifice of those great principles established by years of
endeavor and suffering which have resulted in their embodiment in the
fundamental law of the land.19
This view was, not only reiterated, but, also, broadened in subsequent
decisions on the same Federal Court. 20After reviewing previous decisions
thereon, said Court held, in Mapp vs. Ohio (supra.):
. . . Today we once again examine the Wolf's constitutional documentation of
the right of privacy free from unreasonable state intrusion, and after its dozen
years on our books, are led by it to close the only courtroom door remaining
open to evidence secured by official lawlessness in flagrant abuse of that
basic right, reserved to all persons as a specific guarantee against that very
same unlawful conduct. We hold that all evidence obtained by searches and
seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority,
inadmissible in a State.
Since the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy has been declared enforceable
against the States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth, it is
enforceable against them by the same sanction of exclusion as it used against
the Federal Government. Were it otherwise, then just as without the Weeks
rule the assurance against unreasonable federal searches and seizures would
be "a form of words," valueless and underserving of mention in a perpetual
charter of inestimable human liberties, so too, without that rule the freedom
from state invasions of privacy would be so ephemeral and so neatly severed

from its conceptual nexus with the freedom from all brutish means of
coercing evidence as not to permit this Court's high regard as a
freedom "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." At the time that the
Court held in Wolf that the amendment was applicable to the States through
the Due Process Clause, the cases of this Court as we have seen, had
steadfastly held that as to federal officers the Fourth Amendment included
the exclusion of the evidence seized in violation of its provisions. Even Wolf
"stoutly adhered" to that proposition. The right to when conceded operatively
enforceable against the States, was not susceptible of destruction by avulsion
of the sanction upon which its protection and enjoyment had always been
deemed dependent under the Boyd, Weeks and Silverthorne Cases.
Therefore, in extending the substantive protections of due process to all
constitutionally unreasonable searches state or federal it was logically
and constitutionally necessarily that the exclusion doctrine an essential
part of the right to privacy be also insisted upon as an essential ingredient
of the right newly recognized by the Wolf Case. In short, the admission of
the new constitutional Right by Wolf could not tolerate denial of its most
important constitutional privilege, namely, the exclusion of the evidence
which an accused had been forced to give by reason of the unlawful seizure.
To hold otherwise is to grant the right but in reality to withhold its privilege
and enjoyment. Only last year the Court itself recognized that the purpose of
the exclusionary rule to "is to deter to compel respect for the
constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way by removing
the incentive to disregard it" . . . .
The ignoble shortcut to conviction left open to the State tends to destroy the
entire system of constitutional restraints on which the liberties of the people
rest. Having once recognized that the right to privacy embodied in the Fourth
Amendment is enforceable against the States, and that the right to be secure
against rude invasions of privacy by state officers is, therefore constitutional
in origin, we can no longer permit that right to remain an empty promise.
Because it is enforceable in the same manner and to like effect as other basic
rights secured by its Due Process Clause, we can no longer permit it to be
revocable at the whim of any police officer who, in the name of law
enforcement itself, chooses to suspend its enjoyment. Our decision, founded
on reason and truth, gives to the individual no more than that which the
Constitution guarantees him to the police officer no less than that to which

honest law enforcement is entitled, and, to the courts, that judicial integrity
so necessary in the true administration of justice. (emphasis ours.)
Indeed, the non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the letter, but also,
to the spirit of the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and
seizures. To be sure, if the applicant for a search warrant has competent
evidence to establish probable cause of the commission of a given crime by
the party against whom the warrant is intended, then there is no reason why
the applicant should not comply with the requirements of the fundamental
law. Upon the other hand, if he has no such competent evidence, then it is not
possible for the Judge to find that there is probable cause, and, hence, no
justification for the issuance of the warrant. The only possible explanation
(not justification) for its issuance is the necessity of fishing evidence of the
commission of a crime. But, then, this fishing expedition is indicative of the
absence of evidence to establish a probable cause.
Moreover, the theory that the criminal prosecution of those who secure an
illegal search warrant and/or make unreasonable searches or seizures would
suffice to protect the constitutional guarantee under consideration, overlooks
the fact that violations thereof are, in general, committed By agents of the
party in power, for, certainly, those belonging to the minority could not
possibly abuse a power they do not have. Regardless of the handicap under
which the minority usually but, understandably finds itself in
prosecuting agents of the majority, one must not lose sight of the fact that the
psychological and moral effect of the possibility 21 of securing their
conviction, is watered down by the pardoning power of the party for whose
benefit the illegality had been committed.
In their Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of the Resolution of this
Court dated June 29, 1962, petitioners allege that Rooms Nos. 81 and 91 of
Carmen Apartments, House No. 2008, Dewey Boulevard, House No. 1436,
Colorado Street, and Room No. 304 of the Army-Navy Club, should be
included among the premises considered in said Resolution as residences of
herein petitioners, Harry S. Stonehill, Robert P. Brook, John J. Brooks and
Karl Beck, respectively, and that, furthermore, the records, papers and other
effects seized in the offices of the corporations above referred to include
personal belongings of said petitioners and other effects under their exclusive

possession and control, for the exclusion of which they have a standing under
the latest rulings of the federal courts of federal courts of the United States. 22
We note, however, that petitioners' theory, regarding their alleged possession
of and control over the aforementioned records, papers and effects, and the
alleged "personal" nature thereof, has Been Advanced, notin their petition or
amended petition herein, but in the Motion for Reconsideration and
Amendment of the Resolution of June 29, 1962. In other words, said theory
would appear to be readjustment of that followed in said petitions, to suit the
approach intimated in the Resolution sought to be reconsidered and amended.
Then, too, some of the affidavits or copies of alleged affidavits attached to
said motion for reconsideration, or submitted in support thereof, contain
either inconsistent allegations, or allegations inconsistent with the theory
now advanced by petitioners herein.
Upon the other hand, we are not satisfied that the allegations of said petitions
said motion for reconsideration, and the contents of the aforementioned
affidavits and other papers submitted in support of said motion, have
sufficiently established the facts or conditions contemplated in the cases
relied upon by the petitioners; to warrant application of the views therein
expressed, should we agree thereto. At any rate, we do not deem it necessary
to express our opinion thereon, it being best to leave the matter open for
determination in appropriate cases in the future.
We hold, therefore, that the doctrine adopted in the Moncado case must be, as
it is hereby, abandoned; that the warrants for the search of three (3)
residences of herein petitioners, as specified in the Resolution of June 29,
1962, are null and void; that the searches and seizures therein made are
illegal; that the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued, in
connection with the documents, papers and other effects thus seized in said
residences of herein petitioners is hereby made permanent; that the writs
prayed for are granted, insofar as the documents, papers and other effects so
seized in the aforementioned residences are concerned; that the
aforementioned motion for Reconsideration and Amendment should be, as it
is hereby, denied; and that the petition herein is dismissed and the writs
prayed for denied, as regards the documents, papers and other effects seized
in the twenty-nine (29) places, offices and other premises enumerated in the
same Resolution, without special pronouncement as to costs.

It is so ordered.
Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar and Sanchez, JJ.,
concur.
CASTRO, J., concurring and dissenting:
From my analysis of the opinion written by Chief Justice Roberto
Concepcion and from the import of the deliberations of the Court on this
case, I gather the following distinct conclusions:
1. All the search warrants served by the National Bureau of Investigation in
this case are general warrants and are therefore proscribed by, and in
violation of, paragraph 3 of section 1 of Article III (Bill of Rights) of the
Constitution;
2. All the searches and seizures conducted under the authority of the said
search warrants were consequently illegal;
3. The non-exclusionary rule enunciated in Moncado vs. People, 80 Phil. 1,
should be, and is declared, abandoned;
4. The search warrants served at the three residences of the petitioners
are expressly declared null and void the searches and seizures therein made
are expressly declared illegal; and the writ of preliminary injunction
heretofore issued against the use of the documents, papers and effect seized
in the said residences is made permanent; and
5. Reasoning that the petitioners have not in their pleadings satisfactorily
demonstrated that they have legal standing to move for the suppression of the
documents, papers and effects seized in the places other than the three
residences adverted to above, the opinion written by the Chief
Justice refrains from expresslydeclaring as null and void the such warrants
served at such other places and as illegal the searches and seizures made
therein, and leaves "the matter open for determination in appropriate cases in
the future."
It is precisely the position taken by the Chief Justice summarized in the
immediately preceding paragraph (numbered 5) with which I am not in
accord.

I do not share his reluctance or unwillingness to expressly declare, at this

time, the nullity of the search warrants served at places other than the three
residences, and the illegibility of the searches and seizures conducted under
the authority thereof. In my view even the exacerbating passions and
prejudices inordinately generated by the environmental political and moral
developments of this case should not deter this Court from forthrightly laying
down the law not only for this case but as well for future cases and future
generations. All the search warrants, without exception, in this case are
admittedly general, blanket and roving warrants and are therefore admittedly
and indisputably outlawed by the Constitution; and the searches and seizures
made were therefore unlawful. That the petitioners, let us assume in gratia
argumente, have no legal standing to ask for the suppression of the papers,
things and effects seized from places other than their residences, to my mind,
cannot in any manner affect, alter or otherwise modify the intrinsic nullity of
the search warrants and the intrinsic illegality of the searches and seizures
made thereunder. Whether or not the petitioners possess legal standing the
said warrants are void and remain void, and the searches and seizures were
illegal and remain illegal. No inference can be drawn from the words of the
Constitution that "legal standing" or the lack of it is a determinant of the
nullity or validity of a search warrant or of the lawfulness or illegality of a
search or seizure.

ownership of documents, papers and effects gives "standing;" (b) ownership

and/or control or possession actual or constructive of premises
searched gives "standing"; and (c) the "aggrieved person" doctrine where the
search warrant and the sworn application for search warrant are "primarily"
directed solely and exclusively against the "aggrieved person," gives
"standing."

On the question of legal standing, I am of the conviction that, upon the

pleadings submitted to this Court the petitioners have the requisite legal
standing to move for the suppression and return of the documents, papers and
effects that were seized from places other than their family residences.

Ownership of the properties seized alone entitles the petitioners to bring a

motion to return and suppress, and gives them standing as persons aggrieved
by an unlawful search and seizure regardless of their location at the time of
seizure. Jones vs. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261 (1960) (narcotics stored
in the apartment of a friend of the defendant); Henzel vs. United States, 296
F. 2d. 650, 652-53 (5th Cir. 1961), (personal and corporate papers of
corporation of which the defendant was president), United States vs. Jeffers,
342 U.S. 48 (1951) (narcotics seized in an apartment not belonging to the
defendant); Pielow vs. United States, 8 F. 2d 492, 493 (9th Cir. 1925) (books
seized from the defendant's sister but belonging to the defendant);
Cf. Villano vs. United States, 310 F. 2d 680, 683 (10th Cir. 1962) (papers
seized in desk neither owned by nor in exclusive possession of the
defendant).

Our constitutional provision on searches and seizures was derived

almost verbatim from the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. In the many years of judicial construction and interpretation of
the said constitutional provision, our courts have invariably regarded as
doctrinal the pronouncement made on the Fourth Amendment by federal
courts, especially the Federal Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit Courts
of Appeals.
The U.S. doctrines and pertinent cases on standing to move for the
suppression or return of documents, papers and effects which are the fruits of
an unlawful search and seizure, may be summarized as follows; (a)

An examination of the search warrants in this case will readily show that,
excepting three, all were directed against the petitioners personally. In some
of them, the petitioners were named personally, followed by the designation,
"the President and/or General Manager" of the particular corporation. The
three warrants excepted named three corporate defendants. But the
"office/house/warehouse/premises" mentioned in the said three warrants
were also the same "office/house/warehouse/premises" declared to be owned
by or under the control of the petitioners in all the other search warrants
directed against the petitioners and/or "the President and/or General
Manager" of the particular corporation. (see pages 5-24 of Petitioners' Reply
of April 2, 1962). The searches and seizures were to be made, and were
actually made, in the "office/house/warehouse/premises" owned by or under
the control of the petitioners.
Ownership of matters seized gives "standing."

In a very recent case (decided by the U.S. Supreme Court on December 12,
1966), it was held that under the constitutional provision against unlawful
searches and seizures, a person places himself or his property within a
constitutionally protected area, be it his home or his office, his hotel room or
his automobile:

204, Army & Navy Club); and individually, or through their respective
spouses, owned the controlling stock of the corporations involved. The
petitioners' proprietary interest in most, if not all, of the premises searched
therefore independently gives them standing to move for the return and
suppression of the books, papers and affects seized therefrom.

Where the argument falls is in its misapprehension of the fundamental nature

and scope of Fourth Amendment protection. What the Fourth Amendment
protects is the security a man relies upon when heplaces himself or his
property within a constitutionally protected area, be it his home or his office,
his hotel room or his automobile. There he is protected from unwarranted
governmental intrusion. And when he puts some thing in his filing cabinet, in
his desk drawer, or in his pocket, he has the right to know it will be secure
from an unreasonable search or an unreasonable seizure. So it was that the
Fourth Amendment could not tolerate the warrantless search of the hotel
room in Jeffers, the purloining of the petitioner's private papers in Gouled, or
the surreptitious electronic surveilance in Silverman. Countless other cases
which have come to this Court over the years have involved a myriad of
differing factual contexts in which the protections of the Fourth Amendment
have been appropriately invoked. No doubt, the future will bring countless
others. By nothing we say here do we either foresee or foreclose factual
situations to which the Fourth Amendment may be applicable. (Hoffa vs.
U.S., 87 S. Ct. 408 (December 12, 1966). See also U.S. vs. Jeffers, 342 U.S.
48, 72 S. Ct. 93 (November 13, 1951). (Emphasis supplied).

In Jones vs. United States, supra, the U.S. Supreme Court delineated the
nature and extent of the interest in the searched premises necessary to
maintain a motion to suppress. After reviewing what it considered to be the
unduly technical standard of the then prevailing circuit court decisions, the
Supreme Court said (362 U.S. 266):

Control of premises searched gives "standing."

Independent of ownership or other personal interest in the records and
documents seized, the petitioners have standing to move for return and
suppression by virtue of their proprietary or leasehold interest in many of the
premises searched. These proprietary and leasehold interests have been
sufficiently set forth in their motion for reconsideration and need not be
recounted here, except to emphasize that the petitioners paid rent, directly or
indirectly, for practically all the premises searched (Room 91, 84 Carmen
Apts; Room 304, Army & Navy Club; Premises 2008, Dewey Boulevard;
1436 Colorado Street); maintained personal offices within the corporate
offices (IBMC, USTC); had made improvements or furnished such offices;
or had paid for the filing cabinets in which the papers were stored (Room

We do not lightly depart from this course of decisions by the lower courts.
We are persuaded, however, that it is unnecessarily and ill-advised to import
into the law surrounding the constitutional right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures subtle distinctions, developed and refined by the
common law in evolving the body of private property law which, more than
almost any other branch of law, has been shaped by distinctions whose
validity is largely historical. Even in the area from which they derive, due
consideration has led to the discarding of those distinctions in the homeland
of the common law. See Occupiers' Liability Act, 1957, 5 and 6 Eliz. 2, c. 31,
carrying out Law Reform Committee, Third Report, Cmd. 9305. Distinctions
such as those between "lessee", "licensee," "invitee," "guest," often only of
gossamer strength, ought not be determinative in fashioning procedures
ultimately referable to constitutional safeguards. See also Chapman vs.
United States, 354 U.S. 610, 616-17 (1961).
It has never been held that a person with requisite interest in the premises
searched must own the property seized in order to have standing in a motion
to return and suppress. In Alioto vs. United States, 216 F. Supp. 48 (1963), a
Bookkeeper for several corporations from whose apartment the corporate
records were seized successfully moved for their return. In United States vs.
Antonelli, Fireworks Co., 53 F. Supp. 870, 873 (W D. N. Y. 1943), the
corporation's president successfully moved for the return and suppression is
to him of both personal and corporate documents seized from his home
during the course of an illegal search:

The lawful possession by Antonelli of documents and property, "either his

own or the corporation's was entitled to protection against unreasonable
search and seizure. Under the circumstances in the case at bar, the search and
seizure were unreasonable and unlawful. The motion for the return of seized
article and the suppression of the evidence so obtained should be granted.
(Emphasis supplied).
Time was when only a person who had property in interest in either the place
searched or the articles seize had the necessary standing to invoke the
protection of the exclusionary rule. But in MacDonald vs. Unite States, 335
U.S. 461 (1948), Justice Robert Jackson joined by Justice Felix Frankfurter,
advanced the view that "even a guest may expect the shelter of the rooftree
he is under against criminal intrusion." This view finally became the official
view of the U.S. Supreme Court and was articulated in United States vs.
Jeffers, 432 U.S 48 (1951). Nine years later, in 1960, in Jones vs. Unite
States, 362 U.S. 257, 267, the U.S. Supreme Court went a step further. Jones
was a mere guest in the apartment unlawfully searched but the Court
nonetheless declared that the exclusionary rule protected him as well. The
concept of "person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure" was
enlarged to include "anyone legitimately on premise where the search
occurs."
Shortly after the U.S. Supreme Court's Jones decision the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the defendant organizer, sole
stockholder and president of a corporation had standing in a mail fraud
prosecution against him to demand the return and suppression of corporate
property. Henzel vs. United States, 296 F 2d 650, 652 (5th Cir. 1961), supra.
The court conclude that the defendant had standing on two independent
grounds:First he had a sufficient interest in the property seized,
and second he had an adequate interest in the premises searched (just like
in the case at bar). A postal inspector had unlawfully searched the
corporation' premises and had seized most of the corporation's book and
records. Looking to Jones, the court observed:
Jones clearly tells us, therefore, what is not required qualify one as a "person
aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure." It tells us that appellant should
not have been precluded from objecting to the Postal Inspector's search and
seizure of the corporation's books and records merely because the appellant

did not show ownership or possession of the books and records or a

substantial possessory interest in the invade premises . . . (Henzel vs. United
States, 296 F. 2d at 651). .
Henzel was soon followed by Villano vs. United States, 310 F. 2d 680, 683,
(10th Cir. 1962). In Villano, police officers seized two notebooks from a desk
in the defendant's place of employment; the defendant did not claim
ownership of either; he asserted that several employees (including himself)
used the notebooks. The Court held that the employee had a protected
interest and that there also was an invasion of privacy.
Both Henzel andVillano considered also the fact that the search and seizure
were "directed at" the moving defendant. Henzel vs. United States, 296 F. 2d
at 682; Villano vs. United States, 310 F. 2d at 683.
In a case in which an attorney closed his law office, placed his files in
storage and went to Puerto Rico, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
recognized his standing to move to quash as unreasonable search and seizure
under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution a grand jury
subpoena duces tecum directed to the custodian of his files. The Government
contended that the petitioner had no standing because the books and papers
were physically in the possession of the custodian, and because the subpoena
was directed against the custodian. The court rejected the contention, holding
that
Schwimmer legally had such possession, control and unrelinquished personal
rights in the books and papers as not to enable the question of unreasonable
search and seizure to be escaped through the mere procedural device of
compelling a third-party naked possessor to produce and deliver
them. Schwimmer vs. United States, 232 F. 2d 855, 861 (8th Cir. 1956).
Aggrieved person doctrine where the search warrant s primarily directed
against said person gives "standing."
The latest United States decision squarely in point is United States vs. Birrell,
242 F. Supp. 191 (1965, U.S.D.C. S.D.N.Y.). The defendant had stored with
an attorney certain files and papers, which attorney, by the name of Dunn,
was not, at the time of the seizing of the records, Birrell's attorney. * Dunn, in
turn, had stored most of the records at his home in the country and on a farm

which, according to Dunn's affidavit, was under his (Dunn's) "control and
management." The papers turned out to be private, personal and business
papers together with corporate books and records of certain unnamed
corporations in which Birrell did not even claim ownership. (All of these
type records were seized in the case at bar). Nevertheless, the search in
Birrell was held invalid by the court which held that even though Birrell did
not own the premises where the records were stored, he had "standing" to
move for the return of all the papers and properties seized. The court, relying
on Jones vs. U.S.,supra; U.S. vs. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 53 F. Supp. 870,
Aff'd 155 F. 2d 631: Henzel vs. U.S., supra; andSchwimmer vs. U.S., supra,
pointed out that
It is overwhelmingly established that the searches here in question were
directed solely and exclusively against Birrell. The only person suggested in
the papers as having violated the law was Birrell. The first search warrant
described the records as having been used "in committing a violation of Title
18, United States Code, Section 1341, by the use of the mails by one Lowell
M. Birrell, . . ." The second search warrant was captioned: "United States of
America vs. Lowell M. Birrell. (p. 198)
Possession (actual or constructive), no less than ownership, gives standing to
move to suppress. Such was the rule even before Jones. (p. 199)
If, as thus indicated Birrell had at least constructive possession of the records
stored with Dunn, it matters not whether he had any interest in the premises
searched. See also Jeffers v. United States, 88 U.S. Appl. D.C. 58, 187 F. 2d
498 (1950), affirmed 432 U.S. 48, 72 S. Ct. 93, 96 L. Ed. 459 (1951).
The ruling in the Birrell case was reaffirmed on motion for reargument; the
United States did not appeal from this decision. The factual situation
in Birrell is strikingly similar to the case of the present petitioners; as
in Birrell, many personal and corporate papers were seized from premises not
petitioners' family residences; as in Birrell, the searches were "PRIMARILY
DIRECTED SOLETY AND EXCLUSIVELY" against the petitioners. Still
both types of documents were suppressed in Birrell because of the illegal
search. In the case at bar, the petitioners connection with the premises raided
is much closer than in Birrell.

Thus, the petitioners have full standing to move for the quashing of all the
warrants regardless whether these were directed against residences in the
narrow sense of the word, as long as the documents were personal papers of
the petitioners or (to the extent that they were corporate papers) were held by
them in a personal capacity or under their personal control.
Prescinding a from the foregoing, this Court, at all events, should order the
return to the petitioners all personaland private papers and effects seized, no
matter where these were seized, whether from their residences or corporate
offices or any other place or places. The uncontradicted sworn statements of
the petitioners in their, various pleadings submitted to this Court indisputably
show that amongst the things seized from the corporate offices and other
places were personal and private papers and effects belonging to the
petitioners.
If there should be any categorization of the documents, papers and things
which where the objects of the unlawful searches and seizures, I submit that
the grouping should be: (a) personal or private papers of the petitioners were
they were unlawfully seized, be it their family residences offices, warehouses
and/or premises owned and/or possessed (actually or constructively) by them
as shown in all the search and in the sworn applications filed in securing the
void search warrants and (b) purely corporate papers belonging to
corporations. Under such categorization or grouping, the determination of
which unlawfully seized papers, documents and things arepersonal/private of
the petitioners or purely corporate papers will have to be left to the lower
courts which issued the void search warrants in ultimately effecting the
suppression and/or return of the said documents.
And as unequivocally indicated by the authorities above cited, the petitioners
likewise have clear legal standing to move for the suppression of purely
corporate papers as "President and/or General Manager" of the corporations
involved as specifically mentioned in the void search warrants.
Finally, I must articulate my persuasion that although the cases cited in my
disquisition were criminal prosecutions, the great clauses of the
constitutional proscription on illegal searches and seizures do not withhold
the mantle of their protection from cases not criminal in origin or nature.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. NOEL

TUDTUD y PAYPA and DINDO BOLONG y NARET, accusedappellants.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
. It is desirable that criminals should be detected, and to that end that all
available evidence should be used. It also is desirable that the government
should not itself foster and pay for other crimes, when they are the means by
which the evidence is to be obtained. If it pays its officers for having got
evidence by crime, I do not see why it may not as well pay them for getting it
in the same way, and I can attach no importance to protestations of
disapproval if it knowingly accepts and pays and announces that it will pay
for the fruits. We have to choose, and for my part I think it a less evil that
some criminals should escape than that the government should play an
ignoble part.
[1]

So wrote Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes in Olmstead v. U.S. On this

occasion, this Court is made to choose between letting suspected criminals
escape or letting the government play an ignoble part.
Sometime during the months of July and August 1999, the Toril Police
Station, Davao City received a report from a civilian asset named Bobong
Solier about a certain Noel Tudtud.[2]Solier related that his neighbors have
been complaining about Tudtud, who was allegedly responsible for the
proliferation of marijuana in their area.[3]
Reacting to the report, PO1 Ronald Desierto, PO1 Ramil Floreta and their
superior, SPO1 Villalonghan,[4] all members of the Intelligence Section of the
Toril Police Station, conducted surveillance in Soliers neighborhood in Sapa,
Toril, Davao City.[5] For five days, they gathered information and learned that
Tudtud was involved in illegal drugs.[6] According to his neighbors, Tudtud
was engaged in selling marijuana.[7]

On August 1, 1999, Solier informed the police that Tudtud had headed to
Cotabato and would be back later that day with new stocks of marijuana.
[8]
Solier described Tudtud as big-bodied and short, and usually wore a hat.
[9]
At around 4:00 in the afternoon that same day, a team composed of PO1
Desierto, PO1 Floreta and SPO1 Villalonghan posted themselves at the
corner of Saipon and McArthur Highway to await Tudtuds arrival. [10] All
wore civilian clothes.[11]
About 8:00 later that evening, two men disembarked from a bus and helped
each other carry a carton[12] marked King Flakes.[13] Standing some five feet
away from the men, PO1 Desierto and PO1 Floreta observed that one of the
men fit Tudtuds description.[14] The same man also toted a plastic bag.[15]
PO1 Floreta and PO1 Desierto then approached the suspects and identified
themselves as police officers.[16] PO1 Desierto informed them that the police
had received information that stocks of illegal drugs would be arriving that
night.[17] The man who resembled Tudtuds description denied that he was
carrying any drugs.[18] PO1 Desierto asked him if he could see the contents of
the box.[19] Tudtud obliged, saying, it was alright.[20] Tudtud opened the box
himself as his companion looked on.[21]
The box yielded pieces of dried fish, beneath which were two bundles, one
wrapped in a striped plastic bag[22] and another in newspapers.[23] PO1
Desierto asked Tudtud to unwrap the packages.[24] They contained what
seemed to the police officers as marijuana leaves. [25]
The police thus arrested Tudtud and his companion, informed them of their
rights and brought them to the police station.[26] The two did not resist.[27]
The confiscated items were turned over to the Philippine National Police
(PNP) Crime Laboratory for examination.[28] Forensic tests conducted by
Police Chief Inspector Noemi Austero, forensic chemist of the PNP Crime
Laboratory, Region XI, on specimens taken from the confiscated items
confirmed the police officers suspicion. The plastic bag contained 3,200
grams of marijuana leaves while the newspapers contained another 890
grams.[29] Police Chief Inspector Austero reduced her findings in her report,
Physical Sciences Report No. D-220-99 dated 2 August 1999. [30]

Noel Tudtud and his companion, Dindo Bulong, were subsequently

charged[31] before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City with illegal
possession of prohibited drugs.[32] Upon arraignment, both accused pleaded
not guilty.[33] The defense, however, reserved their right to question the
validity of their arrest and the seizure of the evidence against them. [34]
Trial ensued thereafter.
The prosecution presented five witnesses, namely, arresting officers PO1
Desierto and PO1 Floreta, their civilian informant Bobong Solier, forensic
chemist Police Chief Inspector Noemi Austero, and SPO3 Nicolas Algabre,
exhibit custodian of the PNP Crime Laboratory. Said witnesses testified to
the foregoing narration of facts.
The accused, denying the charges against them, cried frame-up.
Noel Tudtud recalled that on August 1, 1999 he had gone to Kabacan, North
Cotabato to sell pairs of Levis pants, which was his sideline. [35] At about 5:00
in the afternoon, he returned to Davao City by bus. [36] Upon reaching Toril,
Tudtud, along with less than ten passengers, got down the bus. [37]
Suddenly, a man who identified himself as a police officer approached him,
pointing a .38 caliber revolver.[38] The man told him not to run.[39] Tudtud
raised his arms and asked, Sir, what is this about?[40] The man answered that
he would like to inspect the plastic bag Tudtud was carrying, and instructed
Tudtud to open the bag, which revealed several pairs of Levis pants. [41]
The man then directed Tudtud to open a carton box some two meters away.
[42]
According to Tudtud, the box was already there when he disembarked the
bus.[43] Tudtud told the man the box was not his, but proceeded to open it out
of fear after the man again pointed his revolver at him. [44] Tudtud discovered
pieces of dried fish, underneath which was something wrapped in cellophane.
[45]

What is that? the man asked.[46] Tudtud replied that he did not know.
[47]
Without even unwrapping the cellophane, the man said it was marijuana
and abruptly handcuffed Tudtud.[48]

Simultaneously, another man was pointing a firearm at Dindo Bolong at the

other side of the street, some eight meters from Tudtud. [49]
Bolong recounted that he was on his way to a relative in Daliao after
attending a cousins wedding in Hagonoy, Davao del Sur when he was
accosted.[50] After alighting the bus, Bolong crossed the street. [51] Someone
then approached him and pointed a gun at him.[52] The man ordered him not
to move and handcuffed him.[53] Bolong asked why he was being arrested but
the man just told him to go with them.[54]
The suspects were then taken to the police station where, they would later
claim, they met each other for the first time. [55]
Assailing the credibility of informant Bobong Solier, the defense offered the
testimonies of Felicia Julaton,[56] Branch 3 Clerk of Court, Claudio Bohevia,
[57]
Branch 7 Clerk of Court, and Mercedita Abunda,[58] Branch 9 Utility
Clerk, all of the Davao City Municipal Trial Circuit Court. They testified and
presented court documents showing that one Bobo or Bobong Ramirez was
charged in their respective branches with various crimes, specifically, light
threats, less serious physical injuries and robbery. The defense asserted that
the Bobo or Bobong Ramirez accused in these cases is the same person as the
informant Bobong Solier.[59]
Swayed by the prosecutions evidence beyond reasonable doubt, the RTC
rendered judgment convicting both accused as charged and sentencing them
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P500,000.00.
[60]

On appeal, Noel Tudtud and Dindo Bolong assign, among other errors, the
admission in evidence of the marijuana leaves, which they claim were seized
in violation of their right against unreasonable searches and seizures.
The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is secured by Section 2,
Article III of the Constitution, which states:
SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secured in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by

the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the places to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
The rule is that a search and seizure must be carried out through or with a
judicial warrant; otherwise, such search and seizure becomes unreasonable
within the meaning of the above-quoted constitutional provision, and any
evidence secured thereby, will be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in
any proceeding.[61] Section 3 (2), Article III of the Constitution explicitly
provides:
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
The proscription in Section 2, Article III, however, covers only unreasonable
searches and seizures. The following instances are not deemed unreasonable
even in the absence of a warrant:

The RTC justified the warrantless search of appellants belongings under the
first exception, as a search incident to a lawful arrest. It cited as authorities
this Courts rulings in People v. Claudio,[63] People v. Tangliben,[64] People v.
Montilla,[65] and People v. Valdez.[66] The Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), in arguing for the affirmance of the appealed decision, invokes the
cases of People v. Maspil, Jr.,[67] People v. Malmstedt,[68] and People v.
Bagista.[69]
A search incidental to a lawful arrest is sanctioned by the Rules of
Court. Prior to its revision in 2000, Section 12,[70] Rule 126 of said Rules read
as follows:
SEC. 12. Search incident to lawful arrest. A person lawfully arrested may be
searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of
the commission of an offense, without a search warrant.
Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Rules, in turn, allows warrantless arrests:

1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest. (Sec. 12, Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court and prevailing jurisprudence);

SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private

person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

2. Search of evidence in plain view. The elements are: (a) a prior valid
intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally
present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b) the evidence was
inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to be where they
are; (c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; (d) plain view justified
mere seizure of evidence without further search;

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is

actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the

vehicles inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its
transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion
amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and Frisk; and
7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.[62]

.
It is significant to note that the search in question preceded the arrest. Recent
jurisprudence holds that the arrest must precede the search; the process
cannot be reversed.[71]Nevertheless, a search substantially contemporaneous
with an arrest can precede the arrest if the police have probable cause to
make the arrest at the outset of the search. [72] The question, therefore, is
whether the police in this case had probable cause to arrest
appellants. Probable cause has been defined as:
an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. The grounds of suspicion
are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers,
the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing
the offense, is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the

person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on

probable cause, coupled with good faith of the peace officers making the
arrest.[73]

specifically provided by law. To do so would infringe upon personal liberty

and set back a basic right so often violated and so deserving of full
protection.[76]

The long-standing rule in this jurisdiction, applied with a great degree of

consistency, is that reliable information alone is not sufficient to justify a
warrantless arrest under Section 5 (a), Rule 113. The rule requires, in
addition, that the accused perform some overt act that would indicate that he
has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.

Consequently, the items seized were held inadmissible, having been obtained
in violation of the accuseds constitutional rights against unreasonable
searches and seizures.

In the leading case of People v. Burgos,[74] this Court held that the officer
arresting a person who has just committed, is committing, or is about to
commit an offense must havepersonal knowledge of that fact. The
offense must also be committed in his presence or within his view.
[75]
In Burgos, the authorities obtained information that the accused had
forcibly recruited one Cesar Masamlok as member of the New Peoples Army,
threatening the latter with a firearm. Upon finding the accused, the arresting
team searched his house and discovered a gun as well as purportedly
subversive documents. This Court, in declaring then Section 6 (a), Rule 113
of the Rules of Court inapplicable, ruled that:
There is no such personal knowledge in this case. Whatever knowledge was
possessed by the arresting officers, it came in its entirety from the
information furnished by Cesar Masamlok. The location of the firearm was
given by the appellants wife.
At the time of the appellants arrest, he was not in actual possession of any
firearm or subversive document. Neither was he committing any act which
could be described as subversive. He was, in fact, plowing his field at the
time of the arrest.
The right of a person to be secure against any unreasonable seizure of his
body and any deprivation of his liberty is a most basic and fundamental
one. The statute or rule which allows exceptions to the requirement of
warrants of arrest is strictly construed. Any exception must clearly fall within
the situations when securing a warrant would be absurd or is manifestly
unnecessary as provided by the Rule. We cannot liberally construe the rule
on arrests without warrant or extend its application beyond the cases

In People v. Aminnudin,[77] this Court likewise held the warrantless arrest and
subsequent search of appellant therein illegal, given the following
circumstances:
the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a
crime nor was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had just done
so. What he was doing was descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9
and there was no outward indication that he called for his arrest. To all
appearances, he was like any of the other passengers innocently
disembarking from the vessel. It was only when the informer pointed to him
as the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly became suspect and so
subject to apprehension. It was the furtive finger that triggered his arrest. The
identification by the informer was the probable cause as determined by the
officers (and not a judge) that authorized them to pounce upon Aminnudin
and immediately arrest him.[78]
Thus, notwithstanding tips from confidential informants and regardless of the
fact that the search yielded contraband, the mere act of looking from side to
side while holding ones abdomen,[79] or of standing on a corner with ones
eyes moving very fast, looking at every person who came near,[80] does not
justify a warrantless arrest under said Section 5 (a). Neither does putting
something in ones pocket,[81] handing over ones baggage,[82] riding a
motorcycle,[83] nor does holding a bag on board a trisikad[84]sanction State
intrusion. The same rule applies to crossing the street per se.[85]
Personal knowledge was also required in the case of People v. Doria.
[86]
Recently, in People v. Binad Sy Chua,[87] this Court declared invalid the
arrest of the accused, who was walking towards a hotel clutching a sealed
Zest-O juice box. For the exception in Section 5 (a), Rule 113 to apply, this
Court ruled, two elements must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must

execute an overt act indicating he has just committed, is actually committing,

or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the
presence or within the view of the arresting officer. Reliable information
alone is insufficient.
In the following cases, the search was held to be incidental to a lawful arrest
because of suspicious circumstances: People v. Tangliben[88] (accused was
acting suspiciously), People v. Malmstedt[89] (a bulge on the accuseds waist),
and People v. de Guzman[90] (likewise a bulge on the waist of the accused,
who was wearing tight-fitting clothes).
There is, however, another set of jurisprudence that deems reliable
information sufficient to justify a search incident to a warrantless arrest under
Section 5 (a), Rule 113, thus deviating from Burgos. To this class of cases
belong People v. Maspil, Jr.,[91] People v. Bagista,[92] People v. Balingan,
[93]
People v. Lising,[94] People v. Montilla,[95] People v. Valdez,[96] and People
v. Gonzales.[97] In these cases, the arresting authorities were acting on
information regarding an offense but there were no overt acts or suspicious
circumstances that would indicate that the accused has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit the same. Significantly, these cases,
except the last two, come under some other exception to the rule against
warrantless searches. Thus, Maspil, Jr. involved a checkpoint
search, Balingan was a search of a moving vehicle, Bagista was both,
and Lising and Montilla were consented searches.
Nevertheless, the great majority of cases conforms to the rule in Burgos,
which, in turn, more faithfully adheres to the letter of Section 5(a), Rule
113. Note the phrase in his presence therein, connoting personal knowledge
on the part of the arresting officer. The right of the accused to be secure
against any unreasonable searches on and seizure of his own body and any
deprivation of his liberty being a most basic and fundamental one, the statute
or rule that allows exception to the requirement of a warrant of arrest is
strictly construed. Its application cannot be extended beyond the cases
specifically provided by law.[98]
The cases invoked by the RTC and the OSG are, therefore, gravely
misplaced. In Claudio,[99] the accused, who was seated aboard a bus in front
of the arresting officer, put her bag behind the latter, thus arousing the latters

suspicion. In Tangliben and Malmstedt, the accused had also acted

suspiciously.
As noted earlier, Maspil, Jr., Bagista and Montilla were justified by other
exceptions to the rule against warrantless searches. Montilla, moreover, was
not without its critics. There, majority of the Court held:
Appellant insists that the mere fact of seeing a person carrying a traveling
bag and a carton box should not elicit the slightest suspicion of the
commission of any crime since that is normal. But precisely, it is in the
ordinary nature of things that drugs being illegally transported are necessarily
hidden in containers and concealed from view. Thus, the officers could
reasonably assume, and not merely on a hollow suspicion since the informant
was by their side and had so informed them, that the drugs were in appellants
luggage. It would obviously have been irresponsible, if now downright
absurd under the circumstances, to require the constable to adopt a wait and
see attitude at the risk of eventually losing the quarry.
Here, there were sufficient facts antecedent to the search and seizure that, at
the point prior to the search were already constitutive of probable cause, and
which by themselves could properly create in the minds of the officers a
well-grounded and reasonable belief that appellant was in the act of violating
the law. The search yielded affirmance both of that probable cause and the
actuality that appellant was then actually committing a crime by illegally
transporting prohibited drugs. With these attendant facts, it is ineluctable that
appellant was caught in flagrante delicto, hence his arrest and the search of
his belongings without the requisite warrant were both justified. [100]
While concurring with the majority, Mr. Justice Vitug reserved his vote on
the discussion on the warrantless search being incidental to a lawful
arrest. Mr. Justice Panganiban, joined by Messrs. Justices Melo and Puno,
filed a Separate Opinion.
Although likewise concurring in the majoritys ruling that appellant consented
to the inspection of his baggage, Justice Panganiban disagreed with the
conclusion that the warrantless search was incidental to a lawful arrest. He
argued that jurisprudence required personal knowledge on the part of the
officers making the in flagrante delicto arrest. In Montilla, the appellant did

not exhibit any overt act or strange conduct that would reasonably arouse in
their minds suspicion that he was embarking on some felonious enterprise.
Law and jurisprudence in fact require stricter grounds for valid arrests and
searches without warrant than for the issuance of warrants therefore. In the
former, the arresting person must have actually witnessed the crime being
committed or attempted by the person sought to be arrested; or he must have
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested
perpetrated the crime that had just occurred. In the latter case, the judge
simply determines personally from testimonies of witnesses that there exists
reasonable grounds to believe that a crime was committed by the accused.
.
To say that reliable tips constitute probable cause for a warrantless arrest or
search is in my opinion, a dangerous precedent and places in great jeopardy
the doctrines laid down in many decisions made by this Court, in its effort to
zealously guard and protect the sacred constitutional right against
unreasonable arrests, searches and seizures. Everyone would be practically at
the mercy of so-called informants, reminiscent of the makapilis during the
Japanese occupation. Any one whom they point out to a police officer as a
possible violator of the law could then be subject to search and possible
arrest. This is placing limitless power upon informants who will no longer be
required to affirm under oath their accusations, for they can always delay
their giving of tips in order to justify warrantless arrests and searches. Even
law enforcers can use this as an oppressive tool to conduct searches without
warrants, for they can always claim that they received raw intelligence
information only on the day or afternoon before. This would clearly be a
circumvention of the legal requisites for validly effecting an arrest or
conducting a search and seizure. Indeed the majoritys ruling would open
loopholes that would allow unreasonable arrests, searches and seizures. [101]
Montilla would shortly find mention in Justice Panganibans concurring
opinion in People v. Doria, supra, where this Court ruled:
Accused-Appellant Gaddao was arrested solely on the basis of the alleged
identification made by her co-accused. PO3 Manlangit, however, declared in
his direct examination that appellant Doria named his co-accused in response

to his (PO3 Manlangits) query as to where the marked money was. Appellant
Doria did not point to appellant Gaddao as his associate in the drug business,
but as the person with whom he left the marked bills. This identification does
not necessarily lead to the conclusion that appellant Gaddao conspired with
her co-accused in pushing drugs. Appellant Doria may have left the money in
her house, with or without any conspiracy. Save for accused-appellant Dorias
word, the Narcom agents had no showing that the person who affected the
warantless arrest had, in his own right, knowledge of facts implicating the
person arrested to the perpetration of a criminal offense, the arrest is legally
objectionable.[102] [Italics in the original.]
Expressing his accord with Mr. Justice Punos ponencia, Justice Panganiban
said that Doria rightfully brings the Court back to well-settled doctrines on
warrantless arrests and searches, which have seemingly been modified
through an obiter in People v. Ruben Montilla.[103]
Montilla, therefore, has been seemingly discredited insofar as it sanctions
searches incidental to lawful arrest under similar circumstances. At any
rate, Montilla was a consented search.As will be demonstrated later, the same
could not be said of this case.
That leaves the prosecution with People v. Valdez, which, however, involved
an on-the-spot information. The urgency of the circumstances, an element not
present in this case, prevented the arresting officer therein from obtaining a
warrant.
Appellants in this case were neither performing any overt act or acting in a
suspicious manner that would hint that a crime has been, was being, or was
about to be, committed. If the arresting officers testimonies are to be
believed, appellants were merely helping each other carry a carton
box. Although appellant Tudtud did appear afraid and perspiring,
[104]
pale[105] and trembling,[106] this was only after, not before, he was asked to
open the said box.
In no sense can the knowledge of the herein arresting officers that appellant
Tudtud was in possession of marijuana be described as personal, having
learned the same only from their informant Solier. Solier, for his part,

testified that he obtained his information only from his neighbors and the
friends of appellant Tudtud:
Q What was your basis in your report to the police that Tudtud is going to
Cotabato and get stocks of marijuana?

Q You mean to say that Bobot Solier, is not reliable?

A He is trustworthy.
Q Why [did] you not consider his information not reliable if he is reliable?

A Because of the protest of my neighbors who were saying who will be the
person whou [sic] would point to him because he had been giving trouble to
the neighborhood because according to them there are [sic] proliferation of
marijuana in our place. That was the complained [sic] of our neighbors.

A (witness did not answer).

Q Insofar as the accused Tudtud is concerned what was your basis in

reporting him particularly?

The prosecution, on re-direct examination, did not attempt to extract any

explanation from PO1 Floreta for his telling silence.

A His friends were the once who told me about it.

Confronted with such a dubious informant, the police perhaps felt it

necessary to conduct their own surveillance. This surveillance, it turns out,
did not actually consist of staking out appellant Tudtud to catch him in the
act of plying his illegal trade, but of a mere gather[ing] of information from
the assets there.[109] The police officers who conducted such surveillance did
not identify who these assets were or the basis of the latters
information. Clearly, such information is also hearsay, not of personal
knowledge.

Q For how long have you know [sic] this fact of alleged activity of Tudtud in
proliferation of marijuana?
A About a month.
.
Q Regarding the report that Tudtud went to Cotabato to get stocks of
marijuana which led to his apprehension sometime in the evening of August
1 and according to the report [which] is based on your report my question is,
how did you know that Tudtud will be bringing along with him marijuana
stocks on August 1, 1999?
.
A Because of the information of his neighbor.[107]
In other words, Soliers information itself is hearsay. He did not even
elaborate on how his neighbors or Tudtuds friends acquired their information
that Tudtud was responsible for the proliferation of drugs in their
neighborhood.
Indeed, it appears that PO1 Floreta himself doubted the reliablility of their
informant. He testified on cross-examination:

ATTY. CAETE:
Never mind, do not answer anymore. Thats all.[108]

Neither were the arresting officers impelled by any urgency that would allow
them to do away with the requisite warrant, PO1 Desiertos assertions of lack
of time[110] notwithstanding.Records show that the police had ample
opportunity to apply for a warrant, having received Soliers information at
around 9:00 in the morning; Tudtud, however, was expected to arrive at
around 6:00 in the evening of the same day.[111] In People v. Encinada, supra,
the Court ruled that there was sufficient time to procure a warrant where the
police officers received at 4:00 in the afternoon an intelligence report that the
accused, who was supposedly carrying marijuana, would arrive the next
morning at 7:00 a.m.:
Even if the information was received by Bolonia about 4:00 p.m. of May 20,
1992 at his house, there was sufficient time to secure a warrant of arrest, as
the M/V Sweet Pearl was not expected to dock until 7:00 a.m. the following
day. Administrative Circular No. 13 allows application for search warrants
even after office hours:

3. Raffling shall be strictly enforced, except only in case where an

application for search warrant may be filed directly with any judge whose
jurisdiction the place to be searched is located, after office hours, or during
Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays, in which case the applicant is
required to certify under oath the urgency of the issuance thereof after office
hours, or during Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays; . . ..
The same procedural dispatch finds validation and reiteration in Circular No.
19, series of 1987, entitled Amended Guidelines and Procedures on
Application for search warrants for Illegal Possession of Firearms and Other
Serious Crimes Filed in Metro Manila Courts and Other Courts with Multiple
Salas:
This Court has received reports of delay while awaiting raffle, in acting on
applications for search warrants in the campaign against loose firearms and
other serious crimes affecting peace and order. There is a need for prompt
action on such applications for search warrant. Accordingly, these amended
guidelines in the issuance of a search warrant are issued:
1. All applications for search warrants relating to violation of the Antisubversion Act, crimes against public order as defined in the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, illegal possession of firearms and/or ammunition and
violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended, shall no longer
be raffled and shall immediately be taken cognizance of and acted upon by
the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court,
and Municipal Trial Court under whose jurisdiction the place to be searched
is located.
2. In the absence of the Executive Judge, the Vice-Executive Judge shall take
cognizance of and personally act on the same. In the absence of the
Executive Judge or Vice-Executive Judge, the application may be taken
cognizance of and acted upon by any judge of the Court where application is
filed.

3. Applications filed after office hours, during Saturdays, Sundays and

holidays, shall likewise be taken cognizance of and acted upon by any judge
of the Court having jurisdiction of the place to be searched, but in such cases
the applicant shall certify and state the facts under oath, to the satisfaction of
the judge, that its issuance is urgent.
4. Any judge acting on such application shall immediately and without delay
personally conduct the examination of the applicant and his witnesses to
prevent the possible leakage of information. He shall observe the procedures,
safeguards, and guidelines for the issuance of search warrants provided for in
this Courts Administrative Circular No. 13, dated October 1, 1985. [112] [Italics
in the original.]
Given that the police had adequate time to obtain the warrant, PO1 Floretas
testimony that the real reason for their omission was their belief that they
lacked sufficient basis to obtain the same assumes greater significance. This
was PO1 Floretas familiar refrain:
Q When Solier reported to you that fact, that Tudtud will be coming from
Cotabato to get that (sic) stocks, you did not go to court to get a search
warrant on the basis of the report of Bobot Solier?
A No.
Q Why?
A Because we have no real basis to secure the search warrant.
Q When you have no real basis to secure a search warrant, you have also no
real basis to search Tudtud and Bulong at that time?
A Yes, sir.
.
Q And Bobot Solier told you that Tudtud, that he would already bring
marijuana?
A Yes, sir.
Q And this was 9:00 a.m.?

A Yes, sir.

1. It must appear that the rights exist;

Q The arrival of Tudtud was expected at 6:00 p.m.?

2. The person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the

existence of such right;

A Yes, sir.
Q Toril is just 16 kilometers from Davao City?
A Yes, sir.
Q And the Office of the Regional Trial Court is only about 16 kilometers, is
that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q And it can be negotiated by thirty minutes by a jeep ride?
A Yes, sir.
Q And you can asked [sic] the assistance of any prosecutor to apply for the
search warrant or the prosecutor do [sic] not assist?
A They help.
Q But you did not come to Davao City, to asked [sic] for a search warrant?
A As I said, we do not have sufficient basis.[113]
It may be conceded that the mere subjective conclusions of a police officer
concerning the existence of probable cause is not binding on [the courts]
which must independently scrutinize the objective facts to determine the
existence of probable cause and that a court may also find probable cause in
spite of an officers judgment that none exists. [114] However, the fact that the
arresting officers felt that they did not have sufficient basis to obtain a
warrant, despite their own information-gathering efforts, raises serious
questions whether such surveillance actually yielded any pertinent
information and even whether they actually conducted any informationgathering at all, thereby eroding any claim to personal knowledge.
Finally, there is an effective waiver of rights against unreasonable searches
and seizures if the following requisites are present:

3. Said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right. [115]

Here, the prosecution failed to establish the second and third requisites.
Records disclose that when the police officers introduced themselves as such
and requested appellant that they see the contents of the carton box
supposedly containing the marijuana, appellant Tudtud said it was alright. He
did not resist and opened the box himself.
The fundamental law and jurisprudence require more than the presence of
these circumstances to constitute a valid waiver of the constitutional right
against unreasonable searches and seizures. Courts indulge every reasonable
presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights;
acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights is not to be presumed. [116] The
fact that a person failed to object to a search does not amount to permission
thereto.
. As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of
the citizen, the courts do not place the citizen in the position of either
contesting an officers authority by force, or waiving his constitutional rights;
but instead they hold that a peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not a
consent or an invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard for
the supremacy of the law.[117][Underscoring supplied.]
Thus, even in cases where the accused voluntarily handed her bag [118] or the
chairs[119] containing marijuana to the arresting officer, this Court held there
was no valid consent to the search.
On the other hand, because a warrantless search is in derogation of a
constitutional right, peace officers who conduct it cannot invoke regularity in
the performance of official functions and shift to the accused the burden of
proving that the search was unconsented.[120]
In any case, any presumption in favor of regularity would be severely
diminished by the allegation of appellants in this case that the arresting

officers pointed a gun at them before asking them to open the subject
box. Appellant Tudtud testified as follows:
Q This person who approached you according to you pointed something at
you[.] [What] was that something?
A A 38 cal. Revolver.
Q How did he point it at you?
A Like this (Witness demonstrating as if pointing with his two arms holding
something towards somebody).
Q This man[,] what did he tell you when he pointed a gun at you?
A He said do not run.
Q What did you do?
A I raised my hands and said Sir, what is this about?
Q Why did you call him Sir?
A I was afraid because when somebody is holding a gun, I am afraid.
Q Precisely, why did you address him as Sir?
A Because he was holding a gun and I believed that somebody who is
carrying a gun is a policeman.
Q When you asked him what is this? What did he say?
A He said I would like to inspect what you are carrying.[]
Q What did you say when you were asked to open that carton box?
A I told him that is not mine.
Q What did this man say?
A He again pointed to me his revolver and again said to open.
Q What did you do?

A So I proceeded to open for fear of being shot.[121]

Appellants implied acquiescence, if at all, could not have been more than
mere passive conformity given under coercive or intimidating circumstances
and is, thus, considered no consent at all within the purview of the
constitutional guarantee.[122] Consequently, appellants lack of objection to the
search and seizure is not tantamount to a waiver of his constitutional right or
a voluntary submission to the warrantless search and seizure. [123]
As the search of appellants box does not come under the recognized
exceptions to a valid warrantless search, the marijuana leaves obtained
thereby are inadmissible in evidence. And as there is no evidence other than
the hearsay testimony of the arresting officers and their informant, the
conviction of appellants cannot be sustained.
The Bill of Rights is the bedrock of constitutional government. If people are
stripped naked of their rights as human beings, democracy cannot survive
and government becomes meaningless. This explains why the Bill of Rights,
contained as it is in Article III of the Constitution, occupies a position of
primacy in the fundamental law way above the articles on governmental
power.[124]
The right against unreasonable search and seizure in turn is at the top of the
hierarchy of rights,[125] next only to, if not on the same plane as, the right to
life, liberty and property, which is protected by the due process clause.
[126]
This is as it should be for, as stressed by a couple of noted freedom
advocates,[127] the right to personal security which, along with the right to
privacy, is the foundation of the right against unreasonable search and seizure
includes the right to exist, and the right to enjoyment of life while existing.
Emphasizing such right, this Court declared in People v. Aruta:
Unreasonable searches and seizures are the menace against which the
constitutional guarantees afford full protection. While the power to search
and seize may at times be necessary to the public welfare, still it may be
exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights
of the citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to
justify indifference to the basic principles of government.

Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding
the rights of the individual in the name of order. Order is too high a price to
pay for the loss of liberty. As Justice Holmes declared: I think it is less evil
that some criminals escape than that the government should play an ignoble
part. It is simply not allowed in free society to violate a law to enforce
another, especially if the law violated is the Constitution itself. [128]
Thus, given a choice between letting suspected criminals escape or letting the
government play an ignoble part, the answer, to this Court, is clear and
ineluctable.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City is

REVERSED. Appellants Noel Tudtud y Paypa and Dindo Bolong y Naret are
hereby ACQUITTED for insufficiency of evidence. The Director of the
Bureau of Prisons is ordered to cause the immediate release of appellants
from confinement, unless they are being held for some other lawful cause,
and to report to this Court compliance herewith within five (5) days from
receipt hereof.